NYT Op-Ed (Oct 1, 1997): The Encryption Debate

     Underdeveloped
     By PETER WAYNER
     
     Police Versus Us:
     The Encryption Chasm
     
     F or the last five years, I've been immersed in the debate on
     encryption, and during that time I've come to recognize a very
     clear division over the issue: Almost everyone supporting the
     Clinton administration's plan to rewire the Internet for easy
     surveillance draws a government-backed paycheck, and virtually
     everyone in the private sector opposes the idea.
     
     A brief conversation last week offered some insight into this
     apparent gulf between a government of the people and the people
     themselves.
     
     A friend had asked for my help installing a new computer at his
     small business. The last three years had been a slow, steady climb
     up from nothing, and as he unpacked the machine, he spoke about how
     he'd had little money to spend at the beginning. The new computer
     was more than just a tool; it was a symbol of how his business was
     starting to grow into a success. It had been purchased for a new
     employee.
     
     Then he paused to tell me about a conversation he'd had with a
     contractor that had failed to deliver.
     
     "I told him that I needed to win each day," my friend recalled. "If
     I don't win a contract, I don't get paid. If I don't get paid, no
     one at my house eats. This guy was about to screw up the biggest
     deal in the office. He doesn't understand that you've got to get it
     right from the start."
     
     Many of the people who work in government have a very different
     perspective on their jobs. They don't have to worry about deals
     going right. If anything they have to wait around for them to go
     bad. When hurricanes, riots, robberies, fires, wars, disease or
     failed crops come along, they get stuck with the often sad and
     difficult job of cleaning up.
     
     This is the basis for the discontent and wide gulf between the
     Federal Bureau of Investigation and the rest of the nation. The
     business person must be proactive. If he doesn't make things
     happen, he doesn't eat. Good, solid encryption lets him control
     access to his data and keeps competitors and industrial spies from
     snooping into his business. People in government need to be
     reactive. If they don't clean up messes swiftly, they may
     eventually lose their jobs. The police don't want anything to stand
     in their way, and a computer file that can't be read is an
     obstacle.
     
     "All of law enforcement is also in total agreement on one aspect of
     encryption," FBI Director Louis B. Freeh told a Congressional
     committee recently. "The widespread use of uncrackable encryption
     will devastate our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism."
     
     While this may be true for all those who work for government law
     enforcement agencies, it is not true of everyone in America who
     deals with crime prevention.
     
     The fact is that while citizens are quite thankful to have the
     police or the FBI available in times of trouble, they also realize
     that the cavalry usually shows up too late to undo the damage.
     Putting the arsonist in jail doesn't bring back the house or the
     wedding pictures. Arresting the burglar often doesn't recover the
     goods in one piece. Prosecuting the rapist does little more than
     bring a taste of revenge and the hope of saving some other victim
     the pain of assault.
     
     Consider the case of George Gerald Chamberlain, a convicted
     pedophile doing time in a Minnesota penitentiary. The police were
     shocked to discover last year that a prison computer to which
     Chamberlain had access contained a cache of pornography and a list
     of children with notations like "latchkey kids," "speech
     difficulties," "cute," and "Little Ms. pageant winner." The list
     was 52 pages long. Chamberlain denied any connection to it.
     
     The FBI and other parts of the Justice Department often jump on
     examples like this and suggest that we should be happy that he
     didn't encrypt the list. That's the kind of response that comes
     from someone trying to make a case in court and pick up the pieces.
     My instinct, however, is completely different. I want the e-mail of
     children and the details of their lives to be completely encrypted.
     They shouldn't end up on the list in the first place. That's being
     proactive.
     
     The really worrisome part is that the FBI's plan to build in
     "immediate access" for the police to all files and communication in
     America could make the Internet more dangerous. Since prison
     officials are part of the law enforcement community, they'll no
     doubt share in this "immediate access" to all our data. If
     convicted felons could collect pornography and compile lists of
     children on a prison's computer system, can anyone promise with a
     straight face that a prisoner will never get the warden's backdoor
     key to all our files?
     
     Unfortunately, the gulf between the people and the police is
     growing. Alan McDonald, a senior FBI official in the battle against
     encryption technology, recently described people who dare to
     contest the FBI's push for total government access to our data as
     "privacy extremists."
     
     This isn't a good way to reach out to the people who argue, quite
     reasonably, that the FBI's plan to place the equivalent of a bug in
     every computer is not only Orwellian but immensely expensive: it
     could result in the largest bureaucracy ever created.
     
     Most people I know, in and out of the computer industry, hate the
     FBI's plan to rewire the Internet, not for any deeply held
     political or philosophical reason but because it will be a costly
     pain in the neck that will produce little in the way of protecting
     citizens. After all, criminals, who think nothing of robbing,
     stealing and killing, will just use their own encryption while
     law-abiding citizens are entrusting a back door key to their data
     to the police.
     
     In truth, crime prevention is a partnership. Law enforcement is
     only the part that steps in when all else fails. Prevention is the
     job of the average person, and in the private sector, where
     everyday people live, where a failed deal can destroy a business,
     secure encryption is as necessary as a wall safe, a strongbox and a
     trustworthy bank.
     
     UNDERDEVELOPED is published weekly, on Wednesdays. Click here for a
     list of links to other columns in the series.
     
    Peter Wayner at pwayner@nytimes.com welcomes your comments and
    suggestions.
                                      
                 Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company