Arguably the best movie on nuclear war... The orginal poster image and a discussion of the movie can be found on Prof. Hart's homepage at the University of Adelaide.  The main page also contains information about the use of film in the study of history, including the study of war.

 

1. What is the difference between deterrence as opposed to compellence or defense? What type of force would each strategic orientation emphasize and what are their benefits and liabilities? What is the difference between a punishment or counter-value strategy and one based on counter-force options like denial and interdiction? Is the distinction between first strike and second strike forces a useful one, and how does it enter into the debate between counter-value and counter-force options?

2. How can states manipulate risk and the "threat that leaves something to chance" to their advantage in a conflict? Schelling argues, "If the question is raised whether this kind of 'face' [a country's reputation for action] is worth fighting over, the answer is that this kind of face is one of the few things worth fighting over…we lost thirty thousand dead in Korea to save face for the United States and the United Nations, not to save South Korea for the South Koreans, and it was undoubtedly worth it." Do you agree? Do you find Schelling's description of violence as an inherently "confused and uncertain" activity compelling? What opportunities and difficulties does the character of violent or potentially violent conflict pose for a state attempting to manipulate risk to its advantage via "signaling" in a "war of pain and destruction?"

3. What are the contributions and liabilities of applying game theory, system's analysis, or political and social science to nuclear conflict? How does Schelling's concept of the process and opportunities of escalation differ from Herman Kahn's 44-rung escalation ladder or from Kissinger's concept of the nuclear threshold? Do you think limited nuclear war is possible, and if so under what conditions? If not, why?

4. To what extent do you think the "paradoxical logic" of nuclear confrontation holds? What are the tensions between credibility and flexibility and the vulnerability of cities and security in nuclear strategy? Do the traditional weapon virtues of accuracy, survivability, and mobility have different implications for nuclear and conventional conflicts? How has US strategy evolved as the US monopoly on nuclear weapons changed to numerical superiority and later to parity with the Soviet Union? What is the relationship of parity and stability and assured destruction and mutual assured destruction? How have technology and concerns about conventional military power interacted with nuclear strategy?