2006 (with Roberto Casati), Insurmountable Simplicities. Thirthy-nine Philosophical Conundrums, New York, Columbia University Press, 144 pp. (ISBN 978-0-231-13722-5)
• Paperback edition: 2008 (ISBN 978-0-231-13723-2)
• Italian edition: Semplicità insormontabili. 39 storie filosofiche, Roma, Laterza Editore, 2004, 194 pp. (ISBN 88-420-7304-4)
~ Paperback edition: 2006 (ISBN 88-420-7965-0)
~ Reprinted with a preface by Armando Massarenti: Milano, Il Sole 24 Ore Cultura, 2007, 202 pp. (ISBN 9-77186-380379)
• French translation by Pierre-Emmanuel Dauzat: 39 Petites histoires philosophiques d’une redoutable simplicité, Paris, Albin Michel, 2005, 205 pp. (ISBN 2-226-15561-9)
• Korean translation by Hyunkyung Lee: 논쟁의 대가들 · 역설과 위트 논리와 상상력의 39 가지 철학우화, Seoul, Yoldaerim Publishing, 2005, 264 pp. (ISBN 89-90989-11-6)
~ e-book edition: 2005 (ISBN 105-81-99961)
• Portuguese translation by Maurício Santana Dias: Simplicidades insolúveis. 39 histórias filosóficas, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2005, 192 pp. (ISBN 85-35907-49-1)
• Greek translation by Leonidas Balasopoulos: Ακατανίκητες απλότητες. 39 φιλοσοφικές ιστορίες, Athens, Ekdoseis Tou Eikostou Protou, 2006, 198 pp. (ISBN 960-8219-43-4)
• Spanish translation by Josefa Linares de la Puerta: 39 (simples) cuentos filosóficos, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2007, 240 pp. (ISBN 978-84-206-6154-4)
• Chinese translation by Hsu Yuan-Chen: 難解的簡單 · 39 杯哲學 Espresso, Taiwan, Athena Press, 2007, 227 pp. (ISBN 986137079X)
• Japanese translation to appear (Tokyo, Bungei Shunju)
Abstract. A collection of dialogues, epistles, and
imaginary documents illustrating the many philosophical conundrums that hide in the wrinkles of everyday life. Why do mirrors seem to invert left and right but not up and down? How do we know whether strawberries taste the same for everyone? Where is it written that we must observe the law? What if we could swap brains--or the rest of our bodies? Is the train we took today the same we took yesterday? Is everything interesting?
2005, Ontologia [Ontology], Roma, Laterza Editore, 178 pp. (ISBN 88-420-7623-6)
• Reprinted 2008.
• e-book edition: Bari, SWIF - Edizioni Digitali di Filosofia, 2005 (ISSN 1126-4780)
• French translation to appear (Paris, Ithaque)
Abstract. An introduction to analytic ontology. Part 1 deals with the question, What is ontology?, focusing on (i) the interplay between ontological and broadly metaphysical concerns, and (ii) the difference between material ontology and formal ontology. Part 2 deals with the question, How is ontology done?, focusing on (i) the delicate interplay between ontology and truth-making (or: between meaning and existence), and (ii) the differences between revolutionary vs. hermeneutic, prescriptive vs. descriptive, and absolute vs. relative approaches to ontology. Part 3 surveys state of the art a number of areas, both in material ontology (e.g., the problem of universals, the status of objects and events, the ontology of mathematics, of the physical sciences, of the social sciences) and in formal ontology (identity, ontological dependence, part-whole relations).
2001, Parole, oggetti, eventi e altri argomenti di metafisica [Words, Objects, Events, and Other Metaphysical Matters], Roma, Carocci Editore, 239 pp. (ISBN 88-430-1989-9)
• Reprinted 2002.
• Reprinted 2006.
Abstract. Consider the vase on the table and the lump of clay from out of which it is made. Is this one single entity before us or two? Could that very same vase be made out of another lump of clay, or have another shape? And what differentiates a material object such as a vase from entities of different sort, such as the actions of the potter or her intentions? Starting from puzzles such as these, this volume aims to offer an introductory treatment of the main topics in contemporary analytic metaphysics: the nature of things, their identity and persistence conditions, their relations of dependency--more generally, the preconditions for our ability to speak about the world at all.
1999b, An Essay in Universal Semantics, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, ix + 145 pp. (ISBN 0-7923-5629-2)
Abstract. This book is a study in the foundations of model-theoretic semantics. The central thesis is that one does not need to assume a perfect structural fit between languages and their models in order to characterize the basic semantic notions. In particular, truth-value gaps and gluts can be explained away as local phenomena that do not bring logical disaster in their wake. The account is based on a generalization of supervaluationary techniques and is illustrated with reference to a range of different sorts of examples, from sentential logic to type theory.
1999a (with Roberto Casati), Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, x + 238 pp (ISBN 0-26203-266-X)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 2000. (ISBN 0-58510-660-6)
Abstract. Thinking about space is thinking about spatial things. The table is on the carpet; hence the carpet is under the table. The vase is in the box; hence the box is not in the vase. But what does it mean for an object to be somewhere? How are objects tied to the space they occupy? This book is concerned with these and other fundamental issues in the philosophy of spatial representation. Our starting point is an analysis of the interplay between mereology (the study of part/whole relations), topology (the study of spatial continuity and compactness), and the theory of spatial location proper. This leads to a unified framework for spatial representation understood quite broadly as a theory of the representation of spatial entities. The framework is then tested against some classical metaphysical questions such as: Are parts essential to their wholes? Is spatial colocation a sufficient criterion of identity? What (if anything) distinguishes material objects from events and other spatial entities? The concluding chapters deal with applications to topics as diverse as the logical analysis of movement and the semantics of maps.
1998 (with John Nolt and Dennis Rohatyn) Theory and Problems of Logic, Second Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, vii + 322 pp. (ISBN 0-07-046649-1)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 2000. (ISBN 0-07-136868-X)
• Abridged edition: Logic, New York, McGraw-Hill, v + 150 pp. (ISBN 0-07-145535-3)
• Italian translation by Francesca Boccuni et al.:
Logica, Milan, McGraw-Hill Italia, 2003, vii + 316 pp. (ISBN 88-386-5073-X)
• Second Italian edition (fully revised and enlarged): Milan, McGraw-Hill Italia, 2007, xii + 343 pp. (ISBN 88-386-6376-9)
Abstract. An introductory textbook in logic, covering the syntax and semantics of propositional logic (including proof techniques and refutation trees), the syntax and semantics of predicate logic (including proof techniques and refutation trees), inductive logic, the probability calculus, the analysis of fallacies, and further developments in formal logic including the theory of descriptions, higher-order logics, modal logic, and formal arithmetic. Features over 500 problems with complete solutions.
1994, Holes and Other Superficialities (with Roberto Casati), Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, x + 253 pp. (ISBN 0-262-03211-2)
• Paperback edition (with minor revisions and an extended ‘Index’): 1995, x
+ 256 pp. (ISBN 0-262-53133-X)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 1999. (ISBN 0-585-05399-5)
• Italian translation by Libero Sosio (with a new ‘Prefazione’):
Buchi e altre superficialità, Milan, Garzanti
Editore, 1996, 333 pp. (ISBN 88-11-59279-8)
~ Paperback edition: 2002 (ISBN 88-11-67516-2)
• Chapter 3 reprinted as ‘Material Bodies’ in Steven D. Hales (ed.), Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing, 1999, pp. 428-435.
Abstract. Holes are a good example of the sort of entity that down-to-earth philosophers would be inclined to expel from their ontological inventory. In this work we argue instead in favor of their existence and explore the consequences of this liberality--odd as they might appear. We examine the ontology of holes, their geometry, their part-whole relations, their identity and their causal role, the ways we perceive them. We distinguish three basic kinds of holes: blind hollows, perforating tunnels, and internal cavities, treating these uniformly as immaterial bodies. We develop a morphology of holes, focusing on the way a hole can be filled, and then look at the main properties of the resulting conceptual framework: holes are parasitic upon the surfaces of their hosts; holes can move, fuse into each other, split; they can be born, develop, and die. Finally, we examine how some morphological features of holes are represented in perception, including the conditions whereby we have the impression that we see, feel, or even hear a hole. The book has over 150 pictures and is completed by a formal appendix, a section with puzzles and exercises, and a extensive annotated bibliography.
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2008, Metafisica. Classici contemporanei [Metaphysics. Contemporary Classics], Roma, Laterza Editore, 2008, xi + 536 pp. (ISBN 978-88-420-8382-5)
Abstract. This volume brings together, in Italian translation, over thirty selections among the most important and influential works in contemporary analytic metaphysics. The selections are grouped under six major themes--existence, identity, persistence, modality, properties, and causation--and include works by D. M. Armstrong, M. Black, R. Carnap, R. M. Chisholm, D. Davidson, C. J. Ducasse, M. Dummett, G. Evans, P. T. Geach, S. A. Kripke, D. K. Lewis, E. J. Lowe, D. H. Mellor, G. E. Moore, H. Putnam, G. Ryle, T. Sider, P. F. Strawson, W. V. O. Quine, B. Russell, W. Sellars, R. Stalnaker, D. Wiggins, D. C. Williams. Each section is preceded by an introduction by the editor along with a comprehensive thematic bibliography.
2007 (with Roberto Casati, co-editor), Lesser Kinds, Vol. 90/3 of The Monist, 149 pp. (ISSN 0026-9662)
Abstract. Metaphysicians tend to deal with large categories (substance, universals) and oversize issues (the nature of being, existence, necessity, causation). But there is plenty of room at the bottom for lesser categories and entities. Small or undersize problems can be interesting entry points for deep metaphysical enquiries. What is a sound? Do holes exist? Are events fact-like or object-like? Do shadows have a causal structure? What is the nature of the boundary that separates water from air--is it water, is it air? By looking into such questions, this issue of the Monist plans to explore the thesis that metaphysical concerns can be domain-specific without ceasing to be metaphysical in an important sense. Contributors: István Aranyosi, Jerome Dokic, Gregory Fowler, Antony Galton, Alvin I. Goldman, Hud Hudson, Katie Miller, Casey O’Callaghan, Roy Sorensen, Joshua Spencer, and Andrew Wake.
2006 (with Wolfgang Mann, co-editor), Parts and Wholes, special issue of The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103/12, 162 pp. (ISSN 0022-362X)
Abstract. A collection of papers on the metaphysics of parthood and constitution. Contributors: Kit Fine, Hud Hudson, Mark Johnston, Kathrin Koslicki, Calvin Normore, Peter Simons, and Peter van Inwagen.
2005, Time Travel, Vol. 88/3 of The Monist, 143 pp. (ISSN 0026-9662)
Abstract. Quarrels on the possibility of time travel are gaining new interest today as a result of recent work in cosmology and on the theory of causation. They bear also on recent discussions of the problems of free will and personal identity. This issue of The Monist aims to promote further progress in this debate, with emphasis on questions such as the following. following. Is time travel compatible with presentism? Is it compatible with endurantism? Does it entail fatalism? Is the apparent asymmetry between a fixed past and an open future merely an epistemic illusion? Is time travel a travel in time? Contributors: David Horacek, Robin LePoidevin, Steven Savitt, Ted Sider, Jonathan Simon, Matthew Staler, Nicholas Smith, Gordon Stevenson, Peter Vranas.
2004 (with Laure Vieu, co-editor), Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the Third International Conference, Amsterdam, IOS Press, xi + 363 pp. (ISBN 1-58603-468-5)
Abstract. Just as ontology developed over the centuries as part of philosophy, so in recent years ontology has become intertwined with the development of the information sciences. Researchers in various fields have come to realize that a solid foundation for their projects calls for an explicit theorization of the types of entities and relations that make up their respective domains of inquiry, and as the need for integrating such projects arises, so does the need to identify common ontological principles over ad hoc, case-based solutions. This volume collects the papers presented at the third international conference devoted to current research in this area, including invited papers by Peter Gärdenfors and Amie Thomasson.
2003 (with Carola Barbero, Roberto Casati, and Maurizio Ferraris, co-editors), Bozzetti, Vol. 24/3 of Rivista di estetica, 163 pp. (ISBN 88-7011-937-8)
Abstract. A volume in memory of Paolo Bozzi. Contributors: T. Agostini, T. Andina, A. Arbo, C. Barbero, M. Bertamini, I. Bianchi, V. Braitenberg, N. Bruno, R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, S. Cattaruzza, A. Costall with M. Sinico and G. Parovel, M. L. Dalla Chiara with R. Luciani and G. Toraldo di Francia, A. Dell’Anna, G. Derossi, M. Ferraris, D. Floreano, V. Girotto, D. R. Hofstadter, P. Kobau, M. Kubovy, P. Legrenzi, M. Losito, C. Magris, N. Miscevic, K. Mulligan, L. Pizzo Russo, L. Repici, A. Saccon, U. Savardi, B. Smith, L. Taddio, G. Torrengo, G. Vicario.
2002 (with Luca Morena, co-editor), Oggetti fiat [Fiat Objects], Vol. 20/2 of Rivista di estetica, 125 pp. (ISBN 88-7011-915-7)
Abstract. A selection of philosophical texts dealing with the mereology of material objects and the nature of their boundaries. Introduction by Luca Morena. Papers by: Roderick Chisholm, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Avrum Stroll, and Achille C. Varzi.
2001, The Philosophy of Geography, Vol. 20/2 of Topoi, 102 pp. (ISSN 0167-7411)
Abstract. Geography has been much neglected by philosophers. Yet geography presents an interesting and intricate trade-off between empirical issues, on the one hand, and deep philosophical issues (from ontology to political philosophy), on the other. What is a geographic entity? What is the relationship between a geographic entity and a physical territory? Can a geographic entity survive without a territory or without definite borders? Can it survive radical changes in its territory? Are there clear-cut identity criteria for geographic categories? This issue of Topoi aims to go a first step towards a better understanding of these questions and of their implications for the theory of the geographic world. Contributors: Brandon Bennett, Roberto Casati, John Collins, Antony Galton, Barry Smith, Amie L. Thomasson, Achille C. Varzi, Leo Zaibert.
2000b, Temporal Parts, Vol. 83/3 of The Monist, 140 pp. (ISSN 0026-9662)
Abstract. On the one hand there are entities, such as processes and events, which have temporal parts: the beginning of the race; the middle of the concert; the delicate part of the conversation. On the other hand there are entities, such as material objects, which are always present in their entirety at any time at which they exist. The categorial distinction between entities which do, and entities which do not, have temporal parts is grounded in common sense; yet various philosophers have been inclined to oppose it. Some have defended an ontology consisting exclusively of things with no temporal parts. Others have favored ontologies including only temporally extended processes. Others still have endorsed a four-dimensional ontology in which all entities have both spatial and temporal parts. This collection is devoted to the clari_cation of these views and of their implications for such problems as identity through time, spatiotemporal coincidence, and the possibility of a merging and splitting of objects. Contributors: Yuri Balashov, Berit Brogaard, Kit Fine, Mark Heller, Robin LePoidevin, Josh Parsons, Peter Simons, and Peter van Inwagen.
2000a (with James Higginbotham and Fabio Pianesi, co-editors), Speaking of Events, New York, Oxford University Press, ix + 295 pp. (ISBN 0-19-512807-9)
• Paperback edition: 2000 (ISBN 0-19-512811-7)
• e-book edition: Boulder (CO), NetLibrary, 2000 (ISBN 0-58-539434-2)
Abstract. The idea that an adequate semantics of ordinary language calls for some theory of events has sparked considerable debate among linguists and philosophers. On the one hand, so many linguistic phenomena appear to be explained if (and, according to some authors, only if) we make room for logical forms in which reference to or quantification over events is explicitly featured. Examples include nominalization, adverbial modification, tense and aspect, plurals, and singular causal statements. On the other hand, a number of deep philosophical questions arise as soon as we take events into consideration. Are events entities of a kind? What are their identity and individuation criteria? How does semantic theorizing depend on such metaphysical issues? The aim of this book is to address such issues in some depth, with emphasis precisely on the interplay between linguistic applications and philosophical implications. Contributors: Nicholas Asher, Pier Marco Bertinetto, Johannes Brandl, Denis Delfitto, Regine Eckardt, James Higginbotham, Alessandro Lenci, Terence Parsons, Alice ter Meulen, Henk Verkuyl. A comprehensive introductory essay (pp. 3" ©47) is included.
1999, The Nature of Logic, Stanford, CSLI Publications [European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 4], 238 pp. (ISBN 1-57586-179-8)
• Paperback edition: 1999 (ISBN 1-57586-178-X)
Abstract. This volume aims to offer an up-to-date indication of the on-going debate on the nature of logic. The focus is on questions pertaining to the existence and individuation of clear boundaries delineating the concerns of logic: What is their distinctive character? What makes logic a subject of its own, separate from (and generally in the background of) the concerns of other disciplines? What is it for an expression to be a logical constant? Or, perhaps equivalently, what is it for an operation or a relation to be logical? Can these questions be addressed in a general setting, or are they
intrinsically unanswerable except within specific frameworks of reference (e.g., a language, or a conceptual scheme)? How are they to be addressed--are they semantic, syntactic, pragmatic? And how do semantics, syntax, or pragmatics contribute to our understanding of these questions? Are the answers fully captured by extant systems
of logic? Contributors include Ermanno Bencivenga, Johan van Benthem, Dirk van Dalen, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Manuel Pérez Otero, Allen Hazen, Arnold Koslow, Graham Priest, Gila Sher.
1997, Fifty Years of Events: An Annotated Bibliography 1947 to 1997 (with Roberto Casati), Bowling Green (OH), Philosophy Documentation Center, 402 pp. (ISBN 0-912632-66-6)
• electronic edition: Bowling Green (OH), Philosophy Documentation Center, 2005 (Free access)
Abstract. This bibliography is concerned with recent literature on the nature of events and the place they occupy in our conceptual scheme. The subject has received extensive consideration in the philosophical debate over the last few decades, with ramifications reaching far into the domains of allied disciplines such as linguistics and the cognitive sciences. At the same time, the literature is so wide and widely scattered that it has become very difficult to keep track of all lines of development. This work seeks to overcome this difficutly by offering as comprehensive a record as possible. The listing includes over 1800 entries by some 900 authors. Most entries are annotated, sometimes including brief quotations and cross-references. Detailed Index of Subjects, Index of Names, and Index to Second and Subsequent Authors are included.
1996, Events (with Roberto Casati, co-editor), Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, xxxviii + 519 pp. (ISBN 1-85521-731-7)
Abstract. The topic of events has been extensively treated by philosophers under the impact of Davidson’s 1967 paper ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’. It is nowadays quite popular also among linguists and cognitive scientists, who often draw from philosophical material. This volume brings together for the first time a representative selection of papers that have indelibly marked the progress of the debate on this topic. Authors include G. E. M. Anscombe, E. Bach , K. Bach, J. Bennett, M. Brand, R. M. Chisholm, C. Cleland, M. J. Cresswell, J. E. Cutting, D. Davidson, L. Davis, F. Dretske, K. Gill, A. Goldman, P. M. S. Hacker, J. Higginbotham, T. Horgan, J. Kim, D. K. Lewis, L. B. Lombard, A. P. D. Mourelatos, T. Parsons, P. L. Peterson, W. V. O. Quine, J. J. Thomson. A comprehensive introductory essay (pp. xi-xxxviii) is included.
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200+i, ‘Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism’, to appear in Matthew H. Slater (ed.), Carving Nature at Its Joints, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
Abstract. This is an expanded English version of [3:2005b], with an emphasis on the advantages of conventional realism over (a) Berkeleyan idealism, (b) Goodmanian irrealism, (c) Putnamian relativism, and (d) Postmodern anything-goes-ism.
200+h (with Elena Casetta), ‘Nomi in crisi di identità’ [Names in Identity Crisis], to appear in Rivista di estetica.
Abstract. An exchange of letters among proper names and natural-kind terms, dealing with various identity and individuation problems (rigid designation, use-mention ambiguities, translation) from their point of view.
200+g, ‘Mondo-versioni e versioni del mondo’ [World-Versions and Versions of the World], to appear as Preface to the second Italian edition of N. Goodman, Vedere e costruire il mondo, Roma, Laterza Editore.
Abstract. Some reflections on Nelson Goodman’s ontological pluralism (as emerging from his Ways of Worldmaking) and its influence on contemporary philosophy, taking the querelle with Quine (in the columns of The New York Review of Books) as a starting point.
200+f, ‘Che cos’è un derivato? Appunti per una ricerca tutta da fare’ [What Is a Derivative? Notes for a Long-Term Project], to appear as an Appendix to A. Berrini, La crisi finanziaria: oltre la cronaca, Saronno, Editrice Monti.
Abstract. This is an sequel to [3:2007i], focusing on the metaphysics of those peculiar social objects that play an increasingly central role in the financial world—derivatives. On the analysis I offer, they appear to run afoul of Searle’s theory of social objects (or of the theory put forward in my earlier paper), and I put forward some suggestions on where to look for the necessary adjustments.
200+e (with Roberto Casati), ‘L’incertezza elettorale’ [Electoral Uncertainty], to appear in Rivista di estetica.
Abstract. A philosophical dialogue on the functioning, the limits, and the paradoxes of our electoral practices, dealing with such basic questions as: What is a vote? How do we count votes? And do votes really count?
200+d, ‘Failures, Omissions, and Negative Descriptions’, to appear in Kepa Korta and Joana Garmendia (eds.), Meaning, Intentions, and Argumentation, Stanford, CSLI Publications.
• Italian translation by Giuliano Torrengo: ‘Mancanze, omissioni e descrizioni negative’, Rivista di estetica, 32:2 (2007), 109-127.
Abstract. This paper is a condensed and unified version of [3:2006f] and [3:2007b].
200+c, ‘Vaghezza e ontologia’ [Vagueness and Ontology], to appear in Maurizio Ferraris (ed.), Storia dell’ontologia, Milano, Bompiani.
Abstract. On the opposition between de re and de dicto conceptions of vagueness, with special reference to their bearing on the tasks of ontology.
200+b (with Roberto Casati), ‘Event Concepts’, to appear in Thomas F. Shipley and Jeff Zacks (eds.), Understanding Events: How Humans See, Represent, and Act on Events, New York, Oxford University Press.
Abstract. Events are center stage in several fields of psychological research. There is a long tradition in the study of event perception, event recognition, event memory, event conceptualization and segmentation. There are studies devoted to the description of events in language and to their representation in the brain. There are also metapsychological studies aimed at assessing the nature of mental events or the grounding of intentional action. Outside psychology, the notion of an event plays a prominent role in various areas of philosophy as well as in such diverse disciplines as linguistics, probability theory, artifical intelligence, physics, and--of course-- history. This plethora of concerns and applications is indicative of the prima facie centrality of the notion of an event in our conceptual scheme, but it also gives rise to some important methodological questions. Can we identify a core notion that is preserved across disciplines? Does this notion, or some such notion, correspond to the pre-theoretical conception countenanced by common sense? Does it correspond to a genuine metaphysical category?
200+a, ‘Che cosa ci facciamo qui?’ [What Are We Doing Here?], to appear in S. Montalto (ed.), Umberto Eco: l’uomo che sapeva troppo, Pisa, Edizioni ETS.
Abstract. A short dialogue around the question of whether the thoughts expressed by the characters of an historical novel belong to the characters or to the author.
2008b, ‘The Extensionality of Parthood and Composition’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58:1 (2008), 108-133.
Abstract. I focus on three mereological principles: the Extensionality of Parthood (EP), the Uniqueness of Composition (UC), and the Extensionality of Composition (EC). These principles are not equivalent. Nonetheless, they are closely related (and often equated) as they all reflect the basic nominalistic dictum, No difference without a difference maker. And each one of them--individually or collectively--has been challenged on philosophical grounds. In the first part I argue that such challenges do not quite threaten EP insofar as they are either self-defeating or unsupported. In the second part I argue that they hardly undermine the tenability of EC and UC as well.
2008a, ‘Patterns, Rules, and Inferences’, in J. E. Adler and L. J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 282-290.
Abstract. The "Game of the Rule" is easy enough: I give you the beginning of a sequence of numbers (say) and you have to figure out how the sequence continues, to uncover the rule by means of which the sequence is generated. The game depends on two obvious constraints, namely (1) that the initial segment uniquely identify the sequence, and (2) that the sequence be non-random. As it turns out, neither constraint can fully be met, among other reasons because the relevant notion of randomness is either vacuous or undecidable. This may not be a problem when we play for fun. It is, however, a serious problem when it comes to playing the game for real, i.e., when the player to issue the initial segment is not one of us but the world out there, the sequence consisting not of numbers (say) but of the events that make up our history. Moreover, when we play for fun we know exactly what initial segment to focus on, but when we play for real we don’t even know that. This is the core difficulty in the philosophy of the inductive sciences.
2007j, ‘Supervaluationism and Its Logics’, Mind, 116:463 (2007), 633-676.
Abstract. What sort of logic do we get if we adopt a supervaluational semantics for vagueness? As it turns out, the answer depends crucially on how the standard notion of validity as truth preservation is recasted. There are several ways of doing that within a supervaluational framework, the main alternative being between "global" construals (e.g., an argument is valid iff it preserves truth-under-all-precisifications) and "local" construals (an argument is valid iff, under all precisifications, it preserves truth). The former alternative is by far more popular, but I argue in favor of the latter, for (i) it does not suffer from a number of serious objections, and (ii) it makes it possible to restore global validity as a defined notion.
2007i, ‘Il denaro è un’opera d’arte (o quasi)’ [Money Is (almost) a Work of Art], Quaderni dell’Associazione per lo Sviluppo degli Studi di Banca e Borsa, 24 (2007), 17-39.
Abstract. What is money? Paraphrasing Goodman, I say that’s the wrong question to ask. The right question is, When is money? And to get the answer, Searle’s general formula for social objects (X couns as Y in context C) is fine, as long as you give it a different reading.
2007h, ‘Spatial Reasoning and Ontology: Parts, Wholes, and Locations’, in Marco Aiello, Ian E. Pratt-Hartmann, and Johan van Benthem (eds.), Handbook of Spatial Logics, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 945-1038.
Abstract. A critical survey of the fundamental philosophical issues in the logic and formal ontology of space, with special emphasis on the interplay between mereology (the theory of parthood relations), topology (broadly understood as a theory of qualitative spatial relations such as continuity and contiguity), and the theory of spatial location proper.
2007g, ‘Lesser Kinds: Foreword’ (with Roberto Casati), The Monist, 90:3 (2005), 331-332.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:2007], setting the background for the other papers included in the collection.
2007f, ‘Promiscuous Endurantism and Diachronic Vagueness’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44:2 (2007), 181-189.
Abstract. According to a popular line of reasoning, diachronic vagueness creates a problem for the endurantist conception of persistence. Some authors have replied that this line of reasoning is inconclusive, since the endurantist can subscribe to a principle of Diachronic Unrestricted Composition (DUC) that is perfectly parallel to the principle required by the perdurantist’s semantic account. I object that the endurantist should better avoid DUC. And I argue that even DUC, if accepted, would fail to provide the endurantist with the necessary resources for explaining diachronic vagueness in familiar semantic terms.
2007e, ‘Sul confine tra ontologia e metafisica’ [On the Boundary between Ontology and Metaphysics], Giornale di metafisica, 29:2 (2007): 285-303.
Abstract. An examination and defense of the view according to which ontology, understood as the theory of what there is, comes before (and can be done without engaging in) metaphysics, understood as the theory of the nature of things.
2007d, ‘From Language to Ontology: Beware of the Traps’, in Michel Aurnague, Maya Hickmann, and Laure Vieu (eds.), The Categorization of Spatial Entities in Language and Cognition, Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing, 2007, pp. 269-284.
Abstract. Is there any way of telling what sorts of things there are given the sorts of things we say? Alas, there isn’t. Surely the surface grammar is full of traps. But neither can we trust the deep structure, for there is no unique way of telling what it is. No analysis can reveal the deep structure of a given statement; at most we can fix a deep structure for the statement, by dint of resisting alternative interpretations. Depending on what we think there is, we must attach a meaning to what we say. Going the other way around is illegitimate; it amounts to a attributing our ontological views to the language we share with others. (This paper expands on sections 2 and 3 of [3:2002b]).
2007c, ‘La natura e l’identità degli oggetti materiali’ [The Nature and Identity of Material Objects], in Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Roma, Carocci, 2007, pp. 17-56.
Abstract. A critical survey of the main metaphysical theories concerning the nature of material objects (substratum theories, bundle theories, substance theories, stuff theories) and their identity conditions, both synchronic (monist vs. pluralist theories) and diachronic (three-dimensionalism, four-dimensionalism, sequentialism).
2007b (with Matthew H. Slater), ‘Playing for the Same Team Again’, in Jerry L. Walls and Gregory Bassham (eds.), Basketball and Philosophy. Thinking Outside the Paint, Lexington (KY), University Press of Kentucky, 2007, pp. 220-234.
Abstract. How many championships have the Lakers won? Fourteen, if one counts those won in Minneapolis; nine, otherwise. Which is the correct answer? Is it even obvious that there is a correct answer? One is tempted to identify a team with its players. But teams, like ordinary objects, seem to survive gradual turnover of their parts. Suppose players from the Lakers are gradually replaced, one by one, over the years. We have the intuition that the team persists through this change, even after none of the original players remain. Suppose too that these original players wind up playing for the Celtics. Lakers fans face an awkward question: for whom should they root? On the one hand, they have the team currently playing in L.A.--a team that has continued gradually through the years, who wear the same uniforms, but now can’t make the playoffs. On the other hand, there are the beloved Lakers starting five (responsible for all those championships) now playing together in the hated Boston garden--a team which looks (despite wearing those hated Celtics jerseys) and plays just like the Lakers of old. What’s a loyal fan to do?
2007a, ‘Omissions and Causal Explanations’, in F. Castellani and J. Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences, Paderborn, Mentis Verlag, 2007, pp. 155-167.
Abstract. In [3:2006k] I argue that talk about negative events should not be taken at face value: tupically, what we are inclined to think of as a negative event (John’s failure to go jogging) is just an ordinary, positive event (his going to the movie instead); it is a positive event under a negative de-scription. Here I consider more closely the difficulties that arise in those cases where no positive event seems available to do the job, as with putative cases of causation by omission. In particular, I elaborate on Helen Beebee’s idea that not all causal explanations are reports of causation. When we mention John’s failure to turn off the gas as an explanans of why there was an explosion, we do not say what caused the explosion. We do not mention any of the relevant causes. We just remark that one sort of event that was supposed to occur, and whose occurrence would have prevented the explosion, did not in fact occur.
2006h, ‘Parts and Wholes: Foreword’ (with Wolfgang Mann), Journal of Philosophy, 103:12 (2006), 593-596.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:2006], setting the background for the other papers included in the collection.
2006g (with Giuliano Torrengo), ‘Crimes and Punishments’, Philosophia, 34:4 (2006), 395-404.
Abstract. Every criminal act ought to be matched by a corresponding punishment, or so we may suppose, and every punishment ought to reflect a criminal act. We know how to count punishments. But how do we count crimes? In particular, how does our notion of a criminal action depend on whether the prohibited action is an activity, an accomplishment, an achievement, or a state?
2006f, ‘The Talk I Was Supposed to Give’, in Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies (eds.), Modes of Existence: Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic , Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006, pp. 131-152.
Abstract. Assuming that events form a genuine ontological category, shall we say that a good inventory of the world ought to include "negative" events--failures, omissions, things that didn’t happen--along with positive ones? I argue that we shouldn’t. Talk of non-occurring events is like talk of non-existing objects and should not be taken at face value. We often speak as though there were such things, but deep down we want our words to be interpreted in such a way as to avoid seri-ous ontological commitment.
2006e, ‘Strict Identity with No Overlap’, Studia Logica, 82:3 (2006), 371-378.
Abstract. It is common lore that standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic is incompatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world, a view that seems to require a counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this thought is wrong-headed. This note explains why.
2006d, ‘A Note on the Transitivity of Parthood’, Applied Ontology, 1:2 (2006), 141-146.
Abstract. That parthood is a transitive relation is among the most basic principles of classical mereology. Alas, it is also very controversial. In a recent paper, Ingvar Johansson has put forward a novel diagnosis of the problem, along with a corresponding solution. The diagnosis is on the right track, I argue, but the solution is misleading. And once the pieces are properly put together, we end up with a reinforcement of the standard defense of transitivity on behalf of classical mereology.
2006c, ‘What Is to Be Done?’, Topoi, 25 (2006), 129-131.
Abstract. If the question is: What is to be done for philosophy?, then it calls for a political answer and I have little to say besides the obvious. If the question is: What is to be done in philosophy?, then I’m stuck. Drawing up a list of to-do’s and not-to-do’s would not, I think, be a good way to honor the general conception of philosophy that inspired Topoi throughout these years, and that I deeply share.
2006b (with Andrea Borghini), ‘Event Location and Vagueness’, Philosophical Studies, 128:2 (2006), 313-336.
Abstract. Most event-referring expressions are vague; it is utterly difficult, if not impossible, to specify the exact spatiotemporal location of an event from the words that we use to refer to it. We argue that in spite of certain prima facie obstacles, such vagueness can be given a purely semantic (broadly supervaluational) account.
2006a, ‘The Universe among Other Things’, Ratio, 19:1 (2006), 107-120.
Abstract. Peter Simons has argued that the expression ‘the universe’ is not a genuine singular term: it can name neither a single, completely encompassing individual, nor a collection of individuals. (It is, rather, a semantically plural term standing equally for every existing object.) I offer reasons for resisting Simons’s arguments on both scores.
2005f, ‘The Vagueness of ‘Vague’: Rejoinder to Hull’, Mind, 114:455 (2005), 695-702.
Abstract. A rejoinder to G. Hull’s reply to my [3:2003h]. Hull argues that Sorensen’s purported proof that ‘vague’ is vague--which I defended against certain familiar objections--fails. He offers three reasons: (i) the vagueness exhibited by Sorensen’s sorites is just the vagueness of ‘small’; (ii) the general assumption underlying the proof, to the effect that predicates which possess borderline cases are vague, is mistaken; (iii) the conclusion of the proof is unacceptable, for it is possible to create Sorensen-type sorites even for predicates that are paradigmatically precise. I argue that each of these points involves fallacious reasoning.
2005e, ‘Beth Too, but Only If’, Analysis, 65:3 (2005), 224-229.
Abstract. On the difficulty of extracting the logical form of a seemingly simple sentence such as ‘If Andy went to the movie then Beth went too, but only if she found a taxi cab’, with some morals and questions on the nature of the difficulty.
2005d, ‘Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument from Vagueness’, Dialectica, 59:4 (2005), 485-498.
Abstract. The so-called "argument from vagueness", the clearest formulation of which is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is arguably the most powerful and innovative argument recently offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective--I submit--and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But each "defect" corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So once all the gaps of the argument are filled in, the three-dimensionalist is left with the burden of a response that cannot rely on a passive plea for common sense. The argument is not a threat to common sense as such; it is a threat to the three-dimensionalist faithfulness to common sense.
2005c, ‘Time Travel: Foreword’, The Monist, 88:3 (2005), 325-328.
Abstract. A brief introductory note to [2:2005], setting the background for the other papers included in the collection.
2005b, ‘Teoria e pratica dei confini’ [Boundaries: Theory and Practice], Sistemi Intelligenti, 17:3 (2005), 399-418.
Abstract. Are there any bona fide boundaries, i.e., boundaries that carve at the joints? Or is any boundary--hence any object--the result of a fiat articulation reflecting our cognitive biases and our social practices and conventions? Does the choice between these two options amount to a choice between realism and wholesome relativism?
2005a (with Roberto Casati), ‘Esercizi di attenzione’ [Exercises in Attention], in Marco Belpoliti and Gianluigi Ricuperati (eds.), Saul Steinberg (Riga, n. 24), Milano, Marcos y Marcos, 2005, pp. 398-403.
Abstract. A brief study of Saul Steinberg’s works on shadows and reflections, and of the seemingly paradoxical world that emerges from such works.
2004d, ‘Conjunction and Contradiction’, in Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Brad Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. New Philosophical Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 93-110.
• Italian translation by Francesco Berto: ‘Congiunzione e contraddizione’, to appear in Francesco Altea and Francesco Berto (eds.), Scenari dell’impossibile. La contraddizione nel pensiero contemporaneo, Padova, Il Poligrafo.
Abstract. There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on the second (distributive) reading it is perfectly plausible to suppose that LNC may, in some rather special and perhaps undesirable circumstances, fail to hold.
2004c, ‘Identità indeterminate e indeterminatezza linguistica’ [Indeterminate Identities and Linguistic Indeterminacy], Rivista di estetica, 26:2 (2004), 285-302.
Abstract. T. Some philosophers (most notably Terence Parsons) have gone a long way towards a clarification and a defense of the view that there is genuine (worldly) indeterminacy of identity. Among his reasons for taking this view seriously is the contention that extant formulations of the alternative conception, according to which all indeterminacy lies in the semantics of our language (or in the system of concepts embodied in our language), are not fitted for dealing with a host of identity puzzles. I this paper I take issue with that contention and argue that the semantic conception, if charitably construed, can meet such challenges.
2004b (with Elena Casetta), ‘RedPill®’, in Massimiliano Cappuccio (ed.), Dentro la matrice. Filosofia, scienza e spiritualità in Matrix, Milano, Alboversorio, 2004, pp. 29-35.
• Reprinted in Nazione Indiana, 19 (2002) (online publication), March 28, 2004.
Abstract. The red pill or the blue pill? Obviously the red. But are we sure it will work the way it is supposed to? Are we sure it will take us out of the Matrix? We are proud to announce that we have found a document that will throw some new light (and a renewed cloud of suspicion) on this matter: the product packaging of RedPill®, complete with all directions for use and warnings against side-effects.
2004a (with Roberto Casati), ‘Counting the Holes’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82:1 (2004), 23-27 (special issue on "The Philosophy of David Lewis").
• Reprinted in Frank Jackson and Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes. The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 24-28.
Abstract. Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
2003k, ‘Naming the Stages’, Dialectica, 57:4 (2003), 387-412.
Abstract. Standard lore has it that a proper name is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it is that different speakers ever manage to pick out one and the same entity when a host of suitable, overlapping candidates are available. But what if the entity in question is neither a continuant nor a perdurant? What if the things we talk about in ordinary language are time-bound entities that cannot truly be said to persist through time, or stage sequences whose unity resides exclusively in our minds--like the " " waves" ± at the stadium or the characters of a cartoon? In such cases the rigidity claim can’t be right and a counterpart-theoretic semantics seems required. Is that bad? I say it isn’t. And it had better not be, if that turns out to be the best metaphysical option we have.
2003j (with Maurizio Ferraris), ‘Che cosa c’è e che cos’è’ [What There Is and What It Is], in Noûs. Postille su pensieri, Lecce, Edizioni Milella, 2003, pp. 81-101.
• Reprinted in Rescogitans (online publication), October 2005.
Abstract. A dialogue on ontology, featuring a defender of revisionary metaphysics vs. a follower of descriptive metaphysics.
2003i (with Roberto Casati), ‘Sfondo e Figura’ [Background and Figure], Rivista di estetica, 24:3 (2003), 38-40 (special issue in memory of Paolo Bozzi).
Abstract. A dialogue between a figure and its background, illustrating that the perceptual conditions that determine which is which are not as clear as standard Gestalt theory dictates.
2003h, ‘Higher-Order Vagueness and the Vagueness of ‘Vague’’, Mind, 112:446 (2003), 295-298.
• German translation by Sven Walter: ‘Höherstufige Vagheit und die Vagheit von ,vage’’, in Sven Walter (ed.), Vagheit, Paderborn, Mentis Verlag, 2005, pp. 147-150.
Abstract. R. Sorensen’s argument to the effect that ’vague’ is a vague predicate has been used by D. Hyde to infer that vague predicates suffer from higher-order vagueness. M. Tye has objected (convincingly) that this is too strong: all that follows from Sorensen’s result is that there are some border border cases, but not necessarily border border cases of every vague predicate. I argue that this is still too strong: Sorensen’s proof presupposes the existence of border border cases, hence cannot be used to establish that fact on pain of circularity.
2003g, ‘Ontologia: dove comincia e dove finisce’ [Ontology: Where It Starts and Where It Ends], Sistemi intelligenti, 15:3 (2003), 493-506.
Abstract. As Quine famously argued, the answer to the question: "What Is There" is just: "Everything". But to say "Everything" is to say nothing. So we need to go further. This paper deals with the question of whether we can go any further in ontology without doing metaphysics proper.
2003f, ‘Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81:2 (2003), 208-215.
Abstract. I argue that the conjunction of perdurantism (the view that objects are temporally extended) and universalism (the thesis that any old class of things has a mereological fusion) gives rise to undesired complications when combined with certain plausible assumptions concerning the semantics of tensed statements.
2003e, ‘Entia Successiva’, Rivista di estetica, 22:1 (2003), 139-158.
Abstract. The theory according to which most ordinary objects are mere "entia successiva"--sequences of distinct mereological aggregates, whose unity resides exclusively in our minds--is a variant of the standard, three-dimensional conception of objects. For the aggregates are, at bottom, endurants, i.e., entities that persist through time by being fully present at any time at which they exist. In this paper I compare this theory with the so-called "stage view", according to which ordinary objects--indeed, all objects--are sequences of momentary entities that cannot truly be said to persist through time. Both theories face a number of intuitive difficulties but the stage view, I argue, has a lot more to offer in return.
2003d (with Anthony G. Cohn), ‘Mereotopological Connection’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32:4 (2003), 357-390.
Abstract. And extended and unified version of [3:1998a] and [3:1999e], this paper outlines a general frame-work for dealing with the variety of mereotopological theories that stem from alternative ways of construing the basic relation of topological connection.
2003c, ‘Cut-offs and their Neighbors’, in J. C. Beall (ed.) Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 24-38.
Abstract. In ‘Towards a Solution to the Sorites Paradox’, Graham Priest gives us a new account of the sorites based on fuzzy logic. The novelty lies in the suggestion that truth-value assignments should themselves be treated as fuzzy objects, i.e., objects about which we can make fuzzy identity statements. I argue that Priest’s solution does not have the explanatory force that Priest advocates. That is, it does not explain why we find the existence of a cut-off point counter-intuitive. I also argue that this sort of explanation calls for a general theory that goes beyond the special case of linguistic vagueness, for the phenomenon is at bottom not linguistic.
2003b (with Massimo Warglien), ‘The Geometry of Negation’, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 13:1 (2003), 9-19.
Abstract. There are two natural ways of thinking about negation: (i) as a form of complementation and (ii) as an operation of reversal, or inversion (to deny that p is to say that things are "the other way around"). A variety of techniques exist to model conception (i), from Euler and Venn diagrams to Boolean algebras. Conception (ii), by contrast, has not been given comparable attention. In this no