Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Situations:
Problems, Responses and Possibilities

Volume Two
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Foreword

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January 2005 began with massive humanitarian efforts mobilized to address one of the worst natural disasters in recent memory, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Newspapers showed the destruction on the devastated coastlines—a world turned inside out and upside down from the impact of the wave. Schools doubled as shelters for homeless families in Sri Lanka, and hotels served as schools for school-less children in Thailand. In an unusual turn of events, education, often an afterthought in a response to a disaster, was suddenly a priority.

Although support for education has been provided as part of foreign assistance since the Bretton Woods institutions were created, most bilateral donors did not articulate support for education during humanitarian crises (natural disaster, or complex emergencies) as a deliberate policy intervention, separate from education for development, until recently, and some have not yet done so. Prior to the 1990s, most agencies maintained separate operations that responded to humanitarian crises without including education activities. Education services that were delivered in refugee camps maintained by international agencies—for example, in Vietnam, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Guatemala—were an exception to this pattern, but these interventions were not institutionalized under a broad education policy. Providing education services as part of a humanitarian response challenges many of the assumptions on which humanitarian action is based, breaking down divisions between relief and development (Burde, forthcoming).

Now many policymakers and affected populations themselves are challenging the persistent paradigm that divides humanitarian action from development. There are many reasons for the shift toward a new approach, but I will enumerate only a few of them here. First, the logic of the relief/development division is not meaningful for populations caught in these crises. According to many seasoned aid workers, conflict-affected populations request education for their children as part of an assistance package immediately, along with food and shelter (Martone, personal communication, 2004; Bensalah, Sinclair, Hadj Nacer, Comisso, & Bokhari, 2000). Maintaining or returning to normalcy is a coping mechanism that most populations rely on when dealing
with disaster. Development activities represented by education programs are often a key ingredient in the process toward normalcy.

Second, the shift in the type and impact of violent conflict requires innovative responses to these crises. Although the total number of violent conflicts in the world has decreased since the mid-1990s, the number of intrastate conflicts has increased dramatically, and the percentage of civilians affected by armed conflict has skyrocketed. To illustrate, in the wars through most of the 19th and 20th centuries roughly 10% of casualties were civilian; in the intrastate wars of the last decade, 90% of the casualties were civilian (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2002, p. 24). Today, nearly 60% of the countries where USAID operates are currently experiencing conflict (USAID, 2004). Also, new military tactics that incorporate civilians, such as the use of child soldiers, have proliferated (Singer, 2005).

In addition, the number and duration of unresolved political crises has created an enormous population of refugees and displaced people who live for years in semi-permanent camps and require by international law “development-like” social services. There are approximately 11.9 million refugees and 23.6 million displaced persons in the world. Of those classified as refugees, 7.35 million have been in camps for ten years or more (United States Committee for Refugees, 2004). Although schooling and organized educational activities may be provided for children, the same services for adolescents in these circumstances are absent or lacking. Thus the expanded impact of conflict on civilians violates international norms and laws of war, and requires a response that protects the rights of these civilians, including the rights to development activities such as education.

Finally, after September 11th, policy makers in many donor countries re-examined the humanitarian/development paradigm with special scrutiny toward the quality of, or lack of, education support to disaster and war-affected populations. Concerns over the role that education may play in stoking violence have added weight to the confluence of issues described above. Neglecting education for populations affected by conflict or natural disaster is no longer considered benign.

In this context, the search for a logical approach to humanitarian disasters that will simultaneously provide parameters for the responses of international actors while supporting the demands of affected populations, has led many to frame education as a universal human right. Various types of assistance (relief, reconstruction, development), for various affected groups (refugee, internally displaced persons [IDP], vulnerable children), in various circumstances (refugee or IDP camps, low-intensity conflict) can be equally served by the human rights paradigm. Many advocates point out that children have “a right to education even under conditions of emergency” (Bensalah et al., 2000, p. 6). Included in this effort, both the movement to promote Education for All/the Dakar
Framework for Action (Sommers, 2002), and the Millennium Development Goals (Birdsall, Ibrahim, & Gupta, 2004) advocate for holding governments accountable for fulfilling their responsibilities toward children during times of crisis, ensuring that they can exercise their right to education.

In the spirit of figuratively “going to where the silence is” (Goodman, 2004), the articles in this year’s Volume of Columbia Graduate Student Research on education in emergencies, examine political issues facing people who are the most marginalized by conflict, and highlight the ways international actors try to help ameliorate these circumstances. The authors explore questions such as: How do policies toward refugees serve states’ interests? Why do gaps in refugee and IDP services persist? What are some innovative ways to promote education for vulnerable groups living in countries affected by conflict or natural disaster? This volume aims to build on much of the work that is already available and provide additional insights into the array of issues that confront educators working in humanitarian crises.

With this in mind, the articles in this volume offer a range of case studies that rely on qualitative data-collection techniques (primary and secondary sources, interviews and document review) and various theoretical frameworks to explore two primary themes in education in emergencies: (1) politics and policies of education for refugees and IDPs, and (2) approaches to education in emergencies by international actors.

Part one of the volume, “Politics and Policies of Education for Refugees and IDPs,” begins with an article by Ameena Gaffar-Kucher analyzing the impact of repatriation policies on education services for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Kirsten Busch continues this theme, focusing on Turkey’s policies as an asylum country for Iraqi refugees as well as the country of return for displaced Kurds. Examining barriers to education for refugee adolescents, Suzanne Hollmann describes the gap in programming that is available to this particular age group, and highlights the debate between providing education for general knowledge versus vocational training. Moving to war-affected adolescents in stable circumstances, Beth Bogner examines the policies toward refugee adolescents in New York City public schools. Brandi James’ article ends this section with a review of the impact of the United States and Colombian policy of crop eradication on displaced children’s access to education in Colombia.

Part two, “Education for Protection and Prevention: Approaches of International Actors,” examines various promising ways international agencies may address education for children affected by conflict. This section begins with an exploratory article by Jenna Arnold on the potential offered by children’s rights education in the context of demobilization and reintegration programs for child soldiers. The next article, by Tricia Nolan, provides a broad overview of faith-based aid organizations—what they are, which benefits they might offer,
and how they might differ (or not) from secular aid agencies. The last three articles examine specific interventions for populations affected by conflicts in Africa. Morgan Strecker presents the potentially positive results of supplemental psychosocial programs for “night commuters” in northern Uganda. Donna Tonini analyzes the possibilities for violence prevention via education in the midst of political upheaval in Zimbabwe, and Michael Browne examines the potential that mobile education in Sudan holds for Darfur refugees.

This is the second year that graduate students at Columbia University’s Teachers College have published a compilation of articles on education in emergencies. They worked hard to make this happen, designing their research projects and carrying them out, soliciting articles for review, forming a team for a double blind review process, editing the articles selected, and then publishing them, all within the time frame of one semester. This is an unusual feat; they should be commended for their efforts.

With this year’s volume, we anticipate that some of the issues the authors raise and the analyses they offer will provide valuable insights into the conditions facing war- and disaster-affected populations. We hope that increased awareness of these issues will continue the trend that has occurred over the past several years, shifting the importance of education for all, including those affected by emergencies, from an afterthought to a priority.

References


Social Development.


Editors’ Note

The complexity of conflicts and unpredictability of natural disasters around the world make it impossible for traditional humanitarian action to address comprehensively the basic needs of affected populations. As a result, education is becoming a crucial component of humanitarian aid during and after crises. International agencies and local governments are increasingly providing assistance for development initiatives beyond temporary relief, creating more holistic responses to these crises. The delivery of education services under these circumstances takes on heightened importance in ensuring, among other aspects, the protection of communities and the development of children’s well-being.

As initiatives related to education in emergencies continue to grow, graduate students of Columbia University have, for the second year in a row, created a compilation of student work reflecting critical issues in the field. The concerns of these scholars emanate from their catalogue of case studies. From well-publicized cases that are currently in the public eye, to newly emerging events receiving less scholarly and media coverage, the urgent need for attention to education systems in humanitarian emergencies and post-emergency situations is continually underscored. It is our hope that this journal will serve as a catalyst for future scholarly and practical action.

We would like to acknowledge the contributions of the following graduate students, without whom this volume would have been impossible:

Jennifer S. Arnold
Beth A. Bogner
M. Sherwin H. Browne
J. Kirsten Busch
Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher
Suzanne Hollmann
Brandi James
Tricia D. Nolan
Morgan H. Strecker
Donna C. Tonini

We also extend our thanks to all of the master's and doctoral students who responded to the Call for Papers. The articles received reflect both a broad and interdisciplinary interest in this compelling topic and the social concerns of Columbia University students. We commend all of the authors for producing such impressive work. While we tried to be as inclusive as possible, our biggest regret is not being able to include more articles.

We are grateful to Dr. Dana Burde from Teachers College, Dr. Lori Heninger from the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and Dr. Joseph Paul Martin from the Center for the Study of Human Rights for sharing their insights as panel members at the journal launch event.

The journal launch was made possible through a grant from the Columbia University President’s and Provost’s Student Initiative Fund to our
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Special thanks to Morgan Strecker who played an instrumental role in organizing and overseeing the journal from its inception. Thank you to Jennifer Arnold, Juliet Young, Michael Browne, and Chris Capobianco whose writing skills secured a grant from the Columbia University President’s and Provost’s Office. We would like to acknowledge those people who were a part of the review committee: Jennifer Arnold, Tammy Arnstein, Michael Browne, Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher, Luann Gronhovd, Christine Pagen, Morgan Strecker, Leah Sultan-Khan, and Zeena Zakharia. Also, we want to recognize the hard work of those who made the launch a success: Hanna Chin, Justina Tan, Fusaka Tsujioka, Kyoko Shiota, and Rachel Pierre. And thanks to Christine Pagen and Zeena Zakharia for assisting us with the metaphorical A-Z guide of journal reviewing and editing.

Finally, we extend our special thanks to Dr. Dana Burde, whose course, "Politics and Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Regions," inspired us to undertake this project. Dr. Burde not only contributed the foreword to the volume, but also provided guidance to us along the way and enthusiastically supported our initiative.

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Politics and Policies of Education for Refugees and IDPs
The Effects of Repatriation on Education in Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan

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Introduction
Following the October 6th, 2001 bombing of Afghanistan led by American forces, over two hundred thousand Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan. They joined the already two million Afghan refugees displaced from their homes by twenty-two years of devastation from war, civil strife, political repression, and one of the worst droughts in Afghan history. With the world’s attention returning to Afghanistan, there has been a renewed energy in rebuilding the country. As part of this effort, repatriation of Afghans from Pakistani refugee camps began in early 2002.

This paper suggests that the heightened focus on Afghanistan as well as repatriation efforts to return Afghan refugees to their homeland is at the detriment of the refugees still living in Pakistan. I explore the possibility that donor and host fatigue for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan coupled with a renewed zeal for rebuilding Afghanistan has resulted in massive budget cuts, affecting the provision of basic needs including education in Afghan refugee camps.

I begin my analysis by presenting a historical background to the problem at hand. Through this brief history, I show how the international community’s poor response to the needs of the Afghans after the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) laid the foundation for many of Afghanistan’s problems today. In particular, I focus on the impact of neglecting the provision of education for Afghan refugees. I then discuss the politics of repatriation and how the prolonged stay of Afghans in Pakistan has led the Pakistani government to push for repatriation with support from UNHCR and the new Afghan Government.

A Note on Methodology
Information for this paper was collected from various journals, newspaper articles, and policy reports. In addition, primary data was gathered by attending a presentation entitled Refugees and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): Strategies for Inclusion on March 3, 2005 at the Women’s Commission for
Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC) in New York City. At this presentation, I was able to talk with personnel from (WCRWC), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Afghan Women’s Resource Center (AWRC), and the Omid Learning Center (OLC). I maintained contact via email with Sadiqa Basiri of the OLC.

The Miseducation of Afghan Refugees
A brief review of history illustrates the effects of neglecting education in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. When Afghans first came to Pakistan as a way to escape the horrors of war in their own country, they were placed in refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, the two western provinces that border Afghanistan. Rather than create secular “modern” schools in the refugee camps, the conservative, Islamist military government of Zia-ul-Haq set up madaris (s: madrassah; religious seminary) (Haqqani, 2002). During the Cold War, support for these schools not only came from the Pakistani government, but also from Saudi Arabia as well as the United States as they provided a way to continue the supply of recruits for the U.S. backed Afghani resistance against the Soviets (Haqqani, 2002). Once the Soviet-Afghan war ended, the importance of these madaris to the Western world diminished. However, funding continued to come from Saudi Arabia and the number of madaris grew. In a Frontline (2001) interview Professor Vali Nasr, referring to madaris in Pakistan, suggests:

Saudi Arabia has been the single biggest source of funding for fanatical interpretations of Islam, and the embodiment of that interpretation in organizations and schools has created a self-perpetuating institutional basis for promoting fanaticism across the Muslim world... Those interpretations of Islam are being propagated out of schools that receive organizational and financial funding from Saudi Arabia. In fact, I would push it further: that these schools would not have existed without Saudi funding.

Due to their dogmatic nature, these schools are often a poor provider of education. Students, who are typically male, are taught to memorize the Qur’an. Additionally, the curriculum may include further religious education such as Islamic jurisprudence, sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad, and interpretations of the Qur’an (Anzar, 2003). Subjects beyond the scope of religion, however, are rarely included. Whether students are functionally literate at the end of their studies is highly questionable (Singer, 2001; Warwick & Reimers, 1995). More worrisome is the fact that graduates from a number of these seminaries have been responsible for many of the terrorist activities in recent years. The former Taliban leader, Mullah Umer, and many of his compatriots were in fact graduates of one of the largest and most extremist seminaries in Pakistan, Darul-uloom- Haqqania, located in NWFP in close proximity to many Afghan refugee camps (Haqqani, 2002).
In the following pages, I argue that because of a lack of attention given by the international community to Afghan refugees and their education during and after the Soviet-Afghan war period, madaris, particularly violent ones, have grown in number and have been able to find a continuous supply of students and recruits for various causes around the world. Today these madaris are located throughout Pakistan and number in the thousands, of which an estimated five thousand preach a violent, hateful form of Islam (Singer, 2001; Stern, 2000). A recent study from Harvard University challenges this figure arguing that it is a greatly inflated number based on undocumented sources (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2005). Yet, even the authors of this study admit that in NWFP, the region where the bulk of Afghan refugees live, the number of madaris has in fact grown over the past fifteen years. Moreover, they suggest that there is link between events occurring in Afghanistan and the increase in numbers of students attending madaris: “The largest jump in madrassa enrollment (in NWFP) is for the cohort aged 10 in the period 1989-93—coinciding with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban” (Andrabi, et al., 2005, p. 6). Of most concern is their finding that the likelihood that parents will send their children to madaris increases when they have no other school options. The closing down of schools in the Afghan refugee camps and the low priority of education among donor countries is an invitation to the madaris to step in once again and help continue the trend towards functionally illiterate people at best and new recruits for the extremist Islamic cause at worst.

**Pakistan as Host**

No one knows how many refugees currently live in Pakistan. Estimates vary anywhere from one million to two million with some claiming that the figures are even higher than that. What is established is that Pakistan has been host to the largest concentration of refugees in the world for over twenty-five years (Jeffrey, 2002). Although Pakistan has not signed the United Nations Refugee Convention, for many years it had opened its doors and taken in Afghan refugees (Berg, 2004). This acceptance of Afghan refugees is significant in that it is an implicit recognition of the principal of non-refoulement, a central tenant of the UN Refugee Convention that obliges “countries of asylum not to return people forcibly to situations where they have a well-founded fear of persecution” (Cutts, 2000, p. 2). Thus, by “de facto tolerance, Pakistan allowed the refugees basic rights without legal backing” (Berg, 2004, p. 92).

Despite stretching its own resources to provide shelter for millions of displaced Afghans, Pakistan has been heavily criticized over the years for its treatment of refugees. Yet the international community has done little to help. Donors’ generosity (or lack thereof) has often depended on political and military motives, and over the years, aid has become increasingly scarce. This growing disenchantedment is reflected in a quote from Muhummad Haroon Shaukat, who was the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2001:
In the past...there was international assistance. Now we are on our own, but we do not have the resources left to assist the refugees. UNHCR assistance drops all the time, yet the refugees’ needs remain. We are not receiving enough assistance to sustain the refugees. If donors have donor fatigue, then we have asylum fatigue. (as cited in Ruiz, 2001, p. 2)

Pakistan, a poor country itself, does not have the means to house one of the world’s largest refugee populations. Over the past twenty-five years, UNHCR’s budget for the refugees decreased from $201 million in 1981 to $12 million in 2000: a mere $10 for each of the 1.2 million refugees living in camps in Pakistan (Refugees International, 2001).

According to a UNHCR official, the inadequacy of funding stems from a lack of precise knowledge regarding the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (personal communication, March 3, 2005). UNHCR and the Pakistani government have thus begun a census to establish the number of Afghans in Pakistan. The results of this census were due at the end of April 2005. Even though “counting refugees is at best an approximate science” (Crisp, 1999, p. 4), whatever data is collected may be too late to deal with a growing crisis among refugees in Pakistan: Beginning in 2000, Pakistan’s stance toward Afghan refugees notably hardened due to “the combination of a failing economy, donor abandonment, a hardline (sic) governor in the NWFP, and a very large influx of Afghan refugees” (Berg, 2004, p. 93). This growing disillusionment with Afghan refugees is evident in the increasing harassment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan’s urban areas. Pakistan has been severely criticized for this behavior (Parker, 2002). While the criticism is certainly warranted, the fact remains that aid for the refugees has been fast diminishing and Pakistan is no longer able to do it alone. In the words of Muhammad Haroon Shaukat, “If donors’ patience with the Afghan situation has run out, then so has ours” (Ruiz, 2001, p. 2).

A Cut in Aid
With the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, the strategic importance of the exiled Afghans diminished, and thus the very high figures of Afghan refugees projected by the Pakistani government came under great scrutiny (Crisp, 1999). Throughout the 1990s, the international community substantially cut assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Ruiz, 2001). In 1995, UNHCR ended its support for middle and secondary education due to budget constraints (Bethke & Braunschweig, 2004). In the same year, the World Food Program ended food aid to most refugee village residents (Berg, 2004). These actions forced many refugees into Pakistan’s urban areas where the government claims that the refugees took away jobs from Pakistanis, thus impacting an already weak economy.
Despite improvements to the economy over the past three years, Afghan refugees are an easy scapegoat for Pakistan’s many problems. Moreover, since the refugees that entered the country in 2000 were fleeing a drought rather than persecution, the Pakistani government does not recognize them as refugees (Berg, 2004). In early 2001, a provincial government decree announced the forced deportation of a minimum quota of Afghans each day (Berg, 2004; Parker, 2002). The Pakistani government also closed down its borders in 2000 as a way to deter more refugees from entering the country. The government later argued that the reason why the border remained closed was to prevent members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from seeking refuge in Pakistan (Parker, 2002). However, the relatively porous nature of the border still allowed refugees to pass across easily.

Even as refugees continued to enter Pakistan, repatriation efforts began in earnest in 2002. There seems to be an unfounded assumption by UNHCR and the Pakistani and Afghan governments that all Afghans wish to return to their homeland immediately. In fact, there appears to be little planning for what to do with those Afghans who chose to remain in Pakistan. As such, aid has shifted from maintaining the refugee camps to rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. There is no question that money is needed to rebuild Afghanistan so that the situation can be improved for refugees to eventually return there. However, until Afghanistan is more stable, refugees in Pakistan must continue to be cared for. UNHCR’s core mandate is the protection of refugees and the search for solutions to the problems of refugees (Cutts, 2000). Thus, while it may engage in repatriation activities, it must also continue to provide the basic provisions of clean water, food, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and education for the refugees in Pakistan.

The importance of providing education to prepare Afghans for the future cannot be stressed enough. Somaratne Ekanayke, a refugee-education expert, rightly states, “Education is very important for refugees, because it’s the only baggage that they can take back to their country” (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2003). Not only is education important for those Afghans who wish to return home and participate in the rebuilding of their country, it is also important for Afghans who wish to stay in Pakistan. With repatriation taking center stage, donors are less interested in maintaining and educating refugees in Pakistan. Policy-makers and donors seem to overlook the fact that “the longer a refugee remains in exile, the more difficult it will be to go home” (Harreill-Bond, 1989, p. 42). Without an education that can help them become more productive members of society, Afghans will continue to be viewed as a burden by Pakistanis.

**The Politics of Repatriation**

Considering the fact that many Afghans now regard Pakistan as their home, the question of why UNHCR and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan are
pushing for repatriation is worth exploring. Repatriation is intrinsically connected to politics: UNHCR is dependent on donor governments’ support, and donors thus have “undue influence” on the organization and its policies (Chimni, 2000, p. 14). When donors no longer have the financial means (or interest) to sustain a refugee population, repatriation is often employed under the guise of a solution. This trend began in the 1980s, when donors became increasingly frustrated over UNHCR’s growing budget needs (Harrell-Bond, 1989). Repatriation programs are cheaper and faster than assistance programs in the host country and are therefore seized upon as solutions to the refugee problem (Harrell-Bond, 1989).

Voluntary repatriation has thus become the preferred and primary solution for refugees (Uloom, 2001, p. 140). This is what Chimni (2000) refers to as the “repatriation turn” in refugee policy, where repatriation is “presented as a solution whose denial implies the violation of human rights” (p. 13). According to Crisp (1999), “Unlike refugees, returnees are a symbol of political success. When people decide to go back to their country of origin, the leaders of that state can claim that its citizens are expressing some kind of confidence in its government” (p. 10). Furthermore, he argues, “Repatriation also allows the country of origin to seek large-scale international assistance, both in the form of short-term relief and for longer-term reintegration and rehabilitation activities” (p. 10). Thus, it comes as no surprise that the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan with backing from UNHCR (and hence its donors) are pushing for repatriation to show the international community that democracy is prevailing and that Afghanistan is once again a safe place to live.

History Repeats Itself
Although both Pakistan and UNHCR recognize that the absorption capacity of Afghanistan is limited and, therefore, repatriation will take some time, a remarkably short period has been set for repatriation. An estimated two million Afghans are expected to repatriate from Pakistan in the three-year time frame. Beginning in 2003, the agreement is to remain in force until March 2006 after which the situation will be re-evaluated. It remains unclear as to what is to happen after 2006.

This lack of planning is surprising as this is not the first time that Afghans have repatriated. After the end of the Soviet-Afghan war in 1989, many Afghans returned to their homeland (Berg, 2004). But due to civil war, they found their way back to the refugee camps in Pakistan. The current situation in Afghanistan is certainly not safe enough for people to return and resettle (Human Rights Watch, 2002). An absence of rule of law, particularly in rural areas, is a concern for many potential returnees (Berg, 2004; Mahboob, 2004).

The lack of both hindsight and foresight is alarming, especially since it would appear that repatriation thus far has been less than successful. Since its
launch, there have been serious doubts about the absorption capacity of Afghanistan (Berg, 2004) and whether humanitarian agencies have the funding and resources to cope with the large-scale returns that UNHCR is promoting (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The winter weather, security concerns, as well as the murder of a UNHCR employee have also lead to interruptions in the repatriation process (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2004). Moreover, transportation is only provided to the border after which the refugees are on their own (Mahboob, 2004). Despite the squalid conditions of refugee camps in Pakistan, many returnees find themselves worse off at home, due to the lack of jobs, health facilities, infrastructure, and, in particular, security (Brown & Williams, 2003; Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2005). Some reports suggest that many refugees are taking the repatriation package and then returning to Pakistan (Mahboob, 2004), while others indicate that refugees are moving into Pakistan’s urban areas (Parker, 2002).

With so many political and economic concerns involved in stabilizing Afghanistan, education is once again on the back burner. Many organizations have either shut down their schools or are in the process of wrapping up their educational programs in refugee camps and moving to Afghanistan. However, there has not been enough time to establish a sufficient number of schools within Afghanistan for the growing number of returnees who wish to gain an education (Pratawmina Hashimi, Refugees and the UN MDGs, panel discussion, March 3, 2005). According to Sadiqa Basiri of the Omid Learning Foundation, in 2004, there were five million newly registered children in schools. Another one million are expected to register this year (Refugees and the UN MDGs, panel discussion, March 3, 2005). Due to the lack of school buildings in Kabul, the school day is split into three shifts each lasting three hours, compromising the quality of education. This is considerably worse than the situation in refugee schools in Pakistan where there are only two shifts, if any, thus allowing for a slightly longer school day (S. Basiri, personal communication, April 8, 2005). The situation in Kabul is still better than many other parts of Afghanistan where there are no possibilities to go to school.

Implications
The fact that there is such a hard push for repatriation suggests several things. First, host fatigue is reaching new heights. Recent actions by the Pakistani government show that their patience with the Afghan refugees has seriously declined. The Foreigner’s Order of 1951 is the only Pakistani law that applies to refugees and allows for the arrest and detention of any undocumented foreigner (Parker, 2002). In recent years, there have been a series of arrests and incidents of deportation under this order, indicating that the Pakistani government is weary of being host.

Second, shifting donor priorities (such as the Iraq war, the Indian Ocean Tsunami, etc.) have also impacted the amount of money available for the refugees in the camps. UNHCR has seen significant budget cuts in recent years.
For example, in 2002 as the Iraq war became imminent, UNHCR-Pakistan experienced a budget cut of 48 percent - from $32 million to $21 million (Brown & Williams, 2003). Not only has this affected its operations in Pakistan, but it has also impacted repatriation efforts, with considerable reductions to the repatriation package initially offered (Brown & Williams, 2003).

Third, UNHCR’s recent survey of the remaining Afghan refugees in Pakistan, though necessary, is also somewhat suspect: Interest of donor states in refugee statistics can be “strongly conditioned by the desire to limit their expenditure on refugee assistance programmes and to bring an early halt to longstanding humanitarian operations which have outlived their political usefulness” (Crisp, 1999, p. 15). Although the census has been projected as a way to determine the number of refugees left in Pakistan so that their needs may be addressed, refugee statistics are rarely reliable (Crisp, 1999). Because of vague information regarding what is to happen to refugees who choose not to repatriate, it is difficult to judge the true intention behind this census.

Fourth, repatriation sends an important political message: that Afghanistan is once again a safe place to live. Certainly, things have improved but a lack of security due to lawlessness in most parts of the country continues to be a major issue (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2005). The massive repatriation effort (the largest in UNHCR’s history) places a great burden on an already fragile security situation.

Finally, repatriation suggests that Afghanistan has the capacity to absorb the millions of returnees. However, this is particularly difficult because of the large number of returnees and the speed at which repatriation is taking place. Reintegration and reconstruction programs in Afghanistan are extremely inadequate and frustration among returnees is growing (Brown & Williams, 2003).

**Repatriation’s ramifications**

How does repatriation affect the Afghans who remain in refugee camps in Pakistan? The answer is: dramatically. Many of UNHCR’s reports point out the numbers that have repatriated. What is not reported is the number of those people who repatriated and then crossed back into Pakistan. Moreover, because Afghanistan needs to be ready for all of its returnees, donors and aid agencies are focusing their work there and are neglecting those refugees who are still in Pakistan. Whether those who are repatriating are doing so voluntarily is also questionable. UNHCR’s own handbook on voluntary repatriation states:

Refugee repatriation is not voluntary when host country authorities deprive refugees of any real freedom of choice through outright coercion or measures such as, for example, reducing essential services. (UNHCR, 1996, p. 26)
As of September 1, 2004, food and other essentials were withdrawn from camps that had been set up on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Mahboob, 2004). These isolated camps were initially used to address the need of the large influx of refugees in 2000 but were also used as a pull factor because they provided food and shelter to refugees (Jeffrey, 2002). This is certainly a violation of UNHCR’s own policy. Now that aid has ended, the Afghans have few choices.

With basic life needs unaddressed, education is nowhere on the agenda. Almost all schools have been shut down in the refugee camps, except for the few run by the IRC and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (S. Basiri, personal communication, April 8, 2005). According to the NRC’s website, they will be closing their schools in 2005 (NRC, 2005). The German Technical Association (GTZ), one of UNHCR’s major partners in providing education for Afghan refugees in Pakistan with 327 schools (Bethke & Braunschweig, 2004) is also closing down its program at the end of 2005 (GTZ, 2005). The government of Pakistan, UNHCR and the World Food Program seem to believe that cutting back on aid will lead to increased repatriation (Berg, 2004). These actions can be considered tantamount to refoulement and are in direct opposition to UNHCR’s own handbook on voluntary repatriation.

Repatriation is not an overnight process. Afghanistan is certainly in no position to welcome back its people. Thus it is imperative that basic provisions continue to be provided to the thousands of refugees still living in Pakistan. It also means that schools must continue their services so that education continues uninterrupted and the Afghans are given the skills needed to be productive citizens of their own country.

Conclusion
This paper suggests that shifting priorities coupled with both donor and host fatigue are leading towards a potential crisis in the western parts of Pakistan where well over a million Afghans are still living in refugee camps and untold numbers are living in urban areas. This crisis stems from the shrinking funding for the refugees, which compromises the provision of resources for them, particularly education.

Because of the large number of Afghan refugees and the limited funding, even basic human needs for food, clean water, and shelter are not being met. Despite the fact that research points to the importance of education, it is nowhere on the agenda. Several individuals I spoke with stressed that both education and health were parallel needs in Afghan refugee camps. What is most surprising is that the international community is aware of the power of education and ideology as demonstrated by the impact of the Taliban on Afghanistan; yet, little is being done to counter such education. In both the short and the long-run, this will severely affect the Afghans, and ultimately become an even greater problem.
for the international community.

I certainly am not arguing against the heightened focus on rebuilding Afghanistan - this is essential. Nor am I arguing against repatriation. Rather, I am reminding the international community not to forget about those Afghans who remain in Pakistan. Many of them will return home when conditions are better. If repatriation is to be a durable solution, then it must be encouraged when the time is right. That time is yet to come for Afghanistan. The Afghan refugees in Pakistan are part of Afghanistan’s future; to ignore them is to their detriment as well as that of the international community.

“Attention must be paid.”
- Death of a Salesman, Arthur Miller, 1949.

References


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Overview
This study seeks to determine how the politics and policies towards immigrant and minority populations of Turkey affect access to basic education among Iraqi refugees and Kurdish returnees. Emphasis is placed on the time period following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion in Iraq. The focus of this study emerged as a result of a week-long course attended by the author in Istanbul in March 2005 on the subject of Human Rights in Turkey.¹

During the 1991 Gulf War, more than 400,000 Iraqis fled to the Turkish border over a three-week period. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion into Iraq resulted in a second wave of Iraqi refugees seeking asylum in Turkey. It also resulted in efforts from the international community to begin a repatriation program for Turkish Kurds living in Iraq. As of 2003, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identified more than 6,000 documented cases of refugee and asylum-seekers in Turkey, with 600 cases involving persons of Iraqi origin.² These figures are significantly below current estimates on the number of Iraqis who enter Turkey illegally each year, which hover around 22,000 (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2003). In addition to movements of refugees seeking asylum in Turkey, Turkey’s own history of civil strife has resulted in a wave of Turkish refugees seeking asylum in neighboring countries. The UNHCR estimates that 14,000 Turkish Kurds currently reside in northern Iraq (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2004c).

It is the intent of this study to evaluate the appropriateness of the emergency education response on the part of the Turkish government towards Iraqi refugees and Turkish Kurdish returnees. Specifically, the case will attempt to assess whether or not the formation of refugee camps or schools within Turkey has been delayed or constrained to discourage the movement of Iraqis

¹ The course was offered by Teachers College, Columbia University’s Department of International and Transcultural Affairs in conjunction with Istanbul Bigli University.
² It is unclear how many Iraqi refugees in Turkey are of Kurdish descent but it is likely that most Iraqi refugees in Turkey are from northern Iraq, a largely Kurdish region of the country.
and Turkish Kurds across Turkey’s southeastern borders. The case will also attempt to review preliminary educational strategies employed in response to populations of concern in Turkey. It is the hope that this case can serve to highlight the present-day need for educational service provision among refugees and returnees in Turkey such that all children receive the services to which they are entitled.

Problem Statement and Relevance
In November 2002, the Turkish government announced that in the event of war between the United States and Iraq, Turkey would set up thirteen refugee camps in Iraq for Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs). The government indicated that only if these camps became full, would Turkey consider allowing Iraqis to cross the border into Turkey to five additional camps. Under Article 25 of the Turkish constitution, the Turkish Red Crescent Society is responsible for supporting the establishment of refugee camps, “when deemed necessary” (as cited in The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, amended October 17, 2001). However, international aid agencies, including Human Rights Watch and UNHCR fear mistreatment of Turkish Kurds and Iraqis by the Turkish government, citing past human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

Turkey’s treatment of refugees and returnees has garnered increased scrutiny from the international community since 1999, when Turkey attained European Union (EU) candidacy status. Turkey’s accession into the EU will depend on a variety of factors, including the country’s treatment of IDPs and refugees. Yet, domestically, the ability of Turkey to provide an adequate response to the needs of refugees and returnees has often been limited by the country’s own history of political and economic instability. In turn, an increase in the number of educational emergencies worldwide, due to both natural disasters and war, has constrained the activities of international aid agencies in Turkey.

Nonetheless, providing children with access to education is critical during periods of displacement. First, access to appropriate educational services can facilitate an easier return to normal life following the end of a conflict (Sommers, 2002). Second, children without access to education are more vulnerable to recruitment into child soldiering, sex slavery, or other criminal activity (Bethke & Braunschweig, 2002). Yet, more than 27 million children and youth affected by armed conflict, including refugees and IDPs, do not have access to formal education (Bethke & Braunschweig, 2002).

Background

Turkey’s Refugee Population. As a result of its geographical position at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, in a region characterized by political instability
and violence, Turkey is one of the largest asylum-seeker producing countries in the world. Turkey, a country of over 70 million persons, is bordered by eight countries, many of which are characterized by their own turmoil-ridden histories, including Iran and Iraq. Yet, under a geographical reservation to the 1951 European Convention, Turkey only grants refugee status to individuals who became refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe prior to January 1, 1951 (post-World War II). Turkey is the only country that has maintained this reservation. The Turkish government does not recognize Non-Europeans as refugees, but rather as asylum-seekers. Non-European asylum-seekers must register with the police.

Iraqis, fearing deportation, often enter the country illegally. This situation has led to an underestimate by international aid agencies regarding the number of Iraqi refugees in Turkey. However, the percentage of Iraqi refugees who have registered with the Turkish government and subsequently been granted refugee status has increased steadily over the past several years. Of the 5,000 Iraqi asylum applications reviewed by Turkish authorities in 2000, more than half were rejected (Frantz, 2003). By 2003, the number of Iraqis who applied for and were granted refugee status in Turkey increased to 76 percent (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2003).

In 2001, as a partial response to EU member states’ stance on the issue of burden-sharing, the Turkish Parliament adopted the National Program of Action for the Adoption of the EU Acquis (NPAA). The NPAA considered lifting the geographical reservation on the 1951 Convention “in a manner that would not encourage large scale refugee flows from the East, when the necessary legislative and infrastructural measures are introduced” (National Program of Action, 2003, p.16). As Frantz (2003) highlights, “despite these commitments, there are still many legal, economic, and administrative hurdles that need to be overcome to ensure the protection of refugees” in Turkey (p. 14).

Educational Service Provision - Responsibility of the State. Irrespective of such hurdles, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child “calls for states to make primary education compulsory and free to all, and to encourage the development of accessible secondary and other forms of education” (Overseas Development Institute, 2003, p.2). Article 27 of the 1994 asylum regulation states that “possibilities for education are to be accorded to refugees and asylum seekers” (Frantz, 2003, p. 41). Frantz (2003) further emphasizes, Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution states that “no one shall be deprived of the right of learning and education” (p. 41). However, Turkish regulations allow asylum-seeking children to attend primary schools only if they have a valid residence permit. Parents, fearing deportation, are often reluctant to attempt to register their children in schools if they lack valid permits.

Status of Turkey’s Kurdish Population. During the 1980s and 1990s, over 300,000 Turkish Kurds were forcibly displaced by Turkish security forces seeking
to combat the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency, which drew its support from the local Kurdish peasant population in Turkey’s southeastern region (Human Rights Watch, 2005). An estimated 14,000 Turkish Kurds who sought refuge in northern Iraq following this displacement have remained in Iraqi refugee camps or integrated into local Iraqi Kurdish communities for more than a decade. It is estimated that 2,300 Turkish Kurds have returned from Iraq to Turkey with UNHCR support since 1998.

In September of 2003, following the bombing of the UN Embassy in Baghdad, the UNHCR suspended operations in northern Iraqi refugee camps while continuing to service refugees through the use of local intermediaries. In January of 2004, Turkey, Iraq, and the UNHCR agreed on a plan for organized voluntary return of Turkish Kurds to their homeland. The plan includes an agreement to close down one of the larger refugee camps in northern Iraq, Makhmour, which houses an estimated 9,000 Turkish Kurds (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2004b). Makhmour has a reputation among some as “a camp that Ankara has described in the past as no better than a base for the PKK” (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2004a). (See Figure 1 for location of Makhmour Camp).

Negotiations for the agreement were contentious in part because “alongside the humanitarian problem, they [the Turkish government] are concerned that Kurdish separatists driven into Iraq may come back with the refugees. So, “it is thought the government will try to limit the numbers coming into southeast Turkey” (Dymond, 2003). In turn, the UNHCR in Turkey has emphasized the “need for an open-ended repatriation process due to security concerns in Iraq” (Turkish Daily News, 2004b).

**Methodology**

Lines of inquiry for the study were examined primarily through a review of available literature. Emphasis was placed on collecting information from a cross-section of available sources including Turkish media, international aid agencies with a presence in Turkey, and academicians conducting research on the status of refugees and returnees in the region. Where possible, information was checked against interviews with representatives of non-governmental organizations and academicians during the author’s March 2005 visit to Turkey; however attempts to gather information from interview sources was limited due to time constraints.
Findings
The UNHCR identifies seven standards critical to the effective provision of educational services for refugee children. The standards include access, gender equality, teacher quality, curriculum, relevance, peace education and language (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1994). This study concerns itself primarily with questions of access -- namely, has the formation of refugee camps or schools within Turkey been delayed or constrained to discourage the movement of Iraqis and Turkish Kurds across Turkish borders? In instances where the Turkish government has provided access to education for returnees and refugees, the study seeks to examine the effectiveness of this provision as measured by the remaining six UNHCR standards.

Access to Schooling. The Turkish government has made significant strides in its provision of access to education for its school-aged population. In 1998, the Government extended compulsory primary school education from five years to eight through its Basic Education Program. The Program, which costs an average of $3 billion per year, received some financial support from the World Bank (World Bank, 2005). The Bank estimates that there has been an increase of over 1 million in the number of children attending schools by 2003 as compared to pre-1997 levels. The Bank reports that some 640,000 children travel to school by bus in Turkey with an estimated 280,000 children nationwide in the state boarding system. Diyarbakir, a city in the southeastern part of the country that is home to
many refugees and IDPs, has over 5,000 children enrolled in Unal Erkan primary school (World Bank, 2005).

However, as a result of the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish government in the southeastern region of the country, many schools were closed in the 1990s. A review of the literature indicates that many schools in local, rural villages in the southeastern part of the country remain closed or in need of reconstruction (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 5). As a result, Turkish Kurdish families with children often stay in neighboring cities in order to provide their children with access to schooling. This fact is consistent with UNHCR reports that identify the location of 99 percent of its population of concern (refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs) as urban. Stated one IDP in Bingol province, “I cannot speak for others, but I know that if our village was provided with water, a road, and a school, it would be completely full” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 21).

The Turkish government’s current method of providing assistance to IDPs is the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project. Human Rights Watch indicates that the project has failed to restore damaged and destroyed infrastructures to which populations are returning (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Among refugees in Turkey, UNHCR reported that 70 percent of the 723 primary school age children on its caseload were attending schools in or near the UNHCR-run refugee camp in Van, Turkey, as compared to 40 percent of all children in 2001. As UNHCR identifies approximately 10 percent of the 6,000 refugees on its caseload as refugees with Iraq as their country of origin, it is likely that approximately 10 percent of the 723 refugee children in Van, or 72 children, are Iraqi refugees.

Current estimates regarding the number of Iraqi refugees who have entered Turkey illegally are over 20,000. Many of these refugees are children. It is not known how many Iraqi refugee children in Turkey who entered the country illegally have access to schooling but the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children indicate that it is “likely that most Iraqi refugees have no access to schooling” as a result of their status as illegal immigrants (Bethke & Braunschweig, 2004). Furthermore, it is unclear how many Iraqi children who have been granted asylum-status by the Turkish government since 2003 are attending Turkish public schools. The Turkish Red Crescent Society did not set up refugee camps in northern Iraq, citing security concerns. In turn, refugee camps were not established by the Society in Turkey as the government had indicated it would only set up refugee camps in Turkey in the event of an overflow of camps in Iraq. The UNHCR continues to run refugee camps in both Turkey and northern Iraq, in some cases through intermediaries such as the Swedish aid organization Diakonia.

Given greater availability of data, it would also be important to consider problems of access related to parent’s lack of information on the location of schools, knowledge of children’s rights to attend school, number of hours in
which the school is in operation, and any safety concerns that might prevent students from attending their local school. It is unclear what steps, if any, have been taken by the Turkish government to inform refugee populations of children’s rights to attend school or of the location of schools once they are in the country. However, the UNHCR does attempt to provide refugees with this information at authorized border crossings.

Effectiveness of Educational Provision. For those returnees and refugees with physical access to schools in Turkey, problems of school effectiveness remain. In the Makhmour camp in Iraq, 2,800 Turkish Kurdish children attend four different schools. Instruction in the schools is in Kurdish. In contrast, in Turkey, any instruction available to returnees is offered only in Turkish. As a result, many parents, believing that their children will have difficulty to adapting to instruction in Turkish, do not wish to return to their homeland (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2004c).

Returnees and refugees would require teachers with knowledge of instructional practices suitable to non-native language learners to assist children in the classroom. A review of the literature did not indicate what steps if any the Turkish government has taken to train teachers to assist non-native speakers and/or to offer instruction in the student’s primary language. Indeed, cases of language persecution by the Turkish government against its Kurdish population contributed to movements of Turkish Kurds seeking refuge in Iraq. Until 2002, there was a ban on the use of the Kurdish language in any official setting in Turkey, including schools and courts (United States Department of State, 2003). While Turkey adopted legislation in August of 2002 to legalize television and radio broadcasts and language courses in the Kurdish language (Kurdistan Observer, 2002), by the end of 2002, there were still no Kurdish language-courses available in Turkey (United States Department of State, 2003). The first Kurdish language school in Turkey was opened in April of 2004 in the southeastern city of Sanliurfa (the Associated Press, 2004).

Support from Non-Governmental Organizations. While the UNHCR provided additional support to some of the children on its caseload in the form of education kits, uniforms, supplies, vocational training, and recreational training, budgetary constraints required the organization to scale back on these activities in the later part of 2002. The International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) has begun a six month project working with 50 refugee and asylum-seeker children of mixed heritage, including Iraqi children, and offers classes in a range of subjects including English, mathematics, drama and sports. The ICMC is partnering with the Turkish Educational Volunteers Foundation (TEGV) in these efforts. While promising, the scale of these efforts would need to be increased to have a greater impact on refugee and returnee populations in Turkey.
Analysis
While Turkey has agreed to begin work to repatriate the 14,000 Turkish Kurds living in Iraq, little mention in the literature was given to the educational needs of this population upon return to their homeland. According to Osman Paksut, Turkey’s Ambassador to Iraq, “Repatriation has to be orderly. It will take several months or a year” (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2004b). In turn, plans to build a fifth school in Makhmour are underway despite UNHCR’s suspension of activities in the refugee camp (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2004c). It is unclear whether or not the Turkish government will use the repatriation period to plan for the arrival of Turkish Kurds to Turkey. However, the number of Turkish Kurdish children attending refugee schools in northern Iraq (approximately 3,000) represents less than one percent of Turkey’s population of 10 million school-aged children. Given a lack of information to the contrary, it appears as though the formation of schools within local villages that were once home to populations of Turkish Kurdish have been delayed to discourage return to those villages upon repatriation.

The lack of commitment on the part of the Turkish government to service Turkish Kurdish returnees might be explained by comments made by Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy Onur Oymen during an interview with the Turkish Daily News (December 5, 2004). According to Oymen, Turkey’s reservations in international agreements about refugees coming through its southern and southeastern borders stem from concerns over financial costs and political instability. Oymen, citing high financial costs to the state when 450,000 Kurdish Iraqis entered Turkey during the first Gulf War, also referenced an increase in “havoc” between terrorists and refugees in the southeast as a result of the movement of refugees across Turkish borders (Ganiodlu, 2004).

In contrast, the U.S.-led invasion into Iraq in 2003 resulted in a much smaller percentage of Iraqi refugees seeking refuge in Turkey. The small number of Iraqi refugees on UNHCR’s caseload as a percentage of total refugees and the increasing number of Iraqi refugees granted asylum-status by the Turkish government suggest that the need for emergency educational service provisions among Iraqi refugees was overstated. Indeed, by September 2004, some 400,000 Iraqis are believed to have returned to Iraq from neighboring and non-neighboring countries. This figure includes 7,000 returnee children enrolled in Iraqi schools (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2005).

However, it is likely that a sizable population of Iraqi refugees who entered Turkey illegally remains in the country. It is unclear what steps, if any, have been taken on the part of the Turkish government to ensure that these refugee children receive the educational services to which they are entitled. Conversely, the Turkish government’s access to these children is likely constrained by Iraqi parents who, fearing deportation, do not seek out educational services for their children.
Nonetheless, a review of the literature further suggests that there is a greater need for transparency of information in order to ascertain the ways in which Turkey’s improvements to its educational system are benefiting specific populations of children, including returnees and refugees. Further disaggregation of data to reveal the numbers of refugees and returnees attending local schools in Turkey, as well as the types of services provided to these populations, would likely facilitate the development of more appropriate planning and policy mechanisms on the part of the state and nongovernmental educational service providers.

**Conclusion and Agenda for Further Research**

Turkey’s attainment of European Union candidacy-status in 1999 and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion in Iraq resulted in the placement of increased pressure on the Turkish state by the international community to respond effectively to an emergency education situation. This study sought to assess how Turkish politics and policies towards minority and immigrant populations have influenced the government’s provision of emergency educational services to these populations. Problems of access to and quality of educational services in Turkey for refugees and returnees were reviewed.

Based on an analysis of results, it appears that emergency educational service provisions on the part of the Turkish government have been inadequate to date. This is perhaps surprising given the emphasis placed by the European Union on Turkey’s treatment of refugees and returnees as a criterion for entry into the EU. Turkey’s ratification of international conventions surrounding the rights of the child has rendered clear the protection of individual rights against actions benefiting the state. However, the extent to which the presence of international conventions has resulted in a significant change in a state’s practice with respect to the treatment of refugee and returnee children has not been frequently documented and warrants further research.

As the number of children displaced by conflict continues to expand worldwide, the provision of effective educational services for these children is critical. Children must receive the educational services to which they are entitled. Providing children with access to education during periods of conflict has been shown to aid children’s return to society following periods of conflict and to reduce the likelihood of children’s victimization by criminal entities. Failure to provide services will have an adverse impact not only on individual children affected by conflict, but on their home or host states. In the case of Turkey, the effective provision of educational services to displaced Turkish Kurds and Iraqi refugee children will increase the likelihood of future political and economic stability in Turkey, Iraq, and throughout the region, an impact that would clearly benefit both individual children and their countries of origin.
References


Lost Generation: The Importance of Adolescent Education in Refugee and IDP Communities and the Barriers to Access

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Introduction
Adolescents in refugee and IDP camps have the potential to be a transformative, constructive force in community development both within the camp and during the reconstruction process. It is also possible, however, that they can serve as a source of destruction and re-ignite dwindling conflicts. Available educational opportunities are critical to determining how adolescents participate in post-conflict outcomes.

The availability of educational opportunities for youth such as accelerated primary education and post-primary resources is limited in part because of the weak language used in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Primary education is “compulsory and available free to all” whereas secondary and vocational education is “encouraged” (UNHCR, 1989). Because of this weakness, donors focus less on secondary and vocational education, which is geared toward older children. Lack of funding contributes to the sharp decline in school enrollment beyond the forth grade (see figure 3). Furthermore, females are at a disadvantage from the first grade onward when, according to a survey conducted by the Women’s Commission of 500 projects in 113 countries, boys’ enrollment is approximately twenty percent higher than girls’ (see figure 3)[1]. Additionally, while providing decent work opportunities for youth is listed as one of the development goals of the Millennium Development Goals project (MDG), achieving universal primary education has a deadline for completion of 2015. Often, these two ambitions are in competition due to limited funding.

Once children reach adolescence they are frequently required to aid in household chores, generate income and care for younger siblings. They are rarely given a voice in community decisions or in choices affecting their well-being such as whether to go to school, ways to generate income or whether to marry. Essentially, young people aged 12-24 have few positive roles within most refugee communities and very limited constructive outlets through which they
are able to develop into productive, healthy members of society, prepared to aid in the rebuilding of a community in exile. Neglect of this age group compounds their already vulnerable position and leaves them open for recruitment into military service, prostitution, or young marriage. On a community level, lack of opportunity for youth hampers reconstruction efforts and increases the likelihood of a return to conflict as economic growth remains stagnant (Lowicki, 2000). In order to prevent this from occurring, humanitarian agencies need to work together to provide educational programs that will allow youth to have a constructive role in the community.

The first part of this paper discusses the unique challenges and demands faced by youth in refugee and IDP situations, illuminating consequences for failure as well as the need for meaningful action. The second section examines the barriers to access faced in promoting educational opportunities for adolescents. The final segment looks at the work of Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and the Refugee Educational Trust (RET) in order to gain awareness of the different approaches to youth education.

**Methodology**

This study employs several methods to understand the factors that limit adolescent access to education in refugee and IDP situations, as well as the ramifications of these barriers to access both for the individual and the community. Research of secondary sources has been done to understand competing viewpoints of education in these circumstances, as well as the projects currently being supported by various organizations. Five phone interviews with international Non Governmental Organization (NGO) staff were conducted to gain a deeper understanding of different agencies’ perspectives on education and to be able to compare the different approaches being used to address this crisis.
Unique Challenges for Adolescents

While young children have a higher incidence of mortality than adolescents, there are many problems that youth experience at much higher rates than younger children. Adolescents are more likely than young children to be recruited into military service and to engage in armed conflict. There are more than 300,000 child soldiers active in the world today (Singer, 2005). Children who are separated from some or all of their family are more likely to be enlisted into the army because of the support and protection it can provide. Faulkner (2001) explains that this protection is often simply the lesser of two evils and the resulting trauma is difficult to recover from.

However, given the exigencies of warfare, this role will be characterized by violence, brutality, deprivation, death, sexual exploitation and callous indifference to others. The end product is a person capable of gratuitous acts of barbarity, often perpetrated with some enthusiasm, who is bereft of normal character traits and who when peace or demobilization takes effect, is difficult to rehabilitate to requirements of normal life. (p. 495)

Once children are removed from armed conflict, if given proper treatment through psychosocial activities and educational development, they are often able to reintegrate into the community and can contribute to the peace-building process by utilizing their skills and knowledge and applying them to civilian life (Kemper, 2005).

Because adolescents are out of school, and lack other educational opportunities, they are often economically exploited and required to work in dangerous conditions or forced into prostitution. Furthermore, adolescent girls are more likely than younger children to be sexually abused or kidnapped for sexual slavery, which in turn increases the likelihood of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. Potential contraction of the disease is tragic, not only on an individual level, but also as an extremely destructive force within the community as a whole (Lowicki, 2000).

Barriers to Access

Generally refugees are begrudgingly accepted into host countries where their status is considered temporary until the situation stabilizes in their home countries and they are able to return safely. For this reason host countries are reluctant to provide services that are seen as non-essential. Because the CRC defines basic education as a human right to which all children are entitled, international agencies are able to exert pressure to provide these services, specifically because nearly every country in the United Nations (UN) has ratified the CRC. However, once a young person has progressed beyond basic primary education, few opportunities exist for higher-level training. In 2000, only 3
percent of refugees in developing countries attended school beyond the primary stage (RET, 2000).

Once funds are allocated for youth education, agencies must decide which skills and information receive priority. According to UNESCO, the major educational categories are: emergency information such as landmine awareness and cholera, health practices, reproductive health, peace education, vocational education and literacy and numeracy (Aguilar & Retamal, 1998). Specifically heated is the debate regarding whether education should be based in a traditional literacy and numeracy curriculum or if it should have a vocational focus. For example, a major criticism of Bantu education in South Africa was specifically that it trained indigenous Africans only for physical labor. Conversely, in a refugee or IDP community, income generating skills are often requested in lieu of traditional curriculum. When asked about this debate Jane Lowicki, former Youth Protection and Development Advisor of the IRC, replied:

Listen to the youth and guide them. There are a range of opportunities, not just one; literacy and numeracy are cross-cutting. If you look at the research, the vast majority [of adolescents] hasn’t finished primary school and probably never will. The younger ones are particularly interested in finishing primary; older youth are more concerned about jobs than education....Part and parcel of vocational must be literacy and numeracy. Conversely, literacy and numeracy need to be applicable. Kids do not learn inside a box. (personal communication, April 8, 2005)

Lowicki explains that economic development is a key issue in vocational education. For example, the camps on the Thai-Burma border have created a phenomenon that has come to be called “warehouse refugees.” These are refugees that are not able to use the skills they have been trained in, or who are not able to advance in their education (Lowicki, personal communication, April 8, 2005). This also occurred in Sierra Leone when UNICEF allowed youth to select apprenticeships. UNICEF did not conduct a labor market survey beforehand, and youth selected training, such as auto-mechanics, for fields with no demand (Kemper, 2005).

Ann Avery, the Education Research and Development Manager of the RET, explains that the focus of education in refugee camps is often linked to the needs of the donor, especially when the donor is from the private sector. For example, in Azerbaijan private industries are interested in mining for oil, and this creates a need for skilled construction workers. For this reason they will fund a training program to teach people construction skills (personal communication April 14, 2005).

The implication of this practice on a global scale certainly awards private commerce a powerful hand in shaping the future. Alternatively, when funding comes from governments or intergovernmental agencies, the primary factor that
determines which direction education programs will take relies heavily on what the country of origin requests.

According to Avery, traditional views of education need to be re-examined: “The days of general education to prepare people for civil servant positions are out. In Burundi, education is geared to civil service and there are no jobs in civil service; start with the skills needed” (personal communication, April 14, 2005). Avery, like Lowicki, warns against training students in vocational skills that will not be immediately useful. She suggests that in situations where no particular trade is in demand, activities should be geared towards general skills that will be applicable in any vocation such as language skills, math, and reading.

Other experts in the field support Avery’s view that skills training and employment opportunity are the keys to stabilizing war torn countries. The World Bank partnered with the UN and the International Labor Organization (ILO) to form the Youth Employment Network (YEN), whose purpose was to partner with young people throughout the world to solve the unemployment crisis facing countries today. Eleven countries have volunteered to lead the project: Azerbaijan, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Sri Lanka. Specifically, YEN has four objectives: employability, entrepreneurship, equal opportunity and employment generating macro-economic policies (YEN, 2002). These objectives were created to fulfill the MDGs, “in cooperation with the developing countries, [to] develop decent and productive work for youth” (UN, 2000).

Yet competing MDGs may add another barrier to access for adolescent education. In addition to its goal of providing youth with meaningful employment opportunities, the UN has declared that by 2015 it will achieve universal primary education. However, due to scarce funding, often a choice must be made between providing primary education and developing prospects for youth. Perhaps because primary education has a clearly defined timeframe, and youth opportunity does not, significantly more funding goes towards primary-age children. Advocates for adolescents are quick to note that with proper training, youth can be a valuable resource that would aid in the economic growth of the region, indirectly funding their own education (Kemper, 2005).

In order to understand the significance of engaging youth in post-conflict development, consider that there are 1.1 billion people between the ages of 15-24 in the world. The unemployment rate for this population is 14.4 percent as compared to 6.2 percent globally (YEN, 2004) [2]. A study completed by the Institute for Security Studies showed that:

Youth’s violent behavior is partly a reaction to the state’s neglect for their concerns, foremost in education and employment, and the consequential inequality and intergenerational conflicts on a societal level. Heightened levels
of criminal activity circuitously weaken the governments’ ability to offer education and employment even more. (as cited in McIntyre & Weiss, 2003)

McIntyre and Weiss argue that one’s ability to contribute to the economic stability of the family is seen as an important development stage in most cultures. They assert that without legal resources, adolescents will resort to crime and fighting because it provides earnings, an occupation and recognition. In order to prevent the growing number of child soldiers and criminally active child arms traders, they conclude that we must create a “safe space” for youth, “…meaning an increase of alternatives in employment and ‘diversion’ to what the military has to offer” (McIntyre & Weiss, 2003).

Ultimately, the point of disagreement that exists between these two camps is not whether vocational training is useful, but what kinds of vocational skills are needed to promote post-conflict stability. All parties interviewed for this paper support educational activities that encourage youth to use their skills immediately in ways that benefit the community and generate income. Yet some argue that skills such as tailoring, machine repair, and construction are often inappropriate to the needs of the community (Lowicki, personal communication, April 8, 2005). Students who have made the effort to obtain these skills are frustrated by the lack of employment available. Also, if their education is solely in vocational training they may lack cognitive conflict resolution skills, which may further the chance of conflict reemergence (Kemper, 2005).

Discussion
Numerous international humanitarian agencies work in conflict-affected areas across the globe. Three agencies with significant experience working with youth are the IRC, JRS and the RET. Their different approaches to this work provide insights into promising practices.

In its Democratic Republic of Congo division IRC manages 15 non-formal schools and organizes activities for over 5,000 refugee and local children throughout Betou. Its Rwanda unit does not have an education program, but instead uses its energy and funding to work towards family reunification. In Rwanda an estimated 450,000 children were separated, many of whom were orphaned, from their families during the 1994 genocide and the refugee crisis that followed. Although many children have been reunited with their families or reintegrated into the community, an estimated 3,000 children remain at centers, and approximately 5,000 to 7,000 adolescents and children live on the streets. To ameliorate this condition the IRC created the Vulnerable Children Program to target separated children currently living in centers and on the streets in an effort to bring them back home.

Similarly, JRS’ areas of work are in the fields of education, advocacy, emergency assistance, health and nutrition, income generating activities and
social services. In Nimule, Sudan, JRS supports education for IDPs by supplying textbooks and stationery, teacher training, incentives for teachers and support for maintenance and construction of school buildings. In 2003, as a result of these efforts, 5,735 pupils in 14 primary schools received scholastic material, 838 secondary school students received assistance, 688 people enrolled in adult literacy classes and 77 for skills training. Additionally, scholastic materials were provided for 688 learners in 12 adult literacy centers (JRS, 2003). The primary schools are open to primary-age children and youth.

When asked why JRS decided to allocate funds for secondary education rather than increase primary enrollment, Roxanne Schares, the Educational Resource for Africa through JRS, answered, “Education is more than primary level. In refugee camps primary education has funding through UNHCR. It is always the first to be provided for but secondary is not always provided. If it is not available, JRS will identify that need and provide the service” (personal communication, April 14, 2005).

Schares explains that in order to improve the educational opportunities for youth, sensitization and advocacy is required to convince governments, donors and families of the value of education to rebuild infrastructure and educational systems. Teachers need to be trained and work needs to be done to stem the tide of instructors out of camps and into more lucrative positions once they have received training. Finally, alternative forms of education need to be developed that include adult and youth literacy, accelerated learning programs and skills training (personal communication, April 14, 2005).

When asked if the education gap had created a “lost generation” Schares responded, “Several generations have been lost, but others can still benefit. For those who may seem lost, ‘education is not just for the young’ needs to be promoted in communities, and advocated for among governments, NGOs and other groups” (personal communication April 14, 2005). Jane Lowicki also commented:

[To quote] Neil Boothby, ‘I’ve never seen a lost generation.’ It is true that many will be killed, but a generation is never entirely ‘lost.’...I don’t want to give up on the ability of coping skills to overcome... but it is true that there is a cycle of deprivation if you keep ignoring groups in need. (personal communication, April 10, 2005)

Sadako Ogata said of the founding of the RET, “Post-Primary Education should be a promise, not a dream.” (RET, n.d.) The mission of RET is to facilitate and promote international cooperation in post-primary education for refugee youth. This works toward the goal of advancing human dignity, achievement and self-reliance. Finally, RET serves as a resource and advocate for innovative approaches in post-primary education for refugee youth. RET is unique in that it only works with adolescent populations. Ann Avery explains RET’s position in
comparison to other organizations in the following way:

There are so many organizations that have refugee education as a small part of their overall work and within that, concern for the youth and adolescents is an even smaller part of that small part; whereas our focus is only on that part, which is terribly neglected. (personal communication, April 14, 2005)

Educational work for youth, she stresses, must start from day one, because it is fundamental to everything else. Youth empowerment and education enables NGOs to meet the minimum standard of utilizing community participation to rebuild.

A good argument for early intervention in education for youth and adolescents is that youth are such terrific resources. They are the best potential human resource in the camp; they have more energy, more spirit, rebellion (this can often be a problem) but as a resource, they need to be put to work for the well-being of the community. It is just a waste not to put education at the beginning. (personal communication, April 14, 2005)

Avery highlights that throughout a conflict there are multiple partners involved. Each actor has a part to play in efforts to stabilize the situation and every organization must work together to provide not only the life-saving tools needed, but also the life-sustaining.

**Conclusion**

The importance of adolescent involvement and leadership in refugee, IDP and reconstruction efforts has gained more international attention in the last several years than ever before. This is due in part to the increased awareness of education overall such as that which is outlined in the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, the evidence of inaction such as that which was gruesomely demonstrated in the violent acts performed by young militants such as the Interhamwe militia in Rwanda, and the dramatic rise of child soldiers globally, articulates the need for educational opportunities for youth. In places where education goals have been realized, youth play a key role in the development of the community. For example, in Sierra Leone teenagers were trained in carpentry, tailoring, baking and confidence-building skills, which gave them an alternative to combat and the diamond mines (Sessan, et al., 2004).

In the politics of education the content of refugee and IDP curriculum is often determined by the motives of the donors. In some cases, funding will be given to meet the education requirements of the home country. In others, training is shaped to meet a specific need of the donor such as the construction program in Azerbaijan. Among the international NGO representatives interviewed for this paper, however, there is a consensus that education should not be either entirely vocational or entirely literacy and numeracy based, but that the skills taught must be applicable to the environment. Prior to investing time,
energy and valuable funding into an education project, significant research must be conducted to define the needs of the community and ensure the viability of the skills. This training should be fluid enough to adjust to shifting demands of the population to avoid market saturation. Yet the goal of education should never be to simply meet the ever-expanding needs of multinational corporations but to inspire belief in a peaceful future and each individual’s potential for a quality life.

Notes
1. Figure 3 was provided by the Women’s Commission “Global Survey on Education in Emergencies.” The data was compiled from more than 500 projects in 113 countries supported by 160 organizations and governments.

2. The International Labour Organization said the following in regard to a universal minimum legal working age:

   To achieve the effective abolition of child labour, governments should fix and enforce a minimum age or ages at which children can enter into different kinds of work. Within limits, these ages may vary according to national social and economic circumstances. The general minimum age for admission to employment should not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and never be less than 15 years. But developing countries may make certain exceptions to this, and a minimum age of 14 years may be applied where the economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed. Sometimes, light work may be performed by children two years younger than the general minimum age. (Effective Abolition of Child Labour, n.d.)

References


Addressing the Needs of Refugee Students in NYC Public Schools

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Introduction
Although many scholars would be inclined to associate emergency education with regions of the world involved in conflict or post-conflict reconstruction, or with developing nations in extreme impoverishment, the concept of “education in emergencies” can also apply to developed industrialized nations that have not experienced a collapse in their educational and political systems. For many years, flows of refugees and asylum seekers have entered the United States, as well as many other countries, to escape danger and persecution in their home countries. Refugee populations not only include adults, but also children and adolescents who, once resettled in the United States, are entitled to receive an equitable and adequate education. Due to the exigency of the migration, as well as the trauma and hardships refugee children experience, educating this group assumes a level of urgency usually associated with conflict-affected countries.

To serve the needs of refugee students in the United States, policies exist to establish guidelines for educational entitlement and services. After careful review of the available information regarding these rights and services, it appears that refugees are frequently categorized with other immigrant children, regardless of their background or reasons for immigration (Mayor’s Department of Immigrant Affairs, 2005). This policy gap in distinguishing refugee youth from other immigrant children begs the question: are these students’ needs served within U.S. public schools? In a city like New York, with a large population of immigrant children, are administrators and educators provided with the necessary tools to recognize and understand resettled refugees and their specific educational needs? This paper provides a theoretical framework of categorical issues that refugee youth face upon resettlement, as well as best practices to aid in their adjustment. Findings based on interviews with several principals in New York City (NYC) public schools demonstrate that refugee youth are indeed grouped with immigrant students as a whole and the onus of finding information and resources to provide both basic needs, as well as psychosocial support, is left to schools on a case-by-case basis.
The Psychological and Social Implications of Resettlement

Various case studies have been executed with different refugee youth populations, both in school and via informal education, throughout the United States. Marcelo Suárez-Orozco (1989) looked at Central American refugees through an ethnographic study and notes that the many stresses endured by the population include, but are not limited to, working in addition to school and having traumatic memories from their home countries. In a later study by Suárez-Orozco (2001), the author points out that:

Typically, those seeking asylum cannot carefully plan their move in the way that most immigrants do. Often, when the threats become imminent, families must make the move at once. Elaborate preparations, including the psychologically critical work of imagining life in the new country, are impossible. (p. 27)

Refugees are not a completely homogeneous group, because different countries have experienced various levels of conflict, political and economic strife, and refugees come from different class backgrounds with varying levels of education (Yule, 1998). Similarly, the psychological and emotional state of children depends on the amount of involvement in or witnessed violence, as well as the age of the child when these events unfold or when resettlement occurs; other influential variables include the level of family support and community make-up in the arrival country (Huyck & Fields, 1981). Despite variability between refugee experiences, many of the educational, social, mental health and basic needs of refugee youth overlap and have been explored in the literature.

Jill Rutter (1994) has conducted extensive research on resettled refugee children residing in Britain. The issues faced by refugee youth can be diverse but she cites the following list of common problems experienced by students, based on information from the Refugee Council: obstacles in finding a school to attend, schools’ failure to accept documentation, issues adjusting to a new school, educational problems caused by the home environment, withdrawn and aggressive behavior, inability to concentrate, racist bullying by other students, feeling that teachers have preconceived notions regarding the students and lack of language support (Rutter, 1994). This list, though general, provides insight into the broad categories of difficulties refugee youth may face. In his research on immigration and education, Stewart (1993) argues that refugee youth commonly begin their education in the United States at a disadvantage to a typical immigrant.

Most of them do not have prior ties to this country and are less likely to have skills that are transferable. Furthermore, refugees are not as apt to have a well-established community of compatriots in the United States, nor are they able to maintain economic or social ties with their home country. (Stewart, 1993, p. 51)
Circumstances such as death, visa complications, arrests and detentions may also cause refugee children to immigrate unaccompanied or to live with relatives or family friends instead of their parents (Stewart, 1993).

A plethora of literature exists regarding refugee youth, but much of information is directed toward issues regarding general immigrant populations. However, Athey and Ahearn (1991) discuss some of the underlying aspects of young refugees’ mental health. More specifically they state that three defining characteristics of refugee experiences are trauma, loss and deprivation. Athey and Ahearn (1991) explore each of these aspects, but the issue of loss is particularly significant – loss of home, community, security, loss by death, separation, etc. They point out that young refugees’ social networks may be weak because of community loss, but also due to the fact that their parents have had similar experiences and may be psychologically vulnerable themselves.

Yule (1998) also addresses the mental stresses of children surviving disaster or trauma with regard to the experience of refugee children. Some of the common problems include a new “sense of a foreshorted future,” where the child finds no motivation in planning ahead because of feelings of uncertainty (Yule, 1998, p. 79). Refugee youth may also feel distrust for adults or authority in their new environment and feel conflicted about sharing their personal history. Refugee children sometimes manifest anger management issues, sometimes resulting in disruptive behavior (Yule, 1998).

Athey and Ahearn (1991) conclude that policies and programs should emphasize rebuilding community and school networks to help refugee children cope in their new environment. They deduce that settlement programs often make the same mistakes by not taking advice from mental health professionals and often weaken social support by scattering refugees in different areas, rather than maintaining a network. It is imperative, in the case of children, to maintain a connection with language and culture to alleviate the uprooting of the child (Athey & Ahearn, 1991). Scheinfeld and Wallach (1997) speak particularly to the needs of families and propose four educational programs to ease the transition of refugees resettling in schools including: child-parent preschool classes, after-school homework classes, a family service component and language instruction for parents. Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care (UNHCR, 1994) reiterates some of the same suggestions, such as the promotion of community participation, seeking expert advice from colleagues and authorities on the issue, teacher training and parents’ committees.

Methodology
Data collection was focused on gaining the perspectives of administrators in New York City public schools. Rather than concentrating on policymakers, it is useful to gain the insight of administrators who may need information about refugee students in order to ascertain if they are receiving the appropriate
Addressing the Needs of Refugee Students in NYC Public Schools

Interviews were conducted with four principals in New York City public schools, with large immigrant populations thought to include refugee students. Three of the four principals are members of the Cahn Fellows Program for Distinguished New York City Principals and were chosen for this study because of their leadership abilities and successful performance as administrators. It was presumed that, as leaders in their field, these principals would be well connected to their student population as well as city resources. Two principals were interviewed in person and two via telephone communication. All subjects are kept anonymous due to the sensitivity of the subject. The sample is somewhat small because of limited accessibility of administrators, but the emerging themes from interviews provide valuable insight for future studies. It is important to note that these findings are based on this sample of principals’ perceptions and are not grounded in a systemic analysis that further studies of the topic might hope to accomplish.

Refugees in New York City

For each fiscal year, the United States government establishes Refugee Admissions Ceilings to enumerate how many people, by area of the world, are granted approval for refugee status in the U.S. In the year 2004, the total number of refugees allowed admittance into the United States was 70,000, but the total number actually admitted was 52,868 (U.S. Department of State, 2004). While this is only a fraction of the total immigrant flow into the United States, it is still a significant amount of people, especially in light of the fact that the number of refugees allowed for admittance into the U.S. decreased after 9/11 but is now rising to be almost comparable to pre-9/11 ceilings (U.S. Department of State, 2004). These numbers demonstrate that although the refugee population is small compared to the total population of the United States, resettled refugees are still large in numbers and proper attention must be given to refugee needs. However, because refugees represent a smaller portion of immigration in general, they are often grouped together with other immigrants, and as a result their unique experiences are not addressed.

Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) established education as a universal human right (UNHCHR, 1989). The CRC becomes specifically vital for refugees when looked at in conjunction with the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees, which declares that education should be provided for by the host government (UNHCHR, 1951). The UNHCR outlines necessary features of education for refugee children in light of these responsibilities. Although it is not specified, the document does not appear to be written with resettlement in mind; but many of the same issues can be considered when thinking about refugee children in U.S. public schools. For example, the UNHCR stresses that education provides continuity for children, especially when their lives have been greatly disrupted. The authors stress many aspects, but what is important in light of this research is the emphasis on teacher training (UNHCHR, 1994). While it may not be possible to have refugee teachers
in cases of resettlement, needs of children would be better addressed by having some background knowledge of experiences of the child.

Unlike countries with more comprehensive social welfare systems, such as France or Sweden, the United States relies on the educational system to be the main provider of services for children, extending beyond classroom teaching. Therefore, great pressure is put on schools to address not only educational needs, which are especially diverse in urban areas, but also children’s nutrition, housing, psychosocial well-being, as well as other welfare gaps (Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003). These responsibilities are especially salient in the context of refugee students, who are not only adjusting to a new culture but are likely to have additional stress due to the conditions in their home country. Given this situation, it is likely that schools with refugee populations are responsible for providing greater academic requirements as well as broader psychosocial and basic needs.

After careful exploration of the New York City Department of Education (DOE) website, it is clear that refugees get little recognition as a distinct subgroup of the larger immigrant population, via the statistical population information or with regard to resources available for incoming students. Some schools with a focus on recruitment of international and refugee students have emerged throughout the city in recent years, but the vast majority of information provided by the DOE makes no distinction between these two groups (Department of Education, 2005). Support and programs provided by other organizations, such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in New York City, demonstrate that refugee youth may require additional services to make resettlement a smooth transition or to supplement academic gaps where education may have been disrupted (International Rescue Committee, 2004). However, the DOE provides no data regarding the refugee population attending public schools. Aggregated data, or School Report Cards provided by individual districts, simply show the enrollment of recent immigrants, “recent” meaning within the last three years, as a percent of total enrollment. Data collected per school in each region demonstrate the same enrollment figures but breaks the population down further by place of birth. In the current study, the researcher confirmed with an employee at the DOE that the numbers of refugee students are not calculated (Department of Education, 2005).

The Office of the Mayor, which does contain an Office for Immigrant Affairs as well as an Office for Human Rights, also excludes numbers for refugee students or refugees as a population in New York City. The Mayor’s Office for Immigrant Affairs website, lists services for immigrants with a link to information on public schools but no special services are provided specifically for refugees. The focus for public schools is on issues relating to English Language Learners without concentrating on other assistance that could be necessary for refugees. The reason for the omission of tracking statistics and resources for refugees is unclear but possibilities might include that the office is
not equipped to track such specific populations or perhaps that this issue is still fairly new and has yet to be addressed.

Terminology: Refugee or Immigrant
Several significant findings regarding the issues faced by refugee students in New York City public schools and frameworks for assistance emerged from the interviews conducted with principals. The first finding is that, in general, the principals interviewed did not distinguish resettled refugee youth from the general population of immigrant children in their schools. Prior disclosure to schools of the immigration status of a student is not required for admittance in order to protect the rights of children who may be undocumented. Regardless of the lack of categorization of a student as “refugee,” the principals expressed that they are generally aware of incoming students’ home countries, when they immigrated, as well as their domestic situation, particularly because they are often charged with helping to set up medical insurance and other basic needs.

Despite little use of the term refugee, the principals articulated their understanding of students who may be entering school with greater needs than other immigrant students. Those with the greatest need for services are not always refugees but also come from economically disadvantaged countries or areas that are politically unstable; such countries still allow citizens to leave without seeking asylum. One principal opined, in her school the students with the greatest needs come from Mexico, Central America, Turkey, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Countries of origin for students with greater needs change from school to school based on the differing demographics of neighborhoods throughout the city. However, the observation shows that not all students come from refugee producing areas. A number of countries are near to or directly involved in conflict and some have unstable economies or political systems, while others are coping with a combination of these burdens. Although the principals interviewed do not, in practice, differentiate between refugees and immigrants in general, there was a general understanding of the definition of a “refugee.” Principals were able to discuss the issues they face based on this operational understanding, as well as differentiation of home country circumstances as previously discussed.

Behavior and Motivation
Another theme that surfaced from our conversations was the behavior of refugee students who may come from countries currently engaged in conflict or post-conflict reconstruction. Principals acknowledged that anger management issues sometimes arise among students who have had a difficult past in their home country. However, it was also expressed that problems can also manifest themselves in reverse:

And sometimes the opposite of anger management, they’re very withdrawn, very depressed. They don’t interact with children their own age; they won’t get
involved in any of the social activities like play during recess time. You get the other extreme as well. (Anonymous principal, personal communication, April 11, 2005)

The interviewed principals echoed instances, similar to the literature, where refugee students are more distrusting of adults. In all scenarios, principals are charged with making the decision about how to resolve the extreme behavior of the student and almost all of the principals communicated similar means of help, varying slightly between high school and elementary school levels. Proposed remedies in the researched high schools included sessions with a school guidance counselor, mentoring or working one-on-one. In one school a special elective class is held for students who have experienced disruption in their education. Elementary level methods included group counseling and play therapy, and one elementary school principal articulated, “What we feel is more important is getting them to begin to behave like children,” because their past experiences have not allowed them such a right (Anonymous principal, personal communication, April 12, 2005).

Discussion of motivation among refugee students was similar to thoughts on behavior and anger management. Academic motivation in the four schools differs between refugees, and while some students take longer to adjust to their new school system, other refugee pupils were thought to experience “the opposite where the academics is the only thing the children have, so doing well in school is the only positive thing they have in life, so they over-excel” (Anonymous principal, personal communication, April 12, 2005). Two of the principals were of the mindset that both academic and behavior issues experienced by refugees were similar to other immigrant groups, as well as non-immigrants of lower socio-economic status. Additionally, some of the administrators spoke about refugees immigrating unaccompanied by parents to live with a relative or guardian. In these situations, the administrators felt that familial networks are one of, if not the most, influential factors in determining the academic success and social adjustment of the student.

Administrative Resources
When asked about support networks available to aid refugees and immigrant students, the four principals stated that they, as administrators, must independently seek out resources and partnerships for their own schools. As one principal expressed:

We don’t get any support. Whatever an individual school will do in terms of outreach for the children or family, there is no support from anybody. If you’re talking about the DOE, there isn’t any; from the region, there isn’t any. I mean, you have to have your own resources in terms of knowing what to do and how to go about getting it. (Anonymous principal, personal communication, April 12, 2005)
Additionally, the needs of students go far beyond providing academic support. Although one principal expressed that her focus is on the academics and other needs are addressed by outside non-profits or organizations, she alluded to the fact that she and other administrators in the school had helped to set up many of the existing partnerships. Additional principals communicated that for refugees with the most needs, they had to focus on fulfilling basic needs before anything else. One principal opined:

They need to get clothes or food first, and then after you take care of those needs, or even school supplies, then you can begin to taking care of some of the other needs that they have when they come to school. Medical attention is usually the biggest concern or the biggest issue for these children. (Anonymous principal, personal communication, April 12, 2005)

Overall, the principals expressed knowledge of their students who have immigrated in extreme circumstances, often in clusters, based on the political climate of regions in the world. In general, they articulated providing support and networks for children from all backgrounds, based on the connections principals set up independently.

**Serving the Needs of Refugee Students**

Although all interviews indicate a level of “emergency” pertaining to education in New York City public schools, it appears that this urgency may not only apply to the needs of refugees. The interviews suggest that the distinguishing line between refugees and immigrants as a whole is porous. The four principals generally do not categorize their students based on the term “refugee,” regardless of their knowledge of the student’s immigration status; the principals’ main goal is to truly understand the needs of each student, both academic and other. Despite the lexical oversight of the term refugee, these principals are aware that within the larger group of recently immigrated students are other clusters of immigrants who face greater challenges, based on their background in their home country. These students are not necessarily entering as asylum seekers, but may simply come from countries with fewer resources, such as Mexico, or may enter the United States unaccompanied with weak social networks. Neither refugees nor immigrants as a whole are homogeneous groups, but as previously mentioned, there are overlapping issues, with important psychosocial implications that must be identified and supported with appropriate resources and best practices. Additionally, students who immigrate from conflicted areas, as opposed to economic refugees, may have a different set of issues. Therefore, perhaps the most important goal is not to single-out refugee students, but instead, to identify those immigrant and refugee clusters of students with similar needs and to create new or expand on existing general resource networks, like the DOE Youth and Family Support Services (Department of Education, 2005). Perhaps an increase in resources, and efforts to
make them more specific, could alleviate some of the burden of schools acting as the major social welfare state.

Regardless of categorization, it is clear that administrators bare a large responsibility in the provision of academic and basic needs and psychosocial support for refugee and “refugee-like” students. Administrators seem to recognize that these groups enter school with a greater set of issues than a typical student and rely upon school personnel to provide appropriate resources. Schools are often a refugee or immigrant students’ first real interaction with their new country, even if their passage was sponsored by an outside organization. The principals’ responses support the literature in stating that refugees and other groups of immigrants must culturally adjust to many added stresses. Principals’ practices to alleviate such burdens include examples such as extra classes, group counseling, mentor programs and community involvement, parallel best practices mentioned in the literature. However, the adoption of these practices evolved via the choices of administrators who admitted that they lacked outside support in these areas.

Overall, it appeared as though the principals interviewed had an understanding of the issues faced by both the immigrant student population as a whole, as well as the additional issues of refugees, as framed by the literature. Due to the nature of United States schools functioning as a larger network for social welfare, it is imperative for principals to holistically understand students’ backgrounds, because the provision of basic needs and psychosocial support can be a prerequisite to their ultimate academic goals. The issue that terminology is missing to categorize refugees is not necessarily the main problem for lacking resources in New York City public schools for this population, but it is a strong indicator that administrators are not given the necessary support to serve such a population. Perhaps it is not as important to label students as refugees, but interviews certainly revealed that a subpopulation of high-risk immigrants with greater needs – basic, psychosocial, academic, etc. – are underserved because they are not identified by larger governmental institutions. Consequently principals are responsible for finding networks and resources to help students and their families. Although the principals interviewed should be commended for their efforts, many wish for additional support in this area. It should also be kept in mind that the principals in this study have many years of experience and are identified leaders in their field. Newer principals would most likely need additional support.

**Concluding Remarks**

Studying the needs of refugee students and other immigrant populations, in NYC public schools and other parts of the U.S., is crucial to providing the rights promised for education, as set forth by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1951 Geneva Convention. Because U.S. public schools function as a social welfare system, especially in urban areas like NYC, often providing for
basic and psychosocial needs directly, or referring students and families to organizations who can help, it is imperative that policymakers recognize students with greater needs. Just as it is important for principals to be in touch with their students’ backgrounds, so too should the government be in sync with the subcategories of populations within the school system. The provision of equal education for refugees resettling in the United States may not constitute “education in emergencies” in the traditional definition, but it is an “emergency” in the sense that this group’s needs should be met, and the failure to do so is a violation of their rights.

Refugee quota ceilings set by the United States government receded immediately following the tragedies of 9/11, but are once again rising to pre-9/11 numbers. Higher levels of refugees inevitably translate to greater numbers of refugee students in public schools, and as wars involve children more and more, this issue becomes increasingly urgent (Machel, 2001). Addressing the needs of refugee students is by no means exhausted in this study, which has limited generalizability based on sample size, but reiterates the fact that we must draw on the literature as well as the knowledge of those in the field, like teachers and administrators, to meaningfully understand the categorical needs of refugees and “refugee-like” students. Only then can we begin to build appropriate networks and provide resources to alleviate the responsibilities of schools and truly meet the needs of immigrating students.

Notes

1. The terms “emergency education” and “education in emergencies” have, in the past, been used interchangeably in literature. However, the term “education in emergencies” now most commonly refers to supplying education during conflict or reconstruction wherein there has been a serious collapse in the previous education system. I refer to the field to bring to light gaps that may exist for refugees resettling in a stable education system that is ill-equipped to handle their needs.

2. The 1951 Geneva Convention officially defined a refugee as being someone who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (OHCHR, 1951).

3. For more information on the Cahn Fellows Program, go to www.cahnfellows.org.
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Examining the Impact of Illicit Crop Eradication on Education in Colombia

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Introduction
Aerial fumigation as a method of illicit crop eradication began in Colombia in 2000 under Plan Colombia. While the practice has been criticized for being ineffective at reducing the production of coca, fumigation continues to date in Colombia, exacerbating poverty, intensifying civil conflict, damaging licit crops, spurring internal displacement, and harming the health of children. Eradication efforts in Colombia are directly and indirectly related to internal displacement, a phenomenon that overwhelmingly affects children. Although existing literature on fumigation focuses on its detrimental impact on the health of children, it fails to link children’s health and nutritional status to educational achievement. While this study abstains from making policy recommendations concerning illicit crop eradication, it does add fuel to the debate centering around illicit crop eradication by demonstrating how fumigation efforts negatively impact education in Colombia. In particular, this paper highlights the difficulty internally displaced persons (IDPs) have in accessing the educational system and the link between the reported health effects caused by fumigation and educational achievement.

The Debate and Parameters for Illicit Crop Eradication
The centerpiece of the supply-side campaign in the “war on drugs” is illicit crop eradication, the process of destroying opium poppy, coca bush, and cannabis plant. Illicit crop eradication is a contested issue. The principal proponents of eradication are the United Nations (UN) and the United States. The UN provides the current legislative parameters for the eradication of illicit crops; while the 1998 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances excuses the legal cultivation of all three crops for scientific and medicinal purposes, the convention prohibits all other cultivation and states that

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1 In the course of displacement, children often become separated from their communities and families, making them more vulnerable to physical attack, sexual abuse, forced recruitment and enslavement. Internally displaced children are typically at greater risk of malnutrition and disease, while almost inevitably suffering acute psychological trauma (Deng, 2000).
illicit crops shall be eradicated and removed. The UN also notes that all measures adopted for eradication shall respect fundamental human rights (Farrell, 1998).

The UN recognizes the ramifications of illicit crop eradication in terms of the loss of livelihood of subsistence farmers and has, therefore, implemented alternative development programs: a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustainable development (UNODC, 2004). The UN argues that most of the estimated four million people who depend on income derived from the cultivation of illicit crops, and often live below the poverty level, would “gladly switch to other sources of income” if given suitable alternatives (UNODC, 2004).

Opponents of illicit crop eradication claim that this method of drug control is ineffective at reducing supply. James Farrell (1998) concludes the following:

A range of obstacles obstruct the implementation of eradication, including popular opinion and public demonstrations, corruption, and sabotage. Where eradication is implemented, farmers adopt a range of adaptive responses to minimize the impact... The most notable adaptive response is relocation and the new planting of crops. (p. 1)

Opponents also argue that forced eradication increases internal conflict and hostility towards government actors. For example, in early 2003 Bolivian coca farmers operating in tight-knit syndicates brought the government to its knees by blockading the nation’s most important highway and by defending their coca fields with dynamite, booby traps, and rifles (Reed, 2003).

Finally, observers claim that eradication efforts impel internal displacement and create grave humanitarian crises. For example, the article “One Last Harvest” (2005) published in The Economist magazine describes the consequences of eradication in the Kokang Special Region No. 1 in Burma (Myanmar). When opium cultivation was banned there in 2003, one-third of the population (an estimated 60,000 people) left their homes in search of money and food. Health clinics closed down, school enrollment plummeted by 50 percent and parents reportedly sent their daughters to brothels in Thailand and their sons to join rebel armies (“One Last Harvest,” 2005).

Methodology
Due to the controversy surrounding eradication, various non-governmental organizations, government bodies, and international agencies have written extensively on either the benefits of eradication or on eradication’s negative humanitarian consequences. The methodology used to examine the impact of
illicit crop eradication on education, an underrepresented sub-topic, includes secondary analysis of available literature on illicit crop eradication. Secondary analysis of the literature allows for the triangulation of both sides of data.

**Background on Colombia’s Civil Conflict and Illicit Crop Eradication Efforts**

The current armed conflict in Colombia is complex. The Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC) is Colombia’s oldest and largest leftist guerrilla group (Bouvier, 2004). As the FARC gained strength in rural Colombia, they began to demand “revolutionary taxes” from landowners (Crandall, 1999). Many involved in the drug business began buying up land in rural areas in the 1980s. Wars erupted when narco-landowners began recruiting paramilitaries to rid the areas of guerrilla influence. The landowners have and continue to use their paramilitary groups to expel communities from areas where landowners would like to graze cattle or expand crop plantation (Crandall, 1999). These private paramilitary groups, which, according to Human Rights Watch (“Paramilitary groups,” 2004), “have a long and horrific history of abuses against civilians,” often receive tacit or overt support from the Colombian military. Crandall (1999) notes that many Colombians consider eradication efforts dubious partly because farmers who see their livelihoods destroyed often become willing recruits for both the guerrilla and paramilitary forces.

*Plan Colombia,* a controversial $7.5 billion dollar Colombian initiative in operation since 2000, outlines the reduction of the production and distribution of coca, with a heavy emphasis on aerial spraying, as the first of four goals (Embassy of Colombia, 2003). The report “Impact of Aerial Fumigation in the South Bolivar” (2003) claims the following about *Plan Colombia’s* efforts:

The government’s carrot and stick approaches of fumigation and alternative development programs do not respond to the complexity of local situations, with their extremely bad infrastructure, the presence of armed groups... that often impose economic and food blockades on the local population, and a historically weak state presence. (p. 2)

**The Accessibility to Education for Internally Displaced Children**

While this study does not purport that illicit crop eradication is the sole culprit for the phenomenon of internal displacement in Colombia, the study is bound by

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2 The beginnings of the guerrilla insurgency in Colombia trace back to the assassination of populist leader Jorge Elécier Gaitán in 1948. His death sparked rebellion among the Liberals to which the Conservatives responded with a period of violence known as *La Violencia* that ended after some 200,000 Colombians had been killed (Crandall, 1999).

3 The United States originally committed $1.5 billion and has provided over $2.5 billion (Embassy of Colombia, 2003).
the fact that it is increasingly difficult to separate the IDP population according to the official cause of displacement. However, separating IDPs is unnecessary to do since the civil conflict is so heavily rooted in land control and coca cultivation/protection by guerrilla and paramilitary forces. A study by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004) describes this connection through the voice of indigenous communities:

The indigenous communities have alleged that the fight against drugs has resulted in the militarization of many areas where illegal crops are grown….This militarization creates an environment propitious for violations of the human rights of inhabitants…. As a result, the areas where illegal crops are grown have been converted into war zones. (p. 26)

This study will work from the existing evidence that eradication efforts have greatly exacerbated the fighting between armed actors and have, thus, indirectly contributed to internal displacement as civilians attempt to flee threats from armed actors and violent war zones.

Displacement has been an endemic feature of the 40-year conflict; over three million Colombians have been displaced since 1985, giving Colombia the largest IDP population after Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). According to the leading NGO monitoring displacement in Colombia, CODHES, an estimated 30,000 people were displaced by fumigation in 2003 (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). The UNHCR calculates that fumigation programs caused the displacement of 39,397 people in 2002 (Women’s Commission, 2004). From just these two years, there have been at least 69,300 persons displaced as a direct result of eradication efforts.

Protection under IDP status is offered for three months after registration with the Colombian government and, in theory, includes free and unlimited access to health care and priority access to education for one year. However, according to the Pan-American Health Organization, only 22 percent of IDPs receive medical attention (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). Furthermore, the World Food Program estimates that eighty percent of IDPs live in extreme poverty (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). However deplorable the conditions of IDPs may be, it is important to note that the conditions of those displaced by eradication efforts are assumed worse since they are considered ‘migrants’ and excluded from official IDP registers and receive minimal, if any, governmental aid (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004).

One of the most disruptive effects of displacement in Colombia is that children suddenly lose the chance to attend school due to factors such as overcrowding, fees and expenses, and discrimination. The percentage varies from study to study on the number of displaced children unable to access the educational system: UNICEF estimates 70 percent while the Colombian Ombudsman Office estimates 85 percent (Women’s Commission, 2004). In
Colombia’s decentralized educational system, no budgetary provisions on the local level are allotted to cater to the needs of displaced children, even though they are supposed to have priority access to the system for one year (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). The fact that many displaced families are unable to cover education costs once the free year expires further complicates the matter.

The first factor contributing to the inability of IDP children to access the educational system is the reality that there are not enough schools in the urban and/or poor areas to absorb the great influx of displaced children. A study by the Norwegian Refugee Council (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004) illustrates this point:

Schools are overcrowded and in concentrated areas of displacement, schools lack the capacity to take on new kids….In 1999, in Bogotá alone, 60,000 children were not provided placement in government schools because all of the places were filled….Twenty-four thousand of these children that were not granted placement in any school were displaced. (p. 130)

Since eighty percent of IDPs live in extreme poverty, the majority of displaced children who do gain access to the educational system attend schools that lack resources and teachers (Friedland, 2002).

The second problem is that of financial constraints; although tuition may be exonerated for displaced children who are officially registered with the government, which children from families displaced by fumigation rarely are, fees and other expenses often prevent displaced children from attending school. Neither books nor uniforms are provided through government assistance; as a result, about 95 percent of displaced children are rejected from secondary schools due to the lack of exoneration of fees and payments for books and uniforms (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). The Norwegian Refugee Council found that even when enrollment is free for displaced children, 54 percent of them are out of school due to the high costs associated with schooling and 23 percent due to the necessity to work (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004).

The final problem is that displaced children who are admitted to school and manage to pay for related expenses often have to face stigmatization and rejection from teachers and other students, which contributes to school absenteeism and/or dropouts. For example, racial discrimination against displaced Afro-Colombians and indigenous people who move to largely white or non-indigenous municipalities is common in schools (Friedland, 2002). Other displaced children who move to urban areas are mocked for originating from the countryside. Friedland (2002) reports that a displaced boy living in Bogotá,

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4 According to the UNHCR (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004), approximately one-fourth of displaced persons are indigenous people or Afro-Colombians despite the fact that these groups constitute only 11 percent of the population.
humiliated after being called “a little black boy from the coast”, refused to return to school. In addition, adolescents in Villa Espana, Quibdo complain that teachers in their schools discriminate against them because they do not pay fees (Friedland, 2002).

Officials from the Ministry of Education admit that education is treated as a lower priority in IDP programming because education is less visible than the need for food and housing (Friedland, 2002). Indeed, displaced children in Colombia lose the opportunity to attend school and/or receive a quality education due to overcrowding, financial constraints, and discrimination.

The Health Effects of Aerial Fumigation and the Link between Ill Health and Education
Fumigation as a method of illicit crop eradication is especially deleterious to the health of children. The various health effects caused by fumigation efforts - ranging from headaches, eye irritation, and loss of appetite - have negatively impacted education, as children are more likely to be absent from school and to arrive to school in unsuitable conditions for learning. In addition, fumigation indiscriminately destroys licit crops, thereby, aggravating child hunger and making children less likely to attend school.

Glyphosate, the most well known ingredient constituting the herbicide formula sprayed on illicit crops in Colombia, has been pointed to as the product responsible for various health problems and the destruction of licit crops. As a consequence of the bad publicity surrounding glyphosate, the US State Department often issues a Fact Sheet designed to stress the product’s good qualities. The Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2003) concludes the following when asked various questions about the effects of aerial eradication on health and licit crops:

Legal crops are not deliberately sprayed unless they are interspersed with illegal crops...Despite numerous investigations, not a single claim of harm to human health as a result of the spray program has ever been substantiated. These health problems are more likely to be caused by bacteria, parasites, and infections endemic in the remote rural areas where illicit cultivation takes place. (p. 1)

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5 Children are especially vulnerable because they have thinner dermal and epidermal layers of skin and a higher ratio of body surface area to body volume, their higher rates of metabolism and oxygen consumption facilitate inhalation of chemicals, and their kidneys and livers may give them a lesser ability than adults to metabolize and excrete toxins (Women’s Commission, 2004).
6 According to Marsh (2004), both the Center for Disease Control and the EPA indicated to the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá that “because there are no reliable biomarkers of glyphosate exposure it is impossible to determine whether aerial spraying is making people sick without testing subjects before and immediately after the spraying” (p. 15). While the U.S. State Department may claim that health effects reportedly due to fumigation cannot be substantiated, they also cannot be dismissed.
However, after the Office of the People’s Defender in Colombia received some 6,500 complaints in 2002 about harm to health and licit crops resulting from aerial spraying, a Colombian court ordered a halt to aerial fumigation in 2003, ruling that the practice was endangering people’s right to a healthy environment and harming public health and security (Ferrer, 2003). In response to the ruling, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe stated that as long as he is the president of Colombia the spraying of illicit crops would not cease because the nation will keep its commitments to the international community to fight the narcotics trade; indeed, eradication efforts continued despite the court ruling (Ferrer, 2003). However, the official position of the Colombian Ombudsman is critical of eradication efforts:

Current implementation of the aerial eradication program violates the Colombian Constitutional provisions regarding the right to health, the right to a healthy environment, and special protection of vulnerable groups. (Inter-American Association, 2002, p. 1)

The first set of health effects of fumigation includes physical ailments such as skin rashes, dizziness, fever, diarrhea, vomiting, cough, headache, eye irritation, loss of appetite, and difficulty breathing. A study by the Putumayo health department (Marsh, 2004) found that 82 percent of the fumigation complaints in municipalities in Puerto Asis and Putumayo referred to adverse health effects, mainly gastrointestinal and respiratory problems, experienced after spraying events. Researchers in this study also found that the municipal hospital of La Hormiga had a statistically significant increase in fevers, diarrhea, abdominal pain, acute respiratory infection and skin infections following aerial spraying.

The second health effect of aerial spraying of herbicide is the deterioration of children’s nutritional status as subsistence crops are destroyed. As Marsh (2004) concludes, “Since poverty, geographic isolation, security risks and roadblocks by armed actors often limit rural Colombians’ access to food, destruction of food crops have a serious adverse impact on nutrition levels” (p. 18). In January 2001, an inter-governmental commission led by the Colombian Government Ombudsman Office verified that spraying in the Putumayo department damaged eleven alternative development projects funded by the UN (Marsh, 2004). Marsh (2004) expounds, “In mid-March 2001, Ivan Gerardo Guerrero, governor of Putumayo, claimed that of the roughly 30,000 hectares sprayed in the previous six weeks, approximately half were planted in basic food crops instead of or in addition to coca” (p. 10). Additionally, schools in Putumayo had previously cultivated small gardens to provide nutritional supplements for students - many of whom are malnourished and must walk long distances to get to school - and to encourage school attendance. However, fumigation severely damaged the school gardens, making the crops inedible (Women’s Commission, 2004). Indeed, some farmers have reported that because
fumigation destroyed their licit crops they are no longer able to send their children to school since they cannot provide them with a decent breakfast (“Impact of Aerial Fumigation,” 2003).

Numerous studies have shown the association between health and cognitive and educational development. Carpenter (1998) concludes, “Although the causal relationship between health and educational achievement is inconclusive, most studies agree that children’s health and nutritional status correlate with school performance” (p. 2). The argument is summarized by the UN’s World Food Program (WFP, 2005), which claims, “On empty stomachs, kids become easily distracted and have problems concentrating on their lessons.” Zill (1990, p. 2) further outlines the ways in which ill health can interfere with the learning process:

1. Ill health may lead to days absent from class, either because the child is too sick to attend or because of the time required to get medical attention;

2. Ill health may reduce the efficiency of the child’s performance while in class, as when a student is unable to concentrate because of fatigue, hunger pangs, feelings of nausea, feverishness, physical pain, or psychological pain;

3. Ill health may produce disruptive behavior in class; and

4. In extreme cases, ill health may produce serious and/or irreversible impairment of the child’s ability to perceive, reason, or remember.

With this list in mind, one can conclude that the physical sickness and the destruction of food crops caused by fumigation efforts negatively impact the nutritional level of children, and subsequently, their educational development as well.

**Conclusion**

Illicit crop eradication appears to be a phenomenon here to stay. While the 1998 UN Convention is supposed to safeguard fundamental human rights during the process of eradication, studies show that forced eradication has heightened humanitarian crises, as in the case of Colombia. Due to fumigation efforts in Colombia, thousands of children have been displaced, making it almost impossible for them to access the educational system. In addition, fumigation has negatively affected the health of children by destroying licit crops and causing various physical ailments. Ill health interferes with the learning ability and educational achievement of children.
The right to education for the general population is greatly at risk in Colombia. In October 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Katarina Tomasevski, assessed Colombia’s commitment and progress towards education for all. Tomasevski (2003) discovered that the inability to pay is the principal reason why children fail to enroll in or abandon school (an estimated 1.5 million – 3.3 million children are excluded from school), education shows a history of exclusion based on all the discriminatory factors, and the current educational model is “a recipe for perpetuating poverty and inequality” (p. 8).

Tomasevski’s (2003) report implies that Colombia is failing in its international commitments to education, outlined in both the Dakar Framework for Action and core human rights documents such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination. The Dakar Framework for Action contains a clear statement reaffirming education as a fundamental human right and underlines the importance of striving to achieve Education for All (EFA) goals (Tomasevski, 2004). Illicit crop eradication efforts in Colombia exacerbate problems found within the Colombian educational system. Eradication efforts push EFA goals - meeting basic learning needs, universalizing access and promoting equity, and enhancing the environment for learning - further away from attainability by intensifying civil conflict, contributing to internal displacement, and threatening the health of children. Illicit crop eradication is pushing education in Colombia in the wrong direction.

While it is outside of the scope of this paper to suggest alternatives to illicit crop eradication or to offer solutions to the humanitarian problems caused by eradication, the findings from Colombia’s case presented in this paper have laid a foundation for further research on the impact of forced eradication on education in other countries.

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Examining the Impact of Illicit Crop Eradication on Education in Colombia


Education for Protection and Prevention:
Various Approaches from “Outsiders”
New Armor for Children in Armed Conflict: Child Rights Education in the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration Process

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Introduction
Child warriors are used in nearly three-fourths of all armed conflicts around the world today (Faulkner, 2001). Children are conscripted into war for a number of reasons. Typically, they supplement government or rebel groups that do not have a sufficient supply of soldiers or volunteers to withstand opposition forces. Children conscripted into war face many compromising situations; most importantly, their right to eighteen years of education and free play as stated by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is jeopardized, as their only hope for survival and legitimacy becomes defined by taking up arms and joining militia groups. Children are manipulated into believing that the most valuable affiliation for them is with the militia. Institutional frameworks designed to protect children’s fundamental rights fall prey to internal conflict, leaving children unprotected and vulnerable to those who wield the strongest military might.

There is little question that war has a long-term, deleterious impact on these child soldiers. In reaction to such atrocities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) developed a series of four stages to assist children involved in armed conflict in returning to normal lives: disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and re-integration (DDRR) (Orange, 1997). For the international community, a poignant issue to examine is the current practices used to help children in armed conflict develop an understanding of their rights and evolve beyond their experiences to assume a normal role in society.

This exploratory paper sets out to find best practices used to educate children involved in the DDRR process about their rights as stated by the CRC. Literature analysis and interviews with experienced personnel found that discussion about children’s rights curriculum just recently has begun to emerge among those
working to educate children affected by armed conflict. Research identified few curricula that address the broader concepts of human rights and no curriculum that objectifies the more specific sub-category of child rights. Programs designed to educate children in armed conflict about their rights can be effective in the prevention of re-recruitment and can encourage children to become productive members of society. In this exploratory study the author analyzes current programs to educate children in armed conflict about their rights followed by a recommendation of a systematic approach that incorporates rights-based education into the DDRR process.

**Human Rights Education versus Child Rights Education**

While human rights education and children’s rights education programs are interconnected, they are substantially different in their educational goals, teaching methods, and applications. Human rights education is based on the framework and underlying themes expressed in the thirty articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted and proclaimed in 1948 (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 1948). The UDHR addresses basic needs and fundamental rights of all human beings, but does not consider the more complex needs of children. Sexual exploitation, abuse, forced labor, and trafficking of children under the age of eighteen compelled the international community to re-evaluate whether the UDHR protected the needs of children (UNESCO, 1998). As a result, in 1998 the international community drafted and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (OHCHR, 1998). The CRC consists of fifty-four articles pertaining to the relationship between parents and children; children’s rights to participate in social and cultural life; and children’s rights to information, self expression, play, leisure, sports, and protection. Unlike the UDHR, the CRC includes six articles (10, 11, 32, 36, 38 and 39) explicitly relating to the protection of children (UNESCO, 1998). These articles are particularly relevant to children whose lives have been affected by armed conflict. Peter Lucas, a lecturer in the Department of International and Transcultural Studies at Teachers College, strongly believes that “a general human rights curriculum designed for children that does not teach about the articles in the CRC denies them relevant information applicable to their lives” (personal communication, April 10, 2005). While the UDHR is the trunk of human rights education, the CRC is a pertinent branch of information that should be taught to children in armed conflict.

**Classroom Environment**

Currently, the DDRR process is an established, protected system that provides an opportunity to educate ex-combatants and children in armed conflict about their rights.

*Disarmament and Demobilization.* The initial two phases, disarmament and demobilization, offer educators a unique opportunity to begin lessons about
basic rights. Disarmament and demobilization focus on taking the firearm out of the child’s hands and relocating the child to small camps that are cut off from conflict areas. One program known as ‘Weapons for Exchange,’ initiated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), offers children the opportunity to trade their firearms for admission into demobilized camps (Breen, 2003). The security of the encampments cultivates socialization with other ex-combatants and provides a supportive structure for children to share their common anguish. In a Liberian camp, “demobilized child soldiers from different factions played football games against each other without any problem. They were curious to [get to know] the former enemy and sang songs of reconciliation” (Romkema, 1997, p. 53). Although these stages serve as vital opportunities to teach protection rights, no evidence emerged that such programs exist during the disarmament and demobilization phases.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration. The rehabilitation and reintegration phases provide a structure for educating children about their rights. Most of these children have witnessed, been victims of, or participated in horrifying events such as killing, maiming, rape, and sexual violence. “Some children sit and look at running water and just see blood” (Singer, 2005, p. 195). At demobilization camps children begin to emotionally and physically heal. To assist in this process field workers have found that “the very routine of schooling can be a therapeutic source of continuity and stability for children facing traumatic situations” (Office of the Special Representative of Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict [OSRSG], 2005). Although no curriculum about children’s rights education is currently being implemented, programs that teach math, reading, writing, environmental awareness, and conflict resolution have emerged (Romkema, 1997). Children spend anywhere from three days to three months rehabilitating in demobilization camps, which offers an optimal opportunity to incorporate children’s rights education into the daily routine of schooling.

Similarly, the reintegration phase is an opportunity to spread awareness of children’s rights. Research found that reintegration brings normalcy and routine back into the child’s life and helps restore community and familial identity through group healing (Sinclair, 2002). Tonderai Chikuhwa from the OSRSG at the United Nations examines “the unique opportunity that reunification offers to educate both [adults and children] about the fundamental rights of the child. Relatives come to camps to retrieve children and educators have the opportunity to give members of the greater society information about child rights” (personal communication, March 2, 2005). Educating children about their rights during the last two stages of the DRRR process can be an effective way to help them rehabilitate and reintegrate back into society.

Relevance of CRC education
It is imperative to examine the measures taken by the international community to aid children in assimilating back into society in order to address what further research could be conducted to identify effective ways to re-educate students.
about their rights. Research found that Article 38 of the CRC - that no children under the age of 15 may take a direct part in hostilities or be recruited into the armed forces (OHCHR, 1948) - continues to be violated (UN, 2005). After the international community recognized the recruitment and deployment of children in armed conflict, grassroots organizations mobilized themselves in regions of conflict to address the problem. Due to limited resources, NGOs such as Children for Peace (a.k.a. Watoto wa Amani) can do little but collect horrifying statistics about the crimes committed by or against child soldiers and their present state of psychological stability.

[Volunteers] witnessed children being seized from schools and playgrounds to be trained as soldiers and rebels. They were made aware of the fact that in the armies and militias children are being used for heavy work…going into mine fields and minor girls are sexually abused. Children are beaten and given marijuana and cocaine. Gunpowder is mixed in their food, in order to keep them awake. Wounded children are denied treatment; they just disappear. (Romkema, 1997, p. 3)

After evaluating the situation, NGOs found that without international support they would be unable to attack the root causes of the problems. They then turned their attention toward disarming, demobilizing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating children harmed by such atrocities. Initially, due to a lack of funding, camps served as safe areas where children waited to reconnect with family members (Brett, R. & McCallin, M., 1996). Eventually, field workers used these camps to create makeshift classrooms. According to Paul Martin, Executive Director of the Center for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University, “NGOs began to use education as a means of normalizing the lives of the children” (personal communication, April 12, 2005). DDRR programs have evolved to incorporate education as a means to rehabilitate war affected children. Basic curricula in math and language arts are used to bring children up to their age appropriate grade levels (Sinclair, 2002), but “there are few resources that exist to teach ex-combatants about the CRC and how it applies to their lives” (Tonderai Chikuhwa, personal communication, March 2, 2005). Continued examination should be considered in order to understand the best way to incorporate children’s rights education into DDRR programs.

Current Practices to Children’s Rights Education
Although no program or curricula specifically teach children’s rights, a variety of programs do exist that intertwine the much broader theme of human rights. Paul Martin explains why human rights curricula are more abundant than children’s rights curricula:

Human rights curriculum has been written and implemented before children’s rights curriculum because it can be taught to a wide range of people, including adults in the community. Children’s rights education, while it can be taught to
everyone, only really applies to those under eighteen. (personal communication, April 12, 2005)

Martin supports the argument that more resources should be available to educators to teach about children’s rights (personal communication, April 12, 2005).

Child rights education has not reached systematic dissemination in best practices but has been linked to some programs. Educational curricula designed to promote a general understanding of environmental awareness, conflict resolution, and peace education have been developed by many NGOs for children of all ages affected by war. These programs are taught in demobilization camps during the rehabilitation stage (Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies, 2001). Listed below are curricula most closely linked to children’s rights education; however, these curricula do not directly incorporate the subject into their lessons.

- All human beings: a manual for human rights education, (INEE, 2001; UNESCO, 1998). This curriculum groups articles of the UDHR and CRC together by basic themes. Lessons teach articles that apply to the lives of children, but the curriculum does not teach articles related to the rights of protection and recruitment into armed forces (i.e., 10, 11, 32, 36, 38 and 39 [OSRSG, 2005].
- INEE Peace Education Kit, (INEE, 2001; Baxter, 2000). This curriculum focuses on emotional awareness and prejudices, but does not link these concepts to fundamental rights in articles of the CRC (i.e., 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8).
- Booklets for a Culture of Peace, (UNICEF, 2004; Avery, 2000). This curriculum allows students to produce stories and illustrations of the life skills needed for peace. While entertaining, this activity does not teach children’s rights, the role those rights play, or children’s responsibility for sustaining peace through use of these rights.
- Environmental Education, (INEE, 2001; UNHCR, 1999). This curriculum includes lessons that discuss soil, water, plants, animals, energy, shelter, and environmental health. This curriculum addresses articles in the CRC (i.e., 23 and 27), but does not teach other relevant articles.

The curricula listed above touch upon topics related to the CRC but do not serve as comprehensive examinations of all the articles in the convention relevant to children in armed conflict. Despite this weakness, early indicators present encouraging evidence that such methodology produces a general awareness about themes related to children’s rights.

Community Based Inquiry
Another approach to incorporating the CRC into DDRR programs has been devised by Tonderai Chikuhwa. Chikuhwa’s approach involves the participation
of members of the community in discussions about basic needs and their relevance to the CRC (personal communication, March 2, 2005). Chikuhwa initiates dialogues with members of the community,

‘You are a mother, a chief, a religious leader. What do you want for your child? What are your dreams for your child?’ They respond, ‘I want to be able to feed my child and I want my child to be educated. I don’t want my child to be abducted on the way to school.’ Their response becomes a list of basic needs, which I then link to the themes of the CRC. (personal communication, March 2, 2005)

The list of basic needs becomes the local culture’s CRC. Ideas about children’s rights must come from the people, in their context, because they are the ones who must identify what is important to them (Tonderai Chikuhwa, personal communication, March 2, 2005). If community leaders deem the topic relevant, there is a greater likelihood that the children shall too.

Once the adults of the community have embraced the ideals of their children’s basic rights, attention must turn back toward educating the children on the rights the community deems relevant. Chikuhwa has discovered that the most effective way to begin a conversation with children at demobilization camps about their rights is to discuss their right to protection (personal communication, March 2, 2005). Children can “relate to the violation of their protective rights and tend to have a lot to say about their feelings toward this particular violation” (personal communication, March, 2, 2005). These discussions could open the door to dialogue and further education about basic rights as defined by the community and the CRC.

The objectives of this holistic approach are embedded in children’s rights education. Unfortunately, this specific paradigm is not documented and is only used by Chikuhwa.

**Future Plans for Implementation and Research**

Within the parameters of the research and programs discussed here, gaps were found in current practices that educate for basic rights. There seems to be minimal programming designed to teach ex-combatants in the DDRR process. There is a need for further research into how the contents of the CRC can be incorporated into current programs. The following is a recommendation for the structure of an effective curriculum encompassing children’s rights that could be incorporated into the DDRR track.

Research and interviews conducted during the course of this study indicate a need for specific curriculum that would teach children about their rights as stated by the CRC. The following objectives should be met through a series of discussions and relevant activities:

1. Recognition of fundamental rights;
2. Awareness of how each right relates to everyday life;
3. Ways and means of fulfilling basic needs; and
4. Children’s responsibility to maintain such rights (if and when resources permit).

Lessons about the CRC can be incorporated into all four phases of the DDRR process. During the disarmament stage, discussion could focus on helping children understand that being abducted and having a gun placed in their hands are violations of their basic rights. The demobilization phase offers an opportunity to discuss rights to live in a safe environment protected from armed conflict. The last two phases, rehabilitation and re-integration, represent the bulk of the discussion. These lessons may serve as an outline of inquiries that facilitators could use to help children understand their basic needs and how those needs correlate directly with the rights granted to them in the CRC.

Rights education might also incorporate the ideology of responsibility. Children in armed conflict must understand that, although education, shelter, and the right to participate are all fundamental rights, it is their responsibility to utilize and partake in the maintenance of such rights. Curriculum cannot simply offer a plethora of rights that children should have access to; education about these rights must also include education about children’s responsibility to utilize and maintain them. Rights based education will help prepare children for their roles and responsibilities once fully integrated into the community. Self-confidence and self-worth can be gained when children feel empowered to be active members of society.

Conclusion
This exploratory paper set out to find best practices of child rights education in DRRR programs. What was found was discussion about the broad concept of human rights intertwined into curricula being taught at demobilization camps. Best practices pertaining specifically to child rights either do not exist in printed form or struggle to encompass the full meaning of rights based education. Therefore, the development of a specific curriculum centered on children’s rights objectives to be used in all four stages of the DRRR process should be considered. Working toward a sustainable future requires persistent advocacy from both civil society and international actors. Utilizing an educational framework constructed around child rights education may be the most effective means for breaking the cycle of violence.

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Perceptions and Portrayals of Faith-Based Organizations in Education in Emergencies: A Case Study from Sri Lanka

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Introduction
On December 16, 2002, President Bush issued an executive order to establish a Center of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Bush, 2002). The main purpose of the center is to identify and eliminate barriers to the delivery of USAID services by faith-based organizations (FBOs). This is comparable to the missions of centers earlier established in six other governmental departments (Canada, 2003). There is ongoing debate about the constitutionality and morality of this push by the Bush White House to support faith-based initiatives, especially in the midst of serious government cutbacks in other areas of need (Fisher, 2005). Yet, even before the 2002 executive order, 25 percent of USAID partners were faith-based groups (USAID, 2003), and many faith-based organizations, both in the United States and abroad, have substantial funds through private giving. Therefore, regardless of decisions by the current US administration, it is important to recognize that FBOs are a significant reality in international aid, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future.

What are FBOs and how do they differ from non-faith-based organizations? Are they different in name only, or are there substantive differences in their practices in the field? These are especially salient questions in education during emergencies, as education is considered by many in the development world to lay the foundations for future development, and as emergencies are often seen as times of opportunity to introduce reforms (Feinberg & Soltis, 2004). These reforms can be comprised of anything from organizational changes to introducing behavior and belief modifying curricula. To begin to understand the identity and role of faith-based organizations in education in emergencies, one must examine the ways in which FBOs working in this field define themselves and their mission, and the ways in which they are perceived by other aid organizations.
Using the current emergencies in Sri Lanka to provide a context for the research, this paper examines the ways in which FBOs portray themselves on their own websites, and how religion and faith are portrayed by other NGO websites. This information is triangulated with qualitative interviews and document analysis from one secular and one faith-based organization currently working in Sri Lanka. An examination of the websites of NGOs indicates that both faith-based and secular organizations tend to compartmentalize faith as separate from development in practice, especially in education programs. This pervasive attitude of compartmentalization is pragmatic for the development sector as it allows agencies of different worldviews to work together by encouraging them to ignore their differences. Although this practice of compartmentalization may be practical, it leaves the international aid community in danger of a myopia which does not recognize the perils and does not capitalize upon the opportunities inherent in faith-based educational aid in emergencies.

Holistic Development or Religious Neo-imperialism?
While aid organizations may ignore the differences between faith-based and secular groups, scholars who research FBOs identify various important distinctions. The literature about faith-based aid organizations generally falls into two camps: one that views FBOs as the religious arm of neo-imperialism, and another which sees in FBOs the potential to address the world’s problems in a holistic manner.

According to Walter McDougal (1998) there is a growing awareness of religion’s impact on international politics. While religion is not a master variable that can explain all conflict, it plays an important role in many of the world’s conflicts, and much recent scholarship engages the entanglement of religion and politics. Critics of faith-based aid contend that religious groups, especially fundamentalist groups, often exploit problems for their own gain, causing and perpetuating conflicts. Thomas Meyer (2005) explores the problem of religious involvement in development:

None of the known fundamentalisms of this world has come up with a convincing and achievable socio-economic programme which might have some chance of resolving the crises that fundamentalist leaders have tirelessly exploited for their own gain. (p. 106)

Others criticize mainstream religion’s culpability in refusing to adapt in the face of desperate needs. Critics see certain doctrines in many religions as counter-developmental, especially in regards to gender equality and sexuality (Balchin, 2003). Due to a disinclination to address sexual matters, and doctrinal bans on contraceptives, the majority of Christian churches throughout Sub-Saharan Africa have stayed silent while AIDS has devastated entire communities (Kuchment, 2002).
Supporters of FBOs see these same emergencies of religious conflict and HIV/AIDS as exemplifying the need for faith-based aid, especially through education. One religious belief or another is a daily fact of life for most of the world’s population, deeply bound up with people’s sense of identity, community, and ethical action. As a result of the World Bank’s “Voices of the Poor” studies, researchers discovered that often the most trusted people in developing countries were religious leaders (Narayan, 2000). When religious groups and leaders speak out about gender equality and HIV/AIDS, they have the potential to make a great impact. Widespread education of pastors and parishioners, churches and religious groups helped the Ugandan government cut the HIV infection rates from 14 percent in the early 1990’s to 8.3 percent in 2000; and international NGOs hope to persuade other African churches to follow Uganda’s example (Kuchment, 2002).

Another area of influence consistently mentioned by scholars promoting religious international aid is peace education during and after conflicts. There is a great deal of literature devoted to the historical role of a given religious tradition in peaceful social change (Kurtz & Fulton, 2002), as well as calls for inter-religious peacemaking efforts (Smock, 2004). When a conflict has been cast in religious terms by certain political leaders, as is the case in Sri Lanka, that co-opting of religion needs to be challenged by religious leaders to turn the tide toward peace (Bilodeau, 2000).

Some of the most enthusiastic supporters of faith-based international aid claim that the religious orientation of FBO workers gives them a more holistic approach to helping as they are aware of the spiritual as well as material needs of those whom they serve (Myers, Whaites & Wilkenson, 2000). Yet it is just this ministering to spiritual needs that makes opponents of international FBOs wary. Wendy Tyndale (2003) advocates a role for religion in development, but believes that role should be limited to local religious organizations. She asserts that as international FBOs depend primarily on funding and support from the West, they tend to be influenced by Western ideals and can be just as insensitive to local communal and spiritual needs as secular NGOs.

However, this entire academic debate may be moot if Scott Thomas (2004) is correct in asserting that the international aid community, including FBOs, acts as if religion’s only role in development is to provide religious people with the motives for development work of love, charity and compassion. This role is accepted as long as religion doesn’t interfere in the, “secular development agenda, with its own understandings of what constitutes rationality, progress, social justice, and modern economic development” (p. 135).
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is an appropriate case study in which to examine the role of FBOs in education in emergencies because NGOs working there address situations that touch upon each of the key issues facing faith-based aid organizations. The conflict in Sri Lanka is primarily an ethnic conflict stemming from the hegemonic rule of Sinhalese majority over the Tamil minority, yet due to a variety of factors over time, linguistic, economic, cultural and religious friction have entered the mix (Spencer, 1990). During British colonial rule, the minority Tamil elite enjoyed prestige and power as well as higher quality schooling due to the large number of English medium missionary schools set up in the mainly Tamil northern and eastern provinces. After independence, the Sinhalese political leadership took measures to “correct the imbalance,” by passing oppressive laws that marginalized the Tamil population (Perera, Wijetunge & Balasooriya, 2004, p. 386).

Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils have used religious accounts of the genesis of Sri Lanka to solidify their religio-ethnic identity for nationalist purposes. This has led to a seemingly counter-intuitive situation where some Sinhalese Buddhist monks have been heavily involved in political violence against Tamils, even though the fundamental tenants of Buddhism reject all forms of violence. On the other side, the Tamil guerilla group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is popularly supported among Hindu Tamils although Hinduism is widely considered a religion of peace and non-violence (De Silva, Duke & Golberg, 1988).

Sri Lanka is truly a multi-religious country with Buddhists comprising 69.5% of the country, Hindus 14.5%, Christians 8% and Muslims 7% (Bilodeau, 2000). Due to the mix of religious identities in Sri Lanka, and the partially religious nature of the conflict, some local leaders from each of the four religions have tried to address the conflict by forming the Inter-religious Peace Foundation (IRPF) in 1993. The foundation’s purpose is educational: to open up inter-religious dialogue and teach the values of peace that can be found in each of the major Sri-Lankan religions (Bilodeau, 2000). International FBOs however, have been conspicuously absent from peace-building activities in Sri Lanka. According to Goodhand and Lewer (1999), Quaker Peace was the only faith-based organization working on peace-building in Sri-Lanka in the 1990’s.

With the devastation of the December 2004 tsunami in Asia, which killed 40,000 people in Sri Lanka (as compared to the 60,000 people killed in the past twenty years of conflict), the situation there has clearly become a complex emergency. The Sri Lankan Government and the rebel LTTE are attempting to work together on a joint mechanism for post-tsunami reconstruction, based on the cooperation shown by civilians on both sides of the conflict (Manikkalingam, 2005). There have also been calls for Catholic NGOs and other International FBOs to take advantage of this unusual cooperation to help build lasting peace-
dialogues (Fernando, 2005). Whether or not this will happen depends greatly on how these organizations view themselves and their mandate in Sri Lanka.

**Methodology**

To gain an understanding of how the international aid community views faith-based organizations and their role in education in emergencies, I examined the websites of the 165 non-governmental, non-UN organizations listed on ReliefWeb (run by the United Nations office for the Coordination of Human Affairs) that are currently working in Sri Lanka (ReliefWeb, n.d.). For each group I examined whether the group is a faith-based organization, and if so, of which faith; whether they work in education, whether they work with other faith-based or secular organizations, and I analyzed their mission statement.

**Operational Definitions: Faith-Based Organization.** I include organizations that clearly present themselves as faith-based on their website. If the website identifies the organization or their mission using religious/spiritual language such as, “Living out the teachings of Jesus Christ” or “Fulfilling God’s call to . . .” it is counted as an FBO.

**Work in Education.** I operationally define education broadly as training and formal education, but not as advocacy (public awareness campaigns), nor as evangelism. Organizations that build schools, prepare school kits, provide uniforms, school lunches and any other material for educational purposes are included in this category.

**Work with other organizations.** While most websites mention working with ‘partners,’ I only include these affiliations if they give a list of organizations they partner with, associations they belong to, or direct links to other organizations. R indicates that only religious organizations are listed, S indicates only secular organizations, and B indicates both. It is important to note that this list represents only groups the NGOs chose to put on their websites and is not necessarily a complete list of every group with whom they work.

**Mission Statement.** As many websites do not label a section “Mission Statement,” I also considered “vision statements,” “about us” and “who we are” sections. Every website includes at least one page that gives a picture of the organization’s view of itself, its values and its goals.

**Qualitative Research.** To support this website research, I conducted a more in-depth, qualitative review of two organizations, one secular and one faith-based: CARE and United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), by examining their website documents (including finances), as well as their printed promotional documents. I interviewed people from CARE and UMCOR because both of these organizations worked in many different areas of the world and different sectors of relief and development. The types of work they do and the
way their material is presented is fairly representative of this study’s sample of NGOs working in Sri Lanka. I interviewed Ms. Kristin L. Sachen, Assistant General Secretary, Program Emergency Services International at UMCOR and Dr. Hassan Mohamed, Senior Technical Advisor for the Basic and Girls' Education Unit at CARE. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions about their work in education in emergencies, and their perceptions of faith-based organizations.

Findings
Of the 165 NGOs listed on ReliefWeb as currently working in Sri Lanka, 51 (31%) are faith-based. Of the 114 counted as secular organizations, 12 are Red Cross Organizations from different countries and 10 are consortia of NGOs that, in some cases, include FBOs. I considered these consortia as secular even if they had FBO members because they were not entirely made up of faith-based groups. Excluding the Red Cross and consortia, FBOs accounted for 49 of 143 (34%), or over one-third of the independent NGOs working in Sri Lanka. Of the FBOs, 1 is Jewish, 1 is Buddhist, 4 are Muslim and 43 are Christian. Of the 114 secular organizations, 64 work in education, while 43 of the 51 religious organizations work in education. Thus, FBOs account for 40% of the NGOs in Sri Lanka that work in education. Of the 77 NGOs that listed partner organizations and affiliations, three of the FBOs listed only religious groups and three of the secular organizations listed only secular connections. The other 71 NGOs listed connections with both faith-based and secular organizations.

Mission statements varied widely amongst the organizations, but there were some noticeable trends. A few of the FBOs’ statements indicated that part of their mission was evangelism, but others, such as the International Orthodox Christian Charities, declared their organization to be non-evangelistic. The majority of the FBOs either did not discuss evangelism at all, or, like UMCOR, stated that evangelism and missions were the domains of a different department in the wider church, and not part of the NGO’s mandate. A large group of the secular NGOs made a clear statement that they were non-sectarian. Almost all of the NGOs, both faith-based and not, stated explicitly that they did not discriminate on the basis of race, religion or gender when providing services, or they were signatories to a document such as the People in Aid Code (People in Aid, 2005), or the Red Cross Red Crescent Code of Conduct In Disaster Relief (Red Cross Red Crescent, 2005), that stipulate non-discrimination. The word ‘partner’ is used frequently throughout most of the websites to indicate an equal relationship with local groups, people, governments and other international NGOs.

As I conducted only two interviews, they are not to be taken as a generalization of the views of the development community as a whole; rather the interviews aid in contextualizing the findings from the website review. Both interviews were valuable in giving a sense from two perspectives on the nature
and role of FBOs in emergency education. The general sentiment from both interviewees was that faith-based and secular organizations had more in common than not, and the religious character of most FBOs did not make the development services they provided qualitatively different than that of the secular NGOs. Had I interviewed people from organizations that advocated proselytizing, such as Gospel for Asia, the perspective would undoubtedly be different. However, openly evangelizing groups were in the minority in this sample and the results from the website review seem to support the general tone of the interviews from Ms. Kristin L. Sachen and Dr. Hassan Mohamed.

Analysis
The fact that over 30% of NGOs in Sri Lanka are faith-based is a clear indication that FBOs are an imposing presence in the development world, especially in education where 84% of them carry out at least some type of project. Understanding FBOs then, is integral to understanding relief work in general and emergency education in particular.

FBOs are in full communion with the rest of the international aid community as is evidenced by the fact that they are interconnected through their websites and through umbrella organizations that work to coordinate relief efforts. Kristin Sachen from UMCOR explains, “It’s the nature of relief work that it has to be cooperative . . . often there’s sharing of equipment or knowledge” (personal communication, April 7, 2005). This sentiment is echoed throughout the NGO websites in their emphasis on partnerships and cooperation.

In fact, the partnerships extend beyond secular and faith-based NGOs working together. The word ‘partners’ is often used by organizations to indicate local actors and organizations. According to CARE’s Dr. Hassan Mohammed (personal communication, April 11, 2005), all NGOs, faith-based or otherwise, have focused on community-based development since the late 1970’s. The NGO asks the community what it wants and needs and proceeds from there. He adds that for NGOs to get funding for their projects, they must be “professional” in the sense that they are fulfilling community needs instead of imposing their own will. In this way, there is little difference between a project implemented by a secular group and one implemented by a faith-based organization.

Is it enough for FBOs to implement community based relief projects, or is there still a danger that by their very identity they impose the neo-colonialist perspective feared by Wendy Tyndale (2003)? This is a valid concern considering that Sri Lanka is almost 70% Buddhist, yet only one of the FBOs comes from a Buddhist tradition. Christians are over-represented in the aid community, accounting for 88% of the FBOs in Sri Lanka, even though the Sri Lankan population is only 8% Christian. These statistics do indeed indicate that international FBOs are not representative of the populations that they serve. However, this criticism holds for all international NGOs. As the vast majority of
international NGOs originate in wealthy nations especially in the global north, neither faith-based nor secular organizations are representative of the people they serve. That type of representation can only be found in the local NGOs, yet even local groups regularly rely on funding from abroad and cooperation with international NGOs.

Although this divide between international NGOs and those they serve is an intractable reality, the concern should not be dismissed. International NGOs need to be aware of their status as the ‘other’ and be careful not to unwittingly tip the balance of power. Kristin Sachen (personal communication, April 7, 2005) tells of how Christian church leaders in a small village in Sri Lanka were troubled by the presence of an international Christian group that carried out relief work in their community. The church there was very comfortable with its minority status and knew how to work within the power structures as a minority faith. Church leaders were afraid that the overwhelming presence of foreign Christians would inadvertently cause the local political leaders to see Christians as a threat, and thus make it more difficult for the local church to work within the political system.

There are other times when identification with a specific religious tradition may be harmful to an FBO’s mission. So that it can provide aid wherever it is needed, UMCOR will occasionally play down its Christian identity when it is expedient to do so. Ms. Sachen mentioned that they use a version of the UMCOR world symbol without the cross when they are working in predominantly Muslim countries (personal communication, April 7, 2005). This is where the compartmentalization of religion as separate from development becomes very apparent. In some of the FBO websites, the language seems purposefully divorced from religious terminology except in one or two sections where they explain that their motivation for working in relief and development stems from their religious convictions.

Secular NGOs seem just as eager to compartmentalize by prominently identifying themselves as non-sectarian in their promotional materials, even though they may list a number of FBOs as partners. There seems to be an almost hyper-awareness of the potential pitfalls of faith in development which explains why almost every NGO makes a point of stating that they do not discriminate in any way when they give aid. This could be due to the fact that the current paradigm in development is sensitive to concerns about perpetuating post-colonial structures and power relations.

Unfortunately there does not seem to be an equal awareness of the possible benefits of faith-based aid amongst practitioners. Ms. Sachen mentioned the benefit of having local contacts around the world through Methodist churches, and Dr. Mohamed ventured that an FBO may have an advantage in psychological counseling in the immediate aftermath of a disaster if the FBO was of the same faith as the victims, but neither seemed to think that there were
significant areas in which having a faith focus would be helpful. The majority of FBO websites either did not mention advantages or supported Ms. Sachen’s statement about churches being good local connections. With so much of the literature on the subject touting FBOs as a godsend for peace-education efforts, why aren’t faith-based organizations promoting themselves as peace-educators in Sri Lanka?

**Conclusion**
The compartmentalization of faith in one box and relief work in another makes it easier for FBOs to avoid certain pitfalls of taking a faith-based approach, but it may also prevent them from capitalizing upon the strengths of their religious identification. One of the likely factors contributing to this compartmentalization is the desire of FBOs to be accepted by the secular world. This is a practical consideration as FBOs need to both cooperate with secular NGOs in the field and they must compete with them for donor funding. Donors and NGOs are conscientious to promote projects based on local, community initiatives, and try to avoid even the appearance of imposing values on the local populace.

Avoiding an imposition of values is an important step in equalizing the power relationships in development work, but stepping too far in this direction has watered down the mission of international FBOs so that many of them are no more than “Oxfam with Hymns” (Thomas, 2004, p.135). Ignoring the diversity amongst international NGOs means that the areas in which FBOs have a chance to be truly influential such as in HIV/AIDS education and peace education are often left up to local faith-groups. Thus, the churches in Uganda combat AIDS and the Inter-religious Peace Federation takes on the peace struggle in Sri Lanka. These are noble but isolated instances of local faith-based groups using their religious identities to bring about change. Without support from international FBOs, these types of interventions may not expand to take root in other places. It will be unfortunate if the call for religious groups to use the fragile post-tsunami truce in Sri Lanka to bring about lasting peace goes unheeded. In the difficult struggle for education in emergencies to bring about substantial changes, the world cannot afford lost opportunities.

**References**


Supplemental Education and Psychosocial Support in Northern Uganda

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“You know something evil lurks just out of sight when you see thousands of children streaming into town every evening seeking refuge from abduction by the LRA.”

(Prendergast, 2005)

Introduction

Children often bear the brunt of the negative effects of war. In no case is this more evident than in the Ugandan conflict where thousands of children and adolescents have become casualties of war while serving as new recruits for the armed forces. The 18-year Ugandan civil war between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group illustrates the complexity and unintended consequences of warfare: unclear political agendas, civilian involvement and victimization, internal displacement, and horrific violence. However, the new rule of insurgency dictates that if conflict groups want to survive, they have to find their own financial resources (Singer, 2005). The LRA funds itself through the abduction of children who serve as child soldiers. While the GoU and several international organizations such as UNICEF and Oxfam have tried to respond to these issues by working with the International Criminal Court (ICC) or via the provision of education to children, a major problem persists: an estimated 50,000 “night commuters”, children between the ages of three and fifteen, continue to flee the threat of the LRA by trekking every evening from their villages into the safety towns of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum to sleep en masse (Emry, 2004).

A solution to the nightly flight of thousands of children requires a multifaceted approach. To succeed in countering the traumatic impact of war on children, and establishing a sustainable future, emphasis of local and international efforts and aid must be dedicated to strengthening educational development. Machel (1996) notes that increases in school enrollment contribute to the safety and binding of the communities by bringing together children, parents, educators, and local officials with a shared purpose. Educational programming could focus on efforts within communities to prevent and respond
to violence among ‘night commuters’ as well as efforts to create safe spaces for these children within commuter centers. This paper will explore the following questions in an attempt to understand the challenges of planning education in emergencies programs in northern Uganda:

1. In the face of insecurity, how can children, unsafe in their homes and in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, benefit from educational programs? What are the protective and endangering elements of education (Nicolai, 2005)?
2. In what ways can local/national organizations and communities play a role in protecting the rights of children and promoting education as a mechanism of protection?

Methodology
The qualitative methodology used in this paper seeks to understand the situation faced by children in northern Uganda from an ecological and cultural standpoint. Comprehensive research and analysis of secondary sources address the following: the effects of war on children, the availability and accessibility of education for children, the government policies towards the LRA, the work of local organizations, and the role of the International Criminal Court. Finally, interviews with international NGO staff with extensive field experience in northern Uganda shed light on the depth of the situation as well as the current status of coordination efforts among various communities working for the safety of night commuters.

Background
The roots of the Ugandan conflict lead back to colonial times. During the British colonial regime, southern Uganda was transformed into an agricultural base for economic and political development while the north was left untouched, as tribes (mainly Acholi) in this region were viewed as disturbed, hostile and powerful enough to offer stiff and prolonged resistance (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). This national divide along ethnic lines caused the marginalization of the Acholi people and fueled a proxy war.

Whereas the conflict started as an Acholi-led rebellious movement against President Museveni’s government, it has since degenerated into a brutally violent war that overwhelmingly affects children. Prendergast (2005) describes Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, as a man who likens himself to Moses, fighting for a government based on the Ten Commandments and a cleansed Acholi race. Nonetheless, Kony remains an enigma; he runs his army with spiritualism and violence while maintaining unclear political goals as he abducts and kills the Acholi people he claims to protect. The LRA may have started with popular goals (reclaiming respect for Acholi identity and equal economic development between the northern and southern parts of Uganda), but
these goals have fallen by the wayside due to the dwindling support of Acholi people, the increased presence of the ICC, and pressure from the international community.

In March 2002, the Ugandan government launched a military operation, Operation Iron Fist (OIF), in response to the LRA’s increased abductions and abuse of thousands of children. In the words of the International Crisis Group (2004), OIF was supposed to be the “knock out blow” to the LRA. On February 16, 2005, the chief negotiator of the LRA, Brigadier Sam Kolo, surrendered; eight days later, on February 22, the GoU retreated from a unilateral ceasefire. Still, prospects for peace exist at all levels. According to the International Crisis Group (2005), the presence of the ICC in Uganda has already had a positive impact on the peace process by sobering the LRA and influencing Sudan to reduce support. Furthermore, Acholi leaders and ICC officials have had increased contact which has helped develop trust around the court’s intentions in Uganda.

In response to the improved performance of the Ugandan armed forces, reduced support from the Sudanese government, and investigations by the ICC, Jessica Huber from the United Nations Quaker Office notes that the LRA, feeling trapped, has moved back into northern Uganda and intensified conflict (personal communication, April 12, 2005). The effects of this shift have been devastating on children and adolescents. This is demonstrated in alarming emergence of young commanders who try to prove their worth and demonstrate their skills through mutilations and abductions (ICG, 2005). Simultaneously, the Sudanese and the Democratic Republic of Congo conflicts have grabbed the attention of the media, policy makers and donors, leaving Uganda in the dark.

Obstacles to Education in Emergencies in Uganda
The Ugandan conflict is a war in which civilians have become the strategic targets and victims. Berdal and Malone (2000) note that civil wars create dynamic situations with new stakeholders and a new set of winners and losers in the political, economic, and security arenas. Van Creveld (1991) adds that the current transformation of war emerges in the form of low intensity conflicts which tend to dissolve distinction between civilians and soldiers and between individual crime and organized crime. Having a political agenda is no longer critical; instead conflicts are increasingly driven by resource and population exploitation (Singer, 2005). In the volatile context of the Ugandan civil war, the social fabric of society- schools, health posts, teachers, and community leaders-become increasingly vulnerable targets (Singer, 2005). Machel (2001) describes this phenomenon of total warfare as particularly lethal for children; more than two million children died in the 1990s as a result of armed conflict while more than three times that number became permanently displaced and/or seriously injured.
As a child in northern Uganda describes, “if you are under 20 and living here, you have known virtually nothing else your whole life but what it is like to live in a community enduring armed conflict – conflict in which you are the prime target” (Singer, 2005). Children constitute the most vulnerable group due to the LRA’s abduction strategies and to the dangers faced in internal displacement. According to Emry and Heninger (2005), more than half of the young people who have not been abducted live in IDP camps where access to education, health care, and security is limited. While concentrating the population in central locations is believed to improve security and the physical protection of civilians, evidence suggests the contrary (CSOPNU, 2004). Cases of rape, abuse, and sexual exploitation in IDP camps have increased due to a lack of protection from international agencies and Ugandan forces. Huber clarifies LRA tactics: the LRA prefers to attack defenseless posts where there is either a smaller population or a lower level of security (personal communication, April 12, 2005). In order to protect their children from violence, parents in the northern districts of Uganda send their children to spend the night in the districts of Kitgum, Pader, or Gulu – these children are the night commuters of Uganda (Deng, 2004).

To most efficiently meet the needs of children in Uganda, education in emergencies consists of supplementing the informal and formal educational systems already in place. The main assumption is that education gives children the opportunity to develop life-saving skills, brings shape and structure to their lives, and provides protection against exploitation and harm (INEE, 2004). Further developed by Nicolai (2005), education structures can play a more protective role in the lives of children through working with local communities and parent-teacher associations, introducing child-friendly pedagogy and positive methods of discipline in order to reduce the cycle of violence, developing cross-gender teacher training, and mobilizing children to protect themselves and their community. However, education in a school setting can also have the negative consequence of facilitating access to the recruitment of child soldiers (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003). Protection by the government and NGOs must play an important role in enhancing the relative advantages of education in times of crisis and securing education programs.

Children’s well-being and development depend very much on the security of family relationship and a predictable environment (Jareg, 2005). The educational infrastructure in northern Uganda attempts to provide for the security of children and curricular needs described above by Machel, Nicolai and Triplehorn. Nonetheless, when school ends daily, some 50,000 children undergo the challenge of living with little or no adult supervision, the stress of possible abduction, and separation from their families. This night flight creates a generational divide: a breakdown in social cohesion as children’s behaviors go unsupervised at night. For instance, whereas a boy was expected to seek parental approval before pursuing a girl, the unchecked nature of night commuting no longer supports such traditions (Emry & Heninger, 2005a, 2005b). As noted by Neil Boothby (1996), in mobilizing to meet the psychosocial needs of
children, communities can reclaim their children and prevent a ‘lost generation.’ In a country where the conflict relies on the use of children kidnapped from communities, the same children the rebel forces claim to protect, the response from local and international organizations must include bottom-up approaches that focus on strengthening local community initiatives and promoting education as protection.

Findings
Several findings regarding children affected by conflict in northern Uganda are identified through research and interviews.

1. The educational infrastructure in northern Uganda remains relatively functional. However, educators in formal and informal settings face the challenges of providing mental and physical protection to children living in constant fear of abduction.

2. The interaction of children with their ecological environment strongly affects children’s development. In order to address the generational divide created by the night commuting, programs must be developed around children’s communities, families, peers, schools, etc.

3. The Healing Classrooms Initiative (HCI), an initiative that aims to improve teacher development for student well-being, could provide an array of lessons learned and best practices that could be invaluable to the restructuring of educational programs in northern Uganda.

The international and local response to the educational situation in northern Uganda has been weak and primarily provided in terms of technical or material support such as shelter, water, and sanitation projects. However, little emphasis has been placed on non-technical assistance such as recreational activities (Emry & Heninger, 2005a). Huber notes that the humanitarian work underway in Uganda could be strengthened by various factors: increased cooperation and coordination among U.N. agencies and local organizations as well as increased personnel capacities (personal communication, April 12, 2005). The work of the former Ugandan State Minister, Betty Bigome, as the chief peace negotiator between Museveni and Kony, provides a glimpse of hope in spite of the recent withdrawal from the ceasefire by the GoU that has translated into increased rates of violence and abductions by the LRA.

Huber presents a compelling case:

50% of Ugandan money is coming from donors so donors could have a certain leverage in resolving this conflict but are slow in using it. Donors are focused on places like Sudan with the consequence of money being taken away from other crises areas. (Personal communication, April 12, 2005)

Lori Heninger of the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC) underlines that the international community pays less
attention to Uganda since Uganda’s policies fall in line with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of the World Bank and the IMF (under the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility). A principal component of the PRSP is the provision of universal basic primary education (personal communication, March 24, 2005). Although primary education is free, school still presents costs of books, uniforms, and transportation; the opportunity costs of having one less worker in the household; and most importantly, the threat of violence and abduction within schools or on the way to school.

Detailing the living conditions of night commuters, Heninger reports that the children follow a routine of attending school during the day, returning home to perform chores and eat, and proceeding to ‘night commute’ to sleep. Children sleep in bus parks, verandas, basements of hospitals, or in commuter centers. Most nights, they sleep on dirt or cement floors in places with inadequate gender-separated facilities, lighting, sanitation, water, security and supervision (Emry & Heninger, 2005a, 2005b). During a trip to northern Uganda, Heninger asked children in a commuter center to raise their hands if they attended school: “almost 99% of the children present responded affirmatively” (personal communication, March 24, 2005, Emry & Heninger, 2005a). Although northern Uganda is in a crisis situation, its schools are functioning and receiving similar amounts of funding as in previous years. It is important to note that most of the money is returned due to the fragile social and educational infrastructure. For instance, most of the schools in Kitgum and Gulu have been closed due to attacks on school facilities, teachers, and children (Emry & Heninger, 2005). Learning centers, usually designated areas under trees, have been created as temporary replacements.

**Healing Classrooms Initiative and Charity for Peace Foundation**
Without a negotiated settlement between the LRA and the GoU, interruptions in the provision of education will continue. Heninger suggests looking at the Healing Classrooms Initiative (HCI) developed by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in trying to find ways to make the hours spent in school most efficient and effective for children and educators. Jackie Kirk and Sarah Smith from the IRC provide insight on the HCI. Steeped in the theoretical framework that education provides effective protection and healing tools for the well-being of children, HCI was developed as an action research program development process that identifies alternative delivery systems in order to provide better psychosocial training and support for teachers and students (personal communication, April 14, 2005). Smith also details some of the research conducted on alternative delivery systems in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Pakistan, and emphasizes the commonalities and possible applicability to northern Uganda. Specifically she notes the following possibilities that will improve/sustain educational programs: teacher-centered development programs, gender specific teacher training, community involvement, and the
necessary communication between educational organizations and respective governments.

While civil society, international governments, and the ICC continue to pressure the GoU to reach a peaceful resolution with the LRA, closer attention should be given to the work of local organizations. Huber states that local organizations are doing excellent work to provide shelter and protection for night commuters (personal communication, April 12, 2005). James Kidega (2005) established the Charity for Peace Foundation (CPF), which aims to improve the health status and well-being of children affected by war by providing access to safe water, shelter, and sanitation. Located in Gulu Public School, Kidega and his volunteers keep a daily record of attendance, provide gender separated sleeping facilities, enforce a bedtime curfew, and foster a sense of community through the use of song and dance. Some of the problems CPF face include lack of funding, low levels of training to address the psychosocial needs of children, and the challenge of caring for night commuters without creating unequal lifestyles between those children that commute and those that do not but still face similar challenges. CFP also seeks to implement an outreach program with parents in order to address the growing generational divide between parents remaining in the village and the commuting youth.

Information gathered via interviews reveals the complexities of providing education in times of crisis. Low levels of cooperation among organizations, high levels of violence, the current generational divide occurring between night commuters and their families, and the efforts of CFP emphasize the need to focus on strengthening the response and capacity of local communities. As noted by Macksoud, Aber & Cohn (1996), the ecology of a child’s life—parents, families, peer groups, schools, religious communities, and other community-based institutions—influences how war-related experiences affect that child’s development. Bigombe’s mediation work between the LRA and the GoU may provide an opportunity for peace; in the meantime, HCI and CFP have begun addressing the immediate needs of communities, children, and educators.

Educational trends in psycho-social programming

Upon collecting and assessing the data detailed above, it has become apparent that the need for psychosocial health and support within educational systems is crucial. HCI and CFP focus on involving the community and developing a strong psychosocial component to all forms of interactions between caregivers and children. Elizabeth Jareg (2005) from Save the Children emphasizes the following six components that should be included in educational programming for children affected or involved in armed conflict: restoration of family relationships, restoration of relationships with the community, ensuring children’s physical and psycho-social health, organized learning opportunities, vocational training and income generation, and play and recreation. Though the children of northern Uganda maintain family ties, they separate at night to create
their own respective ‘family’ – the challenge for host communities and organizations becomes promoting social cohesion through the creation of interim caregivers as part of community-based programming.

An important consideration is the children’s ecological environment. The ecologies of children’s lives – parents, families, peer groups, schools, religious communities, and other community-based institutions – influence how war-related experiences affect children’s developmental outcomes (Macksoud, Aber & Cohn, 1996). Parents with the ability to maintain a routine can protect their children from war trauma; yet, night commuters’ parents are unable to provide this protective routine. CFP seeks to provide a routine for the children both in the physical space but also in the presence and consistency of the volunteer personnel. Volunteers act as interim parents and caregivers, providing children with instruction, guidance, and attention. Action based research projects such as HCI will offer valuable insight on child development as well as educator training during times of war and post-conflict reconstruction for further development of informal and formal education systems.

In rehabilitating children affected by conflict, programs must assess and evaluate children’s behavioral adaptability, which is displayed in prosocial and planful behavior (Macksoud, Aber & Cohn, 1996). Prosocial behavior in the case of night commuters relates to the ways in which children enhance their ecological environment in their home communities. Although the commute requires both energy and time, children continue to return home in order to help their families with chores and other needs. Planful behavior explains the way in which children pack up their belongings at dusk and trek into towns for safety purposes. These two behaviors, exhibited among some 50,000 children, show a sense of decision-making capability and a level of maturity that should be taken into account in program development. The leaders of CFP and the initiators of HCI believe that assisting war-affected and displaced children requires, as Boothby (1996) suggests, recognizing them as active and capable, both individually and as communities. In other words, with support, night commuter children can and do work to solve their own problems, help their own communities, and meet their own needs.

Given the obstacles to education in Uganda and the nature of the conflict, the most efficient way to strengthen children’s psychosocial well-being is exemplified by the Gulu community. Jareg (2005) describes a Save the Children community based research project in northern Uganda that revealed that children who return home without a period of interim care are more aggressive and unstable and demonstrate militaristic habits. CFP acts as a community-managed program; residents of a local area identify their own problems, select their own project workers, evaluate their own projects, and make their own decisions about the program’s future (Boothby, 1996). Although CFP does not have a formal mode of evaluation, every evening it provides a period of interim care for night commuters. While the program’s aims in 2003 revolved around
capacity-building, girls’ education, public health awareness, and peace and human rights advocacy, CFP now plans to set up rural peace centers and to ‘upgrade’ shelters into outreach centers within which children can find a host of activities (library, sports, clinic, etc.) (Kidega, 2005). Due to the overall mobilization of the community, the current provision of safety by concerned caregivers, the establishment of routines and the creation of safe spaces for peer interaction, CFP has the necessary tools to rehabilitate children and fortify their emotional well-being.

**Conclusion**

This paper investigates the role of communities and local organizations in providing education in a crisis situation. Programs addressing the needs of children affected by conflict must maintain a long-term perspective and be anchored in strengthening the community and family relationships while also providing opportunities to develop peer-to-peer relationships (WCWRC, 1996). In the case of Uganda, war has ravaged the country for almost two decades. To avoid the cycle of trans-generational hatred, communities must play a significant role in bridging the divide between remembrance and reconciliation through the provision of education that supports and strengthens local communities. Effective protection and assistance needs to be based in grassroots initiatives that maximize community participation. Specifically, I highlight initiatives such as Healing Classrooms Initiatives and Charity for Peace that provide new approaches and best local practices to support the well-being of children, the training of educators, and the involvement of local communities. Further studies should be conducted to assess the response and effectiveness of different local and international organizations in improving the plight of night commuters.

**References**


The Breadbasket Goes Empty: Zimbabwe - a Country in Crisis

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Introduction
In February 2000, the Zimbabwean government, headed by Robert Mugabe, launched a controversial plan to seize white-owned farms and redistribute the land to black peasant farmers, in order to comply with a promise made to the country’s war veterans who helped liberate Zimbabwe in 1980. The new era of “land reform” in Zimbabwe was ushered in with violence, when four white farmers and three farm laborers were brutally murdered during what would become known as a “farm invasion.” The heartland of Africa, once known as the breadbasket of the continent, would soon face a crisis formerly unthinkable in Zimbabwe - widespread famine. Once lauded for its forward-thinking “Education for All” policies, its commitment to economic development, and its thriving agricultural sector, Zimbabwe has since deteriorated as both governmental policy and triple-digit inflation have all but destroyed the agrarian economy, and now threaten academic progress (Johwa, 2004). Yet, amidst a backdrop of looming starvation, growing unrest and declining humanitarian conditions, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front) party still clings to political power. Its campaign of repression recently earned the country the label of “outpost of tyranny”, from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Muleya, 2005). This criticism arrived just in time for Zimbabwe’s parliamentary elections, held March 31, 2005, yet until now, the voices of the Western powers, as well as other influential African nations, have been largely silent. Thus, Zimbabwe’s humanitarian crisis has grown and festered with nearly 7.5 million people currently in desperate need of food aid.

According to Robert Rotberg (2002), “nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people” (p. 93). As Zimbabwe’s key governmental, economic and educational institutions fail to provide basic needs and services to its people, it runs the risk of falling victim to failure. Yet, Zimbabwe has not made Rotberg’s (2002) list of contemporary failed states, as it does not presently exemplify all of the characteristics necessary to warrant total failure. Therefore, the first goal of this paper is to clarify the difference between a failed state and a failing state by reviewing the current literature on the subject.
Using Rotberg’s theories to help differentiate failing states from true failures, and the work of Philippe Le Billon to grasp the nature of the conflict, while relaying historical accounts to both contextualize and historicize the struggle, a clearer picture of what is at stake should emerge. After providing a more thorough understanding of the current situation in Zimbabwe, this study will then begin to assess the possibility of using preemptive peaceful interventions to prevent conflict.

Education, in particular, can create a “zone of security”, especially for children, as it is “a life-affirming activity” (Machel, 2001, p. 92). As such, can educational interventions, normally reserved for post-conflict states, work well in a pre-conflict country to prevent violent confrontations in the future and promote peaceful change? The second goal of this paper is to explore the need for educational interventions, despite the fact that Zimbabwe is not currently at war. As the children of Zimbabwe are suffering from conflict-type afflictions such as recruitment into youth militias, abuse and deprivation of basic needs, education may serve as an essential protection measure, which provides important alternatives to child soldiering and other forms of mistreatment, such as violence and sexual exploitation (Sommers, 2002). In light of the outcome of the March 2005 election, the benefits of education may soon emerge as a positive catalyst to help prevent the further decline of Zimbabwe.

A Brief History of the Crisis - From Colonial Rhodesia to Current Zimbabwe
In 1980, former guerilla leader Robert Gabriel Mugabe, head of the ZANU-PF liberation organization, became the President of the newly independent state of Zimbabwe. After decades of minority white, mostly British settler (Rhodesian) rule that deprived the native Africans of their land and natural resources, the Commonwealth finally awarded the black Zimbabweans self-determination, and majority rule. Mugabe came into power amidst promises of land resettlement for blacks. Although governing power was transferred after the elections, however, land was not, as thousands of white farmers opted for Zimbabwean citizenship to retain their legal rights to the land. Mugabe’s government embarked on a constitutionally mandated, conservative land buy-back program dealing with “willing sellers.” When that policy expired ten years later, the Parliament enacted a law that allowed the government to make compulsory land purchases (“Independence,” 2000). Yet, land transfers were few as the government’s coffers were empty, primarily due to corruption, fiscal mismanagement, and Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Congo war. In 1997, Mugabe compiled the first “hit list” of farms that would be compulsorily acquired, placing compensatory responsibility on the British government, on the basis that “Rhodesian colonists had stolen the land from the blacks in the first place” (“Independence”, 2000, para. 5). In early 2000, the unfortunate climax of this “land reform” resulted in what would come to be known as the “farm invasion,” in which ZANU-PF supporters, led by the veterans from the bush war, used deadly force to
confiscate white-owned farmlands, killing several white farmers and their black workers in the process.¹

ZANU-PF’s quick regression from land acquisition by law to land confiscation through violence coincides with the advent of the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change), a political party formed from Zimbabwe’s trade unions and labor movement. As Zimbabwe’s first strong opposition party, the MDC formed in September of 1999, and held its inaugural congress in February 2000, the same month Mugabe initiated the deadly farm invasions. According to the MDC’s mandate, the basis for its existence is to confront the excesses and corruption of the current government, promote transparency and accountability, and halt Zimbabwe’s economic decline (“About MDC,” 2005). To many Zimbabweans, the MDC represented change, and during the parliamentary elections of June 2000, the MDC captured 57 of the 120 available seats, just a few months after the MDC had been born. Mugabe, facing the first credible threat to his 20-year rule, stepped up his “land reform” plan on September 8, 2001, via the Abuja Agreement, which is the key policy document outlining the provisions of the land resettlement. The agreement, which starts with the premise of ending the growing economic crisis, declares the lack of land ownership by blacks as the main cause of Zimbabwe’s fiscal woes. Yet, the famed “land grab” would only signal the beginning of Zimbabwe’s problems, as it would soon see its agricultural sector destroyed, inflation increase by 622 percent, and international aid organizations claiming that seven and a half million Zimbabweans would need food aid this year, or starve to death (Buckle, 2005). In the meantime, amidst accusations of voter intimidation, harassment and electoral rigging, the MDC lost 16 parliamentary seats in the March elections, giving Mugabe wider privilege and power to enact laws and institute constitutional change (“About MDC,” 2005).

**Educational Progress in Zimbabwe after Independence**

After Independence in 1980, Zimbabwe launched new economic policies that focused on strengthening the social sector by increasing government spending in areas such as health and education, especially in the rural areas. Education in particular maintained a progressive agenda, with both of Zimbabwe’s educational ministries (the Ministry of Education, Sport, and Culture and the Ministry of Higher Education and Technology) focusing on eliminating gender inequities in the schooling system. Although a rise in defense spending in the mid to late 1980s curtailed spending on social programs, the overall literacy rate continued to rise. By the end of the 1980s, with adult literacy rates at 87 percent for males and 75 percent for females (UNICEF, 2003), Zimbabwe was gaining recognition as one of the leaders for access to education in Africa. Further cementing Zimbabwe’s progressive educational stance, the Education Act of 1991 abolished all school tuition fees and made attendance in primary school compulsory. By 2000, Zimbabwe came close to achieving “Education for All” with literacy rates at 93 percent for males, and 87 percent for females, with
primary school gross enrollment rates at nearly 100 percent for males and females (UNICEF, 2003). Despite Zimbabwe’s impressive economic gains, however, worsening economic trends were already threatening the education sector’s progress. Although educational spending continued to increase into 1990, it did so at a decreasing rate, growing from 7 percent of GDP in 1985 to just 7.99 percent in 1990 (Globalis, n.d.). In addition, Zimbabwe’s HDI (human development index) fell, causing its ranking to slip from 128 in the 1990s to 147 by 2002 (UNDP, 2003).

Coupled with the country’s declining economic condition and deteriorating living standards, Zimbabwe’s land reform policy displaced nearly 150,000 farm workers, forcing children to cut school to find menial jobs to help support their families (Martin & Lari, 2004). Some children terminated their school careers altogether as the lack of menial jobs in the farming communities forced them into the cities, where they resorted to begging, crime, and prostitution (Martin & Lari, 2004). In addition, because of the land reform policy’s large-scale voluntary resettlement of people from community areas to former white-owned farms, “reverse displacement” occurred as there was no formal school infrastructure in place large enough to accommodate the mass inflow of new children. Thus, instead of the established classrooms to which they were previously accustomed, 70,000 new students must tolerate shoddy school structures, a dire lack of proper sanitation facilities, and a dearth of learning materials (IRIN, 2004). Zimbabwe’s educational system was entering a crisis phase, warranting emergency action to prevent further decline.

The Downward Sliding Scale from Failing State to Failed State
Far from its breadbasket reputation of less than a decade ago, Zimbabwe now embodies many of the characteristics common to failed states such as a falling GDP rate, an increasing unemployment rate, skyrocketing inflation, local currency devaluation, and cessation of nearly all foreign and domestic investment (Rotberg, 2002). Combined with the paucity of health services in a country with one of the largest HIV infection rates in the world, the imminent starvation of many of its people, and the average life expectancy reduced by nearly 20 years, Zimbabwe’s people are at risk (UNICEF, 2003). Zimbabwe’s educational system, once one of the strongest in Africa, is failing despite its recent privatization, as the 622 percent inflation eats away at resources, forcing many school closings in the face of the government’s policy not to increase school fees (Buckle, 2005). Declining literacy and graduation rates, increase of forced internal migration due to farm labor displacement, and the introduction of Mugabe’s new youth militia, the Green Bombers, only worsen the human rights violations and other challenges that children in Zimbabwe now face. Mugabe’s active censorship of the media, violent repression of opposition, and overtly corrupt dictatorship - all ingredients of a failed state – compound these problems still more (Rotberg, 2002).
However, one cannot yet consider Zimbabwe a failed state, as it lacks a single catalyst - a war, or civil insurrection (Rotberg, 2002). While the world seemingly waits for the fallout of the March 31, 2005 elections, making no significant attempts at mediation or crisis prevention, Zimbabwe itself is on the verge of collapse. As outside observers, the Western powers and other African states appear to follow the legalist principle that mandates to “never intervene in the affairs of other states,” and to recognize “that the citizens of a sovereign state have a right, insofar as they are to be coerced and ravaged at all, to suffer only at one another’s hands” (Walzer, 1977, p. 86). Although a democratic society does normally allow for such internal corrections by allowing its citizens to vote and replace the ineffective or corrupt elements of governance, this process becomes problematic if the elections are not widely believed to be free and fair, and if part of the constituency does not consider the current regime to be legitimate. If other states are unwilling to interfere for fear of undermining state sovereignty, yet the legitimacy of the government is in question, the optimal intervention would need to embody political impartiality, and be beneficial to the entire constituency, regardless of partisanship.

As Zimbabweans hit the polls in March amidst an atmosphere of fear, uncertainty, and political oppression, resulting in large gains by the ZANU-PF, the political repercussions are still uncertain as those who consider themselves disenfranchised plan their next moves. Thus, before the Western powers or other African states can consider possible interventions, they must first measure the potential for further state collapse.

**Descending the Downward Spiral toward State Failure**

According to Rotberg (2002) “All that Zimbabwe lacks in order to join the ranks of failed states is a widespread internal insurgent movement directed at the government” (p. 93). Despite all of Zimbabwe’s governmental woes, its domestic trials and economic tribulations, there has not been a civil insurrection. Although there has been general unrest, there has been no uprising. To better understand the nature of the population under Mugabe’s rule, recent survey data from Afrobarometer was analyzed to assess “the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society, and other aspects of development” (Chikwana, Sithole, & Bratton, 2004, p. 1).

Many post cold war conflicts have arisen out of the competition for natural resources, especially in an era of heightened development (Le Billon, 2001). In Zimbabwe’s case, rich farmland is its main resource, yet according to the Afrobarometer survey, land was not included in the people’s top three priorities. Rather, Zimbabweans desired economic improvement, more job creation, and improved food stocks over land wealth (Chikwana, et al., 2004). In addition, three quarters of Zimbabweans agree that buyers should acquire land legally, and compensate the owners accordingly (Chikwana et al., 2004). If the citizenry does not consider land ownership to be a top priority, then why has the
Zimbabwean government seemingly forsaken all other goals to pursue an aggressive, and controversial, land acquisition policy? Le Billon (2001) sheds more light on this subject, stating that resource ownership provides political leadership with a cunning means of maintaining power “by establishing a regime organized through a system of patronage rewarding followers and punishing opponents” (p. 567). Supporting this view is a post-election interview conducted by the BBC of “Freddie,” a citizen in Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare. “Freddie,” who abstained from voting, revealed that it was common knowledge that the local village chieftains were gaining favors from the government in terms of money, land, and energy resources in exchange for delivering votes in favor of ZANU-PF (“Freddie,” 2005). Aside from a handful of ZANU-PF supporters, most Zimbabweans interviewed by the BBC seemed to agree with Freddie’s assessment of the use of intimidation prior to the elections, rendering most people too afraid to vote for the opposition, or so fearful that they abstained from voting at all. It is no wonder that the Afrobarometer survey finds that Zimbabweans are losing faith in democracy, and have become wary of the multiparty system, and the social conflict it creates (Chikwana et al., 2004).

Yet, land is not the only scarce resource in the government’s control, as many Zimbabweans depend on the government for food stipends and other basics (Wines, 2005). Le Billon (2001) notes that control of a key resource sector by a country’s ruling elite leaves little opportunity for accumulating wealth and prominence outside of state benefaction. Thus, rather than dismiss the Zimbabweans as a passive population, one must give credence to the elements that hold them in check, such as fear, and the rationing of basic necessities. The government uses land to reward party loyalists, the military, and chieftains, in exchange for securing regions of ZANU-PF voters. In other words, the government has been buying votes with resources, shadowing Zimbabwe’s electoral process in censorship, political repression, and intimidation. Although there have been calls for protests and “peaceful” revolution, “by a margin of more than five to one, Zimbabweans overwhelmingly reject political violence” (Chikwana et al., 2004, p. vi). Most people desperately want ZANU-PF and the MDC to work together, so that the people may win as well as the politicians.

In sum, most evidence appears to point away from a violent civil insurgency, although it is still a remote possibility. Now, however, attention should turn to a key factor that has influenced Zimbabwe’s stability - education. In regards to human development indices3, in Sub-Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe has generally ranked second only to South Africa in regards to adult literacy rates and combined gross enrollment ratios (UNDP, 2004). However, recent evidence shows that Zimbabwe’s educational position is slipping, as advances in gender parity, compulsory primary schooling, and literacy rates are falling due to the rise in school fees, the increase in school closures, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Although current data is not yet available, slippage is evident as the official adult literacy rate fell from 89 percent in 2000 (UNICEF, 2003), to 76 percent in 2003 (USAID, 2005). In addition, primary school completion rates,
which had peaked in 1990 at 83 percent, had fallen to just 63 percent in 2003 (UNICEF, 2003).

According to the World Bank, democracy is more likely to flourish in countries with higher literacy rates and education levels ("Education and Development," n.d.). Assuming the reverse is also true, the disintegration of Zimbabwe’s educational system may hasten the country’s decline, and increase the chance of conflict as the collapsing infrastructure creates more unemployment, reduces economic opportunity, and further diminishes the state’s ability to ensure the safety and security of its children.

Education as an Intervention
Although a popular uprising seems to be an unlikely course of action, must every situation disintegrate into violence before an intervention is proposed? What possible measures are available to prevent the country, and its once-celebrated educational system from total collapse? According to a recent study by the World Bank, “increases in school enrollment contribute to the safety of the community and reduce the probability of civil war” (as cited in Machel, 2001, p. 93). Through binding communities together, reinforcing a sense of normalcy and stability, and providing hope for a better future, schooling can certainly enhance the prospects for peace (as cited in Machel, 2001). On the community level, parents, educators and officials look toward the schools as a positive institution that is worth protecting (as cited in Machel, 2001). For the children, “the sense of self-worth that comes from being identified as a student and a learner; the growth and development of social networks; the provision of adult supervision and access to a structured, ordered schedule” can “provide vital continuity and support” within the crisis (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003, p. 9). Emergency education is typically instituted in situations where children lack access to formal state education systems due to the incidence of war, violent conflicts, natural disasters, or other crises (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003). Yet, according to Rebecca Winthrop of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), states that are not yet engaged in conflict can implement emergency education as a preventive measure (personal communication, March 30, 2005). Thus, as a non-politicized method of promoting stability and peace in a region, education could possibly be a powerful deterrent to Zimbabwe’s further decline.

The current risks to Zimbabwe’s children mirror those of children involved in actual wars or other violent scenarios. Youth brigades have been present in Zimbabwe since its independence, to deter the formation of opposition parties and maintain Mugabe’s desire to create a one-party state (Madondo, 2005). However, lack of opposition in the late 1980s and 1990s left these militias with very little to do. In 2000, the political scene changed drastically with the formation of the MDC, endangering Mugabe’s stranglehold over Zimbabwe. Once again, Mugabe turned to his young people to “do the things it does not want the [Army] to do” (Madondo, 2005, para. 29). To counter this threat,
Mugabe formed his newest youth militia, known as the Green Bombers. Not only do these youths terrorize innocent Zimbabweans, force people to become ZANU-PF members and brutalize the opposition, but they also stand accused of murdering both MDC supporters and white farmers (Madondo, 2005). Even more troubling is the fact that the recruitment of children into military service is now governmental policy. “Conscription of Zimbabwe's children, aged 10 to 30, to the National Youth Militia Service is now compulsory. They are indoctrinated, taught to use weapons and torture tactics and encouraged to intimidate and violate their own people” (Zimbabwe Democracy Trust, 2004, para. 6). In addition, there have been disturbing reports of rape and child abuse occurring within the youth camps (“Zimbabwe: Report Accuses Youth Militia,” 2003). The only element missing from this depiction of child soldiering is an actual war.

On numerous occasions, emergency education has served to protect children in conflict. “Experience shows that education has a preventive effect on recruitment, abduction and gender based violence, and thereby serves as an important protection tool” (NRC et al., 1998, as cited in Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003, p. 9). Allowing children to establish normal routines through a familiar school setting provides structure in their lives and gives them a sense of purpose. If the children are able to develop hope for the future, they are less likely to fall victim to the indoctrination techniques of influential and violent groups as “education in schools is one of the most practical means of conveying the kind of messages that enable children to make safe decisions” (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003, p. 12).

Yet one of the current obstacles to gaining an education in Zimbabwe is the expense. As inflation has risen into the triple-digit range, schools can no longer afford to provide education on the meager assistance the government provides. Thus, they must go against a government mandate and charge school fees in order to survive. If such schools escape government foreclosure, then they still risk dropping enrollment, as many Zimbabweans must forego the school fees in order to pay for basic needs. During an interview conducted of a local woman, she admitted that she, like other villagers in the area, is down to one or two meals a day. “She pulled her children out of school last fall to save the $2.25 in annual school fees, as are many other families” (Kristof, 2005, para. 6).

Another problem is the lack of food aid. Mugabe halted international food donations in May 2004, as a “bumper crop” was forthcoming (“Zimbabwe Halts Emergency Food Aid,” 2004). As no such harvest arrived, and as Mugabe has used food aid as a political ploy in the past, it is highly probable that the government used food again to secure votes in the March 2005 election. Since the election has passed, the Zimbabwean government has indicated its intent to buy food on the open market (“Zimbabwe to Divert Z$5 Trillion to buy Emergency Food,” 2005). Although this pronouncement is welcome, progress is questionable as the Zimbabwe dollar is weak, and foreign currency remains
scarce. In addition, such a move will further drain the government’s coffers and deplete the few resources remaining for education.

Emergency Education in Action
As Mugabe appears keen on rejecting aid from the “West”, he may try to channel the aid through other African states instead. As Zimbabwe’s neighbors of South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique have already expressed their intentions to keep their borders closed and not accept refugees, these countries have a stake in keeping conditions in Zimbabwe from deteriorating further. If they cannot openly criticize Mugabe’s policies, then perhaps by either providing help themselves, or funneling in aid from other sources, they can both practice the “quiet diplomacy” that they preach as well as alleviate tensions along their borders.

Another way of providing aid involves relying on agencies that are independent of individual countries, such as religious organizations and humanitarian groups. Although Mugabe prohibited some of these institutions in the recent past, as the elections have passed, such donors will most likely be welcome again. Umbrella-type nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) could also collect donations internationally and distribute the aid domestically. As the lack of food hampers children’s ability to learn, basic food aid is necessary to ensure that a healthy learning environment ensues.

Although there is currently no insurgency on the ground to warrant an “emergency” educational intervention, the lack of violence should not preclude the need for Zimbabwe’s children to have an educational system in place to promote stability and security. Using the agencies outlined above, aid could support those schools that are still functioning in order to eliminate their need for fees.

In the regions where the schools have closed or the people are displaced due to the farm takeovers, the implementation of standard emergency education guidelines could get the children into a formal, structured environment where they are making positive, productive use of their time. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to compare and contrast the different emergency education guidelines that are available, there are many organizations, such as Save the Children and UNICEF, among others, that provide toolkits, minimum standards, and field guides for practitioners. As an add-on to the emergency education project planning, the inclusion of a feeding program is necessary, given the food crisis in Zimbabwe. Not only will the prospect of food encourage the parents to send their children back to school, but such a benefit will also serve as an enticement to stay in school as opposed to joining the youth militias. Although schooling cannot reverse the outcome of this year’s elections, it can serve to bring communities back together, provide a sense of purpose for not only the children,
but for teachers and administrators as well, and serve as the building blocks to create a more properly informed electorate in the future.

Conclusion
As this paper describes, although Zimbabwe exhibits many characteristics of a failed state, it is considered to be in the failing stage as it has not experienced an internal insurgency or popular uprising directed at the government. However, this paper also notes that Zimbabweans are poised to protest the severe injustices, human rights violations and life-threatening conditions that they face. Although the country is not currently experiencing a violent conflict, preserving its education system could help to prevent one in the near future. As Mugabe has alluded to letting donors back into the country to institute development programs, education is the key place to start.

Notes

2. According to the website, “Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries can be systematically compared. Trends in public attitudes can be tracked over time.” Afrobarometer. (n.d.) Retrieved April 30, 2005, from http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.html.

3. According to the UNDP (2003), Zimbabwe’s Education Index in 2002 was .79, while its Human Development Index (HDI) rank was 147. South Africa’s Education Index was .83 in 2002, while its HDI rank scored in at 119.

References
The Breadbasket Goes Empty: Zimbabwe - a Country in Crisis


Mobile Education in Darfur: Conduit to EFA or Optical Illusion?

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Introduction
Natural disasters, conflicts and other emergencies present a compound challenge to achieving education for all (EFA) by 2015, as adopted by the World Education Forum, 2000. The violence in North Darfur, in addition to being the genesis of startling human tragedy, accounts for an unprecedented loss of human opportunity. Susan Nicolai, of Save the Children, UK, elaborates:

In places where an emergency has gone on for years and years – Sudan, for example – education hasn’t been available for children, and it just perpetuates the problem. Education in emergencies helps heal the pain of bad experiences, build skills and support conflict resolution and peace building. (Save the Children Alliance, 2004)

The challenges that the nomadic people face because of the violence in Darfur makes EFA appear illusionary. While rebuilding the education system proves challenging, security, stability, access to institutional resources and the absence of governmental support and finance remain the principal hurdles in developing and sustaining the delivery of education to the people of the region.

The paper examines the climate created by EFA, the changing attitudes towards education in Darfur, and it analyzes the success of the Tamorro mobile school. It argues that this mobile education model, with support from the government and NGOs such as Oxfam, can be a conduit to EFA. This paper juxtaposes the role of the Sudanese government and NGOs in education, specifically Oxfam, and analyzes the success, failures and potential of Tamorro as an model for the delivery of education.

The Climate That Created EFA
At The World Conference on Education For All, 1990, it was reported that “more than one-third of the world’s adults have no access to the printed knowledge, new skills and technologies that could improve the quality of their lives...” (UNESCO, 2000). It was also estimated that over 100 million children, including
about 60 million girls, have no access to primary education. Anticipating such challenges, member-states of the United Nations responded, as early as 1948, with the issuance of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the collective expression of their concerns for humanity. Among its avowals is the assertion that everyone has a right to basic education. To this end, the UN, nation-states and NGOs continue to galvanize resources to ensure the realization of the declaration. However, the world faces a plethora of ills, “notably.... war, military occupation, civil strife, violent crimes, [and] the preventable deaths of millions of children....” (UNESCO, 2000). Jomtien detailed the difficulty of the obstacles that must be overcome if EFA is to be achieved, but these problems continue to inhibit efforts to meet the fundamental learning needs of people around the world.

Countries that remain far from achieving EFA, such as Sudan, with a net primary enrollment ratio of only 45.8% (UNESCO: Institute for Statistics, 2002), are yet to increase primary education from four years. The EFA Fast-track Initiative (FTI), a global partnership between donor and developing countries, ensures accelerated progress for countries such as Sudan towards the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015 (The World Bank Group, 2001). This paper argues that mobile education, supported by the changing attitudes towards education in Darfur, bridges local commitment to global goals via reciprocal arrangements and allows ‘Darfurians’ to develop the mobile model as an alternative mode of delivery of education, and for NGOs to support the program with finance and efforts for coordination and acceleration of educational attainment.

**Violence in Darfur**

The effects of the 1970s and 1980s drought and desertification of the entire Sahara region has been described by historians (e.g., Fage & Tordoff, 2000) as the cause of massive ecological and demographic shifts. The increase in the scarcity of land and water forced pastoral tribes from Chad, Libya and other neighboring states to converge on (WHO, 2004) Darfur, a more fertile watered land. Bloodshed ensued when the landowners moved to defend their claims and, the newcomers sought to forcefully consolidate their acquisitions.

The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur Report to the United Nations Secretary-General (ICIDR, 2005) concludes that the region remains the stage for serious human rights violations, displacement, mass violence and the disruption of the lives of the greater portion of its peoples. Carnage continues as the two rebel groups in Darfur -- the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) -- regularly embark on a spate of attacks against the government (ICIDR, 2005).

A joint statement issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights sums up the state of affairs in the region as follows:
We are gravely concerned about the ongoing violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the Darfur region of Sudan…. The conflict in Darfur, which Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called 'little short of hell on earth' has already taken an untold number of civilian lives and is estimated to have caused the forced internal displacement of 1.8 million persons…. Despite efforts, ....the violence continues virtually unabated in a context of wholesale impunity…. (Press Release FR/1126 HR/4822, UN Information Service, March 16, 2005)

Consequently, because of the circumstances surrounding the conflict, the lives of entire communities are interrupted, as tribes that already relocate according to the season, either become victims caught in the violence, active participants on either side or, ‘wanderers’ – internally displaced persons (IDPs). It is within such a turbulent context that this paper analyzes mobile education as a mode for the delivery of education in Darfur and, as a step toward achieving the goals outlined at World Education Forum, 2000.

Education in Sudan
A former colony of the British Empire, newly independent Sudan inherited an education system that was chiefly designed to produce civil servants for the colonial administration, not to educate the general populace. Even though the population is primarily rural, most of the schools, which are largely four-year primary, are focused in and around urban areas such as Khartoum (Oxfam, 2003 & SNR, 1996). As much as the north suffered from the lack of trained teachers, sufficient buildings to house schools and classrooms and serious shortages of material and other resources, the schools in the south -- where education was chiefly the responsibility of missionaries -- suffered a fate that was far more severe (The Library of Congress, 1991). The quality of instruction was so poor that the Sudanese government was eventually forced to provide subsidies to missions and, consequently, appoint provincial education supervisors to monitor the level of education that was being delivered. When civil war erupted in early 2001 and the missionaries were evicted from the country, education in the south suffered further.

Research (e.g., Oxfam, 2003; SNR, 1996; Christian World Service, 2004; Interagency Paper, 2002) shows that tribes and IDPs throughout Darfur are becoming increasingly interested in securing at least a basic education for their children. Recognizing this phenomenon, Trocaire concludes:

People everywhere express a burning wish to learn, to broaden their horizons, to obtain the skills that will help them to improve their lives. In the Nuba Mountains, one of the most forsaken parts of Sudan, local people are slowly beginning to put back together the rudimentary systems of education after years of civil war and isolation. (Trocaire, 2005)

Yet, despite the growing interest, access to basic education remains a problem.
Non-Conventional Mode of Educational Delivery

The livelihood of nomadic people, described as ‘animal wealth’ (SNR, 1996), represents some 19.5 percent of Sudan’s GNP. Though nomads absorb only about 8.5 percent of the population, their historical movement in search of pasture has made attempts to educate the population quite problematic. These conditions are exacerbated by the conflict (Christian World Service, 2004). Beginning in the 1990s, the government launched several educational measures in Darfur, stating:

[We] are very much concerned with the provision of education for all citizens. Thus, the plan for universalization of basic education includes all sectors of the population especially the so-called deprived population such as girls, nomads and [IDPs]. Special arrangements were made for all of them to ensure easy access to basic education. The number of mobile schools for the nomads has reached 178 in 1993/94 in Western Sudan states. (SNR, 1996)

Though the mobile education project was carried out on an experimental basis, the government declared that the nomads manifested their enthusiasm by making various contributions for the hiring, motivation and retention of teachers, including providing incentives to parents who sent their children to school. Declaring the achievements of the project encouraging, the government concludes:

1. At the beginning of the scholastic year 1993/1994, the opening of one hundred schools in the provinces of different states was approved and a special administration for Nomad Education was established.
2. Teachers were nominated to these schools and books and booklets were procured and distributed to the provinces.
3. The commitment of Nomads to motivate teachers by using in kind and financial means [were] manifested in giving the teacher 10 heads of sheep, one fertile she camel, one riding camel, 5.000 pounds per month, rations, and [the tribe’s] commitment to transport school at their departure [at the season’s end]. (World Education Forum, EFA 2000 Assessment)

Oxfam, however, which has supported some 11 schools in Darfur since 1999, has achieved a greater degree of success in operating mobile schools than the government. It has established and continues to direct a number of schools in Darfur. The NGO argues that the strategy delivers education in a manner that is accommodating to nomads and IDPs. Oxfam underscores the ability of mobile schools to meet the increasing demand and need for education by the people of Darfur, affirming:

Mobile schools provide a relevant response to this demand: they fit in with community and family activities and movements; they enable a close relationship to develop between the community and the school; and they allow children to learn in their home environment. (Oxfam, 2003)
As calls for mobile schools increase, attempts to secure government support have been unsuccessful. However, because of the model’s convenience to expeditiously relocate with the community and fit in with tribal activities, tribes have moved to establish schools on their own (Oxfam, 2003 & SNR, 1996).

The Tamorro Mobile School
In North Darfur, Western Sudan, mobile schools provide a flexible model of education that is well-suited to the nomadic pastoralist lifestyle. Oxfam’s Sheila Aikman and Hanan el Haj report on their visit to one program in early 2003 (Oxfam, 2003). The visitors explain that with increasing demand for access to at least basic education, the Sheikh of one tribe successfully lobbied the government for a school for his people. Because the tribe was not aligned to any rebel group, the success of the Sheikh’s negotiations resulted in the establishment of the Tamorro Mobile School. However, the only government resource he was able to secure was the regular payment of the teacher’s salary (Oxfam, 2003). The tribe provided the remaining resources.

According to Aikman and el Haj, when the community moves from North Darfur to South Darfur in November and camp is erected, four school shelters are constructed from thorn shrub to house four classes. Tamorro is set for the duration of the season until the tribe relocates to North Darfur in June. Each class is taught separately. Tamorro’s only teacher teaches about 188 students, including 36 girls between six to 16 years (Oxfam, 2003). On an average day he teaches grades 1 and 2 for about two hours then set work for the class to do while he teaches grades 3 and 4 for about another two hours. To keep the students on task, the teacher moves between classes to check on the progress, and, if necessary, supplements the work. In the evenings, the teacher offers adult literacy classes to the general community and, working with the sheikh, provides medicine for tribal members and their animals as incentive for parents to send their children to school (Oxfam, 2003).

As a critical part of its integrated community development and capacity-building program, Oxfam, in addition to providing books and instructional material, gives the teacher a sheep as part of his compensation (Oxfam, 2003). Livestock equates to valuable currency in Darfur (SNR, 1996).

According to Aikman and el Haj, while Tamorro’s teacher is hopeful that his marriage to a female teacher from the tribe will lessen the enormous demand of his job, it is not certain where her salary will come from, since the Sudanese government has shown no signs of adjusting its ‘one-teacher-per-school policy’ in Darfur (Oxfam, 2003).

Viability of Tamorro Model
Like other mobile schools in Darfur, Tamorro suffers from the absence of more formidable support, chiefly finance (SNR, 1996). The literature (e.g., The Library of Congress, 1991) shows that limited government support accounts for the tragic fate of schools in the region (The Library of Congress, 1991). The government’s one-teacher-per-school policy places an enormous burden on Tamorro’s sole teacher. No doubt, additional teachers would make instruction and assessment more effective. Under the conditions of a teacher-ratio of 1-to-188, children can only receive the very basic education.

Yet Tamorro, and mobile education in general, within the context of EFA, shows positive prospects towards meeting the basic learning needs of communities in Darfur. Jomtien outlines basic learning needs as:

….Comprising both essential learning tools…. and the basic learning content…. required by human beings to be able to survive, to develop their full capacities, to live and work in dignity, to participate fully in development, to improve the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions, and to continue learning. (UNESCO, 1990)

The Tamorro mobile school, with Oxfam’s support of books for the children and instructional materials for the teacher, presents nomads with the basic learning content that will enable them to be able to survive and make decisions. The school’s continued existence and popularity, even with seasonal relocations and teacher shortage, shows the potential of mobile schools if given the support needed to at least retain additional teachers.

While it is encouraging that the government has established a special administration for nomad education, the present ad hoc manner in which education is delivered demands that such an entity move quickly to establish a standard curriculum to be used in mobile schools. The national curriculum does not recognize the special circumstances of nomads and IDPs, nor does it make accommodation for the unique experiences that such persons bring to the education arena. Further research is needed to assess the overall educational situation in Darfur. In addition, it is imperative that such a curriculum investigate the needs of these persons, as what they desire from the educational experience might be somewhat removed from the expectations of individuals not as affected by the conflict or who do not relocate according to seasons. Lastly, attempts must be made to extend mobile education beyond the fourth grade as the numbers of students enrolling increase.

Conclusion
This research shows that there is an increasing demand for access to basic education in Darfur (Oxfam, 2003; SNR, 1996). The measures taken by communities to recruit and retain teachers and the incentives offered to parents to send their children, including girls, to mobile schools, is remarkable. The
operation of schools such as the Tamorro mobile school points to a deeper craving for education among the general pastoral population and internally displaced persons of Darfur and, the recognition by their leaders of the importance of education.

In order to increase access to basic education, and provide a sense of normalcy in the lives children, structured activities must be provided in a safe and secure environment (Couldrey & Morris (Eds.), 2004; Pigozzi, 1999, UNICEF, 2005). Tamorro offers just such an atmosphere and mobile education offers favorable possibilities for achieving EFA. Since the delivery of education is further complicated by the remote locations of many communities, the movement of pastoral communities, and the internal displacement of persons due to violence, mobile education appears to be more than an optical illusion. The approach, as demonstrated through Tamorro, is a conduit to education for all.

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