

TOPICS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY: VOTING

I. Rudiments of social choice: Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

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II. Voting as mechanism.

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III. Markets for Votes.

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IV. Voting, minorities and majorities.

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