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# NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY

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## *Abstract*

Neither nationalism nor ethnicity is vanishing as part of an obsolete traditional order. Both are part of a modern set of categorical identities invoked by elites and other participants in political and social struggles. These categorical identities also shape everyday life, offering both tools for grasping pre-existing homogeneity and difference and for constructing specific versions of such identities. While it is impossible to dissociate nationalism entirely from ethnicity, it is equally impossible to explain it simply as a continuation of ethnicity or a simple reflection of common history or language. Numerous dimensions of modern social and cultural change, notably state building (along with war and colonialism), individualism, and the integration of large-scale webs of indirect relationships also serve to make both nationalism and ethnicity salient. Nationalism, in particular, remains the pre-eminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by reference to “the people” of a country. Ethnic solidarities and identities are claimed most often where groups do not seek “national” autonomy but rather a recognition internal to or cross-cutting national or state boundaries. The possibility of a closer link to nationalism is seldom altogether absent from such ethnic claims, however, and the two sorts of categorical identities are often invoked in similar ways.

## *Introduction*

One of the uglier ways in which nationalism gained popular and academic attention in the early 1990s was the Serbian program of “ethnic cleansing.” When promulgated by a psychiatrist, and other academically trained representatives of modern science, this policy has helped to demonstrate that the

nationalist upheavals and ethnic violence that followed the collapse of Soviet-style communism were not simply throwbacks to some premodern reign of passion, sentiment, and primordial identity. The policy of “ethnic cleansing,” like all of nationalism and ethnic politics, depended on social constructions of identity, mobilized members of the chosen ethnic group only unevenly, and served the interests of some participants far more than others. It forced many Serbs who had previously allied themselves with the vision of a multiethnic, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina to resort to ethnic solidarities in the face of civil war. Claiming these ethnic solidarities and the identity of Serbs as both ancient and seemingly “natural,” the new ideological mobilization successfully demanded that its adherents be willing both to kill and to die for their nation.

If there were any doubt about the importance of the claimed link between ethnicity and national self-determination, the fighting in what was once Yugoslavia should have dispelled it. The Yugoslav conflicts, moreover, stemmed in part from the very nationalities policy employed by the country’s former communist government, both recognizing subordinate nationalities and ethnic groups and drawing state lines that intentionally cross-cut ethnic and national residential patterns (Connor 1984, Banac 1984). Neither ethnic conflicts, nor the discourse of national identity, nor the practical power of nationalist mobilizations has receded into the premodern past despite the confidence of many earlier social scientists (an embarrassment especially for marxists: see Schwartzmantel 1991, Nairn 1975, 1977, Debray 1977). At the same time, the idea of the nation remains central to most attempts to define legitimate political communities (Brubaker 1992, Harris 1990, Mayall 1990, Noiriel 1991b). A central theme in this discourse is the question of the extent to which nationalism should be understood as a continuation of long-standing patterns of ethnicity, or as something distinctively new and modern. This is the focus of the present review.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Modernity of Nationalism*

The discourse of nationalism is distinctively modern. It is variously argued to have originated in the seventeenth century British rebellion against monarchy (Kohn 1944, Greenfeld 1991, 1992), the eighteenth century struggles of New World elites against Iberian colonialism (Anderson 1991), the French revolution of 1789 (Alter 1989, Best 1988), and the German reaction to that revolution and to German disunity (Kedourie 1960, Breuille 1982). But as Best (1982: 29) puts it: “Historians of nationalism agree to

<sup>1</sup>There are innumerable other dimensions to the broad literature on nationalism and ethnicity which are not covered here. The best general reviews are Smith’s (1973, 1981), see also Carter (1981), Deutsch (1970), Haas (1986) and Noiriel (1991b).

differ in their estimates of how much of it (and what sorts of it) already existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They are at one in recognizing that that world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of course its strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it to constitute the most momentous phenomenon of modern history.” In the early modern era the idea of nation as an aggregate of people linked by co-residence or common sociocultural characteristics took political and cultural connotations in struggles with and between states and over state-building. This led to the distinctively modern invocation of nationalism as “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state—a contingency already excluded by the principle in its general formulation—should not separate the power-holders from the rest” (Gellner 1983: 1). As Kedourie (1960: 9) summed up a generation before, the discourse of nationalism ideal-typically offers three propositions: “that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.”

Nationalism has become the preeminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self-determination. The term was apparently coined in German by the philosopher Herder (Berlin 1976: 181) and in French by the Abbe Barruel (O’Brien 1988: 18) just less than 200 years ago. It was linked to the concept of nation-state in the notorious formulations of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations (Mayall 1990: 44–45, Kohn 1962: 133–35).

In the wake of communism’s collapse, nationalism and ethnic conflict appeared as the primary issues in the realignment of Eastern European politics and identity (Chirot 1991, Tilly & Walker 1991). Indeed, in many instances communist governments had been actively involved in nationalist mobilization themselves, in varying degrees cynically and idealistically (Verdury 1991, Connor 1984). Appeals to the idea of nation organize movements of ethnic separatism from Quebec (Birch 1989, ch. 8; Fenwick 1981, Letourneau 1989, Little 1989, Taylor 1992) to the postcolonial states of Africa (Davidson 1992, Lewis 1983, Markakis 1987, Mazrui & Tidy 1984, Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987, Selassie 1980). Nationalism is equally prominent in movements to integrate disparate polities, as in twentieth century Arab nationalism (Anderson et al 1991, Farah 1987, Tibi 1990) and nineteenth century German nationalism before it (Coetzee 1990, Eley 1980, 1992, Meinecke 1970, Mosse 1975, Sheehan 1978). New nationalisms proliferate throughout the developed West (Tiryakian et al 1985, Smith 1981), and attempts are made to decolonize the discourse of nationalism in the Third World and claim it for indigenous movements and meanings (Blaut 1987, Chatterjee 1986). In East Asia, nationalism has throughout the twentieth century been the rhetoric not only

of anti-imperialist struggles but of calls for strengthening and democratizing states from within (Chow 1960, Spence 1981, Schwarcz 1986, Wells 1991, White et al 1990). Nationalism is anything but a thing of the past, thus, and even the newest claims to nationalism are often rooted in a rhetoric of pre-existing ethnicity.

### *Nationalism as Discourse*

Yet, despite this agreement about the contemporary salience of the discourse of nationalism, Hobsbawm (1990: 14) makes a sharply contentious assertion when he writes “the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity.” Even the repetition of the term modern in both subject and predicate of his sentence does not save it from controversy, for Hobsbawm is arguing against a widespread view of both academics and nationalists themselves. This is the view that modern nations are based on ethnic identities that are in some sense ancient, primordial, possibly even natural or at least prior to any particular political mobilization. A great deal is at stake in this argument. Most crucially, can “nationhood” be taken as the prior basis for nationalist claims? Is self-determination, for example, a political right to be accorded all “true” nations, as the apostles of nationalism asserted in the mid-nineteenth century “Springtime of the Peoples” (Kohn 1962, Meinicke 1970, Cohler 1970)? Are Serbs intrinsically a nation, to revert to our opening example, such that any claims of multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina to include large Serbian populations are infringements on the rights of the Serbian nation? Or, is “nation” at best a rhetorical mode of making political claims, and at worst a way for certain elites to manipulate mass sentiments in pursuit of power? In more academic terms, does the prior existence of ethnicity explain nationhood, and does nationhood explain nationalism? Or is the notion of membership in a common nation (and perhaps even in an ethnic group) a product of nationalist (or ethnic) mobilization? Is nationalism simply a derivative result of state-formation and other “material” aspects of modernization, or is it one of the primary constituents of modernity?

This issue is hard to keep entirely clear in our minds because most variants of nationalist rhetoric claim the nation as an always-already existing basis for action, whether as the continuation of ancient ethnicity or as the result of historically specific acts of foundation. As moderns we are all participants in the discourse of nations whether we like it or not. Many of the categories and presumptions of this discourse are so deeply ingrained in our everyday language and our academic theories that it is virtually impossible to shed them, and we can only remind ourselves continuously to take them into account. A simple example is the assumption that “society” is a noun referring to self-sufficient units with clear boundaries. Tilly (1984: 11) makes this the first of his “eight Pernicious Postulates of twentieth-century social thought”:

“Society” is a thing apart; the world as a whole divides into distinct “societies, each having its more or less autonomous culture, government, economy, and solidarity.”

This is a usage produced by the discourse and political salience of the modern idea of nation (and specifically its hyphenated conjunction with “state”). As Halle (1962: 25) put it, “perhaps the idea alone can give the community the singleness and integrity which we attribute to it when we think of it as a corporate person.” In fact, societies have not always been and are not everywhere equally bounded, nor is it clear that they are as bounded in the archetypal cases of modern nation-states—e.g. France—as ordinary language (including ordinary sociological language) implies (Giddens 1984, Anderson 1991). Even island Britain manifests a complex history and present struggle over external as well as internal boundaries (Samuel, ed. 1989).

Given the multiple and overlapping networks of our social relations (Mann 1986 and forthcoming), and given the large scale international flows of our ideas, language, and cultural productions (Bhabha 1990), it should perhaps be a matter of principle to avoid using terms like society as though they referred to unitary, clearly demarcated objects. But this would be an extremely difficult principle to live up to. However sincere our intention to speak only of more or less consolidated patterns of social organization, more or less overlapping and densely integrated networks of social relations, more or less homogeneous cultural forms and contents, etc, we should soon be driven to speak both in proper nouns of Indians and Germans, Koreans and Kenyans, and in common nouns of societies or peoples. We live in a world-system which is organized into states and which thematizes certain cultural differences as constituting “cultures,” while others are suppressed as unimportant internal or cross-cutting variations. This world-system makes both nationalism and claims to ethnic identity as problematic as they are imperative, even while it makes it hard to escape enough from the power of received categories to understand why they are problematic.

This is one reason why “nationalism” and corollary terms like “nation” have proved notoriously hard concepts to define (Alter 1989, Breuilly 1982, Connor 1978, Kemilainen 1964, Smith, 1973, 1983). The notion of nation is so deeply imbricated in modern politics as to be “essentially contested” (in Gallie’s phrase), because any definition will legitimate some claims and delegitimate others. It also reflects more general problems with essentialist definitions (Fuss 1989: 2–6). Nation and nationalism are among those terms used to refer not to any clearly definable set, the members of which all share some common features which nonmembers lack, but rather to a cluster of “family resemblances” (in Wittgenstein’s term). All of the available essentialist definitions are unstable and inherently contestable, thus, not only because they bias usage for or against various political claims, but because

they are based either (i) on qualities which putative nations or nationalist movements share with admitted non-nations (such as ethnicity), or (ii) on qualities which are not clearly shared among all recognized members of the set of nations (like control over or ambition to control a state).

Though nationalisms are extremely varied phenomena, they are joined by common involvement in the modern discourse of nationalism. They are common objects of reference in international law, political debate, and even economic development programs. As Anderson (1991) has stressed, once the idea of imagining political communities as nations was developed, it was “modular” and could be transplanted into a wide range of otherwise disparate settings. This is what raises the issue of whether Third World or postcolonial nationalisms express “authentic” indigenous concerns or are in some sense derivative discourses (Chatterjee 1986). The discourse of nationalism is inherently international. Claims to nationhood are not just internal claims to social solidarity, common descent, or any other basis for constituting a political community. They are also claims to distinctiveness vis-à-vis other nations, claims to at least some level of autonomy and self-sufficiency, and claims to certain rights within a world-system of states (Seton-Watson 1977, Breuilly 1982, Mayall 1990). In other words, however varied the internal nature of nationalisms, in other words, they share a common external frame of reference. Thus, even if nationalist claims to primordial origins, ancient ethnic pedigrees, or hallowed founding histories were all true, thus, and even if every nation had premodern roots (something manifestly impossible in the case of such settler societies as the United States, Australia or South Africa—at least as defined by their European populations), nationalism would still be a modern phenomenon. This is true even of “extreme” forms such as National Socialism, despite the tendency of modernization theorists and others to treat Nazism as a throwback to the premodern (Talmon 1952, 1960, Bendix 1964) rather than a problem of modernity (Alter 1989, Herf 1984). Indeed, this phenomenon of claiming state-centered political rights on the basis of nationhood is arguably one of the defining phenomena of modernity.

### *The Centrality of States*

Those who argue for the priority of nations over nationalism (Armstrong 1982, Marcu 1975, Smith 1986) seldom dispute the distinctiveness or centrality of modern states. They would follow Tilly’s (1990: 2) summary, for example, in distinguishing empires, city-states, and other early formations from “states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures.” Debate centers on whether nationalism is a by-product of the creation of these states—and accordingly likely to disappear as they are transformed in the present era (Tilly 1992). As Tilly develops his argument about the distinctive character of modern states, he

stresses the consolidation of centralized administrative power, the development of capacities to mobilize otherwise civilian populations (and material resources such as industry) for interstate warfare, and the partitioning of the world into comparable states. These tendencies tie the politics and social organization of such states firmly to the modern era. Ambiguity arises only with regard to the role of culture, and more generally the claim of such states to be “national,” or of various “peoples” without states to deserve such “national” states as a matter of right. Tilly (1990: 3) suggests that we simply distinguish “national state” from “nation-state,” restricting the latter term to those states “whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, or symbolic identity.” National states (though Tilly does not define the term) appear to be those which attempt to extend direct rule to their entire populations and expand their capacity to organize the lives of the members of those populations, whether for purposes of warfare or economic development. They are “national” by virtue of their attempt to integrate large populations and territories, and by contrast mainly to city-states (that do not fully integrate their hinterlands) and empires (that do not attempt to integrate or closely monitor the everyday affairs of those they rule).

As direct rule expanded throughout Europe, the welfare, culture, and daily routines of ordinary Europeans came to depend as never before on which state they happened to reside in. Internally, states undertook to impose national languages, national educational systems, national military service, and much more. Externally, they began to control movement across frontiers, to use tariffs and customs as instruments of economic policy, and to treat foreigners as distinctive kinds of people deserving limited rights and close surveillance. As states invested not only in war and public services but also in economic infrastructure, their economies came to have distinctive characteristics, which once again differentiated the experiences of living in adjacent states. To that degree, life homogenized within states and heterogenized among states (Tilly 1990: 116; see also Watkins 1990 on intrastate homogenization of fertility patterns).

State-building produced a basic discontinuity with earlier forms of social organization (Tilly 1975, P. Anderson 1974, Giddens 1984, Poggi 1992, Rokkan 1975). At the same time, capitalist economic development knit together large-scale markets and transformed the units of economic activity and interest (Wallerstein 1974, Balibar & Wallerstein 1991, Hechter 1975, Nairn 1977, Worsley 1964/1986). Tilly shifts emphasis away from culture but does not break sharply with the developmental narrative of older modernization theory (e.g. Gellner 1964, Bendix 1964, Apter 1965, Eisenstadt 1966, 1973, Smelser 1968). This older modernization theory operated with a tension between its assumption of nation-states as basic units of modern political economy and its treatment of all “undesirable” forms of

nationalism as merely inherited from previous eras, a sort of survival that could be expected to wane or moderate into acceptable patriotism in the long run even if it contributed to short-term eruptions every now and again (Talmon 1952, 1960, Parsons 1960). Modernization theory thus predicted that when outlying regions were incorporated into a social system they would gradually be “homogenized” into cultural similarity with the rest of the system, nationalism centered on the encompassing state would grow and contrary ethnic mobilization would be transitory. Researchers emphasizing capitalist economics more than state development often broke more sharply with modernization theory (Wallerstein 1974–1988). Thus Hechter (1975) attempted to show how ethnic mobilizations in Britain’s Celtic periphery were precisely the result of incorporation into British political economy, but incorporation in a disadvantaged position. Hechter’s account focuses primarily on how economic factors provoked ethnic mobilization; it offered much less account of why ethnic identity was salient. This led Smith (1983) to accuse Hechter of economic reductionism. The account of nationalism as a peripheral response to core expansion at best helps to explain levels of resentment and mobilization. It does not address the constitution of national identity or the modern conditions of its reproduction (but see Hechter 1987 and Hechter & Furtado 1992 for revised arguments).

The more materialist and state-centered view, moreover, carries a strong tendency to see not only nationalism but nationhood as basically following from rather than shaping the rise of European modernity. Nations are, in this view, produced by the rise of states (and/or the capitalist world-system). As Giddens (1984: 116) puts it:

By a “nation” I refer to a collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states. ... A “nation”, as I use the term here, only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed.

In such a usage, the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is more or less coincidental. It is the modern state that defines nationhood, and preexisting ethnic relations are revised either to coincide more or less with its boundaries or to constitute the basis of counter-state movements for the formation of new states. Such movements are rooted in power relations, not ethnic solidarities and distinctions per se.

Giddens and especially Tilly associate cultural accounts of nationalism with explanations in terms of pre-existing ethnic solidarities and differences. Gellner (1983), by contrast, analyzes nationalism as a cultural phenomenon dependent not only on state formation and industrial society, but also on certain transformations of culture, such as the creation of “high cultures”

and their changing relations with popular or folk cultures, and the imbrication of all particular cultures within a putatively context-free space of cross-cultural communication. At the same time, he is clear in arguing that nationalism is distinctively modern and that it is not strictly the result of prior ethnicity:

. . . nationalism is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It is, on the contrary, the crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing, though admittedly using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world. (Gellner 1983: 49)

Gellner (1983: 55) holds that “nationalism ... engenders nations, and not the other way round.” Similarly, Hroch (1985) argues that nationalism arose from activities of cultural elites seeking histories and constituted the identities of nations without necessarily giving those identities any immediate political purpose; once established, such nationalist claims were available for politicization by cross-class groups.

The state-centered approach, in sum, clarifies one dimension of nationalism but obscures others. In particular, it (i) makes it hard to understand why national identity can stir the passions it does, and (ii) encourages analysts either to ignore ethnic and other identities that do not coincide with states or to treat them as somehow naturally given.

### *Ethnicity and History*

A good deal is left unaddressed by analyses that rely on states or markets as material “bases” to explain the cultural “superstructures” of nationalism. This is a thinner approach, for example, than stressing “the interaction of two orders of concrete experience, that of everyday life and that of relations with the state,” each crucial to the construction of the contrasting figures of citizen and foreigner (Topalov 1991: 176). Similarly, many approaches to these issues emphasize the constitution of a social realm (or “civil society”) separate enough from the state that state-society relationships might become the focus of attention and even of disputes over legitimacy (Poggi 1992, Cohen & Arato 1992, Seligman 1992, Keane 1988, and Calhoun 1993). Accounts that proceed in an exclusively state-centered way are also apt to underestimate the many changes in patterns of culture that preceded and paved the way for nationalism (prominent themes in the older historiography of Kohn 1944, 1962, Hayes 1931, 1966, Meinecke 1970, and Kedourie 1960, 1974). The Protestant Reformation, for example, was crucial as it replaced the universalistic notion of Christendom with local and regional variants of the common faith, mobilized popular participation, promulgated vernacular discourse and printed texts, and invoked the theological (and in

some Calvinist variants political) sovereignty of the people against Church and monarchs (Kohn 1944: ch. 4).

Later depoliticization of religion was, in turn, both an important concomitant of state-building and an autonomously significant trend. In Switzerland, for example, longstanding religious divisions were replaced by linguistic ones in the wake of mid-nineteenth century revolutionary upheavals and nationalism. As late as 1848, Catholic territories made Protestantism unlawful (and vice versa). In this older regime, language was a matter of voluntary personal choice with little political significance. After mid-century, the pattern was reversed. Territories were divided on linguistic lines and religion was a matter of personal preference with markedly reduced political consequence (Anderson 1991: 138). At the very least, state-centered and economy-centered accounts need cultural complements to deal with variation in the forms of nationalism.

The older modernization theories generally saw nationalism as a functional substitute for local communities, religions, and other sources of identity and security that were necessarily disrupted by the larger scale, greater individualism, and more rapid social change of modernity (Geertz 1963, Gellner 1964, Hayes 1966). Identification of individuals with the nation (rather than tribe or other section) was a functional need to be achieved in the course of modernization (Apter 1965). Such treatments owe a great deal to binary models of social change like Durkheim's (1893) account of the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity. Haas (1964: 465) puts forward a similar argument drawing on Weber and Toennies:

The nation is a synthetic *Gemeinschaft*. In the mass setting of modern times, it furnishes the vicarious satisfaction of needs that have previously been met by the warmth of small, traditional, face-to-face social relations. As social life has been transformed by industrialization and social mobilization into something resembling a *Gesellschaft* based on interest calculations, the nation and nationalism continue to provide the integrative cement that gives the appearance of community.

Nationalism is of interest to Haas (1986) solely as part of a process of rationalization.

The implicit message of such theories was that attempts to maintain ethnic autonomy vis-à-vis the state were reactionary and antimodern; nationalism was bad when it was like ethnicity, but good when it was tied to a modernizing state. Indeed, for both state elites and modernization theorists, ethnic groups are defined in relation to the nation-state as subordinate internal and/or cross-cutting identities: Jews, Transylvanians, Tibetans, Ibo. The distinction between nation and mere ethnic group is precisely the attribution to the former of the right to an autonomous state, or at least an autonomy of some sort within the state. On such an account it doesn't matter whether the nation is

an ethnic group that has proved its superiority in historical struggle (material or ideological), or a multi-ethnic population.

### *Origin Myths*

Nationalisms vary, thus, between claims to have superseded traditional identities such as ethnicity by the founding of a true and modern nation, and claims to national identity and sovereignty rooted precisely in ancient ethnicity. The paradigmatic contrast of these two forms in the literature on nationalism is that between France and Germany. In both cases, historical narratives are mobilized to underpin the nationalist myths. The French narrative traces the nation to a modern act of founding by its members, people who were not constituted properly as French (rather than Provençal or Bearnaise, Protestant or Catholic) until that radically novel founding. It emphasizes the nation-making political form of the republic and the idea of citizenship (Best 1988). In Germany, nationalist history-writing pushes further back in pursuit of a “naturalizing” account of German ethnicity; Germany must be rooted in an “always already existing” ethnic identity. German nationalists from Herder and Fichte forward have emphasized ethnic rather than “political” or “civic” criteria for inclusion in the nation (see Alter 1989, Hayes 1926, 1931, Kedourie 1960, Kohn 1962 on this classic French/German contrast in styles of nationalism). When Renan (1990, orig. 1882) described the nation as a “daily plebiscite,” thus, he was not making a universalizing statement or offering a definition. He was distinguishing those nations (such as France) that are the result of the free choices of their members from those (such as Germany) whose identity and cohesion are given to their members independently of any voluntary will. Such differences in nationalist narratives have practical consequences. Since voluntary will is so crucial to the narrative of French nationalism, for example, France makes it easier than Germany does for immigrants to attain citizenship (even though immigration itself, and right of legal residency, is no easier, Brubaker 1992, Noirel 1988, 1991a).

There are many rhetorical attractions for nationalists to claim that their nations are simply given and immutable (i.e. ethnic) rather than constructions of recent historical action or tendentious contemporary claims. First and foremost, this claim “naturalizes” nationhood, and seems to leave third parties with the choice between recognizing a “natural” human identity or denying it and possibly even condoning its “genocide” (a neologism that reveals the specifically modern nature of this problem, Anderson 1991). Where it is recognized that a nation has a founding moment, it is still attractive to see this as a consequence not merely of choice, but of a long narrative of historical development that historically locates the proto-nation in primordial times. Much early scholarly writing on nations and nationalism worked within this rhetoric and sought to discover which were the “true” ethnic foundations of

nationhood (see Meinecke 1970 on Germany, Skurnowicz 1981 on Poland, and Zacek 1969 on Czechoslovakia).

The contrasting rhetoric is tied both to ideas of popular sovereignty and to modernist (or Enlightenment) opposition to tradition. The claim to voluntary historical foundation (e.g. in US and French nationalist narratives) is a claim to the liberation of individuals both from illegitimate domination and from unreasoning acceptance of mere tradition. This rhetoric of liberating rationality thus assumes (though with opposite evaluation) the same idea of tradition as ancient, unquestioned inheritance as does the narrative of naturalizing primordality. This is a problematic understanding of tradition and hence of ethnicity.

As ideology, it is no doubt effective to claim that a nation has existed since time immemorial or that its traditions have been passed down intact from heroic founders. Sociologically, however, what matters is not the antiquity of the contents of tradition, but the efficacy of the process by which tradition constitutes certain beliefs and understandings as unquestioned, immediate knowledge, as the basis for disputing or questioning other claims (Calhoun 1983). The focus is not simply on continuity, but on the reproduction of culture, the process of passing on that is the literal meaning of tradition (Shils 1981). What is reproduced is not simply content, but a "habitus" or orientation to social action (Bourdieu 1976, 1990). Ethnicity or cultural traditions are bases for nationalism when they effectively constitute historical memory, when they inculcate it as habitus, or as "prejudice" (in Gadamer's 1975, 1977 sense of a precondition to judgment), not when (or because) the historical origins they claim are accurate.

Weber (1922) expressed this common view in defining a traditional orientation as respect for that which has always existed, thereby suggesting that such an orientation must vanish in the face of modernity with its incessant social change. Such a view provides for easy inversion: whenever traditions can be shown to be created and/or recent, they must be false. This is the implication of Hobsbawm & Ranger's (1983, Hobsbawm 1990) treatment of nationalism, in which they argue that because the "traditions" of nationalism are "invented" they are somehow less real and valid. But it is not clear why this should be so. Hobsbawm & Ranger seem to accept the notion that long-standing, "primordial" tradition would somehow count as legitimate, and therefore that illegitimacy follows from their demonstration that various nationalist traditions are of recent and perhaps manipulative creation. This seems doubly fallacious.

First, all traditions are "created," none are truly primordial. This was acknowledged, though rather weakly, even by some of the functionalists who emphasized the notion of (constructed) primordality and the "givenness" of

cultural identities and traditions (Eisenstadt 1966, 1973, Geertz 1963, Gellner 1964). Second, all traditions are internally contested and subject to continual reshaping, whether explicit or hidden. Potential lineage headmen argue over their status in terms of different narratives of descent and ancestral authority (Fortes 1945, 1949, Calhoun 1980). Similarly, as Leach (1954) and Barth (1969) and his colleagues have argued, ethnic identity is constituted, maintained, and invoked in social processes that involve diverse intentions, constructions of meaning, and conflicts. Not only are there claims from competing possible collective allegiances, there are competing claims as to just what any particular ethnic or other identity means. Dispute by no means always undermines traditional identities. Ethnicity is a rhetorical frame within which certain disputes are conducted; participation in the disputes can actually reproduce ethnic understandings (changed or unchanged). There is a difference, thus, between disputes that challenge particular constructions of ethnic identity (or other aspects of tradition) and those that challenge the meaningfulness of ethnic identity as such.

In this context, the difference between the claims of nationhood and subordinate ethnicity need not be great (Horowitz 1985, Kellas 1991). Thus “nationalism” is identified with the state in both India and Africa, while “communalism” and “tribalism” are seen as divisive “ethnic” identities. Generally speaking, Nehru (and Indian predecessors back to the early nineteenth century) were more successful at invoking, claiming and/or creating a common sense of national identity than were most of their African counterparts. This was in part because of differences in the integration of precolonial “India” and the various colonial African states. But India too was in part a colonial creation, and the claim of national unity was developed in relation to British colonization (indeed, the length and intensity of British colonization may be as important a factor as precolonial history). In writing his popular history, *The Discovery of India*, Nehru (1949) was giving historical depth to a nationalist narrative that had as its other crucial base the more “modern” struggle against the British. Indian nationalists thus attempted to appropriate both the rationalist rhetoric of liberation and the claim of deep ethnic history, tradition almost to the point of primordiality. In this attempt, they shared much with many anti- and post-colonial nationalisms. So long as the British ruled in India, the project of nurturing a sense of ethnic nationhood was facilitated by the contrast with the obviously crucial colonial “other.” The departure of the British from India changed the meaning of Congress nationalism, however, as this became the program of an Indian state, not of those outside official politics and resisting an alien regime. Among other effects of this, a rhetorical space was opened up for “communal” and other sectional claims that were less readily brought forward before (Freitag 1989,

Chatterjee 1986 and forthcoming). The opposition between primordiality and “mere invention,” thus, leaves open a very wide range of historicities within which national and other traditions can exert real force.

### *Language and History*

The translation of ethnicity into nationalism is partly a matter of converting the cultural traditions of everyday life into more specific historical claims. As Gellner (1983) suggests, this transformation is made possible partly by the development of a literate “high culture” and is an extension of its relationship to the everyday culture of face-to-face relationships. Anderson (1991) develops this point with more systematic attention to the role of the “print capitalism” of newspapers and novels, which not only engage in history making but constitute the nation as a community of like readers in the imagination of each. This is true not just of the contents of tradition, as folklore gives way simultaneously to “scientific history” and national myth, but of the very medium. Not only literacy but space-transcending communications technologies from print through broadcast can play a crucial role both in linking dispersed populations and in creating the possibility for producing a popular memory beyond the scope of immediate personal experience and oral traditions (Deutsch 1953, 1969, Calhoun 1992). Nowhere, however, is the issue clearer than in the historicizing approach to language of the early modern era. This reconstituted an aspect of the everyday cultural means of social life as part of a historical/ethnic claim to nationhood.

Particularly in Germany, language was given a central status from Herder and Fichte on. In stressing the “originality” of the German language and the “truly primal” nature of the German character, Fichte, for example, claimed a supra-historical status for German nationality (Fichte 1968, orig. 1806–1807, Meinecke 1970: 92). Historically formed national characters were inferior, he argued, to the true metaphysical national spirits that were based on something more primal than common historical experience. This does not mean that Fichte and others of similar orientation saw glory only in the past. On the contrary, they envisaged a dramatic break with many aspects of the past and a national self-realization in what Fichte called a new history. The old history was not one properly self-made, not the product of the self-conscious action of the nation as historical actor. Here echoes of the French revolution appear in German nationalist historiography. The rhetoric of nationalism came characteristically to involve the metaphor of awakening. This involved political, not just ethnic, claims. Positioning their nation within history allowed nationalists who claimed ancient roots still to evoke the heroism of creation and the prestige that since the Enlightenment adhered in many quarters to the production of something new—as in the United States’ claim to be “the first new nation” (Lipset 1960).

Nationalism has a complex relationship to history. On the one hand, the production of historical accounts of the nation can figure very prominently (and this is hardly distinctive of Germany or the West; see examples in Nehru 1949, Gandhi 1939, 1967, and discussion in Chatterjee 1986 and forthcoming). Indeed, the modern discipline of history is very deeply shaped by the tradition of producing national histories designed to give readers and students a sense of their collective identity. At the same time, however, nationalists are prone, at the very least, to the production of Whig histories, favorable accounts of “how we came to be who we are.” As Ernst Renan (1990: 11) wrote famously in 1882:

Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality.

Not only is the definition of nation subject to contest and struggle, the fruits and even the violence of these contests and struggles become inescapably part of who we are. For all its civic rationalism, France has hardly been free from appeals to ethnic nationalism. An ethnic conception of *la patrie* stood behind much of the attack on Dreyfus; Maurras sought to define a true French nation free of Jews, Protestants, Freemasons and other foreigners (Sutton 1982). Aspects of this heritage remain important in contemporary debates over immigration (Todorov 1990, Noiriel 1988). Indeed, Greenfield (1991, 1992) goes so far as to group French nationalism with those to the East as “collectivistic-authoritarian” and based on resentment (by contrast to the “individualistic-libertarian” English variant). France’s violent and irrational Anglophobia (Greenfield 1992:183) is part of her evidence.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalisms have been particularly obsessed with history, as with ethnicity, perhaps because most involve claims to nationhood which are in important ways problematic or challenged by existing states. Thus Gandhi’s Hindu nationalist opponent, Savarkar (1937:284) felt compelled to argue that “verily the Hindus as a people differ most [sic] markedly from any other people in the world than they differ amongst themselves. All tests whatsoever of a common country, race, religion, and language that go to entitle a people to form a nation, entitle the Hindus with greater emphasis to that claim.” Many Indian nationalist historians took on a dual challenge in writing their histories (Chatterjee forthcoming). First, they sought to show that India was one country, against the British suggestion that without the alien Raj, disunity and conflict would reign amongst its many contending peoples (or “communities”). Second, they sought to show that this one country was essentially Hindu, not Muslim (and

thus among other things constituted “indigenously” rather than by previous imperial invasions). Indian intellectuals from the nineteenth century on were often as cosmopolitan as their European counterparts (and certainly at least as likely to be multilingual). But this could never appear as unproblematic in the context of colonial rule as it had for the European enlighteners. Many Indian nationalists (including Nehru) wrote in English and spoke it more comfortably than any “Indian” language; they helped, indeed, to make English an Indian language. But this involved a tension between English as the language of the colonizer and as the putative *lingua franca* that was to help constitute one nation by cutting across the linguistic divisions of the subcontinent. Moreover, at the same time that some nationalists appropriated English as an Indian language, others produced a renaissance of modern Indian languages like Bengali or Marathi. As in Catalonia, Hungary, China, and elsewhere, nationalism meant producing a new, modern literature in the vernacular language. One dimension of this was the attempt to forge a unity between the language of literature and intellectuals and that of ordinary people—since groups previously separated by language were now to be united by a national language.

For the German Romantics, language was a key test of the existence of a nation (Kedourie 1960: 62–73). Language, moreover, was understood primarily in terms of continuity, since “few things seem as historically deep-rooted as languages, for which no dated origins can ever be given” (Anderson 1991: 196). Language often plays a key role in ethnic (or “naturalizing”) versions of nationalism, since an ancient language, shared as the parental tongue among the members of the nation, seems a guarantee of its true existence prior to and separate from any particular set of political arrangements (including fragmentation or alien rule). But the language of nationalist movements is often not the parental tongue of the putative nation’s members, not the first language of each, but rather the second language that unites them. It may be an elite language, shared among aristocrats and/or a bourgeoisie; it may be the language of a colonial power. The shared language is not the “test” of nationhood, but the means of imagining—and thereby creating—the nation (Anderson 1991).

Language figures in at least three different ways in accounts of nationalism. First, it is a central part of the claim that nationhood is rooted in ethnicity. This leads to attempts to show the historic depth and distinctiveness of languages. Second, shared language is a condition (or at least a facilitator) of claimed national community regardless of whether it is ancient or distinctive. As Anderson stresses, the pioneering nationalisms of the Americas were launched in the colonial languages of Spanish and English. Third, opposition to linguistic variation is a key way in which nationalists in power attempt to make the nation fit the state. Thus most citizens of France did not

speak French until the late nineteenth century, and only after the imposition of often-resented educational uniformity (Weber 1976). Russification programs begun under the Czars were carried forward by communist rulers after only brief revolutionary interruption. In the last of these three we see clearly the impact of state-building, and the strong case for a state-centered theory like Tilly's (discussed above). But such a theory offers little help in making sense of the first two, or even in explaining why language should be an issue. Part of the answer to this question has to do with the relationship between claims to pre-existing ethnicity and claims to founding historical moments and political forms. Part of it also has to do, however, with the issue of how people imagine the nation, how this particular category of identity had come to figure so prominently in the modern world.

### *Ethnic Continuities*

Generally speaking, the most prominent twentieth-century analysts of nationalism have rejected the claim that nationalism can be explained by pre-existing ethnicity. Kohn (1944) and Seton-Watson (1977) have stressed the crucial role of modern politics, especially the idea of sovereignty. Hayes (1926, 1960) has argued for seeing nationalism as a sort of religion. Kedourie (1960) has debunked nationalism by showing the untenability of the German Romantic claims. More recently, Gellner (1983) has placed emphasis on the number of cases of failed or absent nationalisms: ethnic groups which mounted either little or no attempt to become nations in the modern senses. This suggests that even if ethnicity plays a role it cannot be a sufficient explanation (though one imagines the nineteenth-century German Romantics would simply reply that there are strong, historic nations and weak ones destined to fade from the historic stage). Hobsbawm (1990, Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) has largely treated nationalism as a kind of second-order political movement based on a false consciousness which ethnicity helps to produce but cannot explain because the deeper roots lie in political economy not culture.

Against this backdrop, Anthony Smith (1983, 1986, 1991) has tried to show that nationalism has stronger roots in premodern ethnicity than others have accepted. He acknowledges that nations cannot be seen as primordial or natural, but nonetheless argues that they are rooted in relatively ancient histories and in perduring ethnic consciousnesses. Smith agrees that nationalism, as ideology and movement, dates only from the later eighteenth century, but argues that the "ethnic origins of nations" are much older. Smith focuses on *ethnie*—ethnic communities with their myths and symbols—and shows that these exist in both modern and premodern times, and with substantial continuity through history. Because, Smith argues, "myths, symbols, memories and values are 'carried' in and by forms and genres of artifacts and activities which change only very slowly, so *ethnie*, once formed, tend to be

exceptionably durable under 'normal' vicissitudes, and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming 'moulds' within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact" (1986: 16). This is the foundation both of particular nations and of the idea of nation.

Smith argues that the origins of modern nationalism lie in the successful bureaucratization of aristocratic *ethnie*, which were able to transform themselves into genuine nations only in the West (Smith 1986: 109). In the West, territorial centralization and consolidation went hand in hand with a growing cultural standardization. "The indivisibility of the state entailed the cultural uniformity and homogeneity of its citizens" (1986: 134). "It would indeed not exaggerate the matter to say that what distinguished nations from *ethnie* are in some sense, 'Western' features and qualities. Territoriality, citizenship rights, legal code and even political culture, are features of society that the West has made its own. So is the realization of social mobility in a unified division of labour" (1986: 144). Well beyond the West, however, the compulsion for *ethnie* to enter the political arena is seemingly universal to the modern era. "In order to survive, *ethnie* must take on some of the attributes of nationhood, and adopt a civic model" (1986: 157). Cross-class inclusion and mobilization for common political purposes are essential (1986: 166). Conversely, rooted in ethnicity, nations are long-term processes, continually reenacted and reconstructed; they require ethnic cores, homelands, heroes and golden ages if they are to survive. Small, breakaway nations rooted in particularist, quasi-religious visions are the most common new nationalist projects today (1986: 212–13). Nonetheless, this tendency towards the production of many new small nations is contained, Smith suggests (writing before the events of 1989–1992 in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Africa), by the existing framework of nation states (1986: 218, 221). In sum, "modern nations and nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and ideals, but modern 'civic' nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments" (1986: 216).

Smith does not claim that ethnicity is natural, rather than socially constructed. His argument, rather, is that ethnicity is very slow to change. He acknowledges also that premodern ethnic boundaries were not sharply fixed, though he does claim that they maintained a level of integrity. Above all, Smith suggests that it is possible to trace a "genealogy of nations" in which both cultural and social structural variables can be introduced to account for which *ethnies* become nations. The crucial moment in such genealogies, he suggests, is the transformation of the members of an *ethnie* into citizens. This is a cultural transformation of the character of membership, stressing the

lateral ties that link members despite class divisions, and that form the basis for potential political mobilization (Smith 1986: 166).

Smith stresses the continuity in ethnic groupings and the relations of cultural similarity that define them. In a clear contrast, Brass (1991: 8) offers an account of ethnicity as the product of manipulation, or at least recurrent invocation. Ethnic groups “are creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves.”

### *Imagined Communities and Categorical Identities*

It is tempting to explain national identity as a transformation of ethnic or cultural similarity wrought by state-building. Certainly a crucial difference between ethnicities and nations is that the latter are envisioned as intrinsically political communities, as sources of sovereignty, while this is not central to the definition of ethnicities. There are, however, a number of obstacles to seeing this as the whole of the issue. First, nationalisms do not vary neatly with the success of efforts to create consolidated states. As Gellner points out, there are vastly more languages and ethnic or cultural groups than there are nationalist movements or states. This is not just because some lost out in a struggle for national identity or autonomy.

For every effective nationalism, there are *n* potential ones, groups defined either by shared culture inherited from the agrarian world or by some other link ... which *could* give hope of establishing a homogenous industrial community, but which nevertheless do not bother to struggle, which fail to activate their potential nationalism, which do not even try. (Gellner 1983: 45)

Beyond this, nationalism is not simply a claim of ethnic similarity, but a claim that certain similarities should count as *the* definition of political community. For this reason, nationalism needs boundaries in a way premodern ethnicity does not. Nationalism demands internal homogeneity throughout a putative nation, rather than gradual continua of cultural variation or pockets of subcultural distinction. Perhaps most distinctively, nationalists commonly claim that national identities “trump” other personal or group identities (such as gender, family, or ethnicity) and link individuals directly to the nation as a whole. This is sharply contrary to the way in which most ethnic identities flow from family membership, kinship, and membership in intermediate groups.

Nationalism, in short, involves a distinctive new form of group identity or membership. It is a new rhetoric of belonging to large scale collectivities. This depends on new forms of collective imagination, and also on communi-

cations capacities and social organizational conditions that encourage a sense of identity with large populations of distant and largely anonymous others. It also depends crucially on modern ideas of individual equivalence.

### *Individualism*

In nearly all premodern patterns of social organization, people were members of polities and other social groups primarily by virtue of their occupation of a variety of ascribed statuses based on descent, kinship, age, gender and the like. Their membership in larger groups, like clan, was based on and grew directly out of smaller groups like lineage segments, and out of specific interpersonal relationships like father-son (Fortes 1945, 1949, Calhoun 1980). This was true, despite otherwise dramatic differences, for relatively small-scale African societies and for such extremely large-scale polities as imperial China. The modern notion of self as individual changed this. Personal identity came to be seen increasingly as the attributes of a self-contained individual—what Taylor (1989) has characterized in Locke’s writings as the “punctual self.” “The alternative to playing the role of so-and-so’s son, so-and so’s brother, so-and-so’s wife was,” as Schwarcz (1986: 112) has written of protagonists in China’s largely nationalist New Culture movement, “to gain a positive sense of one’s own individuality.” Such thinking made it common to understand social groupings as sets of equivalent persons (as in the idea of class as well as in liberal individualism) rather than webs of relationships among persons or hierarchies of positions (Dumont 1982). The modern idea of nation, despite its roots in notions of descent, has been nearly always such a category of equivalent persons.

So, despite more relational roots, is the prevailing modern usage of “ethnicity.” This is revealed in the way in which censuses have been constructed and conducted, quantifying the members of ethnic, racial, and national categories (Anderson 1991: 168). It is revealed also in the ways in which Western social scientists have sometimes hypostatized notions like caste and lineage segment or corporation (see Kapferer 1988: ch. 7, Chatterjee forthcoming). Terms with at least in part a relational usage are recast as though they were simply collectivities of equivalent individuals. Similarly, Ekeh (1990) has noted a tendency to abandon the use of tribe in social anthropology and African studies, and to replace it with “ethnic group.” But this has the effect of imposing a categorical notion—a collection of individuals marked by common ethnicity—in place of a relational one. Where the notion of tribe pointed to the centrality of kin relations (all the more central, Ekeh suggests, because of weak African states from whose point of view “tribalism” is criticized), the notion of ethnic group implies that detailed, serious analysis of kinship is more or less irrelevant. In part, this is a response to recognition of the contested nature of ethnic identities;

it involves an attempt to move away from substantive claims to identify ethnicity on the basis of the “real” shared descent of the members of a group. Weber (1922: 389) defined an ethnic group as one whose members “entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration.” Barth (1969) took this logic a step further and abandoned even the notion of subjective belief in common descent, replacing it with simply the existence of recognized group boundaries. Here the triumph of a categorical logic is complete: an ethnic group is simply a bounded set of individuals, not necessarily characterized by any internal pattern of relationships, much less one of kinship or descent. Once ethnic groups are treated in this purely categorical way—as they are in much everyday contemporary discussion as well as in academic studies—similarities rather than relationships form the defining connection among members. This opens the door to new pressures for conformity.

The categorical nature of national identities is linked strongly to ideas of purity and normalizations of the “correct” way to be a member of a nation. Nationalisms linked to state power are often repressive, thus, not only of the members of “alien” nations or ethnic minorities (like Jews in Europe) but of their own members. Thus European nationalisms have commonly been strongly colored by ideas of middle-class respectability, particularly in the realm of sexuality (Mosse 1985). National identity has been an eroticized identity, and one that carried prohibitions of deviant sexualities as sharply as on deviant ethnicities (Parker et al 1992). Nationalism has also been a distinctly gender-biased ideology in many settings (Eley 1992). Valuing the family as the source of the nation’s continuity in time, nationalist ideologues have seen men as future martyrs, women as mothers. Beyond this, however, nationalists resist women’s movements because accepting the domination of male interests and perceptions merely perpetuates a taken-for-granted, monolithic view of the nation, while encouraging women to identify their distinctive interests and views opens claims that gender has autonomous status as a basis for personal identity which does not pale into insignificance before the commonalities of (male-dominated) nationhood.

Individualism exerts another influence on ideas of nation. Nations are generally seen as logical equivalents, and themselves as individuals. Just as liberal political theory suggests that employer and employee, rich man and poor woman, are equivalent political persons, so liberal international theory suggests that nations like San Marino and Singapore are formally equivalent to China and Germany.<sup>2</sup> As individuals, nations may also be understood as

<sup>2</sup>The contemporary discourse of multiculturalism suggests that ethnic groups are to be seen in much the same relationship of formal equivalence (Taylor 1992).

unitary subjects in historical time. In Fichte's words (quoted in Meinecke 1970: 89), "nations are individualities with particular talents and the possibilities of exploiting those talents." Nations not only could take action but could experience abuse; especially after 1848, Poland was conceived as "the martyr-nation" (Kohn 1944, Walicki 1982, Skurnowicz 1981, Meinecke 1970); Russian nationalism was colored and driven by a constant "ressentiment" (Greenfield 1990, 1992). Marx's contemporary, Friedrich List, "pronounced nations to be 'eternal,' to constitute a unity both in space and time..." (Szporluk 1988: 115). This did not preclude the idea that nations were capable in some sense of making themselves, forging a higher individuality out of heterogeneous constituent parts.

Anderson (1991: 26) has seized on just this aspect of individuality as central to the modern understanding of nation:

The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history.

As Anderson has stressed, the category of nation thus unites the living and the dead. This is a crucial explanation for why the nation can demand such extraordinary sacrifices and commitments from its members. It joins the biographies of individual persons and of the nation as a whole in a common historical narrative. Not only does the nation locate individuals temporally in relation to past and future generations, and in the global context as members of one among many nations, the nation also locates each individual's biography and quotidian narrative as one among the many comparable biographies of the members of the specific nation (see also Bloom 1990).

### *Imagined Communities and Indirect Relationships*

As a category of equivalent persons, a nation is, in Anderson's (1991) evocative phrase, an "imagined community." Rather than treating nationalism as a genre of ideology comparable to liberalism or fascism, Anderson (1991: 5) suggests that we regard nationalism as a distinct mode of understanding and constituting the phenomenon of belonging together, comparable to kinship or religion. A nation, thus:

is an imagined political community ... It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.... The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.... It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm...

Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. (1991: 6–7)

Much of Anderson's book (perhaps the most original, if not the most systematic contribution to the large recent literature on nationalism) is devoted to trying to account for the rise of this distinctive way of imagining community. In addition to the account of distinctive temporal location already touched on, Anderson offers three main arguments.

First, Anderson takes up the notion of language as the essential cultural condition of nationhood. He notes that nationalism did not arise simply out of long-standing traditions of linguistic commonality. On the contrary, in many settings nationalism involved the privileging of vernaculars in place of Latin and other previously widely used languages of high culture and administration (and of cross-regional sharing). It sometimes involved the recovery of little used languages. It often depended on the integration of more or less distinctive dialects or members of language families into new common languages. And in many cases nationalist imaginings took place in the language of colonial powers. What gave language its efficacy in relation to nationalism was the coincidence of print technology and capitalism.

By pushing for ever-larger markets, capitalist cultural production (in the form of books and newspapers) called forth "unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars" (1991: 44). That is, in early modern Europe, capitalists sought markets larger than the small number of elite readers of Latin, and larger than the number of speakers of nearly all local vernaculars. They thus pioneered the creation of the specific linguistic communities associated with eventual national identities. In addition, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, encouraging a stable orthography, grammar, and form in general. This encouraged the image of antiquity conducive to the notion of long-standing national identity by obscuring the extent to which languages gradually evolved and successive members of putative nations spoke mutually unintelligible tongues. Not least of all, print-capitalism standardized usage of certain administratively sanctioned languages, thus disadvantaging within each realm the speakers of other languages. Where Latin had previously united dozens of local dialects and languages within Hapsburg domains, for example, increasing reliance on German disadvantaged Hungarian elites (among others) and created a pressure for nationalism within and eventually against the empire. At the same time, this gave incentives (not always equally taken up) for elites to make common cause (and common culture) with non-elites. Where premodern society had been divided especially into vertical layers, modern politics (including the politics of language) encouraged the overcoming of vertical divisions and the

substitution of horizontal borders. As Gellner (1983: 18) described this transition, “a high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity. *That* is the secret of nationalism.”

In addition to helping to sort out the role of language in the creation of ethnic foundations for nationalism, Anderson’s formulation of “print-capitalism” also helps to make sense of the new kind of imagining of community more directly. The readers of the same novels and newspapers were joined in imagining communities of other such readers, and of imagining communality with the protagonists of the stories they read (1991: 24–36). The readers of daily newspapers not only learned the same news as each other, they learned “wholly new ideas of simultaneity” (1991: 37). They learned to situate themselves in terms of the activity of many individuals (and nations) taking place in the same temporal moment, not solely in a linear development. This also allowed for a sense of shared paths, which “could arise historically only when substantial groups of people were in a position to think of themselves as living lives *parallel* to those of other substantial groups of people—if never meeting, yet certainly proceeding along the same trajectory” (1991: 188). In place of direct relationships among people meeting face to face, thus, print technologies (proliferated by capitalist production relations) encouraged the creation of a new kind of indirect relationship, a social link existing only by virtue of the new medium of communication and its supporting social organizations. Much the same was true of markets, which joined distant and anonymous populations in indirect and sometimes invisible, but clearly powerful social relations (Calhoun 1991, 1992).

The importance of communications media to national integration has certainly been noted before (notably by Deutsch 1953, 1969). In most earlier treatments, however, the categorical identity of the nation is presumed and research is focused on how the development of communications capacity enhances the social and political integration of the nation. Anderson’s central contribution is to explain how communicative forms figured in creating the categorical identity or imagined community of the nation itself. In addition to media, Anderson creatively analyzes the career trajectories of creole officers of colonial states. He locates an important and early source of nationalism in their movement around colonies, and the limits placed on both their upward and lateral movement out of the colony in which they served.

These bounded imaginings were given graphic and synoptic expression in the proliferation of maps. Early maps had been either cosmographies, locating a dynastic or religious realm in relation to heaven and the netherworld, or travelers guides, working by landmarks from one location to another. In the nineteenth century, maps not only began to proliferate by virtue of mechanical

reproduction, they began to register the whole world as a set of bounded territories, different colors for different empires or autonomous countries (Anderson 1991: 170–78). They became the visual representation of a world organized into a system of states. They also offered maps of individual countries as “logos,” the image of their territorial shape giving a definite form to the imagined community. In something of the same way, museums, like history-writing, gave temporal depth to nationalism (Anderson 1991: 178–85, Maier 1987). Colonial powers deployed archaeology to unearth the tangible (and preferably monumental) remnants of ancient cities and sacred sites; these in turn were transformed into tourist attractions and objects of photographs, recordings of a tradition constituted in its distinctness from the modern state. In cosmopolitan museums artifacts from far-flung contexts were (and are) displayed within classifications ordering the world into nations. In national museums, artifacts from disparate temporal and spatial settings are arranged into national narratives. The crucial link was the production of replicable series of artifacts available for classification into types or periods (as distinct from temples still seen as singular in their sacredness, or modern “auratic” works of art imbued with the singularity of an individual creator). The idea of nation is itself an instance and an archetype of this classifying logic of categorical identities.

### *Conclusion*

The relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is complex. Neither is vanishing as part of an obsolete traditional order. Both are part of a modern set of categorical identities invoked by elites and other participants in political and social struggles. These categorical identities also shape everyday life, offering both tools for grasping preexisting homogeneity and difference and constructing specific versions of such identities. While it is impossible to dissociate nationalism entirely from ethnicity, it is equally impossible to explain it simply as a continuation of ethnicity. Numerous dimensions of modern social and cultural change, notably state-building, individualism, and the integration of large-scale webs of indirect relationships all serve to make both nationalism and ethnicity salient. Nationalism, in particular, remains the preeminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by reference to “the people” of a country. Ethnic solidarities and identities are claimed most often where groups do not seek “national” autonomy but rather a recognition internal to or cross-cutting national or state boundaries. The possibility of a closer link to nationalism is seldom altogether absent from such ethnic claims, however, and the two sorts of categorical identities are often invoked in similar ways.

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