WARTIME AND POST-CONFLICT EXPERIENCES IN BURUNDI: AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SURVEY

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Abstract

In this paper, we motivate and outline our micro-level empirical approach to the study of civil war, focusing on our work in Burundi. The centerpiece of our study is an individual level survey of former civil war combatants and civilians in Burundi. A pilot survey has already been completed and the scaled-up survey is currently in the works. The paper outlines the substantive areas of enquiry in our survey: (i) the micro-dimension of civil war onset (recruitment and participation in armed groups) and (ii) the micro-dimension of civil war termination and peace consolidation (peacekeeping, reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, and engagement in peaceful democratic politics). For each of the areas of enquiry, we describe the relevant micro-level dependent variables, micro-level implications of hypotheses to be tested, and empirical strategies that we plan to employ. We use summary statistics from a recently completed pilot survey to illustrate some key points.

Introduction

In this paper, we motivate and outline a micro-level study of individual behavior during civil war, focusing on the civil war in Burundi from 1993-2005. The behaviors under examination include entering into and exiting from armed groups, reacting to interventions such as peacekeeping operations, and engaging in peaceful democratic politics. As we discuss below, we feel that the collection and analysis of micro-level data is a necessary step in the development of theories about the onset and termination of civil wars.

Over the past ten years, political scientists have given increased attention to the causes and consequences of civil wars.[1] This increased attention may be attributable to two primary reasons: (i) political scientists' recognition that civil wars have been responsible for a larger number of deaths than interstate wars since 1945, and (ii) civil wars' superceding international conflict in global prevalence and thus being assigned as a priority on the post-Cold War security agendas of the US and major international organizations.[2]

However, recent scholarship has tended to proceed in two ways: (i) cross-national statistical studies, focusing on country-level attributes, or (ii) descriptive case studies. While immensely valuable in their own ways, both approaches have led to an intellectual cul-de-sac in which once-promising findings have failed to be corroborated by subsequent studies.[3] For example, early findings that ethnic heterogeneity and an abundance of primary commodity exportables were important contributing factors to civil war have not withstood greater scrutiny.[4] Micro-level theories motivated the interest in both of these factors, but the focus on state-level attributes in empirical tests of these theories have glossed over micro-level variation essential for assessing whether they (and other causal mechanisms) are truly relevant. In addition, it is commonly

[1] See Sambanis (2002) for a review of research trends.
[2] For discussion of these two macro-trends, see Fearon and Laitin (2003). Since the mid-1990s, the United Nations and World Bank, among other organizations, had focused attention on articulating their policy doctrines for preventing and containing civil wars; a landmark was United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 *Agenda for Peace*. This emphasis was matched by increased attention to the articulation of peacekeeping doctrine among the major powers, including the US.
[3] See Hegre and Sambanis (2006) for a discussion of the lack of robustness of findings in many of the cross-national civil war research.
[4] With respect to ethnicity see Fearon and Laitin (2003). With respect to natural resources see Fearon (2005), Humphreys (2005), and Hegre and Sambanis (2006).

understood that country-level data on developing countries, which are more prone to civil war than developed countries, suffer from many inadequacies.[5] Case study approaches have tended either to provide narrative illustrations for points tenuously derived from cross-national statistical analysis, to construct descriptive narratives tying together already-available data (often times furnished by governments who themselves had been parties to the conflict in question), or, as narratives, to proceed with little methodological direction or rigor.

Thus, a major advance in the study of civil war would come from filling the empirical gap that currently exists in the civil war literature—that is, from (i) elaborating methods for studying micro-level outcomes such as participation in rebellion, rebel recruitment, changes in attitudes, migration, reintegration, and voter participation, among other outcomes, (ii) refining techniques for gathering suitable micro-level data, and (iii) gathering and using such data to explore the relevance of the many casual mechanisms purported to contribute to the dynamics of civil war.[6] Taking these steps to fill the empirical gap is the aim of this research, focusing in particular on the civil war in Burundi. Substantively the research will gather micro-level data to test hypotheses in two issue areas central to contemporary civil war research: (i) the micro-dimension of civil war onset (recruitment and participation in armed groups) and (ii) the micro-dimension of civil war termination and peace consolidation (peacekeeping, reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, and engagement in peaceful democratic politics).

By practical necessity, micro-level research must proceed one country at a time. Given this constraint, Burundi is at the present a ripe place to conduct such a study. Prior to the implementation of a power-sharing government last March, Burundi had been engulfed in ethnic conflict between the Tutsi-dominated army against Hutu rebel groups since 1993. Over 300,000 people[7] (out of a prewar population of approximately 6 million) are estimated to have died during the conflict, and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. But with the political

[5] See, for example, Przeworksi et al (2000), pp. 117-112, for a discussion on the inadequacies of inequality data.
[6] For a useful discussion of how micro-level approaches can complement and even improve upon macro studies, see Pande and Udry (2005).
[7] This is the figure regularly cited in the popular press and narrative accounts of the war. But as is the case with many death-counts, we are not really sure where this number came from. To our knowledge, no formal enquiry has been conducted to rigorously estimate war-dead between 1993-present. One goal in our study will be to collect data to generate our own war-dead estimate bounded by confidence intervals. We feel that social scientists need to do much more to scrutinize the mortality figures that are available from the popular press.

transition having made significant progress, with international and domestic efforts underway to consolidate the peace, and with memories still fresh, the coming two years provide a tremendous opportunity for studying individual experiences before, during and after the war.

Our research in Burundi will make a strong contribution to the increasingly vibrant "micro-dynamics of civil wars" research program.[8] In the context of this research program, surveys of civilians and former civil war combatants and have been conducted by Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein in Sierra Leone in 2003-4 and Ana Arjona and Stathis Kalyvas in Colombia in 2005. But the Burundi case stands apart from these other two: ethnic tensions were central to the Burundi conflict, unlike in Sierra Leone and Colombia; abduction and other types of coerced participation in rebel groups were extremely rare in the Burundi civil war, unlike in Sierra Leone and Colombia[9]; and the force and autonomy of international policy interventions are less than in Sierra Leone but more than in Colombia. The research in Burundi will make a marked contribution to a research program aiming to deepen our understanding of cross-national variation based on solid micro-foundations.

The centerpiece of our research is a nationwide, individual-level survey of civilians and former civil war combatants in Burundi. We plan to collect data from approximately 3,000 subjects. The data will permit us to conduct micro-level analyses of hypotheses explaining who participated in armed groups and why; whose security, if anyone's, was enhanced by peacekeepers and why; whose post-conflict reintegration prospects are most promising and why; and whose participation in democratic politics was affected by the war and why. The research builds upon an already-completed pilot project, which took place during the summer of 2006. During the pilot, the project team completed 350 closed-ended survey interviews throughout the country with ordinary civilians and "rank-and-file" former civil war combatants[10] as well as a

[8] Those working on complementary projects include Stathis Kalyvas and Ana Arjona at Yale University, Christopher Blattman at University of California at Berkeley, and Belgian economist Philip Verwimp of the "Households in Conflict" Network, among others.

[9] This fact was made clear from the approximately 350 survey interviews conducted during our 2006 pilot study in Burundi.

[10] Our sampling strategy in the pilot was to choose enumeration zones and periods to give equal probability, in principle, for any given ex-combatant or civilian to be selected. With the time and means available, we were able to implement this with respect to ex-combatants but not with respect to civilians. For the ex-combatants, we had data on the current distribution of ex-combatants across communes (the second-smallest administrative unit in Burundi, of which there are 129 if one includes the 13 communes within Bujumbura Mairie). We established the "commune-

series of open-ended interviews with commanders and political leaders from all sides of the conflict. The pilot allowed us to pre-test over 200 survey questions and to clarify subtle points about participation, war termination, and reintegration in Burundi. The pilot study convinced us that this research is feasible and that it will make a major contribution, offering more precise insights on the dynamics of civil war onset, the termination of hostilities, and the consolidation of peace after conflict.

In the rest of this paper, we sketch the questions, variables, and empirical strategies in our four issue areas: (i) recruitment and participation in armed groups; (ii) effects of peacekeeping interventions; (iii) reintegration of ex-combatants; and (iv) changes in democratic participation caused by civil war.

Armed Group Recruitment Strategies and Individual Participation Decisions

The study will collect information on the determinants of participation and recruitment in armed groups. By "participation", we refer individual decisions to serve as full-fledged members of fighting groups, and by "recruitment" we refer to the strategies employed by armed group members to gain new members.[11] The two outcomes are opposite sides of the same coin. Figure 1 gives a snapshot of "participation pathways" during the war for members of the Burundian population, with paths loosely scaled to relative proportion in the population.

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day" as our sampling unit. We then created a pool of commune-days from which we selected our sample. The number of times that a commune was entered into the pool of commune-days was equal to the number of ex-combatants in that commune divided by the minimum number of ex-combatants in any commune, rounded to nearest whole number. Our schedule permitted us to survey over 17 days, thus we randomly selected (with replacement) 17 commune-days. Our sample thus included 16 communes in total (Gihanga commune was selected to be surveyed over two days given the high number of ex-combatants there and thus its heavy weighting in the pool). For each commune-day, we then set for ourselves to sample evenly in three subgroups: demobilized combatants, former civil war combatants currently serving in the military or police, and civilians who were never combatants. Our civilian sample is not geographically representative insofar the correlation between numbers of civilians and ex-combatants across communes is approximately 0 to 0.34. For the scaled-up survey in 2007, we plan to adopt the same approach to for selecting commune-days for our civilians, using population data for weighting in our sampling pool.

[11] In our pilot study, we have information on whether or not individuals were members of armed groups at any of four points in time during the conflict (1993, 1996, 2000, and 2004). Other time-varying individual attributes include age, whether or not one is in school, and migration history; we also have some time-varying information on community attributes, such as economic conditions and numbers of already-joined armed-group members from a given commune. Altogether, this information allows us to use a "person-period" unit of analysis in modeling participation dynamics. Doing so makes full use of the information available and means that the number of observations from our 359 survey interviews becomes 1,436.



Figure 1: "Participation pathways" of members of the Burundian population, 1993-2006. Groups included in the dashed box represent the population from which the 2006 pilot study was able to sample. Significantly, upon the signature of the September 2006 peace agreement between the Burundian government and the FNL-Rwasa faction, the 2007 survey may include members of this last faction.

As is clear, participation was a rare outcome in the grand scheme of things, even compared to death and displacement. Figure 2 shows results from the 2006 pilot survey with respect to modes of recruitment. A striking finding here is that reports of coercive recruitment were very few.[12]

[12] Such was not the case for the Humphreys-Weinstein survey in Sierra Leone, suggesting that different recruitment equilibria may have obtained in the two contexts.



Figure 2: Modes of participation and recruitment in rebel factions and FAB. Note: all of the "other" responses among the FAB interviewees referred to recruits having responded to a communiqué on the national radio to take an examination for placement in the military.

Significantly, the research will allow us to address the "greed versus grievance" debate using micro-level data rather than relying on cross-national indicators, as past work has done with limited success. In Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) work, the concept of "greed" hinges on the availability of economic opportunities for would-be rebel recruiters to launch a rebellion and the absence of prohibitive opportunity costs to would-be recruits for joining a rebellion.[13] For these authors, it is this economic opportunity structure that determines participation in and, thus, the onset of civil wars. Although Collier and Hoeffler find empirical support for their greed hypothesis, subsequent sensitivity analysis by Hegre and Sambanis (2006), a replication study by Fearon (2005), and findings in a collection of case studies published by the World Bank in 2005[14] do not consistently support the hypothesis. Even when certain variables have proven to be robust in determining the likelihood of civil war onset, scholars have differed significantly in their interpretations. An example is the robust finding that low per capita income significantly increases likelihood of civil war onset; for Collier and Hoeffler (2004), per capita growth is taken to be significant as a proxy for opportunity costs, while for Fearon and Laitin (2003), per capita growth is taken to be significant as a proxy for state capacity. The reasons for these divergent interpretations, it seems, are that the mechanisms linking rebel leader initiatives at the top with a following from below remain obscure, mostly because the relevant data simply is not there. Only by filling this empirical gap can any sense be made of such inconsistent results.

In order to assess whether or how "greed" motivations played a role in participation choices, our survey will gather data on the opportunities and opportunity costs facing recruiters and would-be recruits. The survey will ask both civilian and former combatant subjects that were approached by an armed group if they anticipated receiving money, food, or shelter for joining. We will examine whether recruiting opportunities such as proximity to safe havens affected recruitment patterns. We also ask questions about individuals' backgrounds and the socio-economic conditions of their communities to gauge opportunity costs. Given that we know whether or not the subject ultimately chose to join, we will use this information to determine whether offers of

[13] The former is proxied by natural resources, generous diaspora populations, and support from other governments, and the latter is proxied by per capita income, secondary school enrollment, and the economic growth rate. The "economic opportunity" hypothesis is central to the civil war literature, having been argued most forcefully by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Miguel et al (2004). It is the theoretical approach that lead to the focus on primary commodity exports discussed in the introduction above. The gapproach owes a great debt to the rationalist approach to rebellion of Popkin (1979).

[14] Collier and Sambanis (2005).

money or goods are more likely to be a) made to certain types of individuals, or b) accepted by certain types of individuals. Are rebel groups more likely to offer material benefits to individuals with specific characteristics, such as more education or special influence over potential supporters? Are wealthy recruits offered more to compensate for their opportunity cost? Only an individual-level assessment of participation can answer these questions. Finally, Collier and Hoeffler's greed hypothesis takes the credibility of recruiters' commitments for granted, but we will not. By (i) asking whether and why subjects believed they would receive offers and (ii) examining the timing of participation decisions relative to events such as military victories, we will examine when recruiters' material and ideological appeals were deemed credible.

Figure 3 shows results from the 2006 pilot survey with respect to recruits' expectations of benefits. The graphs show differences in the expectations of FAB versus rebel recruits. Indeed, it seems that FAB recruits mostly have character of "fighting for the money" whereas rebels do not. These preliminary findings suggest that some further consideration may be required in assessing how material motivations feature in participation and recruitment.[15]

The survey questions also address "grievance," the counterpart in Collier and Hoeffler's framework to greed. The term "grievance," used in the context of rebellion, can be considered an umbrella term for feelings of repression, inequality, or simple hatred of another ethnic group. Collier and Hoeffler find little support for their grievance hypotheses in predicting the onset of civil war cross-nationally, with an exception perhaps being their finding that conditions of "ethnic dominance" increase the risk of civil war. However, it is not clear that they offer a conclusive test.[16] In addition, other scholars have not been so quick to dismiss grievances in determining patterns of civil war participation. Fine-grained case studies by Petersen (2002) suggest that conditions of state weakness combined with emotions-inducing antecedents can ignite violence between groups.[17] The implication is that grievances may indeed determine patterns in the extent and manner of individual participation.

[15] See Weinstein (2006).
[16] Problems include model misspecification owing to the possible non-monotonic concavity (or "curvilinearity") in the relationship between conflict likelihood and factors such as ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic "polarization," or regime repressiveness, and measurement error in the data available on ethnicity and income inequality.
[17] Petersen's work builds on a social-psychological tradition of scholarship that owes a great debt to earlier work by Scott (1976) and Horowitz (1985).



Figure 3: Expectations of benefits among rebels and members of the national armed forces (FAB).

The survey will collect data on civilians and former combatants to clarify how grievances affect participation. The survey asks whether armed-group recruiters made ideological appeals to tap into popular grievances. Again, when combining this information with the respondent's background information, we can draw conclusions about what types of individuals were more likely to be subject to ideological appeals, and who tended to respond to them. Since we will know the year that the ex-combatants joined the fighting group, we will be able combine this information with knowledge about the group's success at various points during the war to assess when groups perceive ideological appeals to be most compelling. For instance, we will be able to discern whether groups were more likely to use ideological appeals during successful periods, when it appeared their cause would prevail, or during periods of weakness when potential combatants might feel most disillusioned or repressed.

In addition to making general ideological appeals a group might reference specific events, such as massacres or assassinations, which serve as focal points around which leaders can rally support. Knowing what types of events are referenced will help address a current controversy: do episodes of past violence fade in the collective memory over time, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) claim, or do traumatic events have the potential to become focal points for generation to come?[18] The survey asks the respondents whether they recall hearing specific events discussed by elites or within the community. The menu of events from which respondents can select include violent episodes from several decades ago, such as the Hutu massacres by the military in 1972, along with more recent events, such as the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye. By parsing out which events are referenced most frequently, we will be able to make statements about how the elite use focal points, whether to inspire change or to incite violence.

The survey also incorporates questions on emotions in order to complement new work on emotion-based decision making.[19] Petersen (2002), for instance, cites four key emotions in his explanation of ethnic war: fear, hatred, rage and resentment. Distinguishing between these possible emotional motivations can only be done by focusing on the individual. Preliminary results from this past summer's pilot survey suggest that fighters might be motivated as much by

[18] For elaboration on this idea, see Volkan (1994).
[19] In addition to Petersen, see Elster (1999) and Uvin (1999).

fear as by greed or grievance, which echoes Uvin's (1999) assessment of violence in Burundi. Fear can come from a number of sources: the looming threat posed by other fighting groups, the demands made by the recruiting group, or the expectations of the community. The survey distinguishes between these sources by asking whether or not the ex-combatant joined out of fear at all, what he was afraid would happen if he chose not to join, who he thought would harm him and how the threat was communicated. Our measures will allow us to assess whether emotions-based factors affect the opportunity-cost threshold that determines a recruit's willingness to join an armed movement.

One methodological innovation that we will introduce will be to correct for potential biases caused by changes in the population of Burundi that occurred between now and the period when most participation and recruitment decisions were made.[20] The population of Burundi suffered very high mortality and expatriation levels during the war.[21] To the extent that the factors associated with mortality and expatriation are also associated with participation and recruitment, these factors need to be accounted for in estimating parameters in a model predicting participation in an armed group. Thus, we will collect data on deaths and expatriation to develop a selection model that will allow us to correct statistical parameter estimates of the types of individuals who are likely to participate. Such an effort has yet to be undertaken in any of the existing micro-level work; but clearly, any biases in the subject population resulting from death and displacement must be corrected.

Peacekeeping at the Micro-Level

The second issue area is a micro-level examination of peacekeeping. How does peacekeeping affect the prospects for peace? Since the end of the Cold War the UN has increasingly relied on peacekeeping to manage ethnic and civil conflicts in many areas of the world. Today tens of thousands of soldiers serving under the UN banner are deployed in war-torn countries to help

[20] Our pilot work suggests that most decisions to join armed groups were made in the period 1995-1998, in which case about a decade will have intervened between most participation decisions and the survey.
[21] As mentioned above, one in twenty of the prewar population is estimated to have died, although we are still working on checking the reliability of that number. As for expatriation, UNHCR estimates the number of Burundian refugees still outside the country to be approximately 438,000 (out of a current population of 6 to 7 million), although some of these had been displaced during earlier conflicts.

end hostilities and maintain peace. Despite the increasing resort to peacekeeping, we have only vague ideas of how peacekeeping contributes to the durability of peace. Empirical work supports the claim that peacekeeping helps to prolong periods of peace following civil war.[22] However, all of these studies have taken a macro, country-level approach. The theories that guide these empirical studies are actually micro-level theories, because they explain how peacekeeping alters individual combatants' incentives such that they are willing to lay down arms and support the peace process. Indeed, authors have proposed a number of mechanisms linking the presence of peacekeepers to individuals decisions to refrain from further resort to force.[23] But the macro-level tests that have been conducted thus far do not allow us to examine if and under what conditions such mechanisms are relevant.

At the micro level, the dependent variables of interest are the behavior and attitudes of combatants with respect to the peace process, as well as the distribution of types of combatants who enter into the peace process. The most relevant combatant behavior is engagement in hostilities after a ceasefire, and relevant combatant attitudes include senses of security or trust that members of enemy factions will not renege. Our survey will collect information on both of these aspects of combatants' commitment to the peace process. In addition, the information that we gather on combatants' motivations for participating in armed groups will allow us to separate them into types, such as "insecurity-driven" or "material-gain-driven."

Perhaps the predominant theoretical explanation for how and why peacekeeping works is that that it enables combatants to overcome commitment problems in agreeing to ceasefires and disarmament and demobilization processes.[24] Walter (2002) suggests that the commitment problems are motivated by the insecurity arising from the absence of a third-party enforcer, defense-provider, and monitor to ensure that belligerents comply with demobilization and disarmament agreements. Thus, in Walter's view, the role of peacekeepers is to play this third-party role to build confidence between belligerents and help them overcome security dilemmas. The implication is that changes in the deterrent and information-providing credibility of the peacekeeping operation should correspond with changes in the types of combatants willing to

[22] Hartzell et al (2001); Fortna (2004); and Gilligan and Sergenti (2006).
[23] See Fortna (2004).
[24] Walter (2002) and Fearon (2004).

engage in the peace process. In the Burundi case, if we take for granted that the credibility of the peacekeeping operation increased steadily over time, then insecurity-driven ex-combatants should be most likely to have entered later in the process.[25] The spatial and temporal distribution of insecurity-related attitudes and actions should correspond with the distribution of credible peacekeeping deterrents. Our survey will allow us to perform these tests in assessing the "commitment problem" hypothesis.

Another approach to peacekeeping is proposed by Stedman (1997)'s discussion of "spoilers." Stedman suggests that no peace process is perfect, and that peace processes always involve parties and factions that find the success of the peace process to be against their interests. The contribution of peacekeeping to a peace process thus depends on peacekeepers' ability to manage would-be spoilers. Effective management of spoilers depends on identifying their motivations and then providing the appropriate inducements and deterrents to bring them into the peace process. At the micro-level, the implication is that the spatial and temporal distribution of combatants who enter into the peace process should depend on the corresponding presence of appropriate incentives. Factions composed of mostly "greedy" members should only become parties to the process when credible material offers become available to them. Thus, the roll-out of material assistance programs should determine patterns of participation in and attitudes toward the peace process. Analogous outcomes should hold for other motivations, including the participation of resentment-driven combatants in relation to the political process, or the participation of insecurity-driven combatants in relation to the deployment of peacekeepers.[26] By collecting data on motivations and on the roll-out of peacekeeping and other types of interventions, we will be able to test the "spoiler" problem hypothesis.

A third hypothesis linking peacekeeping to durable peace is peacekeeping's role in signaling the material commitment of the "international community" and thus altering beliefs on the ground about post-war prospects and the costs of ceasefire violations.[27] This would directly affect the incentives of political leaders for choosing force and would have an indirect effect in shrinking

[25] In other words, the distribution of the timing of entry into the peace process by insecurity-driven ex-combatants should be skewed toward later periods.
[26] Thus, Stedman's logic encompasses the "commitment problem" hypothesis—indeed, they are not mutually excusive.
[27] Fortna (2004).

the pool of would-be recruits. By examining whether ex-combatants and civilians alike have a brighter view of international assistance now than they did in past periods, we can comment on whether this "audience cost" hypothesis has any bearing on developments in Burundi.[28]

Figure 4 shows results from the 2006 pilot survey, providing a notional illustration of our empirical strategy. The figures show counts of demobilized combatants (both rebels and FAB) who handed in their weapons at different time periods in the peace process. Assuming that credibility of material and security offers were rising steadily over time, then the graphs could be consistent with a story saying that peacekeepers targeted *material motivations* effectively, whereas *security motivated* combatants were driven by other factors to disarm. However, more information is needed on the goods that were on offer through interventions and factors that affected senses of credibility. There are also problems with this measure, because only those combatants who were demobilized actually handed in weapons. Most civil war combatants—including the most capable and loyal—were integrated into the armed forces or police. Thus, for our scaled-up survey, we have identified "entrance into *zones de rassemblement*" as a better measure for entrance into the peace process.

[28] Note that in this case, we do seek to explain variation at the individual level. Rather, the large-N survey will allow us to take an accurate measure of the mean attitude of the population. In doing so, we can merely "comment" on the plausibility of the "audience cost" hypothesis, rather than claim to perform a genuine test of the hypothesis.



Figure 4: Counts of demobilized combatants handing in weapons, by time period in the peace process.

Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

Reintegration into civilian life is the ostensible terminal stage of a combatant's civil war experience and the counterpart to participation. For the purposes of this research, reintegration is to be measured in three chief dimensions: social, economic, and political. By social reintegration, we refer to an ex-combatant's self-reported relations with family and members of his or her community. By economic reintegration, we refer to an ex-combatant's ability to find a productive livelihood in the post-war context. By political reintegration, we refer to a former civil war combatant's commitment to peaceful and democratic political expression.[29]

Unlike recruitment/participation, the rigorous study of post-civil war reintegration is in its infancy. Some macro-level studies exist, particularly studies evaluating programming of major international institutions like UN agencies and the World Bank.[30] However, focusing as they do on macro factors like program design and conflict settlement terms, these studies do not explain individual-level variation in reintegration prospects. To our knowledge, only two studies have attempted to study post-civil war reintegration at the micro-level. The first, by Humphreys and Weinstein (2005), finds that ex-combatants' participation in United Nations-sponsored disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming in Sierra Leone had no measurable effect on improving the reintegration prospects of ex-combatants. The authors also find that success in any one of the three dimensions of reintegration is uncorrelated with success in any other, and that the causes of success in each dimension are particular to that dimension. Blattman (2006)'s ongoing work in Northern Uganda has focused on economic reintegration, assessing the labor market successes of former abductees into the Lord's Resistance Army. Blattman finds evidence that being removed from the labor market during formative adolescent years and sensitivity to wartime trauma, manifested in symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, are significant obstacles to successful economic reintegration.

[29] Our study of reintegration will attempt to explain both individual-level variations among ex-combatants as well as differences, if any, between the ex-combatant and civilian populations. From a policy and justice perspective, it is very important to determine whether distributions of outcomes among ex-combatants differ significantly from among civilians. For example, in order to assess whether ex-combatant economic prospects differ from civilians, it is important to assess whether mean incomes, income variability, and the income distributions across the two camps are significantly different.

[30] See for example Colletta et al (1996) and the studies contributed to the Government of Sweden's *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration* (2006)



Figure 5: Ex-combatants' social reintegration experiences and civilian attitudes toward abusive combatants. The notion that this conflict had "grassroots" is corroborated by measures of social reintegration. However, we do see differences across ethnic lines. What these suggest is that it may be worthwhile to look into how variation in community support affects reintegration outcomes; this is true at the macro-cross-conflict level as well as at the inter-community and individual level.

The thinness of micro-level literature on reintegration exists despite the fact that the international community has committed major resources to support such programming. The World Bank-led Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, of which Burundi is a beneficiary, draws from a $500 million fund for its reintegration programming in seven countries. Similar amounts are dispensed in reintegration programs currently directed by UN agencies in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus, our research in Burundi will mark significant progress toward creating knowledge in a high-stakes policy area.

Our research will thus build on the studies by Humphreys and Weinstein (2005) and Blattman (2006) and explore other important hypotheses in characterizing the determinants of individual reintegration success. We will collect data on ex-combatants and their community-members' attitudes to determine whether community punishment of members of abusive factions or social-psychological disorders from exposure to wartime traumas impede social or economic reintegration, as appears to have been the case in Sierra Leone and Uganda. Data from the 2006 pilot study suggest that ex-combatants themselves rarely report that they are having problems with social reintegration, a finding that is consistent with results from the Humprheys-Weinstein study. Also, civilian attitudes tended to be quite conciliatory, although there were clear differences across ethnic groups in whether reconciliation were conditioned on ex-combatants' efforts to show that they were sorry for any abuses committed during the war (Figure 5).

We will also examine whether an ex-combatant's age at the time of recruitment affects social and economic reintegration success, drawing from findings in Uganda about the harm of social life disruption during early adolescence. If these findings carry over to the Burundi context, they will make an important statement about the lingering consequences of wartime abuses for the consolidation of peace.

As a test of another important hypothesis relating to economic integration, we will collect data to determine whether factors that affect the quality of information available to individual ex-combatants about the prospects of different livelihood options—factors such as literacy, residing

in one's prewar community, and number of family members surviving, among others—also affect economic reintegration prospects.

In examining the causes of political reintegration, we will draw from Wantchekon (2004)'s recent work to assess whether the commitment to democracy in Burundi is associated with perceptions of whether the military outcome was stalemated.[31] We will also assess whether this commitment to democracy has only seized the imagination of the easily persuaded and uneducated, as was found in Sierra Leone, and whether the commitment to democracy is anything more than a reflection of majority (i.e. Hutu) group interests. The benefits of reintegration programming will be evaluated by testing whether sustained participation in one of the nationally run reintegration programs contributed to higher levels of reintegration success in any of the three dimensions.

Civil War's Effects on Democratic Participation

A central issue in the literature on civil war is the relationship between violent conflict and democratic practice. A striking fact that came out of our 2006 pilot survey is that participation in political campaigns and voting actually increased significantly between the 1993 and 2005 elections, even though there was no substantial change in electoral institutions (Figure 6). Preliminary results and interviews with a number of key players suggest that democracy might have been strengthened by the war—indeed the increases . Given the constancy of institutions, the reasons for the changes in democratic participation would have to come from the changes in attitudes and in social, political, and military organization brought on by the war. This discovery dovetails perfectly with Wantchekon (2004)'s recent work on the ability of civil war to promote democracy and Wood (2003)'s work on the transformative effects of civil war on social and political organization. This possibility also turns on its head the "elections cause war" logic argued by Mansfield and Snyder (2005). The data collected will allow us to precisely characterize the nature of these changes in attitudes and organization.

[31] Such is the logic proposed by Wantchekon (2004) in his explanation of how civil wars can produce democracy.





Figure 6: The data from the 2006 pilot study suggest a 13% increase in turnout—amounting to about 1 million "new voters." When we disaggregate, we see that the outcomes do not simply reflect a one-sided "ethnic liberation" story. *NB: We have some concerns about the way the rally participation data was entered, and thus we are holding off on interpreting the apparent counter trend here. For more information, please contact the authors.*

The dependent variables of interest in this area of enquiry will be (i) voting in the 1993 and 2005 elections in Burundi, (ii) participation in rallies or campaigns in the run-up to these elections, (iii) expressed party affiliation, and (iv) sense of political efficacy and faith in peaceful and democratic political processes. We include a multitude of dependent variables here because of the we are interested in accurately characterizing the "story" of how the civil war in Burundi affected democratic participation in the country. Are the changes largely a reflection of the liberation of the majority ethnic group? Or are they reflective of processes that actually deepened commitments to the democratic process across all groups?

We apply three empirical strategies in our study of changes of democratic participation. First, and most simply, will be to examine cross-sectional variation in each of the dependent variables. Second, we will test for "structural change"—in the econometric sense—between the 1993 election and the 2005 election. Thus, do we see changes in the parameters on the variables predicting voting, campaign or rally participation, or party affiliation in 1993 versus 2005? If so, do they correspond to the "liberation" story, "democratic deepening" story, or some other story? The structural change approach will allow us to use data on the likely-to-be-large number of sample subjects who were minors in 1993, and were thus ineligible to formally participate in democratic politics in 1993. Third, we will use a "first differencing" approach to estimate models predicting how individuals' democratic participation (voting, participating in campaigns, or party affiliation) may have been changed between 1993 and 2005.[32]

As mentioned, our interest in this topic arose out of a surprise finding from our pilot study. Thus, we are still reviewing the literature on this issue, and would welcome suggestions on relevant hypotheses.

[32] In both cases, because we will be estimating parameters on the 1993 population, we will have to correct for any biases introduced through death or displacement, or any other factors that may make our sample systematically different from the 1993 voting age population. In doing so, we will apply the results from the sample selection model discussed above for our study of participation and recruitment.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to justify and sketch out areas of enquiry in the micro-level study of civil wars, with a focus on our ongoing work in Burundi. We intend this to be a contribution to the increasingly vibrant "micro-dynamics of civil war" research program. As such, we hope that our work in Burundi can be used a point of reference for others working at the micro-level on conflicts elsewhere. In addition, we fully intend for our work to contribute to theoretical refinements that can guide future cross-national work. Our understanding of the "micro-dynamics" research program is that it intends to contribute to general knowledge about civil wars, but with heightened nuance and verisimilitude, rather than being a retreat to regionalized specialization.

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