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Chapter 3
The Transformation of American Think Tanks, 1970 to today

INTRODUCTION

The early 1970s marked the beginning of a decades-long period of growth and transformation among U.S. think tanks, the elements of which have been well documented. Among the major changes, think tanks became more numerous, more competitive, more eager to attract news media attention, more likely to espouse ideological positions, and more inclined to produce short, synthetic products on faster schedules rather than original scholarly research.[1] This chapter offers an explanatory account of this upheaval. Against the prevailing viewpoint, which characterizes the period in terms of a series of disparate trends, I argue that a unified and coherent transformation took place, the core of which was the crystallization of a distinct think tank field – a hybrid, structured space of relations in which think tanks vie (both with one another and, collectively, against other organs of intellectual production) for a monopoly over the means of producing political expertise. A central feature of this process was that think tanks managed to wrest a degree of autonomy from the university and become a partially self-credentialing sphere of practice – increasing, in the process, their "market share" in the production of political expertise. Think tanks established common criteria of intellectual production, such that by the 1990s there was a recognizable think tank "product" distinct from academic research. Attendant to this change, think tanks grew more dependent on institutions of political and economic power.

What brought about this extraordinary development? I argue that it was the result of a systematic attempt by holders of economic capital to bolster their machinery of intellectual production in an effort to control the conditions of public debate. In the 1970s, a series of economic dislocations gave rise to the political reawakening of American business leaders, prompting a coordinated effort to oppose the taxes and regulatory schemes installed during the New Deal era. Embattled business leaders set about a campaign to legitimate their political priorities. Because their major adversary was a perceived "new class" of intellectuals, the project was carried out principally on the terrain of cultural-intellectual production. Aided by a set of right-wing intellectual brokers, the pro-business advocates aligned with the burgeoning conservative movement to bankroll the creation of new think tanks and the rehabilitation of old ones. At the same time, a set of institutional changes altered the kinds of intellectual tools that could be used in American politics, facilitating the success of these "challenger" think tanks and the reorientation of their "incumbent" competitors. The continued expansion of higher education increased the supply of the highly educated, many of whom moved into the think tank sector.

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[1] [Numerous citations].

The success of the "challenger" think tanks altered some of the basic premises and parameters of production in this social universe. In particular, there were shifts in its dominant temporality and spatiality (i.e., the proper sense of time guiding intellectual production, and the field's spatial configuration), as well as the dominant notion of credibility by which think tank products were judged. Also noteworthy was the emergence of a new social actor, a "hybrid intellectual" whose distinctive skills and habits were borrowed from the proximate fields of politics, business, academe, and journalism. The emergence of a distinct think tank field in the U.S. marked the creation of a new structural location from which such "hybrid intellectuals" could participate in public debates.

Empirically, this chapter is based on historical-archival records, in-depth interviews, and a collection of articles from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *The Economist* magazine. It has two parts: first, a historical overview of American think tanks since 1970, and, second, a series of case studies of specific organizations – most notably, the Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Institute for Policy Studies. I focus on these organizations because they represent important structural locations within, and trajectories through, the competitive space that think tanks occupy. However, the goal of the analysis is to go beyond an account of the organizations and characterize the system of relations in which they are embedded – i.e., the changing parameters, possibilities, necessities, and constraints involved in the production of political expertise. The case studies are meant to uncover general tendencies that applied to all think tanks during the historical period in question.

ANALYTICAL PREMISES: THINK TANKS AS A PROTO-FIELD

One of the major purposes of the notion of field, this study's conceptual anchor, is to overcome the false opposition between internalist and externalist analytical modes (Bourdieu; see also Eyal).[2] On the one hand, the struggles in a field are relatively autonomous, which is to say that they have their own specific histories, dynamics, institutions, and forms of profit. In this view, a field can be regarded as a semi-distinct social universe. Yet on the other hand, the boundaries of a field are porous, which is to say that fields are subject to external determinations. Much of what occurs there reflects larger social forces – though, like a prism, the field's boundaries uniquely refract these forces, whose manifestations are therefore not as simple or straightforward as mere "reflections." The field concept parsimoniously captures both sides of this duality.

The dual approach implied by the field concept mirrors a property of the empirical object: think tanks make up a partially autonomous space, yet they are also structurally dependent on the neighboring realms of politics, business, academe, and journalism. The chapter's central challenge, therefore, is to represent the history of think tanks without overestimating the field's boundedness, but also without overlooking its "field-like" properties and reducing think tanks to a mirror of the more established institutions that brought them into being, and on which they depend for their existence. Accordingly, this chapter pursues a double objective: first, to identify the large-scale economic, political, and cultural determinations that provided the impetus for growth and change among U.S. think tanks, and, second, to trace the evolution of think tanks as a series of internal struggles.

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[2] For a more detailed discussion of the field concept and its uses in this study, see Chapter 1.

Genesis of the think tank field

This chapter's core proposition is that the space of think tanks took on an increasingly relational or "field-like" quality after 1970. How, in general, do we know when a new field has emerged? What marks its genesis? Because Bourdieu developed the concept, above all, as a reminder to think relationally (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), the major prerequisite for the emergence of a new field is the existence of a category of social actors who are oriented toward one another in their practice. Using a more objectivist language, Philip Gorski offers this definition: "[A]n autonomous field exists if, and to the degree, that we can identify a structured and hierarchically ordered set of social positions, occupied by individuals, institutions or classes." The emphasis on hierarchy faithfully reflects Bourdieu's agonistic conception of the social world. Fields are fundamentally sites of struggle over some particular form of authority. But the relations that constitute a field may take on any number of characteristics; we can speak of relations of similarity and difference, domination and subordination, collaboration and competition. The major axis along which fields vary – whether internally, compared with other fields, or over time – is their degree of autonomy. A field is autonomous to the degree that the form of production carried out therein possesses a distinctive logic developed collectively by the producers themselves. The making of "art for art's sake," for example, marks the breaking off of an autonomous artistic realm from other spheres, such as those of commerce and patronage. Autonomy implies the existence of distinctive criteria of judgment and legitimation. By contrast, and again borrowing from Gorski's formulation, "a field is heteronomous if, and to the degree, that its internal structure is inflected or influenced by the structure of neighboring fields." Social practice carried out within a heteronomous field, or within the heteronomous sector of a field, can be subsumed within the logic of other fields.

My central argument is that the space of American think tanks took on an increasingly relational or "field-like" quality after 1970. This change was marked, above all, by the fact that think tanks developed their own <u>institutions</u> and <u>social actors</u>.[3] Despite their increased mutual orientation, think tanks make up a markedly <u>heteronomous</u> field, insofar as they are structurally dependent on the neighboring realms of politics, academics, business, and journalism. Not only do think tanks remain dependent on these proximate spheres for their resources and personnel, but the reigning logic of practice within think tanks is strongly influenced by their dominant orthodoxies. This chapter's second major proposition concerns the changing nature of the think tank field's heteronomy. My argument is that the growth of think tanks has been accompanied by their increased dependence on political and economic institutions and their corresponding migration away from centers of social scientific production. The think tank field's intermediate structural location is what gives its transformation a seemingly paradoxical character – i.e., its growing autonomy, in one sense, and growing heteronomy in another. This is what I mean to convey by the term "interstitial field."

[3] I use the term institution broadly to refer to any durable configuration of rules and resources (Sewell 1992), including formal organizations, mechanisms of reproduction like training programs, and routinized forms of knowledge and practice.

THINK TANKS IN 1970: A SNAPSHOT

In 1970, there were a few dozen American think tanks (Dickson 1973). The oldest and most prominent among them had been operating for roughly half a century. Most think tanks had been founded by wealthy industrialists such as Andrew Carnegie, the famous steel tycoon (in the case of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Robert S. Brookings, a St. Louis lumber and real estate magnate (Brookings Institution), and Edward Filene, a Boston clothing and textile merchant (Twentieth Century Fund). Yet despite the early emergence of a core group of organizations specialized in policy research, the think tank business remained a virtuoso affair for most of its history – which is to say that even into the mid-twentieth century there were few institutionalized connections between think tanks and the state.[4]

The major recent development in 1970 was the emergence of several state-affiliated think tanks – first, the military contract organizations, of which the Rand Corporation was the prototype, and then its domestic policy-oriented counterpart, the Urban Institute, in 1968. Significantly, it was in reference to these new organizations that the term "think tank" was first coined. Rand, established in 1946, performed contract research related to military planning for the Defense Department. The Urban Institute carried out research on the implementation and evaluation of social policies, originally for the Johnson-era Great Society programs. These contract institutes played a central role in establishing a place for the formally autonomous research center in national politics. Table 3.1 lists the major American think tanks in 1970, along with their operating budgets, founding years, and original geographical locations.

[Table 3.1 here]

Now that the state was in the think tank business, a kind of proto-industry for policy research began to crystallize. In his count, Rich (2004) dates the initial multiplication of U.S. think tanks to the early 1970s.

CONTEXTS OF CHANGE

The biggest force that would be exerted on the think tank sphere came from the political mobilization of American business, which produced a massive influx of new capital and new social actors. Seeking to bolster their machinery of intellectual production, business corporations and wealthy advocates of free enterprise bankrolled the creation of new think tanks and the financial rehabilitation of old ones. This project was part of a larger institution-building effort, the goal of which was to increase the conservative movement's internal cohesion and organizational capacity as a way to defend private industry from taxes and regulatory mechanisms. Think tanks, I argue, were among the most important institutions in the "rise of the right."

The political reawakening of American business was motivated in part by a series of economic dislocations in the 1970s. The period after the Great Depression had been

[4] Each had its own policy niche. For example, whereas Brookings focused largely on domestic economic policy, the Carnegie Endowment and the Council on Foreign Relations dealt primarily with matters of foreign policy. For a more thorough inventory of American think tanks, see Smith.

characterized by historically high levels of taxation and social expenditure, high union membership, stable economic growth, and rising levels of productivity. Economic order had been achieved during this era through a "Fordist-Keynesian" compromise. The state played an active role in the management of economic life through such means as market regulation, fiscal policy intended to create demand, and various forms of social expenditure.[5] Politics was marked by a certain stability based on a so-called "liberal consensus" that emphasized a potential harmony between classes based on shared economic goals, the efficacy of technical knowledge for solving social problems, and the desirability of promoting the American way of life throughout the world. [Godfrey Hodgson, footnote 39 in prospectus].

The extraordinary combination of high inflation and slow economic growth in the 1970s effectively brought an end to the Fordist-Keynesian compact. Such economic dislocations prompted business leaders to coordinate their political efforts and advance the argument that the taxes and regulatory schemes originally devised to protect workers, consumers, and the environment were no longer viable in the context of heightened international competition.[50] (Blumenthal 1986; Vogel; Himmelstein 1990). But even if this argument predisposed business leaders to align with the political right, the circumstances of their eventual collaboration with the American conservative movement remain open to explanation. How, we should ask, was this political alliance achieved?

The existing scholarship on this question suggests it was the leadership of the neoconservative intellectuals that facilitated the coalition between American business and the right (CITATIONS). The neoconservatives were a group of liberal Democrats motivated by an opposition to what they saw as the excesses of the New Left and its influence within the Democratic Party.[6] The central factor in bringing about their exodus from the Democratic Party was a disagreement with the party's foreign policy stance, based on the belief that the left had become soft on communism.[7] Disorder at home did not help either: the neoconservatives witnessed the radicalism of the 1960s "with a mixture of horror and contempt," according to historian John Ehrman.[8] They believed "democracy was under a worldwide siege" from totalitarianism, and that the far left was aiding the external threat.[9]

The entry of organized business into the political sphere came at a critical time for the American right. Since the 1950s, conservative activists had been subjecting themselves to a tremendous degree of self-scrutiny in an effort to ensure the internal cohesion of their group. The goal of this effort was nothing short of the stable unification of the conservative political program through a reconciliation of the gaps and tensions

[5] The latter included Social Security benefits, unemployment insurance, public housing assistance, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), food stamps, nutrition programs, Medicaid and Medicare, job training programs, and energy assistance.

[6] Diggins (1975); Steinfels (1979); and Ehrman (1995) are key sources.

[7] According to Ehrman (1995:35), "The rise of the New Left and its revolutionary rhetoric, set amid urban riots, campus upheavals, and a variety of other social disturbances, appalled them."

[8] Ibid., p. 35. Furthermore, because many of the neoconservatives were Jewish, they were also concerned about anti-Semitism, particularly from blacks. They found deeply troubling the occasional unification of black militants and the New Left, such as in the alliance of black students with the SDS at the 1968 Columbia University student rebellion.

[9] Ibid., p. 92.

between its various intellectual strands (Himmelstein 1990).[10] Much of the activity surrounding this unification effort occurred on the pages of conservative magazines and journals like *Commentary*, *The Public Interest*, *Human Affairs*, *The Weekly Standard*, and the *National Review*. The publishers and editors of these journals included prominent conservatives like Frank Meyer, M. Stanton Evans, and William F. Buckley, Jr., who became the primary architects of a project know as fusionism. These thinkers actively sought to reconstruct conservative philosophy by synthesizing its various strands based on the assumption that their differences were matters of emphasis and not fundamental incongruity.

The primary ideological fault line faced by these mediating figures was between libertarian and traditionalist varieties of conservatism. Whereas the former strand identified economic individualism as the central value, the latter emphasized traditionalism on social issues. The eventual synthesis worked out and promoted by the fusionist thinkers retained the libertarian notion of individual economic freedom, but rooted this belief in the traditionalist conception of an objective moral order. Substantively, this meant a shift of priority among conservatives toward a moral, as opposed to a purely technical, defense of capitalism, and toward a more aggressive, interventionist foreign policy, with a heavy emphasis on defeating communism.[11]

Just as important as the formulation of a set of core principles around which conservatives could rally was their identification of a common philosophical opposition to the New Deal and to collectivist impulses in general. These ideological foils were conveniently embodied in the person of the secular humanist, and in the real or perceived "new class" of professionals, technocrats, "pointy-headed intellectuals," and bureaucrats who had acted as architects of liberal reform during the mid-twentieth century. For all their differences, the various kinds of conservatives could agree on a common suspicion of those who had granted the federal government an unprecedented role in the management of economic and social life. Conservative leaders thus developed both positive and negative bases of self-identification.[12] The major result of the fusionist project was an ideological rejuvenation of conservatism in the 1960s. Although there remained rifts and internal contradictions on the right, including over major issues such as the proper size and role of the state and the compatibility of capitalism with biblical faith, American conservatives were able to put aside many of their differences and direct their gaze toward the task of political mobilization.[13]

Now that business leaders were increasing their capacity to , the neoconservatives

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[10] The following four paragraphs draw from Himmelstein (1990).

[11] There is some disagreement as to which side, the libertarian or the traditionalist, was more successful in imposing its definition of conservatism. In her review of Himmelstein (1990), for example, Klatch (1990:802) argues, "Although he concludes that the fusionist synthesis leans heavily toward libertarianism, the evidence presented indicates that the emphasis on religion actually accommodates traditionalism more than libertarianism."

[12] In addition to bringing together disparate intellectual strands on the right, the effort to reconstruct conservative ideology involved purging certain others, particularly the most racist and nationalist elements, from the conservative ranks. On this point, see Brennan (1995).

[13] In this regard, the Republican nomination of Barry Goldwater for president in 1964 has increasingly been identified as the watershed moment of conservative influence within the party. See, for example, Brennan (1995), Goldberg (1995), and Perlstein (2001).

saw the opportunity for collaboration. They urged big business to support the expansion of a "counterintelligentsia" that would promote the ideology of free enterprise (Blumenthal, Himmelstein). For example, Irving Kristol wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* in the early 1970s that the American business corporation is (quote in NYT, December 6, 1981)

> largely defenseless, a nice big fat juicy target for every ambitious politician and a most convenient scapegoat for every variety of discontent…. When you give away your money, you can be as foolish, as arbitrary, as whimsical as you like. But when you give away your stockholders' money, your philanthropy must serve the longer-term interests of the corporation. Corporate philanthropy should not be, and cannot be, disinterested.

The neoconservative figures who were most influential in brokering an alliance with the business community were Kristol, William Simon, and Norman Podhoretz.

UNDERWRITING THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT

The following vignettes describe six of the largest benefactors of this resurgent conservative movement. They have a number of things in common. Most were second- or third-generation capitalists from successful entrepreneurial families whose fortunes had been made during the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century. All were troubled by the germ of radicalism that appeared in the 1960s, motivating a strong anti-communist backlash and an embrace of free market principles. In a few cases, philanthropists redirected the giving patterns of pre-existing philanthropic institutions to reflect this new emphasis. Having witnessed the efficacy of left-leaning public action groups in the 1960s and '70s – and believing that American policy was increasingly under siege by a "new class" of leftist intellectuals – they sought to develop new instruments of cultural-intellectual production to defend American business from collectivist forces.

> (1) **Richard Mellon Scaife (b. 1932).** The son of Pittsburgh steelmaker Alan Scaife and Sarah Mellon (banker Andrew W. Mellon's niece), Scaife is heir to the Mellon fortune made through the oil and banking industries.[14] Expelled from Yale, Scaife graduated from the University of Pittsburgh in 1957. Having developed an interest in journalism at any early age, Scaife purchased several newspapers in his adulthood, including the *Pittsburgh Tribune-Review* in 1969.[15] In 1973, four years after his mother's death, Scaife took control of the family's philanthropic foundations – the Sarah Scaife, Scaife Family, Carthage, and Allegheny Foundations – and shifted the focus of their support to New Right and

[14] At the time of this writing, the Mellon family's primary holdings were in three companies: Mellon Bank, Gulf Oil, and Alcoa aluminum.

[15] Scaife's most notorious publishing venture was his ownership in the 1970s of Kern House Enterprises, a publishing house that ran a London-based news agency called Forum World Features. In 1975, a British magazine called *Time Out* ran an article backed by a purported CIA memo alleging that Forum World was a CIA front operation for spreading anti-communist propaganda. On an equally conspiratorial note, in 1997 the *New York Times* noted that, "Katharine Graham, the former publisher of the *Washington Post*, wrote in her memoirs that in 1972 the Nixon White House weighed a plan to have Mr. Scaife buy the *Post*, which was breaking the Watergate story at the time."

anti-communist causes.[16] Scaife's giving reached far and wide. By 1981, the *Washington Post* estimated that Scaife had "shelled out $100 million to bring us the many voices of his conservative chorus," and speculated that he "could claim to have done more than any other individual in the past five or six years to influence the way in which Americans think about their country and the world."

Scaife funded most of the major conservative think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, the Manhattan Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Institute for Contemporary Studies. The Heritage Foundation became Scaife's "favorite beneficiary," according to a *Washington Post* overview of his grant making. By 1999, Scaife had given the think tank $34 million in inflation-adjusted dollars, including 42% of its 1976 income ($420,000 out of $1 million) and 17% of its 1981 income ($900,000 of $5.3 million). Other think tanks relied heavily on Scaife as well. In 1986, the *New York Times* identified the Sarah Scaife Foundation as the Manhattan Institute's largest single donor (NYT, May 5, 1986).[17] Scaife's charity also aided political candidates (e.g., Barry Goldwater during his 1964 presidential campaign), conservative legal foundations (e.g., the Pacific and Mountain States Legal Foundations), and centers of free-market thought (e.g., Emory University's Law and Economics Center). (WP, July 12, 1981). Scaife gave considerable sums to the *American Spectator* magazine during its 1990s investigations of President Bill Clinton, and $500,000 to support production of the 10-part public television show "Free to Choose," featuring Milton Friedman. In 2005, *Forbes* estimated Scaife's personal fortune at over $1 billion, putting him among the world's 500 richest individuals.[18] By that time, his philanthropic giving had topped $600 million (Wash Post 1999).

(2) **Bradley family.** In 1903, brothers Lynde and Harry Bradley started the Compression Rheostat Company – later renamed the Allen-Bradley Company – in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Specialized in the production of industrial control and factory automation equipment, Allen-Bradley was purchased by Rockwell International Corporation in 1985 for $1.7 billion. The infusion of money led to the creation of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation to honor the company's founders and the philosophical principles according to which they lived. In the foundation's words, "The Bradley brothers were committed to preserving and defending the tradition of free representative government and private enterprise that has enabled the American nation and, in a larger sense, the entire Western world to flourish intellectually and economically."[19] Accordingly, the foundation supported individuals and organizations "devoted to strengthening American democratic capitalism and the institutions, principles and values that sustain and nurture it." The Bradley Foundation quickly became the nation's single largest conservative philanthropy, its assets reaching a high of $715 million in 2000.

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[16] As this sentence implies, the Scaife charities had not always given mostly to conservative causes. In 1981, the *Washington Post* noted that, ten years prior, the Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation "gave mainly to traditional community causes such as the opera and the United Negro College Fund. Today its list of 'public affairs' recipients reads like a Who's Who of the conservative network, a shift reflecting the interests of Richard Mellon Scaife."

[17] In 1999, the *Washington Post* published a retrospective account of Scaife's four decades of philanthropy. See [reference].

[18] See http://www.forbes.com.

[19] http://www.bradleyfdn.org

That year, foundation grants totaled $44 million, a figure that would decline following stock market losses in the subsequent years.[20] In 2003, the Bradley Foundation gave about $27 million in grants.

Since its inception, the Bradley Foundation has given over $500 million, both to local Milwaukee-area and national organizations. Among the latter groups, the foundation's two largest beneficiaries have been the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. From 1985 to 2004, each think tank received more than $13 million in Bradley grants. In 2003, the Hudson Institute created its Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal, a semi-autonomous division with an annual budget of $450,000. The Bradley Foundation has also supported the development of conservative magazines such as *The American Spectator*, *The Public Interest*, and *The National Interest*. The issue of "school-choice" has ranked near the top of its policy priorities.

(3) **John M. Olin (1892-1982).** With a background in chemical engineering, the Illinois native made his fortune through chemical and munitions manufacturing. Olin's company merged with Mathieson Chemical Corporation in 1954 to become Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation. The previous year, Olin had established a philanthropic foundation, but it did not become a politically vigorous entity until 1969, when Olin grew convinced that left-wing radicalism threatened the country. Olin was appalled in particular by antiwar activities at Columbia University, his alma mater, and decided to use his fortune to support the free enterprise system. In 2005, the Olin Foundation listed its purpose as "to provide support for projects that reflect or are intended to strengthen the economic, political and cultural institutions upon which the American heritage of constitutional government and private enterprise is based." William E. Simon, the foundation's longtime president, was explicit about its goal of supporting a conservative "counterintelligentsia."

During its 52-year existence, the Olin Foundation contributed nearly $400 million to various causes, both political and non-political. Think tanks were among the largest beneficiaries. Major grant recipient included the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and the Manhattan Institute. In addition to think tanks, the Olin Foundation funded university programs, particularly in the fields of law and economics. Harvard, Stanford, Chicago, and Yale Law Schools all received substantial Olin contributions. The John M. Olin School of Business at Washington University in St. Louis bears the philanthropist's name, as do endowed professorships at Fordham University, George Mason University, and Yale Law School. The Olin Foundation supported individual scholars with a free enterprise perspective as well, including William J. Bennett, Allan Bloom (*The Closing of the American Mind*), Robert Bork, Dinesh D'Souza, Samuel Huntington (*The Clash of Civilizations*), Irving Kristol, and Charles Murray (*Losing Ground*). The Olin Foundation ended its operations in November 2005.

(4) **Koch family.** In 1940, Fred C. Koch (pronounced "coke") co-founded the Wood River Oil and Refining Company, the Wichita, Kansas firm that would later become Koch Industries. In 1927, Koch had invented a thermal crude oil refining process, the success of which allowed him to build refineries in several countries throughout the 1930s, including Russia, where he became sensitized to

[20] *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, "Funding's new heavy-hitter," Feb. 9, 2003. (ALAN J. BORSUK)

the miseries of life under Stalin. Koch returned to the United States a fervid anti-Communist, co-founding the John Birch Society in Indianapolis in 1958.[21] Fred's son Charles inherited control of the company upon his father's death in 1967, which was renamed Koch Industries. Another son, David, joined the business in 1970, and, in the succeeding decades, the two brothers led the company through a period of enormous expansion and diversification. Following the acquisition of paper manufacturer Georgia-Pacific in 2005, Koch Industries became the largest privately held company in the United States, with more than 80,000 employees worldwide and annual sales exceeding $60 billion.[22] By then, it encompassed a wide variety of companies in the petroleum, chemical, ranching, and financial services industries. With a combined net worth of over $4 billion, David and Charles Koch were listed among the top 50 wealthiest individuals in the United States [NCRP report].

The Koch brothers carried on their father's tradition of right-wing activism by contributing to a wide variety of conservative and libertarian organizations. Most of their charitable giving was channeled through three foundations: the Charles G. Koch, David H. Koch and Claude R. Lambe foundations. In 1996, David Koch served as vice chairman of Senator Robert Dole's 1996 presidential campaign (WP, June 21, 1995). Among his major projects, Charles Koch was a co-founder and initial funder of the Cato Institute in 1977. In 1985, Koch was still Cato's principal benefactor (WP, July 30, 1985), and in 200x, the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy estimated that Koch had given the Cato Institute more than $12 million. In 2006, Charles Koch remained on the Cato Institute's board of trustees. The Koch brothers co-founded a smaller think tank, Citizens for a Sound Economy, in 1984. Charles Koch also funded the Institute for Humane Studies.

(5) **Richardson family.** In the late nineteenth century, North Carolina drug store owner Lundsford Richardson developed a series of pharmaceutical products known as the Vicks Family Remedies. In 1898, he founded the Lunsford Richardson Wholesale Drug Company to promote and distribute these products throughout the region. Richardson's son, H. Smith Richardson, eventually took over the company, having worked as its sales manager since 1907. Possessed of a keen marketing acumen, the younger Richardson transformed the family business into the Vick Chemical Company and renamed its most distinctive product Vicks VapoRub. In 1938, Vick acquired the Merrell Company and became Richardson Merrell, Inc. Richardson established a philanthropic foundation, having expressed his personal philosophy of private property rights and free enterprise as follows: "From the beginning, America, the new world…has offered to humble families, native born or immigrant, the Opportunity to gain a fortune…if they were diligent and lucky. With this fortune went the Right to remain secure in its possession and enjoyment for themselves and their heirs after them." (annual report). Richardson advocated a system of personal rights based on the following maxims: "a person rightfully owned what his industry brought him, and the free enterprise system permitted the maximum scope for industry." In 1985, the company was sold to Procter & Gamble, Inc.

[21] *New York Times*, "Pulling the Wraps Off Koch Industries," November 20, 1994, Section 3, Page 1.
[22] *New York Tim*es, "Paper Maker To Be Sold To Koch," November 14, 2005, by Andrew Ross Sorkin, Page C1.

In line with its founder's vision, the Smith Richardson Foundation became a leading supporter of free market thought. The organization funded work on three seminal texts of the supply-side economics movement: Jude Wanniski's *The Way the World Works*, George Gilder's *Wealth and Poverty*, and Bruce Barlett's *Reaganomics: Supply Side Economics in Action*. Smith Richardson also nurtured neoconservative thought, supporting such writers as Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol through their magazines, *The Public Interest* and *Commentary*. In the think tank arena, the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies were the foundation's largest beneficiaries. In 2006, the Smith Richardson Foundation board of governors included AEI president Christopher DeMuth and senior fellow Ben Wattenberg.

(6) **Coors family.** Adolph Coors started the Coors Brewing Company in 1873 in Golden, Colorado. The family-owned business grew substantially over the next few decades, surviving the prohibition era because of its diverse interests, including its ceramics division. Despite their entrepreneurial vitality, the Coors family was beset tragedy. Adolph Coors committed suicide in 1929, and his grandson, Adolph Coors III, was kidnapped and murdered in 1960 following a failed ransom attempt. The company went to brothers Joseph and Bill Coors, who remade it into one of the country's largest brewing companies. With a degree in chemical engineering, Joseph helped develop the company's unique cold-filtering process. Despite their collaboration on matters of business, Bill and Joe disagreed about politics. "He was very principled and dedicated," Bill Coors was quoted as saying upon his brother's death, "But we got along a lot better if we didn't talk politics.… He was a little bit right of Atilla the Hun." Coors' dedication to conservative principles motivated his philanthropic giving, which was carried out both independently and through the Adolph Coors and Castle Rock Foundations. In 2006, the latter organization listed its fourfold mission as follows: (i) "Promote a better understanding of the free enterprise system," (ii) "Preserve the principles upon which our democracy was founded to help ensure a limited role for government and the protection of individual rights as provided for in the Constitution," (iii) "Encourage personal responsibility and leadership," and (iv) "Uphold traditional American values."

Less diverse than that of other major conservative philanthropists, Joseph Coors' grant-making was targeted largely at a few outlets. He supported Ronald Reagan's campaign for governor of California and later became part of Reagan's "kitchen cabinet," the informal group of advisors who aided his presidential campaign and subsequent transition into the office. In the early 1970s, Coors provided conservative activists Paul Weyrich and Edwin Feulner with $250,000 in startup money to create the Heritage Foundation. Coors served as a Heritage trustee from the think tank's founding until 1991, and as an honorary trustee thereafter, until his death in 2003. In 2006, sister Holland Coors was still on the Heritage board. In 2003, in honor of his late friend and benefactor, Heritage president Edwin Feulner wrote, "Without Joe Coors, The Heritage Foundation wouldn't exist – and the conservative movement it nurtures would be immeasurably poorer. Thanks in large part to Joe, though, we can look back on a record of accomplishment that stretches back three decades." Coors also funded the think tank set up by Paul Weyrich after his departure from Heritage, the Free Congress Foundation.

Table 3.2 draws on a database of the grant-making activities of 36 conservative philanthropies compiled by the nonprofit organization Media Transparency. Media Transparency does not announce an ideological purpose or affiliation but appears to have a left-wing orientation. It exists on the internet at http://www.mediatransparency.org/. Another empirical source for this section are two reports by the nonprofit organization National Center for Responsive Philanthropy.

[Table 3.2 here]

The mobilization of prominent American capitalists was a financial boon to the conservative movement. In 1981, Hugh Newton, the director of public relations for the Heritage Foundation, told the *Washington Post*, "For a long while you could not get money out of conservative businessmen…. [Oil tycoon] H. L. Hunt would take you to lunch and give you a ham sandwich out of his desk. Now you've got people interested in building the network, in changing the American mind.” The same article quoted Irving Kristol: “The intellectual climate has changed…. Corporations are timid creatures. They used to give mindlessly. But they've seen that ideas are important and they want to get involved.” Kristol’s confidante and mentor Irving Howe told the *New York Times* in 1981 that Kristol had successfully “persuaded the bourgeois managers that ideology matters, that they have a body of thought, a morality on their side. That's a new thing for corporation people – that they, too, have an idea and aren't just greedy and selfish.”

Himmelstein (1990) identifies the following outlets for this conservative institution-building effort:

[Table 3.3 here]

Himmelstein (1990:145) writes that, “The most important element of the big-business mobilization was the flow of corporate money to expand existing conservative research organizations and create a host of new ones.” The point is that the expansion of think tanks should be understood in its proper context as one element of a larger effort to build a conservative “counter-intelligentsia” through the expansion of right-wing cultural institutions.

DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE

The norms guiding intellectual production in the think tank universe would be transformed considerably by the massive influx of money from the proponents of free enterprise. As the rest of this chapter will show, the period after 1970 was marked by a symbolic struggle over the field’s boundaries. A group of “challenger” figures entered this space and deploy novel tactics and resources in the production of political expertise. The new entrants came largely from the political and economic fields rather than the intellectual field. Accordingly, they brought practical styles that were at odds with the standing "rules of the game.” The ensuing struggle concerned the acceptable means of producing, promoting, and disseminating political expertise. Whereas actors and organizations tied closely to academe sought to conserve the previously established orthodoxy, by which standards of scholarly judgment held sway in the production of political expertise, the challengers tried to install their own, more "political," legitimating principles. Over the next few decades, the latter group was largely successful, not only in earning recognition as bona fide players in the think tank industry, but also in subverting many of its longstanding rules. The older, "incumbent" think tanks had to adapt to a changing orthodoxy by adjusting their organizational structures, strategies, and personnel – as well as the form and content of their research and the style of its dissemination.

The transformation of American think tanks can be summarized along four dimensions:

(i) Changing temporality. One of the most basic struggles that would develop within the space of think tanks was over the dominant temporality guiding the production of political expertise. By "temporality," I mean a sense of time, or a largely preconscious impression of the rate at which tasks should be performed and products generated. A temporality, in this respect, is not abstract or disembodied. Rather, it is an aspect of the most reflexive, embodied habits of the political expert, a set of spontaneous propensities embedded in the everyday practice of intellectual work.

The most significant divergence that would appear in the think tank universe was between academic and political notions of time. The opposition arises out of a dilemma intrinsic to the production of political expertise – namely, the fact that conducting sound social scientific research requires a certain flexibility, if not indifference, to the passage of time, whereas political cycles move rapidly and inexorably toward definitive conclusions. There are two possible solutions to the practical dilemma raised by this difference, each of which requires a profound compromise from the standpoint of the social scientist or the politician. Either the political expert tailors his or her research and writing to the specific pace of politics, or she carries out intellectual work in such a manner that it might remain unfinished when the policy matter in question is debated and eventually resolved. Each solution is undesirable, if not downright offensive, to the purist of one field or the other. To the social scientist, accelerating, abbreviating, or otherwise curtailing the research procedure in order to satisfy some external requirement is a violation of the scientific ethos. To the politician, activist, or journalist, completing a piece of research after the resolution of a political battle is pointless.

The difference between academic and political temporalities is aptly expressed in the following exchange with the conservative activist Grover Norquist:

> TM: What are the marks of a good policy report?
>
> GN: Timeliness. Legislation moves at certain times. A study of the impact of the French Revolution done at a university is interesting this year. It will be interesting in five years. A study on why a particular piece of legislation would be good or bad for the economy is only of interest in the context of the fact that the legislation is going to be discussed and voted on.

After 1970, there was an intensified struggle among think tanks over the proper sense of time guiding the production of political expertise. My central claim is that the newer, more "political" organizations collectively de-legitimated the social scientific temporality, rendering it subordinate and extinguishing it altogether from most regions of the think tank field. The Heritage Foundation was especially instrumental in leading this shift away from the social scientific mode of perceiving and marking time. This clash of temporalities is only one aspect of the larger contest over the proper "rules of the game" structuring intellectual production.

(ii) Changing spatial configuration. Not only did the dominant temporality guiding the production of political expertise change after the 1970s, but so did the think tank field's spatial configuration. Before 1970, think tanks were rather widely dispersed throughout the country. While most of the key organizations were in Washington, DC or New York City, many prominent think tanks were located elsewhere – notably, the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, California, and the Hudson Institute in upstate New York.

The period after 1970 would see a growing concentration of think tanks in the nation's capital. This process took two forms: first, the proliferation of new organizations in Washington, DC; second, the movement and relocation of some of the older think tanks, via a quasi-gravitational force, to Washington. Why, during a period when cross-country travel and communication became easier and less expensive, would the think tank industry become more spatially concentrated in Washington, DC? The shift is readily intelligible in light of this chapter's core proposition: that think tanks became increasingly dependent on the political field, and less connected to centers of academic production.

(iii) Changing notion of credibility. There was a shift in the dominant legitimating principle underpinning intellectual production by think tanks. Social scientific credibility was gradually replaced by a form of authority I call "ideological credibility." Ideological credibility is marked, above all, by the need for consistency and predictability. Whereas social scientific claims are taken as credible to the degree that they are supported by empirical evidence, ideological credibility is predicated on the speaker's consistency in espousing a particular moral or philosophical point of view. Attached to this change was a corresponding shift in the think tank's audience. Increasingly, think tanks produced intellectual tools for an audience of activists and journalists.

The following exchange with Fred Smith, founder and president of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a free market think tank, illustrates the point:

> TM: So is there some form of scholarly credibility that you have to have in order to be successful?
>
> FS: I'm not sure "scholarly" is a term I'd use. Credibility is certainly something you have to have.
>
> TM: Credibility based in evidence?
>
> FS: Generally, groups like ours, how do we earn our credibility? Well, we have very strong bright-line standards. We have a very strong point of view and we have never deviated from that point of view…. If you're a free market group whose position keeps changing, you don't have any credibility…. Most groups on the left and right are ideological and try to be fairly pure in the sense of being consistent to their beliefs.

Resisting the author's leading question, Smith suggests that his organization derives its legitimacy from a principle nearly opposite that of social science.

(iv) New social actor. In addition to the structural transformations taking place in the think tank universe, this chapter traces the emergence of the "hybrid intellectual," a new social actor whose distinctive practical styles mirrored his contradictory structural location. Think tank officials understand their unique social role and position in terms of four contradictory idioms: those of the scholar, the statesman, the business entrepreneur, and the journalist.[23] The peculiarity of the think tank intellectual lies in the difficult symbolic balancing act needed to reconcile these divergent roles.

CASE STUDIES

The following case studies examine the development of the Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and several "failed" think tanks, including the Institute for Policy Studies, for the period after 1970. I focus on these organizations because each one represents an important structural location within, and trajectory through, the space of think tanks. Even so, the goal of the analysis is to go beyond an account of the organizations and characterize the system of relations in which they are embedded – i.e., the changing parameters, possibilities, necessities, and constraints involved in the production of political expertise. The case studies are therefore meant to uncover general principles that applied to all think tanks during the historical period in question.

I begin with the Heritage Foundation. Critics of think tanks have often suggested that Heritage "broke the mold" for policy research organizations when it was founded in 1973. Yet the think tank's innovations have never been specified in analytical terms. The following case study of Heritage's early development addresses this omission. My argument is that the Heritage Foundation accelerated an immanent tendency in the think tank universe by eschewing the specific form of autonomy that underpins the mission of the intellectual.[24] This development, which would alter the set of objective forces brought to bear on all U.S. think tanks, took the form of a threefold break with the conventions of intellectual production. First, whereas intellectuals typically seek to maintain, as a basis of their credibility, a degree of distance from the everyday battles of politics, the Heritage Foundation sought to place itself at the center of such struggles. Second, whereas intellectuals ask research questions and use analytical categories of their own making, the Heritage Foundation produced studies using the received questions and categories of public debate. Third, whereas intellectuals present their findings through the media of books and articles, Heritage tailored its products to the practical requirements of political actors, such as congressional aides and journalists. Taken together, such innovations represented a heteronomous tendency in the intellectual field. They were made possible by the fact that the Heritage Foundation was established by ex-

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[23] I borrow this phrase from Wacquant (199x), who elaborates the "three kindred idioms" through which boxers in a downtown Chicago gym understand their exploitation at the hands of managers – those of prostitution, slavery, and animal husbandry.

[24] As Chapter 2 argued, this tendency was also embodied in the government contract think tanks of the mid-twentieth century, which were modeled after state agencies rather than universities. The Heritage Foundation succeeded in accelerating this shift through its emulation of a social movement organization. Significantly, a few left-wing think tanks that predate the Heritage Foundation were also modeled after advocacy groups – most notably, the Institute for Policy Studies (established in 1964) and the Worldwatch Institute (1973). But, as I will argue, it was the conservative think tanks that were the most active and successful in generating the funds needed to make an impact on the think tank universe.

legislative aides who brought the practical styles of the politician and the journalist to the think tank universe, as opposed to the dispositions of the scholar.

"THE DESIRE WAS TO BREAK THE MOLD"
Case Study #1: The Heritage Foundation

The Heritage Foundation was established in 1973 by Paul Weyrich and Edwin Feulner, Jr., two Republican Congressional aides. Weyrich, a Greek Catholic from Racine, Wisconsin, began his career as a newspaper and radio journalist in his home state before turning to a career in politics. In 1967, he began a stint as press secretary for Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado. Feulner, a Ph.D. recipient from the University of Edinburgh, held a variety of political posts before his collaboration with Weyrich, most notably as an aide to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Illinois Congressman Philip Crane.[25] On Capitol Hill, Weyrich and Feulner identified themselves as conservatives in the emerging tradition of Barry Goldwater. Disillusioned by what they saw as the capitulation of the Republican Party to the "liberal establishment," they lamented the ineffectiveness of their institutions as compared with the Democrats' sophisticated machinery.

More than anything, Weyrich and Feulner saw the need for timely expertise to bolster Republican policy arguments. According to Weyrich, the concern was amplified one day in early 1969 when he found himself sitting in a coalition meeting of civil rights groups. Weyrich's boss, Senator Allott, had unexpectedly been invited to the strategy session because of his involvement in breaking the southern filibuster of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Weyrich attended in his place:

> I just went and nobody asked me who I was or anything. I sat in the back. And there before my eyes was unveiled exactly how the left operates. I saw the effects of it, but I never understood the mechanics. It was a coalition meeting. They had heard that Richard Nixon, who had just taken office, was going to roll back the civil rights bill on housing. And so right there before my eyes, they put together a bipartisan amendment between [Indiana Senator] Birch Bayh and [Maryland Senator Charles] "Mack" Mathias, who had just been elected. And they proceeded to lay out how they were going to handle this. There was a group called the National Committee for an Effective Congress, and they said we'll double-rate it and we'll tell Senators that if they don't vote for this amendment that we're going to target them for defeat. And there was somebody there from the ACLU, and they said, "We'll file a lawsuit. We don't think we'll win, but it'll be good for political purposes." This was a brand-new concept for me. I'd never heard of filing a lawsuit for political purposes. And then somebody was there from the Brookings Institute [sic]. And they said, "Well, we've got a study coming out on segregation and housing, and we can do a preprint of the study, because it won't be ready yet for another six months. But you tell us exactly when you need it and we'll get the summary out ahead of time, which will help you frame the issue." And then the Methodist Church was there, and they said, "Tell us when you want us to lobby." And there were black groups there, and the argument was whether there should be demonstrations in Washington or elsewhere in the country…. And so on and on it went, the whole panoply of liberal groups intersecting with one another was laid out for me.

[25] Laird served as Secretary of Defense under President Richard M. Nixon from 1969 to 1973.

The fledgling conservative movement of which Weyrich was a part was not nearly so well coordinated. For one thing, there was no equivalent to the Brookings Institution, whose presence at the strategy session Weyrich found especially interesting. Brookings' participation illustrated how a think tank might fit into the larger scheme of effective political organizing – offering intellectual credibility to complement the strong-arm tactics of activist committees like the NCEC and the ACLU.

On the political right, the closest equivalent to Brookings was the American Enterprise Institute. But AEI was a comparatively modest operation, with a budget of around $1 million.[26] Even more important, AEI had recently been investigated by the Internal Revenue Service – and its tax-exempt status nearly revoked – because its president, William Baroody Sr., had been actively involved in the 1964 Barry Goldwater campaign. Questions had arisen about the organization's status as a non-partisan entity. During the episode, AEI trustees had considered firing Baroody, who then grew more careful to avoid the appearance of political advocacy. From their view on Capitol Hill, however, Weyrich and Feulner thought that AEI went too far in pulling its punches. Weyrich remembers a frustrating encounter with the think tank in 1971:

> Among the things that [Senator Allott] had me do was transportation appropriations work. And I one day received an excellent piece of research [from AEI] on the supersonic transport. It had tabs on it, you know, to distinguish the different sections. It was well researched. It had a lot of data, a lot of testimony, if you will, from scientists and so on. There was only one problem with it: it arrived two days after the vote on the SST that killed it! I happened to be mentioning this to Ed Feulner, who at that time was with Congressman Phil Crane, and I said to him, "You know, we really need a think tank that we can work with." So we went to Bill Baroody, Sr. at American Enterprise Institute and said, "Are there things that we can work with you on that will produce timely material?" And he said, "Oh, no, we don't want to produce timely materials. We got in trouble once with the IRS when Lyndon Johnson sicced them on us and so we don't do anything that could be construed as influencing legislation. And I said, "Well, then, what are you doing this stuff for? Are you preparing it for libraries? For what?"[27]

Weyrich and Feulner were perplexed by the idea of a conservative research organization that was reluctant to produce intellectual tools for Republicans in Congress. The incident only served to reinforce their previously held belief that a new research institute could serve an untapped market by offering expertise to conservative politicians.[28]

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[26] According to Edwards (1997:???), in 1974 "AEI listed a staff of fifty, twenty-four adjunct scholars, a 'Talent Bank' of six thousand scholars and experts, [and] the publication of sixty-four books and studies" the previous year.

[27] Author interview. This story has become part of Heritage Foundation lore for what it reveals about the organization's philosophy. Versions of this story are included in Edwards (199x) and Smith (199x).

[28] There is a seeming discrepancy in Edwards' (1997) account of the timing of these events. Edwards (p. xx) quotes Feulner as saying, "It was at that moment [in the spring of 1971, following the AEI-supersonic transfer incident] that Paul [Weyrich] and I decided that conservatives needed an independent research institute designed to influence the policy debate as it was occurring in Congress…." However, elsewhere in his account (p. xx), Edwards describes Feulner and Weyrich as fully engaged in the search for organizational funding in 1969. It seems most likely that the AEI report did not really inspire the idea for the Heritage Foundation as

"What was needed," Weyrich later reflected, "was an outside operation that could provide timely information to Members of Congress from a principled perspective… [and] supply witnesses for hearings and experts to privately brief senators and congressmen." Soon, Weyrich and Feulner would join forces with two other young Washington conservatives who had developed a similar idea – Victor Fediay of the Library of Congress and Jim Lucier, Sr., an aide to South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond. Fediay and Lucier had been soliciting funding from businessmen for more than a year, but with little luck. Now the group incorporated stories of Weyrich's liberal strategy meeting and the ineffectiveness of the American Enterprise Institute into their pitch. Even so, as Weyrich recalls, their approach to acquiring money was somewhat haphazard:

> I didn't know that much about business. I realize now that we were talking to the wrong people, but I didn't know that at the time…. They were mid-level management people who had no control at all over the company's resources. So we would talk to these people and they would listen politely, and they would say, 'Well, yes, that's very interesting, but I don't think that I can do anything about it.' And we had one meeting after another, after another, after another like that. And we were just so discouraged.

A year and a half of frustration followed, but in 1970 there was a fortuitous development:

> One day a letter arrived at Senator Allott's office, and the letter was mistakenly directed to me. And the letter said, "You may remember me, Senator, I used to be news director at KBTR in Denver and I have now been hired by [beer magnate] Joe Coors to find out where is the best place to put his money, to help the conservative movement." So I called this fellow, Jack Wilson, and I said, "You need to get out here, we have a story to tell you…." And so Joe [Coors] came up, and we had him meet with two congressmen and two Senators, and the administrative assistant to the vice-president, and Lyn Nofziger, who at that time was Reagan's man in the Nixon White House. And I had them all wired and they all said we've got to have an operation that gets us information at strategic times. We are not getting it now. There is nobody that is providing it. Brookings is very, very active on the left – they are omnipresent – but we don't have anything on the right. And so eventually Joe bought that, and we started up what is now the Heritage Foundation.

Coors agreed to provide $250,000 in start-up funding, and Weyrich became the new organization's first president. Importantly, a pipeline had been established that connected politically minded capitalists with the conservative movement.

In its early years, the Heritage Foundation barely appeared on the political radar screen: "At the time that we started Heritage," Weyrich says, "it was absolutely insignificant. We had nine employees. We had about $300,000. We had no real experts. We had a bunch of eager young people who in time became expert. But, at the time that I had them, nobody knew who they were. I got them largely from the Hill. We were just a total upstart." Indeed, Heritage was a strange creature in the think tank universe, its major point of differentiation being its close ties with Capitol Hill. Although Heritage experts had few academic credentials, they nevertheless had access to a dense network of conservative legislators and aides. As Weyrich explains,

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Feulner reports; the incident may nevertheless have focused Feulner's and Weyrich's strategic approach.

> We didn't think that President Nixon would be interested in anything we had to say…but we did have friends on the Hill. I had worked on the Hill for not only Senator Allott, but also then for Senator [Carl T.] Curtis of Nebraska, and both were members of the Senate leadership, so you get to meet lots of people when you're in the leadership. So [Heritage] targeted the Hill and our niche was to be very responsive to whatever need was expressed. In the meantime, I went and helped organize the Republican Study Committee, and it became a generator of requests. Likewise, in 1974, Dick Thompson and I, along with Senators Curtis and [James A.] McClure, organized the Senate Steering Committee. And, again, it became a generator of requests. Both of these are caucuses of conservative members, and so when they knew that there was an institution that was available, they would write us a letter and say, "Can you do a study on such-and-such?" Very quickly, the number of requests far exceeded our ability to meet them. And so we had the problem of picking and choosing which we were going to answer positively.

In 1983, Republican Study Committee director Don E. Eberly described the caucus as "basically a conduit…from the Heritage Foundation to and from conservative members of the House." The committee worked both to incorporate Heritage ideas into pieces of proposed legislation and to solicit material from the think tank that would benefit its members. Weyrich and Feulner had positioned their new think tank as an helpful ally to conservatives in Congress.

The Heritage Foundation had reversed the usual pattern of intellectual production. Rather than decide independently what to study, Heritage officials adopted a strategy of making themselves "very responsive to whatever need was expressed," in Weyrich's words. Turning the priority of intellectual autonomy on its head, Heritage generated studies that were expressly designed to meet political needs. Heritage public relations official James Weidman reflects on the significance of this approach:

> The desire was to break the mold. Before [Heritage], think tanks tended to be the standard "universities without students," where people would write about whatever struck their fancy, whatever they found intellectually stimulating and interesting. Write it up and send it over to the staff on the Hill or whoever, and that was kind of the end of it…. So [Weyrich and Feulner said], "Let's address the topics that— not what we determine, but what the opinion leaders of the country, political media, whatever, have determined are the important issues of the day."

On Capitol Hill, Weyrich and Feulner had observed that most think tank research was ignored or quickly forgotten. According to Weidman, they "had been bombarded with useless, boring research material from think tanks" for their entire careers.[29] Yet, paradoxically, they also recognized a strong demand for intellectual tools to be used in public debate – what the *Washington Post* termed a "desperate daily need for intellectual meat to feed the hearings, the speeches, [and] the unrelenting policy grinder." Weyrich and Feulner knew as well as anyone exactly what kinds of tools would be useful to legislators and their aides.

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[29] Author interview. Weidman went on to describe Weyrich and Feulner as "very frustrated [during their Capitol Hill careers] in not being able to get accessible, useful, on-topic materials from them." He also speculated, "I think it was [Feulner's] experience of being a frustrated Hill policy person that led him to [say], 'Okay, if we've got a policy research outfit, let's start researching policies and presenting the policies in a user-friendly format.'"

Heritage's most famous innovation was what it called the "briefcase test," an informal mechanism to define the proper length of a policy report. Heritage scholar and historian Lee Edwards explains that, "The test was [that] if the Congressman could put it in his briefcase and read it going to National Airport…then, okay, he might find some use in it and take the arguments and rely upon those in the debate about a particular issue." Brevity became Heritage's simplest but most indispensable contribution. Heritage officials also understood the growing importance of attracting news media visibility and quickly developed a sophisticated marketing and public relations apparatus. One of Feulner's key moves around this time was to hire two public relations specialists, Hugh Newton and Herb Berkowitz – who, in Weidman's words, "took [Heritage] from zero to a state-of-the-art media operation very quickly." Feulner, now president of Heritage, also brought in Burton Yale Pines, a former associate editor of *Time* magazine, as vice president. Pines developed a template for the think tank's "backgrounder" reports designed to maximize their utility to journalists. As Weidman explains, "There's a formula to it, and it was taken from [Pines'] experience with *Time* magazine and how you express yourself at a fairly high level to the intelligent, fairly knowledgeable layman. And that still is our model."[30] In sum, the Heritage approach revolved around a kind of "consumer demand" principle: produce intellectual materials according to the form and content preferred by their consumers. The method was not only palatable to Heritage officials, but came to them quite naturally, because their professional backgrounds lay in the very fields to which their work catered – namely, politics and journalism – rather than in centers of intellectual production. Other think tanks, staffed largely by academics, had neither the capacity nor the inclination to carry out such a strategy.

Heritage developed in relative obscurity throughout the 1970s, its focus resting almost entirely with the legislative branch. But soon the organization would direct its attention to the White House and the executive branch. When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, Heritage supplied eleven members of his transition team (WP, July 12, 1981). By all accounts, the Heritage Foundation's watershed moment was its publication of a multi-volume, 3,000-page transition document for the new administration, *Mandate for Leadership*. The hefty manual, which the *Washington Post* would later call "the bible of the Reagan transition," laid out a series of policy prescriptions on virtually every topic and touching on every agency of the federal government.

The idea behind *Mandate for Leadership* had come from a story Paul Weyrich heard from J. William Mittendorf, Heritage trustee and former ambassador and Secretary of the Navy. On the night of Richard Nixon's election in November 1968, Mittendorf was at Nixon campaign headquarters in New York's Plaza Hotel. Fred Seton, Secretary of Agriculture during the Eisenhower administration (1953–1961), and Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower's Attorney General, brought Nixon "a briefing book, a blueprint, if you will, of how the administration should proceed on practically every issue imaginable." As Weyrich describes it, "Mittendorf was really put out about it because…they were ushered in, and the people who had been Nixon's supporters and who had been there all night waiting for him were completely frozen out. They never got to see Nixon. And

[30] In 1983, the *Washington Post* noted that "there is a fresh, newsy quality to the scholarly research in the 8- to 14-page 'Backgrounder' reports that Heritage churns out at the rate of two or three a week."

[Mittendorf] knew Brownell…so he asked him, 'What on earth are you here for that Nixon would see you?' And he said, 'Oh, we gave him a blueprint of how to run the administration.'" Impressed by the account, Weyrich told the story to Robert Perry, a Houston homebuilder and major Republican donor: "[Perry] gave us the money to put together a similar briefing book so that if Reagan got elected we would be able to present it to him. And we worked on that, and it was a pretty doggone good document."

Weyrich saw Reagan's election as the Heritage Foundation's opportunity to make its mark. But there was no guarantee that the incoming administration would embrace the document. As it turns out, Weyrich's and Feulner's personal contacts would again make a critical difference. In this case, it was Reagan's principal advisor Edwin Meese III who would serve as the key promoter of *Mandate* inside the White House. Meese, a personal friend of Joseph Coors, had been an ally of Heritage from its inception. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Meese served as Reagan's chief of staff and headed his post-election transition team. When Reagan took office, Meese took a cabinet-level post as member of the National Security Council. He later became U.S. Attorney General. Meese urged Reagan to heed the advice of the Heritage Foundation, and Reagan agreed. Weyrich says,

> Reagan, at his first cabinet meeting, handed out the book and said, "This is a blueprint to run the administration. I want you to follow it." And it was at that point that Heritage's credibility just soared. I mean, word of that got around and all of a sudden Heritage was an important institution.[31]

Heritage had exploited a quirk of the American electoral system – the awkward lag time before an administration, having taken over the White House, has adjusted to its new role. Heritage director of public relations Herb Berkowitz later explained to the *New York Times*, "We knew that when the Nixon Administration took over, so much time was spent learning who was who and what was going on that it was months before anyone could look at policy matters…. So the trustees decided, why don't we come up with policy initiatives on our own?" Heritage's standing relative to other think tanks increased almost instantaneously. Weyrich notes, "By 1980, Heritage had come up significantly. It still was behind Brookings, but it had definitely overtaken AEI. AEI was fading at that point, and Brookings was still ahead, but it was more like 60-40 instead of 95-5 like it was when I started it."

Heritage continued to gain momentum throughout the Reagan administration. In 1983, the think tank celebrated its tenth anniversary by moving into a new eight-story, $9.5 million building located, appropriately, on Capitol Hill. The think tank also launched a major fundraising campaign known as "Heritage 10: Funding the Conservative Decade." The program's goal was to raise $35 million for the purposes of establishing an operating reserve, a building fund, and an endowment for the

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[31] In a 2006 internet column, Meese similarly recalled, "At that time, Reagan and all of us who worked with him looked to The Heritage Foundation for guidance and they came through with one of the most important books ever published: *Mandate for Leadership*. Reagan insisted that all of his cabinet secretaries read this book – he did himself – and use it as the road map to steer America back toward the City on a Hill that she is destined to be." Edwin Meese, "Help get America right again," March 7, 2006, http://townhall.com/. As of this writing in March 2006, Meese was Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and Chairman of the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation.

organization's Asian Studies Center. The year 1983 was also the first in which the Heritage budget cracked $10 million. Reflecting on its fast rise to prominence, the *New York Times* dubbed the think tank "a Washington Cinderella story," while *National Review* publisher William Rusher called the Heritage's creation "probably the biggest development in the conservative movement during the decade of the 1970s…absolutely indispensable." That same year, the *Washington Post* opined, "[I]f America is weaving unsteadily back toward the right-hand side of the road, the Heritage Foundation, while not at the steering wheel exactly, is filling the gas tank, tuning the engine and shoving a road map under the driver's nose."

If the Heritage Foundation's first strength was the dense web of personal contact between the think tank and Capitol Hill, then its second strength was its enormous fundraising capacity. Much has been made, in particular, of the organization's novel direct-mail fundraising strategy, which netted Heritage more than 200,000 donors. Yet the significance of this achievement has usually been misunderstood. In a personal interview, longtime Heritage official Adam Meyerson, [editor-in-chief of Heritage's *Policy Review* from 1983 to 1998 and vice president for educational affairs from 1993 to 2001,] explains it in the following way:

> [T]he significance of the Heritage [fundraising] model…is that the 200,000 or so members gave Heritage a certain credibility with the audience, including their political audience. That is to say, members of Congress would respect any organization that had 200,000 donors, whatever its political ideology. They would respect that. It gave Heritage, I think, more credibility with its number one audience.

In the manner of an advocacy organization, then, the sheer size of the Heritage's membership accorded it clout and legitimacy. This was a form of credibility fundamentally different from what previous think tanks had sought to marshal – one antithetical to the logic of social scientific judgment.

While Heritage officials liked to convey the impression that their organization was funded by an army of small donors, in fact most of think tank's money came from a relatively small number of large contributors.[32] Internal documentation summarizing the "Heritage 10" campaign lists 166 donors of $10,000 or more – 44 of which gave at least $100,000. Of these 166 large contributors, 71 were corporations or corporate foundations, 41 were wealthy individuals or couples, and 39 were philanthropic foundations. [My count. Out of the remaining 15 large contributions, 13 were anonymous and 2 were from non-profit organizations.] Furthermore, secondary evidence suggests the existence of a core "elite" group within that elite. For example, the *Washington Post* reported that …Richard Mellon Scaife and Joseph Coors had given Heritage more than $10 million during the early 1980s. The "Heritage 10" campaign succeeded well beyond expectations, raising $2 million more than the original goal.

[32] Meyerson develops a similar point in a personal interview:

> [T]he large number of donors, those 200,000 people…became the source of much larger contributions later on. So the way that Heritage used this model most skillfully was in identifying from its large direct mail funding base who were those donors who had the potential to give much more. And it was a way of identifying donors who never were on the radar screen before, by getting to know the people who gave small amounts over a long time. And it proved to be, as I said, a very successful model for identifying new and very significant donors.

Historian Shelby Cullom Davis, Chairman of the Heritage Board of Trustees, spoke at a 1986 banquet to celebrate the campaign's close, calling the money "a solid financial base that allows us to look forward to the next decade with greater optimism."

By the mid-1980s Heritage had come to be recognized as one of the leading organizations in the growing conservative movement. As if to solidify this status, Heritage held a gala dinner and tribute in October 1985 to Senator Barry Goldwater, a living symbol of the movement that now traced its origins to his spirited run for the presidency in 1964. "While no one even can adequately thank the Senator for all he has done for the conservative movement over the years," Heritage's invitation read, "we are going to give it our best shot." Behind the scenes, Heritage officials had put together an honorary dinner committee composed of "a dozen or so of the conservative organizations which have played a major role in building up the conservative movement." There were still other indications that Heritage had achieved the leading position in the right-wing mobilization. In 1986, Congressman Jack Kemp wrote to Heritage trustee Clare Boothe Luce, "I'm convinced that the Heritage Foundation is the single most important intellectual 'bank' for our growing 'positive conservatism' in America and the world." The same year, in a letter to the Heritage trustees, Steve Pejovich of the Center for Education and Research in Free Enterprise at [Texas A&M University] gushed, "I believe that the Heritage Foundation is fast becoming one of the finest institutions in the entire history of the United States…[and] I believe that Ed Feulner has single-handedly recreated the conservative movement in the United States, and for that alone he will be remembered as an outstanding American."

In just over a decade, the Heritage Foundation had gone from "total upstart" to headquarters of the conservative movement. Feulner wrote a letter to his trustees summarizing the Heritage Foundation's recent successes:

> 1986 was the most productive year in our history whether measured by numbers of studies published, inches (or perhaps miles) of news stories generated, the impact of Heritage ideas on Washington policymakers, or our total income raised. In terms of income, we were able to take a major step toward our objective of building a financial base that will ensure our permanence as an institution. Our operating reserve, designed to see us through possible hard time in the future, is now fully funded, and we have begun creating endowment funds for some special programs.

Heritage's attempts to place itself at the center of the conservative movement had begun early. In 1978, the think tank started its Resource Bank, a division designed to serve as an information clearinghouse for conservative activists. The Resource Bank's major achievement was a comprehensive directory of more than 1,000 conservative policy experts who were on call for media appearances, speeches, and expert testimony. Heritage also spearheaded the development of other conservative movement organizations – most importantly, a network of state-level think tanks called the State Policy Network. Established in 1992, the State Policy Network characterized itself as the "professional service organization" for a constellation of public policy organizations. As of 2006, the network consisted of 48 state-level think tanks in 42 states united under the mission statement of "working in the trenches at the forefront of the movement for free market policy solutions." Heritage also developed contacts with conservative think tanks and advocacy groups abroad. In 1985, Heritage official W. Bruce Weinrod wrote to *National Review* editor William Rusher, "[I]n practically any nation in the free world, we have established at least some contact and exchange of materials…and believe this effort can only grow in the years ahead,“ to which Rusher replied approvingly, “It is just one more evidence of the enormous growth of the conservative movement in recent years that I didn't realize how extensive your operations are. I ought to have known!” (Weinrod was Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies).[33]

In summary, the Heritage Foundation achieved enormous successes by creating an alternative model of the think tank. It was modeled after, and situated in strategic opposition to, two other think tanks: the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute. According to Heritage scholar Lee Edwards, Feulner and Weyrich “saw the success of the other side, of what the Democrats were doing, of what the liberals were doing. From their perspective on Capitol Hill, the Democrats were always able to call upon Brookings.” Brookings had been both the dominant think tank and an important arm of the “liberal establishment” that the conservatives sought to overturn. “From the perspective of young conservatives like Weyrich and Feulner,” Edwards says, “they saw a network, a liberal network, out there…and they said, ‘We have got to do something like that on our side. We have to have a counter-establishment to what the liberals have…. That was the origin of Heritage.” In 1983, Edwin Feulner described his think tank to the *Washington Post* as “an activist version of Brookings.”

Heritage also situated itself with respect to the major conservative think tank of the time, the American Enterprise Institute. Despite Weyrich's and Feulner's ideological affinity with AEI, the latter organization became the most important counterpoint to what the founders of Heritage wanted to create – a case of what to avoid. Weyrich remembers that, “AEI was, at the time we started, a large institution, but not one that had much influence. I mean, they would produce materials but you did not find them testifying much, didn't find them in these behind-the-scenes meetings…. AEI was big, but not influential.” In particular, AEI was perceived as too academic and too shy in promoting its materials, which were, in AEI's words, “sent to legislators only on request.” Heritage scholar Lee Edwards observes that AEI had become

> more interested in debating the issues, not having a point of view. They had also gotten into the habit of doing big, long studies, fat studies and volumes, and being a little too, in their writing, perhaps a little too scientific and so a little too arcane in some of their language. And so they were not as useful for the purposes of what people like Weyrich and Feulner and others needed on Capitol Hill.

By contrast, the Heritage Foundation suffered no such timidity. A December 1984 letter to the Heritage trustees announcing the release of *Mandate for Leadership II* closed with the following sentence: “Like all Heritage studies, *Mandate II* has been distributed to

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[33] In the same letter, Rusher added, “As you may know, I personally have done my small part to build conservative contacts in various foreign countries, and am currently working to expand them in the course of making speeches for USIS in western Europe this spring. Let's get together and compare notes, and perhaps lay a few plans to integrate our activities.” “USIS” refers to the United States Information Service, more commonly known as the United States Information Agency, an international public diplomacy agency that existed from 1953 to 1999.

every Member of Congress, congressional staff aides, key policymakers in the Executive Branch and members of the national news media."[34]

Weyrich and Feulner had brought different practical styles and sensibilities to the think tank universe. More akin to a social movement organization than to a center of social scientific production, the Heritage Foundation succeeded in installing an alternative form of credibility in the think tank universe. Such credibility rested on the think tank's ability to provide the organizational capacity and serve as the public face of an ideological movement. Heritage thus eschewed the form of autonomy specific to the intellectual, defined as the capacity to carry out intellectual production according to self-determined criteria of judgment. Rather, Heritage officials produced studies tailored to the practical requirements of political actors, based on the received questions and categories of public debate. In doing so, the Heritage Foundation sought to place itself at the center of everyday political struggles rather than maintain a certain distance from them.

Case Study #3: The Brookings Institution

The same forces that led to the creation and rehabilitation of the right-wing think tanks also threatened the stability of the older, more established organizations. In particular, the Brookings Institution experienced a period of crisis and reorganization in the 1970s and '80s.

In 1970, the Brookings Institution was, by most accounts, the dominant political think tank. Established on the model of a research university, Brookings sought to produce scholarship according to academic standards. Economist Henry Aaron recalls that, at the time, Brookings officials measured the organization's success largely in terms of the intellectual quality of its products:

> HA: In 1970, Brookings judged itself fundamentally by, I would say, ninety percent on the basis of the books that it had published, and seven percent on the basis of professional journal articles, and the remaining three percent if people wrote occasional pieces for the newspaper. Television interviews didn't occur. NPR didn't call because NPR didn't exist. And news programs, by and large, just didn't use think tank people in the way they have come to do….
>
> TM: What would be the mark, at that time, of a successful book?
>
> HA: [It was] well reviewed, usually in the scholarly journal. And if you could, on rare, rare occasions, somebody would get reviewed in *Bookworld* or in the [*New York*] *Times* book review. And that's a real breakthrough. That has always been regarded as a major achievement, but it doesn't happen very often.
>
> TM: Was it an attempt to influence an academic discussion?
>
> HA: Yes.

As Aaron indicates, the goal of attracting news media attention was judged secondary to the Brookings mission. "We worked on books and studies," economist Alice Rivlin explains, "but we were not so oriented to getting a message out. In fact, it was almost negative." Asked why Brookings didn't actively pursue media visibility in 1970, Rivlin

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[34] Personal letter from Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. to Clare Booth Luce, December 6, 1984, The Papers of Clare Boothe Luce, The Library of Congress Archival Manuscript Collection, Box 720, Folder 5.

responds, "I think…it wasn't somehow quite seemly for a scholarly organization to be pushing its products. Something like that. [The norm was] you should do research, you should publish, you should go to conferences, but you shouldn't be too focused on the media."[35]

While Brookings researchers followed a set of professional norms akin to those of the academic scholar, the organization did not aspire to be a university per se. Rather, Brookings saw itself as linking the university and American politics. Its original mission statement illustrates the point: "In its conferences, publications, and other activities, Brookings <u>serves as a bridge between scholarship and policymaking</u>, bringing new knowledge to the attention of decisionmakers and affording scholars greater insight into public policy issues." [my emphasis]. Substantively, one of Brookings' major activities was the study of economic deregulation, which Henry Aaron calls "perhaps the most important and influential set of studies that Brookings, maybe any think tank, has been involved with…because it [became] the intellectual foundation of deregulation."[36]

A key factor in Brookings' success was its solid financial standing, including its $50.1 million endowment in 1972.[37] Longtime Brookings scholar Stephen Hess recalls that when he joined the organization that year, "Brookings was rich," and, in some ways, "the only game in town."[38] Similarly, economist Alice Rivlin remembers that, during that time, "there seemed to be adequate funds for whatever most people wanted to do."[39] Both scholars found Brookings a good place to work because of the freedoms afforded them and because of the generous funding environment in which the organization operated.

The same economic turmoil that eventually gave rise to the Heritage Foundation and its organizational kin would also send Brookings into a tailspin. Brookings experienced a financial crisis in the middle part of the decade – its endowment shrinking from $50.1 million in 1972 to $33.4 million in 1978. The problems were mostly due to losses incurred in the 1973-74 stock market decline. In 1980, Brookings president Bruce

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[35] Rivlin recalls doing a stint as both an editorialist and a columnist for the *Washington Post* in the early 1970s, a job that began when she was on leave from Brookings but continued after she returned to the think tank:

> That was viewed with some— well, I'm not quite sure what the word is, but it was viewed negatively. My then boss, Joe Pechman, said, "You shouldn't be doing so much newspaper writing. You'll lose the respect of your professional colleagues." I was relatively young and he was a sort of mentor relationship. It was a friendly, "For your own career's sake you should be focusing more on books and journal articles and not so much on newspaper writing." Nobody would say that now…. [Newspaper writing] is considered good stuff. But in those days it wasn't. It was considered vaguely too popular.

[36] Author interview, Henry Aaron, Brookings Institution, November 19, 2003. Aaron added that this is "something that comes as a bit of a surprise to conservatives who identify Brookings as left-of-center."

[37] *Washington Post*, "Brookings Economics," July 13, 1980.

[38] Author interview, Stephen Hess, Brookings Institution, July 16, 2003.

[39] Author interview, Alice Rivlin, Brookings Institution, Xxx xx, 2003.

K. MacLaury explained to the *Washington Post*, "We were as much into growth stocks as everyone else. We fell victim to the decline."[40]

Despite adjusting its policy on staff media appearances, Brookings' public outreach efforts remained rudimentary. This adjustment came at a time when fundraising was becoming particularly difficult.

By the start of the next decade, the Brookings Institution found itself in an embattled position, both financially and strategically. In September 1981, Brookings retained the services of the consulting firm Barnes & Roche, Inc. to carry out a study of its development program and fund-raising plans, considered "in the broadest terms."[41] According to a report prepared by the consulting firm, the move was prompted by a "recognition that straitened financial circumstances may make Brookings less competitive" in the near future, a situation that carried "pervasive implications for long term fund-raising potential." To assess the problem, Barnes & Roche interviewed Brookings staff members and drew up a diagnostic report for the organization's administrators.

The consultants' report pointed out that the Brookings Institution was now operating in "a substantially changed climate in which measures from the 'old times' are no longer applicable." The think tank business had changed, and the organization's successful adaptation to its new environment would require significant shifts. In particular, the report identified two areas in which Brookings was at a disadvantage: communications and fund-raising. First, the consultants reported:

> The sharpest criticisms we heard were reserved for the repeated failures of Brookings to communicate effectively with various segments of its constituency…. By contemporary standards, the Brookings Institution does not have a public relations program.

The report spoke of the need to develop shorter publications and better mechanisms for disseminating them: "One commentator characterized it succinctly, 'In 1931 the way to communicate one's analysis of a problem was to write a book. And, in 1981 we are still writing books.'" Second, Brookings was now operating in a more competitive fund-raising environment, yet the organization had only a "limited file" on potential donors. To remedy this situation, Barnes & Roche advised the think tank to develop a more "centralized, coordinated" approach to identifying contributors. The consultants launched the information-gathering project themselves: "Initial efforts have been made to gather from the Trustees recommendations on persons whose suspected assets and potential interests may eventually be captured on Brookings' behalf."

The overall tone of the consultants' report was captured in its closing paragraphs: "The Brookings setting is at a point of significant change. The research staff keenly feels the changes and the pressure of transition which press on their organization." Brookings officials responded positively to the report. In April 1982, Executive Vice President and Trustee Roger D. Semerad wrote to his contact at Barnes & Roche, "As I indicated to you on the telephone, there are a great many new configurations required for Brookings to

[40] *Washington Post*, "Brookings Economics: 'Watch What We Say, Not What We Do'; Brookings' Budget Bath," July 13, 1980, K1

[41] Brookings Institution archives. "Executive Summary of the December 1981 Report, A Review of Development Planning and Programs, The Brookings Institution," Barnes & Roche, Inc., February 1982.

capitalize on the potential market, and your wisdom and experience would, I believe, be most useful as we proceed." Even so, the Institution's budget problems were severe enough to warrant a cautious arrangement with the consulting firm. Semerad's letter continued:

> I have very little budgetary flexibility to begin new contractual arrangements, and I would ask that you consider a bit more modest daily fee through this calendar year, or until such time as our new efforts begin to produce additional revenues. I do believe that once our planned efforts begin to produce, the climate and understanding for increased investment in these areas will become more acceptable to the Institution.[42]

[42] Brookings Institution archives. Letter from Roger D. Semerad, Executive Vice President and Member, Board of Trustees, The Brookings Institution, to Mr. Kelsey Murdoch, Barnes & Roche, Inc., April 5, 1982.

Table 3.1: Major U.S. think tanks in 1970

Organization	Established	Original location	1970 budget
Rand Corporation	1946	Santa Monica, CA	$27.6m[1]
Brookings Institution	1916	Washington, DC	$ 5.5m[2]
Urban Institute	1968	Washington, DC	$ 4.5m[3]
Hoover Institution	1919	Stanford, CA	$ 2.2m[4]
Council on Foreign Relations	1921	New York, NY	$ 2.1m[2]
Committee for Economic Dev.	1942	Washington, DC	$ 2.1m[2]
American Enterprise Institute	1943	Washington, DC	$ 0.9m[2]
Institute for Policy Studies	1963	Washington, DC	$ 0.6m[5]
Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace	1910	New York, NY	--*
Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research	1920	Cambridge, MA	--
Aspen Institute	1950	Aspen, CO	--
Hudson Institute	1961	Croton-on-Hudson, NY	--
Twentieth Century Fund	1919	New York, NY	--

* "--" indicates data not available.
[1]Personal communication, Peg Schumacher, Office of Ext. Affairs, Rand Corp., Jan. 12, 2006
[2]John Judis, *The Paradox of American Democracy*
[3]Personal communication, Sheryl Stein, Public Affairs Associate, Urban Inst., Jan. 12, 2006
[4]Personal communication, Michele M. Horaney, Public Affairs Mgr, Hoover Inst., Jan. 11, 2006
[5]IPS archival materials, Wisconsin Historical Society.

Table 3.2: Contributions to think tanks from ten major conservative philanthropies, selected years 1985-2004

	Heritage Fdn	AEI	Hoover Inst	Cato Inst	CSIS	Hudson Inst	Manhattan Inst	CEI	TOTAL
Scaife family foundations									
Sarah Scaife Fdn[1]	**18,835,000**	**5,061,000**	**8,545,500**	**1,877,500**	**8,193,000**	**2,333,000**	**3,095,000**	**1,390,000**	49,330,000
Carthage Fdn[1]	**2,759,000**	600,000	**1,223,400**	180,000	50,000	775,000	693,000	60,000	6,340,400
Scaife Family Fdn[2]	702,640	590,000	--	--	200,000	221,000	25,000	350,000	2,088,640
Lynde & Harry Bradley[3]	**13,283,702**	**15,892,797**	**1,928,500**	662,500	**1,548,402**	**5,600,410**	**2,796,560**	590,040	42,302,911
John Olin Foundation[3]	**8,320,835**	**7,022,124**	**5,015,660**	832,500	**2,112,318**	**3,034,840**	**4,899,500**	230,300	31,468,077
Koch family foundations									
Claude R. Lambe Fdn[4]	**1,874,000**	--	--	**8,950,000**	--	12,650	525,000	336,420	11,698,070
David H. Koch Fdn[5]	--	--	--	**4,043,240**	--	20,000	50,000	315,000	4,428,240
Charles G. Koch Fdn[6]	78,000	50,000	5,000	6,000	--	--	--	15,000	154,000
Smith Richardson Fdn[7]	--	**4,566,713**	**1,456,612**	--	**4,421,868**	**1,595,510**	**1,165,981**	--	13,206,684
Coors (Castle Rock Fdn)[8]	**2,348,760**	345,000	25,000	150,000	--	85,000	105,000	115,000	3,173,760
TOTAL	48,201,937	34,127,634	18,199,672	16,701,740	16,525,588	13,677,410	13,355,041	3,401,760	**164,190,782**

(Source: Media Transparency grants database, http://www.mediatransparency.org/)

[1] Grant-years 1985-2004
[2] 1985-2001
[3] 1985-2003
[4] 1986-93 and 1996-2004
[5] 1986-89 and 1995-2002
[6] 1986-89, 1991-93, and 1995-2004
[7] 1996-2003
[8] 1995-2004

Table 3.3: Major beneficiaries of conservative philanthropy

Organization type	Examples
Political action committees (PACs)	American Conservative Union GOPAC
Public television shows	Milton Friedman's "Free to Choose" Ben Wattenberg's "In Search of the Real America"
Magazines & journals	*The Public Interest* *The American Spectator* *The New Criterion*
Foreign-policy groups	Committee on the Present Danger Committee for the Free World
Legal foundations	Pacific Legal Foundation National Legal Center for the Public Interest
Lobbying and trade associations	The Business Roundtable
University outreach	Endowed professorships for pro-business faculty University research centers Campus newspapers
Independent scholars	Jude Wanniski (*The Way the World Works*) George Gilder (*Wealth and Poverty*) Bruce Barlett (*Reaganomics*)
Think tanks	Heritage Foundation (1973) Cato Institute (1977) Manhattan Institute (1984) Competitive Enterprise Institute (1984) American Enterprise Institute (1943) Hoover Institution (1919) Center for Strategic and International Studies (1962)