View of "Pickett's Charge" from the Union lines at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863.  Image taken from the Gettysburg cyclorama at the Gettysburg National Historical Battlefield Park website.

1.      To what extent do you think it is proper for political considerations to determine the shape of military operations and strategy? Is it ever proper for military considerations to constrain political ones, and if so, to what extent? What impact do you think modern communications has had/should have on this relationship? Are some factors (for example: technological limits, comparative advantages, the reputation of an ally, or the need to manage public perceptions) more important constraints than others? Is the dynamic different for total wars than for limited wars?
 

2.      What is your assessment of US strategy in World War II? Do you find the logic behind the "Europe first" approach and Operation TORCH persuasive? Were the Allies right to mount a second amphibious assault on France (Operation DRAGOON) instead of launching a drive through the Balkans to prevent the Soviets from overrunning Eastern Europe? To what extent is the success of Allied strategy via the Combined Chiefs of Staff system a product of its unique mix of civilian and military decision-makers and to what extent was success hampered by it?
 

3.      Do you find Krepinevich's or Summers' assessment of US strategy in Vietnam more persuasive? Was the US military making a strategy out of tactics as Krepinevich asserts, and if so, what should have been done differently? Assuming that Vietnam was best addressed as a counter-insurgency campaign, to what extent should the military have abandoned some of its previous core competencies to develop new ones given the geo-political situation at the time? Do you agree with Summers use of Clausewitz? If the US military was constrained from striking the enemy's center of gravity, should the US president have been told to amend his goals or choose another war to fight?
 

4.      Did the US-lead coalition stop at, near, far from, before, or after the culminating point of victory in the 1991 Gulf War? Do different actions in the final stages of the war point to the same or different positions on a "culminating point of victory curve"? Was the US command authority premature in ending the ground war, and if so was McCaffrey's post-cease fire engagement and the incidents around Safwan a needed corrective? Was General Frank's direction of VII Corps prudent or overly cautious according to your understanding of the culminating point of victory?