Top Student Exam Answers, Contracts: Fall 2007

Note: These were, in my judgment, the best answers received under examination conditions. They should not be taken as model answers, in that they all contain extraneous material as well as omitting useful information. Some even reach incorrect conclusions. However, they all take intelligent approaches to the questions, are well organized and reasoned, and make sensitive use of the facts.

Because answers were scanned from originals to prepare this page, be aware that odd characters and typos may have been unintentionally inserted into the text.

 

Question #1, Answer #1 Question #2, Answer #1
Question #1, Answer #2 Question #2, Answer #2
Question #1, Answer #3 Question #2, Answer #3





Question 1, Answer 1

The central inquires are (l) what claims may result from the employment dealings, (2) what damages may result and (3) what is the impact of the release.

Employment Claims

Gloucester's contract with Baywatch is not an at-will contract�he shall be employed "so long as his work is satisfactory." Thus, termination for other reasons may be breach. It appears that his work was satisfactory�experts in the field judged it to be innovative and have commercial potential, which is in line with Baywatch's goals as communicated to Gloucester. His management was "careful" and his employment generated an increase in Baywatch's value. Thus, Gloucester might argue that his termination was not for unsatisfactory work, which Baywatch would deny, pointing to the fact that his department recorded almost no earnings and that his division didn't have the desired impact on Baywatch as a whole. However, particularly as Gloucester was not made aware of these criteria, it seems unreasonable to measure a new division by its initial earnings. Furthermore, Gloucester was unaware of these goals as his understanding of Baywatch's outlook and aims of his division were based on incorrect information Eagle provided. In this situation it seems reasonable to use Gloucester's meaning of "satisfactory" rather than Baywatch's, as Baywatch most probably knew that Gloucester's meaning did not match theirs, though he was unaware of this (Restatement 201).

As the contract lacks a merger clause, a court might be willing to examine prior discussions in defining the exact arrangement between Gloucester and Baywatch�a view that is perhaps supported by Eagle's statement that "our word is our bond." Eagle told Gloucester that he had a secure long-term future with the company so long as he performed competently and helped Baywatch achieve its goals. Both sides would probably make similar arguments as above, but this would probably be taken as further evidence that what Eagle has presented to Gloucester as Baywatch's goals would be most reasonable to use in assessing his work.

Any argument by Baywatch about the termination is also undercut by Eagle's statement that the company needs to "retrench", suggesting the termination was not a reflection of Gloucester's performance but of Baywatch's financial situation, evidence that Baywatch's termination was in bad faith. Baywatch might also argue that the termination was excused by a change in circumstances or mistake, but this claim requires the intervening events be unexpected and the risk of such not be allocated. Baywatch executives knew that it was in poor financial shape and viewed their efforts as a "gamble"�they brought Gloucester in to turn around the company.

Another possible claim would be reliance. Gloucester relied on Eagle's promise of a secure-long term future by moving and taking the job, reliance that seems reasonable given the promise and entirely foreseeable to Eagle. Given his hesitation, it also seems clear that Gloucester would not have taken this action without the promise being made. Baywatch could argue that this promise was conditioned on Gloucester doing his job competently and helping Baywatch achieve its goals, to which Gloucester might respond that he did comply with these conditions. Another such claim would be based in duty to disclose. Eagle probably had a duty to disclose Baywatch's financial distress, as it seems that the company's financial well-being was a basic assumption on which Gloucester was basing the contract - he specifically wanted a secure job (Restatement 161)�and perhaps there is also a duty based in the relationship of employer and employee. However, Eagle's conduct seems to go further and constitute misrepresentation (Restatement 164), which could be grounds for voiding the contract. Baywatch might argue that there was in this case no duty to disclose or that Eagle's statement was factually accurate if a bit optimistic�the company did anticipate solid growth and profitability if their gamble paid off but this defense is weak.

Damages

Should a court find that the termination constituted a breach of contract, Gloucester would be entitled to expectation damages, which might prove hard to calculate. While he was promised his salary would rise and that he would have a promotion, it is unclear as to when these events might have transpired, as one depends on an interpretation of the word "quickly" and the other on the retirement of another employee. It is unclear as to how long into the future damages might be due (related to mitigation). While ordering specific performance would solve these problems, courts are unwilling to do so in employment cases. Baywatch would likely argue that awarding any more than his current salary would be based in pure speculation.

Should the court find for Gloucester on a reliance theory, the damages would be limited to what was foreseeable to the promisor (Hadley v Baxendale). Claims such as separation from family and friends, however, would not be recoverable as they lack economic basis. Also, any loss he takes on his Bergen County home will would not be recoverable (Hadley v Baxendale). He did lose his $250,000 job and incur numerous incidental costs in making the transition to New Jersey as a result of his reliance and these would likely be recoverable.

However, Gloucester would also be expected to make a reasonable effort to mitigate lest his award be reduced. He could argue that he has already made such an effort and has not found comparable employment. Ordinarily, relocation would not be required, but given his unusual profession a court may feel differently, given the fact he was alright moving once.

If a duty to disclose was violated, that could support reliance damages or potentially expectation damages. Misrepresentation might allow voiding the contract, which might be desirable if it appeared that a court was going to find the termination had not breached the contract.

The Release

Baywatch will argue that any claims Gloucester may have against the company were terminated by the release. The release is structured to look like a bargain, in that in exchange for giving up any legal claims, Gloucester receives three months of employment to allow him to search for a new job and maintain the appearance of job stability.

A first issue to raise is that the release was possibly signed under duress, allowing Gloucester to void it. Prior to Gloucester's signing the release, Eagle told Gloucester that if he asserted claims, his reputation would be destroyed�essentially a threat of defamation. If this induced his assent and left him with no reasonable alternative, it would constitute duress (Restatement 175). Baywatch might respond that it was not a threat so much as an observation of the attention to Gloucester's performance at Baywatch that might result from a trial; alternatively, Baywatch might argue that such a threat is not improper, as it is actually just a hard-nosed negotiation effort. Yet, this seems unlikely to defeat the argument that it was improper in that it threatened the use of power for illegitimate ends (176).

Similarly, an argument could be made that the release bargain was unconscionable, both procedurally and substantively. The bargaining position of the parties (a large corporation and an unemployed individual whose professional reputation is his key assets) is troubling as is outcome (potentially valuable legal rights are abandoned for a relative pittance). Baywatch might respond that Gloucester was a sophisticated executive who understood what he was giving up and that both got something they wanted. It is unclear from the facts currently before us as to whether Gloucester was actually continuing to perform work for Baywatch during this period or whether it was more fully a charade; if he was continuing to provide labor, this strengthens an unconscionability claim, as he is then giving Baywatch his legal rights plus his labor for the price that that used to purchase only his labor.

Should these arguments fall, an argument could be made that Baywatch materially breached the release contract. Depending on the court's conclusions about Gloucester's termination, it may be that the continued employment offered here as consideration for the release is not actually consideration in that they were already under a legal duty to provide it. While we would need more detail, it appears that the fact Gloucester was leaving ''was not kept secret", meaning that Baywatch may have failed to deliver the promised consideration of the appearance of job stability. Furthermore, depending again on the details, it appears that situating Gloucester in a location that made telephoning hard demonstrates bad faith in their promise to keep him employed for job-search purposes Baywatch would want to argue for a different interpretation of the facts�this employment extension was giving Gloucester something he did not already have a legal right to, that keeping him as an employee fulfilled this obligation of providing the appearance of job stability and that it is still possible to conduct a job search from a noisy workplace.

Should any of these arguments succeed, a court would likely void the release contract, which would reinstate Gloucester's right to legal claims against Baywatch; I believe this a likely outcome.

 [AK: Strictly speaking, Hadley is not relevant in the estoppel setting, where foreseeability is a separate element of Sec 90.]



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Question 1, Answer 2

To protect his legal rights, Gloucester will first need to challenge the validity of the resignation he tendered to Baywatch. Subsequently, Gloucester may then proceed by claiming breach of duty to disclose and by wrongful termination. I address each in turn. 

The Resignation

 If Gloucester sues regarding his employment contract, Baywatch will certainly defend by pointing to Gloucester's agreement to forgo any legal claims against Baywatch. Therefore, Gloucester should sue to declare the resignation, essentially a settlement agreement, invalid on three grounds. First, he may argue the agreement was the product of duress; Eagle, as agent for Baywatch, made an improper threat that left him with no reasonable alternative other than to accept the terms of the resignation when she implicitly threatened to destroy his reputation as a designer and manager. Such a threat is certainly a breach of good faith and fair dealing implicit in Gloucester's employment contract. Because Gloucester's family depended on his success as a boat designer, Gloucester may have a strong argument that such a threat left him with no reasonable alternative but to sign. However, Baywatch will likely argue in response that Eagle was not threatening Gloucester; that even if she did, it did not rise to the level of duress; and that regardless, she exceeded authority. This last point is not persuasive because Eagle is Baywatch's highest ranking officer. The jury will ultimately decide whether Gloucester was under duress. While the standard is high, Gloucester is a sympathetic plaintiff.

 As an alternative, Gloucester may argue that the settlement agreement was unconscionable because Eagle provided him no opportunity to meaningfully consider his options or to negotiate, resulting in an oppressive and one-sided deal benefiting Baywatch. While it is arguable that the deal was not one-sided because it offered Gloucester a chance to find new employment while still receiving his salary, a judge may think that overall, the procedure and substance of the agreement shock the conscience. A realist judge will likely find this argument persuasive given the relative sophistication of the players and the fact that the agreement displaced Gloucester's legal rights.

As a last alternative, Gloucester can challenge the agreement on failure of consideration, arguing that Baywatch was supposed to provide him a reasonable opportunity to find additional employment and allow him to leave quietly. When his departure became public knowledge and Baywatch placed him in a location (the warehouse) that made it impossible to effectively search for a new job, Baywatch did not provide all of their consideration under the deal. However, Gloucester still received his salary for three months, which Baywatch can argue was the only consideration for the settlement. Courts are hesitant to inquire into adequacy of consideration, so this argument is likely ineffective.

Breach of Duty to Disclose

Assuming that he can set aside his settlement agreement, Gloucester can likely succeed in suing Baywatch for breaching its duty to disclose. Gloucester indicated to Eagle that job security was essential to him. Eagle told Gloucester that the company was financially stable and failed to correct that representation. Because Eagle knew job security was material to his decision, Gloucester can argue that Eagle breached her duty to disclose and effectively promised him that Baywatch's financial condition would not impact his job security negatively. Baywatch will likely counter-argue that Gloucester indicated to Eagle that he conditioned his move to New Jersey on job security. When Gloucester learned of the company's financial problems but failed to take action, he waived the condition of job security related to Baywatch's financial health. However, given the material nature of this to Gloucester, this argument is unpersuasive. Baywatch may also argue that Gloucester assumed this risk by failing to do due diligence on the company. As a public company, its financials would be available. However, the facts indicate that the public was not yet aware of the company's condition when Gloucester signed his contract. Given the course of negotiations between Eagle and Gloucester, this claim is strong.

Breach of Employment Contract

Gloucester can also claim against Baywatch for breach of his employment contract by constructive wrongful termination. Gloucester can point to his written employment contract, which expressly states that Baywatch offered him the position "for so long as his work [was] satisfactory." On the plain language of the contract, therefore, Baywatch could only fire him for failing to perform up to par, not because of the company's financial difficulties.  

By setting the settlement aside, Baywatch cannot defend by claiming they did not fire him. However, Baywatch will likely defend on two other grounds. First, Baywatch may argue that the common law rule of employment-at-will should apply. However, this is only a default rule, and the language of the contract suggests the parties contracted around it. Second, Baywatch will argue that Gloucester's work was unsatisfactory. While Gloucester's designs earned acclaim from experts, his boats failed to sell in the first year and his division was unprofitable. Whether this defense is satisfactory will turn on the meaning of "satisfactory." Baywatch will likely argue that a person in the industry would commonly understand a manager's satisfactory performance as encompassing profitability or indications that the manager's designs were selling. Gloucester, to counter, may seek to introduce parol evidence that the parties truly intended his responsibilities to primarily encompass design, not profitability, and that his performance should only be measured by his designs. Further, he may also argue that unsatisfactory performance is merely an excuse to cover their true motivation of restructuring the company. Whether this defense is meritorious will depend on the evidence produced and the credibility of the parties.

Gloucester may try to avoid the issue of whether his performance was satisfactory and instead argue that Baywatch breached its duty of good faith by failing to provide him an adequate time to make his division profitable. Gloucester was hired to create a new line of products. The time required from designing the products to seeing an impact on the bottom line may quite reasonably take longer than one year. Therefore, Gloucester may argue that so long as he was making progress, his constructive termination was in bad faith. Again, the success of this claim is uncertain and may turn on evidence of industry standards.

Remedies

 If Baywatch breached their duty to disclose or wrongfully terminated Gloucester, he is entitled to his expectation damages. In this case, however, expectation will be difficult to measure. One cannot know for how long Gloucester would have worked for Baywatch. He may have had a lengthy career, but Baywatch seems like a potential bankruptcy candidate. Further, while Gloucester was orally promised head of the boat division, there is no guarantee he would have been promoted or received raises. In addition, intangibles such as experience and reputation or the impact on his family and marriage cannot be quantified.

Alternatively, Gloucester may seek his reliance damages. This seems particularly appropriate because Gloucester likely would not have accepted the position if he had known about Baywatch's financials. While an exact figure is uncertain, reliance damages could be substantial. First, Gloucester should be compensated for the impact of his reliance on his income. Presumably, given Gloucester's annual salary at his family business of $250k, he would not have accepted a position that paid less. Therefore, reliance damages should include $250k per year for the expected remainder of

Gloucester's career as approximated by his age, offset to the extent Gloucester finds comparable employment. To date, however, Gloucester has been unable to mitigate, and whether he is able to mitigate is uncertain. Perhaps his reputation in the industry is too tarnished. Therefore, the court could choose to award the entire amount. In addition, reliance damages should include the value of Gloucester's stake in his family business that he gave up. A valuation expert can likely provide a reasonable estimate. Gloucester should also be compensated for his moving expenses. Gloucester is likely not entitled to anything for selling his home, since he sold it at a profit and bought a new home more valuable. His damages may actually be offset by his profit on his home sale. Last, while reliance damages probably cannot compensate for intangible losses, the judge may possibly award punitive damages if he or the jury specifically makes a finding of bad.

As a third measure, Gloucester could also seek restitution for the value of the designs he created while working for the company. This, however, may be hard to quantify. The value of his designs is unclear, and he was paid a salary for producing them. In addition, Gloucester might claim restitution for the additional compensation the executives received when the stock price rose on his arrival. It is unclear whether Baywatch, and not only the executives, could be liable for this amount. Gloucester would also need to prove the stock rose because of his arrival, a challenge since many factors can influence stock price.

Last, specific performance is inappropriate because this is a contract for personal services.

 [AK: Perhaps too much space on settlement letter given other issues, but discussion there is very nice. Only weaknesses: no discussion of parol evidence issue, and discussion of duty to disclose omits its remedial relevance .]



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Question 1, Answer 3


The following memo is an outline of potential legal claims Mr. Greg Gloucester ("GG") could bring against Baywatch ("BW"), possible defenses BW could assert, and the remedies available. 

Letter of Resignation and Release

A court is not likely to enforce the letter of resignation and release. BW will argue on a bargain theory, pointing to the valid offer, acceptance, and written contract. A court would likely find this contract was valid, since GG was able to keep his job for three months and protect his reputation in exchange for giving up his right to sue and resigning. However, no court would enforce this contract under the doctrine of duress since BW induced GG's assent by threatening to damage his professional reputation. BW could defend that their statement was not a threat because they were simply pointing out that word of an employee's termination travels quickly in the boating community, but this argument would not convince a court. The remedy would be to void the release, allowing GG to sue on his employment contract.

Employment Contract

GG could bring suit against BW under a bargain theory. It is clear from BW's written offer and GG's acceptance that there was an enforceable employment contract. However, the terms of the contract will be disputed by BW. GG will argue that the contract terms included the oral promise of job security, advancement, and a promotion to head the boat division. Eagle's statements indicating that business is conducted orally at BW ("we do business based on trust. .. our word is our bond") would indicate to a court that GG was reasonable in believing that terms not included in the written offer were part of the offer.

BW will argue that the oral statement was just preliminary negotiation, and that the written offer of employment is an integrated agreement that precludes consideration of prior agreements at trial under the parol evidence. To support this, BW can argue that any offer of security would have been included in the written agreement. BW will claim that GG was an at-will employee whom BW could terminate at any time, and that it generously allowed GG to save face by offering resignation.

To counter, GG could argue that terms of the agreement were likely to be left out under BW's policy of conducting business orally based on trust. GG could also argue that the brief offer of employment letter did not include an integration clause and was too short to constitute an integrated employment contract since such contracts are normally longer and more specific. On balance, a court would probably find that the oral terms were part of the contract.

BW will also argue that any promises about job security were too indefinite to be part of a binding contract because no term of employment was specified. This is a good argument, but a court would probably find an implied promise of "best efforts" to provide job security, and that the promise to promote GG was concrete.

GG can argue that BW breached by failing to give best efforts. To support this, GG could point out that BW immediately terminated GG when the stock began to fall rather than cutting costs, reducing shareholder dividends, or taking other measures. GG can further argue that BW breached by not offering him the promised promotion. A court would likely find that terminating GG at the first sign of financial trouble did not constitute "best efforts" to offer GG security.

BW also has a weak argument that the company's bad financial situation made it impracticable to continue to employ GG, and that its duty contractual duty was discharged. However, GG can argue that BW knew of its bad financial situation before hiring GG, and that the risk of financial trouble was born by BW since it did not disclose the risk to GG. Furthermore, a 20% drop in stock prices did not make it impossible to continue employing GG, just inconvenient. BW could contend that the risk of financial trouble was born by GG as an employee since employees bear the risk of employer bankruptcy. On balance, however, an impracticability argument would probably not convince a court.

Even if a court does find that there is a contract, BW can argue that it had no duty to give GG job security because that duty was conditional on his work being satisfactory, and GG breached that condition. BW will point to the unprofitability of GG's division to support this. However, a court would likely find that GG did perform to satisfaction. Since courts generally interpret conditions that work be satisfactory on an objective basis, GG's creation of several new designs, which were critically approved by experts in the field, indicates that his work was satisfactory. Furthermore, based on the nature of the boat design business, earnings in the first year is a bad indicator of the profitability of the designs after they were publicized and "caught on" in the boating community. GG could also point to the fact that he carefully managed his division to reduce costs. As such, a court would be unlikely to find that GG breached.

Even if there were a valid contract under a bargain theory, there is the complicating factor of BW's misrepresentations to GG inducing GG to form the contract. GG could argue that he was induced to form the contract based on BW's fraudulent representations that BW was "strong financially and anticipated ... a stable, profitable future." Based on the record, BW's problems were apparent before hiring GG and Eagle presumably knew about them. GG, who was interested primarily in job security, would probably not have taken the job if he had known about the truth about the company's problems. GG could also argue that BW breached a duty to disclose its real financial situation by acting in bad faith in failing to correct GG's basic assumption that the company was stable. GG could make a similar argument under the unilateral mistake doctrine. There is also some evidence that the BW executives acted in bad faith by hiring GG and making expansion plans intending to reap huge profits in the short run while allowing BW to collapse in the long run.

If a court found that BW fraudulently induced GG to enter into the bargain, a court may void the contract. However, GG would still be able to bring suit on an estoppel theory since he relied on the misrepresentations in entering into the contract. BW knew that GG sought job security and that representing BW as financially strong and capable of offering a secure position would induce GG to take the job, and that the representations did in fact induce GG to take the job.

Available Remedies

Courts are generally reluctant to order specific performance for employment contracts, especially when there is a strained employer-employee relationship. A court may also be reluctant to give expectation damages since there was no fixed contract period and no set schedule for increasing compensation over time. From the record, GG is about 40 years old and expected to earn at least $300,000/year until retirement. BW promised that he would eventually be promoted to head of the boat division, and promised that he would "quickly" be making $400,000/year, given positive performance. Assuming that GG expected work for 20 more years and that he got a raise after the fifth year, GG would make $7.5 million in 20 years. Using his salary at his prior job as a proxy for the market salary of similar jobs and assuming that it took him six months to find new work, he could have mitigated damages at $4.875 million. A rough estimate of his expectation damages would be around $2.6 million, but this estimate does not account for further promotions at BW and probably underestimates the market salary for boat designers since his prior job was with a small family business. It also leaves out the value the promised job security and the ability to spend more time designing boats.

Given the uncertainty of expectation damages, a court may use a reliance measure. Relying on BW's promises, GG quit his job, sold his house, moved to New Jersey (where living costs were higher), and purchased a more expensive home. Since GG made more money at BW than at his family business, he cannot claim lost income as damages. GG would be able to claim moving expenses, increased living expenses, and any financial loss from investing the $400,000 from the sale of his home in a new home. If the value of his old home appreciated during the year at BW, a court may use this amount as a measure for the investment income that GG gave up in reliance. A court may also award GG interest payments on his new home loan for the year he worked for BW and the value of having job security, though this would probably be unquantifiable. In restitution, a court could also award title to designs GG created at BW.

[AK: Analysis in some cases could just be a bit more thorough [arguments get conclusory at the very end] but this is made up for by breadth of coverage.]


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Question 2, Answer 1

 

Dear Mint,

 Risks Presented by the Terms as a Whole

In order to formulate an appropriate critique of MC's online terms, it is first necessary to analyze the enforceability of the terms as a whole. The sale of coins between MC and its customers will be covered by the UCC. The Statute of Frauds requires transactions for the sale of goods over $500 to be in writing. MC can limit website orders to those totaling less than $500, and require customers to come into the store to sign a document for orders exceeding that amount. This would cause MC to lose some sales, though. Alternatively, MC can argue that purchases made online with printed out receipts or email confirmations sufficiently meets the Statute of Frauds requirement.

MC's internet 'clickwrap' terms are subject to the standard enforceability problems faced by boilerplates. Unconscionable terms will not be enforced. This might be a problem for the "limitation on claims" and "arbitration" clause (addressed below).

The terms, as a whole, might be unenforceable if they are considered hidden, for lack of mutual assent. Generally, a party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he/she failed to read them before signing. However, MC will be subject to this rule's exception if the terms are not reasonably called to the attention of the website user (Specht). Disgruntled customers can claim that the terms were forced upon them like an adhesion contract.

Additionally, inadequate notice of 'clickwrap' terms is likely to lead to disputes that could harm the company's reputation. This concern is slightly tempered by the fact that the terms have not led to any disputes for the eighteen months that they have been posted. (It is possible that this is simply because website sale activity is infrequent.)

MC should take steps to ensure that users have notice of the terms before purchasing. MC could require users to accept the terms before using the website. To prevent users from quickly ignoring these terms, the site could default to click 'I do not accept,' and users would have to actively click on the 'I accept' option. MC should also program the site to re-route web-surfers to the terms homepage to prevent backdoor access from links or search engines. MC could also program the site to have the terms pop-up frequently (as in ProCD). However, as a practical matter, too many pop-ups might discourage use of the site.

None of these suggestions are able to ensure that users will actually read the terms. The default rule, according to Restatement §211, is that as long as the MC stays within bounds of reasonability, buyers will be considered to have accepted its terms.

Risks Presented by Specific Terms

 Courts might find the requirement to arbitrate to be unconscionable if the terms are hidden (Gentry). MC might have a claim that the arbitration clause is consistent with the American Arbitration Association. However, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 could invalidate contractual clauses commanding arbitration for consumers on the grounds that it is an unfair and deceptive trade practice. This would deprive MC of the ability to settle disputes cheaply, simply, and expeditiously, while avoiding negative publicity.

Similarly, courts might find a limitation on claims beyond one year to be unconscionable. Effectively, this term attempts to dictate the statute of limitations, usually determined by state law. A modern court might find this acceptable, though, in light of standard coin-sale trade usage. Perhaps, the volatility of coin values makes it difficult to adjudicate over such suits brought over a year after the sale.

Regarding the "subject to availability" clause, MC might face a number of legal claims, despite the waiver of liability here. Buyers who were counting on making a purchase of a coin and then selling the coin to another buyer might have a claim for reliance damages. Similarly if a balanced-portfolio investor wished to hedge a separate bet with a coin purchase, he might also have a claim for reliance damages. Under a §90 promissory estoppel theory, these buyers might be able to show foreseeable and reasonable reliance, and establish that equity required a compensatory remedy for MC's deficient inventory.

Additionally, others who were upset by MC's deficient inventory might claim that MC is liable for violation of a 'bait and switch' statute (i.e.: if you make an offer for the sale of goods, you have to have a certain quantity of goods in stock). MC's interests will be better served if their online inventory was frequently updated to match its actual inventory. This would prevent a buyer from purchasing items that are not in stock, and would allow MC to avoid these reliance and 'bait and switch' problems altogether.

Regarding the "money back guarantee" clause, MC is correct to limit this benefit to customers of rare coins. Fluctuations in bullions can lead to substantial losses to MC if the value of a purchased bullion goes down within the 14-day period and is then returned to MC. However, fluctuations in prices also affect rare coins, and consequently, MC would be vulnerable to a similar risk. Customary practice, however, demands a certain safe-harbor period.

MC should consider shortening the length of this period. Additionally, MC could limit the returnability of slabbed rare coins. Instead of allowing buyers to send coins to personal appraisers, MC can use a single appraiser and grading system for all slabbed rare coins. This will diminish the uncertainty of the appraisal process, and give rare coins bought on the website an objective value at the time of purchasing. The policy could instead stipulate that slabbed coins are only returnable for mistaken orders.

Buyers of raw coins can still enjoy the benefit of unchecked subjective approval.

However, MC can limit the number of returns per customer over the course of a certain period. This would prevent losses resulting from repeated shipping costs. This would also limit the number of lost profit from sales that could have been made to another customer had the original order not been bought and returned. After all, MC is a volume seller.

The downside of these recommendations is that a limited return policy will undoubtedly reduce the attractiveness of the site. Additionally, certain slabbed coin purchasers might have a significant reason to use a personal appraiser (trustworthiness, geographic market specifications, loyalty, etc.). MC would risk alienating some of its slabbed coin collectors, who make up a large percentage of its rare coin customer base.

Regarding the "lay-away sales" clause, MC might be liable to pay back prepaid funds for orders that are terminated before the conclusion of the 60-day time period. These payments, received without sending merchandise in return, probably constitute unjust enrichment for MC. As a result, buyers may be able to collect their restitution interest if they object to this term.

Additionally, it is unclear if this price-structuring flexibility option is available to bullion buyers. If so, MC would be vulnerable to opportunistic buyers who manipulate the fluctuations in bullion value. Essentially, these buyers would purchase an option (at 1/3 of the purchase price) to buy the bullion in 60 days. If the value of the bullion goes up substantially after 60 days, the buyer gets a windfall (i.e.: he will have 'locked-in' the earlier price). If the price of the bullion decreases by over 1/3, he can cancel the payment and avoid a losing investment. If MC is responsible to pay back the restitution interest, the opportunistic buyer will effectively get the option for free.

Additional Term and Business Risks

In order to avoid parol evidence problems that may arise if MC salesmen make antecedent representations about the price of coins, MC can include a merger clause in the terms. The presence of the clause makes it more likely the court will find the online price listing, in conjunction with the terms, a total integration.

It is important for MC to avoid problems of indefiniteness. Although open terms do not prevent an agreement from being enforceable (according to the VCC), MC's would benefit from using clear signals of price, coin quality, and payment structure. Clarity about specific terms ex ante will help MC avoid detrimental gap fillers ex post.

MC is exposed to the threat of fraud. A buyer might purchase an expensive coin and then ship back a similar looking coin for a full refund. MC should take steps to combat fraudulent switches. Possibilities include sophisticated tracking devices or careful appraisal of all returns. If anything, a prominently displayed threat of criminal charges might be an effective deterrent for some.

MC could stipulate liquidated damages for returned damaged goods, as long as they are reasonable in light of the harm caused (2-718). This might discourage sales though.

Finally, MC could demand to see the balance sheet of purchasers of large orders to ensure that they have enough assets or financial stability to go through with the transaction. This would inevitably raise privacy issues. 

[AK: Some obvious counterarguments are ignored, and the flurry of points on separate issues at the end is probably less effective than picking the best of these and developing them in depth.]

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Question 2, Answer 2

Morgan Mint,

I will address each of the terms you have posted online in turn, and then make some remarks regarding things you may want to consider when selling to customers over the internet as well as your general business practices and their legal implications.

Sales Subject to Availability

As with many retailers, especially where rare and unique goods are involved, Mint faces the risk that a consumer will place an order which cannot be filled. A major consideration here is implementing a procedure to alert the consumer quickly as to whether or not their item is in stock. The concern here is that enough time may pass that a consumer will come to reasonably rely on the assumption that Mint has the coin, and will miss an opportunity to buy the coin at another retailer. While I don't recommend that Mint bind itself to a certain time period in which you guarantee to let the customer know if his order is available, you may consider implementing a system whereby the order is not considered final until the customer has received an email confirmation stating that his item is or is not in stock. You might also consider allowing the customer an opportunity to confirm or reject the rest of the shipment without the missing item before anything is shipped. This way, if the customer does not want one coin without another, there is an opportunity to avoid extra shipping costs and disputes over nonreturnable items.

Money-Back Guarantee

This term appears to divide the risk between Mint and the customer. Mint bears the risk for rare coins, which may be returned with no questions asked, while the customer bears the risk of bullion coins and fluctuations in the market. Based on the information regarding the coin industry, this appears to be a thoughtful way of providing for flexibility while preventing too much opportunism on behalf of a consumer who simply changes his mind about a bad deal after the market price changes. However, while this provision initially places the risk for rare coins onto Mint, allowing customers to return any coin (this 14 day firm offer is irrevocable), it ultimately places the risk of mistake onto the buyer, if they decide to keep the coin. Mint may want to specify this more clearly, and note that the buyer is being asked to examine the rare coin themselves, even though they may come with industry ratings.

In regard to the different policies for rare and bullion coins, you might consider separating these out into separate paragraphs, so that they will not be lost in the fine print of the agreement. If the customer is at risk of not noticing the policy that bullion coins are not returnable, and would not have agreed to it had they noticed it, a court may decline to enforce this term on a mutual assent rationale. This may also depend on the industry standard here and the sophistication of the buyer. Most of Mint's buyers appear to have some experience in the coin industry, even if amateur collectors, and should not be surprised by this term if it is standard among coin retailers to only allow returns for rare coins. If such practice is not standard, it is important for this term to be taken out of the fine print and perhaps even agreed to separately by the customer.

Lay-Away Sales

Mint provides an opportunity for customers to buy a more expensive coin than they might otherwise be able to afford, in return for the customer not having the right to return that good if it does not meet their satisfaction. There are two main concerns with this policy. First is the perfect tender rule in UCC §2-601. (This issue applies to any term regarding the buyer's right of return.) If, for example, the coin is mislabeled or wrongly appraised, the buyer has the right to reject the improper delivery. Likewise, Mint has a right to cure under DCC §2508. Mint has appeared to have waived its right to cure if a buyer of a rare coin rejects it in the first 14 days. In all other cases, the buyer may reject the good if it does not conform to the contract. It is unclear whether Mint is attempting to contract around this provision of the DCC, or simply saying that if the good conforms to the contract, and the buyer decides that the item nonetheless does not match up to his expectations, that he may not return it. (E.g., the buyer may reject the good if he receives a silver coin where he ordered and paid for a gold one, but not if it is a gold one, as stipulated by the contract, but the buyer just doesn't like it for perhaps a more aesthetic reason. A court may find it unreasonable for the consumer to bear all the risk of the transaction, when Mint may better spread and internalize the costs of error.)

The other concern here is that Mint will hold on to the first two payments if the buyer does not complete the transaction. I assume that the idea behind this is to compensate Mint for holding onto the item instead of selling it immediately, especially if it is a bullion coin, for which Mint is a lost volume seller. However, under DCC §2-718, Mint must refund to the buyer any amount over 20% of the total contract price or $500, whichever amount is smaller. Any attempt by Mint to hold onto the deposit beyond that amount may be considered a penalty by the court and rendered unenforceable. Therefore, Mint may wish to change this provision to more specifically comply with §2-708.

Limitations on Claims

I have discussed above relevant considerations concerning the allocation of risk: Mint has clearly imposed any risk of mistake onto the buyer with this term. A consumer may argue that this term is substantively unconscionable, and that Mint cannot contract out of being held liable for their sales. Again, we should consider the general sophistication of Mint's clientele and whether or not this term is standard in the industry. Otherwise, questions of whether or not this is good for customer relations aside, this appears legally sound.

Arbitration

While courts have occasionally declined to enforce an arbitration clause that is unconscionable, I see no problems with including such a clause in this case. One plausible objection is that Mint chooses the arbitrator, which, in combination with the fact that this term is in the middle of an adhesion contract, gives too much power to Mint. On the other hand, in an industry with many self-regulating mechanisms (in terms of independent appraisals, etc.), arbitration may provide a faster resolution of disputes by someone who is familiar with the intricacies of the industry, which would benefit both buyer and seller.

In terms of considerations unique to online transactions, Mint will want to make sure that these terms appear on their website in a visible place, where a customer does not have to scroll down to find them. To be safe, Mint may want to make the consumer click through the provisions to ensure that there is ample opportunity to read them (especially those terms that are not standard for the industry). More generally, Mint is in a unique position in that it sells both to other business and to consumers (generally thought to be less sophisticated, although this may not necessarily be the case with professional coin collectors). A court may have stricter standards for a form contract between a business and a consumer than a business-to-business contract. A major issue here, as discussed above, is the allocation of the risk. It will be important that Mint is clear in its presentation of the terms, so that consumers understand exactly which risks have been allocated to them.

At the same time, you may wish to add additional protection for Mint, especially in regard to the customer's ability to return rare coins. While it appears that most of Mint's raw coins are slabbed, some are still rare. For these coins, Mint may wish to impose additional safeguards. For example, if a buyer wishes to return one of these raw, rare coins, they might only be allowed to return them on the condition that they sign a separate statement, attesting to the fact that the coin is the same one which was sent to them by Mint. This protection may be especially important when the sale is an online transaction, due to the loss of a personal relationship and trust between the buyer and the seller.

In summary, while these terms have operated successfully for over a year on the Mint website, there exist opportunity to clarify statements and ensure that buyers are aware of the risks and rights that they hold under the contract; this will help Mint escape future liability and protect Mint's interests against opportunistic buyers.

[AKs: On general issues, you could use a little more attention to form contract issues of and procedural unconscionability.  Essay is slightly wordy in some places, and more concise expression would allow you to cover these additional points.]


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Question 2, Answer 3

Dear Ms. Mint,

I have reviewed your terms governing online sales as they appear on your website. Although you have had success to date in avoiding legal issues, I outline below suggestions for making these terms even more effective should a legal problem arise.

 Location on Site

 Because mutual assent is required prior to formation of a contract, the nondrafting party of any contract must have clear notice that such terms exist. Therefore, placement of the terms on your site is critical. Specifically, I recommend having the terms of sales available from a prominent link featured on the home page of Mint Condition. This link should be placed in a position where a person will see it without having to scroll down or over on the screen.

In addition, when a customer is preparing to make a purchase, I recommend having the terms of sale appear on a webpage in between one page where the party fills out his shipping information and the page where the party enters his payment information. I recommend having a box on the terms page where the customer enters his name and, if applicable, company name as indicate that he has reviewed and consents to the terms. By setting up the sales process in this manner, a purchaser clearly has the opportunity to review the terms and is more likely to do so since he must take action in order to move ahead in the purchasing process.

Statute of Frauds

Sales of coins are governed by the Unifonn Commercial Code. Under UCC § 2-201, a contract for goods with a price of $500 or more is not enforceable unless there is a written agreement evidencing the contract that is signed by the party against whom the contract is being enforced. Documents generated online that specify certain terms of the contract, such as item purchased and price, are likely sufficient as a writing under the statute. In order to ensure the signature requirement, however, I recommend using the process described in (l) as an opportunity for obtaining an electronic signature. I recommend labeling this box as an electronic signature for purposes of satisfying the statute of frauds.

Clarification of Contract Formation

I recommend Mint add a clause specifying the process of contract formation on its website. In its "Money-Back Guarantee" clause, Mint suggests that the customer is making an offer to Mint who then accepts or rejects the offer. However, because Mint's website contains a catalog of products it will sell to anyone for a certain price, one could conclude Mint's website is a standing offer to anyone who seeks to purchase, and the act of ordering online constitutes acceptance. This is particularly a risk in light of the DCC's liberal contract formation policy under § 2-204. One area where offer and acceptance may be important is under Mint's "Subject to Availability" clause. While Mint indicates it will not fulfill orders for which it does not have merchandise, someone could still sue Mint for breach of contract, arguing that failure to tender the ordered coin was a breach of contract. This is especially concerning because some of Mint's customers are dealers.

To avoid this problem, I recommend Mint adopt a practice of confirming orders within a specified time (i.e., three days) via email. This confirmation would act as Mint's acceptance of a customer's offer. If Mint is out of stock, Mint should reject the email within that time via email as well. Mint should communicate this process in its terms. One issue, however, is that Mint must communicate that the customer is adopting Mint's terms as the terms of the customer's offer. I propose adding the following clause to its terms:

By placing an order for purchase on Mint Condition's web site, you are offering to purchase the selected items from Mint Condition on the terms provided on this page. Mint Condition will confirm via email within three business days whether it is able to accept your offer, subject to the provisions below titled "Sales Subject to Availability.

 Liquidated Damages

 Mint's "Lay Away Sales" term contains a liquidated damages term. Under UCC §2-718, liquidated damages are only permissible "at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused" by the breach of contract. Depending on the circumstances, therefore, Mint's liquidated damage clause could be unenforceable as a penalty. As the clause is defined, it does not correlate to Mint's expected damages due to breach. Therefore, I recommend Mint re-draft its liquidated damage clause so that it is less contestable.

Any attempt to draft the clause to ensure Mint receives its full expectation damage is likely infeasible. In any case, Mint could invoke either UCC §§ 2-706 or 2708. § 2-708 would be more desirable; § 2-706 would be contingent on resale, and certain rare coins may not have a liquid market facilitating a quick resale. Applying § 2708, Mint is likely not a lost volume seller. The supply of many coins is limited, and it is likely that no two coins are exactly alike. Therefore, Mint's damages under UCC § 2-708 are either 1) the difference between the market price at time and place of tender and the unpaid contract price, plus incidentals (§ 2-708(1)), or 2) its lost profit with "due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale (§2-708(2))." Damages in any case, therefore, are highly tailored to the particular sale.

As a result, I recommend employing a deposit scheme. Under UCC § 2-718, Mint can arrange its layaway sales so that it is entitled to keep 20% of the value of its expected profit from the transaction or $500, whichever is less. True, Mint will get less than its expectation in transactions worth more than $10,000. However, high value transactions are probably the most likely to lead to litigation over the liquidated damages clause.

Disclaimer of Express Warranty by Description

 In order to avoid disputes related to bullion coins under its "Money-Back Guarantee" provision, I recommend adding a sentence to the term expressly disclaiming a warranty that the coin tendered will meet the on-line description to exact specification. In practice, if a tendered coin differs from the on-line description to the extent that the customer is convinced Mint tendered the wrong product, the customer will likely contact Mint. In such a situation, Mint should probably rectify any genuine mistakes. However, given the unique nature of coins, reasonable people may disagree over whether a particular description matches a tendered coin. Therefore, I recommend that Mint add a clause along the following lines (meant to disclaim warranties arising under UCC§ 2-313):

Due to the volatile nature of the bullion market, all gold, silver, and platinum bullion purchases are final once accepted by the company. Descriptions of and pictures of bullion coins online do not amount to a warranty that the coin will conform identically to the picture or description.

Disclaiming Consequential Damages

I recommend that Mint disclaim consequential damages provided under UCC § 2-715.

Mint deals with a variety of customers, including fellow dealers. It is foreseeable that, should something go wrong in a sale from Mint to a dealer, the dealer could lose a subsequent sale and sue Mint for lost profits. A standard disclaimer of consequential damages should provide protection to Mint.

Disclaiming Fitness for a Particular Purpose

Along the same lines, I recommend Mint disclaim damages arising from fitness for a particular purpose under UCC § 2-315. Mint sells to investors, but coins are not appropriate investments for investors who need current income or are unable to assume price fluctuation risk. To avoid being sued by an investor that incurs investment losses from coins purchased from Mint, I would alter the language of Mint's "Money-Back Guarantee" provision: ...you may return your order within 14 days of receipt for a full refund including shipping charges both ways upon proof of appraisal by a certified appraiser as of the date you received your purchase.

Arbitration Clause

I recommend increasing the prominence of your arbitration clause. Because the clause requires a purchaser to restrict his legal rights, it may be more susceptible to scrutiny by courts under UCC § 2-302 for unconscionability, particularly with respect to transactions between Mint and amateur collectors. Arbitration clauses are typically deferred to if reasonable, but a court may conclude that the clause, buried in a form contract, is unconscionable if it forces an ordinary consumer to travel a great distance to assert his rights is. If the clause is more prominent and, therefore, less likely to be skimmed over by a purchaser, a court may be more likely to enforce it on balance.

[AK: Only weaknesses are limited discussion of counterarguments or disadvantages, and perhaps a bit of a laundry list on the warranty disclaimers. A bit more attention to the distinctions among the different kinds of transactions engaged in would also be good.]



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