

Sciences-Po, Paris

Fall 2006

**Selected Problems in Democracy and Democratization:
Theories, Institutions and Practices**

**Professor Alfred Stepan
as48@columbia.edu**

This course will meet for seven weeks, each week
for two sessions, of two hours each.

Monday: 10:15- 12:15

Wednesday: 8:00-10:00

Location: 199 Bd. St. Germain
Salle 511

Professor Stepan will hold “office hours” to talk with members of the class on
Thursday, 14:45-16:45 during class weeks. Location to be announced.

Course Assistant, especially for availability of materials in the Sciences-Po system,
Etienne Smith
etienne.smith@sciences-po.org

[Availability of Materials](#)

The readings that are most likely to be discussed in the seminar phase of the lecture/seminar meeting are marked with an asterisk (*). They have been made available via one of the following ways:

Purchase:

* BOOKLET (hereafter **BOOK**): to be purchased at the *Service de la Reprographie*, 27 rue Saint-Guillaume.

Online:

* JSTOR (hereafter **JSTOR**): Contains full-text articles. Available only from the Sciences Po library computers. Go to the Sciences Po web page. Click on “Documentation-Bibliothèque”, then on “Revue électronique”, then at the bottom of the page on “JSTOR”.

* EBSCO (hereafter **EBSCO**): Contains full-text recent articles. Available only from the Sciences-Po library computers. Go to the Sciences Po web page. Click on “Documentation-Bibliothèque”, then on “Revue électronique”, then at the bottom of the page on “EBSCO”.

* Alfred Stepan’s WEBSITE (hereafter **WEB**): Go to www.columbia.edu/~as48
Click on “Selected Problems in Democracy and Democratization”.

Library:

* BIBLIOTHEQUE DE RECHERCHE (hereafter **BIB**): 199 Bd Saint Germain, 1st floor.

* DIRECT ACCESS (hereafter **DIR**): Main library. 1st floor for books. 2nd floor for journals.

* MAGASIN (hereafter **MAG**): Main library, ground floor. Orders processed in 45 minutes minimum. Old books (hereafter **Annexe**) need to be ordered 24hrs in advance.

For key books, the library has up to six copies: 3 at BIB, 2 at DIR, 1 at MAG.

Course Requirements and Grading Criteria

This course will work best if you do most of the reading before the lectures as each week I will devote approximately 45 minutes of our four hours to your questions to me and to my questions to you.

The class will be restricted to 30 students so as to enable me to work with you personally to develop a research paper that is tailored to your interests; I will meet with you afterward to discuss your paper.

The central requirement of the course is a 30-page paper on a topic that relates to one of our seven weeks of lectures and has been approved by me. Members of the class are invited to meet me at my office hours to discuss potential paper topics. Roughly one-quarter of your grade will be based on the quality of your participation in the discussions that are held at the end of each lecture. The remaining three-quarters of the grade will be based on the quality of your research paper.

Week 1 The Metaframeworks of the Five Arenas of Modern Democratic Politics: With special attention to refinements concerning civil society

* For a classic statement of the eight necessary conditions for a “polyarchy,” or a political democracy, see Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, pp. 1-16 (**BOOK; MAG-Annexe**)

* For a very brief attempt to compare the arena of “civil society” with the arenas of “political society,” “the state,” “rule of law” and “economic society”, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp 3-15 (**BIB; DIR;MAG**). See the introduction to Part IV, “Post-Communism’s Prehistories,” for how the “simultaneity” task in each of the five arenas is especially complex in post-soviet Europe, esp. pp. 237-254 (**BIB;DIR;MAG**), and Alfred

Stepan, "Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory," in *Arguing Comparative Politics*, pp. 167-180 (**BIB; DIR; MAG**)

For some territories (Somalia in recent times), there is no state. In many other polities, the state has no effective institutional or normative presence. Such situations have been under-theorized in the literature on political institutions. * For an important approach to these questions, see Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems (A Latin American View With Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries)", *World Development* 21 (1993) pp. 1355-1369 (**BOOK**). For a recent controversial article on stateness, new conceptions of sovereignty and an argument that highlights "alternative hierarchic relationships" in international relations see David A. Lake, "The New Sovereignty in International Relations", *International Studies Review* (2003) 5, pp. 303-323 (**MAG**). For an innovative discussion of the problem of "broadcasting power over space" see Jeffrey Herbst, *State and Power in Africa*, (**DIR**) read first three chapters.

For a single country study that employs horizontal and longitudinal comparisons to study civil society's contribution to democracy, see Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) (**BIB; DIR**). For an article-length critique of the Putnam book, see Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*," *American Political Science Review* (June 1996), pp. 389-397 (**JSTOR**)

Putnam raises major questions about the decline of what Tocqueville recognized as an American tradition of civic association, in his "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* (January 1995), pp. 35-78 (**MAG**). Also see Seymour Martin Lipset's article in the same issue.

* For the argument that civil society must not only be dense and active (the Putnam argument), but linked positively to democratic institutions, see the brilliantly written article by Sheri E. Berman, "Civil Society in Weimar," *World Politics* 49(3), April 1997 (**JSTOR**).

* For the argument that civil society should not be merely active but should include, in a regular and programmatically oriented way, groups in potential conflict with each other,

see the award winning article by Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond”, *World Politics* (April 2001) pp. 362-398 (**JSTOR**).

Robert A. Dahl gave himself a wonderful 80th birthday present, when he published, *How Democratic Is the American Constitution?* (Yale University Press, 2001) (**MAG**). Since the US model is often implicit in many discussions of politics (both academic and non-academic) this critical comparative perspective is useful to bear in mind.

For members of the course whose primary interest is philosophical, probably the best book on the civil society debate is Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). (**DIR; BIB**)

Citizen security was neglected in early democratization studies. For some new approaches see Laurence Whitehead “On Citizen Security” in his *Democratization: Theory and Experience* (Oxford University Press, 2002),pp. 165-185. (**DIR**)

New theories of democratization and civil society must increasingly incorporate the possibility that in some types of democratic polities some civil society activists go in and out of the state, and some alliances are international. The pioneering and award winning book is by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Policies*, (Cornell University, 1998). (**DIR; BIB**)

Guillermo O’Donnell, “Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics” Kellogg Working Paper #274, (April 2000).

Week 2

Metaframeworks of the Institutions of Democratic Governance: Presidentialism, Parliamentarianism and Semi-Presidentialism

The first two hours will focus on the presidentialism vs parliamentarianism debate and will be one of the most intensely compressed, fastest-moving lectures in the course, so read ahead of time. I will conclude my lecture with three counterfactuals. Would the coups in Brazil 1964 and Chile 1973 never have happened if the systems had been parliamentary and not presidential? Would the military coup effort in Spain in 1981 have been successful if Spain had been presidential and not parliamentary?

The last two hours of lecture will discuss semi-presidentialism (which in Post-Communist Europe was the modal pattern chosen, but which often rapidly turned into “super-presidential semi-presidentialism”), and then conclude with a discussion of the possibility of reforming both the semi-presidential and the presidential models.

Readings with Thoughts on Paper Topics:

The dominant form of parliamentary government is not the Westminster (British) model, and certainly not the U.S. presidential model, but what the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart calls the "consensus model" found in most Western European countries. He spells out the dominant characteristics of the Westminster and consensus models in his widely cited *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), especially pp. 9-48. **(DIR)** If you have not already read this, read it as early in the lecture series as you can, so that you have a sense of the variety of democratic regimes.

* For a sustained argument that, all things being equal, parliamentarism contributes to democratic consolidation, and that presidentialism and semi-presidentialism complicate democratic consolidation, see the influential work by Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?” in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 3-87 **(BIB; DIR)**

* For a review of the available empirical evidence and a theoretical analysis of the results, see Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism,” *World Politics*, Vol. 46 (October . 1993), pp. 1-22 **(JSTOR)** and in my *Arguing Comparative Politics*, pp. 257-275 **(BIB; DIR)**.

* For the unscheduled fall of a dozen Latin American Third Wave Presidents, see Arturo Valenzuela, “Latin American Presidencies Interrupted”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No 4 (October 2004): 5-20 (**WEB**)

*On semi-presidentialism, the classic formulation is Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," *European Journal of Political Research* (1980), pp. 165-187 (**BOOK**), or better his *Les Regimes Semipresidentiels* (Paris: PUF, 1986) (**MAG**).

*For a discussion about the special conditions that allowed semi-presidentialism to work reasonably well in France, see Ezra N. Suleiman, "Presidentialism and Political Stability in France," in the previously cited Linz-Valenzuela volume, pp. 137 – 162 (**DIR. MAG; BIB**). * For how virtually none of these conditions were present in Post-Soviet Europe see Timothy J. Colton and Cindy Skach, “A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism: The Russian Predicament”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.16, No 3 (July 2005):113-126 (**WEB**)

* For a discussion of the possibility of “Parliamentarized Presidentialism” and “Parliamentarized Semi-Presidentialism” see Alfred Stepan, “Introduction: Under-theorized Political Problems in the Founding Democratization Literature and Some Proposals” in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democracies in Danger: Diagnoses and Prescriptions* (**WEB**)

One of the major debates in modern political science concerns the comparative weight of institutions. A seminal article that recontextualized the debate is James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 78 (1984), pp. 734-749 (**JSTOR**). Also see March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989) (**DIR; BIB**)

The modal type of regime chosen in the post-Soviet countries was semi-presidentialism. We need to explain what allowed it to be so successful in the French Fifth Republic, and what some inherent dangers in the model might be. On how semi-presidentialism (for a variety of reasons) rapidly degenerated into authoritarian super-presidentialism in many post-Soviet republics, see Philip Roeder, “Varieties of Post-Communist Authoritarian Regimes,” *Comparative Politics* (1995) (**MAG**). Also see Ray

Taras, ed., *Post-Communist Presidents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) (**MAG**). A possible research paper is to contrast how Yeltsin and Putin responded to the political constraints of semi-presidentialism. Has semipresidentialism contributed to the problems of peacemaking in Sri-Lanka, especially in the crisis that erupted in 2003?

For the argument about the special conditions that decreased the potential dangers of semi-presidentialism in France (and the relative rarity of such conditions), see Alfred Stepan and Ezra N. Suleiman, "The French Fifth Republic: A Model for Import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil," in *Arguing Comparative Politics* (**BIB; DIR;MAG**), pp. 276-294.

For a major new book on semipresidentialism, see Cindy Skach, *Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic* (Princeton University Press: 2006) (**MAG** available soon)

For a comparative empirical analysis of executive powers, see Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 148 - 167. (**MAG; DIR; BIB**) Shugart and Carey also have some recommendations for achieving "workable" presidential configurations, mainly based on electoral system manipulation and timing of elections. See especially Chapter 12, Conclusions, and Appendix A. Do you agree with their arguments?

For a much more sceptical view of parliamentarism than that provided by Linz or Stepan and Skach, see Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism," in the previously cited Linz and Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidentialism*, (**BIB; DIR; MAG**) pp. 106-118.

Also see the critique of Linz by D. Horowitz, "Debate: Presidents vs. Parliaments: Comparing Democratic Systems," *Journal of Democracy* (Fall 1990), (**MAG**) pp. 73-83.

If presidentialism is as "risk-prone" an institutional configuration as Linz, and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi in "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1996), pp. 39-56, (**MAG**) argue, what, if any, special conditions have allowed presidentialism to work in the United States? To start, see Fred W. Riggs, "The Survival of Presidentialism in the United States: Para-

constitutional Practices,” *International Political Science Review*, IV (1988), pp. 247-278. (**BIB; MAG**)

Modern (post-1949) parliamentarism in Western Europe is substantially different from inter-war parliamentarism. The German federal constitution (Basic Law) of 1949 is especially interesting because the problem of inter-war government instability is partially addressed by the “positive vote of no confidence” and by an electoral system which combines “first past the post” districts with proportional representation lists. Someone in the class who is interested in Germany and/or constitutional engineering might want to explore what German institutional reforms, qua institutions, contributed - or did not contribute - to post-1950 German stability. Are any of the above-mentioned German institutional practices especially worthy of consideration by constitution-makers in new democracies?

Giovanni Sartori and others are increasingly advocating semi-presidentialism for Italy. Assess.

If a country which you are studying has recently adopted a semi-presidential constitution you might consider writing on that topic. Your paper might contain a close analysis of the president's prerogatives in the constitution and an analysis of actual practice. If the actual practice of presidential powers exceeds the constitution, what explains this? What are the consequences for democratic consolidation? You might want to compare the formal powers of the president in your country with those of the president in the French Fifth Republic. If so, read and replicate Table 8.2 and Figure 8.1 in Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*.

For the counterfactual approach, see James Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science”, *World Politics* 43(2) (January 1991). (**JSTOR**).

Week 3 On the Metaframework of Territorial Politics in Democracies:
Unitary States (and “Federacies”) versus Federations

In a democracy, there are fundamentally only two ways to approach territorial rule, a unitary state (with possibly some federacies) or a federal state. Confederations exist but

their democratic component comes mainly from the unitary or federal states that compose them.

Over half the people in the world who live in something close to a democracy are living in federations. The U.S., Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Australia, Argentina, Brazil and India are all currently democratic federal systems of at least ten years duration. Russia and Nigeria are federal systems but recent and, unfortunately, at best border-line democracies. If Indonesia, China or Burma were ever to become solidly democratic, they would probably be all federal, or at least have “federacies”. Mexico is a federal democracy of less than seven-years duration, but federal features played an important role in the recent democratic transition. The European Union increasingly has strong federal dimensions.

Two distinctions that are often not made -- but which must be made before we can analyze federalism seriously -- are the distinction between federalism in a democratic regime and in a non-democratic regime, and the distinction between federalism in a mono-national polis and a multi-national polis.

Until recently, federalism was one of the weakest (and most boring) literatures in comparative politics. Fortunately, there now are numerous groups of scholars in different countries attempting to reinvigorate the sub-field of territorial politics.

Strongly Suggested Reading:

* The standard political science work on federalism is William Riker, “Federalism,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. *Handbook of Political Science, Volume 5: Governmental Institutions and Processes* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 93-172. **(BOOK; BIB; MAG)**

* For a different approach, see Alfred Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*, pp. 315 – 362. **(BIB;DIR;MAG)**

An important new work on the origins of federalism with important implications for Riker's theories are Daniel Ziblatt, "Rethinking the Origins of Federalism: Puzzle, Theory, and Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Europe", *World Politics*, Vol. 57, No.1 (October 2004): 70-98. **(JSTOR)**

Is federalism, at best, an equilibrium institution? On the question of how decision-making rules help structure equilibrium (or make status quo politics difficult to change), the writings of Kenneth A. Shepsle have implications for some types of federal systems which have strong anti-majority decision rules, such as the United States and Brazil. See his article with B.R. Weingast, "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice," *Public Choice*, 37 (1981), pp. 503-519 **(MAG)**; also see Shepsle, "Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 81 (1987), pp. 85-104, **(JSTOR)**, and their "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed. *Political Science: The Science of Politics* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986) **(BIB;MAG)**.

The U.S. is, of course, often seen as the model of federalism. See any edition of *The Federalist Papers*, especially numbers 10, 15, 22, 45, 51, 62 and 63.

All federal systems by definition must to some extent *close* the policy agenda of the central democratic government (if the policy agenda of the central democratic government were completely *open*, there would be no "constitutionally-reserved" areas for the sub-units, and therefore the system would not be federal, but unitary). Is this a violation of democratic theory? See Robert A. Dahl, "Majority Rule and the Democratic Process," and especially "When Is a People Entitled to a Democratic Process," in *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 135-152, and 193-212. **(MAG; DIR; BIB)**

See the article by Arend Lijphart, "Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories," in *Publius*, vol. 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-16. In this issue, also see the article by Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism and Consociational Regimes," pp. 17-34. **(MAG)**

An argument developed from the rational choice perspective is that federalism can be “market-enhancing.” See Barry Weingast, “Constitutions as Government Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets,” *Journal Of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 149, No. 1 (1993), pp. 286-311. **(MAG)** Are there conditions under which federalism could be “market-eroding”? Brazil? Russia?

On federalism’s relationship to political parties in the United States, see the classic statement by David Truman, “Federalism and the Party System,” in Arthur W. Macmahon, ed. *Federalism: Mature and Emergent* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 115-136.

(MAG-Annexe)

Federalism (particularly with the political party system discussed by Truman) is one feature which produces divided government. See Morris Fiorina, *Divided Government* (New York and Toronto: Macmillan, 1992) **(MAG)**. Do you believe Fiorina gives sufficient weight to the combination of federalism and the U.S. party system as one of the major reasons for divided government?

There is no substitute for reading constitutions if you wish to do a comparative analysis of federalism. The constitutions of three extremely different federal systems (the U.S., Germany and Russia) are easily available in the useful volume by S.E. Finer, Vernon Bogdanor and Bernard Rudden, *Comparing Constitutions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) **(MAG)**.

Some people believe that the way Germany evolved toward a federation is a useful model to follow for the European Union. Discuss.

Excluding the case of “one nation, two states” in Germany, Communist Europe had eight states. Five were unitary, and three were federal. The five unitary states are now five unitary states, and the three federal states are now at least twenty-two states. Discuss.

Probably less than twenty percent of the world’s states are close to being homogeneous nation-states. Some political thinkers and actors argue that democratic federalism could be a way of combining difference and integration. Discuss.

There is a strand in political philosophy that argues that federal systems can promote democratic values, but other philosophical strands argue that the anti-majoritarian cost of federalism is too great for modern democracies to pay. Discuss.

In the second two hour lecture/seminar this week I will focus on the question of inequality within federalism. In the welfare state literature there was a near consensus that federalism *per se* hurt the construction of comprehensive welfare states, and therefore contributed to inequality. Current research is increasingly showing that there is great variation within federal systems concerning the number of veto players and policy scope of the central governments.

A new work that examines comparative inequality is Herbert Obinger, Stephan Leibfried and Francis Castels, eds., *Federalism and the Welfare State: New World and European Experiences* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). (MAG)

Is there any reason why a geographically small unitary state, with a robust tradition of municipal government, and with a strong welfare regime that produces reasonably good equality for citizens, should consider becoming a federation?

*On patterns of equality and inequality between unitary and federal polities (and within federal democracies) see Linz and Stepan, “Inequality Inducing and Inequality Reducing Federalism”, paper for the Conference of the *International Political Science Association*, Canada, 2001 (WEB). Also see Alfred Stepan, “Institutional and Partisan Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems”, in Edward Gibson, ed., *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004). (MAG).

Week 4 Nationalism, Multinationalism, and Democratic Theory and Practice:

The classic literature on democratic transition and consolidation was based on Southern Europe and Latin America and was virtually silent on the issue of nationalism, and in particular, on the range of people or peoples (demos and demoi) constituting the state.

Likewise, two of the most influential writers on nationalism (Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson) were not really concerned with democracy. Our task is to think creatively about demos/polity relationships.

Under what conditions are democracy-building, and nation-state building, compatible logics? Under what conditions are they conflicting logics? When they are conflicting logics, what types of democratic systems are most, and least, feasible? What do you think of the argument that every nation should be a state, and that every state should be a nation?

In our first two-hour session I will analyze the major arguments about the difficulty multinationalism presents for democracy. I will discuss many famous theorists who are often quoted as arguing that societal and national cohesion is a pre-requisite for democracy.

* Read, for example, J. S. Mill, Chapter XVI, "Of Nationality as Connected with Representative Government" in his *Considerations on Representative Government*, p 291-297(**BOOK; MAG**). See also Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 193-209, (**MAG; DIR; LIB**) and Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* (April, 1970), pp. 337-363. (**MAG**) Ernest Gellner advances his famous functionalist theory of "one culture, one state" in *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), Chapter I. (**DIR; BIB; MAG**)

* One of the most brilliant and influential theorists on nationalism is Ernest Gellner. In his last great book *Conditions of Liberty* (London: Hamilton, 1994) (**DIR**) he spells out a theory of why combining nationalism and democracy was relatively easy in what he calls Time Zone 1 and Time Zone 2 (Great Britain and Northeastern Europe) (see pp. 103-128) (**BOOK**). Unfortunately, most of the countries we are interested in are in what Gellner calls Time Zones 3 or 4, where he argues conditions are vastly more difficult. He gives little attention to how multinationalism and democracy can be reconciled in these time zones (p123-128)

* I began a response to Gellner in my “Modern Multinational Democracies: Transcending a Gellnerian Oxymoron,” in *Arguing Comparative Politics*, (**BIB;DIR;MAG**) pp. 181-199. Linz and I first address the question of what to do if nation-state building and democracy building are conflicting logics in our book, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, chapters 2 and 20 (**BIB; DIR;MAG**). A major book relevant to our task is Jack Snyder’s, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000) (**DIR**). He argues that new democracies are especially prone to nationalist conflict (see esp. 15-43, 313-362).

In our second two-hour lecture of Week 4, I will discuss a major alternative to the nation state model for those polities that Juan J. Linz, Yogendra Yadav and I call “politically robust multinational” in our forthcoming book tentatively called *Democracies in Multinational Societies: India and Other Polities*. * Read Chapter 1, “ ‘Nation-State’ or ‘State-Nation’ ” where we propose a model we call “State Nation” for those polities where a “Nation State ” model would be extremely difficult such as Spain and Belgium (**WEB**). For how India became a relatively successful “state nation” see Chapter 2, “ India: Documenting Great Cultural Diversity But a Shared Political Community. ” (**WEB**).

Two other works that try to explore the puzzle of India’s continued democracy despite great poverty, fifteen official languages, many nations, and numerous religions which are often in conflict elsewhere, are by Atil Kohli and Arend Lijphart. See Atil Kohli, “India: Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Federalism”, in Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, eds., *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004),pp.281-300. (**MAG**) The most important initial discussion of "consociational democracy" is Arend Lijphart's article of the same name in *World Politics*, 21 (January 1969), pp. 44 – 59. (**JSTOR**). *For an application to India, see Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 90, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 258-268 (**JSTOR**).

Week 5

Varieties of Decentralized Governance and Participation

Our first two hour session this week will feature a “matched pair” analysis of the Tamils in India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. *Read, “How State Nation ‘Grammar’ Helped Construct Multiple but Complementary Identities: India and the Tamils”(**WEB**) and “How Nation State “Grammar” Helped Construct Polar and Conflictual Identities: Sri Lanka and The Tamils”. (**WEB**).

In my lectures I will explore a number of political arrangements that might aggravate or ameliorate the tensions between multinationalism and democracy, but you may want to explore them in greater detail in your paper.

In our second two hour session this week we will explore types of decentralization within unitary states and also explore what works and what does not in federal systems. Among democratic theoreticians, civil society activists, and the international aid community, there is a great new interest in decentralization. However, we probably need to step back and try to develop an analytic and political framework that will help us develop criteria for evaluating decentralization. It is possible that decentralization might lead to more transparency, more participation and bring government closer to the people, but it is also possible that decentralization might lead to a concentration of resources in the hands of local elites. What will make the former outcome more likely? Are there some public policies where equality is enhanced by some degree of central involvement and some horizontal and vertical transfers? What are the possibly positive roles of the central state in local reform initiatives? Are some local activists strengthened by their involvement in global networks?

*An excellent series of case studies on effective (and ineffective) local policy reform is Judith Tendler, *Good Government in the Tropics*.(**MAG**) Read the Chapter on “Drought

relief” **(BOOK)**. Read also Alfred Stepan, “Brazil’s Decentralized Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?” *Daedalus* (Spring 2000), pp. 145-169 **(BOOK;MAG)**.

The most successful case of local government reforms and participation in India is, in Kerala. Important research in progress on Kerala is being conducted by Shubham Chaudhuri and Patrick Heller, research which I consider a model of how one can evaluate participation, in particular, see the methodologies they have constructed to evaluate the social capital, rational choice, and social historical explanations of participation in Kerala. See their “The Plasticity of Participation: Evidence from a Participatory Governance Experiment”, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy, Columbia University, Working Papers 03-01, January 2003.

Week 6 The World’s Religions and Democracy: Rethinking the “Twin Tolerations” in Western Europe, Confucianism, Orthodox Christianity and Hinduism

In the first generation of democratization theory the two most neglected areas were nationalism and religion. From the mid 1990s this vacant space concerning religion has been dominated largely by a discourse generated by Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and by policy activists concerned with terrorism and intrigued by the possibility of the United States and some of the other large powers installing democracy from above.

Democratic theorists, comparativists and policy activists must attempt to re-examine the terms of this debate and to provide new conceptual and policy alternatives where appropriate. Unfortunately, though the role of religion in world affairs is one of the most important and difficult issue areas of our era, it has also been one of the least studied themes in political science.

How much separation of Religion and State is necessary for a democracy to function well? In an earlier article, I developed an argument about what I called the “twin

tolerations” that concluded with the assertion: “Within this broad framework of the minimal freedom for the democratic state, and the minimal religious freedoms of citizens, it would appear, from a purely theoretical perspective, that there can be an extraordinarily broad range of concrete patterns of religion-state relations in political systems that would meet our broad definition of a democracy.” Does empirical evidence from Western Europe and the United States support or qualify this assertion?

Do we need to rethink our concepts of secularism? Could the concept of “multiple secularisms” be of more use? Are there some secular systems that violate the requirements of the twin tolerations and are thus not compatible with democracy?

Is it true that every major religion is “multi vocal” in the sense that it contains some components that are compatible with democracy and some components that are incompatible with democracy? If so, what does this imply about the need for “public argument”? For example, the major liberal political philosopher, John Rawls, has famously argued that in order to reach an “overlapping consensus” many religious questions must be “taken off” the political agenda of public argument. Is this possible or prudent in a cultural or political context where religion is part of the most salient conflicts?

In the first lecture, I will explore these questions by a fundamental re-reading of the history of democracy, toleration, and religion in Europe from the 15th century to the present, with some references to the United States. Are there major “maps of mis-readings” that we need to be aware of? Can we construct new maps? In our second lecture, we will explore Huntington’s arguments concerning Confucianism and Orthodox Christianity and also look at India’s innovative “equal distance-equal respect” model of secularism.

For a comparative survey based study of world attitudes and practices concerning religion see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: 2004). (MAG). See in particular the debate about secularism in Chapter 1 and look at the results of twenty years of surveys for eighty countries in the thirty of more tables and figures in the book.

For the history of intolerance during the religious wars in Europe, see the classic work by the Professor of the History of the Church (at the University Oxford), Diarmaid

MacCulloch, *The Reformation* (Viking 2004). On order at MAG. On page 653, he asserts that for hundreds of years before and after the reformation, Western Europe was the most religiously intolerant area of the world -- more intolerant at that time than the Ottoman Empire, the Indian sub-continent, or central and Eastern Europe. We should learn about the attitudes and mechanisms that contributed to this intolerance, and also try to learn something about how a region where intolerance had been the norm, eventually became a region where a reasonable degree of tolerance became the norm.

What role did state actions play in helping to control religious violence and contain the Wars of Religion? Do what extent did some states “impose” tolerance? * See for example, Daniel Philpott, “The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations”, *World Politics*, Vol. 52 (2000) ,pp. 206-245. **(JSTOR)**

*An influential approach to religion and politics is found in John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*. **(DIR; MAG; BIB)** In his desire for a liberal discourse that can arrive at an “overlapping consensus” he normatively favors the use of “free standing propositions”, and urges that many religious questions should be “off” the political agenda. See, in particular, the introduction, especially pp. xix, pp. 151-154, and pp. 220-230. Empirically, to what extent, and how, have successful democratization movements been able to keep religious conflicts “off” the political agenda? If religion has almost never been completely off the agenda of democratic polities what are the theoretical implications? For democracy? For Rawls?

Until recently the major contemporary European political philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, has been silent about the role of religion and tolerance. He recently broke this silence with an important article, which offers some alternatives to Rawls.* See his “Religious Tolerance -- The Pace Maker for Cultural Rights”, *Philosophy*, Vol. 79 (2004): 5-18. **(BOOK)**

Charles Taylor in his “Modes of Secularism” also offers political-philosophical alternatives beyond Rawls in Rajeev Bhargava, ed., *Secularism and its Critics*. **(MAG)**

*I explore these types of questions, with empirical examples from democratization movements within most of the major religions in the world, in my “The World’s Religious

Systems and Democracy: Crafting the Twin Tolerations”, in my *Arguing Comparative Politics*, pp. 213-254. **(MAG; BIB, DIR)**

*What does democracy actually require, and not require, vis-à-vis secularism? For a thoughtful analysis of why the “secularization thesis,” as an empirical prediction and a normative prescription, was shared by almost all of the founders of modern sociology, see José Casanova’s chapter “Secularization, Enlightenment, and Modern Religion” in his *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 11-39. **(MAG)** For a trenchant essay about the antidemocratic quality of some arguments that insist on secularism, see John Keane, “The Limits of Secularism,” *Times Literary Supplement*, Jan. 9, 1988, 12-13. **(MAG)** For a valuable reader that brings together important new statements about secularism by Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” Amartya Sen, “Secularism and its Discontents,” as well as articles by Michael J. Sandel, Jean Bauberot, (on secularism in France) and T.M. Scanlon, see Rajeev Bhargava (ed), *Secularism and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).**(MAG)**

Many thinkers assume that the norm in West European and North American democracies is the separation of church and state. Others, the minority, argue that the 1905 French version of “secularism” is too extreme. Evaluate these two positions. A place to start would be a careful examination of the role of religion in modern constitutions. You will be surprised by what you will find.

Whatever the normative theories of secularism and democracy may be, empirically democracy seems to co-exist with a great variety of patterns of separation of religion and the state. This is important for us to be aware of when judging patterns in new democracies.

*For an article based on a long-term project that attempts to construct an index on degrees of separation of Church and State which will give you data from 1973-2003 for all the European democracies—note the great variety among secular patterns within democracies-- see Jonathan Fox, “World Separation of Religion and State into the Twenty First Century,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 39, No 5 (June 2006):537-569 **(EBSCO; DIR; BIB)**. Also see Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler “Separation of Religion and State in the

Twenty-First Century: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 37, No 3 (April 2005), pp.317-335. **(DIR; BIB)**

Now that you have read something about the history of intolerance and tolerance in Europe you might want to go back and do a critical reading of Huntington’s entire book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. **(DIR; BIB; MAG)**. A major argument of Huntington’s is that only some of the world’s religions are compatible with democracy because they lack some of the key characteristics of Western civilization. “Western Christianity is historically the single most important characteristic of Western civilization”. For Huntington, Western culture’s key contribution has been the separation of church and state. “God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual and temporal authority, have been a prevailing dualism in Western culture”. Of some of the other major religions Huntington asserts “In Islam, God is Caesar, in [Confucianism] Caesar is God, in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar’s junior partner” (all quotes from p.70). Make your own assessment on how accurate an analysis of European history the above observation is. Let us now look at Confucianism, Orthodox Christianity, and Hinduism.

Most great religious traditions are multi-vocal. One part of the Confucian tradition is quite hierarchical and places a positive value on discipline and submission to authority. But, in a strand of Confucian doctrine that until recently has been neglected (or repressed), Confucius also talks of the moral obligation of intellectuals to criticize the ruler if the ruler is abusing power. The largest NGO against corruption in Korea utilizes the latter aspect of the Confucian multi-vocal tradition. For a modern translation and a critical commentary, read *The Analects of Confucius*, translated with notes by Simon Leys (Norton, 1997). Not yet available at Sciences-Po. For an important analysis of the contemporary uses and abuses of “Asian values” in the democracy debate, see Rosemary Foot, “Human Rights, Democracy and Development: The Debate in East Asia,” *Democratization*, Vol.4, No. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 139-153. **(MAG)** For an evaluation of the role of Confucianism in democratic transitions in Korea and Taiwan see the two articles in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *World Religions and Democracy* (Johns Hopkins, 2005), **(MAG)** by Hahm Chaibong, “The Ironies of Confucianism”, and Francis Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy”.

A possible paper might be to compare the new East Asian Democracy Barometer with three or four other regional barometers. What, if any, identifiable “Asian values” do you find? How non-supportive, or supportive, of democracy, are respondents who score especially high on some answers you identify as strongly associated with Confucianism?

* For the role of Orthodoxy concerning non-democratic and democratic regimes, see my “Crafting the Twin Tolerations” article, pp.247-250, the article by Elizabeth H. Prodromov, “The Ambivalent Orthodox”, in Diamond et al., *World Religions and Democracy* and the articles by Sabrina P. Ramet, “The way we were—and should be again? European Orthodox Churches and the ‘idyllic past’” (Chapter 6) and Vjekoslav Perica, “The politics of ambivalence: Europeanization and the Serbian Orthodox Church” (Chapter 7) in Thomas A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Religion in an Expanding Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) (**MAG** soon available). For post Soviet Russia see Jane Ellis, *The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996). Not yet available at Sciences Po.

*On India’s highly original, and increasingly influential, “equal distance, equal respect” model of secularism, see Rajeev Bhargava, “India’s Secular Constitution” in E. Sridharan, Z. Hasan, R. Sudarshan (eds), *India’s Living Constitution: Ideas, Practices, Controversies*, Anthem Press, New Delhi: 2005 (**BOOK**). *Also see the articles in the book edited by Bhargava, *Secularism and its Critics*, especially read, Amartya Sen, “Secularism and its Discontents”, pp. 454-485 (**MAG**).

For an excellent recent book length treatment of India’s model of secularism see Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, *The Wheel of Law, India’s Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context* (Princeton University Press: 2003) (**MAG**).

Yadav, Linz and I wrote many of the questions on religion and politics for the *South Asia State of Democracy Survey:2005* and I will discuss some of the non-intuitive results in the lecture. The survey includes data on all the major religions of India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal.

Is Islam multivocal? Is there space in Islam for some form of modern democracy that would meet Robert Dahl's requirements for a polyarchy? In my article on the "Twin Tolerations", I cite a long list of writers who say no. However, also evaluate the work of some leading Islamic thinkers and activists who are attempting to integrate Islam and democracy. *A leading liberal reformer in Iran is Abdolkarim Soroush. See his *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2000), especially Chapter 9, "Tolerance and Governance: A Discourse on Religion and Democracy", pp.131-155. (MAG) Also see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. New edition 2004) (MAG; BIB; DIR) and Charles Kurzman, ed. *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (Oxford University Press, 1998) (MAG), especially the article by Taha.. If you are interested in the subject read, very carefully, the entire Koran. How multivocal is the Koran? Which specific sections create the most space for the evolution of democracy? Which create the most problems? *On the poor treatment of women as a cause and effect of authoritarianism in many Muslim majority countries, see M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism", *World Politics* (October 2002) pp. 4-37. (JSTOR; DIR)

One of the major puzzles about Muslims and democracy is that on purely socio-economic grounds, non-Arab, Muslim majority countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Senegal, Mali, Turkey, Albania, etc.) are some of the world's greatest "electoral overachievers", whereas Arab-Muslim majority countries, as a set, are the world's greatest "electoral underachievers." A major variable that two sets of countries have in common – Islam -- can not, by itself, explain this strong variation. What does? I helped start this discussion with two recent articles, but the comparative analysis must be carried much further, and deeper, especially by Arab specialists familiar with the general literature on democratization. Ideally, someone in the class who has these interests and skills can deepen the debate with a paper.

*For the puzzle of electoral underachievement, and overachievement within Muslim majority countries see Alfred Stepan with Graeme Robertson: “An *Arab* more than a *Muslim Democracy Gap*”, *Journal of Democracy*, July 2003, pp. 30-44 (**DIR; BOOK**).

*For a forum which has two articles criticizing Stepan/Robertson, and our response, see *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 15, No. 4 (October 2004):126-146. (**DIR; BOOK**)

*For Islam within the debate of the “Twin Tolerations” see Alfred Stepan, “The World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the ‘Twin Tolerations’” in Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics*, esp., pp. 233-246. (**MAG; BIB; DIR**)

An interesting paper would be to explore how Islam is managed -- by many believers and politicians of many stripes alike -- so as to be compatible with democracy in a country such as Indonesia, India, Turkey, Senegal, Mali, or Bangladesh. What is the role of public discourse? Is religion “on” or “off” the agenda in the country you choose to write about?

For an overview over the political role of Islamic authorities and movements, both at times as vehicles of, and at other times as obstacles to, liberalization and democratization processes in Muslim-majority countries around the world, especially in Indonesia, see Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: 2000) (**MAG**). * Also see Hefner’s “Muslim Democrats and Islamic Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia” (ch. 11 in Hefner, Robert W., ed. *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005) (**BOOK;MAG**). R. William Liddle, “Regime: The New Order” in Donald K. Emmerson, ed., *Indonesia Beyond Suharto* (London: M.E. Sharp 1999), pp. 39-70.(**MAG**)

* For the period when anti-fundamentalism forces in Iran in 2000 contributed to the control of the parliament by a strong majority and the reelection of a reformist president, Khatami, in 2002 but Iran still remained a “diarchy” because fundamentalists controlled the judiciary and the security forces, see Bahman Baktiari. ‘Dilemmas of reform and democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran’. (ch. 5 in Hefner, Robert W., ed. *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005) (**MAG; BOOK**). For a good overview over the web of institutions of “clerical conciliar rule” (Arjomand) see “Part I: Iran’s Maze of Power Centers” in the exceptional

study by Buchta, Wilfried. 2000. *Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic*. Washington DC, Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (**MAG**).

For many advocates of strict separation of church and state the existence now of an Islamic influenced governing party in Turkey is an argument against the inclusion of Turkey in the European Union. But what would such critics say about ruling Christian Democratic parties in countries such as Germany, Holland, and Belgium? For how European Christian Democratic parties developed growing autonomy, vis-à-vis the Catholic hierarchy, and responded increasingly to democratic political incentives, see the excellent book by Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Cornell University Press, 1996) (**MAG**, 2 copies). * Read Kalyvas' "From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon" *Comparative Politics* (April 1998), pp. 293-312, (**MAG; BIB**). Also see his "Democracy and Religious Politics: Evidence from Belgium," *Comparative Political Studies* 31(3), (1998), pp. 292-321 (**MAG**). An interesting paper might be to analyze whether this process is occurring now in Turkey. Also, did it partially occur for the Hindu neo-fundamentalist party, the BJP, in India? To the extent that it did not occur what, if any consequences did the BJP suffer?

We will end our course with questions about such key countries of concern for democratic theory and for public policy as Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.

For Turkey our question is: What, if any, consequences did it have for democracy in Turkey that the French version of secularism had such a strong influence on Atatürk's Turkey? Do you think the French legacy is helping or hurting Turkey to become a member of the European Union? For an interesting analysis of similarities and dissimilarities between secularism in France (especially after 1905) and Turkey see Andrew Davison, *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration* (Yale University Press, 1998) (**MAG**) and a recent Columbia dissertation by Murat Akam, "The Politics of Secularization in Turkey and France: Beyond Orientalism and Occidentalism" (Ph.D. Department of Political Science, 2005). See me about possible availability of Akam's dissertation if your research paper is on this theme.

For Iran our question is: Given the current nuclear threatening crisis between Iran and some countries such as the United States and Israel, was there a “missed opportunity” for peaceful and democratic developments in Iran between September and December 2001? In this September -December 2001 period, the non-fundamentalist, democratically elected president of Iran, Ayatollah Khatami (supported by February 2000 parliamentary elections which gave pro-democratic opening reformers a clear parliamentary majority) made four different peaceful overtures to the United States. None of these overtures was publicly recognized, possibly due to US fears that fundamentalists still in charge of the security forces and the judiciary were the more powerful part of this unusual “diarchy,” and a belief that in the last analysis no Islamic cleric could be trusted. Should a normal balance of power international political strategy, or a regime change from above strategy, have been followed?

From the viewpoint of democratic theory and democratization theory, it might be useful to try to expand our imaginations by exploring three somewhat counterfactual questions relating to Iraq. First, Juan Linz and I, well before the Iraq invasion, considered that the then widely used analogy between the successful US role in supporting democracy in Germany and Japan after WWII and an analogous role in Iraq deeply fallacious. Why? Second, far from Iraq being a “most likely” case for democratization, Iraq, from the perspective of democratization theory, was a “least likely” case among the non Gulf Arab countries. Why? Third, four years ago, especially if the US and Iran had been experiencing a thawing of relations of the possible sort suggested above, would Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine and Lebanon have been better cases for internal democratization than Iraq, especially if the US, the EU, and some other major countries such as Japan, Indonesia, Egypt and Jordan participated with financial aid, trade, diplomatic support and with international peacekeepers for the process? If you answer to this hypothetical question is yes, what are your reasons?