Capital and liquidity standards for banks

Economics of capital rules

Regulatory stress tests
Capital and liquidity standards for banks
  Capital standards and the global financial crisis
  Key components of capital standards
  Credit risk capital
  Market risk capital
  Current state of capital standards

Economics of capital rules

Regulatory stress tests
Pre-crisis evolution of international capital standards

1974 Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices set up by G10 governors

1975 The Concordat: Report on the supervision of banks' foreign establishments

1988 Basel Capital Accord (or the Accord)
  • First international supervisory agreement
  • But statutory implementation only by national authorities

1996 Market Risk Amendment to the Capital Accord
  • First use of internal models to compute risk weights

2004 Basel II Revised Framework: model-based credit risk measurement
Post-crisis capital standard revisions

2009  “Basel 2.5”: revised market risk, treatment of securitizations

2010– Basel III revisions
- Increase in minimum capital
- Introduction of non-risk, leverage-based charges
- Introduction of liquidity charges

2013– **Fundamental review of the trading book** (FRTB) to revise market risk capital rules, particularly addressing
  - Variability in market risk RWA across banks
  - Regulatory arbitrage of trading vs. banking book assignments
  - Understatement of tail risk, liquidity risk

**Current Basel framework:** standards published at https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/
Objectives of post-crisis capital standard revisions

- Objectives in conflict, and not necessarily met
- Above all: higher minimum required quantity of capital, especially for large banks, to reduce failure probability
- Higher quality, loss absorbency of capital, i.e. capacity to absorb losses without inducing run-like behaviors
- Avoid taxpayer cost in bailing out or unwinding failing intermediaries
- Reduce complexity, especially in models used to compute RWA
- Capture previously neglected risks, e.g. securitization, counterparty risk
- Reduce variations across institutions and jurisdictions in how rules interpreted without too-detailed prescriptive rules
Quantifying regulatory capital standards

- Standards defined as *minimum ratios*
  - With detailed definitions of numerator (capital) and denominator (assets)
- Numerator is the **quantity of capital**: certain liabilities issued by the bank
  - Distinguished by type or **quality of capital**
  - Recognition of *regulatory capital instruments* other than common equity, raising question of
- **Loss absorbency**: can losses be imposed on the liability—in crisis or at “point of non-viability”—without jeopardizing financial stability?
  - Concern reflects crisis experience: banks received public support while limiting losses to some regulatory capital instruments
  - Standards set out categories of loss absorbency and criteria for acceptance of a capital instrument into each

- The denominator may be either of
  - **Risk-weighted assets** (RWA), with distinct weighting systems for credit, market, operational risk
  - **Total balance-sheet assets**, adjusted using regulatory definitions

→ *risk-based capital*

→ *leverage-based capital*
Loss absorbency hierarchy

**Tier 1** or **core capital**: common equity and other “first loss” components
  - Intended to cover **going concern** losses firm can survive

**Tier 2** or **supplementary capital**: certain subordinated debt, preferred stock, and loan-loss reserves (ALLL account) within limits
  - Intended to cover **gone concern** loss, i.e. if firm failing
  - Protect taxpayer and most senior liabilities, e.g. deposits, senior unsecured debt

**Bail-in-able liabilities** includes other forms of longer-term unsecured subordinated debt
  - Provides further buffer to enable resolution, esp. large banks
Types of Tier 1 capital

**Common equity Tier 1 capital** (CET1): most loss-absorbent funding source, includes

- Common equity and retained earnings
- Common equity not a security type
- Calculated in conformity with accounting standards, excludes
  - *Goodwill*, other *intangible assets*
  - *Accumulated other comprehensive income* (AOCI), cumulative mark-to-market gains/losses on securities *available for sale* (AFS)
  - *Deferred Tax Assets* (DTAs) arising from previous losses
- Limits on an asset, *mortgage servicing rights* (MSRs)

**Additional Tier 1 capital** (AT1) includes

- Hybrid securities with equity and debt characteristics
- E.g. *Noncumulative perpetual preferred stock*
- In Europe: *contingent capital*
Scope of risk-based capital

- Minimum capital requirements measured for
  - Credit risk
  - Market risk
  - Counterparty risk
  - Operational risk
- A bank’s minimum risk-based capital is the total
  - Simple sum, no diversification benefit
Banking and trading books

- Regulatory distinction that largely aligns with accounting distinctions
- Regulatory arbitrage: same asset may have different impact on required capital depending on how assigned
- Tightening of “boundary” in BCBS’ *Fundamental review of the trading book*
Definition of banking and trading books

**Banking book:** original focus of Basel framework and bulk of RWA in most banks
- Primarily C&I loans and mortgages
- Loans valued at par, but with provisions for default loss through the *allowance for loan and lease losses* (ALLL) account
- Mostly credit risk, but also market, esp. interest-rate risk
- Also includes illiquid and real assets, e.g. unlisted equities, real estate
- Includes assets *held to maturity* (HTM), not marked-to-market but reported at *amortized cost*

**Trading book:** positions held for liquidity, market-making and proprietary trading
- And hedges of those positions
- Mostly market risk, but some credit and default risk in securities and loans in trading book
- Includes *trading* and *available for sale* (AFS) securities
Credit risk weighted assets

**Standard approach:** tables of fixed risk weights for assets by type and credit rating
- Use of ratings now excluded by DFA → U.S. applies Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) risk classifications for sovereigns

**Internal ratings-based (IRB) approach:** bank computes risk weights
- Applies formula based on single-factor credit risk model using bank-computed inputs
- Generally reduces RWA for banks that qualify
  - **Foundation IRB:** internal estimate of probability of default (PD)
  - **Advanced IRB:** internal estimate of LGD, exposure at the time of default (EAD), maturity of the exposure
- In U.S., obligatory for **Advanced Approaches Banking Organizations:**
  - Large, internationally active banks, $250 billion+ in assets
Classification of sources of market risk

**General market risk** arising from shocks to broad risk factors

**Default risk** in trading book
- Including securitizations
- Formerly **specific risk**—“exposures to specific issuers of debt securities or equities,” other idiosyncratic sources of risk—phased out following FRTB

**Residual** and **non-modelable risk**
Standardized and internal models approaches

**Standardized approach:** “building-block” approach, treats each risk factor—interest rates, equity, foreign exchange, etc.—separately
- There is a “simplified alternative” to standardized approach for eligible banks

**Internal models approach:** currently VaR-based, but moving toward expected shortfall following FRTB
- Banks using internal models must also calculate standardized approach capital for each trading desk as a control
Post-crisis revisions to market risk capital

- “Basel 2.5” interim revisions to trading book capital rules published 13Jul2009:
  
  **Stressed Value-at-Risk:** → large increase in trading book capital
  - Computed using historical data from a crisis

  **Default risk** in the trading book
  **Correlation trades:** additional capital charge for securitized products

- U.S. adoption (final rule) 07Jun2012

- Revised standards published 14Jan2016 focus on better capture of tail risk:
  - Use of expected shortfall in place of VaR, but at lower confidence level
  - Incorporation of market liquidity risk in minimum required capital
### Standardized approach for market risk capital

- **Risk factors:**
  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit spread risk: non-securitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit spread risk: securitizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign exchange risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Captures** linear (**delta**) and nonlinear (**curvature**) sensitivities, sensitivity to implied volatility (**vega**)
- **Table of risk weights by type of sensitivity** (e.g. delta) risk factor
- **Diversification** recognized within risk factors via prescribed correlation, but not across risk factors
- **Default Risk Charge** (DRC): exposures risk-weighted by rating
- **Residual Risk Add-On** (RRAO) of 1 or 0.1 percent of gross notional of certain assets
  - Captures less-common but often important sources of risk
  - **Examples** include correlation risk of securitizations, prepayment risk of mortgage-backed securities
- **Market risk capital requirement under standardized approach is**
  
  sensitivities-based capital + DRC + RRAO
Internal models approach for market risk capital

Global expected shortfall: a stressed ES
- Includes liquidity adjustment capturing time to liquidate positions
  - 10–250 days, depending on risk factor
- Includes a scenario-based stress component
- Computed by “trading desk”

Default Risk Charge based on a credit portfolio VaR

Stressed capital add-on currently VaR-based, but moving toward expected shortfall following FRTB
- Banks using internal models must also calculate capital based on standardized approach
Computation of expected shortfall for market risk

- Global expected shortfall measured at the 97.5 percent confidence level
  - Liquidity adjustments make time horizon of the ES measure a complex weighted average
  - Under Basel I and 2.5, VaR had been at 99th percentile (equal to 97.5 percent ES under the normal distribution)
    - Normal parametric $0.975 \text{ ES} = 1.00492 \times 0.99 \text{ VaR}$
    - Instantaneous price shock equivalent to a 10-day move, computed daily
- Analytical models, Monte Carlo and historical simulation can be used
- Calculated daily
  - Using worst 250 days
- Backtesting required
  - Backtesting of ES relies on VaR backtesting
  - Reliant on exceedance counts
- Historical observation period: minimum 1 year of data (or weighted average 6 months)
- Any computational technique and model acceptable
Basel III: risk-based capital

- Higher minimum capital ratios to RWA—both quality and quantity:
  - **Common equity Tier 1** (includes retained earnings): 2→4.5 percent (by 2015 in U.S.)
  - **Total Tier 1 capital** including AT1→6 percent Tier 1 (by 2015 in U.S.)
  - **Total capital** including Tier 2≥8 percent (unchanged from Basel II)

- Additional capital requirements:
  - Must be met through issuance of CET1
  - Not meeting these requirements→restrictions on capital distributions and discretionary bonuses

  - **Capital conservation buffer** (CCB): additional common equity of 2.5 percent (by 2019 in U.S.)
  - **Countercyclical buffer** of 0–2.5 percent by 2019 for large banks
  - **G-SIB surcharge** of 1–3.5 percent by 2019 for very large banks

- U.S. final rule approved 02Jul2013
Basel III: leverage-based capital

- **Leverage ratio**: minimum capital based on aggregate on- and off-balance sheet exposures
  - Larger of risk-based capital and leverage ratio is the binding minimum
- **Basel III standard (January 2014)**: Tier 1 capital a minimum of 3 percent of exposure measure or adjusted assets, including
  - On-balance sheet assets
  - Derivative and other off-balance sheet exposures, based on NPV or option value, plus potential future exposure
  - **Securities financing transaction** (SFTs): repo and securities lending; some netting recognized
- **Addresses avoidance of capital charges by underestimating RWA**
  - Impact of RWA estimate can be measured via **RWA density**: ratio of RWA to adjusted assets
  - But low RWA density may be related to bank’s business mix, e.g. large trading book, not RWA manipulation
- **For some banks adjusted assets exceed balance sheet assets**
  - E.g. Deutsche reduces balances-sheet assets with a negative derivatives position
Total Loss Absorbing Capacity

- Rules require G-SIBs to issue certain types of debt
- Intended to address \( \rightarrow \) Too-Big-To-Fail
U.S. Supplementary Leverage Ratio

- U.S. has adopted more stringent leverage-based capital rules
- **U.S. leverage ratio** for all FDIC-insured banks prior to crisis:
  - Long embedded in PCA framework
  - Now applies to Standardized Approach banks
  - Tier 1 capital at least 4 percent
  - At least 5 percent for bank to be “well-capitalized”
  - But relative to generally smaller exposure measure that excludes off-balance sheet items

- **Supplementary Leverage Ratio** (SLR): final rule 08Apr2014, implementation by early 2018)
  - Advanced Approach banks: Tier 1 capital at least 3 percent
  - Relative to exposure measure that includes off-balance sheet items

- **Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio** (eSLR)
  - Applies to GSIBs: 2 percent in addition to SLR
  - Insured bank subsidiaries of GSIBs: SLR at least 6 percent to be considered well-capitalized

- Impact of SLR primarily on largest banks, generally conduct large volume of SFTs through dealing subsidiaries
Relation of risk- and leverage-based capital ratios

- Risk-based capital intended to provide a risk-sensitive measure
  - Ideally varies precisely with riskiness of banks’ assets and activities
- Leverage-based capital intended to provide a backstop
  - Limits manipulation of risk measures by banks
- Required minimums of different regulatory capital instruments calibrated to achieve this
- If binding, risk-based minimum capital makes lower-risk assets less attractive
- If binding, leverage ratio makes higher-risk assets relatively attractive
  - And disincentivizes lower-risk activities, e.g. repo and bond market intermediation
## Summary of post-crisis regulatory minimum capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk-weighted assets</td>
<td>CET1 ≥ 4.5% RWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier 1 = CET1 + AT1 ≥ 6% RWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total risk-based (Tier 1 + Tier 2) ≥ 8% RWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capital conservation buffer CET1 2.5% RWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countercyclical buffer (large banks) CET1 0–2.5% RWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-SIB surcharge CET1 1–3.5% RWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted exposure</td>
<td>Leverage ratio: Tier 1 ≥ 4% exposure (standardized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLR: ≥ 3% exposure (advanced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLR: ≥ 5% exposure (GSIBs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-regulatory capital debt forms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table shows required ratios for U.S. once current regulation fully implemented by 01 Jan 2019.
# Example: Risk-weighted and adjusted assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BAC</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>DB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk-weighted assets</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit risk</td>
<td>863 035</td>
<td>151 573</td>
<td>214 753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVA</td>
<td>57 212</td>
<td>20 011</td>
<td>6 655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market risk</td>
<td>57 386</td>
<td>83 608</td>
<td>34 684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational risk</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td>115 487</td>
<td>98 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total RWA</td>
<td>1 477 633</td>
<td>370 679</td>
<td>354 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted assets</strong></td>
<td>2 192 337</td>
<td>828 000</td>
<td>1 444 000</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of total RWA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit risk</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVA</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market risk</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational risk</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Example: Capital and leverage ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital composition</th>
<th>BAC</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>DB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common equity tier 1</td>
<td>171,431</td>
<td>61,604</td>
<td>52,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional tier 1</td>
<td>23,391</td>
<td>8,776</td>
<td>8,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1 capital</td>
<td>194,822</td>
<td>70,380</td>
<td>61,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 2 capital</td>
<td>27,849</td>
<td>10,645</td>
<td>6,231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital ratios (percent of risk-weighted assets)</th>
<th>BAC</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>DB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common equity tier 1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1 capital</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total capital</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leverage ratio (capital as percent of adjusted assets)</th>
<th>BAC</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>DB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1 leverage</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memo: risk-weighted/adjusted assets (%)</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Capital and liquidity standards for banks

**Economics of capital rules**

Critiques of regulatory capital rules

Regulatory stress tests
A summary of the critiques

**Complexity:** simpler capital rules would do a better job preventing bank failures

**Inaccuracy of standard weights:** higher weights do not necessarily apply to riskier assets
  - **Example:** Merrill and UBS losses on low-weight subprime AAA

**Procyclicality:** gains increase and losses diminish capital and some risk weights may rise during downturns, diminishing bank lending

**Regulatory arbitrage:** the system encourages investment in higher-risk assets within categories with similar risk weights, or redesign of riskier assets to qualify for lower weights

**Quantity** of required capital criticized as too high and too low

**Uniformity and herd behavior:** Since the system applies to all banks, banks adopt uniform approaches to risk weighting → uniform investment and business strategies

**Incentivizes risk-taking:** For example, the leverage ratio penalizes low-risk assets by placing a floor under their risk weights
Excessive complexity of risk-based capital rules

- Basel rules feature complex system of risk weights in calculating minimum required capital.
- Risk-weighting of assets doesn’t lead to more precise measure of bank’s true required capital.
  - Risk-based capital has no discernible relationship to likelihood of bank failure during crisis.
- Simple leverage ratio outperforms risk-based capital in computing required capital and has predictive power for bank failure during crisis.
- Basel rules also feature complex definition (Tier 1) of capital.
  - Capital definition based on equity (core Tier 1) has predictive power for bank failure during crisis.
Procyclicality of risk-based capital

- **During expansions:** asset prices rise and volatility declines
  - Higher asset values generate surplus capital, intermediaries respond by restoring higher leverage, not by “acquiescing” in stronger balance sheet
  - Declining volatility → declining Value-at-Risk for a given volume of assets → release of risk budgets → increase in position size
- **During downturns:** inverse behavior of prices and volatility
  - Internal model estimates of bank borrowers’ default probabilities rise
  - Feedback pathways work pro- rather than countercyclically due to guarantees and moral hazard
  - Tension between procyclicality and ability of rules to discriminate differences in risk across banks at a point in time
- **Mitigation approaches in Basel III:** higher minimums, countercyclical buffers, regulatory leverage ratios
  - Leverage ratios less susceptible to procyclicality than risk-based capital requirements
Regulatory arbitrage of capital rules

- Basel II capital standards induced leverage and liquidity transformation before the crisis
- **Structured credit products** had low or zero risk weight
  - Originate and retain super senior
  - Hedge via CDS to bring risk weight to zero
- **Asset-backed commercial paper** (ABCP) conduit sponsors permitted from 2003 to avoid capital charges:
  - Credit support provided in form of liquidity, not credit guarantees
  - Kept off balance sheet under U.S. GAAP
  - But treated by rating agencies as full guarantees
Regulatory arbitrage: the euro area “doom loop”

- Current EU regulation: zero risk weight for EU sovereign debt, exempt from large exposure limits
  - Basel rules for standard approach banks: zero weight for sovereign debt denominated in domestic currency permitted (not prescribed)
  - IRB banks in EU can apply zero weight to EU government debt
- Marked home bias of Eurozone banks: high concentration of domestic debt in sovereign portfolios
- Doom or diabolic loop:
  - Sovereign perceived creditworthiness deteriorates
  - Banks balance sheets weaken, ↑perceived likelihood of bailouts
  - Sovereign perceived creditworthiness worsens
- Insensitivity to risk an impediment to introduction of euro area-wide “safe asset”
  - E.g. sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS): securitization of euro-area central government issues
Quantity of capital

- High minimum required capital criticized on grounds it constrains lending
- Current Basel and U.S. requirement remain well below historical ratios
Capital and liquidity standards for banks

Economics of capital rules

**Regulatory stress tests**
- How regulatory stress tests developed
- Structure of Federal Reserve stress tests
Origin and purpose of regulatory stress tests

- Stress testing originates as private, single-firm risk management techniques
- Primarily a microprudential supervisory tool for assessing a bank’s condition:
  - Supports capital standards by estimating capital ratios under stress
  - Firms’ internal capital planning as a mechanism for imposing supervisory data collection, modeling capabilities on regulated firms
  - Affects firms’ distribution plans (dividends, share repurchases)
- But evolving into a key macroprudential tool
  - Application to the largest banks
  - Forward-looking, centered on projections of future events
  - Results generally highly publicized, intended to promote financial stability by strengthening confidence
  - But no explicit systemic-risk component, e.g., interactions between firms
- Has become a key measure through high public visibility and impact
  - When results generally positive, supports public confidence in banks and the regulatory mechanism
  - Semi-public nature of tests may compromise credibility
Evolution of stress tests during crisis

- Began as ad-hoc measures during crisis, now annual exercises
- **Supervisory Capital Assessment Program** (SCAP) of 2009 surprisingly effective in reassuring markets
- **Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review** (CCAR), 2011–date,
- **Dodd-Frank stress testing** (DFAST): SIFIs (including nonbanks) and BHCs with consolidated assets $\geq 50$ bill.
- Similar efforts by European regulators have met more skepticism: ECB, EBU, Single Supervisor, Single Resolution Mechanism, Asset Quality Review (AQR)
- Stress tests to be conducted in future on non-bank SIFIs under Dodd-Frank
  - But stress tests need to be adapted, current framework and scenarios not appropriate for non-bank SIFIs
- Credibility is crucial
  - SCAP in 2009 credible, contribution to turn in markets
  - Europe 2010: lack of detail in disclosure, sovereign debt in banking book excluded
Planning horizon of stress tests

- Multi-year horizon rather than measuring results of a ne-time shock
- Identify uses and sources of capital over the planning horizon
  - P&L results under “benchmark” and “adverse” macroeconomic scenarios
  - Capital ratios, capital-raising and dividend-payout plans
- Stress scenarios set by Fed, but only broad outlines, not details of scenarios, are made known to regulated institutions and public
  - Opacity increases compliance costs, introduces potential for arbitrariness in results
  - Full transparency would increase risk of procyclicality due to correlated risks, and potential for regulatory arbitrage
In- and outflows of capital under the stress tests

- Regulated entity computes results according to accounting rules.
- Estimate **after-tax net income** (or losses) each quarter in the scenario:
  - **Pre-provision net revenue** (PPNR): NII plus other income (e.g. fees) less other expenses (e.g. legal costs).
  - Subtract **provisions** (realized and estimated future loan losses), mark-to-market or **other-than-temporary impairment** (OTTI) losses on securities, and taxes.
- Measure capital impact under entity’s **baseline capital plan**:
  - Net income distributed to shareholders or added to capital.
  - Net income but not capital plan computed under stress (e.g. no unplanned dividend cuts in response to losses).
  - How do shareholder and regulatory capital change in the scenario? Does regulated entity still have enough?