

“Nation State” or “State Nation”?

Comparative Reflections on Indian Democracy

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* The three authors are listed in alphabetical order. Alfred Stepan, for six years, and Juan J. Linz, for four years, have been discussing the themes of this article with Yogendra Yadav and at Yadav’s request supplied some questions for the 1998 National Election Study. Many of our reflections on India, which we put in a comparative perspective with the other ten long standing federal democracies, are based on the National Election Studies of India (NES) of 1996 and 1998 for which Yadav was National Coordinator. Linz and Stepan want to thank Shankar Bagpai for being such a gracious intellectual and cultural host in India. All the authors want to thank Enrique Ochoa-Reza and Jeff Miley who are finishing dissertations at Columbia

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“Nation State” or “State Nation”? Conceptual Reflections and Spanish, Belgian and

Indian Data

Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan and Yogendra Yadav

Introduction

One of the urgent conceptual, normative and political tasks of our day is to think anew about how polities that aspire to be political democracies can accommodate great cultural diversity within one state. Given the reality of cultural diversity in many of the polities of the world, the belief that many people have that every state should be a nation, and that every nation should be a state, seems to us to be misguided and indeed dangerous since, as we shall argue, many states in the world today in fact contain more than one nation (or territorially-based cultural groups) within their boundaries.

The belief that every state should be a nation reflects perhaps the most widely accepted normative vision of a modern democratic state, i.e. the “nation state.” After the French Revolution, especially in the 19th century, many policies were devoted to creating a unitary nation state in France in which all French citizens had only one cultural and political identity.

These policies included a package of incentives and disincentives to ensure that French increasingly became the only acceptable language in the state. Political mechanisms to allow the recognition and expression of regional cultural differences were so unacceptable to French nation state builders that advocacy of federalism was at times a capital offense. Throughout France, state schools at any given hour were famously teaching the same curriculum with identical syllabi by teachers who had been trained and certified by the same Ministry of Education rules and tests. Numerous other state institutions, such as universal conscription, were designed to create a common French identity and to be robustly assimilative.¹

Of course, some very successful democracies, such as contemporary Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, and Portugal are close to the ideal type of a unitary nation state. Some federal states such as Germany and Australia have also become nation states. In our view, if a polity (at the historical moment when a state directed political program of “nation-state” building begins) appears to be relatively culturally homogeneous throughout the territory of the state, and most of its politicized citizens have a strong sense of shared history, the aspiration to create a nation state should not create problems for the achievement of an inclusive democracy. In fact, the creation of such a national identity and relative homogeneity in the 19th century was identified with democratization and was possible in consolidated states. In the twentieth century, however, attempts to create a nation state by state policies encountered growing difficulties, even in an old state like Spain. In our judgment, in the last century virtually no new

¹ For a classic book on these policies see Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchman: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). Most 19th Century progressives and democrats, particularly those associated with the French Revolution, were profoundly opposed to federalism. For the normative advocacy of a unified, homogeneous, nation state see the entries on “Federalism”, “Federation”, “Nation”, and “Departement” in the extremely illustrative but not well known, François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Belnap Press, 1989), pp. 54-64, 65-73, and 742-753.

nation-states have been created except as the result of wars, violence, oppression, and secession. However, if a polity has great politically-salient cultural and/or linguistic diversity (and many polities do) we will argue that political leaders in such a polity need to think about, normatively legitimate, and make use of, the concept of “state nation”.

Linz and Stepan first introduced this concept in 1996, but only in a paragraph (and one figure). “We...believe some conceptual, political, and normative attention should be given to the possibility of state nations. The states we would like to call state nations are multicultural, and sometimes even have significant multinational components, which nonetheless still manage to engender strong identification and loyalty from their citizens, an identification and loyalty that proponents of homogeneous nation states perceive that only nation-states can engender.” They went on to say that neither Switzerland nor India were [in the French sense] “strictly speaking a nation state, but we believe both can now be called state nations. Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India made significant gains in managing multinational tensions through skillful and consensual usage of numerous consociational practices. Through this process India became in the 1950s and the early 1960s a democratic state nation.”²

The rest of this chapter will be devoted to developing our concept of “state nation” and to applying it to polities such as Spain, Belgium, and especially India. We will attempt to demonstrate that all three of these polities have strong “state nation” (as well as some “nation state” and some “multinational”) identifications and loyalties.

² See the chapter titled “Stateness, Nationalism, and Democratization,” in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.34, as well as figure 2.1.

In order to develop the “state nation” concept, we think it necessary to clear some conceptual ground. In thinking about how “socio-cultural diversities” are politically managed, there are two axes that need to be mapped, with the help of analytical distinctions. The first axis pertains to the nature of socio-cultural diversities that present themselves to political actors. Such diversities are of course a product of developments over a long historical period, but they are seen as “givens” to political actors. Hence the temptation to see these diversities as essential, natural, or primordial. Nevertheless, what appear as essential divisions in any given society are no more than social cleavages that happen to be politically activated and mobilized at that moment. There is always a gap between the map of potential cleavages that underlie every society and the actual map of politically-salient divisions.

All too often this axis is seen as ranging from “homogenous societies” to “diverse societies,” as if homogeneity or its absence were a “natural” condition or starting point. However, the division between so-called “homogenous” and so-called “diverse” societies is better captured as a distinction between societies in which socio-cultural divisions have not acquired political salience, on the one hand, and societies in which they have, on the other. An historical context is built into this distinction; and in our judgment, the crucial question is whether such potential cleavages have become activated by the time competitive politics are instituted.

Furthermore, we need to distinguish among societies with different types of politically-activated socio-cultural divisions. At one extreme are societies where social divisions have a geographical concentration and are articulated in more than one “nationalist” vocabulary throughout the territory of the state. Such a society may be called a “multi-national society.”

At the other extreme are societies where socio-cultural divisions exist but are not geographically concentrated and are not articulated in a “nationalist” vocabulary. Following the recent literature, we would call such a society a “multi-cultural” society.

Between these two extremes are a range of societies, in which politically salient social divisions do permit varying degrees of geographical concentrations yet are not articulated in a “national” vocabulary. We stress that the distinctions we are making here are between “ideal types.” In reality, a society can be both “multinational” and “multicultural” at once.

The second axis that invites theoretical clarification is the one we will be principally concerned with in this paper. It relates not to the nature and articulation of socio-cultural diversities, but to the models of political strategies and some specific institutional responses for dealing with such diversities. Three ideal-types can be delineated along this axis, that we shall call (1) “nation state,” (2) “state nation,” and (3) “pure or extreme multinationalism.”

“Nation-state” policies stand for a political-institutional approach that attempts to privilege one socio-cultural identity over other potential or actual socio-cultural cleavages that can be politically mobilized. “Nation-state” policies have been pursued historically by following a variety of routes: (1) by creating or arousing a special kind of allegiance or common cultural identity in those living in a state; (2) by encouraging the voluntary assimilation of those who do not share that initial allegiance or cultural identity into the nation-state’s identity; (3) by various forms of social pressure and coercion to achieve this and to prevent or destroy alternative cultural identities; and (4) by coercion that might, in the extreme, even involve ethnic cleansing.

By contrast, “state nation” policies stand for a political-institutional approach that respects and protects multiple but complementary socio-cultural identities. “State nation” policies recognize the legitimate public and even political expression of active socio-cultural cleavages, and they evolve mechanisms to accommodate competing or conflicting claims made on behalf of those divisions without privileging or imposing any one claim. “State nation” policies involve creating a sense of belonging (or “we-feeling”) with respect to the state-wide political community, while simultaneously creating institutional safeguards for respecting and protecting politically-salient socio-cultural diversities. The “we-feeling” may take the form of defining a tradition, history and shared culture in an inclusive manner, with attachment to common symbols of the state and/or inculcating some form of “constitutional patriotism.”

In democratic societies, the institutional safeguards constitutive of “state nation” policies most likely take the form of federalism, and often specifically *asymmetrical* federalism, and/or consociational practices.³

Why is federalism an institutional response that is frequently central to the design of a state nation? This is the subject of Stepan’s separate chapter in this volume.⁴ But, for the proper understanding of the argument we develop in this chapter, we should note that Stepan demonstrates that virtually every long-standing and relatively peaceful contemporary democracy in the world whose polity has more than one territorially concentrated, politically-

³ We accept Robert Dahl’s definition of federalism as “a system in which some matters are exclusively *within* the competence of certain local units – cantons, states, provinces – and are constitutionally *beyond* the scope of the authority of the national government; and where certain other matters are constitutionally outside the scope of the authority of the smaller units.” See his “Federalism and the Democratic Process,” in *Democracy, Liberty and Equality* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 114-126. Quote from 114.

⁴ See his “Federalism, Multinational States, and Democracy: A Theoretical Framework, The Indian Model and a Tamil Case Study”.

mobilized, linguistic-cultural majority, is not only federal, but “asymmetrically federal”(Spain, Belgium, Canada, and India).⁵ This means that, by a certain point, these polities, in order to “hold together” their great diversity in one democratic system, had to constitutionally embed special cultural and historical prerogatives for some of the member units, prerogatives that respond to their somewhat different linguistic/cultural aspirations, demands, and/or historical identities.⁶ We believe that had political leaders in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and India instead insisted upon attempting to impose one language and culture on the country and insisted upon a homogenizing French –style unitary nation state, the cause of social peace, inclusionary democracy, and individual rights would not have been served in any of these four, long-standing democratic states. This was so because more than one territorially based, linguistic, cultural majority had already been activated in each of these four countries. The strategic question therefore was whether to attempt to repress or accommodate this preexisting, politically-activated diversity. Asymmetrical federalism historically emerged in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and India as a policy response aimed at accommodation. We therefore think that, as a normative concept, an institutional framework, and a set of historical experiences, “asymmetrical federalism” should be strongly considered, by theoreticians and political leaders alike, as a possible approach to democracy in polities such as Sri Lanka and Burma that have more than one territorially based, already politically activated, linguistic-cultural majority within the existing state.

⁵ Some border line cases might be Sri Lanka, but while it may be a marginal democracy, it certainly is not peaceful. The United Kingdom, too, bears watching as a possible outlier.

⁶ The concepts of “asymmetrical federalism” and “holding together federalism” will be developed with greater detail and documentation later in this and Stepan’s chapter.

In sum, then, the idea of the nation associated with the “nation state” approach implies creating one common culture within the state; while the idea of the nation associated with the “state nation” approach can contain more than one politically-salient culture, but nonetheless encourages and requires respect for the common institutions of the state, as well as respecting existing socio-cultural diversities.⁷

Thus, “state nation” is a term introduced to distinguish democratic states that do not, and can not, fit well into the classic French style “nation state” model based on a “we feeling” resulting from an existing or forged homogeneity. “State nations” nonetheless can, and have, managed to create powerful and positive citizens’ identification with the institutions and symbols of the state, such as the Constitution, inclusive democratic institutions and procedures, and guarantees of basic freedoms.

The state nation needs to be differentiated from a third model -- namely, that of “pure” or extreme multinationalism, in which territorially-concentrated, socio-cultural groups that employ a “nationalist” vocabulary and conceive of their “nationalities” as nation-states in *potentia*, aim at reducing the state to a basic minimum, with the result, intended or not, of an extremely weak (if any) “we-feeling”.

The leaders of “nationalities” – or “nations” – in a multinational state may reject being part of a “state-nation”; they may define themselves as “nations” living under a state (not as “part of” or “in” a state), and commit themselves to a nation-building project against the state, with the goal of achieving statehood at the first opportunity (by peaceful or violent means).

⁷ The analytical distinction between “nation-state” and “state-nation,” as the terms imply, involves an affinity – since both include the term “nation,” and certainly, for some theorists of nationalism, both terms would fit under their conception of a nation.

Obviously, many advocates of such a “pure” (or what we consider extreme) multinational state do not express themselves so bluntly. Some of them demand that the whole state becomes multinational “all-the-way-down”, doing away with as many symbols and practices supporting the idea of a common state. They may advocate a state that is a sum of nations, each with its own exclusive identity, symbols and laws, where the state becomes an empty shell, and the citizens of the state have nothing important to say about common institutions – except to the extent that in international relations and organizations, the states and their citizens have a say.

Here we would like to make a further comment on the differences between the state-nation, even when it contains important multi-national components, and a “pure” multi-national state composed of nations, in which the state would be reduced almost to an “empty shell,” or at the most a confederation, rather than a federation.

The concept of the state-nation, as a type (and model) existing between that of the nation-state, on the one hand, and the “purely” multi-national state, on the other, is one that has taken on increasing importance in our analysis. In a relatively early formulation (unpublished, but dating from 2000), Linz would argue:

“It is difficult to define the difference between a multinational state and a state-nation. It could be argued that any stable multinational state would also be a state-nation since it requires some sense of identification, of loyalty, to the state rather than wishing its disintegration.”⁸

Elsewhere in the same essay, Linz also stressed that the kind of affective attachment that the state-nation inspires in its citizens is something that cannot be fully captured by Habermas’s overly-rationalistic conception of “constitutional patriotism” alone. Linz argued: “Although the

⁸ Juan Linz, “Democratic States, Nation-States, State-Nations and Multinational States” (unpublished). Quote from pp. 12-13.

Verfassungspatriotismus – the commitment to be a liberal-democratic-social constitutionalism – is one of the elements of the legitimation of state-nations, I do not believe that it is the only or a sufficient one. The construction of a state-nation requires other elements of symbolic and emotional nature we still do not know well.”⁹

Since this earlier formulation, we have become more acquainted with a series of theoretical arguments for “multinational federalism” that have recently proliferated among Catalan nationalist intellectuals in the Spanish context (perhaps most prominently exemplified by the work of Ferran Requejo and Miquel Caminal).¹⁰ What strikes us about these accounts is that, despite the language they use, they seem to be arguing not for a truly federal state at all, but rather, for a model of confederation between multiple nation-states. In particular, their hostility to the Habermasian conception of “constitutional patriotism,” and even to the related concept of *Bundestreue* (roughly, “loyalty to the Federation”), for allegedly being unfriendly to difference alarms us. For indeed, our sense is that commitment to Habermas’ conception of “constitutional patriotism” alone cannot provide a sufficient basis for any state to be perceived as legitimate – that something more is necessary; yet, to our dismay, we have found that these other theorists of “multinational federalism” object to Habermas’ conception on opposite grounds. For them, a state that demands “constitutional patriotism” from all its citizens is demanding too much. This has led us to suspect that these intellectuals are in fact using the

⁹ Ibid. p. 35.

¹⁰ See, for example, Miquel Caminal, *El federalismo pluralista: del federalismo nacional al federalismo plurinacional* (Barcelona: Paidós, 2002); and Ferran Requejo, *Federalisme, per a què?* (Valencia: L’hora del present, 1998). Quite strikingly, a section of the Indian left has since 1946 advocated a multinational state along similar lines. See, for example, the article by Praakash Karat, “Theoretical Aspects of the National Question” and the article by Irfin Habib, “Emergence of Nationalities,” both in a special edition of *Social Scientist*, titled “The National Question in India,” #37 (August 1975).

conceptualization of “multinational federalism” as a mere tactic for legitimating the hollowing-out of the state altogether, for chipping away at its sovereignty, while simultaneously attempting to legitimate projects of piecemeal nation-state building in the periphery. Thus, our shift in emphasis in this chapter. We think it urgent to underscore the necessity for some form of basic loyalty to the institutions of the state, some form of symbolic attachment to it and identification with it, some form of we-feeling.

That said, we need to keep in mind the fact that the concept of state-nation, like that of nation-state, is an ideal-type that only imperfectly corresponds to any given empirical case. We also need to keep in mind the fluidity of empirical reality – i.e. that cases that once fit closer to the model of the nation-state can and have evolved into something closer to state-nations (witness Spain and the UK), and the other way around (witness Austria). With these caveats already in mind, we have reformulated our concept of the state-nation, and its partial distinction from both the nation-state and the “pure” multi-national state.

Again, though, these are analytical distinctions, they can be operationalized using a range of indicators. What’s more, the distinctions themselves are fluid and some theorists of nationalism would include in their definitions of nation-states our state-nations. This, however, would obscure crucial differentiating facts and have the dangerous political implication of creating demands on citizens based on the ideals of a nation-state.

Multinationalism is more a sociological conceptualization than a particular type of political institutionalization. Multinational societies cannot be nation-states (in a specific sense of the term) but can be either state-nations or the basis for conceptualizations aiming at a confederation rather than a federation in one state. Relatively stable democratic federal states

are either nation-states or state-nations but not mere aggregates of multiple nation-states (i.e. confederations of multiple nation-states). When the we-feeling is dominantly or only centered on a “nation” and the state is identified with only one of the nation-states or as alien, if not as an oppressor, the construction of a state-nation becomes difficult if not impossible. Democracies are stable in multinational societies only if an effort is made to legitimate the state by those who also could aim at its disintegration.

Normatively and empirically, we believe in the possibility of multiple and complementary identities in a multinational society, which serve as the support for the construction of affective attachment and loyalty to the state.¹¹ Indeed, later in this article we will document that the modal self-identification in Spain and Belgium, for example, is a dual identity. It is also clear to us that if, in a federal state, the citizens in all the sub-units define their primary loyalty as being exclusively to their sub-unit, and if they have almost no loyalty or identification with the state, not only that federal system but that state as well is prone to disintegration – Yugoslavia by the late-80’s being the clearest case in point.

Let us now turn to examine the relationship between the two axes, one representing activated socio-cultural diversities, and the other representing institutional responses and political strategies. As we have suggested, a key question here is the relation between state nations and multinational societies (such as Yugoslavia in the late 1980’s) in which all the nationalities are conceived of as nation states in *potentia*, and whose leaders aim at reducing the common state to a basic minimum. The result of this process can be the generation of a very weak “we feeling” among the citizens of the state. In the case of Yugoslavia, by the early

¹¹ Here we differ substantially with Ernest Gellner. On this point see Alfred Stepan, “Modern Multinational Democracies: Transcending a Gellnerian Oxymoron”, in his *Arguing Comparative Politics*, 181-199.

1990's, most citizens of the state felt they were "Croatian", "Slovenian", "Serbian", "Bosnian" or "Macedonian", and very few felt that they were also "Yugoslavian". Dual and complementary political identities and loyalties had virtually disappeared as "multinational" Yugoslavia had increasingly become merely a composite of hostile, aspirant nation states with very little or no "we feeling". Multinational societies (even those which tolerate and indeed manifest dual identities and much "we feeling", like Spain) cannot be complete nation states in the classic French sense of the term. However, and this is crucial, multinational and multi-cultural societies can be, or can become, state nations with strong we feelings, if complementary as well as multiple cultural and political identities exist or are generated.

Another issue concerns the relation between multicultural societies and the competing conceptions of the "nation state" and the "state nation". Our conception of "state nation" derives from our belief, based on historical case studies and analysis, that democracy is possible in polities that are sociologically and politically multi-cultural and even partly (but not exclusively) multinational, if an effort is made to legitimate the state by those minorities and majorities who could conceivably aim at its de-legitimation. Our advocacy of the term "state nation" is also based on our recognition that in some countries, cultural groups are not territorially concentrated but instead are so diffusely located that even "asymmetrical federalism" is not an option. However, given the robustness of these different politically salient cultural groups, a classic French-style "nation state" may also not be an option for a peaceful democracy without a costly, and most likely non-democratic, period of state imposed assimilation efforts, and possibly even ethnic cleansing. Nonetheless, in the same cultural

context, a state nation may be a possibility, and probably the most possible, democratic model to pursue.

Some readers might feel that the term “state nation” is an “ideological” concept. However, the argument in France about the absolute necessity of creating a “nation state” after the French Revolution was also ideological. In any case, “ideological constructs” are both a reflection, and a source, of empirical political-social realities. Our introduction of the term “state nation” is intended both to introduce a normative standard to which democracies in polities that appear highly diverse can aspire to, and to introduce a set of at least four observable empirical socio-political realities that a polity, if it is a state nation, will manifest.

A diverse polity, if it has become a state nation, will have the four following, empirically demonstrable patterns. First, despite multiple cultural identities among the citizens of the polity there will be at the same time a high degree of positive identification with the state, and pride in being citizens of that state. Second, citizens of the state will have multiple but complementary political identities and loyalties. Third, there will be a high degree of trust in the most important constitutional, legal, and administrative components of the state. Fourth, by world democratic standards, there will be a comparatively high degree of positive support, among all the diverse groups of citizens in the country, for the specific state-wide democratic institutions through which the multicultural and possibly multinational polity is governed.

At this point, we need to address a potentially powerful, but in our view, misguided, argument about socio-cultural diversity. After the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and parts of the Soviet Union, many analysts have begun to reject wholesale all political and institutional frameworks that grant any form of prerogatives to territorially-concentrated, socio-

cultural groups -- arrangements which they refer to as “ethno-federal” and/or “national federal.”

These scholars criticize “ethno-federal” arrangements because they believe that such arrangements privilege “sub-national” socio-cultural identities at the expense of identification with common symbols, institutions and individual rights. This privileging, they claim, is likely to foster at least the activation of conflictual, *as opposed to complementary*, identities, and perhaps violence and fragmentation.¹²

These critics ignore, however, the fact that nearly all successful democratic states with more than one politically-activated, territorially-concentrated, linguistic-cultural majority, have institutional frameworks that include a substantial (but absolutely not, as in Yugoslavia, a virtually exclusive) “ethno-federal” dimension. In successful state nations, group rights do not,

¹² Even though in her book, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Valerie Bunce does not explicitly argue this point, many people who read her book, have employed its analysis of the Yugoslavian and Soviet experiences to make the case that “ethno-federal” institutions by themselves are “subversive” institutions for stateness and peace. See also Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000). For her part, Bunce refers to “national federalism” as one of the most important “subversive institutions.” She argues that national federalism helped “produce over time a ‘disintegration’ of the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak states along republican lines;” and that “with the expanded opportunities for major change in the 1980s, ‘disintegration’ in all three instances translated into actual disintegration, and the state and the regime departed from Europe in virtual tandem” (p.102). Likewise, she maintains that “national federalism worked to build nations (or reinforce such processes, if nations were already formed), along with protostates at the republican level” (p.136); and that this “contributed not just to homogeneity *within* republics, but also to diversity *among* republics, and that it was the latter that made a single-state project untenable, especially in turbulent times” (p.140). For Yugoslavia in particular, she specifies that after Tito’s death, “new institutions were introduced that created full political equality among the republics and provinces, that allocated to them *all* the decision-making powers vested in the party and the government and that, as a result, encouraged republican party elites to go in very different economic and political directions” (p.88).

However, we would like to note that such devolution of “*all* decision-making powers” goes beyond the Dahlian definition of federalism as consisting in “multiple jurisdictions” and “shared sovereignty,” so that, even when we bracket the important issue of democracy, to describe the Yugoslav state at the time as “federal” rather than “confederal,” as some do, seems somewhat of a stretch. Furthermore, for our purposes, we want to stress that none of the countries that we consider “state nations” have reduced the central state to an “empty shell” remotely analogous to the Yugoslav case, despite the fact that they all have introduced a significant ethno-federal dimension. Thus, the introduction of ethno-federal elements is absolutely not always a slippery slope leading to state disintegration. Whereas the model of pure multinationalism does in fact lead to the disintegration of a single state and, often, after substantial bloodshed and ethnic cleansing, to the emergence of multiple nation-states, the model of the “state nation” does not. Instead, we insist, it can positively help contribute to the maintenance of state integration.

and should not ever, violate the individual's rights that come to them as individual members of the state. Witness the institutional frameworks of the states that we consider to be exemplary state-nations – namely, Belgium, Canada, Spain, and India. The institutional frameworks of all of these contain an element of “ethno-federalism.” Nevertheless, none of these states can be classified as purely “ethno-federal” either, since in these states recognition of the legitimate public and political expression of active socio-cultural “national” cleavages is balanced with constitutionally sanctioned respect for common symbols, institutions, and individual rights, thus facilitating the maintenance and nurturing of *multiple and complementary*, as opposed to *exclusive and conflictual*, identities.

We believe that it would be a grave error to discard the state-nation approach simply because the institutional framework associated with it tends to contain a significant ethno-federal dimension. In our judgment, in order for a variety of states (such as Burma or Sri Lanka) that are not now peaceful and/or democratic to achieve a consolidated democracy, they would have to strive to become state-nations. This means, quite simply, that for consolidated democracy to be possible, these states would have to craft institutional frameworks that contain both (a) a substantial “ethno-federal dimension” and (b) mechanisms facilitating identification with common symbols and institutions. If, in the process of democratization, leaders of these states were to pursue either a pure nation-state model, or a pure ethno-federal model, the result would almost certainly be continued armed struggle and failure to achieve democratic consolidation.

Let us not allow a reading of the Yugoslavian and Soviet experiences to destroy the legitimacy of all institutional arrangements containing an “ethno-federal” dimension; for to do

so would require giving up on the middle ground of the “state-nation” – a model that has proven valuable in the important but extremely difficult task of reconciling cultural inclusiveness with democratic stability in states containing more than one politically-activated, territorially-concentrated, socio-cultural “national” group (see Figure #1).

A Democratic State Is

Possible:

If only one significant, territorially concentrated, politically activated socio-cultural identity exists, democratic nation-state crafting is possible. State structures can be unitary or symmetrically federal. Eg. France and Japan in the 19th century, Australia in the early 20th century.

A Democratic State Is

Improbable:

If almost no loyalty to central state authorities and common symbols exist, and most citizens in sub-units of the state primarily identify with “national” aspirations in these units, and see these units as nation-states in *potentia*, political identities are singular and conflictual. Crafting a democratic, federal, multi-national state is extremely improbable, due to interacting conflicts between secessionist attempts and possible centralization efforts. The situation could lead the central government, even if it is democratically

A Democratic State Is

Possible:

If significant dual and complementary identities exist, democratic state-nation crafting is possible, but a nation-state would be extremely difficult. Least conflictual state structure would be asymmetrical federal-ism, in which some cultural prerogatives are constitutionally embedded for sub-units with salient, territorial identities. Eg. Belgium, Spain, Canada, and India.

ti
Struc
ures

**Pure Nation-State
Model State-
Nation Model
Proposals for Pure
Multinationalism**

Low

High

Intensity of Political Activation of Multiple, Territorially-Concentrated, Socio-Cultural “National” Identities

Figure One: Democratically-Probable and Improbable Relationships between Activated, Territorially-Concentrated, Socio-Cultural Identities and Political-Institutional Strategies.

Let us now attempt to develop our analytic argument in more empirical detail to see if, and if so how, culturally diverse countries such as Spain, Belgium and especially India approximate our ideal-typical model of “state nations”. We shall first examine the key role of the origins of federalism in state-nations (which tend to grow out of an effort to “hold together,” rather than an effort to “come together”), as well as the legal frameworks of the prerogatives and powers of the member units of the federations (which tend to be “asymmetrical” rather than “symmetrical”).

“Holding Together Federalism” and “Asymmetrical Federalism” as Frequent Institutional Forms for the Model of State-Nations

The fact that a number of the oldest and most successful states were nation-states led many to think that all states should be coterminous with nations, that states should be nation-builders like France was in the nineteenth century, and that all nations should become states, as the Wilsonian ideology of self-determination implies.

However, a large number of states do not fit into the classical conception of the nation-state and in fact have significant multi-national components. One example is Spain, one of the oldest states in Europe whose borders have not changed since the mid-seventeenth century. Linz, writing in 1970 before the transition to a federal type of state after the death of Franco, asserted that Spain is a state for all Spanish citizens, a nation-state for a large part of the

population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities. Also, he added, there is a small minority which contests or rejects that state and seeks independence.¹³

In the Spanish case, like that of quite a few other countries, would-be nation-builders who sought to create a unique shared sense of identity based on language, history and culture following the French model, ultimately failed. We would argue that such efforts in the twentieth century were often not fully successful; in the twenty-first century, they might well backfire and arouse the latent sense of national identity of significant minorities.¹⁴ In 1993, in a paper titled “State Building and Nation Building,” Linz formulated clearly some of the main reasons why we feel this is the case. He stressed in particular how in today’s world, sensibilities have emerged within the “international community” that act as an effective pressure against it. He wrote:

“We are living in an era in which the liberal democratic principles of legitimacy, the institutions of the Rechtsstaat, are being loudly proclaimed by everyone, even when they might be constantly violated. That legitimacy formula makes it impossible in many countries needing the respect of the world community to pursue oppressive and discriminatory policies against those asserting primordial identities, cultural and linguistic rights, and also the articulation of nationalist sentiments, even of extreme nationalists. This is a reality that modern states cannot ignore except by turning to authoritarianism, a choice that often is also not legitimate for those who do not share sympathy with, or tolerance for, the nationalists questioning the idea of nation-state building by the state. In this context, it is necessary to turn to different and new methods of state integration other than those based on nation building.”¹⁵

In addition, and complementary to Linz’s point about the international *zeitgeist*, Alfred Stepan, too, has stressed interconnected technological and normative developments that have led to a certain “de-territorialization” of conceptions of individual identity, and thus rendered

¹³ Juan J. Linz, “Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State: the Case of Spain,” in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Building States and Nations: Analyses by Region*. Volume II (Beverly Hills, Ca: Sage Publications, 1973) 32-116.

¹⁴ In India the phrase “minority” normally refers only to a “religious minority”. However, in this paper we will follow standard social science vocabulary when we use the word “minority” so to include linguistic, tribal, ethnic, as well as religious minorities.

¹⁵ Juan Linz, “State Building and Nation Building,” *European Review*, Volume 1 (1993): 355-369.

the chances of successfully pursuing classical models of nation-state building decreasingly likely in contexts where a significant percentage of the permanent residents are first or second generation immigrants (or originally guest workers) and have different cultures. In an article titled “Modern Multinational Democracies: Transcending a Gellnerian Oxymoron,” first published in 1998, he argued:

“Given the significant technological changes that have occurred since the late nineteenth century state-induced homogenization processes so well described by Eugene Weber, and the analytically distinct but related emergence of what Charles Taylor calls ‘the politics of recognition,’ there are grounds for thinking such processes are now less available. Most of the world’s minorities can keep in cultural contact with their home cultures via radio, cassettes, and cheap air travel to a vastly greater extent than was possible a hundred years ago. Also, due to advances in literacy and communications, more minority communities have semiprofessional ‘cultural carriers’, in the Weberian sense of *Träger*, than a hundred years ago. Normative changes in the form of increased desire for cultural autonomy in some minority (especially Muslim) communities – contested by rising antiforeign sentiments in the majority cultures that reduces the integrating capacity that in theory the majority culture would like – probably have contributed to greater cultural will, and greater cultural capacity, for minorities to resist cultural assimilation.”¹⁶

Given all of these developments, we think it necessary to issue a warning to would-be nation-state builders in contexts with a significant degree of politically salient cultural and linguistic diversity: specifically, that their strategy is likely to be ineffectual at best; and most likely it will end up being radically counter-productive. Put simply, the pursuit of nation state building policies will probably provoke the very kind of fragmentation that adherents of the nation-state model most deeply fear. In the process, it will frequently engender significant levels of resistance – resistance that can often only be countered effectively by descent into authoritarian styles of rule. As such, it seems clear that in many parts of the contemporary

¹⁶ Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 187-188.

world, nobody with a genuine commitment to democratic governance should support the pursuit of the nation-state model in contexts where there are already politically salient issues that revolve around deep, especially territorially-based, cultural differences.

Any minority today has articulated leadership and structures, and has intellectuals which formulate their national aspirations and finds support among those concerned with their rights as a culture. This makes the assimilating policies of the successful nineteenth-century nation-builders, as in France, aiming at erasing such distinct identities, extremely costly.

In our view, as we shall show with the limited data we have, India at one point or another has been and is, like Spain, Belgium and Canada, to mention three democratic federal states with multi-national components, a nation-state for most citizens, a state to which they owe allegiance but not a nation in the classical sense for significant minorities, and the state that is contested by some minorities in the periphery of the state.¹⁷

This brings us to a basic distinction among federal states between those federations which are largely “coming together” in their origin, versus those that are largely “holding together” in their origin.¹⁸ Coming together federations were basically formed by a process in which relatively autonomous separate units, often sharing much of the same political culture, sometimes a common enemy, jointly arrive at an agreement to pool part of their previous sovereignty in order to gain the advantages of creating a new federal state. This has been the case of the United States when the thirteen colonies got together to achieve a more perfect

¹⁷ For a typology of democratic states that takes into account both whether they are unitary or federal ones and whether they are mono-national or multi-national, see Juan Linz, “Para un mapa conceptual de las democracias,” *Politeia*, no. 26 (2001): 25-46.

¹⁸ Our original formulation of the distinction between “coming together” federalism and “holding together” federalism can be found in Alfred Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*, 315-361.

union as an independent state. The history of Australia fits that same pattern, as does even multicultural Switzerland.

But there is another quite different process for the emergence of new federal states. Old states, governed as unitary states and originally conceived as future nation-states, when confronted with rising peripheral nationalisms, with new identities based on language, culture or history which threaten their unity, can turn to federalism to continue to “hold together” the people in a common state. This has been the origin of the long process of the transition in Belgium since independence in the 1830's from what was supposed to be a unitary nation-state to a new federal state. A similar process occurred in Spain in the 1970s. This might be the future of Sri Lanka.

There are great differences between the federations formed by a “coming together” of separate units, like the Swiss cantons in the course of their history, the United States and Australia, where the pre-federal units retained considerable power and sometimes a sense of identity, and are zealous of their rights with respect to the center, and those “holding together” federations created on the basis of an existing state, particularly a unitary state, which devolves power to units to satisfy their emerging demands.¹⁹

The “coming together” process of federation formation tend to create constitutionally symmetrical federations in which all full constituent members of the federation have identical prerogatives and obligations, whereas federations that are “holding- together” in their origins

¹⁹ It is possible that if the princely states in India had coincided with cultural, linguistic and other social characteristics, and the federation had been created as was sometimes discussed in the thirties by the princely states retaining their identities, acceding to a federation, India could have been a case of a “coming together” federation. For many reasons we shall not discuss here, this did not happen. For the atmosphere of the debate in the 1930's see N.D. Varadachariar, *Indian States in the Federation* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1936).

and intentions tend to have important asymmetrical characteristics, in which some cultural prerogatives are constitutionally-embedded for sub-units with salient territorial identities.

Obviously, some countries do not fit neatly into this typology. Occasionally the reality involves elements of both processes.²⁰ This was the case in Canada where, in 1867, asymmetrical federalism was used to “hold together” French-speaking Quebec and English-speaking Canada; but Canadian federalism also served to incorporate the Maritime Provinces that, after important incentives were arranged, wanted to “come together” and join the new federation.²¹

In the case of India, the joining of Sikkim, facilitated by Article 2 of the constitution, which allows for the possibility of other political units to join the republic, reflected some “coming together” elements, as did the social reality of the Indian independence movement itself. German federalism in the nineteenth century served the processes of nation-building, giving the nation the roof of the common state, although formally it was the coming together of kingdoms, dukedoms and city states under Prussian hegemony.

Some federal states are based on a strong national identity in practically all its citizens. They are relatively homogeneous in their culture, language and sense of history and can be seen as nation-states. The state and the nation are one. Germany, after giving up claims to Alsace-Lorraine and losing the eastern territories inhabited by large numbers of Poles, is now a nation-

²⁰ In the case of the Soviet Union, especially in 1919 to 1923, there was actually a third pattern that Stepan calls “putting together” federalism. See his “Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective”, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, no. 16 (April-June 2000): 133-176.

²¹ For an overview of the current constitutional impasse in Canada, see Richard Simeon, “Canada: Federalism, Language and Regional Conflict” in Nancy Bermeo, ed, *Territorial Conflict and Federalism in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). On the evolution of Quebecois nationalism, see Maurice Pinard, “Les quatre phases du mouvement indépedantiste québécois,” in Robert Bernier, Vincent Lemieux, and Maurice Pinard, eds., *Combat Inachevé* (Sainte-Foy, Quebec: Presses de l’Université du Quebec, 1997).

state with tiny minorities enjoying a special status like the Danes on the northern border and the Sorbs. However, with the Cold War division between the *Bundesrepublik* and German Democratic Republic, there were two states and one nation. The two states each sought to legitimize their rule, in West Germany by what was called the *Verfassungspatriotismus*, the loyalty to the democratic liberal state and its market institutions, and in East Germany by the construction of a socialist state.²²

The first Austrian republic was founded in 1918 and in its constitution defined itself as part of the German nation and was committed to joining the German Federal Republic. Only after the second World War did Austria acquire an identity of its own as a state, though not for a long time as a nation.²³

Most of those writing about Switzerland do not see it as a nation-state, but as a voluntary state that we would characterize as a “state-nation”. With its linguistic heterogeneity of largely mono-lingual German, French and Italian (Raeto-romansch-speaking) cantons, Switzerland is a unique federation. Given the fact that none of its linguistic regions, none of its religious communities, and none of its cantons consider themselves nations, as many Basques and Catalans consider their Autonomous Communities in Spain, it would be wrong to consider Switzerland a multinational state. The Swiss confederation enjoys a legitimacy, felt by all its

²² For the original formulation of the concept of “constitutional patriotism,” see Dolf Sternberger, *Verfassungspatriotismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1990). For Jurgen Habermas’s development of the concept, see his *Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996). For a recent elaboration on the theme (in English) and adaptation of it to contexts outside of Germany, see Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” in *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), 491-515.

²³ On the very recent emergence of national consciousness in Austria, see T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation. The Political Integration of a Western State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). See especially 220-241. On the same theme, see also the excellent piece by Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, “Politisch-Kulturell Wandel in Österreich,” in Plasser and Ulram, eds., *Staatsbürger oder Untertanen? Politische Kultur Deutschlands, Österreichs und Schweiz im Vergleich* (New York: P. Lang, 1991) 157-245.

multicultural and largely cantonal-focused citizens, which is unique, and provides the ideal type of what we call a state-nation, where the institutions of the state with its distinctive political culture is the basis of a particular type of identification of its citizens.²⁴

In contrast to the ideal-typical state-nation of Switzerland, in state-nations with important multinational components, such as Spain, Belgium, or Canada, many citizens, who may constitute a significant proportion of the population of federal units, identify with a distinctive nation with its own language, culture, history, rights and grievances against the state in which they live. The federal state-nation is a nightmare to those who originally conceived of the state as a nation-state; a nightmare to those who want to nationalize the whole population in the process of nation-building, of which the French Republic would be the historically most successful model; a nightmare for those nation builders for whom federalism would be conceived, at the most, as a form of decentralization for purposes of administrative efficiency.

Multinational Societies: Multiple and Complementary Identities? Possible State - Nations?:

Spain and Belgium

There are those who think that the multi-national federal state is inevitably condemned to break-up, who see federalism in those states as only a step toward disintegration, and who

²⁴ A fine overview of the Swiss case can be found in Lidija Basta, "Minority and Legitimacy of a Federal State," in L. Basta and Thomas Fleiner, ed. *Federalism and Multiethnic States. The Case of Switzerland* (Fribourg, Switzerland: The Institute of Federalism, 1996) 41-69. For another treatment that deals extensively with language policy in Switzerland, see Kenneth D. McRae, *Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies*, vol.1 (Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1986). For an earlier formulation of the concept of the state-nation, and its distinctiveness from both the nation-state and the multi-national state, see Juan Linz, "Democratic States, Nation-States, State-Nations and Multinational States," unpublished. A shortened version of this article was published in German as "Nationalstaaten, Staatsnationen und multinationale Staaten," in Marcus Gräser, Christian Lammert and Söhnke Schreyer, eds., *Staat, Nation, Demokratie. Traditionen und Perspektiven moderner Gesellschaften. Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Puhle* (Göttigen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2001), 27-38. See also Juan Linz, "Democracia, multinacionalismo y federalismo," in *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, Volume 1 (October 1999), 7-40.

therefore want to limit the federal constitution and engage in a process of more or less aggressive nation-building. For complex reasons into which we cannot enter here, such efforts are likely to fail, producing a backlash that will lead to the opposite result from the one that their proponents pursue. However, intelligent political engineering, constructive political leadership and some favorable contextual factors can serve to overcome the tension inherent in multi-national societies. A federal state that is multinational can become a successful state-nation. Unfortunately, we have few systematic studies of how this has been achieved.

A study of the Indian Republic and its history and institutions could make an important contribution to this important task for social scientists and policy-makers. As can closer study of Spain and Belgium. Unfortunately, some of the brilliant theorizing about multiculturalism, particularly in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Europe, in recent years, is only in part relevant to this task.²⁵ Multi-culturalism in the way that we find it discussed in that literature is not distinctive to federal states. The literature is equally relevant to unitary states like France, with its increasingly important Muslim immigrant population. The literature on multiculturalism is especially relevant to cultural minorities, particularly immigrants claiming a range of rights as individuals and communities, but who are not the same as territorially based autochthonous communities with an articulated or latent national identity.

²⁵ The literature on “multiculturalism” is of course extensive, and here we will only refer the reader to some of the most basic works, written from a variety of perspectives. These include: Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), as well as his more recent contribution, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995); Bikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

Multiculturalism represents a different dimension of social and political reality that we can find in nation-states, state-nations, and multi-national societies. Also, multiculturalism certainly can be found in India as a whole and within the states of the Indian federation.

Most of the literature on nationalism treats national identities as if they were mutually exclusive. The literature is plagued with the use of expressions like “the Catalans,” or “the Flemish,” and their opposites, “the Spanish,” or “the Belgians.” However, such expressions represent a gross over-simplification. Though nationalists on both sides reject the idea of dual identities as a form of bigamy, in fact, in all more or less multi-national societies, most citizens tend to have dual, and often complementary, or at least not exclusive, identities.

The region of Catalonia, in Spain, provides a case in point. Since the late nineteenth century and particularly in the twentieth century, there has been a growing sense of cultural and, increasingly, *national* identities among people in bilingual regions in certain parts of Spain – most acutely, in Catalonia and the Basque Country.²⁶ At the turn of the century, nationalist parties emerged in both of these regions and began to articulate these identities. In the decades following the Spanish Civil War, such identities gained additional strength as a reaction to the Franco regime, since that regime pursued an aggressive policy against peripheral nationalist movements, including discriminatory language policies. By the end of the Franco era, the democratic opposition had come to sympathize with the peripheral nationalist movements and

²⁶ For a useful bibliography on the historiographical debates about the rise of peripheral nationalisms in Spain, see Xosé-M. Núñez, “Historical Research on Regionalism and Peripheral Nationalism in Spain: a Reappraisal,” published as a working paper by the European University Institute in Florence as ECS no. 92/6 (1992). For Linz’s contribution to this debate, see Juan Linz, “Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State: the Case of Spain,” in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Building States and Nations: Analyses by Region*, Volume II, 32-116.

to demand that their aspirations be at least partly recognized. In the transition to democracy, the drafters of the 1978 Constitution did just that; they agreed to accommodate linguistic, cultural, and national differences by organizing the state as an “*Estado de autonomías*,” a type of federal political system.²⁷

Since the transition to democracy in Spain, a number of questions about national identity have been asked in opinion polls – all of which reveal the predominance of multiple and complementary identities. Exclusive and competing identities turn out to be the exception, not the rule. For example, when asked, “Which of the following sentences would you identify with most: I feel only Spanish, I feel more Spanish than Basque/Catalan/etc., I feel as Spanish as Basque/Catalan/etc., I feel more Basque/Catalan/etc. than Spanish, or I feel only Basque/Catalan/etc.,” only 16% of the Spanish population chooses an exclusive Spanish identity, and another 5% chooses an exclusive Basque/Catalan/etc. identity. Dual identifications are dominant, sometimes more Spanish, sometimes more Catalan, or whatever other region is chosen. Specifically, 11% of the Spanish population choose “more Spanish than

²⁷ On the process of devolution to a federal state in Spain, see Juan Linz, “Spanish Democracy and the Estado de las Autonomías,” in Robert A. Goldwin, Art Kaufman, and William A. Schambra, eds., *Forging Unity Out of Diversity* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989), 260-303. On electoral results in and public opinion about the Estado de las Autonomías during the first decade-and-a-half of democracy, see Juan Linz, “De la crisis de un estado unitario al Estado de las Autonomías,” in Fernando Fernández Rodríguez, ed., *La España de las Autonomías* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1985), 527-672. On the continuing conflict in the Basque Country, see Juan Linz, *Conflicto en Euskadi* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986). Also see Francisco J. Llera, *Los Vascos y la Política. El proceso político vasco: elecciones, partidos, opinión pública y legitimación en el País Vasco, 1977-1992* (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco, 1994). On public opinion in the Basque Country, see *Euskalherria en la encuesta Europea de valores* (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1992). Also see the series of *Euskobarometro*, directed by Francisco Llera, (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco). For public opinion in Catalonia, see the yearly surveys published by the *Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials* (Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), and Francisco Andrés Orizo and Maria-Àngels Roque, *Cataluña 2001: Los catalanes en la encuesta Europea de valores* (Madrid: La Fundación Santa María, 2001).

Basque/Catalan/etc.,” 50% choose “as Spanish as Basque/Catalan/etc.,” and 16% choose “more Basque/Catalan/etc. than Spanish.”²⁸

What’s more, despite the fact that identification with the region is significantly stronger in Catalonia than it is for the Spanish population as a whole, still only a small minority of the population registers an exclusive identity. To be exact, in Catalonia a mere 11% of the population identify themselves as exclusively Catalan, while another 12.9% identify themselves as exclusively Spanish. The rest – approximately three-quarters of the population there – report some kind of dual identification. They feel as Catalan as Spanish (36%), or more Spanish than Catalan (12%), or more Catalan than Spanish (26%); but they do not exclude one or the other identity. The same can be said for the Basque Country, the region in which identification with the Spanish nation is weakest: even there, those who identify themselves as exclusively Basque barely reach one-fifth of the population (see Table #1).

Table #1: Subjective National Identity in Spain.

	<i>All of Spain</i>	<i>Basque Country</i>	<i>Catalonia</i>	<i>Galicia</i>
Only Spanish	16	05.4	12.9	04.9
More Spanish than Cat/Basque/Gal	11	04.0	11.4	07.8
As Spanish as Cat/Basque/Gal	50	36.2	36.7	43.9

²⁸ All the data we cite from Spain is based on the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Study no. 2228 (March 1996). For a useful monograph based on the results of this study, see Felix Moral, *Identidad regional y nacionalismo en el Estado de las Autonomías* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1998).

More Cat/Basque/Gal than Spanish	16	29.9	25.7	35.5
Only Cat/Basque/Gal	05	20.6	11.0	06.9
Don't Know/Don't Answer	02	04.0	02.2	01.0
	100	100	100	100
(N)	(4932)	(428)	(744)	(490)

Source: *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Study #2228, March 1996.

Nor is Spain an exception in this regard; for the same is true in the case of Belgium. Belgium was founded in 1830 as an independent unitary parliamentary monarchy. In the course of a complex process marked by considerable conflict, it has evolved in the twentieth century into a federal, basically bi-national and bilingual federal democracy.²⁹

In Belgium, a number of relevant questions about national identity have been asked in opinion polls too, distinguishing between those who speak Dutch, those who speak French, and the inhabitants of Brussels. All of these again reveal the predominance of multiple and complementary identities. For example, when asked, “Which of the following statements applies most to you: I consider myself only as a Belgian, I feel more Belgian than Fleming or Walloon, I feel as Belgian as Fleming or Walloon, I feel more Flemish or Walloon than Belgian, or I feel only Flemish or Walloon?,” only 2.9% of the Belgian population choose an exclusive Flemish or Walloon identity. Thus, despite all the talk about the polarization of identities in Belgium, only a tiny fraction of Belgian citizens reject outright any kind of affective identification with the state. Though another 14.2% choose an exclusive Belgian identity, the overwhelming majority choose a dual identity of one kind or another – in

²⁹ For a good synthesis of this historical process and an extended discussion of language policy there, see chapter one of Kenneth D. McRae’s *Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium* (Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986). For a study that focuses on linguistic conflict in the metropolitan region of Brussels, the only place where significant numbers of French-speakers and Flemish-speakers live side by side, see Jan de Volder, “Le FN Brade Bruxelles,” in *Revue Française de Geopolitique*, no. 6 (May 1998).

descending order, “as Belgian as Flemish or Walloon” (43.2%); then “more Belgian than Flemish or Walloon” (20.5%); and finally “more Flemish or Walloon than Belgian” (17.4%).³⁰

Among the French-speaking Walloons, who at the time of the founding of the state lived in the more prosperous and state-building communities, identification with the Belgian nation is somewhat stronger than it is for the whole of the population. 17.7% of them identify themselves as only Belgian; 24.8% identify themselves as more Belgian than Walloon; and 43.8% identify themselves as much Walloon as Belgian. A mere 9.8% identify themselves as more Walloon than Belgian; and a miniscule 1.8% feel only Walloon. In the capital city of Brussels, the only place in the country where significant numbers of French-speakers and Dutch-speakers live side by side, 23.5% identify themselves as only Belgian; 25.7% identify themselves as more Belgian than Flemish or Walloon; 31% report an equal dual identity; 11.3% identify themselves as more Walloon or Flemish than Belgian; and only 2.6% fail to mention the Belgian identity. But despite the fact that identification with the region is stronger in Flanders than for the population as a whole, perhaps what is most surprising about the Belgian case is the strength of the Belgian identity among the Flemish people. In Flanders, which some analysts see as moving towards separation, in fact those who identify themselves as exclusively Flemish amount to a mere 3.5% of the population. Over 95% of “the Flemish” identify to some degree with the Belgian state – 10.6% identify themselves as only Belgian; 17.0% identify themselves as more Belgian than Flemish; 44.6% identify themselves as equally Belgian and Flemish; and 22.8% identify themselves as more Flemish than Belgian (see Table #2).

³⁰ The data we use for Belgium is based on the 1995 *General Election Study*, conducted by the Interuniversitair Politieke-Opinieonderzoek, K.U. Leuven, and the Point d'appui Interuniversitaire sur l'Opinion publique et la Politique, U.C. Louvain. Results published in 1998.

Table #2: *Subjective National Identity in Belgium.*

	<i>All of Belgium</i>	<i>Flanders</i>	<i>Wallonia</i>	<i>Brussels</i>
Only Belgian	14.2	10.6	17.7	23.5
More Belgian than Flemish/Walloon	20.5	17.0	24.8	26.7
As Belgian as Flemish/Walloon	43.2	44.6	43.8	31.5
More Flemish/Walloon than Belgian	17.4	22.8	09.8	11.3
Only Flemish/Walloon	02.9	03.5	01.8	02.6
Don't Know/Don't Answer	01.9	01.4	02.2	04.5
	100	100	100	100
(N)	(3651)	(2099)	(1258)	(311)

Source: 1995 General Election Study Belgium.

What's more, not only do the overwhelming majority of citizens in Belgium, regardless of the territory from which they hail, identify themselves at least sometimes as Belgians; but also, they register a very high degree of affective attachment to an important common state institution – specifically, the monarchy. Such attachment is evident in the responses of Belgian citizens to a question about how much they trust their king – for fully 54.3% of them claim to trust him either very much or a lot (13.4% and 40.9%, respectively); while a mere 10.6% of them claim to trust him only a little or a very little (5.9% and 4.7%, respectively). Now, it needs to be noted that among Walloons, the level of trust in the king is moderately higher than it is among the Flemish. Whereas 59.2% of the former claim to trust their king at least a lot, only 50.6% of the latter do so. Nevertheless, despite this difference, the fact remains that *both* communities share a very strong sense of attachment to the king, and by extension to the institution of the monarchy (see Table #3).

Table #3: *Trust in the king.*

	<i>Trust very much</i>	<i>Trust a lot</i>	<i>No trust, no distrust</i>	<i>Little trust</i>	<i>Very little trust</i>	<i>Don't Know / Don't Answer</i>	<i>N</i>
All of Belgium	13.4	40.9	32.5	5.9	4.7	2.6	(3668)
Flanders	10.7	39.8	35.0	7.4	4.2	2.9	(2099)
Wallonia	16.4	42.8	29.7	3.4	5.2	2.4	(1258)
Brussels	19.3	40.5	27.0	5.8	6.1	1.3	(311)

We understand this kind of affective attachment to a set of common institutions and symbols to be indispensable for the legitimacy, and therefore stability, of any state in contexts with a high level of cultural, linguistic and even national heterogeneity. This is why we stress the importance of not only *multiple* but also *complementary* identities within a multi-national, federal, democratic framework. Of course, as we have already suggested, there are two intimately related difficulties with this framework: first, that centralists often dream of doing away with the fact of *multiple* identities; and second, that peripheral nationalists often seek to undermine the fact of *complementary* identities. But, at least in the Belgian case, neither of these difficulties seem to be unmanageable. We do not share the skepticism of some other commentators, who feel that Belgium is falling apart. Both the overwhelming preponderance of dual identities and, especially, the high level of affective attachment to common symbols and institutions there justify our sense of optimism. Were such affective attachment to common symbols and institutions lacking, there would be reason for pessimism. Late in Yugoslavia, for example, it is highly doubtful that any Yugoslavian institution had a high level of trust by all

the citizens of the country. Fortunately, however, the Belgian case is quite different from that of Yugoslavia.

By all means, nationalists would like the question formulated not as, “Are you *more* Flemish *than* Belgian?” or “Are you *more* Catalan *than* Spanish?” but rather as, “Are you *either* Flemish *or* Belgian?” or “Are you *either* Catalan *or* Spanish?” – despite the ubiquity of multiple and complementary identities in settings that are more or less multi-nation. And inevitably, both those who speak of self-determination, that is, the right of every nation to become an independent state, and those who favor a total national integration into a single cultural or linguistic community, reject the very idea of dual identities.

This is the main reason (and there are many) why democratic plebiscites are normally such an undesirable solution. People have to make one or another choice, like the one of defining the territorial units for which the decision should be binding. The quorum necessary to reverse such a decision is totally different from a normal election since it cannot be reversed four years hence. A plebiscite might be the only solution in certain extreme situations where the polarization created by violent conflict has destroyed any dual identity. But in those cases it will mean a loss of rights and equal citizenship among those not supporting the majoritarian choice.

India as a State-Nation: Where Does the Indian Polity Fit Comparatively?

For the rest of this chapter, we will focus largely on the world’s most diverse democracy, India, which we argue has created a state-nation but cannot, in the foreseeable future, create a nation-

state. India, perhaps more than any country in the world, has rich lessons to teach about democracy and diversity.

As comparativists, and as observers who have had the opportunity to visit many parts of India, we are very aware of India’s continuing problems with low levels of literacy, nutrition, basic sanitation, as well as periodic communal riots. Some of these comparative problems are made abundantly clear in Table 4. We are also painfully aware of some relatively new dangers to the quality of democracy in India, which we will discuss later (see table #4).

Table #4: *Comparative Indicators of India’s Human and Income Poverty.*

Average GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 2000 (US Dollars) among Arend Lijphart’s universe of the thirty-six continuous democracies of the world from at least 1977 to 1996	\$20,252
India’s GDP per Capita in PPP in 2000 (US Dollars)	\$2,358
India’s Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking among the 173 countries of the world ranked by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	124/173
India’s HDI Ranking among Arend Lijphart’s thirty-six continuous democracies	34/36
India’s Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) among the 88 developing countries ranked by the UNDP	55/88
Adult Female Literacy Rate in India	45.4%
Percentage of Underweight Children in India at age 5	47.0%

Sources: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 149-152, 157-159, 172, 190-193, and 224. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999). See table 4.1 for Lijphart’s universe of the thirty-six countries in the world that were all continuous democracies in his judgment from at least 1977 to 1996.

However, the focus of this paper is on political institutions and perceptions of them as mechanisms for handling societal diversity and potential conflict. As writers about democracy and democratization in the world, and as students of nationalism, multi-nationalism, and

diversity and extreme crises of “stateness” such as in the former USSR and Yugoslavia, we are convinced that India has more diversity than any long standing democracy in the world and that democracy nonetheless is increasingly supported by the overwhelming majority of these diverse groups in India. This pattern is not sufficiently recognized, not to say analyzed, by general readers or even by most specialist scholars, so one of our major tasks in this article is to attempt to document, and explain, these phenomena.

Comparatively, where does India fit as a polity? The Republic of India is of course a unique polity among the relatively few stable democracies of the world. Since some basic characteristics of Indian society and polity are clearly distinct from the United States the experience of the American democracy is not always relevant, indeed at times can be quite misleading, for our understanding of India. Comparisons should not be limited to the federalism of the United States (or, for that matter, to the party system of the UK, as is often done), but should extend to other long-standing democracies as well. However, India shares many characteristics with a number of other democracies, particularly federal democracies which should allow us to understand better its problems, successes and failures. This facilitates some comparisons with the United States but also makes it necessary to think of India in the wider context of federal democracies. The United States and India are both among the eleven long-standing federal democracies of the world but their federal structures have a different

historical origins and different functions.³¹ . Both are also major powers, something that differentiates them in many ways from smaller federal democracies, as we shall see.

Though both the United States and India are federal democracies, their form of government is very distinct. The U.S. is presidential, India is parliamentary, a distinction that has important implications for the working of democratic, even federal institutions, as we shall also see. However, the main difference is that India is substantially more diverse culturally, linguistically, and religiously than even the United States. Furthermore, some parts of the Indian republic, particularly in the North-East, introduce a multinational dimension into the Indian polity, and India's federal structures, to a certain extent, reflect a territorially-based pluralism. In contrast, the United States, in spite of its multi-culturalism, is more homogeneous than India, its pluralism has no territorial basis, and federalism does not reflect that pluralism directly partly because, unlike India, Canada, Spain, and Belgium, the United States does not have a politically salient multinational dimension.

As we shall analyze in more detail later, the large body of theorizing and analysis of multi-culturalism in the United States and in Europe as the result of large-scale immigration from other societies in recent decades, is only in part relevant to India. This is so because in

³¹ The eleven federal countries that have been functioning democracies for at least the last 15 years are India, USA, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Australia, Brazil, Argentina and Canada. Belgium's long transformation from a unitary to a federal state was only completed in 1993 but it had increasingly functioned as a federal system since the 1970's. Mexico is federal but it did not complete its democratic transition until 2000. Occasionally we will give data on Russia, but the nature of its political system raises serious questions about its democracy. Nigeria is at best a marginal electoral democracy but it is not long-standing, nor is South Africa. In addition, while we disagree with those who say that South Africa does not have a federal constitution, we acknowledge that due to the dominant position of the ANC at virtually all levels of the government South Africa does not politically function as a federal system yet, but when the ANC eventually becomes less hegemonic, South Africa will begin to have more federal politics. Venezuela has had direct elections since 1958. However, despite its federal constitution Venezuela did not have direct elections at the state level until the late 1980's. Furthermore, the Chávez inspired Constitution of 1999 abolished the Senate. Some might nominate Malaysia or Indonesia but Malaysia is not democratic and Indonesia is not Federal.

India the multi-cultural characteristics are the result of a long history and have a distinctive territorial basis to which Indian federalism has been a response. Witness the creation of the new linguistic states in the 1950s and the process of the creation of new states that continues to this day. It should be noted that although the latest wave of creation of three states (Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh) in 2000 was not on the basis of languages, it did reflect the logic of political representation of diversities, for these states gave better representation to tribal populations or culturally different groups.

India, in contrast to many countries in the developing world, has a relatively strong and usable state with a government, a bureaucracy, an army, a judiciary, and above all, democratic institutions which enjoy considerable legitimacy and are able to exercise their authority over most of its population and territory. The state, born of the struggle for independence and the sad experience of the partition, has become a basic reality that makes possible the functioning of democratic government.

As we shall document, the overwhelming majority of Indian citizens respect the Indian State and generally expect it to serve the collective interests of its citizens. Also, some of the data we will present later on comparative trust in state institutions shows how India, despite its

great diversity and its relative poverty, compares quite favorably with many other long standing democracies, whether they are advanced market or developing polities.

Before discussing public opinion about the quality of India's political system, we should remind the reader of the constitutional basis of Indian federalism. Article 3 provides exceptional power for the center to alter the boundaries of the federal units.³² The sixth schedule simultaneously allows for exceptional autonomy to adapt the federal system to the demands of different groups and for the possibility of asymmetrical federalism. Articles 370 and 371 give special status to Jammu and Kashmir and several states in the north-east, respectively.³³

The Indian federation was not the result of the coming together of pre-existing, highly autonomous, political units. The Indian state under British rule, especially given the center's concept of Paramount Power, existed as an important unitary coercive and regulatory

³² Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, in its entirety, reads: "Parliament may by law – (a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State (b) increase the area of any State; (c) diminish the area of any State; (d) alter the boundaries of any State; (e) alter the name of any State: Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired. Explanation I: In this article, in clauses (a) to (e), 'State' includes a Union territory, but in the proviso, 'State' does not include a Union territory. Explanation II: The power conferred on Parliament by clause (a) includes the power to form a new State or Union territory by uniting a part of any other State or Union territory to any other State of Union territory."

³³ For example, in a January 2003 interview with Pu Zoramthanga, who was formerly the number two leader of the Mizo National Front fighting for the independence of Mizoram and who is now the democratically-elected chief minister of that state, Zoramthanga told Alfred Stepan that Article 371g of the Constitution gave crucial protections to certain cultural prerogatives of the Mizo's. These protections allowed the insurrection to come to an end and for the Mizo's to enter into Indian political life. Article 371g explicitly states that "no Act of [the Indian] Parliament in respect of (i) religious or social practices of the Mizos, (ii) Mizoram customary law and procedure, (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Mizoram customary law, (iv) ownership and transfer of land, shall apply to the State of Mizoram unless the Legislative Assembly of the State of Mizoram by a resolution so decides."

instrument with its famous polity-wide “Steel Frame” civil service.³⁴ The many different components of the British Empire that retained distinctive institutions such as some of the larger and more developed Princely States were not allowed to join the new state with their own personality at the time of independence. Those Princely States, like Hyderabad and Junagarh that did not agree to accede to the Republic of India were “put together” into the rest of the union by Indian security forces. The independence struggle against the British was carried by a powerful nationalist movement under the leadership of the Congress Party led by Gandhi and Nehru, committed to democracy, parliamentarism and some form of federalism.³⁵ It was evident to them that to hold together such a complex and large society, and to govern a subcontinent, a federal form of government was necessary; however, after the experience of partition, the originally-weak unitary voices got stronger, and the emphasis shifted to ensuring a strong center.

The original legitimacy of the republic was thus based on the notion that nationalism and “unitarizing” principles and institutions are central and differentiate India from other federal states. Nonetheless, in the course of fifty years, federalism has become particularly important in the effort to hold together the territories and people of India, with the transformation of many of the boundaries of British India into newly configured linguistic states in the 1950s and the subsequent carving out of new states from Assam, some of which

³⁴ In their book in progress *Federalism, Democracy and Nation*, Linz and Stepan hope to explore why India did not follow the path to federalism that Germany did in 1870 when both were shaped by a national movement and there were pre-existing political structures. In the German case these pre-existing political structures became part of the federal structure but in India many of them, especially the Princely States, were subsumed in the new independent state. The question we will explore is why in the process of independence India, unlike Germany, did not build on those structures.

³⁵ Especially the strong emergency provisions in the Constitution, such as “President’s rule” where the center could temporally assume direct rule if, in the judgment of the center appointed Governor and the President of the country, constitutional order was threatened.

were earlier covered by the Sixth Schedule, which gave them significant autonomy. The formation of new states was a further step in granting autonomy to tribal communities. The much-delayed creation of a Punjabi state on linguistic basis has ultimately served the process of holding together India. Article 3 of the constitution, which has no close parallels in other federal states, has also served that purpose rather well despite the many difficulties and tensions connected with the creation of new states.

Although the number of democratic federal states in the world is small they are very diverse but nonetheless, as we just noted, they fit to a large extent into distinct types. The United States and India are certainly among the most distinct. In fact, they almost represent polar opposites and it would be a great mistake to think that the United States is the model of a federal state and therefore should serve as the basis of any reform of Indian federalism.

Let us look at cultural and political identities in India. For most Indian citizens, India is a nation and therefore they see the Indian Republic as a nation-state, though there are divergent visions of that nationhood, some which would exclude from the nation people that feel they are Indian without having to share an exclusivist conception of the nation.³⁶ There are many people who feel other identities, sometimes equally strong, sometimes somewhat stronger than the Indian national identity. It is not easy to define the number of those who feel an Indian identity, and even less easy to define those who have different conceptions of the Indian nation with the data available to us. It is more difficult than in the case of Spain since the matter of language, so important in that case, is less hegemonic and defining in India. The linguistic states recognize and allow for a certain identification with a distinctive language and culture, and we

³⁶ On visions of the nation in India, see Ashotosh Varshney, "Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of Anxiety," in *Daedalus*, Volume 122 (Summer 1993): 227-261.

quickly see that many Indians have a dual identity, that of being Indian and that of belonging to their state. We discover that some of them feel an identity with their state which may be a linguistic cultural identification, without explicitly seeing themselves as Indian. It is not easy to say if that identity is similar to that of a national identity in multi-national societies. There are certainly citizens of India who do not question the Indian state, but feel very strongly another identity which potentially can serve as a basis for a nationalist sentiment and political movement, as it has been the case with a minority of Sikhs identifying with the project of Khalistan, as an independent Sikh state. There are finally some groups in the Northeast who share very little of the Indian national identity, who feel a distinctive national, or at least tribal, identity, and who at one point or another have even questioned the authority of the Indian state and fought for some independent status but, like Mizoram, have been reintegrated into the Indian state and participate, thanks to federalism, in the Indian political process.³⁷ For them India is just a state-nation and for a few of them probably something like a multi-national state from whose authority they cannot escape under normal circumstances. Fortunately for India's federal democracy there are not many such states and most can be found in the periphery in the Northeast. The Nagas (inside Nagaland and in surrounding states such as Manipur) would probably be the prime example as would probably be the Kashmir valley.³⁸

³⁷ Yadav has recently coordinated in Mizoram a still unpublished opinion survey with the sample size of 2,000, the results of which indicate a surprisingly high level of integration into India's federal democracy. Stepan also carried out interviews with political leaders in Mizoram in January 2003 and arrived at similar conclusions. We find this interesting and significant because most of the Mizeram population is Christian, very few speak any of the main Indian languages, they were not a part of British India, and due to Innerline restrictions the independence movement had a very weak presence. Finally of course, the Mizos waged a long and bloody, and ultimately an unsuccessful armed struggle for independence from India.

³⁸ There is of course an important external dimension to the politics of Kashmir. However, Yogendra Yadav has recently coordinated a large survey in Kashmir with a sample of around 2,000. The results are just being analyzed but Yadav is convinced that a majority of the Kashmiris (those who live in the Kashmir valley, which itself is a little over half of the state of Jammu and Kashmir) would not prefer to join Pakistan or to stay in India but would prefer their own independent nation-state. The situation has not doubt improved in the last few months of 2002 given

Federalism and the processing of new member states, the asymmetrical status of different states, and the multi-tier federalism in some of the states, are essential elements of the building of India as a state-nation.

In India, as in other federal democracies, like Spain or Canada, the institutionalization of an asymmetrical federalism creates tension and hostility. Many think that only a constitutionally symmetrical federalism, like the one we find in the United States, Australia, Switzerland and Germany, is the ideal form of federalism. However, we want to argue, again, that a comparison of Indian institutions with those of the United States, or for that matter Germany, is not the most fruitful approach. Once we enlarge our scope of analysis, we will see that many of the problems that scholars working on India see as unique and threatening may be found in one way or another in other federal multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and/or multi-national societies in which there is no shared conception of the nation or a nation-state. At the same time, the comparison will show that India and its democratic institutions enjoy a legitimacy among the citizens equal to, if not greater than, the institutions in other long standing democratic federal pluralistic societies. It should be noted that in no political system do all the citizens grant to the state, its institutions and democratic processes, a unanimous legitimacy or allegiance. It is only the size of India and the number of its people, that makes these problems somewhat more significant than in some other countries, once we translate the proportions into absolute numbers of citizens.

reasonably free and fair elections in the state and the demise of the government seen as being imposed by New Delhi.

Some Indicators Characterizing the Indian Polity as a State Nation: Pride in India and Multiple but Complementary Identities

After this broad comparative introduction we can turn to some of the relevant data in the hope that they will contribute to stimulate Indian and foreign scholars to further research using broader and even better sets of indicators than the ones we now have.

One important indicator of identification of a citizen with the society and the state is the sense of pride, in this case the pride of being Indian. Fortunately, a similar question has been asked in the federal democracies we are comparing and is continuously asked in the member states of the European Union by the Eurobarometer surveys.

The pride question has been asked in the prestigious and widely used comparative public opinion survey *World Values and European Values* under the direction of Ronald Inglehart et al., based at the University of Michigan. To date there are three rounds of these surveys available for our comparative analysis, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997. The full results of the 1999 - 2001 round will not be available until 2004. The first round covered 22 independent countries, the second 42, the third 53, and the fourth 75. India has been included in all four rounds. This set of surveys is particularly interesting for comparativists, because each country asks most of the same questions and many of the questions have been used in all the rounds.

A sense of pride can be based on many different things, from political institutions, cultural and the artistic heritage, the landscape, and last but not least, cuisine. Indians, more than people in many countries of the world, have reasons to be proud of many aspects of Indian

society, culture and history, while the more recent history of some other countries makes it more difficult for its citizens to feel fully proud of their nation, as is the case of Germany, where the Nazi period and the holocaust legacy represent a heavy burden.³⁹ Those who feel an exclusive identity with another nation and reject the state in which they live are not likely to feel proud of the state or the nation and its heritage. Some of the variations between countries reflect these different attitudes.

When asked "How proud are you to be an Indian?" (69.6%) say "a great deal". Only in the United States the number was larger (78.5%) but the percentage was virtually the same as in Australia as in India, less in Brazil (64.1%) in Argentina (55.8%) lower still in Spain (45%) much lower yet in Germany (11.1%) and surprisingly low in Switzerland (26.3%).⁴⁰ Those saying "not very" or "not at all" add up to 8.3% in India, certainly more than the United States (1.8%) and Australia (2.5), but less than in the other federal democracies, particularly Germany (31.6), and surprisingly again, Switzerland. Perhaps these figures would be different with a more representative sample of the Indian population than the World Value Study, 1995-1997, but they are certainly impressive (see table #5).

Table #5: “How proud are you to be (nationality)?” Responses in the 11 longstanding federal democracies (percent).

	<i>Great Deal</i>	<i>Quite</i>	<i>Not Very</i>	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Total</i>
USA	77.3	19.8	01.5	00.3	01.0	100
Australia	70.3	23.0	02.1	00.4	00.1	100

³⁹ On the complex issue of pride (or lack thereof) in the German nation, see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. “Nationalgefühl und Glück,” in Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, *Die verletzte Nation* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987), 17-74.

⁴⁰ Concerning Switzerland, as the reader will see later (in table 20), consistent with our idea of state-nation, of the eleven long-standing federal democracies, Switzerland has the highest percentage of people with confidence in the government and the second highest percentage of people with confidence in the legal system. So while they may not have pride in being Swiss *as such*, they nevertheless have great pride in their Swiss institutions.

India	69.6	18.1	07.1	01.2	04.0	100
Brazil	64.1	19.1	14.3	01.9	00.3	100
Spain	63.8	26.2	04.5	03.1	00.5	100
Canada	60.6	33.8	04.0	01.5	00.0	100
Argentina	55.3	28.9	08.3	02.6	04.8	100
Austria	53.0	39.9	05.7	01.4	00.0	100
Belgium	29.0	52.3	12.5	06.1	00.0	100
Swiss	23.5	46.7	15.9	07.2	06.7	100
Germany	11.1	35.8	21.5	13.7	17.9	100

Source: The data for all countries but Austria, Belgium and Canada is from *World Values Study: 1995-1997*, Ronald Inglehart et al., Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, question 205. The data for Germany is from the Lander of the former West Germany. Canada, Belgium and Austria were not included in the 1995-97 survey. The data for them is from *WVS: 1990-93*.

Fortunately, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in Delhi has conducted a series of nation-wide surveys that help us address some of the above questions with a larger and more representative sample. The National Election Study (NES) series of the CSDS gives due representation to the various regions, religions, languages and caste-communities of India. The first survey in this series was carried out in 1971 with a sample size of about 4000. In recent years the series was revived through post-poll surveys following the national elections in 1996, 1998 and 1999 with a sample size around 9,000 in each wave. The sample size of the Indian National Election Study compares very favorable with the sample size of the Human Values Study, which in the third round was 2040 or the US National Election Studies supervised by the University of Michigan which normally have less than 2000 respondents. A further advantage of India's National Election Study is that the sample profile of these national surveys matches the Census profile very closely. The surveys were conducted through face to face interviews using 15 of the 18 official languages mentioned in the Indian Constitution. We will use these surveys extensively in this article.

With the available data it is difficult to separate the Indian identity from other identities that might be in conflict with it and to locate the dual or multiple identities of Indians in a way that would be comparable to some of the data we have for national societies, particularly with articulated national identities. The question that allows us to approach this problem asked about feeling identified as “an Indian”, as “an Indian and of their state”, “only of the state” and “other” answers. In the whole large sample, 49.8% say Indian, another 16.1% Indian and state and 19.9% only state, with 3% giving other answers and 11.1% unable to answer or do not know. At least 65.9% of the total and 74.1% of those answering express an Indian identity, a figure extremely close to the 78.5% of those answering in Spain who express a Spanish identity but still significantly lower than the 95% of those answering in Belgium who express a Belgian identity.

What is particularly significant is that the proportion saying "Indian" is higher among Moslems (58.7%) which, added with those saying "Indian and state" (14.3%), represents 73.3% of the Moslems. This is more than among the Hindus, where a somewhat larger number identified only with their state (20.1%) compared to 11.8% among the Moslems.

Among the Christian minority, the number saying Indian is somewhat lower (37.2%) which combined with those saying Indian and state (18.6%) adds up to (55.8%) with a significant number saying only the state (34.4%).⁴¹ Among the Sikks the number of those not answering is particularly small and those opting to say only the state relatively large, 34.4%, with more than in any other religious group saying Indian and state, 34.3%, with a smaller

⁴¹ In the case of the Christians, control for where they live, particularly in the Northeast would be useful. It may be not that they feel Christian instead of Indian, but rather, that they feel that they are, say, Nagas instead of Indian. The historical explanation being that they were in areas that are non-Hindi speaking, never were Hindu, and had a separate geographical and legal position within the British Empire (inner line) which made it extremely difficult for the nationalizing impact of the independence movement to be felt.

number, 28.9%, saying just Indian. The answers are more similar to those we find about identities in multi-national societies but even so the number with an Indian and a dual Indian and state identity is very large, 60.2% (see table #6).

Table #6: *Subjective National Identity and Religion in India.*

	<i>Only Indian</i>	<i>Indian and State</i>	<i>Only State</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Don't Know/ Can't Say</i>	
Total	49.8	16.1	19.9	03.0	11.1	(8133)
Hindu	49.5	16.0	20.1	02.9	11.4	(6749)
Muslim	58.7	14.3	11.8	04.6	10.6	(895)
Christian	37.2	18.6	34.4	00.4	09.5	(285)
Sikh	28.9	31.3	34.4	04.7	00.8	(128)
Others	61.8	13.2	19.7	00.0	05.3	(76)

Source: *Indian National Election Study 1998.*

Even so, it is important to emphasize that the percentages of people who identify only with their state and/or with other identities do not differ very much across religious groups. To be exact, while 22.9% of Hindus claim to identify only with their state or with some other identity, the proportion of Muslims who do so actually falls, to 16.4%; and though the percentages do rise for Christians and Sikhs – to 34.8% and 39.1%, respectively – the increases are far from dramatic.

An exclusively Hindu identity of the nation is likely to weaken the Indian identity now clearly expressed by many Muslims (who constitute eleven percent of the population of India). Something similar could happen in the case of Spain if the Spanish identity were defined as incompatible with other identities and excluded those speaking other languages than Spanish.

There are significant and interesting differences between the states of the federation in the answers to the question about Indian, Indian and state and only state identity. It is not surprising that the Indian identity is dominant in Delhi, 84%, and that the “only state” identity is high in the Northeastern state of Meghalaya, and two of the Southern states Tamil Nadu and Karnataka which have a strong regional and linguistic identity (see table #7).

Table #7: *Subjective National Identity in India by States.*

	Only Indian	Indian and State	Only State	Others	Don't Know/ Can't Say	
Total	49.8	16.1	19.9	03.0	11.1	(8133)
Andhra Pradesh	43.5	17.1	07.4	00.2	31.8	(556)
Assam	42.6	14.0	13.2	28.7	01.5	(265)
Bihar	41.1	24.6	13.8	00.1	20.4	(833)
Gujarat	39.7	30.3	24.6	00.3	05.1	(390)
Haryana	56.4	07.4	22.8	02.0	11.4	(749)
Karnataka	30.2	10.4	55.7	00.4	03.3	(540)
Kerala	45.7	13.9	31.0	02.2	07.3	(368)
Madhya Pradesh	53.2	07.0	15.4	05.7	18.8	(560)
Maharashtra	58.6	15.9	12.7	01.5	11.3	(905)
Meghalaya	43.6	10.3	43.6	00.0	02.6	(39)
Orissa	59.0	18.9	17.6	00.3	04.2	(307)
Pondicherry	35.5	32.3	00.0	00.0	32.3	(31)
Punjab	27.5	32.0	31.6	07.7	01.2	(247)
Rajasthan	44.5	20.6	21.9	05.0	07.9	(456)
Tamil Nadu	39.3	08.1	45.2	00.5	06.9	(595)
Tripura	37.7	11.3	18.9	24.5	07.5	(53)
Uttar Pradesh	75.4	09.8	03.5	02.3	09.0	(1082)
West Bengal	44.2	25.1	19.8	02.1	08.8	(570)

Source: *Indian National Election Study 1998.*

An Excursus on Political Identities and Functioning Federalism in the Punjab

For our purposes, the case of the Punjab is particularly interesting. In that conflictual state relatively few choose the “only Indian” alternative, 27.5%, but a significant number chose a state and Indian identity, 32%. That means a majority chose an Indian identity, compared to 31.6% with only a state identity (with 7.7% giving other answers). Among the Punjabis we can distinguish the Hindu minority and the Sikh majority. The Hindus identify more as Indian, 35.8%, than the Sikhs, 18.9%, and less as Indian and state, 29.2% compared to 34.7% among the Sikhs. However, the Punjabi Hindus also identify to a significant extent as only Punjabis, 34.4%, although somewhat less than the Sikhs, 40.0%.

The complexity of the multiple and sometimes conflictual identities *within* the Punjab itself makes this region of India more comparable to the Spanish case than to either the Belgian or Canadian ones. This is because what distinguishes the Spanish case from its Belgian and Canadian counterparts is the high level of linguistic and national heterogeneity in the peripheral regions with the most developed sense of a distinct national consciousness themselves, namely the Basque Country and Catalonia. As such, not only is Spain as a whole more or less multi-national, but so too are the Basque Country and Catalonia. By contrast, in Belgium, both the regions of Flanders and Wallonia are overwhelmingly monolingual and homogenous (of course, the great exception there is the city of Brussels); and in Quebec, there is a considerable degree of linguistic homogeneity outside of the metropolitan region of Montreal.

Though the diversity in the Punjab is based in the first instance on a religious rather than a linguistic cleavage (as is largely the case in Spain, Belgium, and Canada), the comparison with Spain is nevertheless useful because of the similar type of problem that can be expected to arise in both places. To put the problem simply, the fact that Catalonia, the Basque Country,

and the Punjab are themselves more or less multi-national makes it all the more difficult to accommodate even the cultural aspirations of nationalists in these territories without infringing upon the rights of important minorities there.

In the case of the Punjab, it would naturally be a mistake to infer that those 40% of Sikhs who identify only with their state are supporters of a nationalist or a pro-independence position. Only a more detailed analysis, and a different type of question, would allow us to identify the Punjabi Sikhs that support Khalistan. Fortunately, we have the results of a series of questions that will be useful for this task, but first we must put the survey questions in their overall political context.

In the 1980's a violent secessionist struggle led by a minority of Sikh militants occurred in the Punjab. The Punjab conflict was to a large extent precipitated by the Center deposing, largely for narrow political purposes, the Sikh-led Akali Dal Party from control of the Punjab. The conflict was greatly aggravated by the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh body-guards in retaliation for her authorization of the use of tanks against the Golden Temple, a sacred Temple of the Sikhs, where some of the most violent Sikh militants were based. The conflict increased greatly in intensity when the Central government stood by in Delhi while many Sikhs were butchered in riots in the aftermath of the assassination. Some analysts worried that Sikhs would not really be supportive of Indian democracy again. In addition to the butchering of the Sikhs, what alienated them further was that virtually no legal action was taken against the guilty. It was only in 2002 that the Congress Party officially expressed regrets about what happened. However, after boycotting elections in 1992, Sikhs and the Akal Dal participated in elections in 1998. In fact the Akali Dal joined an alliance with the

Hindu BJP which helped the Akali Dal win control of the Punjab State Assembly, as a result the Akali Dal became part of the twenty-one party coalition led by the BJP that formed the government at the center. By successful participation in the fruits of Indian federal politics at the State and at the Center the Akali Dal was clearly by the early 1990s what Stepan in his chapter in this volume calls a “centric–regional party”, as opposed to a regional, potentially separatist party.

By 1998, attitudes in support of democracy in the Punjab were slightly above the Indian average. There have been two large electoral polls in the Punjab that give us further insight into what other set of attitudes of Punjabi Sikhs and Punjabi Hindus might help contribute to, or at least reinforce, the Punjabi attitudes supportive of Indian unity and democracy. In the 1998 Indian NES “post-poll study”, more respondents in Punjab than in any other state said that life and property were safer now than five years ago.

How should we interpret such a finding? Certainly part of the defeat of the Khalistan independence movement in the Punjab was due to India’s useable state coercive apparatus. As we have argued, for most would-be separatists in India, in sharp contrast to the situation in the former USSR or Yugoslavia, the loyalty of the security forces to the central state and the “state-nation” is a given, as is the fact that force will be met with greater force. Geo-politically there is no exit. This raises a very important question. The insurgents may have been defeated, and the Punjab may in fact be more safe for the average citizen, but at what cost to the legitimacy of the Indian state?

In the case of the Punjab, do Sikhs believe that the methods used by the armed separatists were legitimate, and that the tactics used by the Indian state, especially the Punjab

police, were illegitimate? If so, even if respondents say they feel safer now than in the recent past, there could still be a serious problem of political identities in the Punjab for India. The base for an insurgency, or at least a series of disloyal violent activities that may weaken democracy in the future might still be there.

Fortunately we can begin to answer these questions due to an unusually large Exit Poll Analysis (n = 4950) at the Punjab State Assembly Elections of 1998. In answer to the question “do you believe that the means used by the Kharku (a word coined by the Khalistan activists to describe themselves) to fulfill their objectives were justified or not? , only 5.4 % of the Sikhs (in whose name independence was being fought for) answered “ justified”, 20.7% said “partly justified”, and 65.7% of the Sikhs said “not justified”. Concerning the appropriateness of the (often quite violent) methods of the Punjab Police to counter the Kharku , 26.8% of the Sikhs said that the methods used by the police were “justified”, and 33.1% said “somewhat justified” (see table #8).

Table 8: *Attitudes Towards Methods Used by the Separatist Sikhs and by the Punjab Police during the Khalistan Conflict (Percentage of Sikhs and Hindu Responses)*

Responses	Opinion about the Methods of the Pro Khalistan Sikhs		Opinion about Punjab Police Methods to Repress Khalistan Militants	
	Sikh	Hindu	Sikh	Hindu
"Justified"	5.4	3.9	26.8	40.7
"Somewhat Justified"	20.7	11.6	33.1	36.2
"Not Justified"	65.7	77.3	30.0	13.5
"Can't Say / D.K."	8.2	7.2	10.1	9.6
N=	3,138	1,628	3,138	1,628

Source: NES India, *Exit Poll Analysis of Punjab State Elections*, 4/6/98.

Four years after the poll referred to in Table 8, a similar battery of questions were asked after the Punjab State Assembly elections of 2002. The same pattern of responses was repeated-- except for an even stronger rejection of the methods used by the pro-Khalistan militants. Political, as opposed to ethnic issues, so dominated the 2002 elections that the Congress Party, which many thought would never hold office again in the Punjab, won control of the Punjab State Assembly and the Congress party leader in the Punjab became Chief Minister of the state.

National and International Support for “No-Exit” from India.

Federalism is a complex form of government and consequently generates many problems. Federalism in a multi-lingual, multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-religious society generates even more problems, though democracies of the above characteristics, when the different groups have a clear territorial basis, probably cannot be governed democratically without federalism. We are not going to recount the long history of Indian federalism where, in the beginning, some of the founding fathers were quite skeptical about federalism, would have for many reasons preferred a more unified state, but were also aware that this was an impossibility and with more or less reluctance accepted federalism and eventually the particular form of linguistic states. Statesmen in societies with significant multinational components, where different groups may attain a sense of national identify and where those groups may be mobilized by nationalist parties, have been and are suspicious of federalism. They are aware of the potential threat posed by the invocation of the right of self-determination, an invocation that

often presents problems to many states given the ambiguity and the difficulties of implementing such an invocation. The Indian government has been very conscious of this and at the time of agreeing to the UN Human Rights Covenant declared:

With reference to Article 1 of the Covenants the government of the Republic of India declares that the words the right of self-determination appearing in this article apply only to the peoples under foreign domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign independent states or to a section of the people or a nation which is the essence of national integrity.⁴²

Such a declaration serves the purpose of attempting to exclude international support for such claims, but they cannot prevent them. The relationship between federalism and such claims is complex. On the one hand it satisfies to some extent the demand for self-government in a state-nation by not attempting to impose a single national identity on the entire quite pluralistic polity. It can, however, also make it possible for state governments in the federation to use their power and resources in a process of nation-building against the center. This is not the place to discuss the comparative evidence from other multi-national, multi-lingual federations but to note some of the distinctive factors in the Indian case.

Foremost, the Indian constitution in its Article 3 offers a flexibility that allows the central government to respond to some of those demands within the complex federal system. It also allows for considerable asymmetry in the federal states. For example, in some of the states of the northeast a multi-tiered federal system has emerged. For a long time the party system played an important role in integrating people in different parts of the country into the state.

In most of India, the struggle for independence and the democratic institutions created at that time legitimated a sense of Indian nationhood and a conception of the nation open to its

⁴² Still have to find reference.

pluralism. This makes it unlikely that major political forces, parties, and intellectuals would favor whatever secessionist demands may appear in the periphery (with perhaps the exception of Kashmir). This consensus on the importance of the Indian nation, and on the Indian state-nation, give support to the institutional rules in the constitution that allow the government to act in defense of the Indian Republic. As in many other federal constitutions, there are provisions to defend the constitution and the unity of the state, if necessary by coercive means. The awareness of that possibility, and the actual record of using those resources, has left those who might question the state in a “no-exit” position, one that indirectly favors the search for negotiated compromise within the context of the federal institution of the state.

India, due to its long standing democracy, its significant atomic capability and large mobile ground forces, and its geo-political location in the world, is not very vulnerable to international opinion when confronting secessionist threats. On the one side, its problems are too far from world attention, and on the other it is more difficult for its neighbors to interfere, though in the case of the northeast such interference by China was present, and of course by Pakistan in Kashmir. Also, several of the states where secessionist tendencies might have been strong, or might arise, are too marginal and poor to sustain aspirations to independent statehood without external support. This again is not the case in some other federal multi-national states, like Spain, or the case of Quebec in Canada.

The fact that India has a strong state with legitimate democratic institutions, a functioning legal system, and loyal armed forces, makes it very different from other federal states in the developing world. Geography is also a favorable factor since there is a continuity of territory that, for example, that does not exist in an island state like Indonesia. With all its

problems, we feel that Indian federalism, managed intelligently and democratically, can assure the unity of the Republic.

Indian Political Institutions and Caste and Socioeconomic Groups

One would not expect caste or social and economic position to relate as much to national identity as would religion or some linguistic communities. It is noteworthy that, except for a greater proportion who do not know or cannot say among the underprivileged groups, the proportion of those identifying only with their state is lower among the upper caste members, 14.9%, larger among the OBC'S, 21.1%, and the scheduled caste, 24.8%, and fairly large among Scheduled Tribe (ST) members.

The proportion answering “Indian and state” is relatively similar, 19.8%, 14.5%, 15.5%, 13.6%, with the difference reflected mainly in those answering “Indian”, which range from 56.7% among the upper caste, 48.3% among the OBC's, 45.6% among Scheduled Castes(SC), and a low of 36.1% among the ST (Scheduled Tribe). Clearly, the national integration of these different sectors of the society is significantly different. However, we would have to take into account the religious identity of the members of scheduled tribes, which may explain their attitudes (see table #9).

Table #9: *Subjective National Identity in India by caste.*

	Scheduled Tribes	Scheduled Castes	OBC	Upper caste	Total
Only Indian	36.1	45.6	48.1	56.7	43.4
Indian and State	13.6	15.5	14.5	19.8	21.7
Only State	26.7	24.8	21.1	14.9	30.9
Others	03.7	03.2	03.5	01.7	00.7

Don't Know/ Can't Say	20.0	10.8	12.8	06.9	03.3
	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(671)	(1325)	(2946)	(2039)	(8133)

Source: *Indian National Elections Study*, 1998.

The differences according to economic position are congruent with the data. Again, it is natural that the proportion who answer "do not know" or "cannot say" should be larger among the very poor, 14.8%, and smallest among the upper socio-economic strata, 3.6%. However, the differences in the proportion saying "only state" are in the same direction, largest among the very poor, 27.8%, and significantly smaller among the upper strata, while those saying Indian and state are in the same direction but not so markedly, ranging from 13.7% among the very poor and 19.1% among the upper socio-economic strata. The overall pattern is clearly reflected in those identifying as only Indian, 39.9% among the very poor, 49.6% among the poor, 55.4% among the middle class and 61.9% among the upper class. It should be kept in mind that the data by socio-economic position does not distinguish Hindus from Moslems, Christian and other, but it is evident that those who are socially privileged feel their national identity more distinctively (see table #10).

Tables #10: *Subjective National Identity in India by economic categories.*

	Very Poor	Poor	Middle	Upper	Total
Only Indian	39.9	49.6	55.4	61.9	49.8
Indian and State	13.7	15.9	17.0	19.1	16.0
Only State	27.8	18.4	17.2	13.3	20.2
Others	03.8	03.3	02.0	02.0	03.0
Don't Know/ Can't Say	14.8	12.8	08.4	03.6	11.1
	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(2187)	(2368)	(1909)	(959)	(7423)

Source: *Indian National Elections Study*, 1998.

Other data that show how the degree of national identification affects all political attitudes is that a large percentage of those who cannot answer the question of identity, are also unable to answer the question about whether democracy is the preferable type of political system. The clear preference for democracy, compared to the authoritarian alternative, or thinking that it makes no difference, is largest among those who also identify themselves as Indian, 72.8%, compared to 6.3% opting for authoritarianism under some circumstances or those seeing no difference, 4.8%. Among those saying Indian and state the proportions respectively are 63.0%. 7.7%, 10.3%. Among those who see themselves only as members of a particular state, the commitment to democracy is appreciably weaker, 55.5%. But the difference is not in a greater preference for authoritarianism or indifference about the forms of government, respectively 5.6% and 7.6%, but in the much larger number who have no opinion, 34.1%, compared to the 16.1% giving the answer identifying only as Indian (see table #11).

Table #11: *Preference for Democracy by Subjective National Identity.*

	<i>Only Indian</i>	<i>Indian and State</i>	<i>Only State</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Democracy is preferable	72.8	63.0	55.0	44.9	60.3
Sometimes authoritarianism is preferable	06.3	07.7	05.6	03.6	05.8
No difference	04.8	10.3	07.6	16.6	06.4
Don't Know/ Can't Say	16.1	19.0	31.4	34.8	27.5
	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(4058)	(1313)	(1620)	(247)	(8133)

Source: *Indian National Elections Study*, 1998.

This data by class status and class position and on the attitude towards democracy suggests that a full identification with the nation is an indicator of a broader social integration. It also suggests that the national identity question taps a significant dimension of the political culture in India.

Democratic State - Nations: Who Supports Democracy in India?

We would like to argue that democracy and democratic political institutions and processes are an essential component of the viability and stability of multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-national state-nations. Democracy makes possible the identification with the state of many of its citizens who might have different identities, who might question their nation-state, but are ready to be loyal citizens of the state. Authoritarianism might serve to impose a nation-state model on the society, as was the case of Spain under the authoritarian regime of Franco. But, as the data for Spain show, the result ultimately was a backlash of resurgence and, in the Basque country, violent extreme nationalism.

Democracy, and more concretely federal democracy, can serve to integrate such a society. The *Verfassungspatriotismus* (“constitutional patriotism”) of Dolf Sternberger, developed by Jürgen Habermas in the German Federal Republic, might not have been important in Germany after the unification of the BRD and the DDR, but it certainly is an important component for more heterogeneous societies. Let us note that we would not argue that it is the only component of support for a state-nation but certainly one of the most important ones. It is

for that reason that a more detailed discussion of the attitude of Indians and of different groups in Indian society toward democracy and democratic institutions is so important and interesting.

In analyzing the attitudes of citizens toward the democratic institutions, there are some serious problems with the indicators used. It is important to distinguish the attitude towards the need for certain institutions, beginning with democracy, compared to authoritarian alternatives and ending with the attitudes toward political parties. There is sufficient evidence from many countries that we need to distinguish the belief in the need for certain institutions and their desirability and legitimacy, from the attitudes about the way those institutions actually perform. People in principle might support democracy, but they may often have serious misgivings about how their particular democracy is actually functioning. A distinction between the “legitimacy of institutions” and the “efficacy of institutions” is therefore crucial.⁴³ Citizens may believe that democracy is the best form of government for a country like theirs, but when asked if democracy is able to solve the problems of their society, might be less enthusiastic. When that question is followed by, “How is democracy working in our country?,” in many circumstances the answers might be quite negative. The negative response to the actual performance of democratic institutions in the long run is likely to erode the belief in the need for those institutions, but there is also evidence from many studies that these are different dimensions. The same is true, even more so, with political parties. In many democratic countries people agree on the need for parties to articulate their interests and demands but, at the same time, a large number of people have little trust in actual political parties. There are many and complex reasons for this distrust in practically all democracies, a distrust which is not translated into

⁴³ This is a theme developed in Juan Linz, “Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration,” in Linz and Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

rejection of political parties in principle as necessary institutions in a democracy, and even less of democracy itself.⁴⁴ The same is true to an even greater extent in attitudes towards the incumbents of many offices in democratic systems. The use of one or another indicator may capture different dimensions and sometimes leads to pessimistic perceptions about the stability of democracy.

The question that has been asked in many countries is, “With which of the following phrases are you most in agreement?,” “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government?,” “In some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic government,” “For someone like me a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference,” in addition in allowing for no answers and “do not know.” The “do not know” response is more likely among poor and uneducated segments of the population and therefore it should not be surprising that in a national survey of India it should be 27.5%, the largest amount ever recorded in the list of countries where this question has been asked.

When we turn to the first alternative, the agreement with democracy varies considerably, between countries, though nowhere is it unanimous. In India it is 60.3% of all those interviewed, which means that 83.2% of those expressing an opinion agree that democracy is preferable. The second alternative, that in some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable, is the choice of 5.8% of the population and 8% of those who actually expressed an opinion. Those who say for someone like themselves a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference are 6.4% of the population, and 8.8% of those with an opinion.

⁴⁴ For an elaboration on this theme, see Juan Linz, “Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Problems and Paradoxes,” in Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Juan J. Linz, eds., *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 291-317.

Let us look at the answers in a few other countries. In Brazil, the number with no opinion is 14.6%, a large one in comparison to other democracies, but those clearly preferring democracy are only 41.0%, those expressing the potential support for an authoritarian alternative, 21.1% and those indifferent 23.3%, a much less favorable response than we find in India. If we turn to a relatively new democracy, Spain, the number of no answers is quite small, 6%, and those preferring democracy 78%, those potentially supporting an authoritarian alternative 9%, and those indifferent 7%, figures that are very similar to those we find in India. The Spanish data have been consistently within this range over a long period of time and are very similar to those we find in the other Southern European democracies. In Latin America only Uruguay, with 80% democratic, 8% authoritarian and 6% indifferent is similar. Even in Chile after the painful experience of authoritarianism, democracy is endorsed by only 52.2%, 18.5% do not exclude the authoritarian alternative and 25.3% are indifferent, though the number of those without opinion is only 3.9%. In summary, in an international comparative perspective the support for democracy in India is very high (see table #12).

Table #12: *Attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism in six post-1975 cases of redemocratization: Uruguay, Spain, India, Korea, Brazil and Chile (in percentages). The number in parenthesis shows the attitude of those who answered the question.*

Questions	Country					
	Uruguay	Spain	India	Korea	Chile	Brazil
With which of the following phrases are you most in agreement?						
Democracy is preferable to any other form of government	80 (85)	78 (83)	60 (83)	53 (48)	52 (54)	41 (48)
In some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic government.	08	09	06		18	21
For someone like me, a democratic or a nondemocratic regime makes no difference	06	07	06		25	23
Don't know/ No answer	06	06	27		04	15
N	(1213)		(8133)		(1200)	(1240)

Source: The data for India are from the *National Election Study, 1998*, coordinated by Yogendra Yadav of the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. Data for Uruguay, Brazil and Chile are from the *Latino Barometer 1996*, directed by Marta Lagos. The Spanish data are from the *Eurobarometer 37* (1992). The Korean data is from the *Korea Democracy Barometer 1999*. In Brazil, for the 2002 *Latino Barometer* the "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government" response has dropped from 41% in 1996 to 37%.

We immediately have to ask ourselves whether in the heterogeneous Indian population commitment to democracy is limited to one or another segment of the society. To begin with, the number of "do not know", "no" answers is very similar among Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs, respectively 28%, 27.3% and 26.6%. When we turn to the positive attitude toward democracy, ignoring those with no opinion, we find that 60.0% of the Hindus, 59.2% of the Moslems and 66.4% of the Sikhs agree it is preferable to any other form of government. Among the Christians it is 61.8%, even when the number of those with no opinion is smaller, 18.9%. The authoritarian alternative is chosen by practically the same proportion of Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs, 5.7%, 5.5% and 5.5%, and more of the Christians, 8.1%. The belief that for someone like themselves, a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference, is found in 6.1% of the Hindus, 8.2% of the Moslems, 1.6% of the Sikhs, and 11.2% of the Christians. In

summary, whatever deep cleavages and differences might exist along religious communal lines, they are not reflected in the attitudes toward democracy. Democracy can be a key unifying element among all Indians (see table #13).

Table #13: *Opinions about democracy by religious groups.*

	<i>Hindu</i>	<i>Muslim</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Sikh</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Democracy is preferable	60.1	59.2	61.8	66.4	69.7	60.3
Sometimes authoritarianism is preferable	05.7	05.5	08.1	05.5	03.9	05.8
No difference	06.1	08.0	11.2	01.6	05.3	06.4
Don't know/ Can't say	28.0	27.3	18.9	26.6	21.1	27.5
	100	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(6749)	(895)	(285)	(128)	(76)	(8133)

Source: *Indian National Election Study 1998.*

Not unexpectedly, among the very poor the number of those who do not know or have no answer is particularly large. Even so, a majority of them, 54.9%, opt for democracy, and 10.8% opt for a non-democratic alternative. Among the poor the proportions are 57.4% and 11.1%. Among the middle economic segment the percentages are 64.3% and 13.5%. The apparently more democratic answer of the middle level segment is mostly a result of the much smaller number, 22.3%, who have no answer and the largest democratic response among the upper income level, 69.1%, compared to 15.6% authoritarian of the much smaller with no opinion, 15.2%. It is clear that democracy is not the preference of either the more privileged or the more underprivileged among Indians but a shared preference (see table #14).

Table #14: *Opinions about democracy by economic categories.*

	<i>Very poor</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Middle</i>	<i>Upper</i>	<i>Total</i>
Democracy is preferable	54.9	57.4	64.3	69.1	60.0
Sometimes authoritarianism is preferable	10.8	11.1	13.5	15.6	12.2
No difference/ Don't know	34.3	31.4	22.3	15.2	27.8

	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(2187)	(2368)	(1909)	(959)	(7423)

Source: *Indian National Election Study 1998*.

In view of the historic tensions between Tamil Nadu and the Republic in the early years and the more recent conflict in Punjab it is noteworthy that a commitment to democracy is above the Indian average in both states. In Tamil Nadu 79.5% prefer democracy, 6.4% authoritarianism, 2.7% see no difference, and 11.4% have no opinion, with fewer no opinion 3%. In Punjab 64.4% prefer democracy, 4.5% prefer authoritarian alternative and 1.2% see no difference for themselves (see table #15).

Table #15: *Support for democracy in India as a whole and in Tamil Nadu and the Punjab.*

	<i>All of India</i>	<i>Tamil Nadu</i>	<i>Punjab</i>
Democracy is preferable	60.3	79.5	64.4
Sometimes authoritarianism is preferable	05.8	06.4	04.5
No difference	06.4	02.7	01.2
Don't Know/ No answer	27.5	11.4	30.0
	100	100	100

Source: *National Election Study 1998*.

Note: Of the 11 states where at least 200 people were polled, support for democracy ranked first in Tamil Nadu and third in the Punjab.

It is not easy to compare the attitudes of upper caste Indians, OBC's, SC's and ST communities since the number of those without an opinion varies from 21.3% to 45%. The democratic alternative is chosen by 65.4% of the upper caste, 62.1% of the OBC's, 56.6% of the SC and 40.8% of the ST. But the number of authoritarian preferences varies little from the 13.3% among the upper caste to the 11.6% of the OBC's, 10.6% of the SC's and is only significantly more important among the Scheduled Tribe people, 14.2%, considering the large

number with no opinion. A more detailed analysis of these different groups would certainly reveal some differences in the degree of commitment to democracy (see table #16).

Table #16: *Support for democracy by caste.*

	<i>Upper Caste</i>	<i>OBC</i>	<i>Scheduled Caste</i>	<i>Scheduled Tribe</i>
Democracy is preferable	65.4	62.1	56.6	40.8
Sometimes authoritarianism is preferable	13.3	11.6	10.6	14.2
No difference/ Don't know	21.3	26.3	32.9	45.0
(N)	100 (2039)	100 (2946)	100 (1312)	100 (671)

Source: *Indian National Election Study 1998.*

Although we will turn later to the problem of the distrust of different institutions and particularly political parties, it is important to note how much the Indians agree with the need for parties in answering the question, "Suppose there were no parties or assemblies and elections were not held, do you think that the government in this country can be run better?", only 19.8% of the population has no opinion and 68.8% reject a system of government without parties, assemblies and elections and only 11.4% agree with that possibility. These answers are obviously quite consistent with the commitment to democracy we have just noted. Again we find some interesting differences between states, with a high of 35.0% in Gujarat, followed by Andhra Pradesh with 34.6%. In Tamil Nadu, in spite of the strong commitment to democracy, there are 27.8% that cannot say and 17.8% agreeing with the statement and 54.4% disagree, reflecting a considerable alienation from party politics in that state. A comparison with the

Punjab, considering the conflicts in that state, is quite interesting, though 31.8% do not answer the question, 60% disagree and only 8.2% agree with the no party regime. In comparison the alienation from political parties in Gujarat is quite significant, 16.8% compared to 48.2% that in principle support the need for political parties. We see that within the broad consensus on democracy there are significant differences in the response to different institutions (see table #17).

Table #17: *Support for democracy by state.*

	<i>Democracy is preferable</i>	<i>Sometimes authoritarianism</i>	<i>No difference</i>	<i>Don't Know/ Can't Say</i>	
Total	60.3	05.8	06.4	27.5	(8133)
Andhra Pradesh	44.2	03.8	03.2	48.7	(556)
Assam	58.9	05.3	18.5	17.4	(265)
Bihar	55.0	01.9	02.6	40.5	(833)
Gujarat	44.9	10.0	19.7	25.4	(390)
Haryana	53.0	06.0	00.7	40.3	(149)
Karnataka	62.6	05.2	02.4	29.8	(540)
Kerala	77.2	09.0	01.9	12.0	(368)
Madhya Pradesh	43.2	02.1	10.2	44.5	(560)
Maharashtra	74.8	08.6	02.5	14.0	(905)
Meghalaya	71.8	15.4	05.1	07.7	(39)
Orissa	64.2	03.9	16.6	15.3	(307)
Pondicherry	54.8	06.5	22.6	16.1	(31)
Punjab	64.4	04.5	01.2	30.0	(247)
Rajasthan	57.7	09.4	08.1	24.8	(456)
Tamil Nadu	79.5	06.4	02.7	11.4	(595)
Tripura	81.1	01.9	11.3	05.7	(53)
Uttar Pradesh	64.8	06.7	06.1	22.5	(1082)
West Bengal	41.4	03.7	09.5	45.4	(570)


Source: *India National Election Study 1998.*

India as a State Nation: Assessing Trust in Institutions

Let us try to go beyond the overall question of support for democracy to trust in the major institutions of the state. The study of trust has been a major research area in policy analysis and social science research for the last twenty years or so. Recently Pippa Norris at Harvard University attempted to bring this research together so as to be able to make comparative judgments about trust in institutions.⁴⁵ Using the Human Values 1990-1993 round of surveys she constructed a composite index of trust by measuring expressed trust in five major institutions she felt were important for a democratic state: parliament, civil service, the judiciary, police and the military. She did this for 23 democracies, one of which was India (see table #18).

Table 18: Institutions and Political Trust in India and Twenty Other Democracies: 1990 - 1993

⁴⁵ Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).



Source: Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), figure 11.2, p. 229. Norris constructed this chart by combining the responses in *World Values Surveys: 1990-93* concerning trust for five institutions, parliament, the civil service, the legal system, the police, and the army, p.222.

In order to see if India's very high comparative standing concerning trust in institutions held up in a later survey, we ran the data on trust in institutions for the eleven long-standing federal democracies based on the 1995-1997 round of the Human Values surveys. If we combine the total percentages of respondents who answered that they had a "Great Deal of Trust" or "Quite a Lot of Trust" in an institution, India ranks first or second out of the eleven long standing federal democracies in five of the six categories. No other country scores in the top two more than twice. At the opposite end of the scale Argentina ranks last in four of the six categories (see table #19).

Table 20: Responses in the 11 Longstanding Federal Democracies to Questions about Citizen Trust in Six Major Institutions (percentage)
 “How much confidence do you have in the (Central) Government?”

	Switzerland	India	Brazil	Canada	USA	Spain	Argentina	Australia	Germany	Belgium	Austria
Great Deal	5.1	11.5	10.9	5.9	4.7	3.8	5.1	2.3	1.1	n.a.	n.a.
Quite	45.2	36.8	37.3	31.8	25.9	26.3	21.6	24.1	22.4	n.a.	n.a.
Not Very	34.3	22.4	19.3	50.2	55.2	44.3	41.7	53.7	53.2	n.a.	n.a.
None	11.7	12.3	31.6	12.1	14.2	22.7	31.6	19.9	21.1	n.a.	n.a.
Don't Know	3.7	17.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	n.a.	n.a.

“How much confidence do you have in Parliament?”

	India	Belgium	Switzerland	Austria	Canada	Spain	Brazil	Australia	USA	Germany	Argentina
Great Deal	11.5	3.6	2.2	6.0	5.8	3.6	4.8	4.0	3.1	1.4	2.1
Quite	41.9	39.1	39.2	35.2	32.2	31.1	28.5	26.6	27.2	26.7	13.9
Not Very	18.9	43.4	40.1	48.9	51.4	40.9	20.3	54.0	55.4	55.7	43.6
None	9.4	13.8	12.9	9.9	10.7	19.2	45.3	15.4	14.2	11.9	40.4
Don't Know	18.4	0.0	5.5	0.0	0.0	5.1	1.1	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.0

“How much confidence do you have in the Legal System?”

	India	Switzerland	Austria	Brazil	Canada	Germany	Spain	Belgium	USA	Australia	Argentina
Great Deal	19.0	9.2	14.9	17.4	10.4	7.6	7.6	6.6	6.1	5.2	6.8
Quite	47.8	55.3	43.5	37.3	44.0	46.1	37.0	38.0	30.2	29.8	19.9
Not Very	14.4	27.3	34.7	21.1	38.8	39.5	39.9	40.3	50.1	53.4	47.6
None	4.1	5.9	6.8	23.8	6.8	5.4	11.1	15.1	13.6	11.6	25.7
Don't Know	14.7	2.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.4	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 20 cont.
 “How much confidence do you have in the Police?”

	Canada	Australia	USA	Germany	Austria	Switzerland	Spain	Belgium	Brazil	India	Argentina
Great Deal	24.3	18.1	16.3	10.0	16.5	11.7	11.0	6.9	9.4	11.7	3.9
Quite	59.8	57.5	54.9	60.4	51.3	54.9	49.5	44.1	35.5	24.0	18.7
Not Very	13.1	20.5	23.7	26.1	27.5	25.3	27.1	37.6	20.2	28.7	46.4
None	2.8	3.9	5.1	2.8	4.7	5.2	9.8	11.4	34.1	22.5	31.0
Don't Know	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	2.9	2.6	0.0	0.8	13.0	0.0
	84.1	75.6	71.2	70.4	67.8	66.6	60.5	51.0	44.9	35.7	22.6

“How much confidence do you have in the Political Parties?”

	India	Brazil	Switzerland	USA	Spain	Australia	Germany	Argentina	Canada	Belgium	Austria
Great Deal	11.0	3.7	1.2	2.7	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Quite	28.4	28.5	24.2	18.5	16.4	14.9	12.5	7.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not Very	28.2	19.4	48.6	62.4	49.1	66.1	66.0	42.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
None	16.2	47.6	19.1	16.3	29.0	18.0	17.5	49.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Don't Know	16.2	0.8	6.9	0	4.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	39.4	32.2	25.4	21.2	17.9	15.9	13.5	8.4			

“How much confidence you have in the Civil Service?”

	Brazil	India	USA	Canada	Germany	Switzerland	Belgium	Austria	Spain	Australia	Argentina
Great Deal	13.9	12.7	7.2	6.2	2.5	2.0	4.3	5.6	3.5	3.6	0.7
Quite	44.7	40.5	44.7	43.9	44.1	40.9	38.3	36.3	36.1	34.6	7.1
Not Very	21.8	17.1	40.4	42.6	43.2	39.4	42.9	50.6	41.8	51.2	43.9
None	18.7	6.1	7.8	7.3	7.6	11.4	14.5	7.5	13.5	10.6	48.3
Don't Know	0.8	23.6	0.0	0.0	2.8	6.3	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0
	58.6	53.2	51.9	50.1	46.6	42.9	42.6	41.9	39.6	38.2	7.8

State Nation or Nation State? India

Source: The data for all countries but Austria, Belgium and Canada is from *World Values Survey: 1995-97*, Ronald Inglehart et al., Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan. The data for Germany is from the Lander of the former West Germany. Canada, Belgium and Austria were not included in the 1995-97 survey. The data for these countries is from *World Values Survey: 1990-93*. For both the 1990 - 1993 and 1995 - 1997 surveys the question numbers were from top to bottom, 142, 144, 137, 141, 143 and 145. Question 143 was not asked in Canada. Questions 142 and 143 were not asked in Belgium and Austria.

What's more, when we calculate the average ranking in trust for all of the major institutions indicated above, we find that of the eleven longstanding federal democracies, India is the country that scores best, followed by Switzerland, and then Canada. We consider this to be a finding of major theoretical import, because none of these countries approximate the "nation state" model. Rather, they are all closer to the ideal type of the "state nation."

Nor does such a finding appear to be a fluke; for when we examine the entire universe of the eleven longstanding federal democracies and calculate and compare the average ranking of the five federal states closest to the "state nation" model with that of the six states closest to the "nation state" model, we find that on the whole, the state nation set scores significantly better than the nation state set, 4.8 to 7.0, to be exact. As such, we can conclude that the "state nation" model does not lead to any deficit in political trust, as many analysts fear. To the contrary, there tends to be more citizen trust in longstanding federal democracies that approximate the model of the "state nation" than there is in longstanding federal democracies that approximate the model of the "nation state" (see table #20).

Table #20: Citizen Trust in Major Institutions in the World's Eleven Long-Standing Federal Democracies: "State Nations" versus "Nation States"

Average rank of trust in major institutions	
Average rank of states closest to the "state nation" model (Belgium, Canada, India, Switzerland, and Spain)	4.8
Average rank of states closest to the "nation state" model (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Germany, United States)	7.0
Average rank per state from most trust to least trust:	
India	3.0
Switzerland	3.7
Canada	4.0
Brazil	4.6
Austria	5.0
USA	5.9
Belgium	6.3
Spain	7.2
Germany	7.6
Australia	8.0
Argentina	10.6

Source: See table 20. For the two questions in which we do not have data for all eleven countries, we adjusted the rankings of the rest by multiplying the actual ranking by eleven, then dividing by the number of countries for which data exists.

What is particularly disturbing about the comparative results is that, with the exception of the police, the next institution the Indians trust least is political parties, but Indians trust political parties more than any other long standing federal democracy does! For a poor multi-cultural country in which over 45% of the citizens are illiterate, the fact that among the long standing federal democracies only Argentina has a less trusted police than India is also very disturbing.

While very impressive, tables 18, 19, and 20 are based, as we discussed previously, on a sample in India that under-represents illiterates, rural dwellers and was only given in eight of the country's fifteen official languages, so we must look at the India's NES to measure trust with greater confidence. Fortunately the NES did administer a somewhat comparable trust question for India. But a cautionary note is in order: the NES has only three, not four, categories of response concerning the degree of trust respondents had in institutions ("Great Deal", "Somewhat" and "None"). The NES India also does not have the category "na/dk" for this question. These differences noted, it is interesting to see if the inclusion in the sample of more illiterates and more rural dwellers presents a somewhat different picture than that presented by the Human Values survey. The results are presented in table #21.

Table #21: *Trust in Institutions in India. Q: I would like to seek your opinion about different institutions of India in which you may have good deal of trust, some trust or no trust at all.*

Institutions	Great Deal	Somewhat	Not at all
Election Commission	45.8	31.1	23.0
Judiciary	41.5	34.2	24.3
Local government/panchayat/ municipality	39.0	37.8	23.2
State government	37.1	43.7	19.2
How much trust/confidence do you have in the Central government	35.1	42.6	22.3
Elected representative	19.9	40.5	39.6
Political Parties	17.3	43.6	39.0
Government officials	17.2	40.5	42.3

Police	12.9	30.0	57.1
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Source: 1996 National Election Study India.

At this stage three conclusions strike us as worth comment. First, the most trusted institution in India is the Federal Election Commission. This powerful Commission has the responsibility for supervising the fairness and efficiency of the entire electoral process.⁴⁶ The fact that this institution is the most trusted institution in India helps give the democratic electoral process itself enhanced legitimacy.⁴⁷ Respect for law in India is also probably helped by the fact that the next most trusted institution in India is the Judiciary.

Second, in comparative terms, even when we substitute the NES for the Human Values sample, India's relatively high trust ranking holds up. After the Election Commission and the Judiciary, the next three most trusted institutions are, in rank order, local government, state government, and central government. All three levels of government receive a "great deal" of trust ranging from 39% to 35% and a "None" that ranges from 23% to 19%. The Central government has a "None" of 12.7% in the

⁴⁶ The riots in the recent electoral outcome in Gujarat raise many disturbing questions. However, the Election Commission emerged stronger in one respect in that against the ruling BJP desires the Election Commission managed to postpone the timing of the Gujarat elections. The Election Commission also gained prestige due to the positive role it played in bringing about reasonably fair elections in Kashmir in 2002.

⁴⁷ Such an institution is worth more serious academic study and political consideration than it has received. In 2001 in Mexico, and 2002 in Senegal (which is very poor and dominantly Muslim), long standing hegemonic parties lost, for the first time ever, Presidential elections. Significantly in both Mexico and Senegal political analysts point out the important contribution made to the citizen's growing confidence that elections would be fair, and that the dominant party might lose and leave office, was due to the prestige and procedural power of recently created electoral commissions similar to India's.

Human Values Survey, which increases to a 22.3% in the NES India survey. This means however, that even with a sample that includes a proportionate amount of India's illiterates, rural dwellers, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes, the percentage of all respondents in India who answer "none" concerning their confidence in the central government is virtually the same percentage as in Germany, Spain and Australia. The use of three categories in NES India, as opposed to four in the Human Values survey, may have inflated the number of respondents who answered that they had a "great deal" of trust, 35%, in the central government. This percentage in India remains, by a substantially increased margin, the highest percentage of respondents of any of the long standing federal systems that have a great deal of trust in the central government.

Third, the biggest variance in responses concerning institutions between the NES and the Human Values surveys relates to the Police. In both surveys the least trusted institution is the Police. However the inclusion of more illiterates and rural dwellers in the NES India sample probably accounts for the dramatic difference of "none", which is only 22.5% in the Human Values survey, but 57.1% in the NES India survey.

Interestingly, at the level of a "great deal" of trust, the surveys are extremely similar with both being in the 22% to 23% range.

Voter Participation Rates, Sense of Political Efficacy, and Parliamentarianism vs.

Presidentialism: Contrasting Patterns in India and the USA

In the last twenty years India has seen what many see as a threatening new political party configuration. The polity-wide Congress Party, which many analysts felt contributed an indispensable factor of national integration to the Indian state because of its historic association with the Gandhi and Nehru led independence movement and its polity-wide presence, is no longer the ruling party. The emergence of governments with more than twenty parties in the governing coalition raises for some the specter of ungovernability (see table #22).

Table 22: *Most Amount of Parties in the Government of 23 OECD Countries From 1945-1995,(and India for 1952-2003)*

Country	Highest ever number of parties in government	Year(s)
India	23	(2003)
India	17	(1998)
India	11	(1996)
Belgium	8	(1945)
France	8	(1947)
Japan	7	(1993-1994)
Netherlands	5	(1971-1997)
Finland	5	(Various)
Italy	5	
Germany	5	(1953-1957)
Portugal	5	
Iceland	4	
Sweden	4	
Switzerland	4	(Since 1958)
Austria	3	
Spain	2	
Canada	2	

Australia	2
New Zealand	1
United Kingdom	1
USA	1

Source: For all countries except India, J. Lane, D. McKay and K. Newton, *Political Data Handbook: OECD Countries* 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 212-340.

What does our survey data, linked to our knowledge of voting and governing practices, indicate about this new party configuration? Contrary to observers who see growing signs of political disintegration in India, there are signs that in fact there is growing participation, growing sense of efficacy and, despite the proliferation of parties, especially state parties, growing commitment to Indian democracy as a way of managing diversity, among previously marginalized groups.

In this section we will attempt a systematic comparison between citizen's political involvement, and sense of efficacy, in the world's two largest democracies. The differences are great and may help explain some of the findings we have presented so far.

There is a general presumption, especially in the US sociological literature, that the lower the education level, and the lower the income level, the lower the voting participation rates and the lower the sense of personal political efficacy.⁴⁸ This is coupled with the belief that in the modern world, political trust in institutions has been

⁴⁸ For example, a classic study by Verba and Nie of participation in America flatly asserts: "the most important point to be made in this chapter – a point that is already well-documented in the literature [is that] citizens with lower social status – low levels of education or income – are greatly overrepresented among those who are politically inactive, while the upper-status groups are underrepresented among the inactives," Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Quote from p. 97.

declining for over three decades. Finally there is Samuel Huntington's famous axiom that if participation increases faster than institutionalization, there can be a crisis of governability. Most of these assumptions and or worries are true for the United States, some are true for Western Europe, none are true for India.

Part of the virtuous circle we have been documenting about Indian democracy may be a cause and an effect of increasing levels of voter participation and a growing sense that citizens can have an impact on government. We will now discuss data that make us believe that this assertion holds, in sharp contrast to the USA, at almost all socio-economic, religious, caste, tribal and gender levels in India for the last three decades, and with increasing force in the last decade.

Let us first examine the widely held hypothesis about the lower the socio-economic status, the lower the voting turn out. In the United States this assertion holds true with brutal regularity. If we divide levels of income into five quintals, for each quintal that income decreases in the USA, there is a monotonic decline in voter turnout, 77%, 67%, 59 %, 52%, 43%. The same holds true, even more sharply, for the six levels of education in the USA., the percentage of post-graduate voters is 84%, then for each descending level of education the percentages are, 79%, 66%, 57%, 43% and 38%. Also, blacks and Latinos vote less than whites. In the non-presidential year of 1994, 47% of whites voted, 37% of blacks voted, and 20% of Latinos voted.

In sharp contrast to the USA, in India, voting rates are absolutely not monotonic. Illiterates have a higher turnout than do post-graduates, who in fact have the lowest turnout rate. In terms of income, quintal 3 and 4, vote at a substantially higher rates than

do the two wealthiest quintals, quintals 1 and 2. In terms of ethnic/cultural community, in 1998 the minority communities of Muslims, Sikhs, and Scheduled Castes, all voted at higher rates than did upper caste Hindus. As Table 23 makes clear, the lower socio-economic status, lower voting rate thesis is confirmed for the USA, but does not hold in India.⁴⁹

Table 23: Socio-Economic Status and Voting Turnout in USA and India

USA (1988)				India (1998)	
1998	Turn Out	49%	1988	Turn Out	60%
(Turn out below expressed as percentage of Voting Age Citizens)				(Turn out below expressed as percentage of National Average)	
<i>Income:</i>				<i>Income:</i>	
1)	Lowest		43%	1)	Lowest
2)			52%	2)	
3)			59%	3)	
4)			67%	4)	
5)	Highest		77%	5)	Highest
<i>Education:</i>				<i>Education:</i>	
	No High School		38%		Illiterate
	Some High School		43%		Up to Middle
	High School Grad		57%		College
	Some College		66%		Post-Graduate
	College Grad		79%		
	Post-Graduate		84%		

⁴⁹ As it turns out, Western Europe does not conform to the lower-income, lower-turnout hypothesis either. In fact, in a careful study of electoral participation in 16 Western European countries between 1960 and 1992, the author concluded that “there is no significant correlation between educational attainment and electoral turnout.” See Richard Topf, “Electoral Participation,” in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State. Volume One: Beliefs in Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 27-51. It should also be said that the reverse pattern in India was already noted by Samuel Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed as far back as 1978. On the basis of a 1967 questionnaire administered to campaign activists, they found that the most active educational group were illiterates, followed by those with primary school, and the group with the lowest percentage of campaign activists were those who are the most educated. See Samuel Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed, *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behavior in India*. (University of Chicago Press, 1978), table 14.5, 195. Eldersveld and Ahmed attribute this pattern to the mobilization tactics of parties. They write: “their mass participation is in response to the efforts and appeals of parties.” Quote from p. 11.


<i>Community:</i>	% Voted		<i>Community:</i>	1971	(96)	1998
	1994 (Non- President ial Year)	1996 (Presidential Year)				
White	47	56	Hindu (Upper)	61.4		60.2
Black	37	50	Hindu (OBC)	45.3		58.4
Latino	20	27	SC	57.5		75.1
			ST	35.9		59.0
			Muslim	87.9	53.3	69.6
			Sikh	84.6	(49.8)	89.4

Sources: For India, Yogendra Yadav, "Electoral Politics in Time of Change: India's Third Electoral System, 1989-99," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol XXXIV, (Aug. 21-28, 1999), pp. 2393-2399. For USA, Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler, "Socioeconomic Bias in Turnout 1964-1988: The Voters Remain the Same," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 86, (Sept. 1992), pp. 725-736.

Contrasting sharply with India, the U.S. data from the National Election Study of 1996 continued to show a monotonic decrease in voting for *each* progressively lower level of education and income similar to that revealed in the 1988 study.

Another major thesis in the US political sociological literature is that there is a general decline in voting rates in the democratic world and some believe that this decline is due to a decrease in what is called a sense of “efficacy” on the part of the voters. The National Election Studies unit based at the University of Michigan has constructed an index on voter efficacy in the United States since 1952. The index is constructed using data measuring respondent agreement with the following questions: “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does”, or “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think”. The US political efficacy index average of respondents who gave answers indicating they felt efficacious for the four consecutive observations between 1952-1964 was 69.7%. In the four most recent consecutive observations between 1994 and 2000 only 39.7% of the respondents felt efficacious (see table #24).

Table #24: *Evolution of External Political Efficacy in the United States*



The Indian National Election Studies also has a efficacy index but the question is somewhat different “ Do you think your vote has an effect on how things are run in this country or do you think your vote has no effect?” They also only have two

observation points, 1971 and 1996. The trend is the opposite of the United States, 48.4% of the respondents felt efficacious in India in 1971 but 58.7% felt efficacious in 1996.

The most interesting thing about the Indian data is that if we select the groups that felt most marginal to effective participation in 1971, virtually all of them express an increase in their belief that their “ vote has an effect on how things are run in this country”, that is in their efficacy as a voting citizen .Out of 16 groups whose sense of efficacy was recorded in 1971 the seven groups which expressed the lowest efficacy, in ascending order from the bottom were, the Scheduled Tribes (ST), illiterates, women, the lowest economic quintal (the “very poor), the Scheduled Castes (ST), the second lowest quintal (the “poor”), and the rural population. However, in 1996, all of these seven groups expressed significant increases in their sense of efficacy compared to 1971. This growing sense of efficacy could have expressed itself in a growing desire to be anti-system. Since India is a long standing democracy this might have meant an increasing dissatisfaction with democracy. In India however, what we see between 1971-1996, is a high correlation between the previously most marginal groups feeling more efficacious and more supportive of democracy (see Table #25).

Table 25: Rapid Growth in Sense of Political Efficacy and Support for Democracy among Seven Previously Highly Marginalized Groups in India: 1971 - 1996

Group	Political Efficacy			Support for Democracy		
	1971	1996	Percentage Points Increase	1971	1996	Percentage Points Increase
National Average	48.4	58.7	+10.6	43.4	68.8	+25.4
ST	30.5	47.5	+17.0	41.2	66.4	+25.2
Illiterate	35.7	47.0	+11.3	30.6	61.6	+25.2
Women	35.9	50.9	+15.0	32.0	64.1	+32.1
Very Poor	37.9	50.7	+12.8	32.3	63.5	+31.2
SC	42.2	60.3	+18.1	38.2	67.3	+29.1
Poor	43.4	54.9	+11.5	37.2	67.8	+30.6
Rural	44.2	56.9	+12.7	39.4	69.0	+29.6

Source: India NES, 1971, 1996 and Yogendra Yadav, "Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s," in Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, and Balveer Arora, eds. *Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), Tables 14 and 15. The efficacy question was: "Do you think your vote has effect on how things are run in this country or do you think your vote makes no difference?". The support for democracy question was: "Do you think that the government in this country can be run better if there are not parties or assemblies or elections?"

Let us conclude this section by addressing the worries about governability and even the integration of India that some analysts express when they ponder the consequences of India having, by almost a factor of three, more parties in the governing coalition than any other democracy in history. These worries are based on both the high number of parties, and the fact that many of these parties are not polity wide but receive all their votes from one state. There is the fear that these parties are not only regional but latently separatist. The fact that India's parliamentary system requires the Prime

Minister to have a majority of votes in the federal lower chamber to govern (or at least not have a majority against the government) has led some to advocate a US style Presidential form of government for India. The advantage such advocates see in Presidentialism is that it means that a president will have a fixed term, say five years, and so could continue to rule with or without a majority in parliament, would not have to rely on regional parties, and so would be able to surmount the actual or potential crisis of governability. We have five reservations about this line of argument.

First, the NES India asked the respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: “We should be loyal to our region first and then to India.” The percentage of respondents who agreed with this statement has declined over time, 67.1 in 1971, 52.9 in 1996, and 50.7 in 1998. Furthermore, when we did a cross-tab on trust in central government and the question on whether first loyalty should be to the region or to India, the percentage of respondents who said that loyalty should be to the region had exactly the same degree of “great trust” in the central government, 38.2%, as did those who said that the primary loyalty should be to India. The cross tabs of those with “no confidence” were also very similar. When Linz and Stepan first brought this cross-tab to Yadav’s attention, Yadav wrote back “this cross-tab demonstrates the nature of ‘regionalism’ in Indian politics and brings out the fact that it normally does not run against national unity or pose a threat of secession”.

Second, as Stepan argues in his chapter in this volume, if a “regional” party is helped in its efforts (as was the Sikh Akali Dal party in the Punjab) to form a government in its state by an alliance with a polity-wide governing party in Delhi, and

gets important posts in Delhi because it is one of the parties in the governing coalition, it makes more analytic and political sense to call such a party “centric-regional” rather than “regional”. In fact the participation of such a “centric regional” party in a coalition at the center creates important incentives for such parties to collaborate with the central government, and for the governing party to be attentive to reasonable cultural demands of its “centric regional” coalition partners.

Third, this set of positive incentives for the “centric regional parties” to cooperate with a polity wide ruling party at the center, and for the polity wide governing party to cooperate with now loyal “centric regional parties,” would be less under Presidentialism than under Parliamentarianism, because the president, with a mandate guaranteed for five years, would not have comparable incentives – indeed the political imperative – to cooperate with regional parties. Furthermore, it is also highly likely that if India became Presidential, the states would successfully campaign to get directly elected governors. Without the constraints and/or rewards of coalition, both directly elected Presidents and directly elected Governors would be more free to pursue more maximalist cultural policies. We do not feel that such culturally maximalist leaders would help in building a “state nation” in India. Parliamentarianism is coalition-requiring and coalition-sustaining. Presidentialism is neither.⁵⁰

Fourth, presidentialism does best if there is a relatively low number of parties as measured by the Laakso-Taagepera index. The USA has seldom been over 2.5 on this

⁵⁰ For a general discussion of parliamentarianism versus presidentialism, see Juan Linz, “Presidentialism or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in Linz and Valenzuela, ed. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) 3-90. Also see Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism Versus Presidentialism,” in *World Politics*, no. 46 (October 1993): 1-22.

scale. India has recently been around 6.5 on this scale. There is a strong literature that argues and documents that the worst combination for government stability and government law making capacity is presidentialism and party fragmentation.⁵¹ Two countries that would fall into this category are Brazil and, if it were to become presidential, India.

Finally, for all the talk of a growing crisis of governability in parliamentary, multi-party, federal India, India in fact had one of the highest economic growth rates in the world in 1996-2002.

In short, asymmetrically-federal, multi-party and parliamentary India, on many dimensions, continues to astonish theorists of democracy in the modern world.

Conclusion: India as a “State Nation”: Past Accomplishments and Potential Threats

In our introduction to this chapter we argued that being a “state nation” is an extremely important normative goal for culturally diverse, especially partly multinational, democratic federations. We also argued that the relative presence or absence of a polity’s state-nation characteristics could be empirically observable concerning three of the most politically important attributes; first, the degree of pride in citizen’s identification with being members of the polity, second the degree of citizen’s trust in the most important state institutions such as electoral procedures, the judiciary,

⁵¹ See for example Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination”, *Comparative Political Studies*, no. 26 (1993): 198-228.

the civil service, and third, the degree of citizens support for the democratic political system.

Notwithstanding the great linguistic, religious, ethnic, and caste differences within its diverse polity, India is one of the world's democracies that scores most highly on these three state nation indicators of identification, trust, and support.

Our methodological and analytic position is that in politics, what has been socially constructed, can also be socially destroyed. We shall discuss these possibilities later in this conclusion. However, no matter what may happen in the future, India's past and present achievements concerning being a state-nation are worthy of reiteration, and comparative analysis, in this conclusion.

Concerning identification, certainly less than 30% of the total Indian population speak Hindi, are Hindus, and come from a part of India (ie., the non-“inner line” areas) that experienced the somewhat homogenizing and interactive impacts of direct British Colonial rule, and more importantly, the historic Gandhi-Nehru led Congress Party independence movement.⁵²

Nonetheless, in answer to the World Values survey question “How proud are you to be Indian,” 69.6% of all Indian respondents said they had a “great deal” of pride, and 18.1% answered they were “quite” proud. Thus, 87.7% of Indian respondents were proud of being Indian. Among the 11 long-standing federal democracies in the world only the United States and Australia had higher “great deal” of pride scores. Moreover, among the four long-standing federal democracies that have a significant multinational

⁵² Add long footnote from Yogendra, using census data.

dimension (Canada, Belgium, Spain and India) India has the highest percentage of respondents who said they have a “great deal” of pride in their country. See Table 5.

Concerning trust in major state institutions, Pippa Norris of Harvard, using the World Values study of 1990-1992, came to the conclusion that among the twenty-one countries she analyzed for trust in five key political and state institutions (the parliament, civil service, legal system, police, and army) India ranked first, and the three other countries with significant multinational components ranked 8th (Canada), 17th (Spain) and 19th (Belgium). Pippa Norris’ set of countries included such long standing and leading social welfare states as Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, and the global superpower, the USA. See Table 18.

Our confidence in Pippa Norris’ findings was bolstered when we ran the data on trust in six major institutions for the eleven long-standing federal democracies using the 1995-1997 World Values study. When we combined “great deal of trust” and “quite a lot of trust” for each of the six institutions, India ranks first or second out of the eleven federations for five of the six institutions. No other long-standing federal democracy ranks first or second for more than two institutions. When we study the scores for the three other countries with significant multinational components, we see that Belgium and Canada rank in the top two for only one institution (of the four for which we have data) and Spain was not in the top two for any of them. See table 19.

Concerning our indicator of support for democracy, as Table 12 showed, 60% of respondents in India said that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government”. In 2001(a particularly bad year) the Latin American average for this

question was 48%. Chile only had 45% and Brazil 30%. In East Asia, Korea, in 1999, only had 53%.⁵³

However, in a diverse polity, even if the average is fairly high, if within a major minority group, support for democracy is low, this can present a problem. Yet this is not a problem in India concerning religion because the major religious minority group is the Muslims, and they are not statistically different in their support of democracy (59.2%) than the Hindus (60.1%). See Table 13. Of the major long-standing democracies in the world India has by far the lowest per capita income. If the poorest segment of the population had a very low support for democracy in contrast to the rest of the population this could also present a problem, but 54.9% of the “very poor” in the Indian sample answered that “democracy is preferable”. Finally, given India’s uniquely important caste system, it is important to note that even among the Scheduled Castes (formerly called “untouchables”), 56.6% support democracy. In comparative terms therefore, the percentage of India’s Muslims, of India’s untouchables, and of India’s poorest strata, who answer that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government”, is about ten percentage points higher (for each of these potentially alienated anti-democratic groups) than the average of Latin America countries for 2001.

On our three key empirical indicators for which a high score is particularly useful for a diverse polity to be a successful “state nation”, positive identification and pride in being citizens, trust in the major state institutions, and support for democracy, India scores extremely well. In this respect, India’s past and present achievements in

⁵³ For Latin America in 2001 see Marta Lagos, “A Road With No Return?”, *Journal of Democracy*, 14 (April 2003), Table 1, p. 165.

creating unity, democracy, and a useable state in the context of great diversity must be recognized, and we hope, further analyzed.

We would like to end this chapter however with a cautionary note. There is a significant element of “social construction” in politics. What has been socially constructed can under some circumstances be socially destroyed. More than a quarter of a century ago Linz and Stepan edited a volume on the breakdown of democracy in twelve West European and Latin American countries. One of their major conclusions was that “the independent contributions made to the breakdowns by political incumbents is a theme that emerges in almost all cases.”⁵⁴ Linz and Stepan also concluded that virtually none of the breakdowns was inevitable.

The authors of this chapter have two major conclusions concerning India’s political engagement with its socio-cultural diversity. First, India is not a classic “nation state.” Second, India has managed to create a functioning, democratic “state nation.” In our judgment, the effort to attempt to forge a classic “nation state” of the French style would destroy the present, functioning “state nation” and not assure the creation of a democratic nation-state. Worse, the attempt to forge a nation state in India would be extremely dangerous and ultimately unsuccessful and would almost certainly produce at best, a lower quality democracy, an eroded state nation, and weaker attachments to the state. To the extent that the Indian state is not a classic nation-state, and that India’s federalism has historically recognized the diversity of people within the union, a nation-building campaign on the basis of a cultural, linguistic or religious homogeneity, and the

⁵⁴ See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), IX.

marginalization of those not sharing in this sought after homogeneity, is a potential threat to the Indian state. Many loyal segments of the population in India, many groups, many political administrative units, can be part of a state-nation, but not part of a classical nation-state.

However, increasingly in India, some militant groups often referred to as “Hindu fundamentalists” (such as the RSS, the VHP, and the Bajrang Dal, and frequently – but not always – supported by the BJP) often use a discourse, and carry out actions, whose socio-political consequences, if their project for India were ever implemented, would make India sharply less inclusive. In the Gujarat massacres of 2002, in which approximately 1500 Muslims were killed, many of the “Hindu fundamentalist” groups supported, indeed helped coordinate, the anti-Muslim attacks, with the complicity of the BJP’s state government. In the wake of the massacre, the BJP swept elections in Gujarat, and discussion of the “Gujarat model” as the future electoral strategy of the BJP was frequently referred to in Indian political discussions. After the Gujarat elections, Ashutosh Varshney wrote the following, which we will quote at length to give an indication of the worries that some important observers have about the current threats to pluralism and inclusiveness in India.

“ In effect, Gujarat’s electorate has legitimised independent India’s first unambiguous pogrom, a pogrom much more vicious than the the killings of the Sikhs in Delhi in 1984, a pogrom that came closest to the classic, anti-Jewish pogroms of Russia and Europe in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century. The Congress Party, though deplorably involved in anti-Sikh violence in 1984, never had an anti-Sikh ideology. For purely electoral reasons, the Congress became contingently anti-Sikh for a while. In contrast, the VHP, the RSS and their stormtroopers, the Bajrang Dal, have an anti-Muslim ideological core.

Therefore, the victory of Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress in 1985 was basically a strategic phenomenon, cynically parasitic as the Congress campaign was on Mrs Gandhi’s assassination by her Sikh bodyguards. The BJP’s victory in Gujarat, on the contrary, is ideological. It is about a larger vision of the polity, in which minorities, as the RSS put it earlier this year, must seek protection in the goodwill of the majority community, not in the laws of the land. The massive

legitimation of an ideologically charged pogrom is a truly bruising embarrassment for all Indian liberals and a severe undermining of the pluralist national vision in Gujarat.⁵⁵

Clearly, if the Gujarat model became a dominant model in India this would bring about the socio-political destruction of India's state nation. We hope that this will not occur, and we do not believe it is inevitable that it will.⁵⁶ Much of what we have discussed about India's institutions as well as the data we have presented here about the attitudes of citizens would support a more optimistic view.

⁵⁵ Ashutosh Varshney, "Will the Stallion Balk in Mid-Gallop?" *The Hindu Magazine* (December 30, 2002).

⁵⁶ Let us briefly mention some reasons that make us more confident than many others that the "Gujarat model" is not bound to be successful in India's twenty-seven other states. Gujarat has many features that make it exceptional in India. First, the Gujarat electoral model was aided by the fact that the BJP was ruling in Gujarat without the actual, or at least potential, constraint of coalitional partners. In all other major states where the BJP was then in power they were in multi-party coalitions. Second, Ashutosh Varshney in his award winning book *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p.97, presents data on deaths as a result of communal violence per 1,000,000 of urban populations in seventeen major states in India from 1950-1995. Gujarat, by far, had the highest death rate. Third, of the seventeen states for which we have survey data on support for democracy, the state that had the highest number of explicitly anti-democratic responses in 1998 was Gujarat (see Table 18). Fourth, Gujarat had emerged as the safest electoral bastion for the BJP and had witnessed the most intense Hindu-fundamentalist mobilization of any state in the decade prior to the massacre. See Yogendra Yadav, "The Patterns and Lessons [of Gujarat Election Verdict]" (*Front Line*, January 3, 2003: 10-16). Fifth, the Godra incident in which 58 Hindus burned to death in a train returning from Ayodhya, one of the main symbols for Hindu fundamentalism, helped ignite the massacres. Without great complicity by incumbents, and unprecedented terrorism by civil society groups (whether Muslim or Hindu), a Godra type incident will be an extremely rare occurrence. More generally, we can say that the leaders of the BJP as a political party (who are in a governing coalition with twenty-three partners) for reasons of parliamentary, coalitional, electoral, and even very important national and international investment imperatives, might well want to distance themselves from full association or complicity with, the projects of such groups as the RSS, VHP and the Bajrang Dal. Finally, a non-BJP government at the center, might not allow this, not only out of a commitment to value India's tradition of inclusiveness but also for reasons of party competition. This would contribute to governability, a strong Indian state, and wide-spread support for a state nation. Such a government at the center, in all likelihood, would not tolerate an individual state leader's incitement of a Gujarat type anti-inclusionary campaign and its attendant massacres. The BJP's defeat in the state assembly elections in Himachal Pradesh in February 2003 has already demonstrated some limits to the Gujarat model.

