2006 (with Roberto Casati), Insurmountable Simplicities. Thirthy-nine Philosophical Conundrums, New York, Columbia University Press, 144 pp. (ISBN 978-0-231-13722-5)
• Paperback edition: 2008 (ISBN 978-0-231-13723-2)
• Italian edition: Semplicità insormontabili. 39 storie filosofiche, Roma, Laterza Editore, 2004, 194 pp. (ISBN 88-420-7304-4)
~ Paperback edition: 2006 (ISBN 88-420-7965-0)
~ Reprinted with a preface by Armando Massarenti: Milano, Il Sole 24 Ore Cultura, 2007, 202 pp. (ISBN 9-77186-380379)
• French translation by Pierre-Emmanuel Dauzat: 39 Petites histoires philosophiques d’une redoutable simplicité, Paris, Albin Michel, 2005, 205 pp. (ISBN 2-226-15561-9)
~ Paperback edition: 2008 (ISBN 978-2-253-08390-0)
• Korean translation by Hyunkyung Lee: 논쟁의 대가들 · 역설과 위트 논리와 상상력의 39 가지 철학우화, Seoul, Yoldaerim Publishing, 2005, 264 pp. (ISBN 89-90989-11-6)
~ e-book edition: 2005 (ISBN 105-81-99961)
• Portuguese translation by Maurício Santana Dias: Simplicidades insolúveis. 39 histórias filosóficas, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2005, 192 pp. (ISBN 85-35907-49-1)
• Greek translation by Leonidas Balasopoulos: Ακατανίκητες απλότητες. 39 φιλοσοφικές ιστορίες, Athens, Ekdoseis Tou Eikostou Protou, 2006, 198 pp. (ISBN 960-8219-43-4)
• Spanish translation by Josefa Linares de la Puerta: 39 (simples) cuentos filosóficos, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2007, 240 pp. (ISBN 978-84-206-6154-4)
• Chinese translation by Hsu Yuan-Chen: 難解的簡單 · 39 杯哲學 Espresso, Taiwan, Athena Press, 2007, 227 pp. (ISBN 986137079X)
• Polish translation by Anna Fraś and Aleksandra Maderak: Proste sytuacje nie do rozwiązania. 39 opowiadań filozoficznych, Kraków, Wydawnictwo Znak, 2008, 186 pp. (ISBN 978-83-240-1014-1)
• Japanese translation to appear (Tokyo, Bungei Shunju)
Abstract. A collection of dialogues, epistles, and imaginary documents illustrating the many philosophical conundrums that hide in the wrinkles of everyday life. Why do mirrors seem to invert left and right but not up and down? How do we know whether strawberries taste the same for everyone? Where is it written that we must observe the law? What if we could swap brains--or the rest of our bodies? Is the train we took today the same we took yesterday? Is everything interesting?
2005, Ontologia [Ontology], Roma, Laterza Editore, 178 pp. (ISBN 88-420-7623-6)
• Reprinted 2008.
• e-book edition: Bari, SWIF - Edizioni Digitali di Filosofia, 2005 (ISSN 1126-4780)
• French translation to appear (Paris, Ithaque)
Abstract. An introduction to analytic ontology. Part 1 deals with the question, What is ontology?, focusing on (i) the interplay between ontological and broadly metaphysical concerns, and (ii) the difference between material ontology and formal ontology. Part 2 deals with the question, How is ontology done?, focusing on (i) the delicate interplay between ontology and truth-making (or: between meaning and existence), and (ii) the differences between revolutionary vs. hermeneutic, prescriptive vs. descriptive, and absolute vs. relative approaches to ontology. Part 3 surveys state of the art a number of areas, both in material ontology (e.g., the problem of universals, the status of objects and events, the ontology of mathematics, of the physical sciences, of the social sciences) and in formal ontology (identity, ontological dependence, part-whole relations).
2001, Parole, oggetti, eventi e altri argomenti di metafisica [Words, Objects, Events, and Other Metaphysical Matters], Roma, Carocci Editore, 239 pp. (ISBN 88-430-1989-9)
• Reprinted 2002.
• Reprinted 2006.
Abstract. Consider the vase on the table and the lump of clay from out of which it is made. Is this one single entity before us or two? Could that very same vase be made out of another lump of clay, or have another shape? And what differentiates a material object such as a vase from entities of different sort, such as the actions of the potter or her intentions? Starting from puzzles such as these, this volume aims to offer an introductory treatment of the main topics in contemporary analytic metaphysics: the nature of things, their identity and persistence conditions, their relations of dependency--more generally, the preconditions for our ability to speak about the world at all.
1999b, An Essay in Universal Semantics, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, ix + 145 pp. (ISBN 0-7923-5629-2)
Abstract. This book is a study in the foundations of model-theoretic semantics. The central thesis is that one does not need to assume a perfect structural fit between languages and their models in order to characterize the basic semantic notions. In particular, truth-value gaps and gluts can be explained away as local phenomena that do not bring logical disaster in their wake. The account is based on a generalization of supervaluationary techniques and is illustrated with reference to a range of different sorts of examples, from sentential logic to type theory.
1999a (with Roberto Casati), Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, x + 238 pp (ISBN 0-26203-266-X)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 2000. (ISBN 0-58510-660-6)
Abstract. Thinking about space is thinking about spatial things. The table is on the carpet; hence the carpet is under the table. The vase is in the box; hence the box is not in the vase. But what does it mean for an object to be somewhere? How are objects tied to the space they occupy? This book is concerned with these and other fundamental issues in the philosophy of spatial representation. Our starting point is an analysis of the interplay between mereology (the study of part/whole relations), topology (the study of spatial continuity and compactness), and the theory of spatial location proper. This leads to a unified framework for spatial representation understood quite broadly as a theory of the representation of spatial entities. The framework is then tested against some classical metaphysical questions such as: Are parts essential to their wholes? Is spatial colocation a sufficient criterion of identity? What (if anything) distinguishes material objects from events and other spatial entities? The concluding chapters deal with applications to topics as diverse as the logical analysis of movement and the semantics of maps.
1998 (with John Nolt and Dennis Rohatyn) Theory and Problems of Logic, Second Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, vii + 322 pp. (ISBN 0-07-046649-1)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 2000. (ISBN 0-07-136868-X)
• Abridged edition: Logic, New York, McGraw-Hill, v + 150 pp. (ISBN 0-07-145535-3)
• Italian translation by Francesca Boccuni et al.:
Logica, Milan, McGraw-Hill Italia, 2003, vii + 316 pp. (ISBN 88-386-5073-X)
• Second Italian edition (fully revised and enlarged): Milan, McGraw-Hill Italia, 2007, xii + 343 pp. (ISBN 88-386-6376-9)
Abstract. An introductory textbook in logic, covering the syntax and semantics of propositional logic (including proof techniques and refutation trees), the syntax and semantics of predicate logic (including proof techniques and refutation trees), inductive logic, the probability calculus, the analysis of fallacies, and further developments in formal logic including the theory of descriptions, higher-order logics, modal logic, and formal arithmetic. Features over 500 problems with complete solutions.
1994, Holes and Other Superficialities (with Roberto Casati), Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, x + 253 pp. (ISBN 0-262-03211-2)
• Paperback edition (with minor revisions and an extended ‘Index’): 1995, x
+ 256 pp. (ISBN 0-262-53133-X)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 1999. (ISBN 0-585-05399-5)
• Italian translation by Libero Sosio (with a new ‘Prefazione’):
Buchi e altre superficialità, Milan, Garzanti
Editore, 1996, 333 pp. (ISBN 88-11-59279-8)
~ Paperback edition: 2002 (ISBN 88-11-67516-2)
• Chapter 3 reprinted as ‘Material Bodies’ in Steven D. Hales (ed.), Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing, 1999, pp. 428-435.
Abstract. Holes are a good example of the sort of entity that down-to-earth philosophers would be inclined to expel from their ontological inventory. In this work we argue instead in favor of their existence and explore the consequences of this liberality--odd as they might appear. We examine the ontology of holes, their geometry, their part-whole relations, their identity and their causal role, the ways we perceive them. We distinguish three basic kinds of holes: blind hollows, perforating tunnels, and internal cavities, treating these uniformly as immaterial bodies. We develop a morphology of holes, focusing on the way a hole can be filled, and then look at the main properties of the resulting conceptual framework: holes are parasitic upon the surfaces of their hosts; holes can move, fuse into each other, split; they can be born, develop, and die. Finally, we examine how some morphological features of holes are represented in perception, including the conditions whereby we have the impression that we see, feel, or even hear a hole. The book has over 150 pictures and is completed by a formal appendix, a section with puzzles and exercises, and a extensive annotated bibliography.
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2009 (with Elena Casetta, co-editor), Convenzioni [Conventions], Vol. 44/2 of Rivista di estetica, forthcoming.
Abstract. A collections of new articles on the nature of conventions and on the tenability of conventionalist positions in various areas of philosophy, from metaphysics to epistemology, value theory, logic, and the philosophy of language. Introduction by E. Casetta. Papers by M. Ferraris, L. Franklin-Hall, M. García-Carpintero, F. Guala, A. Hazen, K. Miller, L. Morena, M. Rossi and J. Tagliabue, G. Torrengo, V. Tripodi, J. Westerhoff.
2008, Metafisica. Classici contemporanei [Metaphysics. Contemporary Classics], Roma, Laterza Editore, 2008, xi + 536 pp. (ISBN 978-88-420-8382-5)
Abstract. This volume brings together, in Italian translation, over thirty selections among the most important and influential works in contemporary analytic metaphysics. The selections are grouped under six major themes--existence, identity, persistence, modality, properties, and causation--and include works by D. M. Armstrong, M. Black, R. Carnap, R. M. Chisholm, D. Davidson, C. J. Ducasse, M. Dummett, G. Evans, P. T. Geach, S. A. Kripke, D. K. Lewis, E. J. Lowe, D. H. Mellor, G. E. Moore, H. Putnam, G. Ryle, T. Sider, P. F. Strawson, W. V. O. Quine, B. Russell, W. Sellars, R. Stalnaker, D. Wiggins, D. C. Williams. Each section is preceded by an introduction by the editor along with a comprehensive thematic bibliography.
2007 (with Roberto Casati, co-editor), Lesser Kinds, Vol. 90/3 of The Monist, 149 pp. (ISSN 0026-9662)
Abstract. Metaphysicians tend to deal with large categories (substance, universals) and oversize issues (the nature of being, existence, necessity, causation). But there is plenty of room at the bottom for lesser categories and entities. Small or undersize problems can be interesting entry points for deep metaphysical enquiries. What is a sound? Do holes exist? Are events fact-like or object-like? Do shadows have a causal structure? What is the nature of the boundary that separates water from air--is it water, is it air? By looking into such questions, this issue of the Monist plans to explore the thesis that metaphysical concerns can be domain-specific without ceasing to be metaphysical in an important sense. Contributors: István Aranyosi, Jerome Dokic, Gregory Fowler, Antony Galton, Alvin I. Goldman, Hud Hudson, Katie Miller, Casey O’Callaghan, Roy Sorensen, Joshua Spencer, and Andrew Wake.
2006 (with Wolfgang Mann, co-editor), Parts and Wholes, special issue of The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103/12, 162 pp. (ISSN 0022-362X)
Abstract. A collection of papers on the metaphysics of parthood and constitution. Contributors: Kit Fine, Hud Hudson, Mark Johnston, Kathrin Koslicki, Calvin Normore, Peter Simons, and Peter van Inwagen.
2005, Time Travel, Vol. 88/3 of The Monist, 143 pp. (ISSN 0026-9662)
Abstract. Quarrels on the possibility of time travel are gaining new interest today as a result of recent work in cosmology and on the theory of causation. They bear also on recent discussions of the problems of free will and personal identity. This issue of The Monist aims to promote further progress in this debate, with emphasis on questions such as the following. following. Is time travel compatible with presentism? Is it compatible with endurantism? Does it entail fatalism? Is the apparent asymmetry between a fixed past and an open future merely an epistemic illusion? Is time travel a travel in time? Contributors: David Horacek, Robin LePoidevin, Steven Savitt, Ted Sider, Jonathan Simon, Matthew Staler, Nicholas Smith, Gordon Stevenson, Peter Vranas.
2004 (with Laure Vieu, co-editor), Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the Third International Conference, Amsterdam, IOS Press, xi + 363 pp. (ISBN 1-58603-468-5)
Abstract. Just as ontology developed over the centuries as part of philosophy, so in recent years ontology has become intertwined with the development of the information sciences. Researchers in various fields have come to realize that a solid foundation for their projects calls for an explicit theorization of the types of entities and relations that make up their respective domains of inquiry, and as the need for integrating such projects arises, so does the need to identify common ontological principles over ad hoc, case-based solutions. This volume collects the papers presented at the third international conference devoted to current research in this area, including invited papers by Peter Gärdenfors and Amie Thomasson.
2003 (with Carola Barbero, Roberto Casati, and Maurizio Ferraris, co-editors), Bozzetti, Vol. 24/3 of Rivista di estetica, 163 pp. (ISBN 88-7011-937-8)
Abstract. A volume in memory of Paolo Bozzi. Contributors: T. Agostini, T. Andina, A. Arbo, C. Barbero, M. Bertamini, I. Bianchi, V. Braitenberg, N. Bruno, R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, S. Cattaruzza, A. Costall with M. Sinico and G. Parovel, M. L. Dalla Chiara with R. Luciani and G. Toraldo di Francia, A. Dell’Anna, G. Derossi, M. Ferraris, D. Floreano, V. Girotto, D. R. Hofstadter, P. Kobau, M. Kubovy, P. Legrenzi, M. Losito, C. Magris, N. Miscevic, K. Mulligan, L. Pizzo Russo, L. Repici, A. Saccon, U. Savardi, B. Smith, L. Taddio, G. Torrengo, G. Vicario.
2002 (with Luca Morena, co-editor), Oggetti fiat [Fiat Objects], Vol. 20/2 of Rivista di estetica, 125 pp. (ISBN 88-7011-915-7)
Abstract. A selection of philosophical texts dealing with the mereology of material objects and the nature of their boundaries. Introduction by Luca Morena. Papers by: Roderick Chisholm, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Avrum Stroll, and Achille C. Varzi.
2001, The Philosophy of Geography, Vol. 20/2 of Topoi, 102 pp. (ISSN 0167-7411)
Abstract. Geography has been much neglected by philosophers. Yet geography presents an interesting and intricate trade-off between empirical issues, on the one hand, and deep philosophical issues (from ontology to political philosophy), on the other. What is a geographic entity? What is the relationship between a geographic entity and a physical territory? Can a geographic entity survive without a territory or without definite borders? Can it survive radical changes in its territory? Are there clear-cut identity criteria for geographic categories? This issue of Topoi aims to go a first step towards a better understanding of these questions and of their implications for the theory of the geographic world. Contributors: Brandon Bennett, Roberto Casati, John Collins, Antony Galton, Barry Smith, Amie L. Thomasson, Achille C. Varzi, Leo Zaibert.
2000b, Temporal Parts, Vol. 83/3 of The Monist, 140 pp. (ISSN 0026-9662)
Abstract. On the one hand there are entities, such as processes and events, which have temporal parts: the beginning of the race; the middle of the concert; the delicate part of the conversation. On the other hand there are entities, such as material objects, which are always present in their entirety at any time at which they exist. The categorial distinction between entities which do, and entities which do not, have temporal parts is grounded in common sense; yet various philosophers have been inclined to oppose it. Some have defended an ontology consisting exclusively of things with no temporal parts. Others have favored ontologies including only temporally extended processes. Others still have endorsed a four-dimensional ontology in which all entities have both spatial and temporal parts. This collection is devoted to the clari_cation of these views and of their implications for such problems as identity through time, spatiotemporal coincidence, and the possibility of a merging and splitting of objects. Contributors: Yuri Balashov, Berit Brogaard, Kit Fine, Mark Heller, Robin LePoidevin, Josh Parsons, Peter Simons, and Peter van Inwagen.
2000a (with James Higginbotham and Fabio Pianesi, co-editors), Speaking of Events, New York, Oxford University Press, ix + 295 pp. (ISBN 0-19-512807-9)
• Paperback edition: 2000 (ISBN 0-19-512811-7)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 2000 (ISBN 0-58-539434-2)
Abstract. The idea that an adequate semantics of ordinary language calls for some theory of events has sparked considerable debate among linguists and philosophers. On the one hand, so many linguistic phenomena appear to be explained if (and, according to some authors, only if) we make room for logical forms in which reference to or quantification over events is explicitly featured. Examples include nominalization, adverbial modification, tense and aspect, plurals, and singular causal statements. On the other hand, a number of deep philosophical questions arise as soon as we take events into consideration. Are events entities of a kind? What are their identity and individuation criteria? How does semantic theorizing depend on such metaphysical issues? The aim of this book is to address such issues in some depth, with emphasis precisely on the interplay between linguistic applications and philosophical implications. Contributors: Nicholas Asher, Pier Marco Bertinetto, Johannes Brandl, Denis Delfitto, Regine Eckardt, James Higginbotham, Alessandro Lenci, Terence Parsons, Alice ter Meulen, Henk Verkuyl. A comprehensive introductory essay (pp. 3" ©47) is included.
1999, The Nature of Logic, Stanford, CSLI Publications [European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 4], 238 pp. (ISBN 1-57586-179-8)
• Paperback edition: 1999 (ISBN 1-57586-178-X)
Abstract. This volume aims to offer an up-to-date indication of the on-going debate on the nature of logic. The focus is on questions pertaining to the existence and individuation of clear boundaries delineating the concerns of logic: What is their distinctive character? What makes logic a subject of its own, separate from (and generally in the background of) the concerns of other disciplines? What is it for an expression to be a logical constant? Or, perhaps equivalently, what is it for an operation or a relation to be logical? Can these questions be addressed in a general setting, or are they
intrinsically unanswerable except within specific frameworks of reference (e.g., a language, or a conceptual scheme)? How are they to be addressed--are they semantic, syntactic, pragmatic? And how do semantics, syntax, or pragmatics contribute to our understanding of these questions? Are the answers fully captured by extant systems
of logic? Contributors include Ermanno Bencivenga, Johan van Benthem, Dirk van Dalen, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Manuel Pérez Otero, Allen Hazen, Arnold Koslow, Graham Priest, Gila Sher.
1997, Fifty Years of Events: An Annotated Bibliography 1947 to 1997 (with Roberto Casati), Bowling Green (OH), Philosophy Documentation Center, 402 pp. (ISBN 0-912632-66-6)
• electronic edition: Bowling Green (OH), Philosophy Documentation Center, 2005 (Free access)
Abstract. This bibliography is concerned with recent literature on the nature of events and the place they occupy in our conceptual scheme. The subject has received extensive consideration in the philosophical debate over the last few decades, with ramifications reaching far into the domains of allied disciplines such as linguistics and the cognitive sciences. At the same time, the literature is so wide and widely scattered that it has become very difficult to keep track of all lines of development. This work seeks to overcome this difficutly by offering as comprehensive a record as possible. The listing includes over 1800 entries by some 900 authors. Most entries are annotated, sometimes including brief quotations and cross-references. Detailed Index of Subjects, Index of Names, and Index to Second and Subsequent Authors are included.
1996, Events (with Roberto Casati, co-editor), Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, xxxviii + 519 pp. (ISBN 1-85521-731-7)
Abstract. The topic of events has been extensively treated by philosophers under the impact of Davidson’s 1967 paper ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’. It is nowadays quite popular also among linguists and cognitive scientists, who often draw from philosophical material. This volume brings together for the first time a representative selection of papers that have indelibly marked the progress of the debate on this topic. Authors include G. E. M. Anscombe, E. Bach , K. Bach, J. Bennett, M. Brand, R. M. Chisholm, C. Cleland, M. J. Cresswell, J. E. Cutting, D. Davidson, L. Davis, F. Dretske, K. Gill, A. Goldman, P. M. S. Hacker, J. Higginbotham, T. Horgan, J. Kim, D. K. Lewis, L. B. Lombard, A. P. D. Mourelatos, T. Parsons, P. L. Peterson, W. V. O. Quine, J. J. Thomson. A comprehensive introductory essay (pp. xi-xxxviii) is included.
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200+c, ‘Universalism Entails Extensionalism’, to appear in Analysis.
Abstract. I argue that Universalism (the thesis that mereological composition is unrestricted) entails Extensionalism (the thesis that sameness of composition is sufficient for identity).
200+b, ‘On the Interplay between Logic and Metaphysics’, to appear in Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations.
Abstract. On the one hand, logic has (or ought to have) nothing to do with metaphysics; it ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. On the other hand, metaphysics can hardly get off the ground without the help of logical analysis; to be is to be a truth-maker, and the search for truth-makers requires that we lay open the logical structure of our language. So somethings gotta give: either logical analysis is metaphysically biased, or metaphysicians must make up their mind before resorting to logical analysis. Or both. (The second part of this paper has some overlap with [3:2007e].)
200+a, ‘Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism’, to appear in Matthew H. Slater (ed.), Carving Nature at Its Joints, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
Abstract. This is an expanded English version of [3:2005b], with an emphasis on the advantages of conventional realism over (a) Berkeleyan idealism, (b) Goodmanian irrealism, (c) Putnamian relativism, and (d) Postmodern anything-goes-ism.
2008j, ‘Failures, Omissions, and Negative Descriptions’, in Kepa Korta and Joana Garmendia (eds.), Meaning, Intentions, and Argumentation, Stanford, CSLI Publications, 2008, pp. 61-75.
• Italian translation by Giuliano Torrengo: ‘Mancanze, omissioni e descrizioni negative’, Rivista di estetica, 32:2 (2007), 109-127.
Abstract. This paper is a condensed and unified version of [3:2006f] and [3:2007b].
2008i, ‘The Extensionality of Parthood and Composition’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58:1 (2008), 108-133.
Abstract. I focus on three mereological principles: the Extensionality of Parthood (EP), the Uniqueness of Composition (UC), and the Extensionality of Composition (EC). These principles are not equivalent. Nonetheless, they are closely related (and often equated) as they all reflect the basic nominalistic dictum, No difference without a difference maker. And each one of them--individually or collectively--has been challenged on philosophical grounds. In the first part I argue that such challenges do not quite threaten EP insofar as they are either self-defeating or unsupported. In the second part I argue that they hardly undermine the tenability of EC and UC as well.
2008h (with Elena Casetta), ‘Nomi in crisi di identità’ [Names in Identity Crisis], Rivista di estetica 48:2 (2008), 143-156.
Abstract. An exchange of letters among proper names and natural-kind terms, dealing with various identity and individuation problems (rigid designation, use-mention ambiguities, translation) from their point of view.
2008g (with Roberto Casati), ‘Event Concepts’, in Thomas F. Shipley and Jeff Zacks (eds.), Understanding Events: From Perception to Action, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 31-54.
Abstract. Events are center stage in several fields of psychological research. There is a long tradition in the study of event perception, event recognition, event memory, event conceptualization and segmentation. There are studies devoted to the description of events in language and to their representation in the brain. There are also metapsychological studies aimed at assessing the nature of mental events or the grounding of intentional action. Outside psychology, the notion of an event plays a prominent role in various areas of philosophy as well as in such diverse disciplines as linguistics, probability theory, artifical intelligence, physics, and--of course-- history. This plethora of concerns and applications is indicative of the prima facie centrality of the notion of an event in our conceptual scheme, but it also gives rise to some important methodological questions. Can we identify a core notion that is preserved across disciplines? Does this notion, or some such notion, correspond to the pre-theoretical conception countenanced by common sense? Does it correspond to a genuine metaphysical category?
2008f, ‘Il catalogo universale’ [The universal catalogue], in Roberto Finzi and Paolo Zellini (eds.), Forme della ragione, Bologna: CLUEB, 2008, pp. 91-113.
Abstract. There are more things between heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy, says Hamlet. Right. But there are also philosophies that have dreamt of things that are neither here nor there, as Goodman says. There is a danger of suffering from ontological myopia just as there is a danger of suffering from ontological allucination. This paper is about some basic strategies that are available to (or have been elaborated by) philosophers to steer clear of both dangers in their efforts to draw up a good inventory of what there is.
2008e, ‘Mondo-versioni e versioni del mondo’ [World-Versions and Versions of the World], Preface to the second Italian edition of Nelson Goodman, Vedere e costruire il mondo, Roma, Laterza Editore, 2008, pp. vii-xxiv.
Abstract. Some reflections on Nelson Goodman’s ontological pluralism (as emerging from his Ways of Worldmaking) and its influence on contemporary philosophy, taking the querelle with Quine (in the columns of The New York Review of Books) as a starting point.
2008d, ‘Patterns, Rules, and Inferences’, in J. E. Adler and L. J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 282-290.
Abstract. The "Game of the Rule" is easy enough: I give you the beginning of a sequence of numbers (say) and you have to figure out how the sequence continues, to uncover the rule by means of which the sequence is generated. The game depends on two obvious constraints, namely (1) that the initial segment uniquely identify the sequence, and (2) that the sequence be non-random. As it turns out, neither constraint can fully be met, among other reasons because the relevant notion of randomness is either vacuous or undecidable. This may not be a problem when we play for fun. It is, however, a serious problem when it comes to playing the game for real, i.e., when the player to issue the initial segment is not one of us but the world out there, the sequence consisting not of numbers (say) but of the events that make up our history. Moreover, when we play for fun we know exactly what initial segment to focus on, but when we play for real we don’t even know that. This is the core difficulty in the philosophy of the inductive sciences.
2008c, ‘Vaghezza e ontologia’ [Vagueness and Ontology], in Maurizio Ferraris (ed.), Storia dell’ontologia, Milano, Bompiani, 2008, pp. 672-698.
Abstract. On the opposition between de re and de dicto conceptions of vagueness, with special reference to their bearing on the tasks of ontology.
2008b, ‘Che cos’è un derivato? Appunti per una ricerca tutta da fare’ [What Is a Derivative? Notes for a Long-Term Project], Appendix to A. Berrini, Le crisi finanziarie e il "Derivatus paradoxus", Saronno, Editrice Monti, 2008, pp. 143-171.
Abstract. This is an sequel to [3:2007i], focusing on the metaphysics of those peculiar social objects that play an increasingly central role in the financial world--derivatives. On the analysis I offer, they appear to run afoul of Searle’s theory of social objects (or of the theory put forward in my earlier paper), and I put forward some suggestions on where to look for the necessary adjustments.
2008a (with Roberto Casati), ‘Voti e altri buchi elettorali’ [Ballots and Other Polling Holes], Rivista di estetica 48:1 (2008), 169-194.
Abstract. A philosophical dialogue on the functioning, the limits, and the paradoxes of our electoral practices, dealing with such basic questions as: What is a vote? How do we count votes? And do votes really count?
2007k, ‘Supervaluationism and Its Logics’, Mind, 116:463 (2007), 633-676.
Abstract. What sort of logic do we get if we adopt a supervaluational semantics for vagueness? As it turns out, the answer depends crucially on how the standard notion of validity as truth preservation is recasted. There are several ways of doing that within a supervaluational framework, the main alternative being between "global" construals (e.g., an argument is valid iff it preserves truth-under-all-precisifications) and "local" construals (an argument is valid iff, under all precisifications, it preserves truth). The former alternative is by far more popular, but I argue in favor of the latter, for (i) it does not suffer from a number of serious objections, and (ii) it makes it possible to restore global validity as a defined notion.
2007j, ‘Il denaro è un’opera d’arte (o quasi)’ [Money Is (almost) a Work of Art], Quaderni dell’Associazione per lo Sviluppo degli Studi di Banca e Borsa, 24 (2007), 17-39.
Abstract. What is money? Paraphrasing Goodman, I say that’s the wrong question to ask. The right question is, When is money? And to get the answer, Searle’s general formula for social objects (X couns as Y in context C) is fine, as long as you give it a different reading.
2007i, ‘Spatial Reasoning and Ontology: Parts, Wholes, and Locations’, in Marco Aiello, Ian E. Pratt-Hartmann, and Johan van Benthem (eds.), Handbook of Spatial Logics, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 945-1038.
Abstract. A critical survey of the fundamental philosophical issues in the logic and formal ontology of space, with special emphasis on the interplay between mereology (the theory of parthood relations), topology (broadly understood as a theory of qualitative spatial relations such as continuity and contiguity), and the theory of spatial location proper.
2007h, ‘Lesser Kinds: Foreword’ (with Roberto Casati), The Monist, 90:3 (2005), 331-332.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:2007], setting the background for the other papers included in the collection.
2007g, ‘Promiscuous Endurantism and Diachronic Vagueness’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44:2 (2007), 181-189.
Abstract. According to a popular line of reasoning, diachronic vagueness creates a problem for the endurantist conception of persistence. Some authors have replied that this line of reasoning is inconclusive, since the endurantist can subscribe to a principle of Diachronic Unrestricted Composition (DUC) that is perfectly parallel to the principle required by the perdurantist’s semantic account. I object that the endurantist should better avoid DUC. And I argue that even DUC, if accepted, would fail to provide the endurantist with the necessary resources for explaining diachronic vagueness in familiar semantic terms.
2007f, ‘Sul confine tra ontologia e metafisica’ [On the Boundary between Ontology and Metaphysics], Giornale di metafisica, 29:2 (2007): 285-303.
Abstract. An examination and defense of the view according to which ontology, understood as the theory of what there is, comes before (and can be done without engaging in) metaphysics, understood as the theory of the nature of things.
2007e, ‘From Language to Ontology: Beware of the Traps’, in Michel Aurnague, Maya Hickmann, and Laure Vieu (eds.), The Categorization of Spatial Entities in Language and Cognition, Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing, 2007, pp. 269-284.
Abstract. Is there any way of telling what sorts of things there are given the sorts of things we say? Alas, there isn’t. Surely the surface grammar is full of traps. But neither can we trust the deep structure, for there is no unique way of telling what it is. No analysis can reveal the deep structure of a given statement; at most we can fix a deep structure for the statement, by dint of resisting alternative interpretations. Depending on what we think there is, we must attach a meaning to what we say. Going the other way around is illegitimate; it amounts to a attributing our ontological views to the language we share with others. (This paper expands on sections 2 and 3 of [3:2002b]).
2007d, ‘Che cosa ci facciamo qui?’ [What Are We Doing Here?], in S. Montalto (ed.), Umberto Eco: l’uomo che sapeva troppo, Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2007, pp. 253-256.
Abstract. A short dialogue around the question of whether the thoughts expressed by the characters of an historical novel belong to the characters or to the author.
2007c, ‘La natura e l’identità degli oggetti materiali’ [The Nature and Identity of Material Objects], in Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Roma, Carocci, 2007, pp. 17-56.
Abstract. A critical survey of the main metaphysical theories concerning the nature of material objects (substratum theories, bundle theories, substance theories, stuff theories) and their identity conditions, both synchronic (monist vs. pluralist theories) and diachronic (three-dimensionalism, four-dimensionalism, sequentialism).
2007b (with Matthew H. Slater), ‘Playing for the Same Team Again’, in Jerry L. Walls and Gregory Bassham (eds.), Basketball and Philosophy. Thinking Outside the Paint, Lexington (KY), University Press of Kentucky, 2007, pp. 220-234.
Abstract. How many championships have the Lakers won? Fourteen, if one counts those won in Minneapolis; nine, otherwise. Which is the correct answer? Is it even obvious that there is a correct answer? One is tempted to identify a team with its players. But teams, like ordinary objects, seem to survive gradual turnover of their parts. Suppose players from the Lakers are gradually replaced, one by one, over the years. We have the intuition that the team persists through this change, even after none of the original players remain. Suppose too that these original players wind up playing for the Celtics. Lakers fans face an awkward question: for whom should they root? On the one hand, they have the team currently playing in L.A.--a team that has continued gradually through the years, who wear the same uniforms, but now can’t make the playoffs. On the other hand, there are the beloved Lakers starting five (responsible for all those championships) now playing together in the hated Boston garden--a team which looks (despite wearing those hated Celtics jerseys) and plays just like the Lakers of old. What’s a loyal fan to do?
2007a, ‘Omissions and Causal Explanations’, in F. Castellani and J. Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences, Paderborn, Mentis Verlag, 2007, pp. 155-167.
Abstract. In [3:2006k] I argue that talk about negative events should not be taken at face value: tupically, what we are inclined to think of as a negative event (John’s failure to go jogging) is just an ordinary, positive event (his going to the movie instead); it is a positive event under a negative de-scription. Here I consider more closely the difficulties that arise in those cases where no positive event seems available to do the job, as with putative cases of causation by omission. In particular, I elaborate on Helen Beebee’s idea that not all causal explanations are reports of causation. When we mention John’s failure to turn off the gas as an explanans of why there was an explosion, we do not say what caused the explosion. We do not mention any of the relevant causes. We just remark that one sort of event that was supposed to occur, and whose occurrence would have prevented the explosion, did not in fact occur.
2006h, ‘Parts and Wholes: Foreword’ (with Wolfgang Mann), Journal of Philosophy, 103:12 (2006), 593-596.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:2006], setting the background for the other papers included in the collection.
2006g (with Giuliano Torrengo), ‘Crimes and Punishments’, Philosophia, 34:4 (2006), 395-404.
Abstract. Every criminal act ought to be matched by a corresponding punishment, or so we may suppose, and every punishment ought to reflect a criminal act. We know how to count punishments. But how do we count crimes? In particular, how does our notion of a criminal action depend on whether the prohibited action is an activity, an accomplishment, an achievement, or a state?
2006f, ‘The Talk I Was Supposed to Give’, in Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies (eds.), Modes of Existence: Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic , Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006, pp. 131-152.
Abstract. Assuming that events form a genuine ontological category, shall we say that a good inventory of the world ought to include "negative" events--failures, omissions, things that didn’t happen--along with positive ones? I argue that we shouldn’t. Talk of non-occurring events is like talk of non-existing objects and should not be taken at face value. We often speak as though there were such things, but deep down we want our words to be interpreted in such a way as to avoid seri-ous ontological commitment.
2006e, ‘Strict Identity with No Overlap’, Studia Logica, 82:3 (2006), 371-378.
Abstract. It is common lore that standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic is incompatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world, a view that seems to require a counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this thought is wrong-headed. This note explains why.
2006d, ‘A Note on the Transitivity of Parthood’, Applied Ontology, 1:2 (2006), 141-146.
Abstract. That parthood is a transitive relation is among the most basic principles of classical mereology. Alas, it is also very controversial. In a recent paper, Ingvar Johansson has put forward a novel diagnosis of the problem, along with a corresponding solution. The diagnosis is on the right track, I argue, but the solution is misleading. And once the pieces are properly put together, we end up with a reinforcement of the standard defense of transitivity on behalf of classical mereology.
2006c, ‘What Is to Be Done?’, Topoi, 25 (2006), 129-131.
Abstract. If the question is: What is to be done for philosophy?, then it calls for a political answer and I have little to say besides the obvious. If the question is: What is to be done in philosophy?, then I’m stuck. Drawing up a list of to-do’s and not-to-do’s would not, I think, be a good way to honor the general conception of philosophy that inspired Topoi throughout these years, and that I deeply share.
2006b (with Andrea Borghini), ‘Event Location and Vagueness’, Philosophical Studies, 128:2 (2006), 313-336.
Abstract. Most event-referring expressions are vague; it is utterly difficult, if not impossible, to specify the exact spatiotemporal location of an event from the words that we use to refer to it. We argue that in spite of certain prima facie obstacles, such vagueness can be given a purely semantic (broadly supervaluational) account.
2006a, ‘The Universe among Other Things’, Ratio, 19:1 (2006), 107-120.
Abstract. Peter Simons has argued that the expression ‘the universe’ is not a genuine singular term: it can name neither a single, completely encompassing individual, nor a collection of individuals. (It is, rather, a semantically plural term standing equally for every existing object.) I offer reasons for resisting Simons’s arguments on both scores.
2005f, ‘The Vagueness of ‘Vague’: Rejoinder to Hull’, Mind, 114:455 (2005), 695-702.
Abstract. A rejoinder to G. Hull’s reply to my [3:2003h]. Hull argues that Sorensen’s purported proof that ‘vague’ is vague--which I defended against certain familiar objections--fails. He offers three reasons: (i) the vagueness exhibited by Sorensen’s sorites is just the vagueness of ‘small’; (ii) the general assumption underlying the proof, to the effect that predicates which possess borderline cases are vague, is mistaken; (iii) the conclusion of the proof is unacceptable, for it is possible to create Sorensen-type sorites even for predicates that are paradigmatically precise. I argue that each of these points involves fallacious reasoning.
2005e, ‘Beth Too, but Only If’, Analysis, 65:3 (2005), 224-229.
Abstract. On the difficulty of extracting the logical form of a seemingly simple sentence such as ‘If Andy went to the movie then Beth went too, but only if she found a taxi cab’, with some morals and questions on the nature of the difficulty.
2005d, ‘Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness’, Dialectica, 59:4 (2005), 485-498.
Abstract. The so-called "argument from vagueness", the clearest formulation of which is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is arguably the most powerful and innovative argument recently offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective--I submit--and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But each "defect" corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So once all the gaps of the argument are filled in, the three-dimensionalist is left with the burden of a response that cannot rely on a passive plea for common sense. The argument is not a threat to common sense as such; it is a threat to the three-dimensionalist faithfulness to common sense.
2005c, ‘Time Travel: Foreword’, The Monist, 88:3 (2005), 325-328.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:2005], setting the background for the other papers included in the collection.
2005b, ‘Teoria e pratica dei confini’ [Boundaries: Theory and Practice], Sistemi Intelligenti, 17:3 (2005), 399-418.
Abstract. Are there any bona fide boundaries, i.e., boundaries that carve at the joints? Or is any boundary--hence any object--the result of a fiat articulation reflecting our cognitive biases and our social practices and conventions? Does the choice between these two options amount to a choice between realism and wholesome relativism?
2005a (with Roberto Casati), ‘Esercizi di attenzione’ [Exercises in Attention], in Marco Belpoliti and Gianluigi Ricuperati (eds.), Saul Steinberg (Riga, n. 24), Milano, Marcos y Marcos, 2005, pp. 398-403.
Abstract. A brief study of Saul Steinberg’s works on shadows and reflections, and of the seemingly paradoxical world that emerges from such works.
2004d, ‘Conjunction and Contradiction’, in Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Brad Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. New Philosophical Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 93-110.
• Italian translation by Francesco Berto: ‘Congiunzione e contraddizione’, in Francesco Altea and Francesco Berto (eds.), Scenari dell’impossibile. La contraddizione nel pensiero contemporaneo, Padova, Il Poligrafo, 2007, pp. 63-86.
Abstract. There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on the second (distributive) reading it is perfectly plausible to suppose that LNC may, in some rather special and perhaps undesirable circumstances, fail to hold.
2004c, ‘Identità indeterminate e indeterminatezza linguistica’ [Indeterminate Identities and Linguistic Indeterminacy], Rivista di estetica, 26:2 (2004), 285-302.
Abstract. T. Some philosophers (most notably Terence Parsons) have gone a long way towards a clarification and a defense of the view that there is genuine (worldly) indeterminacy of identity. Among his reasons for taking this view seriously is the contention that extant formulations of the alternative conception, according to which all indeterminacy lies in the semantics of our language (or in the system of concepts embodied in our language), are not fitted for dealing with a host of identity puzzles. I this paper I take issue with that contention and argue that the semantic conception, if charitably construed, can meet such challenges.
2004b (with Elena Casetta), ‘RedPill®’, in Massimiliano Cappuccio (ed.), Dentro la matrice. Filosofia, scienza e spiritualità in Matrix, Milano, Alboversorio, 2004, pp. 29-35.
• Reprinted in Nazione Indiana, 19 (2002) (online publication), March 28, 2004.
Abstract. The red pill or the blue pill? Obviously the red. But are we sure it will work the way it is supposed to? Are we sure it will take us out of the Matrix? We are proud to announce that we have found a document that will throw some new light (and a renewed cloud of suspicion) on this matter: the product packaging of RedPill®, complete with all directions for use and warnings against side-effects.
2004a (with Roberto Casati), ‘Counting the Holes’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82:1 (2004), 23-27 (special issue on "The Philosophy of David Lewis").
• Reprinted in Frank Jackson and Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes. The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 24-28.
Abstract. Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
2003k, ‘Naming the Stages’, Dialectica, 57:4 (2003), 387-412.
Abstract. Standard lore has it that a proper name is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it is that different speakers ever manage to pick out one and the same entity when a host of suitable, overlapping candidates are available. But what if the entity in question is neither a continuant nor a perdurant? What if the things we talk about in ordinary language are time-bound entities that cannot truly be said to persist through time, or stage sequences whose unity resides exclusively in our minds--like the " " waves" ± at the stadium or the characters of a cartoon? In such cases the rigidity claim can’t be right and a counterpart-theoretic semantics seems required. Is that bad? I say it isn’t. And it had better not be, if that turns out to be the best metaphysical option we have.
2003j (with Maurizio Ferraris), ‘Che cosa c’è e che cos’è’ [What There Is and What It Is], in Noûs. Postille su pensieri, Lecce, Edizioni Milella, 2003, pp. 81-101.
• Reprinted in Rescogitans (online publication), October 2005.
Abstract. A dialogue on ontology, featuring a defender of revisionary metaphysics vs. a follower of descriptive metaphysics.
2003i (with Roberto Casati), ‘Sfondo e Figura’ [Background and Figure], Rivista di estetica, 24:3 (2003), 38-40 (special issue in memory of Paolo Bozzi).
Abstract. A dialogue between a figure and its background, illustrating that the perceptual conditions that determine which is which are not as clear as standard Gestalt theory dictates.
2003h, ‘Higher-Order Vagueness and the Vagueness of ‘Vague’’, Mind, 112:446 (2003), 295-298.
• German translation by Sven Walter: ‘Höherstufige Vagheit und die Vagheit von ,vage’’, in Sven Walter (ed.), Vagheit, Paderborn, Mentis Verlag, 2005, pp. 147-150.
Abstract. R. Sorensen’s argument to the effect that ’vague’ is a vague predicate has been used by D. Hyde to infer that vague predicates suffer from higher-order vagueness. M. Tye has objected (convincingly) that this is too strong: all that follows from Sorensen’s result is that there are some border border cases, but not necessarily border border cases of every vague predicate. I argue that this is still too strong: Sorensen’s proof presupposes the existence of border border cases, hence cannot be used to establish that fact on pain of circularity.
2003g, ‘Ontologia: dove comincia e dove finisce’ [Ontology: Where It Starts and Where It Ends], Sistemi intelligenti, 15:3 (2003), 493-506.
Abstract. As Quine famously argued, the answer to the question: "What Is There" is just: "Everything". But to say "Everything" is to say nothing. So we need to go further. This paper deals with the question of whether we can go any further in ontology without doing metaphysics proper.
2003f, ‘Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81:2 (2003), 208-215.
Abstract. I argue that the conjunction of perdurantism (the view that objects are temporally extended) and universalism (the thesis that any old class of things has a mereological fusion) gives rise to undesired complications when combined with certain plausible assumptions concerning the semantics of tensed statements.
2003e, ‘Entia Successiva’, Rivista di estetica, 22:1 (2003), 139-158.
Abstract. The theory according to which most ordinary objects are mere "entia successiva"--sequences of distinct mereological aggregates, whose unity resides exclusively in our minds--is a variant of the standard, three-dimensional conception of objects. For the aggregates are, at bottom, endurants, i.e., entities that persist through time by being fully present at any time at which they exist. In this paper I compare this theory with the so-called "stage view", according to which ordinary objects--indeed, all objects--are sequences of momentary entities that cannot truly be said to persist through time. Both theories face a number of intuitive difficulties but the stage view, I argue, has a lot more to offer in return.
2003d (with Anthony G. Cohn), ‘Mereotopological Connection’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32:4 (2003), 357-390.
Abstract. And extended and unified version of [3:1998a] and [3:1999e], this paper outlines a general frame-work for dealing with the variety of mereotopological theories that stem from alternative ways of construing the basic relation of topological connection.
2003c, ‘Cut-offs and their Neighbors’, in J. C. Beall (ed.) Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 24-38.
Abstract. In ‘Towards a Solution to the Sorites Paradox’, Graham Priest gives us a new account of the sorites based on fuzzy logic. The novelty lies in the suggestion that truth-value assignments should themselves be treated as fuzzy objects, i.e., objects about which we can make fuzzy identity statements. I argue that Priest’s solution does not have the explanatory force that Priest advocates. That is, it does not explain why we find the existence of a cut-off point counter-intuitive. I also argue that this sort of explanation calls for a general theory that goes beyond the special case of linguistic vagueness, for the phenomenon is at bottom not linguistic.
2003b (with Massimo Warglien), ‘The Geometry of Negation’, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 13:1 (2003), 9-19.
Abstract. There are two natural ways of thinking about negation: (i) as a form of complementation and (ii) as an operation of reversal, or inversion (to deny that p is to say that things are "the other way around"). A variety of techniques exist to model conception (i), from Euler and Venn diagrams to Boolean algebras. Conception (ii), by contrast, has not been given comparable attention. In this note we outline a twofold geometric proposal, where the inversion metaphor is understoood as involving a rotation o a reflection, respectively. These two options are equivalent in classical two-valued logic but they differ significantly in many-valued logics. Here we show that they correspond to two basic sorts of negation operators" !" Post’s and Kleene’s" !"and we provide a simple group-theoretic argument demonstrating their generative power.
2003a, ‘Riferimento, predicazione, e cambiamento’ [Reference, Predication, and Change], in Claudia Bianchi and Andrea Bottani (eds.), Significato e ontologia, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2003, pp. 221-249.
Abstract. This paper focuses on the semantics of statements of the form ‘x is P at t’ vis-à-vis its metaphysical underpinnings. I begin by considering four main readings, corresponding to the four basic parsings of the temporal modifier ‘at t’: (1) at-t x is P, (2) x-at-t is P, (3) x is-at-t P, and (4) x is P-at-t. Each of these readings--which correspond to different metaphysical con-ceptions of the nature of temporal change--is found inadequate or otherwise problematic. In the second part of the paper I therefore consider a fifth account whose advantages over (1)-(4), I argue, exceed its revisionary costs. This fifth account is based on a conception of objects as entia successiva held together by a nexus of temporal counterparthood and reads ‘x is P at t’ as ‘the t-counterpart of x is P’.
2002g, ‘Parti connesse e interi sconnessi’, Rivista di estetica, 20:2 (2002), 87-90.
Abstract. The Doctrine of Potential Parts says that proper undetached parts are merely potential entities, entities which would exist if they were detached from the rest of the
wholes to which they belong. I give an argument showing that this doctrine does not fare well with the general fusion principle and implies a parallel but quite independent Doctrine of Potential Wholes. According to this second doctrine, disconnected wholes (i.e., wholes that are not in one piece) are in turn potential entities, entities which would exist if they were put together in some suitable form.
2002f, ‘Events, Truth, and Indeterminacy’, The Dialogue, 2 (2002), 241-264.
Abstract. The semantics of our event talk is a complex affair. What is it that we are talking about when we speak of Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar? Exactly where and when did it take place? Was it the same event as the killing of Caesar? Some take questions such as these to be metaphysical questions. I think they are questions of semantics--questions about the way we talk and about what we mean. And I think that this conflict between metaphysic and semantic concerns is indicative of a "deep indeterminacy" (Bennett’s phrase) in our event concept. We do talk about events; but what events a statement is about is not something that can be inferred from the event names we use; it depends heavily (more heavily than with ordinary material objects) on local context and unprincipled intuitions. This paper illustrates this view in connection with two examples: the phenomenon of vagueness and the dispute over identity statements.
2002e, ‘On Logical Relativity’, Philosophical Issues, 12 (2002), 197-219 (annual supplement to Noûs, volume on "Realism and Relativism").
• Italian translation by Luca Morena: ‘Sulla relatività logica’, in Massimiliano Carrara and Pierdaniele Giaretta (eds.), Filosofia e logica, Cosenza, Rubbettino Editore, 2004, pp. 135-173.
Abstract. One logic or many? I say--many. Or rather, I say there is one logic for each way of specifying the class of all possible circumstances, or models, i.e., all ways of interpreting a given language. But because there is no unique way of doing this, I say there is no unique logic except in a relative sense. Indeed, given any two competing logical theories T1 and T2 (in the same language) one could always consider their common core, T, and settle on that theory. So, given any language L, one could settle on the minimal logic T0 corresponding to the common core shared by all competitors. That would be a way of resisting relativism, as long as one is willing to redraw the bounds of logic accordingly. However, such a minimal theory T0 may be empty if the syntax of L contains no special ingredients the interpretation of which is independent of the specification of the relevant L-models. And generally--I argue--this is indeed the case. (The argument expands on a point first made in [3:1995f].)
2002d (with Roberto Casati), ‘Un altro mondo?’ [A Different World?], Rivista di estetica, 19:1 (2002), 131-159.
• Reprinted with omissions as ‘Senso comune, apparenza e realtà’, [Common Sense, Appearance, and Reality], in Evandro Agazzi (ed.), Valori e limiti del senso comune, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2004, pp. 423-442.
Abstract. Alexandre Koyré wrote that Newton and the science that followed led to a splitting of the world: on the one hand is the "world of qualities and of sensible perceptions", on the other is the "world of quantities and of reified geometry". A comparison between facts held true by common sense and false by the scientific image of the world (or vice versa) seems to confirm this view. But is the dichotomy a real one? Is the world of common sense really "another world" relative to the world of the natural sciences? In this paper we argue in support of a negative answer.
2002c (with Barry Smith), ‘Surrounding Space’, Theory in Biosciences, 120:2 (2002), 139-162.
Abstract. The history of evolution is a history of development from less to more complex organisms. This growth in complexity of organisms goes hand in hand with a concurrent growth in complexity of environments and of organism-environment relations. It is a concern with this latter aspect of evolutionary development that motivates the present paper. We develop a formal theory of organism-environment relations and we show that the theory can be applied to a range of different sorts of cases, both biological and non-biological, in which objects are lodged or housed within specific environments or niches. Where biological science is interested in types (in regularities which can serve as the basis for the formulation of laws or general principles), the framework here presented draws on the idea that types (for example genotypes, phenotypes--and niche types) exist only through their corresponding tokens.
2002b, ‘Words and Objects’, in Andrea Bottani, Massimiliano Carrara, and Daniele Giaretta (eds.), Individuals, Essence, and Identity. Themes of Analytic Metaphysics, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, pp. 49-75.
Abstract. A lot of work in metaphysics relies on linguistic analysis and intuitions. Do we want to know what sort of things there are or could be? Then let’s see what sort of things there must be in order for what we truthfully say to be true. Do we want to see whether x is distinct from y? Then let’s see whether there is any statement that is true of x but not of y. And so on. In this paper I argue that this way of proceeding is full of traps and is bound to be pretty useless unless we already have a good idea of what sort of things there are, and of how we are going to count them.
2002a, ‘Ontologia e metafisica’ [Ontology and Metaphysics], in Franca D’Agostini and Nicla Vassallo (eds.), Storia della Filosofia Analitica, Torino, Einaudi, 2002, pp. 81-117.
Abstract. A critical survey of topics that play a central role in contemporary analytic ontology and metaphysics, including, identity, persistence through time, the problem of universals, the notion of ontological commitment, and the boundary between semantic issues and metaphysics proper.
2001j, ‘The Best Question’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30:3 (2001), 251-258.
Abstract. In ‘The Paradox of the Question’ Ned Markosian tells a tale in which philosophers have a chance to ask an angel a question of their choice. What should they ask to make the most of their unique opportunity? Ted Sider has suggested asking: What is the true proposition (or one of the true propositions) that would be most beneficial for us to be told? I think we can do much better than that.
2001i, ‘Parts, Counterparts, and Modal Occurrents’, Travaux de Logique, 14 (2001), 151-171.
Abstract. The paper investigates the link between the theory of modal occurrents (where individuals are allowed to stretch across possible worlds) and Lewis’s counterpart theory (where all individuals are world-bound but have counterparts in other worlds). First I show how to interpret modal talk extensionally within the theory of modal occurrents. Then I show that the assumption that worlds be pairwise discrete is all that is needed to reconstruct the bulk of counterpart theory (i.e., to define the concept of a counterpart and to derive the standard postulates governing that concept) in terms of the theory of modal occurrents. Finally, I argue that this reconstruction allows us to view the indeterminacy of our modal intuitions as being part and parcel with the indeterminacy of our criteria for individuating modal occurrents, and that this indeterminacy is naturally explained in terms of linguistic (as opposed to ontic) vagueness.
2001h, ‘Doughnuts’, in Monima Chadha and Ajay K. Raina (eds.), Basic Objects: Case Studies in Theoretical Primitives, Shimla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2001, pp. 41-51.
• Reprinted in Reports on Philosophy, 22 (2004), 49-59 (special issue in memory of Artur Rojszczak, edited by Tadeusz Czarnecki).
• Russian translation by Andrei Rodin: ‘Bublik
vokrug dirki’, in Logos, 4 (2001), 192-197.
Abstract. In classical topology the only part of a doughnut that matters is the edible part. Here I review some good reasons for reversing the order and focusing on the hole instead. By studying the topology of the hole one can learn interesting things about the morphology of the doughnut (its shape), and by studying the morphology of the hole in turn one can learn a lot about the doughnut’s dynamic properties (its patterns of interaction with the environment). The price--of course--is that one must be serious about reifying voids.
2001g, ‘Vagueness in Geography’, Philosophy & Geography, 4:1 (2001), 49-65.
• Early version appeared as ‘Vague Names for Sharp Objects’, in Leo Obrst and Inderjeet Mani (eds.), Proceedings of the KR Workshop on Semantic Approximation, Granularity, and Vagueness, Breckenridge (CO), AAAI Press, 2000, pp. 73-78.
• Italian version as ‘I confini del Cervino’ [The Boundaries of Mt. Cervino], in Vincenzo Fano, Gino Tarozzi, and Massimo Stanzione (eds.), Prospettive della logica e della filosofia della scienza. Atti del convegno triennale della Società Italiana di Logica e Filosofia delle Scienze, Cosenza, Rubbettino Editore, 2001, pp. 431-445.
• Extended abstract preprinted as ‘Are There Vague Boundaries?’, in Stephan Winter (ed.), Geographical Domain and Geographical Information Systems, (GeoInfo 19), Vienna, Institite for Geoinformation, 2000, pp. 119-121.
Abstract. Some philosophers have argued that the vagueness exhibited by names and descriptions such as ‘Mount Everest’, ‘Downtown Manhattan’, or ‘that cloud in the sky’ is ultimately ontological: they are vague because they refer to vague objects, objects with fuzzy boundaries. I take the opposite stand and argue for the view that all vagueness is semantic. There is no such thing as a vague mountain. Rather, there are many things where we conceive the mountain to be, each with its precise boundary, and when we say ‘Everest’ we are just being vague as to which thing we are referring to. This paper defends this view against some plausible objections.
2001f (with Roberto Casati), ‘That Useless Time Machine’, Philosophy, 76:298 (2001), 581-583.
Abstract. Dear "Time Machine" Research Group: if in order to travel to the past one has to have been there already, and if one can only do what has already been done, then why build a time machine in the first place? À quoi bon l’effort?
2001e, ‘Introduction: Philosophical Issues in Geography’, Topoi, 20:2 (2001), 119- 130.
Abstract. An outline of the wealth of philosophical material that hides behind the flat world of geographic maps, with special reference to (i) the centrality of the boundary concept, (ii) the problem of vagueness, and (iii) the metaphysical question (if such there be) of the identity and persistence conditions of geographic entities. Serves as an introduction to [2:2001].
2001d (with Massimiliano Carrara), ‘Ontological Commitment and Reconstructivism’, Erkenntnis, 55:1 (2001), 33-50.
• Extended abstract published as ‘A Note on Ontological Reconstructivism’, in Third European Congress of Analytic Philosophy: Abstracts of Contributed Papers, special issue of ANaliza (1999), pp. 39-40.
Abstract. Some forms of analytic reconstructivism take natural language (and common sense at large) to be ontologically misleading: ordinary sentences must be suitably rewritten or paraphrased before questions of ontological commitment may be raised. Other forms take the commitment of ordinary language at face value, but regard it as metaphysically misleading: common-sense objects exist, but they are not what we think they are. This paper is an attempt to clarify and critically assess some common limits of these two reconstructive strategies.
2001c, ‘Vagueness, Logic, and Ontology’, The Dialogue, 1 (2001), 135-154.
• Reprinted in Darragh Byrne and Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about Language, London: Routledge, to appear.
Abstract. The paper reviews the link between logical and ontological aspects of vagueness and offers new arguments in favor of the view that all vagueness is de dicto (i.e., semantic or pragmatic) as opposed to de re (or ontological).
2001b (with Barry Smith), ‘Environmental Metaphysics’, in Uwe Meixner (ed.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age. Proceedings of the 22th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 2001, pp. 231-239.
• Japanese translation by S. Kajitani: ‘Kankyo no Keijijyogaku’, The Riso, 669 (2002), 170-180.
Abstract. We outline the beginnings of a general theory of environments, of the parts or regions of space in which organisms live and move. We draw on two sources: on the one hand on recent work on the ontology of space; on the other hand on work by ecological scientists on concepts such as territory, habitat and niche.
2001a, ‘L’autoriferimento si spiega da sé’ [Self-Reference Self-Explained], Rivista di Estetica, 18:3 (2001), 5-7.
• Reprinted with minor revisions as ‘I contesti del paradosso’, in Carlo Penco (ed.), La svolta contestuale, Milano, McGraw-Hill Italia, 2002, pp. 267-270.
• English version as ‘Self-Reference Self-Explained’, The Blue and White, 9:2 (2002), 50-51.
• English version reprinted in PhiNews, 6 (2004), 36-39.
• Also reprinted in [1:2006].
Abstract. A dialogue among statements that try to explain to each other the mechanisms and peculiarities of self-referential assertions and--particularly--of their context-dependence.
2000j, ‘Mereological Commitments’, Dialectica, 54:4 (2000), 283-305.
Abstract. We tend to talk about (refer to, quantify over) parts in the same way in which we talk about whole objects. Yet a part is not something to be included in an inventory of the world over and above the whole to which it belongs, and a whole is not something to be included in the inventory over and above its constituent parts. This paper is an attempt to clarify a way of dealing with this tension which may be labeled the Minimalist View: An element in the field of a part-whole relation is to be included in an inventory of the world if and only if it does not overlap any distinct element that is itself included in the inventory.
2000i (with John Collins), ‘Unsharpenable Vagueness’, Philosophical Topics, 28:1 (2000), 1-10.
Abstract. A plausible thought about vagueness is that it involves semantic incompleteness. To say that a predicate is vague is to say (at the very least) that its extension is incompletely specified. Where there is incomplete specification of extension there is indeterminacy, an indeterminacy between various ways in which the specification of the predicate might be completed or sharpened. In this paper we show that this idea is bound to founder by presenting an argument to the effect that there are vague predicates which cannot be sharpened in such a way as to meet certain basic constraints (of penumbral connection and public accessibility) that must be imposed on the very notion of a sharpening.
2000h, ‘Temporal Parts: Foreword’, The Monist, 83:3 (2000), 319-320.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:2000b], setting the background for the other papers included in the collection.
2000g (with Philip Kitcher), ‘Some Pictures Are Worth 2ℵ0 Sentences’, Philosophy, 75:293 (2000), 377-381.
Abstract. According to the cliché a picture is worth a thousand words. But this is a canard, for it vastly underestimates the expressive power of many pictures and diagrams. In this note we show that even a simple map such as the outline of Manhattan Island, accompanied by a pointer marking North, implies a vast infinity of statements--including a vast infinity of true statements.
2000g, ‘Supervaluationism and Paraconsistency’, in Diderik Batens, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest, and Jean Paul Van Bendegem (eds.), Frontiers in Paraconsistent Logic, Baldock, Research Studies Press, 2000, pp. 279-297.
• Extended abstract published in Proceedings of the First World Congress on Paraconsistency, Gent, Universiteit Gent, 1997, pp. 157-160.
Abstract. A much revised and extended version of [3:1995d], this paper examines a family of paraconsistent logics (logics in which inconsistent premises do not warrant arbitrary conclusions) which emerge from a corresponding variety of super/sub-valuational policies.
2000e (with Roberto Casati), ‘Topological Essentialism’, Philosophical Studies, 100:3 (2000), 217-236.
Abstract. Considering topology as an extension of mereology, this paper analyses topological variants of mereological essentialism (the thesis that an object could not have different parts than the ones it has). In particular, we examine de dicto and de re versions of two theses: (i) that an object cannot change its external connections (e.g., adjacent objects cannot be separated), and (ii) that an object cannot change its topological genus (e.g., a doughnut cannot turn into a sphere). Stronger forms of structural essentialism, such as morphological essentialism (an object cannot change shape) and locative essentialism (an object cannot change position) are also examined.
2000d (with Barry Smith), ‘Fiat and Bona Fide Boundaries’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60:2 (2000), 401-420.
• Early version appeared as ‘The Formal Ontology of Boundaries’, The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (online publication), 5 (1997).
• Shortened version published as ‘Fiat and Bona Fide Boundaries. Towards an Ontology of Spatially Extended Objects’, in Stephen C. Hirtle and Andrew U. Frank (eds.), Spatial Information Theory: A Theoretical Basis for GIS. Proceedings of the Third International Conference, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 103-119.
Abstract. There is a basic distinction, in the realm of spatial boundaries, between bona fide boundaries on the one hand, and fiat boundaries on the other. The former are just the physical boundaries of old. The latter are exemplified especially by boundaries induced through human demarcation, for example in the geographic domain. The classical problems connected with the notions of adjacency, contact, separation and division can be resolved in an intuitive way by recognizing this two-sorted ontology of boundaries. Bona fide boundaries yield a notion of contact that is effectively modeled by classical topology; the analogue of contact involving fiat boundaries calls, however, for a different account, based on the intuition that fiat boundaries do not support the open/closed distinction on which classical topology is based. In the presence of this two-sorted ontology it then transpires that mereotopology--topology erected on a mereological basis--is more than a trivial formal variant of classical point-set topology.
2000c (with Fabio Pianesi) ‘Events and Event Talk: An Introduction’, in James Higginbotham, Fabio Pianesi, and Achille C. Varzi (eds.), Speaking of Events, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 3-47.
Abstract. A critical review of the main themes arising out of recent literature on the semantics of ordinary event talk. The material is organized in four sections: (i) the nature of events, with emphasis on the opposition between events as particulars and events as universals; (ii) identity and indeterminacy, with emphasis on the unifier/multiplier controversy; (iii) events and logical form, with emphasis on Davidson’s treatment of the form of action sentences; (iv) linguistic applications, with emphasis on issues concerning aspectual phenomena, the telicity/atelicity distinction, the treatment of statives, and temporal quantification. Serves as an introduction to [2:2000a].
2000b (with Roberto Casati), ‘All the Things You Are’, in Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modi dell’oggettività, Milano, Bompiani, 2000, pp. 77-85.
Abstract. An imaginary dialogue between Andrea Bonomi and Gonzalo Pirobutirro (the main character of Gadda’s novel La cognizione del dolore) aiming to challenge Bonomi’s tenet that a work of fiction defines a domain of objects which is closed with respect to the actual world.
2000a (with Roberto Casati), ‘True and False: An Exchange’, in Anil Gupta and André Chapuis (eds.), Circularity, Definition, and Truth, New Delhi, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2000, pp. 365-370.
Abstract. Classically, truth and falsehood are opposite, and so are logical truth and logical falsehood. In this paper we imagine a situation in which the opposition is so pervasive in the language we use as to threaten the very possibility of telling truth from falsehood. The example exploits a suggestion of Ramsey’s to the effect that negation can be expressed simply by writing the negated sentence upside down. The difference between ‘p’ and ‘~~p’ disappears, the principle of double negation becomes trivial, and the truth/falsehood opposition is up for grabs. Our moral is that this indeterminacy undermines the idea of inferential role semantics.
1999h (with Barry Smith) ‘The Niche’, Noûs, 33:2 (1999), 214-238.
• Polish translation by Anna Redlin: ‘Nisza’, Filozofia Nauki, 8:3-4 (2000), 5-30.
• Extended abstract published as ‘Mereology, Topology, Ecology: A Formal Theory of Organism-Niche Relations’, in Jacek Cachro and Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (eds.), 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Volume of Abstracts, Cracow, Jagiellonian University, 1999, p. 351.
Abstract. The concept of niche (setting, context, habitat, environment) has been little studied by ontologists, in spite of its wide application in a variety of disciplines from evolutionary biology to economics. What follows is a first formal theory of this concept, a theory of the relational ties between objects and their niches. The theory builds upon existing work on mereology, topology, and the theory of spatial location as tools of formal ontology. It will be illustrated above all by means of simple biological examples, but the concept of niche should be understood as being, like concepts such as part, boundary, and location, a structural concept that is applicable in principle to a wide range of different domains.
1999g (with Lucia Tovena), ‘Events and Negative Descriptions’ (Abstract), in Sinn und Bedeutung 1999. Fourth Annual Conference of the Gesellschaft für Semantik, Düsseldorf, Heinrich-Heine Universität, 1999, pp. 71-73.
Abstract. We argue against the idea that the semantic analysis of such sentences as ‘Mary saw John not jump’, ‘John often hasn’t paid taxes’, or ‘John kept the child awake by not turning out the light’ calls for an ontology of negative events, i.e., events which did not occur. When we talk about things that happened (just as when we talk about objects) we may help ourselves with all sorts of descriptive means. In some cases privative or negative descriptions may work best (‘John saw Mary not leave’, ‘Bill met a non-linguist’). In other cases, a positive description may be more appropriate (‘John saw Mary stay’, ‘Bill met a singer’). But the use of different descriptions need not imply that we are talking about different (types of) events or objects, just as the use of, say, psychological rathern than physicalistic descriptions does not imply an ontological distinction between mental and physical events or phenomena.
1999f, ‘Le strutture dell’ordinario’ [The Structures of the Ordinary], in Luigi Lombardi Vallauri (ed.), Logos dell’essere, logos della norma, Bari, Editrice Adriatica, 1999, pp. 489-530.
Abstract. The general hypothesis underlying this work is that mereology (the study of the relations between an entity and its parts) and topology (understood as the study of the qualitative relations of connection and compactness) may jointly constitute adequate grounds for the formal-ontological analysis of the world of ordinary experience. The analysis focuses on certain minimal (structural) principles on the basis of which different philosophical theories may be erected.
1999e (with Anthony G. Cohn) ‘Modes of Connection’, in Christian Freksa and David M. Mark (eds.), Spatial Information Theory. Cognitive and Computational Foundations of Geographic Information Science, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 299-314.
Abstract. There has been a proliferation of theories for representing space and time in a qualitative way based on a primitive notion of topological connection. In previous work [3:1998a], we have commenced the construction of a unified framework. Independently of any foundational or applicative concerns, we attempt to delineate the space of mereotopological theories based on an account of their intended models and to place some existing theories into this framework. This paper extends this work by considering a second, orthogonal dimension along which varieties of topological connection can be classified: the strength of the connection.
1999d (with Barry Smith) ‘The Formal Structure of Ecological Contexts’, in Paolo Bouquet, Patrick Brezillon, Francesca Castellani, and Luciano Serafini (eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Proceedings of the Second International and Interdisciplinary Conference, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 339-350.
Abstract. This is an informal presentation of the theory of niches [3:1999h] understood as ecological contexts. The first part sets out the basic conceptual background. The second part outlines the main principles of the theory and addresses the question of how the theory can be extended to aid our thinking in relation to the special types of causal integrity that characterize niches and niched entities. A technical appendix shows how reference to the theory of holes [1:1994; 3:1996b] can simplify the mereotopological account of niches presented in [3:1999h].
1999c (with Fabio Pianesi) ‘The Context-Dependency of Temporal Reference in Event Semantics’, in Paolo Bouquet, Patrick Brezillon, Francesca Castellani, and Luciano Serafini (eds.), Modeling and Using Context. Proceedings of the Second International and Interdisciplinary Conference, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 507-510.
Abstract. Temporal reference in natural language is inherently context dependent: what counts as a moment in one context may be structurally analysed in another context, and vice versa. In this note we show how the apparatus developed in [3:1996f] allows one to account for this phenomenon within the framework of event-based semantics.
1999b, ‘Introduction’, in Achille C. Varzi (ed.), The Nature of Logic, Stanford, CSLI Publications, 1999, pp. 1-3.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:1999a], highlighting the need for of serious philosophical reflection on logic.
1999a (with Roberto Casati), ‘I trabocchetti della rappresentazione spaziale’ [The Pitfalls of Spatial Representation], Sistemi Intelligenti, 11:1 (1999), 7-28.
Abstract. This is a position article summarizing our approach to the philosophy of space and spatial representation. Our concern is mostly methodological: above all, we argue that a number of philosophical puzzles that arise in this field--puzzles concerning the nature of spatial entities, their material and mereological constitution, their relationship with the space that they occupy--stem from a confusion between semantic issues and true metaphysical concerns.
1998d (with Francesco Orilia), ‘A Note on Analysis and Circular Definitions’, Grazer philosophische Studien, 54 (1998), 107-115.
• Italian version as ‘Analisi e definizioni circolari’, in Michele Di Francesco, Diego Marconi, and Paolo Parrini (eds.), Filosofia analitica 1996-1998. Prospettive teoriche e revisioni storiografiche, Milano, Guerini e Associati, 1998, pp. 146-50.
• Extended abstract appeared as ‘Analysis, Substitution, and Circular Definitions’, in Filosofia e analisi filosofica. Prospettive teoriche e revisioni storiografiche (Convegno Nazionale della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica), Milano,
Guerini e Associati, 1996, pp. 120-22.
Abstract. On a rather popular conception, the paradox of analysis suggests that the intersubstitutivity of analysans and
analysandum should be restricted to non-psychological contexts. This is typically taken to be compatible with the idea that two sentences differing only in that one has the analysandum where the other has the analysans express exactly the same proposition. In this note we argue that this should be pondered upon in light of the view that many important ordinary concepts are circular. In particular, we submit that if there are correct analyses grounding circular definitions, then we are bound to further restrict the substitutivity principle, for we must admit that it might fail even in non-psychological contexts.
1998c, ‘Basic Problems for Mereotopology’, in Nicola Guarino (ed.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems, Amsterdam, IOS Press, 1998, pp. 29-38.
Abstract. Mereotopology is today regarded as a major tool for ontological analysis, and for many good reasons. There are, however, a number of open questions that call for an answer. Some are philosophical, others have direct applicative import, but all are crucial for a proper assessment of the strengths and limits of mereotopology. This paper is an attempt to put sum order in this area.
1998b (with Roberto Casati and Barry Smith), ‘Ontological Tools for Geographic Representation’, in N. Guarino (ed.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems, Amsterdam, IOS Press, 1998, pp. 77-85.
• Japanese translation in InterCommunication, 45 (2003), 80-91.
Abstract. This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final part we also consider the idea of non-standard geographies, which may be associated with geography under a classical conception in the same sense in which non-standard logics are associated with classical logic.
1998a (with Anthony G. Cohn), ‘Connection Relations in Mereotopology’ in Henri Prade (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 98), Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1998, 150-154.
Abstract. We provide a model-theoretic framework for investigating and comparing a variety of mereotopological theories with respect to (i) the intended interpretation of their connection primitives, and (ii) the composition of their intended domains (e.g., whether or not they allow for boundary elements).
1997c, ‘Boundaries, Continuity, and Contact’,
Noûs, 31:1 (1997), 26-58.
• Reprinted in Patrick Grim, Kenneth Baynes, and Gary Mar (eds.), The Philosopher’s Annual, Volume 20, Atascadero (CA), Ridgeview, 1999, pp. 225-258.
• Early version appeared in Pascal Amsili, Mario Borillo, and Laure Vieu (eds.), Time, Space and Movement: Meaning and Knowledge in the Sensible World (Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop), Toulouse, COREP, 1995, Part D, pp. 79-100.
Abstract.
There are conflicting intuitions concerning the status of a boundary separating two adjacent entities (or two parts of the same entity). The boundary cannot belong to both things, for adjacency excludes overlap; and it cannot belong to neither, for nothing lies between two adjacent things. Yet how can the dilemma be avoided without assigning the boundary to one thing or the other at random? Some philosophers regard this as a reductio of the very notion of a boundary, which should accordingly be treated a mere façon de parler. In this paper I resist this temptation and examine some ways of taking the puzzle at face value within a realist perspective--treating boundaries as ontologically on a par with (albeit parasitic upon) extended parts.
1997b, ‘Inconsistency Without Contradiction’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38:4 (1997), 621-638.
Abstract. David Lewis has argued that impossible worlds are nonsense: if there were such worlds, one would have to distinguish between the truths about their contradictory goings-on and contradictory falsehoods about them; and this--Lewis argues--is preposterous. In this paper I examine a way of resisting this argument by giving up the assumption that ‘in so-and-so world’ is a restricting modifier which passes through the truth-functional connectives The outcome is a sort of subvaluational semantics which makes a contradiction ‘A & ~A’ false even when both ‘A’ and ‘~A’ are true, just as supervaluational semantics makes a tautology ‘A v ~A’ true even when neither ‘A’ nor ‘~A’ are. Connections with discussive logics and complications of the account are discussed, and some general morals are drawn.
1997a (with Roberto Casati), ‘Spatial Entities’, in Oliviero Stock (ed.), Spatial and Temporal Reasoning, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 73-96.
Abstract. Ordinary reasoning about space--we argue--is first and foremost reasoning about things or events located in space. Accordingly, any theory concerned with the construction of a general model of our spatial competence must be grounded on a general account of the sort of entities that may enter into the scope of the theory. Moreover, on the methodological side the emphasis on spatial entities (as opposed to purely geometrical items such as points or regions) calls for a reexamination of the conceptual categories required for this task. Building on material previously presented in [3:1995b], in this work we offer some examples of what this amounts to, of the difficulties involved, and of the main directions along which spatial theories should be developed so as to combine formal sophistication with some affinity with common sense.
1996f (with Fabio Pianesi), ‘Refining Temporal Reference in Event Structures’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 37:1 (1996), 71-83.
• Early version appeared in Pascal Amsili, Mario Borillo, and Laure Vieu (eds.), Time, Space and Movement: Meaning and Knowledge in the Sensible World (Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop), Toulouse, COREP, 1995, Part D, pp. 17-27.
Abstract. This work expands on the theory of events put forward in [3:1994d, 3:1994e, 3:1996e] by further investigating the subtle connections between time and events. Specifically, in the first part we generalize the notion of an event structure to that of a refinement structure, where various degrees of temporal granularity are accommodated. In the second part we investigate how these structures can account for the context-dependence of temporal structures in natural language.
1996e (with Fabio Pianesi), ‘Events, Topology, and Temporal Relations’, The Monist, 78:1 (1996), 89-116.
Abstract. This paper expands on the theory of events put forward in [3:1994d, 3:1994e]. In the first part we consider some
difficulties that arise as we move from the analysis of spatio-temporal regions to that of their natural occupants, such as physical bodies or events. In the second part we focus on the latter and we give a refined formulation of our argument to the effect that the temporal dimension can be directly construed from a domain of
events in terms of the basic mereotopological relations of parthood and boundary.
1996d (with Roberto Casati), ‘The Structure of Spatial Localization’, Philosophical Studies, 82:2 (1996), 205-239.
Abstract. What are the relationships between an entity and the space at which it is located? And between a region of space and the events that take place there? What is the metaphysical structure of localization? What its modal status? This paper addresses some of these questions in an attempt to work out at least the main coordinates of the logical structure of localization. Our task is mostly taxonomic. But we also highlight some of the underlying structural features and we single out the interactions between the notion of localization and nearby notions, such as the notions of part and whole, or of necessity and possibility. A theory of localization--we argue--is needed in order to account for the basic relations between objects and space, and runs afoul a pure part-whole theory. We also provide an axiomatization of the relation of localization and examine cases of localization involving entities different from material objects.
1996c, ‘Parts, Wholes, and Part-Whole Relations: The Prospects of Mereotopology’, Data and Knowledge Engineering, 20:3 (1996), 259-86.
Abstract. We can see mereology as a theory of parthood and topology as a theory of wholeness. How can these be combined to obtain a unified theory of parts and wholes? This paper examines various non-equivalent ways of pursuing this task, with specific reference to its relevance to spatio-temporal reasoning. In particular, three main strategies are compared: (i) mereology and topology as two independent (though mutually related) chapters; (ii) mereology as a general theory subsuming topology; (iii) topology as a general theory subsuming mereology. Some more speculative strategies and directions for further research are also considered.
1996b, ‘Reasoning about Space: The Hole Story’, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 4 (1996), 3-39.
Abstract. This is a revised and extended version of the formal theory of holes outlined in [3:1993c]. The first part summarizes the basic framework (ontology, mereology, topology, morphology). The second part emphasizes its relevance to spatial reasoning and to the semantics of spatial prepositions in natural language. In particular, I discuss the semantics of ‘in’ and provide an account of such fallacious arguments as "There is a hole in the sheet. The sheet is in the drawer. Ergo *there is a hole in the drawer".
1996a (with Roberto Casati), ‘Introduction’, in Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi (eds.), Events, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, 1996, pp. xi-xxxviii.
Abstract. A critical survey of event theories, organized into five sections: (i) the role of events in the logical analysis of natural language; (ii) the metaphysical status of events; (iii) their identity and individuation criteria; (iv) their role in the analysis of space, time and causality; and (v) the distinction and classification of various types of events and event-like entities (such as processes and states). Serves as an introduction to [2:1996].
1995f, ‘Model-Theoretic Conventionalism’, in James Hill and Petr Kotátko (eds.), Karlovy Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning, Prague, Filosofia, 1995, pp. 406-30.
Abstract. Model-theoretic conventionalism is the view that logic (any logic) is neither more nor less than a theory in the model-theoretic sense: it is specified by a certain set of theses expressed in a distinguished language, and these theses in turn are specified by singling out the intended interpretation of certain distinguished terms or operations available in the language (those terms and operations that are regarded as primitives of the theory). Building on the results of [3:1993d, 3:1995c], this paper attempts a full characterization of this view and scrutinizes some basic facts and arguments supporting it as well as some consequences arising from it.
1995e, ‘Vagueness, Indiscernibility, and Pragmatics: Comments on Burns’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33 Suppl. (1995), 49-62.
Abstract. In ‘Something to Do with Vagueness ...’, Linda Burns defends an analogy between the informational and the borderline-case variety of vagueness. She argues that the latter is in fact less extraordinary and less disastrous than people in the tradition of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright have told us. However, her account involves presuppositions that cannot be taken for granted. Here is to take a closer look at some of these presuppositions and argue hat they may--when left unguarded--undermine much of Burns’ general account.
1995d, ‘Super-Duper Supervaluationism’, in Timothy Childers and Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica ’94. Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium, Prague, Filosofia, 1995, pp. 17-40.
Abstract. Since its first appearance in 1966, the notion of a supervaluation has been regarded by many as a powerful tool for dealing with semantic gaps. Only recently, however, applications to semantic gluts have also been considered. In previous work [3:1991, 3:1994a] I proposed a general framework exploiting the intrinsic gap/glut duality. Here I also examine an alternative account where gaps and gluts are treated on a par: although they reflect opposite situations, the semantic upshot is the same in both cases--the value of some expressions is not uniquely defined. Other strategies for generalizing supervaluations are considered and some comparative facts are discussed.
1995c, ‘Variable-Binders as Functors’, in Jan Wolenski and Vito F. Sinisi (eds.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 40 (1995), 303-19.
Abstract. This work gives an extended presentation of the treatment of variable-binding operators adumbrated in [3:1993d]. Illustrative examples include elementary languages with quantifiers and lambda-equipped categorial languages. Some remarks are also offered to illustrate the philosophical import of the resulting picture. Particularly, a certain conception of logic emerges from the account: the view that logics are true theories in the model-theoretic sense, i.e. the result of selecting a certain class of models as the only "admissible" interpretation structures (for a given language).
1995b (with Roberto Casati), ‘Basic Issues in Spatial Representation’, in Michel De Glas and Zdzislaw Pawlak (eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd World Conference on the Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence, Paris, Angkor, 1995, pp. 63-72.
• Reprinted in Carlo Penco and Giovanni Sarbia (eds.), Alle Origini della Filosofia Analitica. Atti del Convegno Nazionale della Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica, Genova, Erga Edizioni (CD Rom edition), 1995.
Abstract. This is a preliminary report of part of a long term project on the foundations of spatial representation. In prospective, our aim is to unfold a general framework where the major results and open problems in this field can be set up and approached in a uniform fashion. Here, our concern is mainly with (i) analysing some basic notions that can be (or have been) used as primitives for this purpose (geometric points, places, regions, and bodies in the first place), and (ii) assessing the degree and significance in which the choice of any of such primitives may condition the resulting representation system.
1995a (with Piero Bonatti), ‘On the Meaning of Complementary Systems’ (Abstract), in 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Volume of Abstracts, Florence, International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, 1995, p. 122.
Abstract. Two proof systems are complementary iff what can be derived in one system is precisely that which cannot be derived in the other. We argue that the study of such systems--of which we provide a novel, Gentzen-style exemplification for classical logic--presents several points of interest both philosophically and metamathematically. We also draw connections with computer science, arguing that systems of this sort have important bearing on
the semantics of programming languages and the logical characterization of complexity classes.
1994f, ‘On the Boundary Between Mereology and Topology’, in Roberto Casati, Barry Smith, and Graham White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1994, pp. 423-42.
Abstract. Much recent work aimed at providing a formal ontological analysis of the "common-sense" world has emphasized the need for a mereological prospect to be supplemented with topological concepts and principles. How exactly these two frameworks are related, however, and how the underlying principles should interact with one another, is a rather unexplored issue. This paper provides a first assessment of some alternative routes, discussing their relative merits and examining to what extent their adequacy, and more generally the boundary between mereology and topology, depends on the ontological fauna that one is willing to countenance.
1994e (with Fabio Pianesi), ‘The Mereo-Topology of Event Structures’, in Paul Dekker and Martin Stokhof (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, 1994, pp. 527-46.
Abstract. We hold that combining a mereological approach with a topological perspective provides a resourceful framework for the formal-ontological analysis of natural language semantics. In this spirit we present a general setting--using as primitives the relation of parthood and the notion of a boundary--which is meant to apply uniformly to as diverse domains as space, time, and the common-sense world. In particular, we focus on event-related phenomena and show how the temporal dimension can be reconstructed from the basic primitives. Illustrative examples include a discussion of some facts about present tense sentences and a tentative characterization of Aktionsarten-aspectual phenomena.
1994d (with Fabio Pianesi), ‘Mereo-Topological Construction of Time from Events’, Anthony G. Cohn (ed.), Proceedings of the 11th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 94), Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1994, pp. 396-400.
• Reprinted with revisions in Carola Eschenbach, Christopher Habel, and Barry Smith (eds.), Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science. Papers from the Workshop at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science in Buffalo, Hamburg, Universität Hamburg, 1994, pp. 151-71.
Abstract. We are used to regarding actions and other events, such as Brutus’ stabbing of Caesar or the sinking of the Titanic, as occupying intervals of some underlying linearly ordered temporal structure. This attitude is so natural and compelling that one may be tempted to reduce actual happenings to mere intervals cum description. On the other hand, if individual events are countenanced in the first place, then temporal relations may
arguably be construed out of them. The main argument of this paper is that this relationist perspective can be accomplished by reasoning exclusively in terms of the basic mereotopological relations of parthood and boundary. More precisely, it is argued that the connection between the way events are perceived to be ordered and
the underlying time dimension is essentially that of a construction of a linear ordering from the part-whole structure of a connected domain of events
1994c (with Roberto Casati), ‘Sulla rappresentazione dello spazio’ [On Space Representation], AI*IA Notizie, 7:3 (1994), 18-21
• Reprinted with revisions as ‘Perché i buchi sono importanti. Problemi di rappresentazione spaziale’ [Why Holes Are Important. Issues in Spatial Representation], Sapere, 63:2 (1997), 38-43.
Abstract. The methodological anarchy that characterizes much recent research in artificial intelligence and other cognitive sciences has brought into existence (sometimes resumed) a large variety of entities from a correspondingly large variety of (sometimes dubious) ontological categories. Recent work in spatial representation and reasoning is particularly indicative of this trend. Our aim in this paper is to suggest some ways of reconciling such a luxurious proliferation of entities with the sheer sobriety of good philosophy.
1994b, ‘Things All of a Piece’, in Marco Somalvico (ed.), IV Convegno dell’Associazione Italiana per l’Intelligenza Artificiale: Atti del gruppo di lavoro "Aspetti Epistemologici e Gnoseologici dell’Intelligenza Artificiale", Parma, Università degli Studi di Parma, 1994, pp. 55-58.
Abstract. What is it that makes it possible to distinguish things and events that are all of a piece, such as a cup or a whistle, from scattered entities made up of several disconnected parts, such as a broken cup, a soccer tournament, or Brutus’ repeated stabbing of Caesar? The purpose of this note is to indicate a way of characterizing this issue, both as a matter of formal ontology and in accordance with some basic guidelines of knowledge representation.
1994a, ‘Supervaluational Policies for Epistemic Semantics’, in Marco Somalvico (ed.), IV Convegno dell’Associazione Italiana per l’Intelligenza Artificiale: Atti del gruppo di lavoro "Aspetti Epistemologici e Gnoseologici dell’Intelligenza Artificiale", Parma, Università degli Studi di Parma, 1994, pp. 51-54.
Abstract. This paper reviews some main strategies for extending the use of supervaluational techniques in the context of epistemic semantics. The final part examines connections with modal logics and suggestions for further generalizations.
1993d, ‘Do We Need Functional Abstraction?’, in Johannes Czermak (ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics. Proceedings of the 15th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Part 1, Vienna, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1993, pp. 407-15.
Abstract. There is a widespread view according to which functional application is too poor a paradigm for the analysis
of complex linguistic structures: we also need functional abstraction. For instance, variable-binding operators such as quantifiers, integrals, and the like seem to run afoul of the functor/argument scheme, though they can be accounted for easily with the help of functional abstracts. In this paper I argue against that view by presenting a way of interpreting functional abstraction within the framework of a pure categorial language, where the only relevant distinction is of the functor/argument type.
1993c, ‘Spatial Reasoning in a Holey World’, in Pietro Torasso (ed.), Advances in Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the 3rd Congress of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 326-36.
• Early version appeared as ‘Spatial Reasoning in a Holey World: A Sketch’, in Frank Anger, Hans Guesgen, and Johan van Benthem (eds.), 13th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the Workshop on Spatial and Temporal Reasoning, Chambéry, IJCAI, 1993, pp. 47-59.
• Early version reprinted in Nicole Bidoit (ed.), Informatique Fondamentale et Intelligence Artificielle. Actes des Vèmes Journées du LIPN, Villetaneuse, Université de Paris Nord, Institut Galilée, 1993, pp. 53-65.
Abstract. Much of our common-sense reasoning about space involves reasoning about holes and holed objects. We put things in holes, or through holes, or around them; we jump over a hole or fall into one; we compare holes, measure them, enlarge them or fill them up. A basic formalism for dealing with such forms of reasoning has been introduced in previous work [1:1994, 3:1993b]. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how that formalism can be exploited to provide a framework for more general patterns of qualitative spatial reasoning.
1993b (with Roberto Casati), ‘An Ontology for Superficial Entities I: Holes’, in Nicola Guarino and Roberto Poli (eds.), International Workshop on Formal Ontology in Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation, Padova, Ladseb-CNR, 1993, pp. 127-48.
Abstract. A presentation (including some novel developments) of the formal theory of holes adumbrated in the appendix of our book [1:1994]. Several domains come to interact: ontology (holes are parasitic entities), mereology (holes may bear part-whole relations to one another); topology (holes are one-piece things located at the surfaces of their hosts); morphology (holes are fillable).
1993a, ‘Elaborazione e interrogazione degli atti visitali: qualche spunto metodologico’ [Processing and Querying a Visitation Document: Methodological Remarks], in Cecilia Nubola and Angelo Turchini (eds.), Visite pastorali ed elaborazione dei dati. Esperienze e metodi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993, pp. 309-19.
Abstract. The documents of pastoral visitations constitute a very rich source of historical information. However, their systematic analysis involves various problems which in some cases appear to undermine the foundations of the historiographic method. This paper examines some of these problems with an eye on their epistemological aspects, also from the perspective of recent developments in the field of information retrieval and natural language processing.
1992, ‘Complementary Logics for Classical Propositional Languages’, Kriterion. Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 4 (1992), 20-24.
Abstract. In [3:1990b] I introduced a complete axiomatization of classical non-tautologies based essentially on Lukasiewicz’s rejection method. The present paper provides a new, Hilbert-type axiomatization (along with related systems to axiomatize classical contradictions, non-contradictions, contingencies and non-contingencies respectively). This new system is mathematically less elegant, but the format of the inferential rules and the structure of the completeness proof possess some intrinsic interest and suggests instructive comparisons with the logic of tautologies.
1991, ‘Truth, Falsehood, and Beyond’, in Liliana Albertazzi and Roberto Poli (eds.), Topics in Philosophy and Artificial
Intelligence, Bozen, Mitteleuropäisches Kulturinstitut, 1991, pp. 39-50.
Abstract. Always in the background and sometimes in the foreground of standard semantics is a twofold assumption on the admissible state representations: every sentence must be either true or false (completeness); no sentence can be both true and false (consistency). In these notes, a more general semantic framework is presented in which incomplete and/or inconsistent structures are admitted as bona fide models. The approach is based on a lattice-theoretic generalization of supervaluational techniques and is discussed with special reference to sentential languages.
1990b, ‘Complementary Sentential Logics’, Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 19:4 (1990), 112-16.
Abstract. It is shown that a complete axiomatization of classical non-tautologies can be obtained by taking F (falsehood) as the sole axiom along with the two inference rules: (i) if A is a substitution instance of B, then A |- B; and (ii) if A is obtained from B by replacement of equivalent sentences, then B |- A (counting as equivalent the pairs {T, ~F}, {F, F&F}, {F, F&T}, {F, T&F}, {T, T&T}). Since the set of tautologies is also specifiable by purely syntactic means, the resulting picture gives an improved syntactic account of classical sentential logic. The picture can then be completed by considering related systems that prove adequate to specify the set of contradictions, the set of non-contradictions, and the set of contingencies respectively.
1990a, ‘La logica della vaghezza’ [The Logic of Vagueness], in Pietro Ciaravolo (ed.), Informatica e Metodologia Filosofica, Rome, Cadmo Editore, 1990, pp. 107-24.
• Second edition: Roma, Aracne Editrice, 2006.
Abstract. An outline and defense of what has come to be known as the supervaluational account of vagueness.
1986 (with William E. Seager), ‘Dual Logics’ (Abstract), in Recent Developments in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Abstracts of the 11th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Österreichische
Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, 1986, p. 42.
Abstract. Given a set of sentences S, let its dual be the set S*={A: ~A is in S}. If S is the set of all theorems of classical sentential logic, then obviously S* is axiomatizable. More generally, it turns out that if S is closed under the principle of double negation, i.e. if A is in S iff ~~A is in S, then S is axiomatizable iff S* is also axiomatizable. In this work we provide a simple proof of this fact, along with an investigation of the general conditions under which the converse holds as well. The philosophical import of these facts is then discussed in relation to the task of determining adequate criteria for characterizing constructive logic and mathematics.
1983, ‘Free Semantics: Supervaluations at the Predicate Level’, in Paul Weingartner and Johannes Czermak (eds.), Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Proceedings of the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1983, pp. 35-38.
Abstract. A semantic characterization of free predicate logic based on a new method for extrapolating supervaluations from partial models (as functions registering the pattern of agreement of the relevant completion classes). An extension of the approach to languages involving definite and/or indefinite descriptions is also outlined, though it can be shown that the resulting notion of logical truth cannot be captured axiomatically.
2005, ‘Ontologia’ [Ontology], to appear in Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico, Supplemento 2005, Torino, Utet.
Abstract. A brief overview of recent trends and views in analytic ontology.
2004, ‘Boundary’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CSLI (internet publication), 2004.
• Revised edition: 2008.
• Italian translation by Elena Casetta: ‘Confini. Dove finisce una cosa e inizia un’altra’, in Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies (eds.), Ontologie regionali, Milano, Mimesis, 2007, pp. 209-222.
Abstract. A brief review of the main philosophical problems and theories about the nature of boundaries and their place in our conceptual scheme.
2003b, ‘Mereology’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CSLI (internet publication), 2003.
• Revised edition: 2009.
Abstract. An overview of contemporary part-whole theories, with reference to both their axiomatic developments and their philosophical underpinnings.
2003a, ‘Vagueness’, in Lynn Nadel (editor in chief), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, London, Macmillan and Nature Publishing Group, 2003, Volume 4, pp. 459-464.
Abstract. A critical survey of the main theories about vagueness, organized in four main sections: (i) What is vagueness? (ii) Problems and paradoxes; (iii) Theories of vagueness; (iv) Vagueness and cognitive science.
2002, ‘Events’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CSLI (internet publication), 2002.
• Revised edition: 2006.
Abstract. A critical survey of the main philosophical theories about events and event talk, organized in three main sections: (i) Events and Other Categories (Events vs. Objects; Events vs. Facts; Events vs. Properties; Events vs. Times); (ii) Types of Events (Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements, and States; Static and Dynamic Events; Actions and Bodily Movements; Mental and Physical Events); (iii) Existence, Identity, and Indeterminacy.
1996, ‘Holes’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CSLI (internet publication), 1996.
• Revised edition: 2003.
• Revised edition: 2009.
• Hungarian (Magyar) translation by Polgárdi Ákos: ‘Lyukak’, Különbség, 8:1 (2004), 149-154.
Abstract. A brief introduction to the main philosophical problems and theories about the nature of holes and such-like nothingnesses.
200+b, ‘Logica’ [Logic], to appear in Franca D’Agostini (ed.), Introduzione alla filosofia, Bologna, Zanichelli.
Abstract. A short, introductory textbook chapter on logic.
200+a, ‘Metafisica’ [Metaphysics], to appear in Franca D’Agostini (ed.), Introduzione alla filosofia, Bologna, Zanichelli.
Abstract. A short, introductory textbook chapter on metaphysics and ontology.
2007 (with Laura di Summa), ‘Listen to the World Beneath Your Feet’, Cluster, 6 (2007), 128-135.
Abstract. Cities are weak organisms that grow over holes. They are cultural stilts which have grown over history. Catacombs, the entrances to pyramids, underground cities with earth where the sky should be. There’s nothing we can do: the ability to dig holes is an evolutionary mechanism, a skill which determines natural selection. And under the manholes lie sewers, cables, heating: things we never see but which are always, undoubtedly vital.
2005, ‘Le linee di un racconto’ [The Lines of a Tale], in Matteo Pericoli, New York e altri disegni, Macerata, Quodlibet, 2005, pp. 9-12.
Abstract. A line drawing depicts what the artist sees by means of things that do not correspond to anything real--lines. And deciding which lines to draw is no straightforward business. Pericoli’s drawings do not tell us what he sees, but what he thinks.
2004 (with Luciano Coen), ‘Libertà obbligata’ [Bound Freedom], Nazione Indiana, 19 (2002) (online publication), January 19, 2004.
• Reprinted in [1:2006].
Abstract. You find yourself in a room where what looks like a mirror turns out to be the boundary between your world and its symmetric replica. You and your "mirror image" do exactly the same things, and think the same thoughts. Is either of you free?
2003, ‘Ineffabile sfera’ [Ineffable Sphere], Nazione Indiana, 19 (2002), (online publication), July 17, 2003.
Abstract. An imaginary report of Square’s plans for a journey aimed to find out whether the topology of Flatland is sphere-like or torus-like.
2002b, ‘Ontologia e informatica medica’ [Ontology and Medical Information Science], Il giornale del medico, 19 (2002), May 27, p. 17.
Abstract. An interview on the practical relevance of formal ontology, with special reference to recent applications in the fields of Medical Information Science.
2002a, ‘Philosophie italienne: quoi de neuf?’ [Italian Philosophy: What’s New?], Magazine Litéraire, 497 (2002), 50-52.
• Italian translation: ‘Filosofia italiana: cosa c’è di nuovo?’, Il Giornale della Filosofia, 11 (2004), pp. 15-16.
Abstract. Some thoughts about what’s old and what’s new in the Italian philosophical scene.
2001 (with Luciano Coen), ‘May I Help You?’, The Blue and White, 7:4 (2001), pp. 114 and 125.
• Reprinted in [1:2006].
Abstract. A short dialogue on the conversational maxim of relevance.
1999, ‘The Other Face of Metaphysics’, Philosophy Today, 12:30 (1999), 3-5.
• Italian excerpt appeared as ‘L’altra faccia della metafisica’, Il Sole, May 24, 1998, p. 35.
Abstract. A brief report and commentary on the idea that many applicative issues in the social sciences (including information technology) have an ontological root.
1995b, ‘Il linguaggio formale della teoria degli insiemi’ [The Formal Language of Set Theory], in Gianni Sembianti (ed.), Metropolis. Saggio sulla comunicazione umana, Rome, Armando Editore, 1995, pp. 295-305.
Abstract. A brief introduction to the main concepts and principles of naive set theory, with some discussion on the role of definitions, the use of Euler diagrams, and the philosophical significance of Russell’s paradox.
1995a, ‘Il linguaggio dell’informatica e la disambiguazione’ [The Language of Computers and Disambiguation’], in Gianni Sembianti (ed.), Metropolis. Saggio sulla comunicazione umana, Rome, Armando Editore, 1995, pp. 310-314.
Abstract. A brief introduction to natural language processing (aims, problems, on-going projects).
1994b, ‘Intelligenza artificiale, metafisica, e gruyère’ [Artificial Intelligence, Metaphysics, and Gruyère], Sistemi & Impresa, 40:2 (1994), 15-19.
Abstract. Moving from an outline of the motivations that led to the development of so-called "naive physics", it is argued that the design of artificial systems capable of autonomous interaction with the world of ordinary experience can hardly stay away from ontological issues.
1994a, ‘Sull’intelligenza delle macchine’ [On Machine Intelligence], in Maria Vittoria Nodari (ed.), La società dell’informazione, Vicenza, Edizioni del Rezzara, 1994, pp. 37-48.
Abstract. This article expands on the material presented in [4:1991]. The final part elaborates upon an argument by Diego
Marconi to the effect that Turing’s test, regardless of whether it actually counts a sufficient condition of intelligent behavior, is not a necessary condition.
1993, ‘Note in margine: La metafisica del senso comune’ [Notes on the Metaphysics of Common Sense], AI*IA Notizie, 6:4 (1993), 29-33.
Abstract. A critical notice of the 13th IJCAI conference; it is argued that common-sense metaphysics represents a new, interesting meeting point between philosophy and AI research.
1991, ‘L’intelligenza e l’artificiale’ [Intelligence and the Artificial], KOS. Rivista di Scienza e Etica, 7:66 (1991), 12-19
Abstract. From Jaquet-Droz’s androids to Babbage’s anlaytical engine up to von Neumann’s digital computer; from Church’s thesis to Turing’s test up to Searle’s "Chinese room" argument: some reflections on the history, motivations, goals, and problems of so-called Artificial Intelligence.
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2006, Critical Notice of John Heil, From an Ontological Point of View [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003], Philosophical Books, 47:2 (2006), 148-154.
2005b, Review of Herbert Hochberg and Kevin Mulligan (eds.), Relations and Predicates [Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004], Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 10.06 (2005).
2005a (with Elena Casetta), Review of Benjamin Morison’s On Location: Aristotle’s Concept of Space [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002], Dialectica, 59:1 (2005), 75-81.
2002, Review of Evandro Agazzi and Nicla Vassallo’s, Introduzione al Naturalismo Filosofico Contemporaneo [Milano, Franco Angeli, 1998], Epistemologia, 25:1 (2002), 167-171.
2001b, Critical Notice of Amie L. Thomasson’s Fiction and Metaphysics [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999], Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63:3 (2001), 723-727.
2001a, Review of André Gallois’s Occasions of Identity. A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness [Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998], The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79:2 (2001), 291-295.
2000, Review of Brian McGuinness (ed.), Language, Logic and Formalization of Knowledge [Gaeta, Bibliotheca, 1998], Studia Logica, 66:3 (2000), 437-440.
1999, Critical Notice of Roberto Cordeschi’s La scoperta dell’artificiale: Psicologia, filosofia e macchine intorno alla cibernetica [Milan, Masson-Dunod, 1998] and Domenico Parisi’s Mente: I nuovi modelli della Vita Artificiale [Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999], in La rivista dei libri, 9:11 (1999), 29-31.
1998b, Review of Susan Haack’s Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond The Formalism [Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996], in The Philosophical Review, 107:3 (1998), 468-471.
1998a, Critical Notice of Umberto Eco’s Kant e l’ornitorinco and Patrizia Violi’s Significato ed Esperienza [both Milano, Bompiani, 1997], in La Rivista dei Libri, 8:2 (1998), 10-13.
1996b, Review of Yiannis N. Moschovakis’s Notes on Set Theory [New York, Springer-Verlag, 1994], History and Philosophy of Logic, 17:1 (1996), 172-175.
1996a (with Francesco Orilia), Review of Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap’s The Revision Theory of Truth [Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 1993], Minds and Machines, 6:1 (1996), 124-129.
1993, Review of Gennaro Chierchia’s ‘Logica e linguistica. Il contributo di Montague’ [Chapter 8 of Marco Santambrogio (ed.), Introduzione alla filosofia analitica del linguaggio, Rome, Editori Laterza, 1992], Acta Analytica, 10 (1993), 182-185.
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1983, Italian translation of Andrew Redford, La sintassi trasformazionale, Bologna, Il Mulino, xiv + 524 pp. [Transformational Syntax. A Student’s Guide to Chomsky’s Extended Standard Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, ix + 402 pp.]
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