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The Location and Purpose of Wars Around the World: A New Global Dataset, 1816–2001

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A critical question in the quantitative study of war is how to choose appropriate units of analysis. While most studies link wars to the sovereign states that fight them, several authors have recently offered alternative perspectives, focusing on the properties of rebel organizations and armies or tracking events in fine-grained geographic spaces. We contribute to these developments by introducing a new dataset of wars fought from 1816–2001 on fixed territorial units of observation that conform to the grid of states in 2001. Compared to standard datasets, we expand the geographic purview to include states not recognized by the international system. We provide location codes that identify the territories on which conflicts are fought, which is especially important for the analysis of imperial wars and colonial rebellions. We also introduce a new typology of wars based upon the aims of warring parties rather than their status in the state system. This dataset is uniquely suited to explore new questions that cannot be addressed with other datasets. To illustrate, we test an institutionalist theory of war and show empirically that the types of wars fought in a territory depend on whether it is governed as a modern nation-state, an imperial dependency, or the center of an empire.

KEYWORDS geographic location of wars, war aims, war dataset, war typology
In recent years, researchers have made considerable progress in improving the quality of datasets employed in the quantitative study of war. Most of these endeavors (Fearon and Laitin 2003; K. Gleditsch 2004; Sambanis 2004 among others) build upon the canonical Correlates of War (COW) dataset, first introduced in the 1960s. A remarkable independent effort has produced the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset, which documents conflicts at a new level of precision for the post-World War II period (N.P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). All these efforts remain tied to an international relations perspective which divides the world into a set of competing sovereign states. Correspondingly, these datasets take states as their units of observation and code all variables with regard to these units.

This focus on countries as units of observation has been criticized by a variety of scholars who advocate for the coding of non-state political actors or the analysis of geographically defined units at the substate level. The first avenue has been pursued by K. Gleditsch and coauthors, who have argued persuasively that country-level datasets obscure lower level processes and actors operating at the regional or even local level. The civil war in Assam, to give an example, might be quite unrelated to the characteristics of India as a whole (on local conflict dynamics, see also Kalyvas 2006). With a new dataset using rebel organizations and government armies as units of analysis, Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2005) test how military capabilities influence the likelihood of escalation and conflict duration. Their dataset is also uniquely suited to explore whether transnational connections between rebel organizations influence the likelihood of war and peace (K. Gleditsch 2007). Similarly, various students of ethnic conflict have argued in favor of taking ethnic groups as units of observation and seek to determine how interactions between such groups and the states that host them affect the probability of armed conflict (Gurr 1993; Roeder 2007; Buhaug, Cederman and Rød 2008; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).

Others have argued that wars need to be linked to the locations where they take place, rather than to the states that fight them. An impressive new dataset of sub-Saharan Africa codes conflicts and a range of explanatory variables at the level of 100 square kilometer units (Buhaug and Rod 2006). Braithwaite has embarked upon an ambitious data collection enterprise to identify the precise geographic location of each event in the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (Braithwaite 2010).

This paper builds on these efforts to geographically locate conflicts, going beyond the state as the unit of analysis. In contrast to the more fine-grained GIS-based datasets and in line with Braithwaite’s efforts, we maintain the long-term horizon of the COW project and offer a new list of wars from 1816–2001 (see Appendix). We also retain the COW definition and threshold for war, requiring at least 1000 battle deaths from at least two identifiable organizations, one of which represents a state agent. We thus
exclude pogroms, riots, civilian massacres, warfare between tribal fighters, and other forms of mass violence from consideration.

We expand and complement the COW dataset in three ways. First, we enlarge the geographic purview beyond independent states recognized by the West to include colonial and imperial dependencies, kingdoms, and other states not acknowledged as equals by the “great” European powers of the nineteenth century, paralleling current efforts by the COW team itself (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Such a global dataset enables the evaluation of new questions such as whether the emergence of sovereign states or the expansion of the international state system represent in themselves a major cause for war.

Second, our dataset takes geographically fixed territories on which conflicts are fought as units of observation. These geographic units are defined by the political borders between states in 2001, extended back through time to 1816. By using these geographically-fixed territories as constant units, one can observe how different actors fight different kinds of wars on a territorial unit over time. We can thus track a territory from precolonial times through colonization and eventual national independence—the modal trajectory of the world’s populations over the past two hundred years. The COW dataset, by contrast, identifies wars by the imperial power that a colony belonged to. Only after independence does a territory appear as a unit of observation in the COW framework, making conflicts in the colonial and imperial peripheries more difficult to trace. This may not represent a disadvantage for research on wars between sovereign states, but it substantially limits the ability to inquire into the long-term dynamics of war and peace in the colonized world.

Finally, we introduce a new typology of wars based upon the aims of warring parties, an approach that complements the COW typology which focuses on the status of actors within the international state system. A typology based on aims allows one to grasp variations in the political logic of warfare pursued by actors in a better way than a typology based on the distinction between members and nonmembers of the international state system.

Every dataset based on particular units of observation implies a certain ontology (Tilly 1995), i.e., certain assumptions about what constitutes “a case,” which parts of reality are stable and which ones change, and what kind of causal forces can be thought of as operative. Our dataset shifts focus away from states and toward territories that are governed by different types of political systems over time. The dataset is thus uniquely suited to test institutionalist theories of war, which assume that incentives to fight or maintain peace depend on the institutional characteristics of the polity governing a territory. We test the hypothesis that different types of political systems—empires, modern nation-states, etc.—imply a different rationale for pursuing political ends by means of war. Correspondingly, the likelihood of
different kinds of war should depend on the type of political institutions that govern a territory at a point in time. We explore this theory using multinomial regressions on a dataset of all territories of the world over two centuries with different war types as the outcome.

The article proceeds as follows: First, we review the geographic limitations of existing datasets and describe how far we have been able to overcome them. The next section discusses the implication of shifting to geographic units of analysis based on 2001 state boundaries. We then introduce our war typology. The final section discusses the kinds of questions that can be studied with this dataset and tests hypotheses derived from an institutionalist theory of war and peace.

TOWARD A GLOBAL DATASET

The COW Project’s list of wars is the most widely cited dataset of violent conflict for the post-Napoleonic world. Most other lists, including the one introduced in this article, rely heavily on the original catalog of wars offered some four decades ago by Singer and Small (1972). Revisions by the COW team include an improved typology of war and several corrections and additions (Small and Singer 1982; Sarkees 2000). COW’s war list drew largely upon Quincy Wright’s (1942) research on the causes of war, the posthumously published work of Lewis Richardson (1960), and Pitirim Sorokin’s (1937) survey of wars through history. A new, expanded war list is currently under preparation and will be published soon (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Even while critics have questioned the appropriateness of its definitions and the consistency with which they were followed over time (Sambanis 2004), the systematic way in which COW classified wars reshaped the study of conflict and laid the groundwork for the contemporary literature on war and peace.

Among the more critical decisions made by the COW project was to restrict its universe to states that were members of the Western-centered global political system. This choice was informed by the classical international relations perspective according to which world history represents the drama of European state-formation and the subsequent expansion of Western power across the world. As a result, COW includes conflicts fought only by those sovereign states that maintained diplomatic relations with Britain and France up to 1920 or were members of the League of Nations or the United Nations thereafter. Conformingly, the COW dataset lacks any direct information on non-state participants or the geographic location of these conflicts.

To address these limitations, Gleditsch and Ward (1999) returned to the list of wars that COW had excluded from its dataset because they did not involve a system member (the list can be found in Small and Singer 1982,
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331–340) and added those that occurred within or between states that were sovereign according to prevailing criteria. This effort produced an improved dataset (Gleditsch 2004). However, it still excluded parts of the world governed by states that did not correspond with Western notions of sovereignty (e.g., the Kingdom of Dahomey or the Tukolor Empire in nineteenth-century western Africa). While it is consistent to exclude stateless units—since without a state participant there can be no war, following standard definitions—there is no a priori reason to exclude precolonial states from the analysis.

In the meantime, the COW team has started to address the limitations implied by the exclusive focus on system members in a more systematic way. A new compendium (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) extends the time frame to 2007, includes newly identified cases, and broadens the definition of war to include wars between non-state actors, such as intercommunal conflicts. Most importantly in the context of our discussion, the new list promises to include wars in territories that are not incorporated into Westphalian states (creating a new category of “non-state” wars). Since the list of such “non-state” wars has not been accessible at the time of writing, it remains to be seen in how far this extended dataset parallels our own endeavor.

Our data collection effort reaches for the goal of global coverage for all territories of the world while maintaining the established COW standards in defining what counts as an armed conflict. We include conflicts in any area governed by states, thus excluding tribal warfare and village vendettas that do not conform to standard definitions of war in the quantitative literature. We expand the definition of a state by following political anthropology conventions in which a state is defined as a centralized political organization that includes at least a three-level administrative-political hierarchy (Murdock and White 1969, Müller 1999, 222). We thus include all colonial states, city-states, khanates, feudal kingdoms, and centrally-organized tribal empires from 1816–2001. Only a dataset that includes these other state types can capture how the evolution and expansion of the Westphalian state system in and of itself contributes to the dynamics of war and peace—a concern for many scholars of the history of war (Tilly 1975; Mann 1993; Giddens 1995; Centeno 2003). We estimate that our data collection strategy leaves about 3% of territory-years out of our purview—periods in which areas were not governed by states of any kind.

We constructed our dataset by revisiting classic works as well as by exploiting new historical research and taking advantage of improved access to rare and once difficult to obtain sources of information. Drawing upon various sources, we created a candidate list of historical conflicts that are absent from the COW and Gleditsch (2004) lists. We first reviewed COW’s original historical sources including Wright (1942), Sorokin (1937), and Richardson (1960) to identify wars that may have been excluded for the reasons discussed above. In addition, we relied upon the research efforts of
Michael Clodfelter in his monumental “Warfare and Armed Conflicts” (2002) and the online Armed Conflict Event Dataset maintained by Ralph Zuljan. Clodfelter is an amateur historian and Vietnam veteran who spent decades researching and writing about the battles of world history. Zuljan’s Armed Conflict Event Dataset (ACED) is an online repository of war information with records on a large number of conflicts drawn from various military history books and government-sponsored country studies.

For each of the newly identified candidate wars, we conducted supplementary research on the basis of articles, books, and scholarly online sources in Spanish, French, German, Italian, and English. A new war entered our final list only if dates could be verified and at least 1000 battle-deaths could be confirmed by at least two independent sources. All candidate wars for which battle death claims could not be corroborated were excluded (a considerable number especially in Richardson’s (1960) list and in Gleditsch’s (2004) list. In addition, we updated the list to 2001 from COW’s end date in 1997 using the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset.

Our research identifies 64 new wars not included in the COW dataset. These represent many wars that were fought by or in sovereign states not recognized by the UK or France in the nineteenth century, especially in Latin America, southeast and central Asia, and Africa. Among the latter, we include nineteenth-century civil wars among the Xhosa, the wars pitting the Boers against the Matabele, Dahomey’s expansion in Benin, the Tukolor conquest of the Bambara empire, the Zulu civil war, and the interstate war of the Siamese and Viet kingdoms over control of Cambodia. Despite our best efforts, it is likely that our list misses wars in parts of the world where historical records are scarce or are inaccessible to Western scholars.

Several potential wars drawn from COW’s original candidate list were excluded from our dataset because our historical sources signal doubt as to whether the 1000 battle death threshold was reached, or battle death information could not be verified from at least two independent sources.

FROM “WHO” TO “WHERE”: SHIFTING TO TERRITORIAL UNITS OF OBSERVATION

Datasets that use states as units of observation need to disregard changes in a state’s political characteristics and territorial extension over time. The Ottoman empire of 1820, to give an example, is thus conceived as the same unit as the Ottoman empire of 1910 or Turkey 1990, although the Ottoman empire controlled a vastly more extended territory at the time of the Congress of Vienna than today’s Turkey. An additional consequence of using sovereign states as the unit of analysis is that many datasets do not code where a war took place but only who its protagonists were. Singer and Small explicitly state that “the geographical loci [of wars] are, from our point
of view, of limited interest. Our major concern is with the political systems within which, and among which, international war occurs…” (Singer and Small 1972, 35).

Since only sovereign states are recognized by COW, wars in dependent territories (such as anticolonial rebellions) are associated with the core country of the empire and no information is recorded for the rebel groups or for the general characteristics of the imperial dependency within which the war was fought. This has important consequences for the kind of theories that can be tested. For example, relating the Mau-Mau rebellion to its primary state actor, the United Kingdom, might yield useful inferences for evaluating the effects of imperial overstretch on the likelihood of conflict within an empire. But because Kenya does not appear in country-year datasets in the 1950s, the Mau-Mau rebellion cannot be linked to local level processes such as economic inequality between European settlers and the native population or the spread of anticolonial discontent.

Several solutions have been proposed to this problem. One is to take the entire territory of an empire as the unit of observation, as done by Fearon and Laitin (2003) in their post-1945 dataset of civil wars. However, assigning wars in one corner of the empire to its entirety is imprecise and less than ideal. Moreover, averaging per capita income, democracy scores, and other independent variables over the entire empire is problematic. For example, Fearon and Laitin create imperial Polity scores by calculating the average of the center’s Polity score and a strong autocracy score for the colony, weighting by the relative share of the center’s population to the total imperial population. Thus the entire French Empire is assigned the same weak autocracy score, overlooking dramatic differences across the empire in the opportunities for democratic participation, which might very well have a serious impact on the local likelihood of war (Sambanis 2004, 827). Sambanis therefore suggests either the exclusion of imperial wars from civil war lists (and maintaining them in the COW category of extra-state wars), or the inclusion of controls that would indicate whether a state was an empire or a non-imperial nation-state by measuring the degree of inequality between the center and periphery (Sambanis 2004, 828).

As an alternative solution, we propose using stable, geographically-defined territories as units of observation for the entire world. Our dataset uses territorial units as defined by the political borders between states in 2001. These geographic units stay fixed and remain unchanged across the temporal range of our dataset from 1816–2001. By doing so, we encourage a systematic distinction between the concepts of state and territory. The state is a political entity whose geographic extent can contract and expand. Meanwhile, our territories are fixed geographic units whose shape does not change and over which different state entities can govern at various points in time. By using the division of the world in 2001 as the basis of our geographic units, we assume consonance between state and territory at the end of our
dataset. However, at the beginning of our dataset, the picture is much more varied. Through the use of fixed territories as the units of analysis, we are able to observe the sequence of wars fought on a particular territory over the last two centuries, independent of the polity to which a territory might have belonged. Thus, a civil war that happened in 1836 in Sarajevo would be coded as being located on the territory of what in 2001 was Bosnia, though Bosnia was part of the Ottoman empire and not an independent state. If colonial subjects rebelled against Her Majesty’s government in what is today Kenya, the war is attributed to the territory of Kenya and not to the United Kingdom, of which Kenya was a part at the time the rebellion occurred. Figure 1 displays the frequency of wars fought within these territorial units since 1816.

![Figure 1: War frequency by territory (1816–2001).](image)
We used the 2001 country map to define our territories for pragmatic reasons, both to maximize the amount of data that can be extracted from existing country-year datasets and also because the current state grid represents the most detailed division of the world into countries in the modern era. An even more compelling design might ignore state borders altogether and collect data along a geo-referenced grid with uniform size cells over time (see the first steps in this direction by Braithwaite 2005; Buhaug and Rod 2006). Given very severe limitations in data availability at this level of disaggregation for independent variables typically used in the study of war, we do not attempt this here.

To determine the territories upon which wars were fought, we identified the geographic location of major battlefields from various sources including the ACD dataset, Clodfelter (2002), and additional print and online references. If battlefields were located on more than one territory (such as during the Russian Revolution), we coded multiple territorial locations. Following COW’s coding rules for determining who counts as a participant in a war, a territory was coded as a war location if at least 100 died in battle or 1000 troops were actively engaged in battlefields on that territory.

We should note three possible objections to our choice of observational units. First, since our coding attributes wars to territories and not to state actors, the coding criteria produces a few odd locational codings, mainly in cases where expanding empires met outside of their core territories, vying for control over a region that had no local force strong enough to participate in battle. According to the territorial coding logic, this war is then related not to the two empires but to the territory on which the battles took place. The cases are the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, which is attributed to the territory of today’s China (and not to Russia or Japan), the Russo-Persian war of 1826, which is coded as relating to the territory of what is today Armenia, Afghanistan, and Turkey (but neither Russia nor Persia), the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1887, which is related to the territory of today’s Eritrea (not to Ethiopia), and Russia vs. Central Asian Rebels of 1931, which is coded as a war in China. We used these locational classifications for the sake of consistency.

Second, one could object that our fixed territorial units of observation—the states of 2001—do not correspond to meaningful political entities in the past, especially when territories were governed as part of much larger imperial polities. In other words, the decision to go to war in earlier periods may have occurred within political units that do not correspond to our units of observation. However, most of the territories in our dataset did house relevant decisionmaking entities throughout the range of our time period. The overwhelming majority were imperial provinces before achieving independence (see Anderson 1991; Roeder 2007) and such provinces represented political units with a certain degree of political independence, given that most empires ruled their dependencies through some form of indirect rule. Bosnia under the Habsburgs or Egypt while still under the
nominal sovereignty of the Sultan, to give two examples, were units within which many political decisions were taken, including the decision to go to war with neighboring territories (the Egyptian conquest of Sudan) or to raise arms against the imperial center (as in Bosnia throughout the nineteenth century). For territories that have not experienced any dramatic shifts in state boundaries, such as Japan, Switzerland, and Brazil, the problem obviously does not exist.

A third possible objection is that our units of observation are not independent of the causal processes we observe because the 2001 grid of states is a result of the last 200 years of war associated with empire building and nation-state formation. However, this is a feature of many datasets whose units of observation are determined by the outcome of interest. The units in all country-year datasets, for example, are shaped by wars: states enter a dataset only after independence, frequently gained through wars of secession or independence, while states exit the dataset after being absorbed by another entity, often through wars of conquest. Our dataset, by contrast, begins with a set of units in 1816 that are identified independent of a prior history of war. It is future wars (i.e., all those leading up to the 2001 countries) that shape the selection of units. If we assume, following standard notions of causality, that the future does not influence the past, then our choice of observational units has less of an endogeneity problem than it appears.

How far does a territory-based dataset produce a different picture of war and peace compared to a state-based dataset? One way of answering this question is to look at the war-proneness of the different units of observation. Figure 2 compares the number of wars per decade on fixed territorial units as compared with the state units used by COW (with shifting territorial extension). The discrepancies dramatically illuminate how the choice of units of observation influences the empirical patterns that we observe, especially regarding inter-polity wars: while the United Kingdom, France, and Russia are the most war-prone states taking state actors as units, they do not even appear on our list of most war-prone territories. This is simply because most of the wars fought by these countries were directed against colonized peoples in the peripheries of the international system—the very wars that are glorified in Great Britain’s Imperial War museum and similar war shrines of other “civilizing nations.” Once we shift to a territorial perspective, however, these wars are seen from the perspective of the colonized. Not surprisingly, many of the most war-prone territories are those that were the most difficult to conquer and “pacify” such as India, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Morocco.

Regarding intra-polity wars, the major difference consists of the fact that Turkey, Russia, France, the U.S., and the United Kingdom—all longtime system members—appear at the top of COW’s most war-prone list but not in ours. This is because we include wars in precolonial and pre-system-membership periods of non-Western territories (India, Brazil, Morocco,
FIGURE 2 Most war-prone territories and state participants (1816–2001). Notes: aIncludes wars of conquest and interstate wars fought on territorial locations corresponding to the 2001 world grid of states; COW list is of state participants involved in interstate wars and extra-state wars up to 1997; bIncludes secessionist and non-secessionist civil wars fought on territorial locations corresponding to the 2001 world grid of states; COW list is of state participants involved in intrastate wars up to 1997.
Peru, Pakistan), which therefore accumulate more wars over the total time period than these Western countries.

From a different perspective, after controlling for the size of the territory, the territories most prone to inter-polity wars over the last two centuries have been Lebanon, Israel, El Salvador, Macedonia, and Cyprus and for intra-polity wars Lebanon, Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and El Salvador—mostly territories that have had a history of protracted ethnic conflict.

FROM “BETWEEN WHOM” TO “WHAT FOR”:
A NEW TYPOLOGY OF WAR

COW’s well-known war typology is logically derived from taking states that are members of the international system as units of observation. The distinction between extra-state wars, interstate wars, and intrastate wars depends on the status of war participants in the international state system in a two-fold way. First, COW differentiates states from non-state actors. Secondly, it distinguishes between states recognized by the European great powers and others that are not part of that “international” system. Combining these two distinctions, one arrives at four types of war in the COW universe: imperial wars occur between a system-member state actor and an actor that is not recognized by the Great Powers as a sovereign state (e.g., a traditional kingdom, a tribal sheikhdom); colonial wars involve a system-member state actor and a non-state system actor that is located outside of the core territory of the sovereign state (i.e., in its colonies); interstate wars engage independent system-member state actors; and intrastate wars implicate a system-member state actor and a domestic non-state actor.15

This typology has proven useful for a wide range of research questions and provides consistency to the dataset: The distinction between system member states and nonsystem member states underlies both the choice of units of observation (only the former enter a dataset as units) and the typology of wars (wars between system members are assigned to a different category than wars between members and nonmembers). For a dataset that uses geographically-defined territories, rather than states as units of analysis, distinguishing between extra-state and intrastate wars on the one hand, and imperial wars and interstate wars on the other hand becomes less meaningful. We therefore develop a different war typology that is compatible with our territorial framework.

We classify wars by the aim of the actors that initiate it, rather than by the types of actors involved (for a similar effort see Holsti 1991, chap. 1 12). Our typology thus distinguishes between different political goals pursued by actors when making war: creating a new state, establishing regional hegemony vis-à-vis other states, or gaining power within an existing state.16
The main theoretical reason for choosing a war aim typology is that we assume that the political dynamics that lead actors to pursue specific goals through war is substantially similar across different types of actors. For example, wars of secession are fought by actors in search of autonomy and independence, irrespective of whether their rulers are members of the state system or not. Wars of conquest will be directed against weaker actors, while balance of power wars will be more likely to involve rivals with similar power capabilities—again without regard to the status of the states involved.

According to our typology, war participants can fight for domestic power within a given polity (intra-polity wars) or to enlarge the power of the polity relative to others (inter-polity wars). Intra-polity wars are divided depending on whether participants try to establish a new independent state (secessionist civil wars) or gain/retain control over an existing one (non-secessionist civil wars). We subdivided non-secessionist civil wars into those that are primarily motivated by (ethno-)nationalist motives and those that are not, following the criteria used by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Secessionist civil wars were subdivided into nationalist and nonnationalist wars, depending on whether or not secessionists wanted to establish a modern nation-state or some other kind of independent state. Inter-polity wars are divided into wars of conquest, which aim to permanently incorporate the territory and population of the enemy state, and balance-of-power wars, where the balance of power between states is at stake and participants are not trying to absorb the enemy state. Classifications depend on intentions rather than outcomes: when secessionists fail to establish their own state, the war is still classified as secessionist; when conquest is successfully resisted, the war is nevertheless coded as one of conquest. The type of war is therefore not determined by who won. Our typology of wars is summarized in Table 1.

The decisions that were required to code wars according to this new schema were numerous and are discussed only briefly here. First, we treated noncolonial empires (the Ottoman, Habsburg, Chinese, Romanov, and Abyssinian empires) and Communist empires (the Soviet Union), in the same way as colonial empires (French, Portuguese, British, Dutch). Therefore, rebellions against Ottoman rule in the Balkans (e.g., the Greek and Serbian “wars of liberation”) were classified in the same category as the anticolonial wars in Algeria or Angola.

Second, we chose operational criteria to distinguish between different types of intra-polity wars. If a rebellion against a political center was directed against specific aspects of governance, such as laws that infringe on traditional rights, new taxes, or direct administration by the center’s officers and administrators, or aimed to alter the balance of power between various domestic political groups (such as through coups or revolutionary rebellions) without challenging the borders of the existing state, we defined this as a
<table>
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<td>Definition of sub-types</td>
<td>Balance-of-power wars</td>
<td>Fight against the political center with the aim to establish an independent state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-sub types</td>
<td>Non-nationalist wars of secession</td>
<td>Nationalist wars of secession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of sub-sub-types</td>
<td>Fight for a separate, non-modern state (an independent khanate, sultanate, kingdom, tribal confederacy)</td>
<td>Fight for a separate, modern nation-state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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non-secessionist civil war. When the main aim was to establish a new breakaway state, these civil wars were classified as secessionist.

There is obviously a fine line between secessionist and non-secessionist civil wars since many tax rebellions turned into nationalist wars of liberation, and many antiimperial movements were composed of groups with different motives. The Druze rebellion against the French in Lebanon from 1925 to 1927, which were initiated by Druze mountain tribes resisting direct administration and later joined by Arab Syrian nationalists, is a case in point. We also had to distinguish between cases where the demand for independence was of a tactical nature (the Karen’s threat to establish an independent state from Burma) or represented a long-term strategic objective (such as when a coalition of ethnic leaders headed by Uygurs established the short lived “Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan” in what is today western China). While the former ended up in the non-secessionist category, the latter was classified as a war of secession.

Next, we had to determine whether a secessionist civil war was “nationalist” or not. “Nationalist wars of secession” were defined as rebellions against the political center with the expressed aim of establishing a separate state to represent a nationally defined people, thus conforming to the modern ideal of the nation-state. If the breakaway movement was not motivated by nationalist ideology but rather by premodern principles of political legitimacy (such as the establishment of a khanate in western China or the adjacent Russian territories; an independent emirate or sultanate in the Middle East), we counted this as a nonnationalist war of secession. In some cases it is difficult to distinguish whether the demand for a new state is driven by nationalist or non-nationalist motives. For example, did the semi-independent Bosnian province under a Bosnian Vizier that Christian rebels demanded from the Ottoman Sultan in 1836 conform to the ideals of a modern nation-state? Did the independent Khanate that Muslim rebels fought for in 1863 in China or the reinstallation of the Mogul during the so-called Indian mutiny in the middle of the nineteenth century embody nationalist ideals? We decided on the basis of contextual and historical judgment whether or not the nationalist elements were dominant in these and some other borderline cases.

A third distinction had to be made between wars of conquest and balance of power wars. We coded a war as one of conquest if war leaders aimed to absorb the entire territory and population of the enemy state and to permanently incorporate it as a dependent entity into the domains of the state. Attempts at “pacifying” the hinterland (such as the wars in Libya against the Sanusi tribes in the 1920s) are also coded as wars of imperial conquest. If, on the other hand, wars were fought over territorial boundaries (but without the aim of incorporating the entire enemy state), over regional hegemony, or the political outlook of the other state’s government, they were classified as balance of power wars. Wars that resulted in temporary
military occupation (such as the allied occupation of Germany after World War II or the contemporary occupation of Iraq by U.S. and British troops) without the intent to permanently incorporate the enemy state were not considered to be in pursuit of conquest and were therefore classified as balance of power wars.

Overall, our new project resulted in a dataset of 462 wars, plus the two World Wars. This total is composed of 72 wars of conquest, 92 inter-polity balance of power wars, 109 secessionist civil wars (27 of which were non-nationalist, 82 nationalist), and 189 non-secessionist civil wars (70 of which were ethnic, 119 nonethnic). This compares to 400 wars in the COW dataset, made up of 79 interstate wars, 213 civil wars, and 108 extra-state wars, 49 of which are colonial wars and 59 are imperial wars.

NEW QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS: TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO WAR

This territorial dataset allows for the evaluation of how the purpose of war has changed within territories over time, including periods before internationally recognized sovereignty is achieved. Thus, a scholar interested in Latvia can observe how the wars fought on that territory have varied in purpose: the war of liberation during the Russian revolution that led to its independence after World War I; the fight against the Nazis who conquered its territory during World War II; the subsequent futile struggle for independence that preceded its reincorporation into the Russian empire. An analyst using COW data, by contrast, would conclude that Latvia participates in no wars and appears, disappears and reappears from the world stage, ignoring the actual experiences of the Latvian population throughout the turbulent twentieth century.

New Questions

The typology that distinguishes between war aims also allows new questions to be asked and answered. We can look, for example, at how the aims of warfare have changed over time, going beyond the common observation that civil wars have become more frequent and interstate wars much less so in the last fifty years. By tracking the rates of war by aim, Figure 3 shows that wars of conquest have disappeared in recent decades while the share of ethno-nationalist wars has dramatically increased since the 1930s. How are we to understand such global shifts in the purpose of war? Is it a consequence of the global spread of the nation-state form, as we have argued elsewhere (Wimmer and Min 2006), or is it linked to the effects of growing global interconnectedness, as adherents to globalization theories have maintained?
What determines the kinds of wars that are fought within a territory's boundaries? We examine this question in this section, using multinomial logistic regressions with the four main war types identified above as possible outcomes. We investigate an institutionalist approach to war and peace (cf. Wimmer and Min 2006), according to which the types of wars that are fought depend on the institutional rules of governance that influence the behavior of a territory’s elites. We distinguish between empires and modern nation-states, and other types of institutions (tribal confederacies, city-states, absolutist and feudal states, etc.). Empires are further divided between their core territories (e.g. present-day Turkey under the Ottomans) and their dependencies. Colonial empires are made up of modern nation-states at the center and colonial dependencies in the peripheries. For the purpose of this analysis, we coded the dependencies of the Soviet Union as internal colonies and group them together with colonial dependencies into one category, while Russia proper is defined as a modern nation-state since the Russian revolution. We thus arrive at a fivefold typology that distinguishes between colonial dependencies, imperial dependencies, imperial centers, modern nation-states, and all other political systems.

**FIGURE 3** Change in war aims over time. Note: Ethno-nationalist civil wars include nationalist wars of secession and ethnic non-secessionist wars.
Which types of wars do we expect to be more frequent in territories ruled under these different institutional rules? Empires are defined by center-periphery relations, hierarchical inclusion of subordinate political entities via indirect rule, and claims to universal legitimacy. Thus, they know no natural borders and may potentially cover the entire globe and bring civilization, Christianity, Islam or revolutionary progress to all of humanity, irrespective of the ethno-national background of the population. Empires show an institutionalized drive to expand their domain through conquest, even if at high military, political, and economic costs. At the same time, the border of empires are much less settled than those of modern nation-states, which is a derivative of the indirect rule principle and which thus makes the domains of sovereignty less clearly delineated (as shown in the uncertain status of nominal dependencies of the Ottoman empire such as Egypt or Tunisia). We thus expect that empires should see more balance of power wars around the borders of their territory when they struggle over the exact delineation of their domain with neighboring states (Hypothesis 1). Given the multiethnic composition of empires, we expect also that territories under imperial rule are likely to have a higher risk of secessionist civil wars being fought on their territories (Hypothesis 2), once nationalism spreads throughout its domain and inspires breakaway movements.

In modern nation-states, governments should be representative of the ethno-national makeup of the population, and ethnic “like” should therefore rule over like—in stark contrast to empire, in which the ethno-cultural hierarchy between imperial elites and subjects was considered a stabilizing and legitimate feature of proper government. We expect secessionist civil conflict to be less likely in nation-states than in all other types of polities since a territory ruled as a nation-state already conforms to these principles and incentives for launching a nationalist secession are therefore reduced (Hypothesis 3). We further expect that balance of power wars should be less frequently fought on territories ruled as modern nation-states compared to the territories of empires (Hypothesis 4), because the national principles allows for clearer delineation of domains of sovereignty and nation-states show no inherent expansionist drive beyond the territory inhabited by the core national community. However, civil wars of a non-secessionist type should be most frequent in modern nation-states (Hypothesis 5). For one, the politicization of ethnicity that the “like over like” principle entails will make struggles over the ethnic balance of power or the ethnic nature of the state more likely (Wimmer 2002). Nonethnic civil wars should also be more frequent than in any other type of polity since the principle of rule in the name of “the people” invites challenges to government authority much more than in polities where the will and makeup of the population does not matter much.

Colonial and imperial dependencies are less likely to be the site of non-secessionist civil wars (Hypothesis 6), on the other hand, because the
metropole can effectively enforce peace among various local forces and because government is judged in terms of the tax burden and the provision of public goods without reference to ideas of representational justice (this is a version of the “colonial peace” argument; cf. Killingray 1986). But they will be the location of secessionist civil wars against “foreign domination” which unfold as soon as the nationalist ideology of self-determination takes local roots (Hypothesis 7). Wars of conquest, however, will be most likely in colonial dependencies because these are the sites where expanding colonial powers meet with resistant tribes of the hinterland (think of the notoriously difficult to “pacify” tribes of Northwestern Pakistan), not yet conquered indigenous kingdoms (such as the Ashanti of Ghana or the Burmese kingdom), and so forth (Hypothesis 8).

To test these theories, we construct a territory-year dataset identifying in each year whether a territory was ruled as a modern nation-state, an imperial center, an imperial dependency, a colonial dependency, or some other form of governance. As soon as a territory was effectively administered by an empire, or a garrison was established that controlled parts of the territory militarily, or a territory legally became a protectorate or colony (whichever comes first), we coded the territory as an imperial or colonial dependency. We coded territories as modern nation-state as soon as an independent, internationally recognized government was established on the basis of a written constitution that defined a national group of equal citizens (for coding rules see Wimmer and Min 2006).

Other, more established theories regarding territory-specific characteristics that influence war and peace can be found in the literature. We introduce them and the corresponding hypotheses in the briefest possible way here. Democratic peace theory (cf. Ravlo et al. 2003) maintains that democratic territories should be less likely to see balance of power wars since democracies do not fight one another and are less likely than autocracies to attack other states (Hypothesis 9). Democratic civil peace theory offers a similar argument regarding intra-polity wars: These should be less likely in democratically ruled territories, where the ballot replaces the gun, and in autocratically ruled territories, where governments can suppress dissent by threatening overwhelming force (Müller and Weede 1990; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Hegre et al. 2001; Ellingsen 2000). All other types of political regimes should be more prone to civil wars, both secessionist and non-secessionist (Hypothesis 10). We use Polity IV data and the widely adopted cutoffs of +6 and −6 to identify democracies, autocracies, and anocracies. We categorized colonial and imperial dependencies as autocracies. In addition, we created an anarchy category for territories with no central government, including in years of interregnum.19

Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) “insurgency model” maintains that civil wars break out if government forces are weak and disorganized and if
mountainous terrain allows rebels to hide and retreat. We included a measure of mountainous terrain (giving rise to Hypothesis 11), previous regime change (which weakens the government vis-à-vis rebels according to Hypothesis 12), as well as the change in the repressive capacity of government as variables to test their model (Hypothesis 13). The mountainous terrain data are adopted from their dataset, regime change in the previous two years is defined as any shift between regime type (e.g., from anocracy to autocracy, from anarchy to democracy, etc.), and the repressive capacity is proxied by the percentage change in the number of government soldiers either of the imperial/colonial center or the autonomous state (taken from the COW dataset) relative to the average over the previous decade.

Michael Ross (2003) has developed a theory of how the availability of natural resources affects different types of conflict. He expects that when the extraction of natural resources can be obstructed by rebels, as with oil, the likelihood of secessionist civil wars increases (Hypothesis 14; cf. also Collier and Hoeffler 2004). To measure the impact of oil, we generate an oil production per capita variable based upon data from Mitchell (Various years).

Several other control variables were added, most importantly the size of a territory and the population as well as GDP per capita, all of which are known to have robust effects on civil and interstate wars. Our GDP per capita and population data are derived from Maddison (2003), who offers the best available GDP per capita estimates for the nineteenth century and full data for all territories except the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states from 1950 onwards. To test for spillover effects (cf. Gleditsch 2007 for civil wars in independent states), we counted the number of wars that were ongoing in any contiguous territory during the same or any of the preceding three years. To control for time dependency, we follow Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) and use natural cubic splines with three knots constructed as a function of calendar time. Since our dataset allows for several different types of war to be fought simultaneously on a territory, we include an ongoing war year dummy in all models, but also ran models that deleted such years (results not shown).

Results and Discussion

The dataset has full coverage for all independent variables, except for change in the military personnel of the center, which is limited by the range of the COW dataset, GDP per capita, and population size, which are available for roughly only half of the observations. Since models that include these variables result in nonrandom deletion of many observations in precolonial territories and colonial dependencies, we present two model specifications, one that includes only variables with full coverage and and
### Table 2: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Four Types of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (full dataset)</th>
<th>Model 2 (reduced dataset)</th>
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**Control variables**

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Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
one with GDP per capita and population size as well as the military capacity variable. Table 2 contains the results of these two multinomial logistic regressions on four types of war onsets, coded as 1 in the year of onset and 0 otherwise.

How do the various theories fare in this test? We start with a discussion of the institutional rule variables. The omitted category in both models are modern nation-states. Compared to these, colonial dependencies are indeed more likely to experience conquest (Hypothesis 8) and secessionist civil wars (Hypothesis 7), but less likely to be the site of non-secessionist civil wars (H6) and balance of power wars (though the term is not significant in model 2 with a reduced sample). Imperial dependencies also have less risk of non-secessionist civil (H6) and more secessionist civil war (H7), and less balance of power war risk, though the latter is again only significant in model 1. These results together confirm the colonial peace argument according to which imperial and colonial dependencies are spared the wars that haunt modern, independent nation-states since the time of Napoleon.

Imperial centers are more likely to be the location of balance of power wars, consistent with hypothesis 1, though it just misses standard levels of significance \( p = .051 \). Conforming to hypothesis 2, secessionist civil wars are more likely in imperial centers compared to modern-nation states, though the variable again loses significance when GDP per capita, change in military capacity and population size are introduced in model 2 and large numbers of observations on imperial centers are dropped.

Most of the assumptions of democratic peace theory are also confirmed: Democratically and autocratically ruled territories experience less non-secessionist civil war (in both models 1 and 2), confirming to H10. Democracies are also less likely to experience balance of power wars (following H9), though this result is again only valid for model 1.

The expectations of the insurgency and feasibility theories are partially met by the data. Mountainous terrain does indeed increase the likelihood of intra-polity wars (in both models, following H11), and political instability predicts intra-polity wars (in model 1 only, thus providing mixed support for H12). A change in the military capacity of the center, however, does not affect the likelihood of intra-polity wars (see model 2), but rather that of both types of inter-polity wars—confirming the expectations of rivalry theory (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001), though obviously in a way that is not devoid of endogeneity problems. Oil does entice secessionist civil wars (as maintained by H14), except if we exclude observations of the colonial and imperial world which lack income and population data.

Finally, we note that control variables behave as expected, indicating that rich territories have less war risk while populous territories face increased risks, ceteris paribus. Meanwhile, ongoing wars in neighboring territories do indeed have a positive spillover effect on war risk (except for secessionist conflicts), though the results are sensitive to model specification.\(^{20}\)
CONCLUSION

The dataset introduced here expands substantially on existing compendiums of war by identifying wars fought in territories prior to their inclusion in the state system, explicitly coding the territorial locations in which wars were fought, and introducing a typology that describes the aims of warring parties. The analysis in the preceding section serves to illustrate the potential of such a dataset by showing how observing fixed geographic units over time allows for the testing of hypotheses such as the colonial peace argument or an institutionalist approach according to which the rules defining legitimate government shape the aims of war. While working with observations for dependencies or state-less territories introduces formidable data challenges, we hope to have shown that these challenges are worth tackling and that interesting questions can be answered with the help of such data.

Other questions, however, should continue to be dealt with other datasets. A dyadic dataset—which is easily assembled on the basis of COW data—is certainly the most adequate to test rivalry theories of interstate war (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001), and our territorial approach is unhelpful precisely because it does not have state actors as constant units of observation. For more fine-grained analysis of civil war that takes local specificities and actor-constellations into account, a GIS-based approach or a dataset with actors as units of observation is certainly to be preferred.

NOTES

1. A well-documented criticism of COW is the 1000 battle-death threshold it uses to qualify conflicts as wars. While some argue that the threshold is arbitrary and excludes smaller conflicts whose political and military dynamics resemble those of larger conflicts (Sambanis 2004, 821 ff.), others maintain that the threshold aids in overcoming difficulties with data reliability for many historical wars with fewer victims (Gleditsch 2004). Another concern is that the high death threshold produces relatively few observations over time, thus reducing the flexibility of statistical analysis (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 617). For a discussion of other coding problems see Sambanis (2004).

2. Since COW’s efforts began in the 1960s, there have been other attempts to produce a comprehensive list of wars around the world over a long historical span, though they have generally been less systematic and uneven in their geographic coverage. Luard’s (1986) compendium of wars begins in 1400, with 458 wars from 1816–1983. But his criteria for inclusion are vague, limiting the value of his list for most quantitative analysis. Sivard and Eckhardt (1989) include a list of 428 wars from 1816–1988 based on COW and expanded through independent research. They provide estimates of military and civilian casualties and the years of conflict. However, their list lacks additional supporting documentation. Holsti (1991) provides a global list dating back to 1648, but it covers only 121 wars from 1816–1989, which focus mostly on the Western world. Across these efforts, coverage of wars in pre-independent territories remains poor, especially in nineteenth-century Latin American and precolonial Africa.

3. We plan to update our own war list and coding as soon as the Sarkees/Wayman dataset becomes available. These updates can be accessed through the author’s website at www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/wimmer/Datasets.html
4. We calculate this figure based on data from Müller (1999), counting all territory-years prior to colonization in which less than 3% of the population were governed by states. Included in this estimate are precolonial Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Papua New Guinea, Ivory Coast, Botswana, Central African Republic, Qatar, Somalia, and Kenya.


6. We are well aware of the problems associated with using a high threshold and aggregating deaths over the duration of a conflict. However, given the scarcity of historical details and the fact that all of COW’s wars meet this duration of conflict threshold but perhaps not the 1000 deaths per year threshold, we choose the former to preserve comparability.

7. Conflicts that do not enter our dataset because of a lack of reliable battle death information include the wars among Yoruba states in precolonial Nigeria, the civil wars in Ethiopia and Afghanistan during the middle of the nineteenth century, the wars connected to Buganda expansion in Uganda in the precolonial era, and wars between the khanates of Central Asia before the Russian conquest. Some wars of imperial conquest may also have been missed because accurate accounts of the death toll among the local populations are rare.

8. Thus our list differs in this regard from Gleditsch (2004), who automatically includes all conflicts from the COW list if the state participant meets his sovereignty criteria. We confirm only the following civil and extra-state wars from his list: Siam-Kedah (1821), Argentina (1828–1831), Nicaragua (1855–1857), China-Khokhand (1857), Ethiopia (1867), Ethiopia-Egyptians (1885–1895), and Cameroon (1959–1961). From his list of interstate wars, we confirm only: Argentina-Brazil (1825–1828) and the War of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (1836–1839).

9. For a general discussion of the problems associated with the assumption of constant units, when they may de facto merge or split, see Abbott 1998.

10. The PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset codes the geographic coordinates and extent of wars, but covers only the post-World War II period. Braithwaite (2005) geo-codes the location of militarized interstate disputes over a longer time horizon.

11. Using the world map from 2001 and excluding mini-states leaves us with 150 territorial units.

12. Exceptions are the reunited states of Vietnam, Yemen, and Germany, and, of course, the principalities of preunification Germany and Italy.

13. There were a few cases where we deviated from these rules: in some civil wars, the forces that aim at overthrowing the government may set up a base of operation outside the territory of the country. These bases may come under attack by “hot pursuit” operations of government forces. We decided that such cross-border pursuits did not justify adding an additional location to the war (this was relevant for the civil wars in Nicaragua, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Turkey).

14. A related critique would be that using a territorial logic results in the over-counting of wars that had battlefields in several states, but were united by a single political logic. The two World Wars are a case in point. To avoid this misunderstanding, we should like to emphasize that the two World Wars are still referred to as one war each in our dataset; but these wars have several locations and thus take place in more than one unit of observation—quite comparable to the COW world, in which a world war involves many more state-actors than the average interstate war.

15. Later on, COW reconsidered this typology and defined wars that happened within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state (e.g., the rebellions within the Ottoman empire) as civil wars, while it continued to regard wars in colonies as extra-state wars (e.g., the anticolonial wars in Algeria). Still, the basic logic underlying the typology remained the same.

16. While there is, by definition, an affinity of certain types of actors to fight certain types of wars (e.g., actors within a system member state cannot fight interstate wars since they do not represent competing states), most war aims may nevertheless be pursued by most actor types. For example, states may try to conquer each other (Nazi Germany’s expansion toward the East) or to change the balance of power between them (Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor); they may also conquer nonstate members (the wars of colonial expansion fought by France and Britain) or fight with them over balance of power issues (the French-Siamese wars). Actors within a system state may seek to overthrow a government or they may aim at establishing a state of their own.

17. Fearon and Laitin use a combination of political goals as well as the recruitment basis of war parties as criteria.

18. Given the unique complexity of the two World Wars, we coded these conflicts separately, identifying individual beginning and end years as well as war aims for each territorial location where conflict occurred. See Appendix.
19. For territories not represented in Polity, we proceeded as follows: colonies were coded as autocracies since several test codings of individual colonies revealed that one would never arrive at an anocracy score for a colony (for a different approach see Fearon and Laitin 2003). Dependent territories of classic land-based empires received the same score as the imperial center. Independent territories were coded as “anarchy” if they had no central government, autocracy if they could be classified as traditional states such as emirates, or anocracy in the case of elite democracies such as the Swiss confederation.

20. To check for robustness of our results, we ran model 1 with different time specifications, with continental dummies, excluding ongoing war years from the dataset, and with dummies for hegemonic cycles following Wallerstein’s theory. Some minor changes can be reported. We limit ourselves here to those that affect the institutional variables. Models that exclude ongoing war years make colonies no longer prone to conquest (though the p-value is 0.051) but interstate wars are now significantly more likely in territories controlled by imperial centers, but lose significance for wars of secession. Continental dummies affect the likelihood of conquest of colonies and imperial dependencies but none of the other institutional variables. In models with a linear time trend, imperial dependencies are no longer significantly less likely to have interstate wars, but imperial centers now reach standard levels of significance for interstate wars, but narrowly miss them for secessions. When decade dummies are added instead of splines, imperial centers are again significantly more likely to be the site of interstate wars, but colonies become borderline significant only for wars of conquest. A period of hegemony is indeed less likely to see balance-of-power wars between states, as maintained by Wallerstein, but the results disappear if decade dummies are introduced instead of splines. The discrete time specification shows that wars of conquest are rarer in the 1830s and from 1950 to 1979, compared to the first decade in our dataset. Similarly, the linear time trend is significant and negative for wars of conquest, but for none of the other war types.

REFERENCES

A. Wimmer and B. Min


