Politics G53.2105
S. J. Brams
New York University
715 Broadway, Rm. 424
Fall 1996
998-8510
Applications of game theoryand an alternative strategic theory called
theory of movesas well as social-choice theory to a wide variety of strategic
situations, principally but not exclusively in politics, will be examined.
Uses of strategy in voting in committees and elections, in political campaigns,
in the defense and deterrence policies of nations, and in bargaining and
coalition-building situations will be among the topics discussed. Secrecy
and deception as political strategies will also be analyzed.
Although the applications of strategic thinking will be mainly to American
and international politics, strategy in everything from the Bible to sports
and business today will be studied, too. Social-choice topics that will
be analyzed include the fairness and manipulability of different voting
systems, problems of achieving proportional representation in parliamentary
democracies, and conflicts among different apportionment methods.
In addition to the required readings, further readings will be recommended
throughout the course for those interested in pursuing particular topics
in greater depth. No mathematical training beyond high school mathematics
is assumed in the course. The written requirements of the course include
a midterm and a final examination plus a short paper on a topic that is
chosen in consultation with the instructor. Each of the three written requirements
will count approximately 1/3 towards your final grade.
Books (all paperbacks)
Brams, Steven J. RATIONAL POLITICS: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND STRATEGY.
Washington, DC/Boston: CQ/Academic Press, 1985/1989 (out of print; used copies and bound reproductions in bookstore). RP
Brams, Steven J. THEORY OF MOVES. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1994. TOM
Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE
EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE. New York: W. W. Norton,
1991. TS
Assignments Due
Sept. 9: RP, chs. l-2; TOM, Introduction; TS, Introduction
Sept. 16: TOM, ch. 1; TS, ch. 1-2
Sept. 23: TOM, ch. 2; TS, ch. 3-4
Sept. 30: TOM, ch. 3; TS, ch. 5-6
Oct. 7: TOM, ch. 4; TS, ch. 7
Oct. 14: TOM, chs. 5-6
Oct. 21: TOM, chs. 7-8
Oct. 28: Midterm Examination
Nov. 4: RP, ch. 3; TS, ch. 8-9
Nov. 11: RP, ch. 4; TS, chs. 10-11
Nov. 18: RP, chs. 5 & 7 (skip ch. 6)
Nov. 25: 8-10 page paper due; oral reports
Dec. 2: RP, chs. 8-9; TS, chs. 12-13
Dec. 9: Review
Dec. 16 (?): Final Examination
Game Theory Texts
Bierman, H. Scott, and Luis Fernandez. GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC
APPLICATIONS. Addison-Wesley, 1993.
Binmore, Ken. FUN AND GAMES: A TEXT ON GAME THEORY. D. C. Heath, l992.
Davis, Morton D. GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION, 2d ed.
Basic, l983.
Eichberger, Jrgen. GAME THEORY FOR ECONOMISTS. Academic, 1993.
Friedman, James W. GAME THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMICS, 2d.
ed. Oxford University Press, 1990.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. GAME THEORY. MIT Press, 1991.
Gardner, Roy. GAMES FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS. Wiley, 1995.
Gibbons, Robert. GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS. Princeton
University Press, 1993.
Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P., and Yanis Varoufakis. GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION. Routledge, 1995.
Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa. GAMES AND DECISIONS: A CRITICAL
SURVEY. Wiley, l957.
Morris, P. INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY. Springer-Verlag, 1994.
Morrow, James D. GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS. Princeton
University Press, 1994.
Myerson, Roger B. GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT. Harvard
University Press, l99l.
Rasmusen, Eric. GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY, 2d ed. Basil Blackwell, l994.
Rubinstein, Ariel, and Martin J. Osborne. A COURSE IN GAME THEORY. MIT
Press, 1994.
Straffin, Philip D. GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY. Mathematical Associaiton
of
America, 1993.
Zagare, Frank C. GAME THEORY: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS. Sage, l984.
Applications and History of Game Theory and Social-Choice Theory
Ankeny, Nesmith C. POKER STRATEGY: WINNING WITH GAME THEORY.
Basic, 1981.
Aumann, Robert J., and Michael B. Maschler. REPEATED GAMES WITH
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. MIT Press, 1995.
Aumann, Robert J., and Sergiu Hart (eds.). HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, vols. 1/2. North Holland, 1992/1994.
Axelrod, Robert. THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION. Basic, l984.
Baird, Douglas G., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker. GAME THEORY
AND
THE LAW. Harvard University Press, 1994.
Binmore, K. G. GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. Vol. 1:
PLAYING FAIR. MIT Press, 1994.
Binmore, Ken, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani (eds.). FRONTIERS OF GAME
THEORY.
MIT Press, 1993.
Boorman, Scott A. THE PROTRACTED GAME: A WEI-CHI INTREPRETATION OF
MAOIST REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY. Oxford University Press, l969.
Brams, Steven J. BIBLICAL GAMES: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF STORIES
IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. MIT Press, l980.
Brams, Steven J. GAME THEORY AND POLITICS. Free Press, l975.
Brams, Steven J. NEGOTIATION GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO
BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION. Routledge, l990.
Brams, Steven J. PARADOXES IN POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
NONOBVIOUS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. Free Press, l976.
Brams, Steven J. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION GAME. Yale University Press,
l978.
Brams, Steven J. SUPERIOR BEINGS: IF THEY EXIST, HOW WOULD WE KNOW?
GAME-THEORETIC IMPLICATIONS OF OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPOTENCE,
IMMORTALITY, AND INCOMPREHENSIBILITY. Springer-Verlag, l983.
Brams, Steven J. SUPERPOWER GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO
SUPERPOWER CONFLICT. Yale University Press, l985.
Brams, Steven J., and Peter C. Fishburn. APPROVAL VOTING. Birkhuser
Boston,
1983.
Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. GAME THEORY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY. Basil Blackwell, l988.
Brams, Steven J., and Alan D. Taylor. FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING
TO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Colman, Andrew. GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 2d ed. Butterworth, Heinemann, 1995.
Colomer, Josep M. GAME THEORY AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:
THE SPANISH MODEL. Edward Elgar, 1995.
Coughlin, Peter. PROBABILISTIC VOTING THEORY. Cambridge University pess,
1992.
Downs, Anthony. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY. New York: Harper,
1957.
Symposium: Economics of Voting. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 9,
no. 1 (Winter 1995): 3-98.
Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich (eds). ADVANCES IN THE SPATIAL
THEORY OF VOTING. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich. THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING: AN
INTRODUCTION. Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Farquharson, Robin. THEORY OF VOTING. Yale University Press, l969.
Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. Yale
University Press, 1994.
Grofman, Bernard (ed.). INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION, AND CHOICE: AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PERSPECTIVE. University of Michigan
Press, 1993.
Hamburger, Henry. GAMES AS MODELS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA. Freeman, l979.
Howard, Nigel. PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY: THEORY OF METAGAMES AND
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. MIT Press, l97l.
Kelly, Jerry S. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY. Springer-Verlag, l988.
Kreps, David M. GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING. Oxford
University Press, l990.
Landany, Shaul P., and Robert E. Machol (eds.). OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN
SPORTS. North Holland, l970.
Livingston, Paiseley. LITERATURE AND RATIONALITY: IDEAS OF AGENCY IN
THEORY AND FICTION. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
McDonald, John. THE GAME OF BUSINESS. Doubleday, l975.
McLean, Iain, and Arnold B. Urken (eds.). CLASSICS OF SOCIAL CHOICE.
University of Michigan Press, 1995.
McMillan, John. GAMES, STRATEGIES, AND MANAGERS: HOW MANAGERS
CAN USE GAME THEORY TO MAKE BETTER BUSINESS DECISIONS.
Oxford University Press, 1992.
Macrae, Norman. JOHN VON NEUMANN. Pantheon, 1992.
Merrill, Samuel, III. MAKING MULTICANDIDATE ELECTIONS MORE
DEMOCRATIC. Princeton University Press, l988.
Miller, Nicholas R. COMMITTEES, AGENDAS, AND VOTING. Harwood Academic,
1995.
Mor, Ben D. DECISION AND INTERACTION IN CRISIS: A MODEL OF
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BEHAVIOR. Praeger, 1993.
Moulin, Herv. COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC
INTRODUCTION. Princeton University Press, 1995.
Mueller, Dennis C. PUBLIC CHOICE II. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Muzzio, Douglas. WATERGATE GAMES: STRATEGIES, CHOICES, OUTCOMES.
New York University Press, l982.
Nurmi, Hannu. COMPARING VOTING SYSTEMS. D. Reidel, 1987.
Ordeshook, Peter C. GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY. Cambridge
University Press, l986.
Ordeshook, Peter C. A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER. New York: Routledge,
1992.
Ostrom, Elinor. GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION. Cambridge University Press,
1990.
Poundstone, William. PRISONERS DILEMMA: JOHN VON NEUMANN, GAME
THEORY, AND THE PUZZLE OF THE BOMB. Doubleday, 1992.
Riker, William H. THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION. Yale University
Press,
1986.
Riker, William H. LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
CHOICE. Freeman, l982.
Riker, William H. THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS. Yale University
Press, l962.
Saari, Donald G. GEOMETRY OF VOTING. Springer-Verlag, 1994.
Sandler, Todd. COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS. University
of Michigan Press, 1992.
Schelling, Thomas C. MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR. Norton, 1978.
Schelling, Thomas C. THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT. Harvard University Press,
l960.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. MODELS OF MULTIPARTY ELECTORAL COMPETITION.
Harwood, 1991.
Sigmund, Karl. GAMES OF LIFE: EXPLORATIONS IN ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION,
AND BEHAVIOR. Oxford University Presss, 1993.
Smith, John Maynard. EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES. Cambridge
University Press, l982.
Strom, Gerald S. THE LOGIC OF LAWMAKING: A SPATIAL THEORY
APPROACH. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Taylor, Alan D. MATHEMATICS AND POLITICS: STRATEGY, VOTING, POWER,
AND PROOF. Springer-Verlag, 1995.
Taylor, Michael. THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION. Cambridge University
Press, l987.
Tsebelis, George. NESTED GAMES: RATIONAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE
POLITICS. University of California Press, l990.
Vajda, Steven. MATHEMATICAL GAMES AND HOW TO PLAY THEM. Ellis
Horwood, 1992.
Weibull, Jrgen. EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY. MIT Press, 1995.
Weintraub, E. Roy (ed.). TOWARD A HISTORY OF GAME THEORY. Duke
University Press, 1992.
Young, Peyton. EQUITY: HOW GROUPS DIVIDE GOODS AND BURDENS
AMONG THEIR MEMBERS. Princeton University Press, 1994.
Zagare, Frank C. THE DYNAMICS OF DETERRENCE. University of Chicago
Press, l987.