This is the third and final course in the GSB's core sequence in Political Economics. The course presumes that students have acquired basic technical skills in formal theory from P680 and P681 (equivalently PS201a and b) and basic empirical skills from various statistics and econometrics courses. This course brings these skills together to obtain a more comprehensive and systematic understanding of collective decision-making.

Collectively, the readings have three properties: identification of empirical regularities, theorizing about such regularities, and systematically linking theory with data. The metaphor commonly used to discuss such research is that of bridge-building between relatively purely theoretical research and relatively exploratory empirical research. The paramount objective of the course is to learn about the scholarly pitfalls and payoffs associated with bridge-building research. While the course readings center on legislative politics, the somewhat narrow substantive focus of the course nevertheless provides methodological knowledge that is much more generally beneficial for social scientists.

The reading list is quite comprehensive, but it should be noted that not all of the items on the reading list will in fact be assigned. (For example, many of my articles and papers will not be assigned.) My aim is to preserve some flexibility in responding to class interests. Readings that are certain to be used are marked with (*) and are included in the syllabus packet. Others will be copied and distributed in class as needed.

Requirements for the course include regular homework, class participation, occasional class presentations, and a final exam. The books listed below can be purchased from the Stanford Bookstore.

Required Books

Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Mayhew, David. 1991. Divided We Govern. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Recommended Book

Oleszek, Walter. 1984. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Methodological overview

* Riker, William H. 1977. The Future of a Science of Politics. American Behavioral Scientist 21: 11-38.

* Kramer, Gerald H. 1986. Political Science as Science. In Political Science: The Science of Politics, ed. Herbert Weisberg. New York: Agathon Press.

* Basu, Janet. 1994. Scientists Studying Possible Link Between Signals, Earthquakes, Continuing Research; Still Just a Theory. Campus Report February 2.

Examples of positive approaches

* Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

* Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Institutions

* Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. American Political Science Review 81: 85-104.

* Diermeier, Daniel. 1995. Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions. American Political Science Review 89: 344-55.

* Field, Alexander James. 1979. On the Explanation of Rules Using Rational Choice Models. Journal of Economic Issues 13: 49-72.

Dowding, Keith. 1994. The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and 'New Institutionalism'. Journal of Theoretical Politics 6: 105-17.

Patterson, Samuel. 1995. Legislative Institutions and Institutionalism in the United States. Journal of Legislative Studies 1: 10-29.

Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. Definitions of Institutions and their Uses. Stanford University: Typescript.

Tests of institutional theories

* LaRue, James B., and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 1992. Institutional Features of Congressional Decisions: The Fight to Prohibit Smoking on Airlines. Public Choice 73: 301-18.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban. Journal of Law Economics and Organization forthcoming.

Shipan, Charles R. 1992. Individual Incentives and Institutional Imperatives: Committee Jurisdiction and Long-Term Health Care. American Journal of Political Science.

Bowler, Shaun, and David M. Farrell. 1995. The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization and Co-ordination. British Journal of Political Science 25: 219-43.

Controversies about committees

* Hall, Richard L., and Bernard Grofman. 1990. The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias. American Political Science Review 84: 1149-66.

Londregan, John, and James Snyder. 1994. Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 233-66.

Jones, Bryan D., Baumgartner, and Talbert. 1993. The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress. American Political Science Review 87: 657-71.

Related measurement literature

* Snyder, James M. 1992. Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings. Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 319-46.

* Krehbiel, Keith. 1994. Deference, Extremism, and Interest Group Ratings. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 61-78.

* Groseclose, Timothy, Steve Levitt, and James Snyder. 1995. An Inflation-Adjusted ADA Measure. M.I.T.: Typescript.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis. American Journal of Political Science 29: 357-84.

Heckman, James J., and James Snyder. 1995. A Linear Latent Factor Model of Voting. University of Chicago: Typescript.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1992. Constituency Characteristics and Legislative Preferences. Public Choice 76: 21-37.

Herrera, Richard, Thomas Epperlein, and Eric R.A.N. Smith. 1995. The Stability of Congressional Roll-Call Indexes. Political Research Quarterly 48: 403-16.

Lobbying

* Groseclose, Timothy. 1995. An Examination of the Market for Favors and Votes in Congress. Economic Inquiry forthcoming.

* Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1994. Counteractive Lobbying. American Journal of Political Science 38: 25-44.

Baumgartner, Frank M., and Beth L. Leech. 1995. The Multiple Ambiguities of "Counteractive Lobbying". American Journal of Political Science forthcoming.

Kroszner, Randall S., and Thomas Stratmann. 1996. Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees. Chicago Graduate School of Business: Typescript.

Groseclose, Timothy, and James M. Snyder. 1996. Buying Supermajorities. American Political Science Review forthcoming.

Tests of theories about rules

* Dion, Douglas, and John Huber. 1996. Party Leadership and Procedural Choice in Legislatures. Journal of Politics forthcoming.

Sinclair, Barbara. 1994. House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 477-94.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. Restrictive Rules Reconsidered. Stanford University: Typescript.

Parties in legislatures

* Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where's the Party? British Journal of Political Science 23: 235-66.

* Rohde, David W. 1994. Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: 341-359.

Sinclair, Barbara. 1992. The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives. Journal of Politics 54: 657-84.

Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 1995. Theories of the Party in the Legislature and the Transition to Republican Rule in the House. Michigan State University: Typescript.

Schickler, Eric, and Andrew Rich. 1996. Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House. Yale University: Typescript.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House. Legislative Studies Quarterly 2: 215-31.

Snyder, James M. 1993. Estimating Party Influence on Congressional Roll-Call Voting. MIT: Typescript.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1995. Where's the Party Theory? Class note.

Congress and the executive branch

* Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern. New Haven: Yale University Press.

* Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics 8: 7-40.

* McCarty, Nolan M., and Keith T. Poole. 1995. Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11: 282-312.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. Pivotal Politics. Typescript: Stanford University.

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures. Columbia University: Typescript.

Rivers, Douglas, and Nacy L. Rose. 1985. Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress. American Journal of Political Science 29: 183-96.