All you ever wanted to know about Clausewitz, and more..... |
[image taken from the self-styled Clausewitz homepage] |
You should be familiar with and be able to explain the following key terms and concepts:
Polarity
Interaction
The Relationship of Policy and War
Absolute War
Escalating Forces
Conditions for
De-escalating forces (i.e. what leads to war in reality)
Paradoxical Trinity
Hsing (from Sun Tzu)
BONUS: (these concepts are anticipated in Book I, chp I but are fully developed elsewhere - you will see them again in section VI of the course)
Friction
Fog of War
1.
Clausewitz states, "War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale," a analogy
which Mueller accepts in developing an argument about the prospects for
abolishing war. Later Clausewitz claims "in the whole range of human activities,
war most closely resembles a game of cards." Why do you think Clausewitz
chose these two analogies? How might these analogies be imperfect and how
might this affect the argument put forth by Mueller? What sort of rules
would a hypothetical dueling match have to have in order to approximate
the conditions and character of absolute war, and how might these conditions
be modified to approximate war in reality?
2.
Fight a hypothetical war using Clausewitz's concept of the paradoxical
trinity. Be able to give examples of how each of the three nodes (government/rational,
army/creativity, and people/passion) could move your hypothetical scenario
closer to and further away from absolute war. Be able to give examples
of how each of the nodes might support or limit one another - especially
how the people and army might limit the policy set forth by the government.
3.
What is the relationship between policy and war and the government and
the army? Does this relationship change once war is declared? In what ways
(if at all), does or should the military instrument affect the aims of
policy?
4. What are the differences (if any) between Clausewitz's and Sun Tzu's treatment of war? Which work do you feel is more relevant to your interests, and/or better captures the nature of war today? Why? How does each author treat certainty and chance in war? Do you think their strategic advice is compatible? Are they talking about warfare at the same level?