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From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816–2001

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The existing quantitative literature on war takes the independent nation-state as the self-evident unit of analysis and largely excludes other political types from consideration. In contrast, the authors argue that the change in the institutional form of states is itself a major cause for war. The rise of empires and the global spread of the nation-state are the most important institutional transformations in the modern age. To test this hypothesis, the authors introduce a new data set that records the outbreak of war in fixed geographic territories from 1816 to 2001, independent of the political entity in control of a territory. Analysis of this data set demonstrates that wars are much more likely during and because of these two transformations. For the transformation to the modern nation-state, the authors confirm this hypothesis further with logit regressions that control for variables that have been robustly significant in previous research. The results provide support for the main mechanisms that explain this time dependency. Modern nation-states are ruled in the name of a nationally defined people, in contrast to empires, which govern to spread a faith across the world, to bring civilization to backward people, or to advance the world revolutionary cause. The institution of the nation-state thus introduces incentives for political elites to privilege members of the national majority over ethnic minorities, and for minority elites to mobilize against such political discrimination. The resulting power struggles over the ethno-national character of the state may escalate into civil wars. Interstate wars can result from attempts to protect co-nationals who are politically excluded in neighboring states. The reported research thus provides a corrective to mainstream approaches, which exclude ethnic and nationalist politics as factors that would help understand the dynamics of war.

The lives and memories of most contemporaries have been shaped by the destructive power of war. Entire generations fought and died in the two world wars. Throughout the developing world, many remember the armed struggles for independence or have experienced a postcolonial civil war. The list of current conflicts is long and includes entries from Afghanistan to Zaire. "Events of the recent past have once again clearly demonstrated that the world is not yet ready for perpetual peace" (Hintze 1975:215). This statement is as obvi-

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ously true today as when it was when penned 100 years ago by Otto Hintze in what is perhaps the first sociological treatise on warfare.

Why do wars break out? Where and when are they most likely to occur? Despite the early interest by Hintze and others of his generation, sociology has subsequently left the study of these questions to other disciplines. Sociologists have discussed war as a cause for other phenomena of interest to them, but rarely as an explanandum in its own right. Thus, a long and respectable tradition in comparative historical sociology, stretching from the early work of Ratzenhofer (1893) to Tilly (1975) and Centeno (2003), analyzes the role of war in the making of the modern, sovereign state in Western Europe and beyond. Another tradition was initiated by Theda Skocpol’s (1979) well-known book, in which she looked at how wars helped to bring about the great revolutions of the past centuries, such as those of Russia and China. Meanwhile, research into the causes of war has remained almost the exclusive domain of historians and political scientists.¹

Yet sociology has much to offer for the study of war. This article shows that the macrohistorical processes traditionally studied by comparative sociologists need to be taken into account to arrive at a proper understanding of why, where, and when wars break out. We assert that two such processes play an especially important role in the history of modern war: the expansion of empires during the 19th century and the spread of nation-states across the world during the 20th century.

That empire building and nation-state formation are major driving forces of war might not come as a surprise to scholars well versed in world history or those familiar with the political development of a particular region. It represents, however, a new insight for the highly specialized literature on wars that has emerged over the past several decades. Furthermore, considerable methodological obstacles need to be overcome for this hypothesis to be evaluated in quantitative terms. To that end, we created a new data set of wars from 1816 to 2001 that identifies conflicts in all of the world’s territories, including most pre-colonial and all colonial lands.

Our study intends to overcome three basic limitations of mainstream quantitative research on war. First, most current conflict scholars focus on short-term dynamics, such as the impact of democratization over five years (Mansfield and Snyder 1995) or the effects of independence over two years (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Recently, scholars have assembled ever more disaggregated data sets to explain where and when wars are fought (Levy 1998), including detailed war event histories that decompose a civil war into various battle episodes (Raleigh and Hegre 2005) or studies of war theaters at the regional level (Buhaug and Rod 2005). Meanwhile, macropolitical perspectives have largely been abandoned.

The once prominent long-wave theories of war sought to explain the periodic recurrence of world wars as a consequence of economic cycles stretched over six decades (Goldstein 1991), or of the rise and fall of hegemonic powers that compete for preeminence in world politics (Modelski and Morgan 1985; Thompson 1988). Although there is no doubt that the past two centuries have seen several such global wars involving the major power centers of the world, most researchers now recognize that they do not follow a clear pattern of periodicity. In other words, there are no cycles of a uniform length between global wars.

With this article, we attempt to revitalize this macropolitical perspective by examining patterns of conflict over the span of decades rather than across a handful of years as in mainstream contemporary research. In contrast to long-cycles theory, however, we do not conceive of the globe as an integrated system, nor as a single unit of observation, but rather as an arena for the discontinuous diffusion of institutional forms.

Second, the standard units of analysis in quantitative political science are existing independent states, which are treated as continuous and comparatively stable entities once they enter the international community of states. This overlooks the fact that their institutional shape and territorial extension may change dramatically over time, not least as a consequence of war.²

¹ A partial exception is Randall Collins’s theory of geopolitics (see summary in Collins 1995).

² For a general discussion of the problems associated with the assumption of constant units—when they may de facto merge or split—see Abbott (1998).
Tsarist Russia of 1846, for example, is conceived to be the same unit as the Soviet Union of 1926 and the Russian Federation of 2006. Even more disconcerting, standard country-year data sets exclude those parts of the world’s surface and population that are not governed by independent states—still more than half of the globe by 1900. With such data sets, we cannot observe the consequences of macro-institutional transformations such as the colonization of the world in the 19th century or the shift to the nation-state form during the 20th.

To overcome these difficulties, our data set uses fixed geographic territories as the unit of analysis, independently of whether a territory is part of an internationally recognized independent state. By relating each territory’s conflict history to its history of institutional change over a 200-year period, we are able to identify a recurring pattern: the likelihood of civil and interstate wars is highest during the two institutional transformations that have shaped the political landscape of the modern world. The data problems associated with a shift to a territory-year data set are considerable because pre-independent territories rarely have been units of data generation and recording. However, does this justify blinding out the world of empires and the entire period of colonial domination? By doing so, we greatly reinforce the methodological nationalism that plagues so much of the social sciences (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002)—the tendency to take the nation-state for granted and to conceive of the social world as an assemblage of nation-state societies without asking how this came about and what the consequences of this particular form of political organization might be. This article is written as an invitation for other researchers to join us in the effort to overcome these methodological limitations and to improve on the 200-year data set we have created for this project.

Third, the literature has largely overlooked possible linkages between civil wars and interstate wars beyond occasional acknowledgments of military strategic spillover effects (Most and Starr 1980; Wilkenfeld 1973; but see Davis and Moore 1997). Although we are not able to examine the precise nature and extent of this relationship, our results suggest that many civil and interstate wars are outcomes of the same processes. Both civil and interstate wars are fought over the institutional structure of the state, and thus are most likely to break out when these institutional principles are contested. More precisely, our model suggests that the mechanisms relating nation-state formation to war are similar: wars over territory inhabited by co-nationals on the other side of a state border (commonly called irredentist or revanchist wars) follow the same logic of nationalist politics that may drive civil wars, as majorities and ethnic minorities compete for control over the state (Weiner 1971). The entrenched division of labor between scholars of interstate wars and scholars of civil wars may be an obstacle to the development of an encompassing understanding of war, as many political scientists have recently observed.

Our project thus explores the prospects of revitalizing the macrohistorical tradition in the study of war. To be sure, we conceive of this as a complement, rather than an alternative, to mainstream lines of research. Many of the war-generating factors identified in the recent literature are indeed important to understanding the conditions under which political conflict may develop into full-scale war, remain virulent over time, or give way to the possibility of peace. These factors include political instability at the centers of power (Fearon and Laitin 2003), local feuds that feed wars independently of the larger political dynamic (Kalyvas 2005), the availability of natural resources to support warring parties (Ross 2004), a specific dynamic of rivalry that may lead states to fight each other on the battle field (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001), and various mechanisms which make autocracies more war-prone than democracies (Levy 1998). Our approach may help to understand at what point along the long-term history of institutional transformations political tensions are likely to build, allowing the preceding factors to come into play. To put it differently, whereas our approach focuses on when wars occur, the aforementioned research is more suitable for explaining where it happens. However, developing an encompassing account that integrates these various levels of analysis and specifies the link between long- and short-term processes is beyond the scope of this article.
FROM EMPIRES TO NATION-STATES: A LONG-TERM, INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH

We develop our "big picture" argument from an institutionalist perspective, as it has been developed in the study of nation-state formation and conflict over the past decade (Brubaker 1996; Hechter 2000; Mann 2005; Posner 2005; Strang 1990; Wimmer 2002). Building on these various cited works, we sketch out an integrated framework for understanding how institutional transformations relate to modern war. The basic hypothesis states that modern wars have resulted from two processes of institutional transformation: incorporation into empire and nation-state formation. In the next section, we offer a descriptive account of these two transformations. We then introduce our theoretical model and specify the mechanisms linking these two processes to war.

Imperial Expansion and Nation-State Formation, 1816–2001

Figure 1 shows the percentage of the world's surface area occupied over the past two centuries by empires, modern nation-states, and other political institutions. On the basis of the definitions offered by Samuel Eisenstadt (1963:10–24) and Stephen Howe (2002:13–20), empire is defined by the following institutional features: centralized bureaucratic forms of government, the domination of a core region over peripheries, an ethnically or culturally defined hierarchy between rulers and ruled, and claims to universal legitimacy—whether referring to a revolutionary ideology (e.g., the Soviet Union), a mission civilisatrice (e.g., colonial empires), or religious conversion (e.g., the Spanish empire). Nation-states also are based on centralized bureaucratic forms of government, but are ruled uniformly without an institutionalized differentiation between core and periphery, embrace the principle of equality of citizens (replacing hierarchy), and govern in the name of a bounded national community rather than some universal principle. The nation may be imagined as multiethnic and multireligious, as in Switzerland or India, or as monoethnic and monoreligious, as in France and Japan.

All polities governed by other institutional principles were assigned to the category of "other." Absolutist kingdoms also know centralized bureaucracies, but lack the center–periphery structures and the universal-

Figure 1. Percentage of Land Surface Governed by Empires, Nation-States, or other Institutions, 1816–2001

Note: States smaller than 25,000 km² are excluded.
ist forms of legitimacy of empires. In contrast to nation-states, absolutist states are not based on the equality of all citizens, which makes a difference even if a nation-state is ruled by a dictator with the powers of an absolutist king. Feudal states, tribal confederacies (e.g., the Sanusi of Libya), city states (e.g., Switzerland before 1848), and patrimonial empires (e.g., the Tukolor or Mongol empires) all lack centralized bureaucracies.

Note that we exclude “informal empires” (Mann 2006), such as the contemporary United States or the dispersed hegemonic “empire” of Hardt and Negri (2000), from our definition of empire because these are not politically coherent entities. Note also that following the territorial logic on which our project is based, we code the political institutions governing a particular territory, not those of entire states. Thus, the territory of Great Britain is classified as a nation-state, even while it was the core of a large colonial empire. The territory of the contemporary United States is a nation-state, although Guam is governed according to imperial principles.

The graph shows that shortly after the Congress of Vienna was held in 1814/1815, roughly half of the world’s surface was ruled by empires and half by “other” political systems. In 2001, almost the entire globe was controlled by modern nation-states. The two centuries between tell the story of a struggle between

empire building and nation-state formation. While empires replaced “other” governments during the 19th century (see also Strang 1991), especially the Western colonial empires in Africa and Asia, but also the Romanov empire in Central Asia, they were at the same time replaced by nation-states in the Western hemisphere, most importantly in Latin America.

The expansion of empires during the 19th century does not match, however, the dramatic proportions of their decline during the 20th century, when the nation-state form spread across the globe to achieve finally an uncontested hegemony, as John Meyer (1997) and others (e.g., Strang 1990) have shown. This process of diffusion developed entirely within our time horizon. In 1816, only France and Great Britain were autonomous nation-states. By 2001, empires had entirely disappeared, and only a handful of states were absolutist kingdoms (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Bhutan, Brunei) or patrimonial states (Libya). There is thus only a moderate left- and right-censoring problem for our analysis of the second transformation, whereas there is considerable left-censoring for the first transformation because more than half of the world was already under imperial rule when our data series begins. This is one reason why our research focuses more on the second transformation to nation-statehood.

The diffusion of the nation-state occurred in waves, each triggered by the crisis of a major empire and its eventual dissolution. The first wave followed the collapse of the Spanish empire. The second wave occurred after World War I with the breakup of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, and the third after World War II, when the Middle East as well as South and Southeast Asia were decolonized. The fourth wave followed about 1960, when the British and French colonial empires broke apart, and the fifth occurred when the oldest colonial empire, the Portuguese, finally dissolved. The sixth wave rolled over the Soviet empire during the early 1990s. These six main waves of nation-state creation are discernible in Figure 2 (see a definition of nation-state creation later).

A LONG-TERM, INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL OF MODERN WAR

Why should these two institutional transformations—empire building and nation-state for-
mation—cause war? Our model assumes that wars are fought over the most basic institutional principles of government i.e., the informal and formal rules that determine who legitimately can lay claim to governmental power and what the legitimate borders of a polity should be. It is thus a genuinely political understanding of war in which economic interests or military-technical feasibility play only a secondary role. From this perspective, the history of modern warfare appears to be not so much the result of changing power balances between actors or of revolutionary conflict as primarily a struggle between competing projects of state building. This struggle leads to the two transformations described in the preceding section.

However, is it not self-evident that the creation of new states or the absorption of existing states into an expanding empire will be accompanied by war? We should like to address this potential misunderstanding early on. First, most of the wars in our sample are not associated with the creation or absorption of states, as we show in greater detail later. This is true for most civil wars and many interstate wars. Second, and conversely, not all territorial expansions and contractions of states are associated with war. A study by Diehl and Goertz (1988:115) shows that only one fourth of all territorial changes in the world state system from 1816 to 1980 have involved some violence. According to another study, very few of the 26 sovereign states that have disappeared from the political map since 1415 did so as a consequence of war (Strang 1991:155). Third, where wars do coincide with the creation of new states or the absorption of existing ones, we argue that they are the consequence of institutional transformation rather than a separate causal mechanism. A new principle of political legitimacy implies a new definition of those that should legitimately be included in the territory of a state and those that should not, as discussed in the section on mechanisms later. Attempts to create new states or destroy existing ones can therefore be conceived as part and parcel of the fight over the institutional form of governance. Fourth, many instances of nation-state formation do not go hand in hand with the creation of new states, as the examples of Japan, Switzerland, France, Thailand, and Ethiopia illustrate. The previous graphs thus do not display the creation (and

Figure 2. Number of Nation-State Creations (Five-Year Periods), 1800 to 2000
destruction) of states, but rather, the diffusion of the nation-state form across the territories of the globe.

If nation-state formation is not synonymous with the establishment of new states, criteria are needed to establish when the institutional transformation to nation-statehood has been achieved, independently of changes in a state’s borders. For the process of both nation-state formation and imperial incorporation, we identified a crucial “turning point” representing the climax and successful completion of the respective institutional transformation. Whether this turning point is ever reached or not depends on who wins in the struggle over the institutional shape of the state. During imperial expansion, the turning point occurs when the principle of imperial sovereignty is established in the local arena. This may occur through warfare, strategic marriage alliances, or religious conversion, and thus is analytically distinct from war and imperial conquest. We call this turning point “imperial incorporation,” after which the territory is governed as a dependency of a faraway imperial center and ruled in the name of the spread of civilization, Islam, Christianity, or revolutionary progress. In the process of nation-state formation, the turning point is reached when nationalist forces manage to establish the principle of national sovereignty (thus overcoming dependency from an imperial center), and the territory is henceforth ruled in the name of a nationally defined group of equal citizens, replacing the hierarchical universalism of empire. We call this turning point “nation-state creation.” Detailed coding rules are discussed in the data section.

The first transformation, to empire: mechanisms. What are the causal mechanisms that link imperial expansion and nation-state formation to war? First, we briefly discuss imperial incorporation. Empires are defined, according to our model, by center–periphery relations, hierarchical inclusion, and claims to universal legitimacy. Thus, they know no natural borders and may potentially cover the entire globe and bring civilization, Christianity, Islam, or revolutionary progress to all of humanity, irrespective of the ethno-national background of the population. Empires show an institutionalized drive to expand their domain through conquest, even if at high military, political, and economic costs. Claims to universal legitimacy make the extension of the imperial domain a benchmark for judging the success of the military-political elite. Moreover, the center–periphery structure allows for easy incorporation of newly conquered populations. They are simply added as new pieces to the ethno-national mosaic and henceforth ruled through some mixture of direct and indirect rule.

Local political units—tribal confederacies, alliances of city states, traditional kingdoms—may resist imperial expansion and refuse to be “pacified” and “civilized” by the encroaching army and the imperial administration. A shift toward imperial principles of rule not only implies a loss of power, but also a delegitimation of the very institutional rules that allowed elites to struggle for and perhaps gain power. Tribal sheiks, for example, risk losing not only military control over a territory once an imperial army starts to establish garrisons. The very possibility of gaining power by holding a centripetal alliance of clans together is undermined by the new bureaucratic system of administration. Similarly, bourgeois elites that were organized in city councils lose their political standing and capacity for forging alliances with other city-states once their government is incorporated as the lowest tier into a political and bureaucratic hierarchy far removed from the reach of elite councils.

Under conditions not specified by our model (e.g., military opportunities, a given distribution of resources between actors), tribes or city-states may choose to fight against expansionist empires. Once the crucial turning point is reached and a territory is governed according to imperial principles, the hinterland may continue to resist imperial expansion. When the entire territory is militarily subdued or “pacified,” the process of expansion is complete, and imperial peace should prevail, interrupted by occasional rebellions against higher taxes, violations of traditional rights or undue interference in local political affairs, or attempts of ambitious provincial governors to establish their own mini-empires and cease paying tribute to the center.

5 On the related concepts of “turning point,” “critical junctures,” and “cross-roads” see Abbott (2001, chapter 8) and Zapf (1996).
THE SECOND TRANSFORMATION, TO NATION-STATE: MECHANISMS AND INTERVENING VARIABLES. The second institutional transformation starts with the spread of the major competing project of state-building: modern nationalism. For the sake of simplicity, we treat this diffusion process as exogenous to our model. The spread of the nationalist doctrine—that states should be governed in the name of a nationally defined community of equal citizens—triggers the process of nation-state formation. During this first phase, we expect a higher likelihood of secessionist wars than during any other period of history. In the political order for which nationalist leaders aspire, each ethno-national group should govern itself, and the government in turn should be representative of the ethno-national makeup of the population. This stands in stark contrast to the institutional principles of empire, in which the ethno-cultural hierarchy between imperial elites and subjects is considered a stabilizing and legitimate feature of proper government, and political legitimacy is derived from God or revolutionary progress, and not from a nationally defined people (cf. Calhoun 1997).

Many nationalist movements will thus encounter the resistance of imperial elites, who will have no chance of being admitted to the new game for power, given that they often are of a different ethnic background than the local population. Wars of secession against an imperial center are thus one road to the second institutional turning point toward nation-statehood, when a territory starts to be governed according to nationalist principles. We note again, however, that other roads are traveled as well. Absolutist states such as France and Thailand, or alliances of city-states such as Switzerland may transform into modern nation-states without significant changes in their territorial extension. In these cases, the struggle over the institutional shape of the state leads not to secessionist wars, but instead to an increased likelihood of other types of civil war.

Once the turning point is reached, the institutional logic of the nation-state creates further incentives for making war, both between and within newly established states. Because the new state is governed in the name of a nationally defined people (a “Staatsnation” in Meinecke’s well-known terms), the new political elite tend to treat members of this “Staatsnation” preferentially. In other words, equality before the law, protection from arbitrary violence, and political participation are confined to members of the dominant ethnic group. The legal and political status of ethnic minorities now often worsens dramatically (Wimmer 2002; see also Noiriel 1991; Williams 1989). At the same time, differential treatment of individuals on the basis of ethnic or national background now contradicts the fundamental institutional principles of the state, which is supposed to be based on the twin principles of equality and freedom from “foreign” rule.

The prospect or reality of ethnic discrimination increases the likelihood of both interstate and civil wars. To protect co-nationals living across a state border (a legacy of the patchwork settlement pattern of empires) from ethnic discrimination and to show to their own constituency that they care “about our ethnic brothers,” a nationalizing state’s elite may be tempted to annex the corresponding territory in the name of “national unification” (Weiner 1971). Such irredentist wars over borders and territory are of a different nature than wars of conquest. The very logic of nationalist doctrine

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6 Various theories accounting for this process of diffusion have been discussed in comparative historical sociology and political science including economic functionalism (Gellner 1983), world culture arguments (Meyer 1997), political culture accounts (Anderson 1991), diffusion models (Strang 1990; Wimmer and Min 2005), and political modernization arguments (Hechter 2000). We need not enter this debate here because we are more interested in the consequences of nation-state formation for modern war than in its causes.

7 Not all interstate wars in the modern era arise over territorial issues, and not all territorial issues are the consequence of the ethno-political dynamic described in the preceding discussion. But we know from previous research that the likelihood of interstate wars increases significantly if such territorial and ethno-political conflicts emerge in a dyad of countries (Huth 1996; Vasquez and Leskiw 2001). Most importantly, Davis and Moore (1997) show that states will have higher levels of conflict (including war) if an ethnic group is dominant in one state and dominated or mobilized in antigovernment protest in the neighboring state.
impedes modern nation-states from expanding much beyond the domains of their core ethno-national group. At least two factors help to predict whether the shift to the nation-state will be accompanied by interstate war. The first factor is the ethno-demographic makeup of a state and whether or not it contains substantial minorities that are majorities in neighboring states. Previous research has shown this to be a powerful predictor of interstate war onset (Davis and Moore 1997). Cross-border ethno-national politics also produces spillover effects, along the lines that Weiner described as the “Macedonian syndrome” (Weiner 1971). The second factor is that the likelihood of interstate war will be higher when a neighboring territory is already involved in a war because ethnic kinships can stimulate governments to protect their cross-border co-ethnics from consequences associated with power shifts in the warring state. Such “outside interference” may not be tolerated by the neighboring government, and tensions may escalate into another interstate war. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to test the effects of cross-border ethnic kinship networks, although we do test for more general spillover effects.

We now turn to mechanisms and intervening variables for civil wars. The shift to the nation-state may lead to civil war when minority members mobilize against political discrimination and attempt to overthrow the ethno-ecocratic regime by force, or when they use violent force to secede and create a new state in which they would represent the national majority or join their co-ethnics in a neighboring state. Building on earlier comparative historical research (Wimmer 1997, 2002), our model thus identifies political discrimination along ethnic lines as the central mechanism that links nation-state formation to these various forms of conflict. High degrees of political discrimination along ethnic lines8 will lead to ethno-political mobilization against such discrimination, and eventually to conflict. Research by Cederman and Girardin (forthcoming), using a demographic proxy to capture levels of ethno-political discrimination, provides additional quantitative support for this hypothesis. Our data set introduces a newly constructed variable that measures ethnic discrimination more directly (discussed later).

Obviously, ethno-political mobilization does not always lead to civil war. Our model specifies three intervening variables. First, rich countries find it easier to react to ethno-national protest through a policy of power sharing, affirmative action, or redistribution than do poor countries. In poor countries, state resources are scarcer and alternative sources of income are lacking, transforming competition over state revenue into a zero-sum game (cf. Wimmer 1997). Indeed, much empirical research finds that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is one of the most robust factors in predicting civil war onsets (Sambanis 2004).

Second, different sources of state revenue have different effects on the political process, including those leading to war. Oil resources in particular have been linked to an increased likelihood of civil war (Ross 2004; but see Sambanis 2004). Our model incorporates one of the explanations brought forward in the literature (cf. Humphreys 2005): a state that depends not on taxes, but on oil rents may develop higher degrees of clientelism than tax-dependent and resource-poor states. Ethnic clientelism may in turn feed a dynamic of ethnic exclusion that can lead to ethno-political mobilization and eventually to civil war.

Third, civil wars in one country are likely to affect relations between politically relevant ethnic groups in neighboring countries, resulting in an escalation of political tensions in those countries.9 Although we again lack data on rela-

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8 Our full theory endogenizes discrimination by specifying the conditions under which higher degrees of exclusion along ethnic lines are to be expected: if nation-states are created at a moment when networks of civil society organizations are only weakly established, political elites will rely on ethnic and other communal ties to build up a political following

9 Gleditsch (2003) shows that the likelihood of civil wars increases if an ethnic group stretches across the territories of two neighboring states (however, the results are not supported by Ellingsen 2000). This is consistent with Sambanis' (2001) finding that wars in a neighboring state increase the likelihood of
tions of ethnic kinship across state borders, we can at least determine whether we can observe the spillover effect that our model postulates.

In summary, the transition from empire to nation-state increases the likelihood of both interstate and civil wars because the institutional principles of legitimate government change: claims to universal legitimacy are replaced by rule in the name of the people, and the realm of the state is reduced to the territory occupied by members of the nation. This switch in the rules of the political game provides new incentives for the pursuit of power, including by violent means. In the first phase of the transition, secessionist wars of “national liberation” against the ruling empire are likely to be fought. In the second phase, wars between new states over ethnically mixed territory may break out, and ethnic minorities might rebel against political exclusion by national majorities. The model predicts that such civil wars are more likely where ethnic discrimination is high, where governments are poor and thus unable to accommodate ethno-political protest, or where there is dependence on oil revenues that foster ethnic clientelism and exclusion.

This model obviously does not attempt to explain all wars in the modern world. Revolutionary wars are not driven by the politics of nation building and ethnic exclusion that accompany the shift to the nation-state form. We thus expect that the likelihood of war recedes back to a baseline rate after nation-state formation is complete. Nation-state formation comes to an end once struggles over the ethno-national character of the state and its borders with neighboring states are settled. This may be reached through a stable, institutionalized arrangement of power sharing (as in the Swiss case), through a series of ethnic cleansings in civil and interstate wars (as in Eastern Europe), or through a successful policy of assimilation that achieves the nationalist dream of homogeneity in other ways (as in France). During this late stage in the process, a posthegemonic state based on the idea of multicultural diversity may finally emerge.

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Summary: institutional transformations and war. In summary, we expect the ceteris paribus likelihood of violent conflict to be highest near periods of institutional transformation, when the struggle over the institutional principles of government is most intense. Figure 3 summarizes the expectations of our model. The likelihood of war is predicted to crest at the turning points associated with imperial incorporation and nation-state creation, and to drop to lower levels of risk during periods of institutional stability. The result is a double inverted U-shape.

The model also describes which type of conflict should be most likely during a territory’s trajectory through these two institutional transformations. Wars of conquest will be the most frequent type of war in territories undergoing the first transition as empires replace other forms of governance. During the first half of the nation-state formation process, secessionist civil wars against imperial rule should be the dominant war type. After the turning point, nonsecessionist struggles over the ethno-national character of the state and interstate conflicts over ethnically mixed territories will be more frequent.

We should like to briefly discuss the character of this model here. It stylizes and simplifies complex historical event chains and thus describes a certain developmental pattern rather than a relationship between independent variables that affect stable units in a history-free space (cf. Abbott 1998). This does not mean, however, that our model is not causal or cannot be tested using standard regression methods. The model is causal because it specifies the mechanisms through which institutional transformations and warfare are linked. To be sure, these mechanisms are historically specific and irreversible: during some phases of the overall process, wars cause institutional shifts (and are thus independent variables), whereas in other phases, wars are the consequence of this shift (and are thus dependent variables). The model can be tested with standard methods because we can measure institutional shifts independently from warfare and thus determine whether their temporal relationship follows the predicted patterns under ceteris paribus conditions. We also can test whether the mechanisms linking institutional shifts to war hold up empirically by

ethnic civil war much more significantly than nonethnic civil wars. For further statistical evidence of the “contagion effect” of ethnic conflicts, see Gurr (1993:181), and Lake and Rothchild (1998).
including intervening variables in the regression equation.

**A NEW DATA SET**

To perform adequate tests of the model, we had to create a new data set. Our theory required that we identify fixed geographic territories as units of analysis because only this would allow us to determine whether changes in the institutional form of governance over a territory are indeed related to the onset of war. If we took independent states as our units of observation, such institutional shifts would be impossible to trace. We thus departed from the standard country-year data set to collect and code data for fixed geographic units both for our dependent variable (onset of war) and our independent variables. This section describes the most important coding principles. More details can be found at www.soc.ucla.edu/faculty/wimmer/data.

**Units of Observation.** Which territorial units of observation would be adequate for the task at hand? We used the division of the world's states in 2001 as a territorial grid, extending these fixed geographic units back to the beginning of our data set in 1816. All our information thus had to be coded accordingly, as the following examples illustrate. An income estimate for "Bosnia" in 1915 relates to the territory that in 1991 became Bosnia, independently of the fact that this territory in 1915 was a part of the Austrian–Hungarian empire. Wars were coded as occurring on the territory of its major battlefields, defined, according to conventions in the field, as a conflict with more than 1,000 battle deaths. If colonial subjects rebelled against Her Majesty's government in what today is Kenya, the war is attributed to the territory of Kenya, and not to the United Kingdom, of which Kenya was a part at the time the rebellion occurred. Episodes of nation-state creation or imperial incorporation also were attributed to individual territories: when Yugoslavia was founded in 1921, each of the individual territories that belonged to Yugoslavia at the time was coded as experiencing a nation-state creation. If the different territories forming a state are governed according to different institutional principles, the coding for the individual territories also differs. The territory of Great Britain was governed according to nation-state principles throughout the period under consideration,

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**Figure 3.** A Stylized Historical Model of Institutional Change and War
whereas the territory of current Ghana went through imperial incorporation in the 19th century and began to be governed as a nation-state much later, in 1960.

The shift to a territorial logic allows one to hold a spatial unit constant and observe over time how it is governed, whether by an empire, a modern nation-state, or some other form of polity. We can thus determine whether periods of institutional transformation from one type of governance to another are indeed more likely to be accompanied by war. Before we proceed to a description of the data set, we note two possible objections to our choice of observational units.

First, the territories do not always correspond to process units (i.e., the units within which the relevant political dynamics unfold). The Russo-Japanese war, to give the most striking example from our data set, was entirely fought on the territory of current China, and is thus attributed to China rather than to the territory of Russia or Japan, where the decisions of going to war were made.

Ideally, we should determine, at each point in time, within which political units the relevant processes that led to a war unfolded, and then code all other information with reference to these units. However, most of the territories in our data set did represent relevant political entities during most of the period covered by our data set. As mentioned earlier, empires are characterized by the domination of peripheral units by a political center. The peripheries are governed as separate political units, whether through indirect rule or, much less frequently, through direct administration. Bosnia under the Habsburgs and Egypt while still under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan were indeed units within which many political decisions were made, including the decision to go to war with neighboring territories (as in the Egyptian conquest of Sudan) or to raise arms against the imperial center (as in Bosnia throughout the 19th century). Because almost all current states that were part of former empires represented such imperial provinces, our approach may be considered reasonable. For territories that have not experienced any dramatic shifts in state boundaries (e.g., France, Japan, Switzerland, Ethiopia), the problem does not exist. Overall, our data set contains less than a handful of cases for which our territorial logic makes little sense, such as the Russo-Japanese war mentioned earlier.

A second possible objection is that our units of observation are not independent of the causal processes we observe. The 2001 grid of states indeed has resulted partly from the past 200 years of war associated with empire building and nation-state formation. However, our explanandum is not the territorial shape of states, but rather the occurrence of war. That we observe this occurrence through a grid that is the result of future wars would be problematic only if these wars fought at \( t + x \) were influencing the state of variables at \( t \), which at least according to Humean notions of causality is quite impossible.

**The War Data Set.** A series of data problems had to be overcome once we shifted from a data set that contains only sovereign states to one that covers the entire globe over the past 200 years. We invested considerable effort to create reasonably complete codings for wars, our dependent variable. Our starting point was the widely used Correlates of War (COW) project data set. We first had to find and code wars that occurred in territories excluded from the COW country list because they were not part of the Western state system as defined by COW—a limitation that has been mostly overlooked by researchers who use the COW data (other problems are discussed by Sambanis 2004). We searched for wars missing from COW’s data set for much of 19th-century Latin America, Central Asia before the Russian conquest, and the like. Our major sources were Richardson (1960), who provided the basis for COW’s original data set; a detailed historiography of wars of the modern world (Clodfelter 2002); and a number of online sources such as onwar.com. We are confident that our new war data set is reasonably complete, with the exception of some areas in precolonial Africa and Central Asia. We also updated the

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10 A second possible limitation is that our units of observation are not independent of the causal process—
list to 2001, relying on Gleditsch et al. (2002), and followed some of the revision to the COW data set proposed by Gleditsch (2004).

We then added locational codes for all wars in our database so wars could be assigned to one of the fixed territories. In the COW data set, wars are attributed to states, independently of their actual territorial extension. Thus, COW codes a war in early 20th-century Morocco as a French war because Morocco was part of the French empire.12 Most of the information regarding the location of battlefields was collected from Clodfelter (2002).

Finally, COW’s classification of wars depends on the status of actors within the Western state system. “Imperial wars” occur between a recognized state actor and an actor which is not part of that system (a tribe, an independent kingdom). A “colonial war” is fought between a recognized state actor and a nonstate actor which is part of the system. “Interstate wars” take place between independent system actors, and “intragovernment wars” are waged between a state actor and a domestic nonstate actor.

Because our units of observation are fixed geographic territories rather than actors, we had to come up with a new typology of wars that would be independent of the character of the actors involved. Our institutionalist model suggests that the aims of warring parties may change according to the institutional environment. We thus reclassified all wars according to a simple typology of war aims (for a similar effort, see Holsti 1991, chapters 1 and 12). According to this typology, war participants can fight for domestic power (civil wars) or to enlarge the power of the state vis-à-vis other states (interpolity wars). Civil wars are subdivided depending on whether the participants try to establish a new independent state (secessionist war) or gain/retain control over an existing one (nonsecessionist civil war). Interpolity wars are subdivided into wars of conquest, which aim at the permanent incorporation of the territory and population of the enemy state, or interstate wars, in which the balance of power between states is at stake and participants are not trying to absorb the enemy state completely. Codings depend on intentions rather than outcome: when secessionists fail to establish their own state, the war still is classified as secessionist. When conquest is successfully resisted, the war is nevertheless coded as one of conquest. The type of war is therefore not dependent on who won.

We dealt with the difficult coding problem of changing or conflicting war goals as well as we could. Table 1 gives an overview of this new classification scheme and the COW categories that contain the greatest overlap with our new types. It should be noted that the definition of these war types is independent from our definitions of political systems. Indeed, all types of wars can occur in premodern states, in empires, and in modern nation-states, which is not to say that we expect them to be equally likely. Quite to the contrary, our model claims that institutional frames influence the political aims that actors pursue, including the aims of warfare, and that certain types of war should therefore be more frequent in certain types of political systems. For this claim to be nonontological and nontrivial, definitions of war must be independent from definitions of political systems. It may thus be useful to briefly illustrate this independence for interpolity wars, in which it might appear to be more problematic. Interstate wars may occur between competing empires trying to snatch territory from each other, such as when the Romanov and the British empires fought over control of Afghanistan, however,

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11 We guess that some of the following wars may have reached the 1,000-battle-death threshold: the wars among Yoruba states in precolonial Nigeria, the civil wars in Ethiopia and Afghanistan during the middle of the 19th century, the wars connected to Buganda expansion in Uganda in the precolonial era, and the wars between the khanates of Central Asia before Russian conquest. Unfortunately, we were not able to gather reliable data on battle deaths, and thus did not include them into the current version of our data set.

12 Sambanis (2004) discusses this problem and one other possible solution: to take the entire territory of an empire as the unit of observation. However, this would create a difficult data problem because GDP and other figures would have to be averaged over the entire empire. Furthermore, important differences in the living conditions—including human rights and democratic participation—of the “motherland” and the colonies would disappear from the picture. Sambanis does not discuss the possibility of territorially defined units of analysis.
Table 1. A New War Typology

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Types and Subtypes of War</th>
<th>Wars between Independent Polities</th>
<th>Civil Wars</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Wars of Conquest</td>
<td>Segessionist Civil Wars</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expansion of state territory, permanent incorporation of new territories and populations; resistance against such expansion.</td>
<td>Fight between states over borders and territory, regional hegemony (but without aim of permanent incorporation as in wars of conquest)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imperial extra-state wars</td>
<td>Inter-state wars</td>
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Note: COW = Correlates of War.

without Britain aiming at absorbing the entire territory of the Russian empire into the realms of Her Majesty (as in a war of conquest). Interstate wars also occur between city states vying for control of regional trade, between nation-states over disputed territory (however, without attempting to annex the neighboring state), between absolutist states, and between tribal confederacies. Wars of conquest have historically occurred between empires (e.g., the dismembering of the Ottoman empire by an assorted group of Western imperial powers during World War I), nation-states (e.g., the United States conquering the Dominican Republic or Nazi Germany conquering Eastern Europe to gain “Lebensraum”), between city-states (e.g., Athens and Sparta), and tribes.

The institutional transformation data set. To test our model, we had to determine when the turning points in the two processes of institutional transformation occurred in calendar time, independently from the actual occurrence of war or border changes. We established the following coding rules. As soon as a territory was effectively administered by an empire, or a garrison was established that controlled the territory militarily, or a territory legally became a protectorate or colony (whichever came first), we coded this as the year of imperial incorporation. We coded as the year of nation-state creation the date when a territory began to be governed on the basis of a written constitution that identified a national group as the sovereign of the state, whether the nation was defined in multiethnic or monoethnic terms. National sovereignty has a domestic and an external component. Domestically, the constitution should establish a nationally defined community of equal citizens and foresee an institutional representation of this community (not necessarily a freely elected parliament). Externally, national sovereignty means control over the foreign policy decisions of the country. The criteria had to be cumulatively fulfilled. The United States and South Africa, to give two examples, were treated as nation-states only after the abolition of slavery and the end of apartheid (i.e., after introduction of equality for all members of the nation). We thus excluded “Herrenvolk”-democracies or slaveholding republics from our definition of modern nation-states. Saudi Arabia, Bhutan, and Brunei still lack popular representation today and continue to be ruled according to dynastic principles.
Note that a territory can experience various episodes of imperial incorporation and of nation-state creation. Examples include the current territory of Poland, which has gone through various partitions and imperial annexations, and the multiple nation-state creations that a territory such as today’s Croatia has experienced over the past 100 years. We thus arrived at a data set of 484 distinct wars, including 77 wars of conquest, 111 interstate wars, and 296 civil wars, 109 of which were secessionist civil wars and 187 were nonsecessionist civil wars. Our data collection efforts involved more than 156 territorial units, 140 of which were incorporated into an empire at some point (92 during the temporal range of this project, 1816 to 2001), and 150 of which experienced nation-state creation. We use this slightly reduced set of 150 territories for all subsequent analysis.

**DISCOVERING THE PATTERN:**
**TEMPORAL VARIATION IN WAR RATES**

**Rates of War around the Two Transformations**

This new data set allows us to test whether wars have been more frequent during the two periods of major institutional transformation that have characterized the modern world. Figure 4 shows strong support for this claim. We calculated rates of war onset for each year before, during, and after the two turning points by tabulating the number of territories at war versus those at peace in any given year relative to each transformation. Thus, the x-axis is made up of the years before and after a territory experienced either imperial incorporation or nation-state creation. It does not record chronological time, but rather shows the transformation clock of the individual territories, the year of the turning point being set at zero. The y-axis shows the percentage of territories in which a war broke
out in a particular year before, during, or after these two transformations. We depict the war rates associated with the two transformations separately.

The dashed curve shows the rate of war as a 10-year moving average in relation to the year of imperial incorporation—excluding territories that were never part of an empire.\(^{13}\) The wave pattern that we expect is clearly visible: the rate of war rises dramatically during imperial expansion and is roughly twice as high at its turning point as in the decades that follow.\(^{14}\)

The solid curve shows wars as they relate to the second transformation, to the nation-state, this time including all the territories of the world. Again, the pattern conforms to our stylized model. The rate of wars increases sharply as events move closer to the date of nation-state creation. Roughly speaking, more than twice the number of territories were at war in the immediate years around nation-state creation compared with several decades before or afterward. Even at this high level of aggregation, these graphs show that violent conflict does not occur at a uniform rate across time, and that there is a systematic pattern of temporal dependence that must be caused by some underlying mechanism beyond chance or randomness.

To what extent are these findings nontrivial? Do the two graphs simply tell us that whenever polities change boundaries, this may happen through war? We come back to our earlier argument that the two turning points—imperial incorporation and nation-state creation—are not the same as the extension or contraction of state boundaries. First, in quite a number of cases (e.g., Switzerland, Thailand, Japan, France), the shift to the nation-state was not associated with any significant change in the boundary of the polity. Conversely, some such territorial changes (e.g., the Louisiana Purchase in the United States, various territorial acquisitions through royal intermarriage, and the transfer of colonies between imperial powers as spoils of war) had nothing to do with either imperial incorporation or nation-state creation. Moreover, three-fourths of border changes since 1816 have occurred peacefully (Diehl and Goertz 1988:115).

Second, half of our war types and 61% of wars in our data set were not fought, at least not exclusively, over borders. Nonscessionist civil wars, both in empires and in nation-states, are entirely unrelated to border changes. They constitute 38% of all wars in the sample. Interstate wars may or may not be fought over territory and may or may not lead to boundary changes. In other words, the empirical pattern that our two graphs show must be the result of a more complex political process than simply a fight over state borders.

**Rates of Onset for Different Types of War**

Our stylized historical model makes specific assumptions about the types of war that should be associated with different phases in the transformation process. We look at these by focusing on the transformation to nation-statehood for which war data are available over a longer range of time and offers a substantial number of observations.\(^{15}\)

Figure 5 confirms our expectations regarding interpolity wars. Wars of conquest are less frequent once a territory is governed by a nation-state and conforms to standards of statehood that gradually establish an uncontested hegemony during the period under consideration. Our results confirm the findings of Strang (1991):

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\(^{13}\) We also experimented with moving averages of 20-, 5-, and 1-year periods. The main pattern does not change.

\(^{14}\) Almost half of the wars that constitute a second peak 70 to 100 years after imperial incorporation consist of nationalist wars of secession, which clearly relate to the second transformation, to nation-statehood, in many territories. The picture is not distorted by the fact that our war data start in 1816 only, whereas many territories were incorporated into an empire centuries ago. A graph that includes only territories that became part of an empire for the first time after 1816 displays the same pattern (not shown here).

\(^{15}\) The number of observations is too small to be significant for most war subtypes and years during imperial expansion. It is sufficient to say that the peak in the probability of war is mostly related to wars of conquest—just as our model assumes. These become gradually less likely after incorporation and are no longer significant 40 years after incorporation. After incorporation, civil wars and interstate wars occur from time to time in the random pattern our model predicts.
few states, once recognized as nation-states, have been attacked by other states. The most prominent exception is the attempt by Nazi Germany to establish an imperial polity. The rate of interstate wars rises dramatically around the time of nation-state creation—potentially because of the “Macedonian syndrome” of irredentist claims on the territory of neighboring states—and drops steadily throughout the century thereafter. The war rates for secessionist wars show a dramatic peak immediately before nation-state formation, conforming exactly to our model. Secessionist wars are much less likely once a nation-state is established and the nationalist principle of legitimacy has been established.

The pattern for nonsecessionist civil wars is more complex. As we expect, the rate rises from an average of 0.4% in the years between −150 and −10 to nearly 2% immediately after the creation of a nation-state. According to our model, this results from the struggles over the ethno-national distribution of power that the shift to the modern nation-state form may bring about. We were surprised, however, that the overall decline in the war rate is not as steep after nation-state creation as we had anticipated. We had expected that after two generations, the conflict potential that nation-state formation entails would have been absorbed through secession, ethnic cleansings, or various institutional mechanisms such as power-sharing formulas, federalization, or a regime of minority rights (cf. McGarry and O’Leary 1993). At closer examination, the civil wars beyond 100 years after nation-state creation all are revolutionary wars in Latin America (e.g., the cristero rebellion in Mexico, the “dirty” wars in Argentina and Chile, the sendero luminoso rebellion in Peru) and in Spain (the civil war).

In general, Latin America’s civil wars are not well described by our model. Despite high degrees of ethnic exclusion in many countries (of the Amerindian population in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico, or of the black populations in many former plantation

Figure 5. Nation-State Creation and Types of War (10-Year Moving Averages with 95% Confidence Intervals)
We seem to model these pathways leading to revolutionary civil wars—not covered by our model—by treating them with considerably higher frequency in Latin America than elsewhere. This finding shows up also in the regression models that we present in the following sections. If we exclude Latin American territories from Figure 5, the war rates do indeed decline to what we suspect is their baseline after 60 years (not shown here).

Although the patterns of war described in this section generally conform well to our model, they might be generated by mechanisms other than those on which our model is built. The following two sections evaluate this possibility by controlling for other factors previously shown to be strong predictors of war onset. We again focus on the transformation to nation-statehood and look at onsets of civil war and interstate war. We first introduce our variables along with hypotheses of their expected effects.

VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESIS

Dependent variables. Our dependent variables are civil war onset and interstate war onset. They are coded 1 in the territory-year that a war begins and 0 otherwise. Because we are interested in war onsets, and because years in which a war is already ongoing are not generally at risk for another onset, we drop all ongoing war years when conducting regressions.

Testing the institutionalist model. Our main hypothesis, as described earlier, is that the likelihood of civil wars and interstate wars is highest in periods closest to nation-state creation. This can be contrasted with the null hypothesis that war onset is just as likely at any point in time across the institutional history of a territory. To estimate time dependence on the year of nation-state creation, we follow the advice of Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) and use natural cubic splines with three knots constructed as a function of the number of years to and from nation-state creation. Natural cubic splines, or restricted cubic splines, are constructed of piecewise cubic polynomials such that the function, its derivative, and its second derivative are continuous at each of the specified knots. In addition, the spline function is constrained to be linear beyond the end points, simplifying their calculation. Splines are an efficient way to estimate nonlinear time dependence, which can be traced easily using the estimated spline coefficients, as we will show later in this article.

In addition to tracing time dependency, we coded the variable that tracks the central mechanism linking nation-state formation to war in our model: political discrimination against minority groups. We generate a political discrimination variable from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set collected by Ted Gurr and collaborators. Unfortunately, MAR’s data begin only in 1950 and are coded for independent countries only, so we can test this variable only on a subset of our data after remapping the MAR codings to conform to our territorial logic.

As discussed in the theory section, the degree of political discrimination along ethnic lines varies under the influence of other factors. First, the governments of rich countries can afford to discriminate less and co-opt ethno-political protest movements through redistribution. We expect per capita GDP to be correlated negatively with the likelihood of war. All our GDP and population data come from Maddison (an organization of national statistical offices).

State creation is also likely to affect the likelihood of war. We find this to be the case. The median date of independence is 1825, although three-quarters of the cases were formed before 1900. Given the rapid pace of state creation at the turn of the twentieth century, it is not surprising that we find a significant difference in the likelihood of war and political discrimination between countries before and after 1900.

16 The splines were created in Stata 9.2 using the RC_Spline package (http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/r/rc_spline.ado) with three knots placed at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the time to nation-state creation variable. We tried alternate numbers of knots and locations, but there were no major changes in the results.

17 The MAR dataset has been faulted for selection of the dependent variable (Fearon 2003:196) because it includes only groups that have shown some minimal degree of political mobilization and/or have been substantially discriminated against. Our assumption is that all ethnic groups not coded by MAR have neither been discriminated against nor politically mobilized.

18 For each group, MAR codes a political discrimination score for five-year periods ranging from 1 (underrepresentation addressed by affirmative action) to 4 (an apartheid-type situation). We create a single score for each territory by calculating a population-weighted average of the scores for all minority groups within that territory and scaling the score to range from 0 to 100. Territories with no MAR groups received a 0.
(2003), who offers the best available GDP estimates for the 19th century and full data for all territories except the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states from 1950 onward. Second, not only the amount of revenue, but also its source matters. Oil-rich territories should have a higher probability of civil war than countries that rely on taxes for revenue generation because oil creates economic rent-seeking behavior that encourages ethnic clientelism and discrimination. To measure the impact of oil, we generate an oil production per capita variable based on historical data (Mitchell various years) that includes annual oil production estimates for a comprehensive cross-section of oil-producing states and colonies. Finally, we construct a variable to test the spillover effects that our model postulates. Ethnic civil wars in one territory tend to stir up tensions and civil wars in neighboring territories that harbor similar ethnic groups, and interstate wars of an irredentist nature have a tendency to draw in other states that seek to influence the ethnic balance of power in their neighborhood. We counted the number of wars that were ongoing in any contiguous territory during the same or any of the preceding three years and thus constructed a neighboring war variable.

There are a range of other variables—not related to our model—that have been identified by various authors as crucial to understanding the dynamics of war. We have included the most robust or theoretically interesting ones and present them briefly below.

**Other Independent Variables.** According to the hegemonic cycles theory of Modelski and Morgan (1985), interstate wars occur during the transition from one world hegemon to the next. We introduced dummy variables for the various periods of the hegemonic cycles that Modelski and Morgan identified and that should show significant differences in the likelihood of war.

Democratic peace theory refers to the risk of war between democratic dyads. It assumes that two democratic countries will not go to war with each other, whereas the likelihood of warfare between an autocratic and a democratic country is highest. To make the democratic peace hypothesis testable with our monadic territory-year data set, we constructed an interaction variable between a territory’s democracy indicator variable and the percentage of its directly contiguous neighbors that also were democratic.

Whereas democratic peace theory refers to static dyads of countries, other models have related war to the process of democratization. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) maintain that societies experience a higher likelihood of interstate war in the early stages of democratization because the nationalist spirit conjured up when power shifts to the people often is channeled toward the outside. Our regime type data are unfortunately not fine-grained enough to test this theory in a way that does full justice to the details of its argument. Still, all democratizing regimes will be situated somewhere between autocracy and democracy. Such “anocracies” should thus be more prone to war with their neighbors than either full democracies or autocracies.

The democratic civil peace theory states that democracies are better able to solve internal disputes. Autocracies, on the other hand, can suppress rebellions by the use of force or by threatening massive violence. Civil wars should therefore be less likely in democratic and autocratic societies (Müller and Weede 1990). All our regime variables are based upon Polity IV wars and small-scale wars involving only two countries as principally different. Because hegemonic power is by definition global in its reach, its effects on the conflict behavior should be the same for all states.

A number of quantitative studies have confirmed this so-called democratic civil peace argument (Ellingsen 2000; Hege et al. 2001). Reynal-Querol (2002), and Sambanis (2001) found similar results, but for ethnic wars only.
data, and use the widely adopted cutoffs of +6 and -6 to identify democracies, autocracies, and anocracies. In addition, we created an anarchy category for territories with no central government (including years of interregnum).22

Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) much discussed “insurgency model” maintains that wars are not driven by questions of political legitimacy, but by military opportunity. If government forces are weak and disorganized, and if mountainous terrain allows rebels to hide and retreat, ambitious leaders will be able to organize a rebellion in whatever name: national liberation, fewer taxes, or more self-government; elimination of class oppression; religion; or straightforward self-enrichment. We included a measure of mountainous terrain, previous regime change (which weakens the government vis-à-vis rebels), and change in the repressive capacity of government as variables to test their model. The mountainous terrain data are adopted from their data set. Regime change in the previous two years is defined as any shift between regime types (e.g. from anocracy to autocracy, from anarchy to democracy), and the repressive capacity is proxied by the percentage change in the number of government soldiers relative to the average over the previous decade. We thus assumed that rebel forces react to the change in the number—rather than the absolute number—of government soldiers (taken from COW data). Following Fearon and Laitin, we should expect rebels to descend from their mountain retreats and fight as soon as the military strength of the government has been reduced.

Finally, we included two control variables. First, a larger population represents more opportunities for warfare, as the following thought experiment illustrates. Imagine a one-person country in which the likelihood of warfare is necessarily 0 and contrast this with a world-state in which all wars would be counted as civil wars. Similar thought experiments could be made regarding interstate wars. Population size is thus included as a simple control variable.

Second, we included a measure of ethnic and religious fractionalization. The literature is inconclusive regarding the role of ethnic fractionalization in explaining civil war.23 The measurement captures demographic characteristics, but it is a rather poor indicator of the political dynamics of ethno-nationalism, as Cederman and Girardin (forthcoming) have argued. Because it is political discrimination, not ethnodemographic heterogeneity, that lies at the heart of ethnic conflict, the number or demographic shares of ethnic groups should not be expected to predict civil war. We include the fractionalization measure as a control variable, but do not expect significant results.

**TWO REGRESSION MODELS**

The problems finding data on all of these independent variables were considerable once we moved further back in time beyond 1950 and, even more importantly, once we attempted to find data for former colonies or precolonial areas of the developing world. Still, we were able to create a data set with a reduced set of independent variables (including time to nation-state creation, regime type, neighboring wars, and oil production) for all of the world’s territories and years. Once we included GDP and population, the two most robust variables in the quantitative civil war literature, we had to drop almost half of our observations, excluding most of Africa and Central Asia before 1950, most of

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22 For territories not represented in Polity IV, we proceeded as follows. Colonies were coded as autocracies because several test codings of individual colonies showed that one would never arrive at an anocracy score for a colony (for a different approach, see Fearon and Laitin 2003). Dependent territories of classic land-based empires received the same score as the imperial center. Independent territories were coded as “anarchy” if they had no central government, as “autocracy” if they could be classified as traditional states such as emirates, or as “anocracy” if they were elite democracies such as the Swiss confederation.

19th-century Latin America, and pre-1870 Eastern Europe. When we include political discrimination and ethnic fractionalization, we are confined to post-1950 data for independent territories only. However, across this wide range of specifications of the regression model, the main results remain remarkably stable, as discussed in the following.

**Civil War Onsets**

Table 2 presents estimates from logit regressions on civil war onset for a range of models. All specifications include natural cubic splines with three knots to trace time dependence relative to the year of nation-state creation. We present

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24 All logit estimations were performed in Stata 9.2. Because standard errors are likely to be correlated for observations within territories, we specify the robust and cluster options to correct the standard errors.

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25 Our expectation in this project is that temporal dependence exists primarily as a function of insitu-

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### Table 2. Logit Analysis of Civil War Onset

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation-state Formation</td>
<td>Time to nation-state creation</td>
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(Continued on next page)
Table 2. (Continued)

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<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
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<th>Model 2 1816–2001: Dropped Observations&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 3 1816–2001: Excluding Some Territories&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 4 Post-1950&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>(.7421)&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(1.0259)&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>(1.1546)&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Observations: 24,779 13,707 6,554 2,031

<sup>a</sup>Lagged one year.<br>
<sup>b</sup>In 1000's.<br>
<sup>c</sup>In metric tons.<br>
<sup>d</sup>Dropped observations due to missing data for most of pre-independent Africa, some 19th century Latin America, pre-1870 Central Europe, some small territories.<br>
<sup>e</sup>Excludes territories with no data on key independent variables in period of nation-state creation.

*<sup>p</sup> < .1; **<sup>p</sup> < .05; ***<sup>p</sup> < .01 (two-tailed tests).

Four models, gradually increasing the number of independent variables to minimize the number of dropped observations resulting from missing data. We therefore include all variables for which we have no missing data in Model 1, and introduce the variable that results in the highest number of dropped observations in Model 4. The results demonstrate that even after controlling for a range of important independent variables and despite variations in the sample size as a result of missing data, our main finding does not change: the spline functions show that across all models, the likelihood of war depends significantly on the time to/from state creation. All else being equal, the likelihood of war increases in the decades before nation-state creation, peaks at the moment a new nation-state is formed, and slowly recedes thereafter.

How does this basic finding relate to the existing literature on civil war? It is certainly consistent with Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study, which finds that the odds of civil war onset are more than five times higher in the first two years after independence than in the other post-independence years. They suggest that this supports their insurgency model of civil war because they suppose that the departure of the imperial army provides insurgents with an opportunity for rebellion. However, our results show that the likelihood of civil war increases already well before independence, when the imperial army still is firmly in place. Their “new state” variable thus captures only half of the relevant temporal relationship between the
formation of nation-states and the odds of civil war.  

From Model 1 onward, we control for intensity of neighboring civil conflict, regime type, prior regime change, mountainous terrain, and oil production. The neighboring civil conflict variable is highly significant and stays that way in all our models except Model 4, consistent with our argument that ethno-national struggles in one territory often spill over into neighboring territories. Closer investigation shows that much of this effect is driven by the strong spillover effects from nationalist wars of independence (results not presented). This confirms our stylized historical model, according to which nationalist movements spread from territory to territory and increase the likelihood of armed struggle against an imperial center. Also consistent with our expectations (and that of other explanatory models), we find that oil resources increase the risk of civil war. The results gain high significance in Models 3 to 5 when many of the observations of the pre-oil era are dropped. The regime variables show no support for the democratic civil peace hypothesis. Conditions of anarchy and instability after a regime change are closely related and are both positive and significant, as Fearon and Laitin’s insurgency model predicts.  

From Model 2 onward, we control for population size, per capita GDP, and change in the size of the government’s army. We have to drop observations for much of pre-1950 Africa and Central Asia as well as much of 19th-century Latin America and Eastern Europe because very little time-series data exist for these regions of the world. That said, population is positive and significant across all models, confirming that territories with larger populations have a higher risk of civil war. Consistent with much of the empirical literature on civil war that uses income as a proxy for various causal mechanisms, we find poverty to be a very strong predictor of civil war onset. According to our interpretation, this is because the governments of richer territories can react to ethno-political mobilization with redistribution and co-option. A recent change in the size of a government’s army is not statistically significant, contrary to the central argument of the insurgency model. This comes as no surprise because we have already seen that anti-colonial nationalists rose in arms even when imperial armies were still in place, a fact that is overlooked when only independent countries are included in the data set. Overall, our findings show the weakness of approaches that foresee no place for institutional factors and explicitly reject the idea that the lack of legitimacy may contribute to the dynamics of insurGENCY.

In Model 3, we test the robustness of our findings by dropping all territories for which we lack data on independent variables in the 5-year period centered on nation-state creation. In this way, we make sure that our results are not biased by what statisticians call “left truncation.” It could be that our results are biased because we include observations for territories only several decades after they became modern nation-states without any data on war patterns before nation-state creation. Even after dropping 73 territories for which we lack pre-nation-state creation data, there is no major change in the significance levels of the variables that we have reported for preceding models.

In Model 4, we include the political discrimination variable to test whether the central mechanism linking nation-state creation to civil war holds. For lack of data, the model excludes all observations before 1950 and in dependent territories, such as colonies. We also include ethnic and religious fractionalization indices, for which data are available that roughly reflect the ethno-demographic constellations after 1950. The political discrimination variable is strongly significant. Higher levels of discrimination

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26 Yet another explanation would focus on the post-colonial power vacuum in new states and their institutional weakness, more specifically their incapacity to politically control armies and militias. However, we would again be left wondering why the likelihood of civil war should increase in the periods before a new, institutionally weak state is founded. The power vacuum and institutional weakness argument is not incompatible with our approach: both reinforce a tendency toward escalation of conflict when principles of political legitimacy shift during the transition from empire to nation-state.

27 In contrast to previous research, we find that anocracy is not a strong predictor of civil war onset. We believe this is because most definitions clump together all midrange Polity scores into an anocracy category, including years of interregnum. We believe it is sensible to separate out interregnum years as years of anarchy.
against minorities increase the risk of civil war, suggesting that nation-state formation may lead to wars because of the ethnic discrimination that it often entails. As expected, the degree of ethnic and religious diversity is generally not significant.

We also ran a model (results not shown) that includes only those territories that became nation-states after 1950 and for which we had data in the years before and after nation-state creation. Analysis of this restricted sample—basically sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina, and the territories that once formed the communist world—allows for closer scrutiny of potential truncation bias in our earlier models. Some right-hand truncation will remain, it should be noted, because we do not observe patterns of war and peace that have not yet occurred, especially in the recently founded states of the former communist bloc. In general, the results do not suggest a large truncation problem in Table 2. Time to nation-state creation remains partially significant, and political discrimination against ethnic groups is as powerful a predictor of war as in Model 4.

Taken together, these results, from multiple-model specifications that control for a variety of variables and examine different combinations of geographic regions and periods, provide strong support for our institutionalist model of civil war. Simply looking at the coefficients of the spline variables, however, tells us little about the shape that the time dependency takes and when the likelihood of war onset is likely to be highest and lowest. To facilitate interpretation of logit coefficients, we graphed predicted probabilities for each year relative to the year of nation-state creation while other variables were held at their mean or modal values. Figure 6A presents the predicted probability curve for Model 2 along with confidence intervals.

The graph conforms well to our theoretical expectations and the descriptive results presented in previous sections. There is a marked increase in the likelihood of civil war onset in the years around nation-state creation. The risk of civil war peaks in the second decade after nation-state creation, with civil wars starting in 1.5% of territories. The risk of war is 25% higher than average in the 50-year window beginning in the decade before nation-state creation. Outside this high-risk window, the predicted rate of war drops off rapidly. This pattern of time dependency is basically the same for the other regression models (figures not shown). 28

**Interstate War Onsets**

Table 3 presents results from a logit analysis of interstate war onset for our full data set of territories from 1816 to 2001. The territory-year structure of our data set is not ideally suited for analysis of interstate wars because studies that use dyadic data sets routinely show that country-level attributes do not explain war as well as the characteristics that describe country pairs. We conduct our analysis with the modest aim of suggesting plausibility for our model and to encourage future tests using dyadic research designs.

To see whether the likelihood of war depends on the stage in the process of nation-state formation, we again use natural cubic splines created as functions of years to nation-state creation. Model 5 includes independent variables for which we have data covering the entire globe from 1816 to 2001. Model 6 adds additional control variables, which result in the loss of many observations including those for pre-independent Africa, much of 19th-century Latin America, and pre-1870 Central Europe. In both models, the signs and significance of the spline coefficients are as predicted, tracing out an increase in wars during the years approaching nation-state creation, followed by a decline afterward. Model 7 includes only the 76 territories for which we have data on all independent variables in the five-year period centered on nation-state creation, thus reducing possible truncation problems. The spline coefficients are no longer significant at standard levels, but the signs and relative magnitudes remain similar to those of earlier models, suggesting that although the smaller number of observations

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28 We also ran Model 1, for which we do not have significant missing data, for the different cohorts of territories that became modern nation-states, usually because they emerged from the same empire. The results (not shown here) demonstrate that with the exception of the first largely Latin American cohort of the first half of the 19th century, the pattern of time dependency is stable and strong for all cohorts.
contains too much noise for time dependency to emerge, the general pattern appears to be consistent with our argument.

To make the spline coefficients easier to interpret, we again plot the predicted probabilities of war onset against time to nation-state creation in Figure 6B, on the basis of estimates from Model 6. We note that the spline coefficients are only weakly significant, but that the shape of the calculated probability of war is as expected by our model. The two graphs of Figure 6 thus lend support for our claim that interstate wars and civil wars might be caused by a similar constellation of factors, a relationship often overlooked in the specialized literatures. Struggles over the ethnic distribution of power in emerging nation-states can drive irredentist wars that extend across borders, just as they can drive secessionist wars and ethnopolitical conflicts within states. Conforming to this broad historical argument, we also find strong spillover effects for interstate wars, as we did for civil wars: The fight over the ethnonational character of states may draw in neighboring territories populated by the same or related ethnic groups.

What do the results reported in Table 3 tell us about other theories of interstate war? The “dangerous democratization” hypothesis of Mansfield and Snyder postulates that anocratic regimes are more likely to be engaged in interstate wars than democracies or autocracies, because many democratizing polities will be categorized in this “anocracy” category. Democratization may conjure up an aggressive nationalism that political elites then direct toward neighboring states. Their hypothesis complements our model because democratization often runs parallel to nation-state formation and further nourishes the irredentist claims that the transition from empire to nation-state can encourage. Table 3 provides some support for the dangerous democratization hypothesis. The results are weakened, however, as soon as we control for per capita GDP in Models 6 and 7. A more direct measurement of democratization would capture Mansfield and Synder’s hypothesis in a more adequate way, and perhaps produce stronger results.

The democratic peace theory, tested by an interaction term between democracy in a territory and the percentage of democratic neighbors, is once again strongly confirmed, although our monadic research design is less than perfect for capturing dyadic effects between state pairs. The results show that democratic territories are much less likely to be attacked by—and to attack—other democracies.

In contrast to our findings with regard to civil wars, a previous regime change does not increase the likelihood of interstate wars. The population variable, included as a simple control variable, strongly influences the likelihood of interstate war onsets. Also as expected, rich-
## Table 3. Logit Analysis of Inter-state War Onset

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Inter-State War Onset</th>
<th>Model 5 1816–2001 All observations</th>
<th>Model 6 Dropped Observations$^c$</th>
<th>Model 7 Excludes Some Territories$^d$</th>
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<td>-.0002 (0.0001)$^*$</td>
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Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets.

$^a$ Lagged one year.

$^b$ In 1000's.

$^c$ Dropped observations due to missing data for most of pre-independent Africa, some 19th century Latin America, pre-1870 Central Europe, some small territories.

$^d$ Excludes territories with no data on key independent variables in period of nation-state creation.

$^* p \leq .1$; $^{**} p \leq .05$; $^{***} p \leq .01$ (two-tailed tests).
er territories are less likely to provide the arena for an interstate war than poor territories, consistent with the findings regarding civil wars. We suppose again that richer states can afford to solve domestic ethnic conflicts by means of redistribution, thus reducing the incentives for neighboring states to intervene on behalf of their ethnic brethren across the border. A prior increase in military personnel is associated with an increased risk of interstate war, in line with the expectations of rivalry theory (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001), which hypothesizes that states with a history of saber-rattling and involved in strategic arms races are likely sites of future conflict.

We find no support at all for Modelski’s hegemonic cycle argument, which we test in Models 6 and 7 by adding phase dummies to the regression. Interstate wars are not more frequent during his “global war” phase than they are when “hegemonic peace” should prevail. It seems that more important than global constellations of power are domestic institutional transformations that shape the incentive structures for political actors, including the motives and opportunities to pursue political ends with military means.

CONCLUSION

Our study shows that macro-institutional transformations do matter for a proper understanding of war. The comparative historical sociology of empire building and nation-state formation provides important insights for the quantitative study of warfare, which has been dominated by approaches that take the institutional form of the independent modern state as a given and exclude other types of polities from analysis. In contrast, we demonstrate that the emergence of this state structure provides the macrohistorical context within which an explanatory model of war should be situated. More precisely, periods of transition from one type of political institution to another are much more war-prone than periods of institutional stability.

This perspective puts the long-term political development of a territory at the center of analysis and provides an important complement to established theories of war and peace. The standard international relations approach looks either at systemic properties of world politics or at the relationships between competing state dyads. Our model conceives of the global system as an arena of institutional diffusion rather than an integrated and coherent entity with its own logic of development. The search for recurring hegemonic cycles and other properties of the global system may obscure rather than illuminate the profound change that the institutional transformation of the system’s constituent units has brought about. Politics in the age of empires followed a quite different logic than politics in the current world of nation-states, as a comparison between the British and the U.S. occupation of Iraq may well illustrate. On the other hand, the dyadic relationships between states are shaped, if we extrapolate from our analysis, by their basic institutional form, and not only by their degree of democratization. To restate the obvious, empires behave differently toward other polities than do nation-states, and the transition from the former to the latter has redefined the political character of dyadic relationships between states, independently of whether these are governed according to democratic principles or not.

Our model also complements the established findings of comparative politics. We confirm that political instability and oil resources do matter and make a territory more prone to civil war. Should we conclude that wars are primarily driven by military opportunities to rebel (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or by the greed for oil rents and diamond fields (Collier and Hoeffler 2000)? We argue that such military and economic incentives for war-making are shaped by larger processes of institutional transformation. Once nationalism has spread across a population, secessionist civil wars against an imperial center may represent a viable political option, especially if the government is weakened by political instability or feeble institutions. Instability, however, represents not a prime causal factor, but rather a circumstantial trigger. Once a nation-state is established, new incentives to protest and rebel and new opportunities to pursue ethno-nationalist goals in civil and irredentist wars are created. Oil resources, which can be distributed along ethnic lines and thus can be used to consolidate ethnic clienteles, provide further fuel for the dynamics of ethnopolitical competition, but they are not their primary cause.

Finally, our analysis speaks to the literature on the end of the Cold War and globalization.
Several authors have argued that the wave of civil wars that has swept over the globe since the 1970s must be related to increasing levels of globalization. Mary Kaldor (1999) maintains that the "new wars" of the 1990s have resulted from two interrelated processes of globalization: the emergence of a global weapons market combined with the decreasing capacity of states to uphold the monopoly of violence. Amy Chua (2004) postulates that successful minority groups are likely to become victims of violence at the hand of those who lose their standing in the stiffer winds of global competition. The notorious clash-of-civilization hypothesis (Huntington 1993) related increased levels of ethnic and religious conflicts to the end of the Cold War.29

By contrast, our analysis shows that what has been observed in recent decades may simply be more of the same old story. Although history never repeats itself, the same process patterns may be operating at different times and in different historical contexts (cf. Collier and Mazzuca 2006). The dismemberment of empire and the formation of the nation-state have led to wars since the time of Napoleon. The patterns of warfare in the Caucasus and the Balkans in the 1990s resemble those on the Indian subcontinent in the 1940s, those of Eastern Europe during and after the World War I, and so on. The return of the "Macedonian syndrome," as Myron Weiner (1971) has called the intermingling of ethnic conflict and irredentist wars, explains such recurrent patterns of war much better than any variant of globalization theory. To treat them as a fundamentally new phenomenon, brought about by the end of the Cold War or increased globalization, represents yet another example of the widespread tendency among social scientists to perceive their own times as unique and exceptionally dynamic (on "chrono-centrism," see Fowles 1974).

The consoling message conveyed by our research is that there are not many politcs left to break apart and to be transformed into a series of competing nationalizing states. There are, however, still many unresolved conflicts from the last two major waves of nation-state formation in sub-Saharan Africa and the former communist world that will continue to preoccupy the international community. Conflicts emerging from previous waves, such as the struggle over control of the Iraqi state, have not yet found an adequate institutional solution and will continue to be virulent. Our model does not give much support to the idea that such conflicts can be managed easily through "prevention," "peace making," or "reconciliation" (Wimmer 2004). If wars are fought over the institutional shape and territorial extension of the state, a successful intervention policy must address these issues directly and design institutional solutions that decrease the incentives for war-making in a sustainable way. We are not surprised that this task has proved to be much more difficult than many had thought when the end of the Cold War turned the world's attention to conflicts across the developing world.

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29 For empirical critiques see Gurr (1994), Russet, Oneal, and Cox (2000), and Chiozza (2002).


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