
Edmund
S.
Phelps
International Affairs, Suite 1126
Phone: 212-854-2060
Dept. Phone: 212-854-3680
Fax: 212-854-3735
Email: esp2@columbia.edu
Edmund Phelps was
born in 1933 in Evanston, Ill., spent his childhood in Chicago
and, from age six, grew up in Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. He
earned his B.A. from Amherst in 1955 and his Ph.D. from Yale
in 1959. He is McVickar Professor of Political Economy at
Columbia University, Director of Columbia’s Center
on Capitalism and Society. He was the winner of the
2006 Nobel Prize in Economics. His
career began with a stint at the RAND Corporation. Back east
in 1960, he held positions at Yale and its Cowles Foundation
until 1966, then a professorship for five years at Penn. In
1970 he moved to New York
and joined Columbia
in 1971.
Phelps’s work can be
seen as a program to put “people as we know them” back into
economic models – to take into account the incompleteness of
their information and their knowledge and to study the
effects of their expectations and beliefs on the workings of
markets. He has adopted this perspective in studying
unemployment and inclusion, economic growth, business swings
and economic dynamism.
Phelps holds many
honorary doctorates and professorships, including from the
Université libre de Bruxelles (2010), Tsinghua
University (2007) and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de
Paris (2006), among others. Phelps is a Fellow of the National
Academy of Science and a Distinguished Fellow of the American
Economic Association, and in 2001 a Festschrift conference was
held in his honor. In 2008, he was named Chevalier de la
Légion d’Honneur and awarded the Premio Pico della
Mirandola and the Kiel Global Economy Prize. The same year the
UBA Law School established the Catedra Phelps and the Phelps
Medal for Innovation. In 2010, he was appointed Dean of New
Huadu Business School at Minjiang University in Fuzhou. In
2011, Professor Phelps received the Louise Blouin Creative
Leadership Award and was named a Full Foreign Member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences and in 2012 he was elected an
Honorary Patron of the University Philosophical Society of
Trinity College and was awarded the Mendeleev Medal for
Achievement in the Sciences.
Phelps’s work
is best known for introducing in the late ’60s an expectations-based
microeconomics into the theory of employment determination and
price-wage dynamics. Keynes’s great work of the ’30s had left it
unexplained why involuntary unemployment is observed even in the
best of times and why a drop of aggregate “effective demand” causes
a rise of unemployment – why not a prompt fall of money wages and
prices by just enough to forestall a fall of employment? The
challenge was to resolve these issues while continuing to posit the
elementary rationality that economics traditionally ascribed to workers, consumers and firms.
In Phelps’s “micro-macro” models, attaining equilibrium in
the markets – meaning participants’ expectations consistent with
their actions – does not generally eliminate unemployment, not even
involuntary unemployment. In a 1968 paper, the economy's firms face
a management problem, costly employee turnover, and a firm's wage
policy aims to balance payroll cost against turnover cost. On an
equilibrium path, the going wage at each point is generally an
"incentive wage," hence a wage that is more than enough to hire
employees; but that results in “job rationing" and thus involuntary
unemployment throughout. In a 1969 paper, Phelps sketched an economy
of widely separated "islands" in which workers have to decide
whether to accept the local market wage or to move on. Even in an
equilibrium scenario, workers on an island with an appreciably
inferior wage will get on the boat to try another island, suffering
voluntary unemployment during
their search.
The main discovery from these models was the potential for
disequilibrium and its effects on economic activity.
Errors
in wage or price expectations would disturb the volume of
unemployment. If, in the labor turnover model, each firm deciding
its next wage, say, underestimates the wage being set at
the other firms, i.e., the actual wage exceeds the expected wage,
the error reduces the firms’ expected turnover and hence their
expected costs, thus encouraging them to pay less and hire more,
which drives down unemployment. If, in the islands model, the
average wage exceeds what workers expect it is, the underestimate
prompts some workers to accept a job rather than go on searching,
so, again, unemployment drops. In the same spirit, a 1967 paper
supposed that an underestimate by each firm of the price being set
by the others would encourage increases in output supply and labor
demand, raising employment; a 1970 paper introducing the “customer
market,” coauthored with Sidney Winter, supplied a basis for this
idea. From all this, an answer to the puzzle of Keynes emerged: An
unperceived rise in “effective demand,” in driving up the average
money wage and the price level, would reduce unemployment if the
average firm (or island) did not know or imagine that the general
price and wage level had increased by as much as its own – i.e.,
if the actual price or wage inflation exceeded the expected. A
persistent over-estimation of upcoming money wages and
prices could cause a protracted depression. The volume deriving
from a conference Phelps organized at Penn, Microeconomic Foundations of
Employment and Inflation Theory (Norton, 1970), was the
first wave in this new macroeconomics. Applications to demand
management were made in the 1967 paper and in his monograph
Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory (Norton, 1972).
These prototype micro-macro models contained another
departure from convention. The models usually postulated that the
equilibrium path of the unemployment rate depended only on
non-monetary considerations, hence not upon the expected or the
actual inflation rate. This supposed “neutrality” of money and
inflation (dubbed the
natural rate hypothesis by Milton Friedman in his parallel work on
disequilibrium labor supply) nicely simplified the analysis of
shocks and most econometricians found it descriptive enough in
normal cases. The striking implication of this postulate was that,
once expectations adjust, the inflation rate that was targeted by
the central bank would have no effect on the subsequent path of
unemployment rate and hence no effect on the medium-run steady-state
level to which any equilibrium path (with its distinct starting
point) would lead. Thus, raising the inflation rate target might
advance an employment recovery but not improve the end result. This
logically inessential but apparently realistic feature of the new
models challenged the Keynesian tenet, embodied in the famous
Phillips curve, that monetary or
fiscal stimulus could achieve a lower unemployment rate by
choosing a higher inflation rate.
Phelps spent much of the ‘70s replying to a further development from
other quarters: to theoretical demonstrations that a departure from
the current equilibrium path would be merely momentary if every
economic actor had so-called rational expectations. (When all the
“news” arrives at month’s end, prices and wages would jump precisely
to regain equilibrium.) In frequently collaborative research at
Columbia in the 1970s he argued that if most wage and price setting
is nonsynchronous, such a
deviation would take time to die out even if everyone had "rational"
expectations. See, for example, a 1977 paper with John Taylor. This
work helped start what came to be known as New Keynesian
macroeconomics. In the early 1980s Phelps argued that if
participants believe their preferred model of sales, employment and
prices is not shared by all participants, the deviation might be
protracted. Various consequences of this pluralism of beliefs,
actual or feared, are analyzed in his paper and other papers in the
conference volume he edited with Roman Frydman, Individual
Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes (Cambridge,
1983).
While these views went on winning support among
macroeconomics experts, the last two decades were testing times.
The ‘80s witnessed a powerful slump in Europe with no evidence of
unexpected disinflation or deflation; the latter half of the ‘90s
brought a strong boom to the U.S. economy and northern Europe
without evidence of unexpected inflation—all contrary to the
simple models. In response, Phelps began in the late ‘80s to
develop a theory of the equilibrium path itself – a theory of the
determinants of the natural unemployment rate. The models built
and their first statistical test were set forth in Structural Slumps: The Modern
Equilibrium Theory of Unemployment, Interest and Assets
(Harvard, 1994). Subsequent papers in this project include
‘Growth, wealth and the natural rate: is Europe’s jobs crisis a
growth crisis?’ ‘The rise and downward
trend of the natural rate,’ ‘Natural rate theory and OECD unemployment,’
and ‘Lessons in natural-rate dynamics.
At the level of historical understanding, this theoretical
development served to underpin hypotheses linking the ‘80s slump to
a worldwide rise of real interest rates, the sharp transition to
more moderate productivity growth in the European economies, and the
growth of the welfare state to huge proportions, especially on the European continent. At a more general
level, this work pointed to the crucial role for employment
determination played by the values (also known as shadow prices)
that firms place on the various sorts of business assets with
which they operate: the employee with the needed firm-specific
preparation, the customer, and nonhuman tangibles such as
industrial plant and office facilities. This feature of the theory
suggested that the prices of shares traded on organized stock
exchanges might be serviceable as observable proxies for the
mostly unobservable asset values, which opened up new statistical
tests of the theory. See 'Behind this
structural boom: the role of
asset valuations,' and 'Roots
of the recent recoveries: labor reforms or private-sector forces?’
This
equilibrium theory of endogenous structural unemployment turned
out to supply an explanation of the inflationless booms in the
late ‘90s. In their thinking about the long wave of business
expansions in the late 19th century, the German School under
Spiethof and Cassel suggested that prospects of new industries or
new methods requiring further capital, and this interpretation can
be translated into an unexpected jump in the values that firms,
looking to the new opportunities, place on one or more business
assets. (An April 2000 Wall Street Journal
essay provides an introduction to this analysis.)
Phelps’s interest in structural booms alongside his interest,
dating from the early ‘90s, in the questions raised by the professed
desire of some eastern European countries to build predominantly
capitalist economies have led to mounting research on his part into
the functioning and performance of capitalist institutions. The
first step, following some years surveying the interwar literature
on theory, was to confirm, in a 1996 paper (forthcoming) with Darius
Palia, that indeed countries with more of the economy’s industry
under private ownership achieve faster productivity growth, other
things equal. The next step was to ask whether the economies that
boomed in the late ‘90s (the U.S., Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and so
forth) had the sort of institutions and resources that entrepreneurs
under capitalism require to a greater extent than the countries that
did not boom (Italy, Germany, Austria, Spain and so forth); the
results here were published in a 2001 paper with Gylfi Zoega. (An August 2000 Financial Times essay presents
an elementary exposition.) Phelps and Zoega are now embarking on a
broader assessment of the effects of
the institutions of capitalism, with special attention to
productivity level and job satisfaction.
Alongside his recent research on capitalism Phelps has also
done research on the causes and cures of joblessness and low wages
among disadvantaged workers. His recent book for the general public
Rewarding Work (Harvard, 1997)
combines these interests. Subsequent papers on these themes include
'A strategy for employment
and growth: the failure of statism, welfarism, and free markets,'
an OECD conference paper titled 'The
importance of inclusion and the power of job subsidies to increase it,’
and a critique of proposals for stakeholder grants and universal
income benefits titled ‘Subsidize wages.’
Phelps recently served as Senior Advisor to the project Italy
in Europe at the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Italy, for
three years until May 2000. He was a member of the International
Panel on Economic Policy of the OFCE in Paris in the 1990s, and
co-organizer of the annual Villa Mondragone seminar of the
University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' from 1990 to 2000. He was a charter
member of the Economic Advisory council of the EBRD and wrote most
of the Annual Economic Outlook, which appeared in September 1993. He
has been a consultant at the U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Senate
Finance Committee, and Federal Reserve Board.
In 2001 Phelps founded with Roman Frydman the Center
on Capitalism & Society at Columbia (now a unit of Arts
and Sciences) to promote and conduct research on capitalism.
Among his other books are
Fiscal Neutrality toward Economic Growth (McGraw-Hill, 1965) and
Golden Rules of Economic Growth (Norton, 1966), his selected
papers in Studies in Macroeconomic Theory (Academic Press, 1980),
the reader Economic Justice (Penguin, 1974), a conference volume
Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory (Basic Books, 1975), his
textbook Political Economy (Norton,
1985), the monograph with J.P. Fitoussi, The Slump in Europe
(Blackwell, 1988), and his Arne Ryde lectures Seven Schools of
Macroeconomic Thought (Oxford, 1990).
Phelps was elected to the National Academy of Sciences (USA)
in 1981, was made a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic
Association in 2000, and was elected to be a full member of the
Russian Academy of Science in December of 2011. (Citation.)
He is also a former vice-president of the Association, a fellow of
the Econometric Society, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
and the New York Academy of Sciences. He was a Guggenheim fellow in
1978, a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavior
Science in 1969-70 and visiting scholar at the Russell Sage
Foundation in 1993-94. He holds a Ph.D. from Yale University (1959).
In 1985 he was awarded an honorary degree from his alma mater,
Amherst College. In June 2001 he received an honorary doctorate from
the University of Mannheim and from the University of Rome “Tor
Vergata,” in October 2003 from Universidade Nova Lisboa, in July
2004 from University of Paris Dauphine and in October 2004 from the
University of Iceland. He was made an honorary professor at the
Renmin University, Beijing, in May 2004. He also holds honorary
doctorates from the Institut d'Etudes des Sciences Politiques de
Paris (2006), the Universidad de Buenos Aires (2007),
Tsinghua University (2007), and the Université libre
de Bruxelles (2010). An international Festschrift in
his honor was held at Columbia University in October 2001 and the
600 page conference volume was published by Princeton University
Press in 2003 (Knowledge,
Information and Expectations in Modern Economics P. Aghion,
R. Frydman, J.E. Stiglitz and M. Woodford, eds.)
Business Website: edmundphelps.com
The Center on Capitalism and Society: www.capitalism.columbia.edu
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Last Update: August 25,
2014