Propaganda and Ethno-Religious Politics in Developing Countries: Evidence from India

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Abstract: This paper provides evidence for the efficacy of ethno-religious campaigns in inducing voters to support political parties espousing ideologies of ethno-religious nationalism. During the 1991 Indian national elections, the leader of the Hindu-nationalist BJP political party toured northern India on a "pilgrimage" to the city of Ayodhya, holding numerous rallies along the way to promote the construction of a Hindu temple. Causal identification of the campaign's effect comes through the incidental exposure of localities due to their lying along the road joining the cities which were the ultimate target destinations of the campaign. The main result is that the campaign increased the BJP's vote share by 5-9 ppts in the constituencies through which it passed. This was not due to an increase in voter turnout, which was unaffected by the campaign. In addition, the campaign increased the probability of riots by 9 ppts, and the associated riots in turn increased the party's vote share by 3.5 ppts. The improvement in the BJP's vote share translated to a 10-20 ppts increase in the probability of victory for the BJP in visited constituencies. I also find evidence that the campaign led to an increase in the availability of local public goods in the areas through which it passed.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Political propaganda is widely perceived to play an important role in shaping public opinion and political and policy outcomes. Ethno-religious themes have played a substantial role in the design of such campaigns; developing countries in particular – where there exist higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and where the allocation of patronage and public goods is more discretionary, and therefore dependent on political outcomes – are attractive settings for the mobilization of ethno-religious identities for political gain (Fearon, 1999). In this paper, I analyze the effects of a notable ethno-religious campaign in India prior to the 1991 national elections. The character of this campaign was one of politico-religious exhortation, with the intent of of increasing the salience of Hindu identity through a fusing of traditional religious themes with contemporary political concerns.

Voter behavior is highly responsive to the messages disseminated through political campaigns and media framing. Voters are substantially more likely to participate in elections after being visited by campaign workers (Green *et al.*, 2003).[1] Voters in India exposed to a campaign exhorting them to vote based on policy rather than caste identity are more likely to vote, less likely to vote for their caste preferred party, and less likely to vote for politicians who are corrupt (Banerjee *et al.*, 2009).[2] Clientelistic campaign appeals can be effective in increasing vote shares, though the effect is stronger amongst men, with women being more receptive to appeals based on national public policy (Wantchekon, 2003).[3] Media framing too can exert substantial influence over political outcomes, with voters being more likely to vote for parties aligned with the biases of of the media outlets to which they are exposed (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber *et al.*,

[1] The authors study the effects of six campaigns in different American cities encouraging voter participation through door-to-door canvassing. The mean effect of the six campaigns is a 7.1 percentage points increase in the probability of voting.

[2] The campaign was conducted in Uttar Pradesh's state elections, and consisted of an exhortation to "vote on issues, not on caste." This campaign led to an 11 percentage points increase in the probability of vote, and a 10 percentage points decline in the probability of supporting the caste preferred party. (It should be noted that the campaign may have been perceived by villagers as an exhortation against the caste parties themselves, rather than caste voting in general, which would give the results a slightly different interpretation.)

[3] Wantchekon (2003) randomized the campaign messages of parties in national elections in Benin, with some villages receiving a clientelist message, others a public policy message, while villages not randomized into either group being used as the control.

2006).[4]

Ethnic identity represents a potentially potent instrument for influencing voter behavior, particularly in developing countries, where societies are characterized by greater levels of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. Identity-based appeals are both rendered more efficacious by the presence of pre-existing ethnic cleavages, and simultaneously can have the effect of increasing the salience of those very identities.[5] During close elections, the salience of ethnic identity relative to other ascriptive identities such as class and gender, has been found to increase, presumably due to a combination of political exhortation and perceived voter self-interest (Eifert *et al.*, 2008).[6] Where ethno-linguistic groupings are large enough to be decisive in electoral politics, even closely related groups can find themselves accentuating their differences with one another, where in less politicized contexts their differences are deemed minor (Posner *et al.*, 2004).[7] Where political power in village councils in India is reserved for low-caste groups, individuals become more favorably disposed towards politicians of the same caste but a different sub-caste (Dunning, 2009).[8]

I analyze the effects of a politico-religious campaign in India occurring prior to the 1991 national elections, the purpose of which was to increase the Hindu sentiment of the population,

[4]DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) describe the effects of Fox News in increasing support for the Republican Party in the 2000 US national elections, with the Party seeing an 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points increase in vote share in districits exposed to the Fox News Cable channel. For identification, the authors use the differential availability of Fox News due to the timing of contracts being signed with local service providers. Gerber *et al.* (2006) show that households randomly given subscriptions to the Washington Post, which has a Democratic orientation, increases the probability that the recipient votes for the Democratic candidate by 8 to 11 percentage points.

[5]An influential literature explores the ways in which ethnic identity is made more salient by the operation of political and historical forces. Factors such as colonial intervention (Laitin, 1986; Young, 1994), and the formation of minimum winning coalitions (Fearon, 1999; Posner, 2004), have been invoked to explain observed ethnic cleavages. Posner (2004) provides a discussion of this literature.

[6]Using the Afro-barometer data set across a series of election in ten African countries from 1999-2004, Eifert *et al.* (2008) find that individuals in the run-up to closely fought elections tend to emphasize their ethnic identity, as opposed to gender, professional, and class identities, when asked to choose among the offered identities the one most salient to them.

[7]Posner *et al.* (2004) find that the Chewa and Tumbuka tribes have significantly different relations and self-perceptions on opposite sides of the Zambia-Malawi border, which the authors attribute to the different electoral configurations on either side of the border. In Zambia, where the groups jointly constitute a small minority of the total population, differences between them are perceived by individuals to be small and relations are amicable. In Malawi, in contrast, where these groups constitute a significant share of the population, and therefore their separate ethnicities have proven viable for sorting into competing political parties, relations between the groups are acrimonious, and individuals in these tribes perceive their cultural differences to be very large.

[8]In this paper, the author uses an RD design to identify the effects of caste reservation. Not only are individuals in caste-reserved villages more likely to vote for candidates outside their sub-caste, but within their caste, but they also come to view these candidates more favorably in terms of their personal qualities.

against the rival identities of caste, class, and region. In late 1990, the leader of the Hindu nationalist BJP party undertook a national campaign to garner support for the building of a temple to the god *Ram* in the northern Indian city of Ayodhya. This campaign consisted of the party leader's touring northern India on a *yatra* ("pilgrimage") to the site of the proposed temple, holding numerous rallies along the way of a mixed political and religious character. The route itself was determined largely by the desire to maximize national publicity by passing through large urban agglomerations in key states across northern India. Identification comes through the exposure of voters to the the campaign due to their lying along the route connecting these large urban agglomerations. Constituencies through which the *yatra* pass show a 5-9 ppts increase in the vote share given the BJP, which in turn increased the probability of BJP victory by 10-20 ppts. In addition, Hindu-Muslim riots attributable to the activities of the campaign increase the BJP's vote share by 3.5 ppts.

A second finding of this paper is that local public goods allocations improve in areas visited by the *yatra*. Tap water, electrification, paved roads, telephone access, and primary education all see improvements, generally on the order of 3-6 ppts. Though this may seem to contradict the well-established result of ethno-linguistic fractionalization lowering the quality of policy outcomes, by de-emphasizing the myriad caste identities in favor of a more homogeneous Hindu identity, the campaign may have had the effect of reducing the effective level of fractionalization.[9] Such an interpretation would be in accord with the results found in Miguel and Gugerty (2005), who show the positive effects of a national versus ethnic identity by a comparison of the disparate abilities of ethnic groups to cooperate with one another in the provision of public goods across the Kenya-Tanzania border.[10]

[9] With more than 80% of the India's population being Hindu, the ethno-religious identity being promoted by the campaign was one with the potential to mitigate the caste cleavages hindering collective action.

[10] The authors argue that the inability of groups to cooperate for the provision of public goods in Kenya is due to that government's deliberate fomentation of ethnic conflict for electoral advantage; whereas the ability of the same ethnic groups to cooperate just across the border in Tanzania is due to the government's deliberate promotion of a national identity.

2 Background

2.1 Caste and Religion in Indian Politics

India is the locus of a particularly complex array of ascriptive identities. The caste system divides society into thousands of endogamous social groups, cutting across boundaries of religion, region, and class. Regional and linguistic identities figure prominently in Indian society: many states are associated with ethnic groups possessing a distinct language, cultural heritage, and political history. India is also home to multiple religious communities: Hindus, Muslims, Jains, Sikhs, Christians and Buddhists are all prominently represented, with deep cultural roots, and complicated relationships with regional, and even caste, identities.

Since independence, the dominant force in Indian politics has been the Congress party, which under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru articulated a secularist ideology that came to constitute a near national "consensus" for the better part of three decades. Regional parties such as the DMK in Tamil Nadu and the TDP in Andhra Pradesh became influential actors in Indian politics soon after independence, constituting in many states the principal rival to the national Congress party; and have, in recent years, been pivotal in the formation of ruling coalitions in the Central government (Guha, 2007). Since the late-1970s, caste- and religion-based parties have become increasingly important actors in state and national politics. The earlier incarnation of Hindu nationalist politics, the Jana Sangh, had only a marginal presence in Indian politics after independence;[11] the 1980s, however, witnessed the rapid rise of its successor, the Hindu nationalist BJP, which by 1991 had emerged as the Congress party's principal rival for national power. The party's rise was due in no small part to its effectiveness in mobilizing voters around the movement to construct a Hindu temple at the site of the *Babri Masjid* in Ayodhya (Jaffrelot, 1996), of which the campaign studied in this paper represented a particularly important move in bringing the issue to national prominence. These were also important years for caste-based politics, with parties such as the BSP emerging to represent the interests of the marginalized Scheduled Castes; and the Janata party and its various local offshoots representing the interests of the increasingly assertive middling agrarian classes (Jaffrelot, 2003). As a consequence, the

[11] This was due largely to Nehru's hostility to sectarianism, as well as the role played by Hindu activists in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.

nearly uninterrupted authority of the Congress party has been replaced by shifting coalitional formations based on a variety of caste, religious, regional, and ideological parties.

2.2 Historical Background and the 1991 Election

The politico-religious campaign studied here – the *Ram Rath Yatra* – was part of a broader movement to build a temple to the god *Ram* at his legendary birthplace in Ayodhya, a town in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. According to activists, the original temple at the site of his birth was destroyed by the Muslim invader Babur, who in its place built a mosque, the eponymous *Babri Masjid*, in 1528. In 1949, a small icon of *Ram* was smuggled into the mosque during the night, after which the mosque was closed off to all worshippers, Hindu and Muslim, for fear that conflict over the site would re-ignite the communal passions that had led to horrific carnage following Partition the previous year. For more than 30 years the issue was largely dormant, until its revival in the mid-1980s by Hindu activists, in large part for the purpose of increasing popular support for the Hindu nationalist movement and its political wing, the BJP. Further aggravating matters, in 1987 the mosque was re-opened by judicial fiat to Hindu worshippers, likely at the behest of Congress leadership, who hoped to fracture the Hindu "vote bank" being cultivated by the BJP (Jaffrelot, 1996).

Throughout the 1980s, a series of campaigns were organized to bring greater attention to the temple issue. A particularly popular tactic was the organization of long-distance processions, wherein party activists would travel between religious sites around the country, holding rallies and ceremonies that blended religious themes with political exhortation (Jaffrelot, 1996; Assayag, 1998). Though successful in bringing attention to the issue, these campaigns failed to move the political or judicial apparatus to sanction the replacement of the mosque with a Hindu temple. Becoming increasingly impatient at the continuing deadlock, Hindu nationalist groups announced that construction of the temple would commence on October 30, 1990, regardless of government consent. In support of this effort, L.K. Advani, then president of the BJP, declared his intention to conduct a *Ram Rath Yatra* ("pilgrimage of *Ram*'s chariot"), traveling in "pilgrimage" across northern India to Ayodhya, where he would arrive on the day designated for construction to begin.

Several factors in Indian society rendered the moment propitious for the *yatra* campaign. During this time there aired a television serial based on the mythology of *Ram*, which became the most popular show in Indian history and helped to give the god a pan-Indian significance previously absent (Lutgendorf, 1990). In addition, 1989 saw the outbreak of a separatist movement in Muslim-majority Kashmir, supported by India's rival Pakistan,[12] which rendered the population amenable to a political movement castigating the Muslim community and decrying the betrayal of Hindu India by a feckless political elite. Following on the heels of the infamous Shah Bano affair,[13] the narrative of a beleaguered Hindu nation held hostage by its minority communities gained increasing traction in public discourse.

Perhaps most explosive of the controversies roiling Indian society, however, was the announcement on August 7, 1990 by the ruling Janata Dal party that the government would be implementing the recommendations of the Mandal Commission to establish quotas in government employment and higher education for the so-called "Other Backwards Castes" (OBCs).[14] The share to be apportioned the OBCs was 27.5% of the positions in the relevant institutions; added to the 22% already reserved to Scheduled Castes and Tribes, this would mean that half the positions would be unavailable to higher caste groups, which had long dominated the ranks of government employment and higher education.[15] The backlash against this announcement was swift and violent: across the country, but particularly in the north and the national capital, Delhi, protestors took to the streets in massive demonstrations. Most ominously, a number of upper caste students voiced their opposition through public self-immolations, helping to turn public opinion against the ruling coalition. Amongst those segments of society which stood to gain from the Mandal recommendations, however, of which a significant share supported the

[12] India and Pakistan had fought wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971.

[13] In this case, a 62 year-old Muslim woman had been unilaterally divorced by her husband, then denied alimony under Muslim Personal Law. After the Supreme Court overturned this ruling, and required that the husband pay alimony, the Congress-led government passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, which upheld the original ruling denying the wife alimony. This law was widely perceived as a craven act of political pandering, and touted by Hindu nationalists as emblematic of the Congress party's "pseudo-secularism," whereby the national interest had been surrendered to the parochial demands of clamorous minorities, particularly Muslims.

[14] This is a group located above the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the social hierarchy, but still suffering significant social and economic disadvantage.

[15] The Constitution stipulates that reservations must constitute less than half the share; hence the determination that 27.5% of positions would be reserved for OBCs.

ruling Janata Dal party, the policy enjoyed widespread support.

The Mandal recommendation and the *Ram Rath Yatra* were each, in important ways, responses to the larger social and political forces represented by the other. Since the beginning of the year, pressure had been building from Hindu nationalist groups for progress on the temple issue. With October 30 as the announced deadline for work on the temple to commence, the Mandal announcement was conceived by the Janata Dal leader V.P. Singh as, in part, helping to blunt this growing threat, and in the longer run breaking up the Hindu "vote bank" being assiduously cultivated by the BJP. Simultaneously, with the Mandal announcement on August 7, and the protests that followed, the BJP was eager to dissociate itself from the Janata government without explicitly disavowing the Mandal recommendation, which would have alienated the party from the many lower caste voters who supported the ruling. The *Ram Rath Yatra*, conceived months earlier by the BJP leader L.K. Advani, was announced on September 12: with the October 30 deadline looming and the Mandal ruling putting increasing pressure on the BJP to act, the moment was propitious for such a campaign (Jaffrelot, 1996).

2.3 *Yatra*

The *yatra* commenced on September 25 from the religious town of Somnath in western India.[16] The imagery employed throughout was designed to promote a pan-Hindu identity transcending the myriad caste and doctrinal divisions endemic to Hindu society. Though long the preserve of high caste Hindus, the ideology of Hindu nationalism had from the beginning held as one of its central doctrines the unification of Hindus across caste boundaries. In a similar vein, the leaders of the temple-building campaign had as their conscious objective the promotion of a Hindu identity based on themes and traditions transcending the more divisive aspects of caste-based Hinduism, which were perceived as having allowed Hinduism to be overwhelmed by Muslim invaders (Jaffrelot, 1996). For the Hindu nationalist BJP, the effort to unite Hindus according to religious identity had an additional, more instrumental, purpose: being the party

[16]The choice of this site was significant: a famous Hindu temple had been destroyed there in 1025 by the Muslim invader Mahmoud of Ghazni; in the early years of independence, a new temple had been erected at the site, serving as a model for what Hindu nationalists hoped to achieve in Ayodhya. The date too was significant, as September 25 was the birthday of the Hindu nationalist leader Deendayal Upadhyaya.

of high-caste Hindus, the ability to win the support of lower caste voters due to religious identity rather than policy concessions was particularly attractive, presenting the possibility of blunting the increasingly sharp edge of caste-based politics without having to compromise the material interests of the party's core constituents.

Political rallies and religious processions were held along the path of the procession, with Hindu activists from across the country converging on the places through which it passed. In the cities, hundreds of thousands would assemble to welcome the arrival of the *yatra*; in the the countryside too, people lined the road offering salutations to the passing *yatra*, or attended the numerous small rallies held along the way. The effects of the *yatra* extended far beyond the populations directly exposed. The national papers and television networks gave almost daily updates on the *yatra*'s progress. Supporting campaigns were held throughout the country, with smaller *yatras*[17] being conducted in places such as Bangalore, Kerala, and West Bengal (Jaffrelot, 1996).

A few quotes from the *Times of India* will suffice to explicate the character and efficacy of the *yatra*. "Like yesterday, Mr. Advani received spontaneous receptions as people lined the entire route to greet the BJP leader with folded hands... despite driving for two days, stopping frequently to receive village crowds" (TOI, 9/27/1990). "More than 3,000 volunteers belonging to the BJP, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, joined the rally from Fazalpur on two-wheelers, tempos, cars... Thousands of people waited on both sides of the road..." (TOI 9/28/1990). "On its first leg in Madhya Pradesh, Mr. L.K. Advani's Ram rathyatra has been a roaring success. The adverse weather... has not deterred villagers" (TOI, 10/8/1990). "Hundreds of thousands of saffron-clad supporters of the BJP, the VHP, and Bajrang Dal along with others thronged the streets..." (TOI, 10/21/1990). The following description from the early days of the campaign is illustrative:

> "The organizers had scheduled six public meetings only at major stops every day. But the enthusiastic supporters of the Bajrang Dal and the thousands of people who had lined up on the road for hours would not be satisfied with just a wave of the hand or a benign smile. Whenever the rath slowed down, people surrounded it and would

[17] These were the *Ram Jyoti Yatras*, "pilgrimages of the light of Ram."

> not let go until Mr Advani uttered a few words... Vehicles carrying newsmen often ahead of the rath on the smooth, sprawling national highway. And sure enough, they were accosted by groups of people waiting for the rath, asking when it would pass them... The enthusiasm of the people waiting for the rath was so great..." (TOI, 9/30/1990)

The *yatra* successively passed through the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, and Bihar.[18] State and national leaders had followed the campaign with increasing apprehension, concerned at the potential for large-scale unrest and violence should it reach its destination. After passing through Bihar, the *yatra* was to enter Uttar Pradesh, proceeding to Ayodhya on October 30. The leaders of these two states, however, representing rival parties of the BJP, and governing states particularly susceptible to communal violence, were determined to ensure that the *yatra* not reach its destination. On October 23, Advani was arrested by state authorities in the town of Samastipur, Bihar. His arrest triggered protests throughout the country, often accompanied by violent rioting, and resulting in the arrests of hundreds of thousands of activists.

3 Identification Strategy

3.1 Empirical Framework

The identifying assumption is twofold: First, I argue that the selection mechanism for the *yatra* was determined by the desire for national exposure, and is not correlated with potential outcomes *at the constituency level*, once controlling for observable constituency characteristics. Second, insofar as the first assumption is violated,[19] by excluding constituencies which determined the route of the *yatra* the selection bias is removed, as the remaining constituencies will have received the treatment due only to their incidentally lying along the road connecting the target destinations.

[18] Advani initially bypassed Uttar Pradesh, riding by train from Delhi to Bihar, so that UP would be the final state through which the campaign passed.

[19] For example, if constituencies most suitable for gaining national exposure were also those in which the party was independently gaining vote share; or if the organizers employed a more sophisticated selection mechanism based on knowledge of unobservable local characteristics.

The identification strategy solves two slightly different problems. By establishing a context in which there occurs quasi-random variation in the exposure to the politico-religious campaign, I am able to solve both the "selection bias" problem, and also to identify a more general average treatment effect, rather than merely a treatment-on-the-treated effect. The latter is important, as I am trying to establish the general efficacy of the *yatra* campaign; if the estimated effects in the analysis are limited to the sub-sample of the population most receptive to the campaign, then the results, while still causally identified, will not be generalizable to the entire population.

Formally, I model the share of the vote accruing to the BJP as linear function of a vector of observables, $\mathbf{X}_i$, and the politico-religious mobilization campaign, *yatra*:

$$bjp91_i = \alpha + \rho yatra_i + \beta \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbf{X}_i$ includes the BJP's 1989 vote share, and various socio-demographic characteristics correlated with their change in vote share between 1989 and 1991. Insofar as there is selection on potential outcomes, we will have $E(yatra_i \varepsilon_i) \neq 0$, vitiating the validity of the OLS. A naive OLS estimate would therefore yield:

$$\begin{aligned} E[bjp91_i \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X}_i] - E[bjp91_i \mid yatra_i = 0, \mathbf{X}_i] \quad = \quad & \underbrace{E[bjp91_{1i} \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X}_i] - E[bjp91_{0i} \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X}_i]}_{\text{treatment on the treated}} \\ & + \underbrace{E[bjp91_{0i} \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X}_i] - E[bjp91_{0i} \mid yatra_i = 0, \mathbf{X}_i]}_{\text{selection bias}}, \end{aligned}$$

with the latter term representing the selection bias, and the first term representing the effect of treatment on the treated (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The selection bias term accounts for the possibility that the treatment was assigned to constituencies that would have realized a differential change in support for the BJP independent of the treatment. If the *yatra* simply visited constituencies that were already going to increase their support for the BJP, then the estimated coefficient will be biased upwards. By random assignment of the *yatra* treatment, conditional on observables, the selection bias is removed, as

$$E[bjp91_{0i} \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X}_i] - E[bjp91_{0i} \mid yatra_i = 0, \mathbf{X}_i] \quad \rightarrow \quad E[bjp91_{0i} \mid \mathbf{X}_i] - E[bjp1991_{0i} \mid \mathbf{X}_i] = 0.$$

We are now left with the first term, so that the estimated effect is that of the treatment on the treated. However, random assignment is in fact sufficient to identify the average treatment

effect, as

$$\begin{aligned} E[bjp91_i \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X}_i] - E[bjp91_i \mid yatra_i = 0, \mathbf{X}_i] &= E[bjp91_{1i} \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X_i}] - E[bjp1991_{0i} \mid yatra_i = 1, \mathbf{X}_i] \\ &= E[bjp91_{1i} \mid \mathbf{X}_i] - E[bjp1991_{0i} \mid \mathbf{X}_i]. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, if the *yatra* campaign is as good as randomly assigned conditional on observables, as I will subsequently argue, then OLS estimation will be sufficient to identify the average treatment effect.

3.2 Summary Statistics and Balance

Table 1 gives summary statistics for the *yatra* and the incidence of rioting. There are 497 constituencies in the 15 states included in our sample. The *yatra* passed through 57 constituencies, with 7 states having no constituencies visited by the *yatra*. In all the regressions, megalopolises such as Bombay and Calcutta are excluded,[20] which brings to 49 the number of constituencies through which the *yatra* passed. Another class of constituencies that we will sometimes want to exclude from our regressions are the "target constituencies,"[21] in which are located cities that plausibly played a role in determining the route of the *yatra*. Excluding these, there remain 38 constituencies through which the *yatra* passed. Riots occurred in 62 constituencies between the 1989 and 1991 elections, and in 35 constituencies during the five weeks of the *yatra*. There occurred 2194 deaths due to rioting in between the two elections, 161 of them during the time of the *yatra*. In the baseline regressions, only the major urban agglomerations are excluded, and not the "target constituencies," except when the two overlap. The reason for this is two-fold: First, as argued above, constituencies were visited not based on potential outcomes, but rather for the purpose of generating national media exposure; insofar as these "target constituencies" did not possess unobservable characteristics correlated with the outcome, this will not introduce bias into our estimates. Second, because these constituencies constituted a large share of those that were visited (and tended to be subjected to the most intense treatment), their exclusion

[20]The excluded urban constituencies are Bombay (5 constituencies), Calcutta (3 constituencies), Madras (3 constituencies), Hyderabad (2 constituencies), Pune, and Bangalore (2 constituencies).

[21]The constituencies defined as "target constituencies" are Junagadh, Ahmedabad, Bombay, Nasik, Pune, Hyderabad, Nagpur, Jabalpur, Indore, Bhopal, Udaipur, Jaipur, Dhanbad, and Patna. A few of these, such as Indore and Bhopal, are not clearly target constituencies, but plausibly played a role in determining the route.

greatly reduces the number of treatment constituencies, rendering it more difficult to test for important heterogeneities in the *yatra*'s effects across population characteristics such as class and religion. In the robustness checks, these constituencies are dropped from the sample, yielding little change in the magnitude or significance of the coefficients.

Table 2 reports the balance of constituency characteristics across the *yatra* treatment. It is not the contention here that the constituencies along the path of the *yatra* were randomly chosen, but merely that they were not chosen based on potential outcomes. In fact, given that the *yatra* passed between many of the largest cities of north India, it is anticipated that areas visited will, for example, be somewhat more urbanized than areas not visited. Column (3) shows the raw difference in means; column (4) adds state fixed effects; and column (5) includes a control for urbanization. Looking only at the raw difference in means, we see that there exist substantial differences across *yatra* and non-*yatra* constituencies. Most conspicuously, the urbanization rate was 9.3 ppts higher in *yatra* constituencies, and the level of the BJP's 1989 electoral support considerably higher, with the party 26 ppts more likely to have competed in *yatra* constituencies and winning 13 ppts more of the vote (with a 16 ppts higher margin) in those constituencies contested. There are also small difference in the composition of the work force. The inclusion of state fixed effects largely removes the differences in prior electoral outcomes: though the party is still 20.8 ppts more likely to have contested a constituency, its vote share in those constituencies contested is no different. The inclusion of an urbanization control does not substantially change these differences. The higher level of prior BJP participation is unsurprising, and poses little trouble for the identification strategy; in all specifications I account for the party's prior participation and and its level of support within the constituency. The balance achieved merely by the inclusion of state fixed effects largely validates the identification strategy, though it will be necessary to account for the differences in urbanization.

3.3 *Yatra* Route

Figure 1 shows the route traveled by the *yatra*. Though the route appears conspicuously circuitous, and might suggest selection on outcomes, those familiar with the geography of India will immediately recognize the major urban agglomerations located at each of the *yatra*'s inflec-

tion points, so that the path would appear to be designed primarily to reach these cities, while passing through the northern states where the party enjoys its greatest support.[22] To describe the dominant factors determining the route of the *yatra*, I estimate the following regression

$$yatra_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i, \tag{2}$$

with $\mathbf{X}_i$ a vector of variables potentially determining the route of the *yatra*.

Table 3 gives the results of this regression. Columns (1) and (2) give the mean and standard deviation of each of the indicated variables. In column (3) are given the results of regressions of the *yatra* on each of the variables independently, without the inclusion of state fixed effects; state fixed effects are included in column (4). The explanatory variables are demeaned by the mean level for non-*yatra* constituencies and divided by the standard deviation.[23] Column (5) gives the results of a regression of the *yatra* on all of the variables simultaneously, without state fixed effects; and, in column (6), with the inclusion of state fixed effects. Looking at column (6), we see that the *yatra* has selected into constituencies having a higher urbanization rate and a higher prior BJP vote share. Accounting for state fixed effects, a constituency with an urbanization rate one standard deviation above the mean is 5.6 ppts more likely to have been visited by the *yatra* than a constituency with an urbanization rate equal to the mean. A 1 sd increase in the BJP vote share is associated with a 3.3 ppts higher probability of a constituency's being visited by the *yatra*. In addition, constituencies with an SC/ST population one standard deviation above the mean are 3.0 ppts more likely to have been visited by the *yatra* than those with an SC/ST population equal to the mean. When we come to the main results, specifications will be estimated including each of these variables as a control. As we will see, despite these constituency characteristics being correlated with a higher likelihood of being visited by the *yatra*, controlling for them has no effect on the estimated results.

Figure 2, which details the evolution of the BJP's vote share across the 1984-1996 elections,

[22] Even in Madhya Pradesh, where the inflection point is not a megalopolis, the city where the *yatra* turns west is Jabalpur, the third largest city in the state; the two largest cities in the state are Indore and Bhopal, which were also visited by the *yatra*.

[23] That is, $Xdev_i \equiv (X_i - mean(X_{nonyatra}))/sd(X_{nonyatra})$ – which, for notational simplicity, is given as X_i in model (2).

hints at one of the principal challenges for the identification strategy: namely, that the *yatra* may have simply passed through constituencies in which the BJP's support was independently trending upwards. As discussed above, these were years in which the BJP substantially increased its national profile. In 1984, the BJP had a marginal national presence (due in part to the assassination of Indira Gandhi just prior to the 1984 election). With the 1989 election, the party had begun to make major inroads in northern India, particularly in the states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. During the 1991 election, the party contested nearly 90% of constituencies, winning 120 of them and gaining 24% of the vote in the seats contested. The party's performance in 1996 continued this trend, with the party winning 161 seats, and 26% of the vote in contested constituencies.

The principal strategy for coping with the potential correlation of the *yatra* with differential trending support is through an interaction of the BJP's 1989 vote share with state fixed effects, which will capture within-state convergence patterns. In addition, alternative specifications are estimated controlling for trends in the BJP vote share between 1984 and 1989. Finally, I also perform placebo regressions using earlier elections. Figure 3, in any case, shows why this possibility may not represent too serious a threat to the identification strategy. The BJP's vote share across the 1984, 1989, 1991, and 1996 elections are shown, disaggregated by the *yatra* status of the constituency. Panel (a) shows constituencies for which all elections between 1984 and 1996 were contested; panel (b) shows those constituencies which were contested for the first time in 1989. Despite the slightly sharper increase in support for the BJP between 1984 and 1989 in *yatra* constituencies, the trend levels off between the 1989 and 1991 elections. Amongst constituencies contested for the first time in 1989, there is some evidence for a relative improvement in the BJP's vote share in *yatra* constituencies between 1991 and 1996, but no difference between 1989 and 1991.

4 Data

The election data comes from the Election Commission of India. The Election Commission of India maintains on their website text files of the results of all state and national elections since

independence.[24] This data set includes information on the number of votes received by every candidate for each constituency, the party to which the candidate belongs, as well as candidate characteristics such as name and gender. In addition, GIS constituency maps can be found on the ECI website for all constituencies as they existed at the time of the 1991 election.

For socio-demographic and public goods data, I use the 1991 Indian census. This data is provided at the village level, which can be aggregated up to the sub-district and district levels. The matching of administrative and political data is problematic in India, as Indian districts imperfectly match up with political constituencies, preventing a simple one-to-one matching of the two. To solve this problem I use the sub-district aggregation of the census data: because sub-districts are largely nested within parliamentary constituencies, they can be more precisely matched. Using the names of the sub-districts, I then match the 1991 census sub-districts to the 2001 census data, for which GIS maps are provided. Finally, using ArcGIS mapping software, I take the centroids[25] of these sub-districts, assigning each to the constituency within which it falls. Figure 4 shows how this is done; the boundaries delineate the parliamentary constituencies, and the points represent the centroids of the sub-districts.

Data on the route of the *yatra* was constructed using daily accounts from *The Times of India*, one of the major national daily newspapers. Using these journalistic accounts, together with GIS maps of the parliamentary constituencies, the road network, and built-up areas,[26] I was able to determine the constituencies through which the *yatra* had passed. Figure 1 shows the route of the *yatra* as determined by this method.[27]

Riot data comes from Varshney and Wilksinson's (2005) data set on Hindu-Muslim riots in India dating back 50 years. This data includes detailed information on the location and timing of riots, including the city and district in which they occurred. To match the riot data to political constituencies, I identify the location of the city in which the riot occurred in the GIS map on built-up areas; then, using ArcGIS, the riots are assigned to the constituencies in which they fall. Figure 5 shows the location of the riots occurring between the 1989 and 1991 elections, and

[24] I am grateful to Leigh Linden for the use of digitized versions of these files.

[25] These are the points at the geometric center of the given plane figure.

[26] The latter two are from the International Steering Committee for Global Mapping.

[27] The route can also be seen in figure 4: the path traced out in blue is that traveled by the *yatra*; the red lines are the "primary" roads, described below.

the route of the *yatra*.

Finally, I also construct a variable giving the distance of each sub-district to a national highway. I later explain how this information is used; here, I simply describe how this is variable constructed. Using the map on the Indian road networks, I identify all roads given as "primary." Merging this shape file with that on the sub-districts, I then use ArcGIS software to determine the distance of each sub-district to the nearest "primary" road. Figure 4 shows how this is done: each sub-district is assigned a distance value calculated as the distance from the sub-district to the nearest length of highway, represented by the red lines on the map.

5 Results

5.1 Yatra and BJP Vote Share

5.1.1 Baseline Results

Figure 6 previews the results. The BJP's 1991 vote share is plotted against its 1989 vote share, disaggregated by the *yatra* status. The BJP's vote share is seen to be higher in constituencies through which the *yatra* passed, conditional on its previous vote share.

The baseline regression is as follows:

$$bjp91_{i,s} = \alpha + \rho yatra_i + \varphi R_i + \phi ayodhya_i + \theta \mathbf{E_i} + \gamma bjp89_i + \delta_s + \boldsymbol{\Upsilon}(\delta_s \times bjp89_i) + \varepsilon_i. \quad (3)$$

The outcome variable, $bjp91_{i,s}$, is the BJP's 1991 vote share in constituency i in state s. The explanatory variable of interest, $yatra_i$, a dummy indicating whether the *yatra* passed through a constituency. A control is included for the BJP's 1989 vote share, $bjp89_i$; and a vector of electoral variables, $\mathbf{E_i}$, that influenced the election, including whether the BJP had entered into a vote-sharing arrangement with the Janata Dal party in the previous election,[28] and whether voting in the constituency was held before or after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. I also

[28]In the 1989 election, the BJP and Janata Dal had a vote-sharing arrangement, whereby it was agreed that in certain constituencies only of the two parties would compete. This allowed the two parties to maximize the number of seats they jointly won, with the ultimate objective being to reduce the number of seats held by Congress. After the election, the Janata Dal received outside support from the BJP so that the former could hold together a minority-led governing coalition in the central government.

include a dummy for the incidence of a riot between the 1989 and 1991 elections, R_i. $ayodhya_i$ is a dummy for the constituencies in which the temple site was either located, or which were adjacent to the constituency.[29] Finally, state fixed effects, δ_s, are included, as well as their interaction with the 1989 vote share, to account for state-specific convergence patterns. The inclusion of the interaction term considerably improves the precision and stability of the results across all specifications.

An important issue is that the *yatra* passed through constituencies in which the BJP had a higher probability of participating in elections in 1989. To account for this, I disaggregate the sample by the BJP's prior participation, and estimate the regressions separately for each sample. Relatedly, the *yatra* may have simply passed through constituencies in which there was an independently upward-trending support for the party. To control for this, I include in some specifications a quadratic in the change in the BJP's vote share between 1984 and 1989, and in others a control for the 1984 BJP vote share and its interaction with the 1989 vote share.

Table 4 gives the baseline results. Limiting the sample to only those constituencies that had previously been contested, of which there were 194, we find that the *yatra* is associated with a 5.3 ppts increase in the BJP vote share, significant at the 1% level. Including controls for the 1984 vote share and its interaction with the 1989 vote share, the coefficient is is 4.6 ppts (5% level); while, with the inclusion of the quadratic trend, it is 4.7 ppts (5% level).[30] Limiting the sample to those constituencies not previously contested, of which there were 237, the coefficients are relatively similar. The effect of the *yatra* is a 7.0 ppts increase in the BJP's vote share, significant at the 1% level. Including the 1984 vote share and its interaction, the coefficient is 5.34 ppts (5% level). The inclusion of a 1984 to 1989 quadratic trend yields a coefficient of 5.39 (5% level). Finally, the regressions are estimated using the entire sample, including a dummy for newly contested constituencies. The respective coefficients for the three specifications are 5.70, 4.58, and 4.59, significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the *ayodhya* dummy is positive but insignificant in all our specifications, ranging in value from 1.7 to 3.9. Riots are seen to have positive effects on the BJP's vote share. When using only the sample of constituencies

[29] These are Akbarpur, Amethi, Bara Banki, Basti, Faizabad, Gonda, and Sultanpur.

[30] The sample size declines with the inclusion of controls for the 1984 election due to the cancellation of elections in Punjab in 1984.

previously contested by the BJP, the effect is found to be small and insignificant. However, in constituencies not previously contested, the effect is a 6.5 ppts increase in the BJP vote share, significant at the 1% level. When estimated using the complete sample, the effect is 3.7 ppts, significant at the 1% level. In results not shown, I find no evidence that the *yatra* led to an increase in voter turnout.

An important event in the 1991 election was the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, which occurred a day after the first round of voting and three weeks before the second round.[31] Those constituencies voting after the assassination gave a substantially higher share of the vote to the Congress party, increasing the probability of its victory by more than 20 percentage points (Blakeslee, 2012). An assassination dummy has already been included in the baseline specification; a *yatra*-assassination interaction term is now added, to account for heterogeneities in the *yatra* effect according to whether the election was held before or after the assassination. Table 5 gives the results. In columns (1)-(3), we now see that the *yatra* has in fact increased the BJP vote share by 8.1-9.2 ppts in constituencies previously contested, depending on the 1984 and 1989 vote controls, significant at the 1% level. This is quite a bit larger than the previously estimated effect. Where the assassination intervened, however, the effect of the *yatra* is almost perfectly canceled out. When estimating the full sample, we see that the effect of the assassination is between 6.2-7.6 ppts (1% level), though the assassination now offsets only a portion of the *yatra* effect, due to the lack of an off-setting effect in constituencies not previously contested.

In sum, the baseline specifications show the *yatra* to have significantly increased the BJP's vote share in constituencies through which it passed. Moreover, the effectiveness of the *yatra* has been obscured somewhat by the assassination, which served to effectively neutralize the campaign's effect where the two coincided; taking this into account reveals the *yatra* to have been even more potent. The fact that the assassination interaction perfectly cancels out the *yatra* coefficient (in previously-contested constituencies) gives additional credence to the identification strategy. Had the *yatra* coefficient been reflecting some sort of omitted variable bias, it is hard to see why the interaction term would have had the property of negating the *yatra* effect, unless

[31] The vote is conducted in India across multiple rounds, with some portion of constituencies voting in each round, and the results not being released until all voting is concluded.

this ommitted constituency characteristic was similarly correlated with the responsiveness of the population to the assassination, a coincidence hard to credit.

5.1.2 Socio-Demographic Controls

To account for the possibility that the *yatra*'s route was correlated with constituency characteristics that may have been correlated with the outcome of interest, I estimate specifications including these possibly confounding variables as controls:

$$bjp91_{i,s} = \alpha + \rho yatra_i + \varphi R_i + \phi ayodhya_i + \theta \mathbf{E_i} + \gamma bjp89_i + \lambda X_i + \delta_s + \boldsymbol{\Upsilon}(\delta_s \times bjp89_i) + \varepsilon_i, \quad (4)$$

where X_i is the control variable. Included among these are: percentage of the population that is constituted by different caste and religious groups (brahmins, Muslims, SC/ST); caste and caste/religious fragmentation; the urbanization rate; the percentage of villages possessing paved roads; and the percentage of cultivated land being irrigated.

Table 6 shows the results. Each row gives the coefficient on the *yatra* variable when including the indicated control. Columns (7)-(12) give the *yatra* coefficients in specifications including the *yatra*-assassination interaction term. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) include only the sample of constituencies previously contested by the BJP; while columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) include the full sample. As can be seen, the *yatra* coefficient is remarkably robust to the controls. The only exception is the urbanization control, where there is a reduction in the coefficient magnitude and statistical significance for the previously-contested sample, when excluding the assassination interaction term: the use of the full sample, however, or specifications including the assassination interaction term, continue to yield large and statistically significant coefficients.[32]

[32]The modest decrease in magnitude and significance with the inclusion of an urbanization control is somewhat misleading. For virtually the entirety of the range of urbanization, *yatra* constituencies give a similarly increased share of the vote to the BJP; for a small number of highly urbanized non-*yatra* constituencies, however, the vote share of the BJP is very high, causing the linear fit to attribute a disproportionate share of the BJP vote share to the urbanization rate.

5.1.3 Primary Roads

The most obvious threat to the identification strategy is the possibility that populations clustered near the major roads were independently increasing their support for the BJP during these years, with the *yatra* merely picking up this differential trend due to its traversing the major highways. Though the results are robust to the inclusion of the urbanization rate, which in principle should give a rough proxy for the population's concentration around the main roads, there may nonetheless be characteristics of constituencies along these routes that cannot be captured by the urbanization control, and which will introduce a correlation between the *yatra* and the error term.

To account for this possibility, I construct an index for the concentration of the population within a constituency around a large road. Using the variable for the distance of each sub-district from the nearest "primary" road, I construct the "main road index" using the following formula:

$$MainRoad_i = \sum_{subdist \in i} \frac{pop_{subdist}}{pop_i} \times f(RoadDist_{subdist}), \tag{5}$$

where

$$f(RoadDist_{subdist}) = \begin{cases} ln(x/RoadDist_{subdist}) & \text{if} \quad RoadDist_{subdist} < x \\ 0 & \text{if} \quad RoadDist_{subdist} \geq x. \end{cases}$$

In words, the $MainRoad_i$ index sums a function of the distance of each sub-district in constituency i from the nearest "primary" road, weighting each by the share of the constituency's population contained within the sub-district. The distance function takes the natural log of some distance parameter divided by the distance of the sub-district from the nearest primary road. Therefore, the distance function is monotonically decreasing in distance. Once the distance of the sub-district reaches the chosen parameter, x, the value of the function becomes zero.

Table 8 shows the coefficients on the *yatra* variable using equation (4), with the road index being used as the control variable. Each row shows the results using the indicated parameter

x, which ranges from 25 to 500 kms, to construct the index. The *yatra* coefficients are largely unchanged; there is no evidence that it is the population's proximity to the main road driving the results.

5.1.4 Heterogeneous Effects of *Yatra*

An important question is whether the *yatra* proved more effective in constituencies possessing characteristics associated with greater sympathy for Hindu nationalist sentiment. The principal groups associated with support for the BJP at this time were high caste Hindus, as well as the middle and upper classes (Heath, 1999). To explore these issues, I next estimate equation (4) incorporating an interaction term of the *yatra* with the socio-demographic variables included in table 6. The control variables are demeaned by the mean for non-*yatra* constituencies, and divided by the standard deviation.

Table 8 gives the coefficients on the *yatra* and the *yatra*-control interaction term. The *yatra* was significantly more effective where the share of the Muslims was higher – an increase of 1 sd in the share of the population that is Muslim nearly doubles the effect of the *yatra* – evidence, perhaps, of the greater ability to stoke antipathy towards Muslims in areas where they were of large enough numbers to be deemed a plausible threat. Indeed, the *yatra* is seen to have no effect in constituencies with a Muslim population 1 sd below the mean. Higher levels of irrigation are associated with a weakened effect of the *yatra*, with a 1 sd increase in the share of land being irrigated above the mean associated with the complete negation of the *yatra* effect, which is perhaps due to the association of such constituencies with the middling agrarian classes generally associated with the Janata Dal.[33] There is some evidence that the *yatra* is less effective where a larger share of the population is brahmin, an interesting result given the association of the party with the interests of the upper castes. This may be due to voters in constituencies with higher shares of brahmins being more likely to interpret the *yatra* as a pure upper-caste mobilization campaign, rather than the pan-Hindu campaign the BJP and Hindu activists were arguing it to be. The interaction coefficients are not significant however, and the variation in the brahmin variable is relatively small, so this interpretation should be treated with caution.

[33]These classes also tended to be those benefitting from the Mandal ruling.

There is also evidence that the *yatra* was more effective where levels of caste and religious fragmentation were higher, which would be consistent with the campaign's having helped to supplant caste identities in favor of a less fragmented religious identity, though the coefficients again are not statistically significant.

There is no evidence that the *yatra* was more effective in areas populated by those economic classes most supportive of the BJP: the interaction terms for urbanization, the percentage of the work force engaged in manufacturing, and the percentage of villages having access to paved roads are all small and insignificant. This would seem to provide evidence for the campaign's having worked through channels orthogonal to economic interest, though these variables are coarse proxies for the socio-economic characteristics of interest. There is no evidence that the institutional architecture of the colonial era is associated with a differential responsiveness to the campaign, with the interaction terms on princely states and the landlord-based tenurial system (*zamindar*) showing small and insignificant coefficients.[34]

5.1.5 Persistence of *Yatra* effects

An interesting question is whether the *yatra* had persistent effects on voter sentiments. In table 9, the baseline regressions are estimated using the BJP's 1996 vote share as the outcome variable. When limiting the sample to those constituencies in which the BJP had competed prior to 1991, the effect of *yatra* is found to be a 4 ppts increase in the BJP vote share, which is either significant at the 10% level, or marginally insignificant. However, the *yatra*-assassination interaction term is approximately -11 ppts, more than off-setting the *yatra* effect. When including the full sample of constituencies in the regressions, the *yatra* is found to lead to an increase of 5-6 ppts in the BJP's vote share, significant at the 10% and 5% levels; and the interaction term is now approximately -4 ppts. These results suggest that the *yatra* had enduring, if somewhat diminished, effects on the BJP's vote share. However, it is not possible to distinguish any enduring ideological effects of the *yatra* from a more traditional vote-share persistence.[35]

[34]The effects of a region having been under indigenous (princely state) rule during the colonial era is studied in Iyer (2004), and the effects of the landlord-based system (*zamindar*) in Banerjee and Iyer (2005). It should be noted that I have not instrumented for these variables as done in the cited papers.

[35]Blakeslee (2013) shows the persistence of vote share and incumbency status when exogenously shifted.

5.2 *Yatra* and BJP Victory

Given the influence of the *yatra* on the BJP's vote share, in stands to reason that it would have also increased the likelihood of victory. However, this will depend on whether the constituencies through which it passed would have been closely enough contested absent the campaign to have had their results swayed by the change in vote share caused by the *yatra*. To test for this possibility, I estimate model (3), substituting BJP victory for vote share as the left-hand variable.

Table 10 gives the results. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) use only the sample of constituencies previously contested; columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) the full sample. Columns (7)-(12) also include the *yatra*-assassination interaction term. In columns (1)-(3), the *yatra* coefficient is associated with 7 ppts increase in the probability of BJP victory, but is always insignificant. With the full sample and no controls for the 1984 vote share, the *yatra* is associate with a 13.3 ppts (5% level) increase in the probability of victory, significant at the 5% level; the inclusion of 1984 vote share controls reduces the coefficients to approximately 10 ppts, which is now marginally insignificant. When we include the interaction term, the coefficients become large and statistically significant. Now we see that the *yatra* increases the probability of BJP victory by 22-25 ppts (significant at the 10% and 5% levels), but that this effect is largely wiped out by the assassination.

Given these coefficients, a rough estimate can be given of the number of seats won due to the *yatra*. If we assume the *yatra* to have increased the probability of victory by approximately 10 ppts, as in columns (4)-(6), and with 57 constituencies having been visited by the *yatra*, then this would imply that the campaign swung approximately 6 seats to the BJP. Alternatively, if we assume the *yatra* to have increased the probability of victory 20 ppts when occurring before the assassination, and by approximately 5 ppts when occurring after the assassination, as in columns (10)-(11), and taking into account that the *yatra* passed through 20 constituencies that both voted before the assassination and were contested by the BJP, and 37 that were contested and voted after, this would again mean that approximately 6 seats were won because of the *yatra* (4 before the assassination, and 2 after). This estimate of 6 seats won due to the campaign are

relatively small compared to the party's total of 120 seats won nationwide; however, it must be noted that the national effects of the *yatra* were far greater than the local effects, so that a significant share of the remaining 114 seats were won due to the non-local effects of the campaign.

5.3 Riots

The month during which the campaign occurred was associated with a major outbreak of communal violence, much of which occurred along the route of the *yatra*. Whether deliberately staged or incidental to the passions incited, the numerous riots that broke out across the country at this time were closely clustered along the route travelled by the *yatra*.[36] Of the 64 Hindu-Muslim riots which took place between the 1989 and 1991 elections, 35 occurred during the 6 weeks surrounding the *yatra*, 11 of which were in constituencies through which it passed. Of the remaining riots during this period, many were due to the activities of the sympathy *yatras* being held in other parts of the country as discussed above. Figure 5 shows all the cities having riots at any time between the 1989 and 1991 elections.

Communal riots between Hindus and Muslims represent a particularly severe expression of ethnic competition in India, and one which became increasingly common throughout the 1980s and 90s. A large literature has explored the mechanisms determining the locus and timing of Hindu-Muslim riots. Brass (1997), in his seminar work on the topic, emphasizes the importance of "institutionalized riot systems" in generating Hindu-Muslim conflict, with local activists deliberately fomenting communal antagonisms. Varshney (2003) argues that riots are more prevalent in localities in which Hindu-Muslim civic organizations are absent, so that there exist no institutional checks when parties attempt to polarize voters through the incitement to violence. Consistent with this, Jha (2008) finds that localities in which patterns of trade during medieval times (ca. 700-1700 AD) required Hindu-Muslim cooperation were characterized by a lower prevalence of rioting between 1850-1950, and that this pattern continued during the 2002 Godhra riots. Field *et al.* (2008) show that riots are more prevalent in areas of Ahmedabad where Hindus and Muslims are constrained to live in close quarters due to historical property

[36]It should be noted that riots occurring along the route generally occurred in the days prior to or after the actual passage of the *yatra*.

arrangements, so that individuals with low tolerance live in closer proximity to rival groups than they otherwise would. Rioting, in their framework, is a mechanism for gaining control of valuable property. Finally, Wilkinson (2004) argues that the principal explanatory variable of riot occurrence is the local- and state-level alignment of political forces, with political elites allowing, and even fomenting, riots where it is deemed politically expedient, and preventing them where it is not.[37]

I now explore two related issues with respect to Hindu-Muslim riots: the extent to which they were caused by the *yatra*, and their effects on the subsequent electoral outcome. To determine the effect of the *yatra* on the incidence of rioting, I estimate the model

$$R_{i,s} = \alpha + \rho yatra_i + \delta_s + \varepsilon_i, \tag{6}$$

where the outcome is a dummy indicating the incidence of a riot between the 1989 and 1991 elections.

Table 11 presents the results. In column (1), we see that the *yatra* is associated with a 13.9 ppts increase in the incidence of rioting, significant at the 1% level. The inclusion of state fixed effects, in column (2), reduces the coefficients to 10.9 ppts, and the significance to 5%. I next decompose all the riots occurring between the 1989 and 1991 elections into three categories: those occurring before the *yatra*, those occurring after the *yatra*, and those occurring during the *yatra*. The *yatra* is associated with a 9.2 and 6.0 ppts higher incidence of pre-*yatra* rioting, indicating that the *yatra* passed through areas that were already more riot-prone. In column (6), we see no significant correlation between the *yatra* and post-*yatra* rioting, once accounting for state fixed effects. Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we see that the *yatra* is associated with a 12.8 and 11.6 ppts higher incidence of *yatra* riots, significant at the 1% level. In sum, while it appears that the *yatra* has led to an increased incidence of rioting, the fact that the *yatra* is also associated with riots which occurred prior to it suggests that the correlation between the

[37]Where the heightened salience of ethnic identities serve the interests of local political actors, efforts will be made to polarize voters along communal lines. However, the success of such campaigns depends on the acquiescence of state authorities who control the security apparatus: where state parties depend on Muslim voters for the maintenance of a ruling coalition, or are likely to do so in the future, they effectively suppress communal violence so as not to alienate this crucial constituency; where the electoral incentives are absent, communal violence will be allowed to proceed.

yatra and rioting may be due, at least in part, to its selecting into riot-prone areas.

To further explore the relationship between the *yatra* and rioting, I estimate specifications regressing *yatra* riots on the *yatra* dummy, but now controlling for pre-*yatra* riots, as well as riots occurring between the 1984 and 1989 elections ("pre-1989 riot"), the latter enabling us to capture longer-term riot patterns. I also include as controls the BJP's 1989 vote share, as this will likely be correlated with unobserved levels of Hindu nationalist sentiment, an important driver of Hindu-Muslim riots. The results are given in table 12. Columns (3) and (4) include the pre-*yatra* riot variable; columns (5) and (6) the pre-1989 riot variable; and columns (7) and (8) both. The relationship between the *yatra* and rioting is 10.4 (1% level) and 9.6 ppts (5% level) without and with state fixed effects, respectively. The inclusion of the pre-*yatra* riot control reduces the coefficient to 9.0 ppts (5% level), while the inclusion of the pre-1989 riot control leaves it unchanged. The inclusion of both simultaneously again reduces the coefficient to 9.0 ppts (5% level). In all specifications, the pre-*yatra* riot and pre-1989 riot controls are strongly predictive of *yatra* riots, but nonetheless show the *yatra* exercising an independent effect. Finally, in columns (9) and (10), I estimate the correlation between the *yatra* and pre-*yatra* riots: controlling for state fixed effects, the correlation between the two is now an insignificant 4.5 ppts. This evidence points to the *yatra*'s having increased the probability of rioting by 9.0 ppts.

To explore the effect of the riots on the BJP vote share, I estimate the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} bjp91_{i,s} &= \alpha + \rho yatra_i + \gamma bjp89_i + \theta \mathbf{E}_i + \phi templetown_i + \delta_s + \boldsymbol{\Upsilon}(\delta_s \times bjp89_i) \\ &\quad + \beta_1(yatra_i \times yatraRiot_i) + \beta_2 yatraRiot_i + \beta_3 preyatraRiot_i \\ &\quad + \beta_4 postyatraRiot_i + \varepsilon_i. \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

The right-hand riot variables are specified as four different types of riot events: the incidence of riots; the numbers of riots; the incidence of riot-caused deaths; and the number (in logs) of riot-caused deaths.[38] Each riot variable is disaggregated according to its timing (before, during, and after the *yatra*); and an interaction term of the *yatra* and riot event is included to capture the effects of riot events plausibly attributed to the local campaign itself – though it must be

[38] I specify the number of deaths as $log(1 + deaths)$ to account for the large number of constituencies for which the number of deaths is 0.

emphasized that riots occurring during this time in other places were also likely due to the heightened polarization across the country caused the *yatra*, which was covered extensively in the national press. This interaction term can be interpreted as either the amplification of riot events due to their association with the *yatra*, or as the true effect of the event when freed of endogeneities that might normally afflict such variables.

Table 13 shows the results of these regressions. Panel A estimates the effect of riots; Panel B the effect of riot deaths. Columns (1)-(6) use dummies of riots and riot deaths as the explanatory variables; columns (7)-(12) use the number of riots and riot deaths. As before, I estimate both the previously-contested sample and the full sample of constituencies. In column (3), we see that *yatra*-"caused" riots are associated with a 5.28 ppts increase in the BJP vote share, which is statistically insignificant. The lack of statistical significance is unsurprising, given the insignificant coefficient on the aggregated riot variable in column (1). When the sample is expanded to include all constituencies, we now see that riots occurring during and after the *yatra* are associated, respectively, with a 3.5 ppts (10% level) and 3.0 ppts (marginally insignificant) increase in the BJP's vote share. Riots along the path of the *yatra* are no more potent than other riots occurring at this time. Where the variable used is the number of riots, we find similar results; the only difference is that the number of post-*yatra* riots has no effect on the BJP's vote share when using the full sample. The effects of riot-caused deaths are somewhat similar. For the full sample, we see that the occurrence of a riot death at the time of the *yatra* leads to statistically significant 4.7 ppts increases in the BJP vote share, and that a 1% increase in the number of deaths leads to a 2.4 ppts increase in the BJP vote share. For the sample of previously-contested constituencies, there is some evidence for deaths "caused" by the *yatra* increasing the BJP vote share, though the coefficients are statistically insignificant. There is also evidence for deaths occurring before the *yatra* leading to a higher BJP vote share: in columns (2) and (8), respectively, we see the incidence of a riot-related death leading to a 6.5 ppts increase in the BJP vote share, and a 1% increase in the number of deaths leading to a 4.18 ppts increase in the BJP vote share.

This evidence would appear to point to riots and riot deaths occurring during the *yatra* having a large effect on the BJP's vote share in places that the BJP was contesting for the first

time in 1991.[39] This may be taken as evidence for the larger effects of Hindu-Muslim violence in areas not previously characterized by a high prevalence of ethno-religious politics; in areas where the BJP had a more established presence, it may be that riots associated with the *yatra* were more readily discounted as partisan events. In those constituencies previously contested by the BJP, deaths associated with riots are relatively potent when occurring before the *yatra*; riot-deaths occurring during the *yatra*, in contrast, had no effect on the BJP's vote share. This may again be due to the voters in such areas having a more jaundiced eye for riot activities attributable to the partisan electioneering of the *yatra*.

5.4 Robustness Checks

Despite earlier arguments for the identification strategy, as well as the incorporation of the road index to account for the concentration of the population around national highways, there nonetheless remains the possibility that the *yatra* was correlated with unobservables unaccounted for by these controls. I therefore perform additional robustness tests to further validate the results. The two principal strategies are: first, to progressively reduce the sample included in the regressions; and, second, to perform a placebo test by estimating the regressions using 1989 election outcomes as the left-hand variable.

Table 14 shows the results from regressions with progressively smaller samples. In each panel, I first estimate the regression using the full sample of the included states, then remove the large cities, and finally drop out both the large cities and the "target constituencies" which determined the route of the *yatra*.[40] In Panel A I use the entire sample of states – the second row of this panel, therefore, uses the sample included in our baseline regressions. In Panel B I drop the states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, where the BJP had only a slight presence;[41] in Panel C, the sample includes only those states through which the *yatra* passed.[42] Columns

[39]Because the effects are somewhat small and insignificant in places that the BJP was already contesting, it follows that the effects were much larger in places being contested for the first time. In results not shown, I find this to indeed have been the case.

[40]These are the inflection points in figure 1, as well as the other larger cities plausibly influencing the route of the *yatra*. The full list is given in footnote 21.

[41]In results not shown, I also drop Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Orissa, and West Bengal, states where the BJP had a middling presence. The results found using this sample are essentially the same.

[42]I also drop the states of Haryana and Karanataka: though the *yatra* visited each, it spent less than one day in the first of these states, and passed through only one constituency in the latter.

(1)-(6) show the results from specifications excluding the *yatra*-assassination interaction term, and columns (7)-(12) the results where it is included; as before, the effects are estimated for both the full samples and only those constituencies where the party had competed in the prior election. As can be seen, the effect of the *yatra* is found to be remarkably robust. Indeed, even when including only constituencies located in the states visited by the *yatra*, and removing all large cities and any constituencies plausibly determining the *yatra*'s route, as shown in the final row of columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(11), the *yatra* effect remains large and statistically significant.

I next perform the placebo regression, re-estimating model (3) using the 1989 BJP vote share as the outcome variable. As before, controls are included for riots, SC/ST constituencies, state fixed effects, and an interaction of state fixed effects with the prior vote share. Dummies for the incidence of riots are also included; the riot dummies for the 1989 elections indicate the incidence of a riot between the 1984 and 1989 elections. Table 15 shows the results of this regression; the original regressions are included for comparison. Columns (1)-(2) give the original results, using the two samples of previously-constested constituencies and all constituencies, respectively; columns (3)-(4) give the results including the assassination dummy and its interaction with the *yatra*. Columns (5)-(8) give the results for the corresponding specifications using the 1989 election as the outcome. Having occurred in 1991, the assassination should not have affected elections in 1989; for completeness, however, these terms are included. The coefficients on the *yatra* variables for the 1989 elections are reassuringly small and insignificant. The inclusion of the *yatra*-assassination interaction term increases the magnitude of the *yatra* coefficient somewhat, though it is still insignificant.

The results of these robustness checks, therefore, provide further validation of the identification strategy. Taken in tandem with the results of tables 6 and 7, where controls were included for various constituency characteristics, including the population's concentration around large highways, these results should allay any concerns of the results' being driven by ommitted variables.

5.5 *Yatra* and Public Goods

I finally turn to an analysis of the *yatra*'s effects on local policy outcomes. As discussed earlier, one of the reasons for which the ethnicization of politics is of interest is the close association of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and poor policy and economic outcomes. A variety of explanations have been proposed for these adverse political and economic results, ranging from the inability of different ethnic groups to solve collective action problems (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyariamana *et al.*, 2007),[43] to a divergence of policy preferences across across ethnic groups (Alesina *et al.*, 1999).

To explore the effects of the *yatra* on local policy outcomes, I estimate the relationship between a sub-district having been visited by the *yatra* and changes in public goods over the subsequent 10 years. The specification is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} PG2001_{t,i,s} &= \alpha + \beta_1 yatrasubdist_t + \beta_2 yatra_i + \beta_3 onmainroad_t \\ &\quad + \gamma PG1991_t + \gamma bjp89_i + \varphi R_i + \lambda X_i + \delta_s + \boldsymbol{\Upsilon}(\delta_s \times bjp89_i) + \varepsilon_{t,i}. \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

$yatrasubdist_t$ is a dummy equaling 1 if the *yatra* passed within 10 kms of sub-district t, as determined by the distance from the *yatra* road to the centroid of the sub-district. *yatra*, as before, is a dummy indicating that the constituency i in which the sub-district lies was visited by the $yatra_i$; and $onmainroad_t$ a dummy indicating that the sub-district lies within 10 kms of any large highway.[44] $PGyear_{t,i,s}$ gives the level of the public good in the years 1991 and 2001 for sub-district t, measured as the percentage of villages within the sub-district possessing the public good. Because a dummy is included for the constituency's being visited by the *yatra*, the *yatrasubdist* variable will be capturing the differential effect for constituencies located closer to the road. I also include the *onmainroad* dummy to ensure that we're not simply picking up a more general main-road effect. Error terms are clustered at the constituency level.

[43] Miguel and Gugerty (2005) argue that the difficulty of preventing free-riding across the ethnic groups lowers investment in public goods in areas characterized by higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and show how this operates in the context of voluntary community school funding in rural Kenya. Habyarimana *et al.* (2007) show that co-ethnics are more likely to adopt cooperative strategies in a series of games designed administered in Uganda, and also seem to exist within tighter social networks, facilitating communication and collaboration.

[44] Refer to figure 4, which depicts the primary roads, the *yatra* route, the constituency boundaries, and the sub-district centroids.

Table 16 shows the results of this regression. Columns (1) and (6) include only the *yatrasubdist* dummies. The subsequent columns include, respectively, the *yatra* dummy, the *onmainroad* dummy, and the two together in a single regression. Finally, in columns (5) and (10) are included constituency fixed effects and the *onmainroad* dummy. Across specifications, there are statistically significant increases in handpump and tap drinking water of approximately 4 and 6 ppts, respectively. There are also increases in domestic (approximately 5 ppts), agricultural (4 ppts) and industrial electrification (5 ppts); and increases in telephone access (6 ppts), paved roads (2 ppts), and primary education (1.5 ppts). Finally, we see an increase in health subcenters and irrigation. Even with the inclusion of constituency fixed-effects, in columns (5) and (10), most of the results continue to obtain, with the exception of handpump drinking water and industrial electrification. There are also now statistically significant increases in the availability of middle and high schools.

The results are striking. The *yatra* is associated with increases in many of the given public goods. Though one might be concerned that an ommitted variable is in fact driving these results, they are robust even to the inclusion of controls for proximity to large roads and constituency fixed effects. Table 17 shows again the results of the regressions including the *yatra* dummy, with and without the *mainroad* dummy, with the coefficients on *yatra* and *yatrasubdist* given side-by-side. As can be seen, the *yatra* coefficients are generally small and insignificant, in stark contrast to those for the *yatrasubdist* dummy. This is consistent with the *yatra* having exercised a localized influence independent of its effect on the electoral outcomes in the 1991 campaign. Given the fact that the campaign is estimated to have changed the identity of the MP in only approximately 6 constituencies, it is unlikely that the results on public goods would have been driven by the identity of the MP.

The public goods results presented here are somewhat speculative. The electoral correlations identified in this paper are found for elections occurring a mere 7 months after the occurrence of the *yatra*; the changes in public goods, in contrast, took place over the course of a full decade following the *yatra*. Nonetheless, the results seem plausible, and I cite two possible mechanisms. First, by increasing the level of inter-caste Hindu solidarity, it is possible that the *yatra* helped to solve the collective action problem, somewhat akin to the mechanism postulated in Miguel and

Gugerty (2005). A second possibility is that the *yatra* empowered the BJP at the local level, and that local BJP politicians were more adept at implementing policy, due to a lower susceptibility to the corruptions generally associated with the Congress party. However, given the possibility that there is some ommitted variable which cannot be captured using the *onmainroad* control and the constituency fixed effects, I present these results as more suggestive than conclusive.

6 Conclusion

This paper shows strong evidence for the efficacy of the *yatra* campaign in mobilizing voters according to ethno-religious identity. The campaign being waged at a moment of heightened religious sentiment, voters had been primed to be receptive to its message of aggressive Hindu nationalism. The effect was amplified in constituencies featuring a large share of Muslim inhabitants, indicating a greater success where the central message of the campaign had local validation in the presence of the stigmatized minority. The incidence of Hindu-Muslim riots also played a substantial role in increasing the BJP's vote share, with the effect being amplified when coinciding with the *yatra*, particularly in constituencies unaccustomed to ethno-religious politics. The efficacy of this campaign provides striking evidence for both the general effectiveness of political propaganda, as well as models stressing the instrumental character of ethnic politics, with political entrepreneurs strategically heightening ethno-religious sentiments for electoral gain.

In addition, there is evidence for the *yatra*'s improving the provision of local public goods. This finding provides an interesting counterpoint to the electoral results; whereas it is generally posited that ethno-linguistic mobilization has negative implications for policy and economic outcomes, this result shows, in contrast, potential benefits to the mobilization of ascriptive identities. There is no necessary contradiction here, however, with models stressing the negative consequences of ethno-linguistic fractionalization for public goods allocations: the campaign may have helped to mitigate the social cleavages of the caste system by their replacement with a less divisive pan-Hindu identity.

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Figure 1: *Yatra* Route



Notes: This graph shows the route traveled by the *yatra*. Bold lines indicate state boundaries; the smaller units are parliamentary constituencies.

Figure 2: *Yatra* and BJP Vote Share Trend



Notes: This graph shows the route traveled by the *yatra*. The BJP's vote share in the respective years is indicated by the color coding.



Notes: This graph shows the BJP's vote share over time, disaggregated by the *yatra* status. Panel (a) includes constituencies in which the BJP competed in all election between 1984 and 1996; panel (b) includes constituencies the BJP did not contest in 1984.

Figure 4: Sub-Districts, Cities, Primary Road Network, and the Yatra Route



Notes: This graph shows the route traveled by the *yatra*, indicated by the blue line. The red lines are primary roads. The points are the centroids of sub-districts, and the the boundaries indicate political constituencies.

Figure 5: Riots



Notes: This graph shows the route traveled by the *yatra*. Bold lines indicate state boundaries; the smaller units are parliamentary constituencies. The red dots indicate locations where riots occurred.



Notes: The figure plots the BJP's 1991 vote share against its 1989 vote share, disaggregated by whether the constituency was visited by the *yatra*.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

states	constituencies	yatra			riots		deaths	
		total	exclude		any	yatra	any	yatra
			cities	+ targets				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Andhra Pradesh	42	5	3	3	2	1	312	7
Bihar	54	8	8	6	6	3	119	7
Gujarat	26	11	11	9	10	7	420	20
Haryana	10	3	3	3	1	0	0	0
Himachal Pradesh	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karnataka	28	1	1	1	7	6	302	38
Kerala	20	0	0	0	2	2	7	4
Madhya Pradesh	40	7	7	4	2	1	53	11
Maharashtra	48	17	11	9	5	3	8	0
Orissa	21	0	0	0	1	0	16	0
Punjab	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rajasthan	25	5	5	3	4	2	43	1
Tamil Nadu	39	0	0	0	3	1	12	0
Uttar Pradesh	85	0	0	0	14	7	790	61
West Bengal	42	0	0	0	5	2	112	12
Total	497	57	49	38	62	35	2194	161

Notes: Column (2) gives the number of constituencies visited by the yatra. Column (2) gives the number when excluding the large cities; column (3) excludes the large cities and and "target constituencies." Column (5) gives the number of constituencies experiencing any riot; and column (6) the number of constituencies experiencing a riot at the time of the yatra. Column (7) gives the number riot-related deaths; and column (8) gives the number of riot-deaths occurring during the yatra.

Table 2: Balance

	non-yatra	yatra	Difference		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
cities					
urbanization rate	0.196	0.289	0.093***	0.086***	
			(0.025)	(0.026)	
work force					
cultivators	0.089	0.071	-0.018*	-0.016*	-0.001
			(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
agricultural labor	0.115	0.089	-0.025**	-0.025**	-0.009
			(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)
forestry	0.021	0.017	-0.005	-0.003	-0.002
			(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
mine workers	0.011	0.032	0.021***	0.022***	0.022***
			(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
manuf (hh)	0.041	0.031	-0.010	0.002	0.003
			(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
manuf (non-hh)	0.151	0.189	0.038**	0.022	-0.003
			(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)
construction	0.041	0.047	0.007*	0.001	-0.002
			(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
trade	0.218	0.199	-0.019**	-0.015*	-0.012
			(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
transportation	0.071	0.074	0.003	-0.001	-0.006
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
other	0.242	0.251	0.009	0.013	0.010
			(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
marginal workers	0.031	0.030	-0.001	-0.002	0.001
			(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
elections					
competed 1989	0.395	0.658	0.263***	0.208***	0.188**
			(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.078)
vote share 1989	26.108	39.565	13.457***	-3.480	-4.047
			(4.453)	(3.231)	(3.354)
vote margin 1989	-17.052	-1.086	15.966***	-3.875	-4.654
			(5.880)	(4.677)	(4.851)
close election	0.187	0.160	-0.027	-0.045	-0.032
			(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.094)
ethnicity					
brahmins	0.051	0.044	-0.007	-0.005	-0.004
			(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
muslims	0.096	0.057	-0.039**	-0.007	-0.007
			(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)
sikhs	0.027	0.001	-0.025	-0.014**	-0.015**
			(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.006)
SC/ST	0.252	0.234	-0.018	-0.017	-0.002
			(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)
caste fragm	0.861	0.897	0.036	0.010	0.010
			(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
geography/institutions					
steep/sloping	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000
			(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
barren/rocky	0.007	0.009	0.003*	0.001	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
princely states	0.261	0.403	0.142**	-0.008	-0.007
			(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.045)
zamindar	458	0.357	-0.101	0.027	0.034
			(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.048)
state FEs			no	yes	yes
urbanization			no	no	yes

Notes: This table shows the balance across yatra and non-yatra constituencies. The coefficients in column (3) come from a regression of the indicated variable on the yatra dummy; those in column (4) include state fixed effects; and those in column (5) include the urbanization rate.

Table 3: Yatra Route

Outcome: Yatra	mean	sd	single variate		multivariate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
BJP1989	12.355	19.855	0.104***	0.046***	0.071***	0.033**
			(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)
brahmins	0.049	0.034	-0.022	-0.021	-0.009	0.012
			(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.026)
muslims	0.091	0.093	-0.077***	-0.046**	-0.042**	-0.030
			(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.024)
SC/ST	0.248	0.133	0.018	0.009	0.012	0.030*
			(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
caste fragm	0.849	0.179	-0.024*	-0.044***	0.021	-0.007
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.019)
manufacturing	0.197	0.097	0.044***	0.048***	0.012	0.019
			(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)
urbanization	0.219	0.177	0.075***	0.067***	0.060***	0.056***
			(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.016)
paved roads	0.473	0.255	-0.017	0.047	-0.016	0.018
			(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.034)
irrigation	0.374	0.275	-0.058***	-0.013	-0.020	-0.015
			(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.024)
state FEs			no	yes	no	yes

Notes: Column (1) gives the mean level of the indicated variables; column (2) gives the standard deviation. The coefficients in column (3) come from a regression of the yatra on each of the indicated variables independently, with each variable being demeaned by the mean level for constituencies not visited by the yatra and divided by the standard deviation; column (4) includes state fixed effects. Column (5) gives the coefficient from a regression of the yatra dummy on all the variables simultaneously; column (6) includes state fixed effects.

Table 4: Yatra and BJP Vote Shares

Outcome: BJP Vote Share 1991	prior compete			newly contested			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
yatra	5.296***	4.641**	4.680**	7.044***	5.343**	5.385**	5.696***	4.581***	4.585***
	(1.876)	(1.822)	(1.826)	(2.503)	(2.473)	(2.438)	(1.457)	(1.427)	(1.428)
ayodhya	1.699	3.610	3.072	1.890	2.852	3.945	2.144	3.350	3.172
	(8.201)	(7.963)	(7.956)	(3.586)	(3.489)	(3.462)	(3.221)	(3.130)	(3.126)
riot	1.365	0.948	0.969	6.442***	6.760***	6.341***	3.603***	3.684***	3.719***
	(1.768)	(1.718)	(1.726)	(1.837)	(1.783)	(1.764)	(1.245)	(1.206)	(1.210)
post-assassin	-2.333	-3.022*	-2.722	-1.433	-1.687	-1.616	-2.025*	-2.543**	-2.465**
	(1.706)	(1.681)	(1.657)	(1.461)	(1.418)	(1.398)	(1.086)	(1.057)	(1.055)
SC/ST	0.681	0.635	0.694	0.871	0.936	1.331	0.739	0.679	0.692
	(1.586)	(1.532)	(1.537)	(1.259)	(1.232)	(1.222)	(0.971)	(0.945)	(0.945)
BJP1984		0.403**			0.301***			0.312***	
		(0.163)			(0.081)			(0.071)	
BJP1984 X BJP1989		-0.004			0.000			-0.002	
		(0.003)			(0.000)			(0.002)	
BJP1989 - BJP1984			-0.308**			-0.898***			-0.267***
			(0.119)			(0.235)			(0.052)
BJP1989 - BJP1984 SQ			0.002			-0.020***			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.007)			(0.001)
R-squared	0.809	0.824	0.823	0.730	0.751	0.759	0.780	0.796	0.796
N	197	194	194	237	231	231	434	425	425

Notes: Each column gives the results of a regression of the BJP's 1991 vote share on the indicated variables. Columns (1)-(3) include only the sample of constituencies contested by the BJP in 1989; columns (4)-(6) only those constituencies in which the party had not competed in 1989; and columns (7)-(9) all constituencies. Controls are also included for the BJP's 1989 vote share, state fixed effects, and the interaction of the two. Stadard errors are iid.

Table 5: Yatra, Assassination, and BJP Vote Share

Outcome: BJP Vote Share 1991	prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
yatra	9.186***	8.099***	8.340***	7.574***	6.161***	6.229***
	(2.648)	(2.581)	(2.579)	(2.265)	(2.209)	(2.210)
yatra X post-assassin	-7.226**	-6.385*	-6.808**	-3.125	-2.618	-2.729
	(3.508)	(3.402)	(3.419)	(2.884)	(2.793)	(2.798)
ayodhya	2.155	3.954	3.550	2.076	3.288	3.110
	(8.123)	(7.902)	(7.887)	(3.221)	(3.131)	(3.127)
riot	1.081	0.713	0.749	3.535***	3.627***	3.664***
	(1.756)	(1.709)	(1.714)	(1.247)	(1.208)	(1.211)
post-assassin	-1.255	-2.049	-1.716	-1.774	-2.331**	-2.244**
	(1.768)	(1.746)	(1.718)	(1.111)	(1.081)	(1.079)
SC/ST	0.803	0.744	0.825	0.781	0.716	0.730
	(1.572)	(1.521)	(1.525)	(0.971)	(0.946)	(0.946)
BJP1984		0.390**			0.311***	
		(0.162)			(0.071)	
BJP1984 X BJP1989		-0.004			-0.002	
		(0.003)			(0.002)	
BJP1989 - BJP1984			-0.318***			-0.266***
			(0.118)			(0.052)
BJP1989 - BJP1984 SQ			0.002			0.001
			(0.002)			(0.001)
R-squared	0.814	0.828	0.828	0.780	0.797	0.797
N	197	194	194	434	425	425

Notes: Each column gives the results of a regression of the BJP's 1991 vote share on the indicated variables. Columns (1)-(3) include only the sample of constituencies contested by the BJP in 1989; and columns (4)-(6) all constituencies. Controls are also included for the BJP's 1989 vote share, state fixed effects, and the interaction of the two. Error terms are iid.

Table 6: Yatra and BJP Vote Share, with Controls

Outcome: BJP Vote Share 1991

	Yatra Coefficients											
	w/o assassination						with assassination					
	prior compete			full sample			prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
baseline	5.18***	4.40**	4.46**	5.70***	4.58***	4.59***	9.29***	8.05***	8.30***	7.57***	6.16***	6.23***
	(1.83)	(1.77)	(1.77)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)	(2.63)	(2.55)	(2.55)	(2.26)	(2.21)	(2.21)
brahmins	5.11***	4.36**	4.42**	5.56***	4.49***	4.49***	9.30***	8.09***	8.34***	7.39***	6.03***	6.09***
	(1.81)	(1.75)	(1.75)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)	(2.62)	(2.54)	(2.53)	(2.26)	(2.21)	(2.21)
muslims	5.14***	4.41**	4.48**	5.78***	4.71***	4.72***	8.95***	7.78***	8.04***	7.39***	6.03***	6.09***
	(1.81)	(1.75)	(1.75)	(1.41)	(1.38)	(1.39)	(2.63)	(2.55)	(2.55)	(2.20)	(2.14)	(2.14)
SC/ST	4.96***	4.05**	4.04**	5.73***	4.56***	4.55***	9.11***	7.69***	7.97***	7.60***	6.11***	6.17***
	(1.82)	(1.74)	(1.74)	(1.46)	(1.42)	(1.42)	(2.62)	(2.51)	(2.50)	(2.26)	(2.20)	(2.20)
caste fragm	4.79**	4.21**	4.23**	5.62***	4.51***	4.51***	8.19***	7.23***	7.44***	7.47***	6.05***	6.12***
	(1.86)	(1.81)	(1.82)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)	(2.67)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(2.27)	(2.21)	(2.21)
princely state	5.71***	4.99***	5.04***	5.79***	4.72***	4.72***	9.18***	8.13***	8.36***	7.46***	6.11***	6.19***
	(1.88)	(1.84)	(1.84)	(1.43)	(1.40)	(1.40)	(2.64)	(2.58)	(2.58)	(2.22)	(2.16)	(2.16)
zamindar	5.52***	4.87***	4.90***	5.83***	4.72***	4.72***	9.40***	8.35***	8.60***	7.65***	6.28***	6.35***
	(1.85)	(1.81)	(1.81)	(1.45)	(1.42)	(1.42)	(2.61)	(2.56)	(2.55)	(2.25)	(2.20)	(2.20)
manufacturing workforce	5.02***	4.45**	4.52**	5.71***	4.61***	4.61***	9.20***	7.87***	8.22***	7.60***	6.11***	6.18***
	(1.85)	(1.77)	(1.77)	(1.46)	(1.42)	(1.42)	(2.63)	(2.54)	(2.54)	(2.26)	(2.20)	(2.20)
urbanization rate	3.53*	3.03*	3.05*	4.89***	4.01***	4.00***	7.52***	6.56**	6.87***	6.61***	5.47**	5.54**
	(1.86)	(1.79)	(1.80)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)	(2.64)	(2.55)	(2.54)	(2.25)	(2.20)	(2.20)
paved roads	5.42***	4.59***	4.67***	5.77***	4.60***	4.61***	9.35***	8.00***	8.35***	7.32***	5.84***	5.92***
	(1.83)	(1.76)	(1.76)	(1.44)	(1.41)	(1.41)	(2.62)	(2.52)	(2.52)	(2.25)	(2.18)	(2.19)
irrigation	5.08***	4.21**	4.26**	5.48***	4.35***	4.35***	8.89***	7.41***	7.71***	7.04***	5.58**	5.64***
	(1.79)	(1.71)	(1.71)	(1.44)	(1.40)	(1.40)	(2.60)	(2.48)	(2.48)	(2.24)	(2.17)	(2.17)
1984 X 1989 controls	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no
1989 - 1984 controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The coefficients given are for the yatra variable from baseline regression. Each row includes the indicated variable as a control. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) use only the constituencies in which the BJP had competed in 1989; columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(11) include all constituencies. The specifications in columns (7)-(12) also include the interaction term of the yatra and the assassination as a control. Controls are included as in the baseline regressions, and the error terms are iid.

Table 7: Yatra and Main Roads

Outcome: BJP Vote Share 1991

	Yatra Coefficients											
	w/o assassination						with assassination					
	prior compete			full sample			prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
main road (500)	5.15***	4.59**	4.61**	5.75***	4.66***	4.66***	9.04***	8.03***	8.26***	7.63***	6.25***	6.31***
	(1.93)	(1.87)	(1.88)	(1.47)	(1.44)	(1.44)	(2.68)	(2.61)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(2.22)	(2.22)
main road (400)	5.14***	4.57**	4.60**	5.74***	4.66***	4.66***	9.03***	8.02***	8.25***	7.62***	6.24***	6.31***
	(1.93)	(1.87)	(1.88)	(1.47)	(1.44)	(1.44)	(2.68)	(2.61)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(2.22)	(2.22)
main road (300)	5.13***	4.55**	4.58**	5.74***	4.65***	4.65***	9.01***	8.00***	8.23***	7.62***	6.24***	6.30***
	(1.93)	(1.87)	(1.88)	(1.47)	(1.44)	(1.44)	(2.68)	(2.61)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(2.22)	(2.22)
main road (200)	5.11***	4.53**	4.56**	5.73***	4.64***	4.64***	9.00***	7.98***	8.21***	7.61***	6.23***	6.29***
	(1.93)	(1.88)	(1.88)	(1.48)	(1.44)	(1.44)	(2.68)	(2.61)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(2.22)	(2.22)
main road (100)	5.07***	4.48**	4.51**	5.71***	4.62***	4.62***	8.97***	7.94***	8.17***	7.59***	6.21***	6.27***
	(1.94)	(1.88)	(1.88)	(1.48)	(1.44)	(1.45)	(2.68)	(2.61)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(2.22)	(2.22)
main road (50)	5.01**	4.42**	4.44**	5.68***	4.60***	4.60***	8.91***	7.88***	8.11***	7.56***	6.18***	6.24***
	(1.93)	(1.88)	(1.88)	(1.47)	(1.44)	(1.44)	(2.68)	(2.61)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(2.22)	(2.22)
main road (10)	4.90**	4.27**	4.30**	5.55***	4.47***	4.47***	8.74***	7.68***	7.90***	7.36***	6.01***	6.06***
	(1.91)	(1.85)	(1.86)	(1.47)	(1.44)	(1.44)	(2.69)	(2.61)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(2.22)	(2.22)
1984 X 1989 controls	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no
1989 - 1984 controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The coefficients given are for the yatra variable from baseline regression. Each row includes the mainroad control using the indicated distance parameter. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) use only the constituencies in which the BJP had competed in 1989; columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(11) include all constituencies. The specifications in columns (7)-(12) also include the interaction term of the yatra and the assassination as a control. Controls are included as in the baseline regressions, and the error terms are iid.

Table 8: Heterogeneous Yatra Effects

Outcome: BJP Vote Share 1991	Yatra Coefficients and Interaction Terms					
	prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
yatra	5.32***	4.69**	6.41***	5.42***	4.29***	4.29***
	(1.89)	(1.83)	(2.06)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)
X brahmins	-1.20	-1.50	-2.43	-2.28	-2.89	-2.94
	(2.32)	(2.24)	(2.57)	(1.91)	(1.85)	(1.85)
yatra	7.85***	7.13***	8.84***	9.35***	7.69***	7.81***
	(2.68)	(2.61)	(2.99)	(2.18)	(2.15)	(2.14)
X muslims	6.19	5.97	5.84	8.43**	6.98*	7.22*
	(4.59)	(4.44)	(5.05)	(3.95)	(3.85)	(3.84)
yatra	5.01***	4.21**	5.80***	5.73***	4.55***	4.55***
	(1.88)	(1.81)	(2.05)	(1.46)	(1.42)	(1.43)
X SC/ST	-1.69	-1.33	-0.92	0.78	1.07	1.10
	(2.13)	(2.05)	(2.33)	(1.60)	(1.55)	(1.56)
yatra	3.98	3.75	5.53	4.61***	3.75**	3.73**
	(3.24)	(3.14)	(3.49)	(1.72)	(1.68)	(1.68)
X caste fragm	1.74	1.00	0.93	2.94	2.25	2.31
	(5.67)	(5.50)	(6.20)	(2.68)	(2.60)	(2.60)
yatra	5.88***	5.11***	6.98***	5.93***	5.19***	5.23***
	(2.00)	(1.95)	(2.18)	(1.56)	(1.52)	(1.52)
X princely state	-0.38	-0.24	-0.39	-0.23	-0.82	-0.91
	(1.37)	(1.33)	(1.50)	(1.07)	(1.04)	(1.04)
yatra	5.52***	4.88***	6.45***	5.84***	4.69***	4.70***
	(1.86)	(1.81)	(2.06)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)
X zamindar	0.00	-0.75	-1.57	0.11	-0.24	-0.21
	(1.37)	(1.35)	(1.54)	(1.15)	(1.12)	(1.13)
yatra	5.31***	4.78**	6.70***	5.81***	4.70***	4.71***
	(1.95)	(1.88)	(2.16)	(1.48)	(1.45)	(1.45)
X pct manuf	-0.63	-0.63	-1.33	-0.52	-0.45	-0.50
	(1.53)	(1.51)	(1.67)	(1.37)	(1.35)	(1.36)
yatra	3.74*	3.32	4.70**	5.12***	4.21***	4.22***
	(2.07)	(2.01)	(2.29)	(1.57)	(1.54)	(1.54)
X urbanization	-0.12	-0.16	-0.42	-0.40	-0.35	-0.38
	(1.19)	(1.16)	(1.34)	(1.01)	(0.99)	(1.00)
yatra	6.04***	5.75***	7.50***	5.70***	4.56***	4.57***
	(2.15)	(2.07)	(2.36)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)
X paved roads	0.98	2.02	2.65	-0.46	-0.29	-0.27
	(2.22)	(2.15)	(2.50)	(1.47)	(1.43)	(1.43)
yatra	4.43**	3.18	4.08*	4.05**	3.02*	3.06*
	(2.16)	(2.08)	(2.41)	(1.61)	(1.57)	(1.57)
X irrigation	-1.51	-2.43	-4.09	-3.29*	-3.08*	-3.00*
	(2.37)	(2.27)	(2.63)	(1.72)	(1.66)	(1.67)
1984 X 1989 controls	no	yes	no	no	yes	no
1989 - 1984 controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The coefficients given are for the yatra and its interaction with the indicated control variable using the baseline specification. The control variables are demeaned by the mean for non-yatra constituencies, and divided by the standard deviation. Columns (1)-(3) use only constituencies contested in 1989; columns (4)-(6) use all constituencies. Errors are iid.

Table 9: Yatra, BJP Vote Share, and Persistance

Outcome: BJP Vote Share 1996	prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
yatra	4.533*	3.741	4.265	6.146**	5.028*	5.205*
	(2.558)	(2.480)	(2.629)	(2.899)	(2.704)	(2.766)
yatra X post-assassin	-10.824*	-10.382*	-10.955*	-4.281	-4.028	-4.286
	(5.739)	(5.649)	(5.879)	(4.729)	(4.504)	(4.605)
ayodhya	7.092***	9.696***	8.021***	4.224***	5.616***	5.120***
	(2.566)	(2.999)	(2.702)	(1.539)	(1.606)	(1.557)
riot	3.440	3.524*	3.415	2.428	2.632	2.708
	(2.099)	(2.096)	(2.102)	(1.781)	(1.777)	(1.796)
post-assassin	1.766	0.644	1.547	-2.296	-2.887*	-2.653*
	(2.171)	(2.179)	(2.206)	(1.544)	(1.528)	(1.540)
SC/ST	3.875	3.877	3.956*	2.573*	2.494*	2.532*
	(2.383)	(2.361)	(2.380)	(1.329)	(1.291)	(1.290)
BJP1984		0.520**			0.353***	
		(0.222)			(0.113)	
BJP1984 X BJP1989		-0.010**			-0.006**	
		(0.004)			(0.003)	
BJP1989 - BJP1984			-0.201			-0.228***
			(0.154)			(0.082)
BJP1989 - BJP1984 SQ			0.003			0.003
			(0.003)			(0.002)
R-squared	0.726	0.731	0.725	0.672	0.679	0.677
N	197	194	194	434	425	425

Notes: Each column gives the results of a regression of the BJP's 1996 vote share on the indicated variables. Columns (1)-(3) include only the sample of constituencies contested by the BJP in 1989; and columns (4)-(6) all constituencies. Controls are also included for the BJP's 1989 vote share, state fixed effects, and the interaction of the two. Error terms are iid.

Table 10: Yatra and BJP Victory

Outcome: BJP 1991	w/o assassination						with assassination					
	prior compete			full sample			prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
yatra	0.078	0.072	0.067	0.133**	0.097	0.096	0.249*	0.234*	0.219	0.232**	0.186*	0.184*
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)
yatra X post-assassin							-0.319*	-0.300*	-0.283	-0.166	-0.146	-0.146
							(0.179)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.121)
ayodhya	0.353	0.320	0.361	-0.001	0.026	0.031	0.371	0.335	0.379	-0.004	0.022	0.028
	(0.416)	(0.413)	(0.414)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.414)	(0.410)	(0.412)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.135)
post-assassin	-0.195**	-0.177**	-0.197**	-0.069	-0.081*	-0.083*	-0.146	-0.130	-0.154*	-0.056	-0.069	-0.071
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
riot	0.016	-0.011	-0.011	0.053	0.050	0.050	0.004	-0.022	-0.020	0.049	0.047	0.047
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)
SC/ST	-0.095	-0.098	-0.099	-0.064	-0.071*	-0.071*	-0.088	-0.091	-0.093	-0.062	-0.069*	-0.069*
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
BJP1984		-0.006			0.007**			-0.006			0.007**	
		(0.008)			(0.003)			(0.008)			(0.003)	
BJP1984 X BJP1989		0.000*			0.000			0.000*			0.000	
		(0.000)			(0.000)			(0.000)			(0.000)	
BJP1989 - BJP1984			-0.002			-0.008***			-0.003			-0.008***
			(0.006)			(0.002)			(0.006)			(0.002)
BJP1989 - BJP1984 SQ			-0.000			-0.000			-0.000			-0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)			(0.000)			(0.000)
R-squared	0.408	0.431	0.425	0.446	0.466	0.465	0.419	0.441	0.434	0.449	0.468	0.467
N	197	194	194	434	425	425	197	194	194	434	425	425

Notes: Each columns gives the results of a regression of the BJP's victory in 1991 on the indicated variables. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) include only constituencies previously contested; columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) use all constituencies. Columns (7)-(12) include the interaction of the yatra with the assassination dummy. Controls are also included for the BJP's 1989 vote share, state fixed effects, and the interaction of the two. Error terms are iid.

Table 11: Yatra and Riots

	any riot		pre-yatra riot		post-yatra riot		yatra riot	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
yatra	0.139***	0.109**	0.092***	0.060*	0.056*	0.020	0.128***	0.116***
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.040)
state FEs	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
R-squared	0.017	0.079	0.021	0.059	0.006	0.113	0.024	0.090
N	482	482	482	482	482	482	482	482

Notes: The tables give the results of a regression of riot variables on the yatra dummy, with state fixed effects included where indicated. Columns (1)-(2) use as the outcome a dummy for any riot occurring between the 1989 and 1991 elections. Columns (3)-(4) use as the outcome a dummy for any riot occurring after the 1989 election but before the yatra; columns (5)-(6) riots occurring after the yatra and before the 1991 election; and columns (7)-(8) riots occurring at the time of the yatra.

Table 12: Yatra and Riots, with Controls

	yatra riot								pre-yatra riot	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
yatra	0.104***	0.096**	0.092**	0.090**	0.087**	0.095**	0.079**	0.090**	0.060**	0.045
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.032)
pre-yatra riot			0.166***	0.125**			0.126**	0.102*		
			(0.059)	(0.059)			(0.059)	(0.059)		
pre-1989 riot					0.129***	0.105***	0.119***	0.099***	0.078***	0.065***
					(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.024)
BJP1989	0.001**	0.002***	0.001*	0.002***	0.001	0.002***	0.001	0.002**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
state FEs	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
R-squared	0.032	0.106	0.048	0.114	0.073	0.128	0.082	0.134	0.058	0.087
N	482	482	482	482	482	482	482	482	482	482

Notes: Columns (1)-(6) give the results of a regression of a dummy for riots occurring during the yatra on the indicated variables, with and without state fixed effects. Columns (9)-(10) use as the outcome variable a dummy for riots occurring after the 1989 election and before the yatra. Error terms are iid.

Table 13: Yatra, BJP Vote Share, and Riot Events

Outcome: BJP Vote Share 1991	event dummy						number of events					
	prior compete			full sample			prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Riots												
yatra	5.30***	4.96***	4.19**	5.70***	5.77***	5.70***	5.27***	5.21***	4.51**	5.75***	5.83***	5.74***
	(1.88)	(1.90)	(2.01)	(1.46)	(1.47)	(1.54)	(1.89)	(1.93)	(2.00)	(1.47)	(1.46)	(1.53)
riot	1.36			3.60***			0.45			0.86**		
	(1.77)			(1.25)			(0.66)			(0.43)		
yatra riot X yatra			5.28			0.60			4.56			0.51
			(4.45)			(3.78)			(3.48)			(2.52)
yatra riot		2.20	0.54		3.61**	3.48*		2.53	0.29		3.23***	3.14**
		(2.33)	(2.72)		(1.69)	(1.90)		(2.05)	(2.67)		(1.17)	(1.25)
pre-yatra riot		2.91	1.85		-0.86	-0.93		-0.40	-0.89		-1.92	-1.93
		(2.91)	(3.04)		(2.25)	(2.30)		(1.69)	(1.73)		(1.36)	(1.37)
post-yatra riot		-0.96	-1.10		3.02	3.00		-0.35	-0.66		0.52	0.48
		(2.94)	(2.94)		(1.99)	(2.00)		(1.25)	(1.27)		(0.91)	(0.93)
Panel B: Riot Deaths												
yatra	5.26***	4.83**	4.29**	5.59***	5.67***	5.77***	5.30***	4.83**	4.39**	5.67***	5.64***	5.70***
	(1.88)	(1.89)	(1.96)	(1.45)	(1.46)	(1.51)	(1.87)	(1.88)	(1.92)	(1.46)	(1.47)	(1.50)
deaths	1.59			4.83***			0.71			1.96***		
	(2.02)			(1.42)			(0.89)			(0.64)		
yatra deaths X yatra			4.90			-1.08			3.79			-0.61
			(4.80)			(4.25)			(3.52)			(2.81)
yatra deaths		1.59	-0.20		4.66**	4.88**		0.32	-1.46		2.37**	2.46**
		(2.59)	(3.12)		(1.88)	(2.07)		(1.89)	(2.51)		(1.06)	(1.14)
pre-yatra deaths		6.51*	5.25		0.91	1.06		4.18**	3.14		1.44	1.57
		(3.80)	(4.00)		(2.84)	(2.90)		(2.07)	(2.28)		(1.74)	(1.85)
post-yatra deaths		-1.66	-1.52		1.97	2.00		-0.91	-0.61		0.52	0.52
		(3.07)	(3.08)		(2.20)	(2.20)		(1.36)	(1.39)		(0.95)	(0.95)

Notes: This tables gives the results from regressions of riot events on the indicated variables. In panel A, the outcomes are dummies for riots in columns (1)-(6), and the number of riots in columns (7)-(12). In panel B the outcomes are dummies for the incidence of any riot death in columns (1)-(6), and the log of the number of riot deaths in columns (7)-(12). The samples are those indicated. State fixed effects are included, and error terms are iid.

Table 14: Yatra and BJP Vote Share Across Sub-Samples

Outcome: BJP Voteshare 1991	w/o assassination						with assassination					
	prior compete			full sample			prior compete			full sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: All States												
full sample	5.97***	5.44***	5.52***	7.46***	6.04***	6.03***	9.13***	8.11***	8.35***	10.77***	8.57***	8.63***
	(1.80)	(1.76)	(1.76)	(1.43)	(1.40)	(1.40)	(2.64)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.17)	(2.13)	(2.13)
w/o cities	5.30***	4.64**	4.68**	5.70***	4.58***	4.59***	9.19***	8.10***	8.34***	7.57***	6.16***	6.23***
	(1.88)	(1.82)	(1.83)	(1.46)	(1.43)	(1.43)	(2.65)	(2.58)	(2.58)	(2.26)	(2.21)	(2.21)
w/o cities and target PCs	4.52**	3.84*	3.75*	5.75***	4.42***	4.38***	8.06**	6.90**	7.07**	6.67**	5.13**	5.16**
	(2.12)	(2.07)	(2.07)	(1.61)	(1.58)	(1.58)	(3.22)	(3.15)	(3.15)	(2.64)	(2.58)	(2.58)
Panel B: Selected States												
full sample	5.97***	5.38***	5.48***	7.46***	6.01***	6.00***	9.14***	8.02***	8.30***	10.76***	8.51***	8.57***
	(1.91)	(1.87)	(1.87)	(1.48)	(1.45)	(1.45)	(2.81)	(2.75)	(2.75)	(2.25)	(2.21)	(2.21)
w/o cities	5.29***	4.57**	4.63**	5.69***	4.55***	4.56***	9.19***	8.00***	8.29***	7.58***	6.12***	6.20***
	(1.99)	(1.94)	(1.94)	(1.51)	(1.48)	(1.48)	(2.81)	(2.74)	(2.74)	(2.34)	(2.29)	(2.29)
w/o cities and target PCs	4.52**	3.79*	3.71*	5.77***	4.41***	4.38***	8.07**	6.83**	7.04**	6.71**	5.14*	5.17*
	(2.25)	(2.20)	(2.21)	(1.66)	(1.64)	(1.64)	(3.42)	(3.35)	(3.34)	(2.74)	(2.67)	(2.67)
Panel C: Yatra States												
full sample	5.69***	4.88**	5.20**	7.93***	7.03***	7.04***	7.90**	6.72**	7.35**	13.01***	11.34***	11.39***
	(2.07)	(2.06)	(2.05)	(1.68)	(1.64)	(1.64)	(3.07)	(3.04)	(3.04)	(2.60)	(2.58)	(2.58)
w/o cities	5.05**	4.01*	4.29**	6.13***	5.47***	5.47***	7.96**	6.64**	7.33**	9.65***	8.66***	8.69***
	(2.15)	(2.13)	(2.13)	(1.68)	(1.66)	(1.66)	(3.06)	(3.02)	(3.00)	(2.68)	(2.64)	(2.65)
w/o cities and target PCs	4.44*	3.46	3.49	6.05***	5.33***	5.32***	6.93*	5.74	6.19*	8.83***	7.83**	7.85**
	(2.42)	(2.41)	(2.41)	(1.86)	(1.85)	(1.85)	(3.69)	(3.67)	(3.65)	(3.21)	(3.18)	(3.18)
1984 X 1989 controls	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no
1989 - 1984 controls	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: This table gives the coefficients on the yatra variable from the baseline regressions using the indicated samples. Panel A uses all 15 states in the sample; panel B drops the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu from the sample; panel C includes only the states through which the yatra passed, excluding Haryana and Karnataka, in which only a small number of constituencies were visited. Columns (7)-(12) include the interaction of the yatra and assassination as controls; and the samples are as indicated. Error terms are iid.

Table 15: Yatra, BJP Vote Share, and Prior Elections

Outcome: BJP Vote Share	1991				1989			
	w/o assassin		with assassin		w/o assassin		with assassin	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
yatra	5.608***	4.936***	9.543***	6.915**	-0.581	-0.561	2.391	2.251
	(1.210)	(0.962)	(2.670)	(2.983)	(1.514)	(1.338)	(3.668)	(3.424)
riot	1.150	3.662**	0.992	3.780**	-0.239	-0.200	-0.221	-0.174
	(1.555)	(1.543)	(1.655)	(1.554)	(0.144)	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.150)
yatra X post-assassin			-8.418*	-6.479			-7.539	-6.420
			(3.996)	(4.525)			(8.377)	(7.256)
post-assassin			-1.775	-1.787			-0.036	-0.627
			(1.837)	(1.387)			(1.964)	(2.801)
prior-compete	yes		yes		yes		yes	
full sample		yes		yes		yes		yes
N	197	434	197	434	132	203	132	203
R-squared	0.806	0.778	0.789	0.757	0.772	0.825	0.777	0.828

Notes: Columns (1)-(4) give the results from the baseline regressions, with the 1991 BJP vote share as the outcome. Columns (5)-(8) give the results from the baseline regressions, now using the 1989 BJP vote share as the outcome. In the latter regression the riot dummies indicate the occurrence of a riot between the 1984 and 1989 elections; and controls are included for the 1984 vote share, state fixed effects, and the interaction of the two. Error terms are iid. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) include only constituencies previously contested. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) include the full sample.

Table 16: Yatra and Local Public Goods

yatrasubdist coefficient

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
drinking water						health facilities					
any	0.007***	0.010***	0.007**	0.010***	0.008***	health center	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
tap	0.048**	0.039**	0.046**	0.036*	0.022**	primary health center	0.007*	0.007**	0.005	0.005	0.009***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.011)		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
well	0.017	0.001	0.012	-0.005	-0.017	health sub-center	0.023*	0.038***	0.020	0.035***	0.031***
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.017)		(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
hand pump	0.069***	0.051**	0.072***	0.053**	-0.003	maternity-child	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	0.001
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.018)		(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
tube well	0.048*	0.025	0.043	0.018	0.029	hospital	-0.008*	-0.010**	-0.009**	-0.012***	-0.006
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.022)		(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
river	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.005	-0.012	dispensary	-0.008	-0.003	-0.010	-0.005	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.010)		(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)
any	0.020	0.030*	0.016	0.026	0.021*	any	0.030**	0.030***	0.027**	0.026**	0.019*
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.012)		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)
domestic	0.042**	0.053***	0.035**	0.045**	0.028**	tank	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.009***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.013)		(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)
agricultural	0.043**	0.042**	0.036**	0.035*	0.030*	private canal	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.015)		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
industrial	0.045***	0.056***	0.036**	0.046**	0.016	government canal	0.023*	0.018	0.024*	0.019	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.017)		(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.008)
						well (electrified)	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.003	0.015**
post office	-0.006	0.012	-0.010	0.007	0.023***		(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.008)	well (non-elec)	0.008	0.004	0.007	0.003	0.005
telegraph	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.006		(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	tubewell (electrified)	0.011	0.015	0.011	0.014	0.021**
telephone	0.073***	0.074***	0.059**	0.058**	0.076***		(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.009)
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.016)	tube well (non-elec)	-0.010*	-0.006	-0.014**	-0.010*	-0.013**
paved roads	0.021*	0.030**	0.014	0.023	0.034***		(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)	uncultivated	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.003	-0.004
							(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)
any	0.017***	0.020***	0.017***	0.020***	0.013***						
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)						
primary	0.013***	0.017***	0.012**	0.016***	0.011**						
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)						
middle	0.015	0.017	0.012	0.013	0.021***						
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.008)						
high	0.008	0.010	0.007	0.008	0.013**						
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)						
adult literacy	0.008	0.005	0.009	0.005	-0.000						
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)						
main road	no	no	yes	yes	yes		no	no	yes	yes	yes
yatra constituency	no	yes	no	yes	no		no	yes	no	yes	no
constituency FEs	no	no	no	no	yes		no	no	no	no	yes

Notes: This table gives the results of a regression of the indicated public good on a dummy indicating the passage of the yatra through a sub-district. The unit of observation is the sub-district. Controls are included for the level of the indicated public good in 1991. A cubic is included in the BJP's 1989 vote share and a dummy for the party's victory in 1989. In addition, each column includes the controls included for a main road passing through the sub-district, the district being a constituency visited by the yatra, and constituency fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the sub-district level.

Table 17: Yatra and Local Public Goods

	yatra coefficients								
	w/o *mainroad*		with *mainroad*			w/o *mainroad*		with *mainroad*	
outcome:	PC	sub-district	PC	sub-district	outcome:	PC	sub-district	PC	sub-district
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
drinking water					health facilities				
any	-0.007*	0.009***	-0.007*	0.009***	health center	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
tap	0.017	0.038**	0.017	0.036*	primary health center	-0.001	0.008**	-0.000	0.005
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.019)		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
well	0.030	-0.006	0.030	-0.009	health sub-center	-0.030**	0.040***	-0.029**	0.036***
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.036)		(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
hand pump	0.033	0.049**	0.033	0.053**	maternity-child	-0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.002
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.024)		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
tube well	0.047	0.032	0.049	0.021	hospital	0.005	-0.006**	0.006	-0.010**
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)		(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
river water	-0.004	-0.002	-0.005	0.003	dispensary	-0.010	0.000	-0.009	-0.004
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
electrification					irrigation				
any	-0.019*	0.032**	-0.018	0.026	any	0.001	0.032***	0.001	0.027**
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.017)		(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
domestic	-0.021	0.054***	-0.020	0.044**	tank	0.001	-0.002	0.002	-0.005
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.019)		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
agricultural	0.004	0.046**	0.005	0.036*	private canal	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002*
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
industrial	-0.021	0.065***	-0.019	0.049***	government canal	0.009	0.015	0.009	0.018
	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.018)		(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)
comm and transport					well (electrified)	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.004
post office	-0.035**	0.011	-0.034**	0.006		(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.012)	well (non-elec)	0.007	0.003	0.007	0.003
telegraph	-0.000	0.004	-0.000	0.003		(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	tubewell (electrified)	-0.006	0.020	-0.005	0.017
telephone	0.005	0.096***	0.009	0.067**		(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.020)
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	tubewell (non-elec)	-0.007	-0.005	-0.006	-0.010*
paved roads	-0.016	0.036**	-0.015	0.025*		(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.014)	uncultivated	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
education						(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
any	-0.007	0.015***	-0.007	0.017***					
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)					
primary	-0.007	0.012**	-0.007	0.013**					
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)					
middle	-0.003	0.019	-0.003	0.014					
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)					
high	-0.004	0.011	-0.004	0.008					
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)					
adult literacy	0.006	-0.001	0.005	0.002					
	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.015)					

Notes: This table gives the result of a regression of the level of the indicated public good in 2001 on dummies for a sub-district being visited by the yatra, and for the constituency being visited by the yatra. Regressions are at the sub-district level. Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) give the two coefficients from a regression in which a dummy is not included for a the sub-district being on a main road; columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) for a regression in which the main road dummy is included. Controls are included for the level of the indicated public good in 1991. A cubic is included in the BJP's 1989 vote share and a dummy for the party's victory in 1989. State fixed effects are included, and errors are clustered at the constituency level.