



Banks and Mo • What are the implication	• 1		•
	As	ssets	Liabilities
	Loans	Reserves	Deposits
1 st National Bank	90	10	100
2 nd National Bank	81	9	90
3 rd National Bank And so on	72.9	8.1	81
Total	900	100	1000
			4
			4


Banks and Money Supply in Words

- Suppose banks keep 10% of deposits on reserve.
- If the 1st National Bank has 100 yen in deposits, then there will be 100 * (1/0.1) = 1000 yen in circulation
- The money multiplier is one over the reserve ratio. It tells you how much currency is generated by 1 yen of deposits.

5









What Were Kinroku Kosai?

- Bonds were priced at 5-14 times the nominal stipend value
- 5% yield
 - Bond rate should have been around 12%
- Not redeemable for 5 years and then some randomly redeemable each year for 30 years
- Magnitude
 - Issued ¥175 mil worth of bonds to 310,000 people
 - To get some sense of the magnitude consider the following

9

- Gov't budget was around ¥59 million
- GNP was around ¥800mln








Date	Number of National	Assets (millions of	Bank Notes (millions of
872	Banks 0	yen)	yen)
872 873	0	3	0.9
873 874	4	3.5	0.9
375	4	3.5	0.0
876	5	2.5	1.7
377	26	23.0	13.0
878	95	33.3	24.5
379	153	40.6	34.0


Gov Pape Mor	er Bank	al Total	Specie and Convertible to Total	
1876 10	•	107	40	
1877 10	6 13	119	35	100
878 13	9 26	166	26	108
.879 13	0 34	164	26	130
880 12	4 34	159	23	148


Effect	
Value of bonds fell enormously – Removed financial strain on government	nt
Didn't create financial warriors	
Raised relative position of merchant	S
The issuance of Kinroku kosai lead, rebellion in 1877	in part, to the Satsuma
- Satsuma felt betrayed by Meiji reforms	
 Government won but cost of fighting w (Y27 mln) and letting banks issue mono- 	
 Prices more than doubled between 1870 Inflation at 20% per year 	6 and 1881
- Badly hurt Samurai, which benefited go	overnment
- New government problem was that land	d was not reevaluated























	Institutional Bo	rrowing	
Source	Organization	Year	
Britain	Navy	1869	
	Telegraph System	1869	
	Postal System	1872	
	Postal Savings System	1875	
	Commercial Banks	1882	
France	Army	1869	
	Primary School System	1872	
	Police	1874	
	Judicial System	1872	
	Industrial Banks		
US	Primary School System*	1879	
	National Bank System	1872	
Germany	Army*	1878	
Belgium	Bank of Japan*	1882	









Comments on the success of Japanese industry


"Public response in the US to the expansion of Japanese trade has been varied, depending on the nature of the group interests affected. A large section of the public has remained indifferent, if not oblivious. Various business interests have expressed concern over Japanese competition, especially as it has appeared in the American market, ranging from vague worriment to emphatic appeals for government aid in the case of the XXXX industry. Proponents of "Buy Americanism" have made effective propaganda for the cause out of this alleged threat to the American standard of living. The press, for example, has industriously inflated the "Japanese menace" with graphic accounts "of darkened American factories, of poverty and despair in homes of honest, able workmen-a story of cunning Japanese subtlety spreading ruin while [economists] talk of 'Trade Balances.'" "Those [economists] said Senator XXXX in the Senate on April 19, 19XX, "if they have not gone to Russia, may now be retired to Tokyo, receiving medals made in Japan ... "






se muu				
1870 85 5 10	18	890 72 13 15	1912 62 18 20	1930 52 19 29
1875 24.3 40.2 22.3	1890 18.8 35.2 36.1			1930 32.8 25 30.6
	1870 85 5 10 1875 24.3 40.2	Em 1870 18 85 5 10 1875 1890 24.3 18.8 40.2 35.2	Employmen 1870 1890 85 72 5 13 10 15 1875 1890 1905 24.3 18.8 22.7 40.2 35.2 34.4	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$










Industry Results

- · Adapt foreign technology for domestic conditions
 - Industry went with "ring" spinning
 - Had to use high quality raw cotton, not flexible
 - Needed a lot of people around to retie broken threads by hand
 - Able to use a lot of female labor between ages of 12-16
 - · Idiot-proofed the machinery and went with a McDonanlds strategy
 - Entire industry switched away from water power to steam. Earlier all but three had used water power


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





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


Year	Ratio of Money Supply to
	National Income
1875-80	35
1880-85	26
1885-90	23
1890-95	24
1895-1900	24
1900-1905	24
1905-10	26
1910-14	23





Specialized Institutions
 Postal Savings System Established in 1875 for small savers Served as depository institutions before these existed Were an alternative to the government bond market By 1890's half of all deposits were in PSS Special Banks Idea was these were public service institutions Industrial Bank of Japan, Hypothec Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank Stock held by private sector Did not take deposits but raised capital through debentures (unsecured bonds) that they sold to the government Gov't obtained the money from the Postal savings system By 1914, 26% of all loans were from these institutions
42



	Meiji Finance	
•	National banks	
	 Could issue currency until 1882 	
	 Charters expired b/n 1896 and 1899 and converted into private banks 	
•	Private banks (including specialized institutions except PSS)	
	 Focused on lending 	
•	Quasi-banks	
	- Engaged in lending, trade, and production	
	 Similar to trading companies 	
	– SR lending	
	- In 1893 bank act forced to convert into private banks	
		44

	Number, Total Paid-In Capital, and Average Capital of National Banks,									
Private Banks, and Quasi-Banks in Japan, 1873-1899 (capital in thousand yen)										
						Nationa				
Year	No.	Total	No.	Total	No.	Total				
		Cap.		Cap.		Cap.				
1873	1	2.441	0	0		- 1				
1874	4	3,432	0	0						
1875	4	3,450	0	0						
1876	5	2,350	1	2,000						
1877	26	22,986	1	2,000						
1878	95	33,596	1	2,000						
1879	151	40,616	10	3,290						
1880	151	43,041	39	6,280	120	1,211				
1881	148	43,886	90	10,447	369	5,894				
1882	143	44,206	176	17,152	438	7,958				
1883	141	44,386	207	20,487	573	12,071				
1884	140	44,536	214	19,421	741	15,142				
1885	139	44,456	218	18,750	744	15,397				
1886	136	44,416	220	17,959	748	15,391				
1887	136	45,839	221	18,896	741	15,112				
1888	135	46,878	195	15,790	711	14,408				
1889	134	47,681	218	17,432	695	14,421				
1890	134	48,645	217	18,976	702	14,512				
1891	134	48,701	252	19,796	678	13,827				
1892	133	48,326	270	22,856	680	13,944				
1893	133	48,416	604	31,030	0	0				
1894	133	48,816	700	37,411	0	0				
1895	133	48,951	792	49,967	0	0				
1896	121	44,762	1,005	88,970	0	0				
1897	58	13,630	1,217	149,286	0	0				
1898	4	390	1,444	189,440	0	0				
1899	0	0	1,561	209,973	0	0				