"Preparing to "hop the bags" outside                Beaumont Hamel. 1st Battalion, Lancashire                Fusliers. 1-Jul-1916."              (image and title taken from: http://www.worldwar1.com/tlindex.htm a good quality collaborative effort WWI site) Another good site is the Canadian Forces College website:  http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/milhist/wwi.html

Be able to identify and use the following terms and concepts:

Friction

Strategy

Tactics

Moral Forces

Interior Lines of Communication

Culminating Point of Victory
 

BONUS: The Principle of Continuity in the Offense (a.k.a. Exploitation)
 

NOTE: Discussion may also cover question #4 from the previous session if necessary.

1.       Assess the role of friction and moral factors in Clausewitz's view of War - give an example of how each might operate. Is there much to be gained from such intangible analytical principles beyond the caveat that it is harder to do things than imagine them or that it is helpful for soldiers to have high spirits? In other words are friction and moral factors more a concern for the practitioner (i.e. general) than for the analyst? How do these concepts fit into Clausewitz's discussion of War as art vs. science? If no laws can be given about War, then what use is a weaker formulation like method and routine?

2.      Clausewitz states, "The means and forms that the strategist employs are so very simple, so familiar from constant repetition, that it seems ridiculous in the light of common sense when critics discuss them, as they do so often, with ponderous solemnity." How then should the student of political science approach the study of war? How does Clausewitz feel that knowledge or insight about War can be gained? Do you feel it is generally more productive for political scientists to deal with macro concepts and theories - working with historical minutia only when necessary to inform or confirm a broader perspective - or should political scientists approach the study of war from the ground up? Likewise would the in-depth study of a particular war or battle be of greater or lesser benefit for you given the time it would require?

3.       Describe Clausewitz's conception of the relationship between the attack and defense. How important are the sub-concepts of counter-attack and the culminating point of victory? If defense is the stronger form then why does war ever occur? In other words, why does the attacker bother attacking? When should the attacker stop attacking? Do you agree with Clausewitz's assessment or do you think the relationship between the attack and defense runs in the opposite direction - or does it shift depending on technology, doctrine, etc.?

4.       How, if at all, can one determine if a given military technology or set of technologies favors the offense or the defense? Is there a difference in this respect between conventional and nuclear weapons? Should one be more concerned about subjective perceptions of technologies or objective assessments of their capability to the extent that the two can be distinguished? Assuming one can discern the offense-defense balance, what impact will this have on international relations? Assuming it can be done, will institutionalizing defense dominance contribute to world peace?