Uniting Religion and Politics in a Bid for Autonomy: Lamas in Exile in China and America

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An examination of the activities of Tibetan lamas in China in the early decades of this century reveals the repetition of centuries-old traditions as well as innovations associated with modernity. Most interesting for those who are familiar only with the current interest in Tibetan Buddhism in America is the fact that many of the strategies for propagating Buddhism to a non-Tibetan audience and seeking support for an autonomous Tibetan polity have earlier antecedents. The spread of Tibetan Buddhism in China, and later in the West, has been intimately linked to the political status of exiled Tibetan lamas. For this reason, this chapter discusses the connection between certain prominent Tibetan lamas’ search for political patronage and the Tibetan Buddhist mission. The host of other Tibetan Buddhists with little interest or involvement in politics who helped to disseminate their religion in China and in America must unfortunately be neglected here. However, I should add that, both in China and America, ethnic Tibetan and Mongol lamas who focused more exclusively on teaching religion were important forerunners, preparing the ground, so to speak, for the later political activities of the lamas who are the subject of this chapter.

Viewing the activities of Tibetans in China in the early twentieth century allows us to discern patterns that provide significant parallels to the current place of Tibetan Buddhism in contemporary America. The assertion that these lamas were merely the pawns of Chinese politicians is a commonplace, while few Americans have a historically informed perspective on the current Dalai Lama’s relations with the American government. I contend that all of these lamas, past and present, have exercised an agency that elevates their roles above that of pawns in someone else’s game. At the same time, I recognize the very real context of events (or, in Buddhist terms, the nexus of causes and conditions) that serves to limit these actors’ choices. Among the issues I will discuss are the enduring role of nationalism in prompting Tibetan “missions” abroad, the initial religious nature of such missions, their gradual politicization, and finally a combination of religious and political activities that has been a characteristic feature of Tibetan Buddhism for centuries.

In the study of the cross-cultural transfer of Buddhism and globalization, the Tibetan Buddhist example holds a special place. Even before the Mongol successors of Genghis Khan became patrons of Tibetan Buddhism from the Middle East to China, this religion had been linked with prominent political leaders. The origins of some Tibetan Buddhists’ orientation toward patrons from outside Tibetan regions date back to the time of the Western Xia state (1038–1227). Lamas from a branch of the Kagyu school became spiritual preceptors to the ethically Tangut rulers of the Western Xia state and were still serving in this role when Genghis Khan eliminated the state and the dynastic family to whom the Tibetan Buddhists had been ministering. Within a few short decades, branches of the Kagyu school and the Sakya school had all come under the sway and received the patronage of various descendents of Genghis Khan. This relationship—the Genghissid patronage of various Tibetan Buddhist religious schools and the claim on their associated properties—led to a vast dispersal of Tibetan Buddhism over much of East Asia, and even parts of the Middle East.

This first wave of Tibetan Buddhism’s “global” dispersal was less the result of a mission undertaken by Tibetans than a requirement of their relationship with the rulers of the Mongol empire. Qubilai Khan (1260–1294) must be given the greatest credit for ensuring the enduring relationship between the Chinese empire and Tibetan Buddhism. Through the relationship between Phagpa lama Lo drol gyal tshan (1235–1280) and Qubilai Khan, a close bond between China and Tibet and between the religious and political functions of Tibetan lamas in the service of the state was established. Certain elements of this “contract” remained prominent in Sino-Tibetan relations into the twentieth century, though there was rarely direct continuity; these instances represent an enduring, rather than an unbroken, tradition. In his Tibetan Nationalism: The Role of Patronage in the Accomplishment of a National Identity, Christian Klieger described this Tibetan tradition as follows: “Tibetan culture provides a mechanism whereby forces and personnel from the ‘outside’ can be utilized . . . to economically and ideologically support the perceived continuation of Tibetan cultural patterns.” Instead of focusing on the reception of Tibetan Buddhism in China and America, as discussed by Richard Payne (Chap. 4), I explore how certain lamas engaged with “outside” resources, spreading their religion while simultaneously pursuing political goals.

On the one hand, disciples of Tibetan Buddhism in China and America shared an interest in potent ritual activity and the prestige associated with being the patron (and student) of prominent religious figures. On the other hand, teachers shared the desire to propagate their religion and receive patronage. Elsewhere I have explored why Tibetan Buddhism was so popular in the early twentieth cen-
tury among Chinese Buddhists, and also the link between Angarika Dharmapala and Master Taixu (Tai Hsi). A key figure in supporting Tibetan Buddhism in China, Taixu embraced the Tibetan tradition of uniting religious and secular concerns. His brief education in a Buddhist mission school inspired by Dharmapala is a thread that links several of these chapters together, as Taixu's "this-worldly" reforms of Chinese Buddhism influenced both Fuguang Shan's Master Xingyun and, through Master Yinshun, Ciji's Master Zhengyan.4 In this essay, therefore, I will focus on a scarcely explored connection between Tibetan Buddhist mission activity and the political goals of exiled lamas. As these varied interests make obvious, a union of religious and secular matters was involved in forging the modern relations between Tibetans and their Chinese and American disciples.

The Tibetan understanding of the proper relation between religion and politics can be traced back to the end of the Tibetan empire in the eighth century, but was set in place most firmly in the time of 'Phagspa and Qubilai. Far from a conception of the separation of church and state, the Tibetan idea of the inextricable connection between religion and politics (chos snid zing 'grel) implies that these are not two opposing fields of activity which are meant to be kept separate. Rather, the linking of these two arenas is seen as perfectly appropriate in Tibet. As the current Dalai Lama stated in his autobiography, "religion and politics do mix."5

Tibetan society, since at least the time of the fifth Dalai Lama in the seventeenth century, had been accustomed to the notion of a joint religious and secular rule.6 When the global wave of nationalism closed in on Tibet from British India and Han China, the thirteenth Dalai Lama tried to centralize these two aspects of leadership under his personal control more effectively than had any Tibetan leader in the past. With his success in this endeavor, other lamas found their positions—which shared similar features of joint religious and political rule, but on a local level—challenged. Unable to resist the Dalai Lama's military and political power, some Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs fled to China. Although modern Chinese may have shared some of the Western beliefs in the separation of the "church" and state, Tibetan Buddhists certainly did not.

As discussed in Julia Huang's essay (Chap. 8), globalization was largely a product of the spread of nationalism. The appearance of first a British, then a Chinese army bent on redefining the relations of power in the very heartland of Tibet forced the Tibetans to take a more active role in the world of nations. The thirteenth Dalai Lama, Thub ten gya tsho (1876–1933), was able to elevate his role to what is commonly perceived today to be an ideal model for Tibetan leadership: a truly unified secular and religious head of state. His innovation was actually taking into his hands all the secular power that had so often been associated in principle with religious leadership. By tightening his control over Tibet and modernizing, as much as possible, the Tibetan administration, the Dalai Lama hoped to assert Tibet's independence. Nevertheless, his efforts to create a compact national territory caused tensions in the larger Tibetan cultural world, parts of which did not necessarily recognize the supreme authority of a central Tibetan government. Just as Tibet had broken with China when the Chinese attempted to administer Tibet directly, so the leaders of heretofore self-governing Tibetan regions resisted the authority of the centralizing policies of the Tibetan government in Lhasa. Some of these leaders turned to their enemy's enemy, China, in order to counter these efforts at nation building.

At least partially, the Chinese aggression toward Tibet throughout the twentieth century has involved a similar contestation of power. Whereas the thirteenth Dalai Lama felt that he should exercise dominion over all culturally Tibetan regions, the Chinese believe that they have rightful dominion over all of the former Qing frontier dependencies, which included Tibet. The real source of the Tibetans' current claim to independence is that the central Tibetans succeeded in driving out the Chinese forces at the end of the Qing dynasty. On the other hand, the monastic polities that resisted the centralization of Tibet under the rule of the thirteenth Dalai Lama were not successful in resisting central Tibetan aggression. Therefore, they—like the current (fourteenth) Dalai Lama—were forced to seek support outside of Tibet proper. The imperus of nationalism that drove the Tibetans to consolidate a Tibetan nation in the first half of this century is not entirely different from the forces of nationalism that impelled the Chinese to exert control over Tibet in the second half of the century. In both cases, smaller polities, which wished to be separate and independent (but were not recognized as such by the international community), were forcibly incorporated into a larger community on the basis of nationalistic motivations.

Within a decade of his return from exile, the thirteenth Dalai Lama's efforts to centralize and militarily maintain a Tibetan nation-state resulted in the alienation of one of the most important figures in the Tibetan Buddhist world, the Panchen Lama. The Chinese were happy to receive the lama when he arrived in Chinese territory and provided for his basic needs for many years.7 Similarly, India and the United States would later support the fourteenth Dalai Lama against the "communist menace" of the PRC.8 Although the circumstances of these two lamas going into exile are not identical, the parallels are striking. Neither was forcibly ejected from his home territory. Rather, in each case the stronger power tried to coerce the weaker but legitimate authority to adjust to a reduction of autonomy.
When both lamas felt that their lack of cooperation would soon lead to their imprisonment, they fled into exile. Another example of a lama driven into exile did not share this common fate. The Nor Iha Hutukhtu (1865-1936), the spiritual and political leader of territory in Khams, was actually imprisoned by the Tibetan government and only went into exile after he escaped his captors. He arrived in Beijing late in 1924, just as the Panchen Lama himself was making his way to the Chinese capital overland.

TEACHING RELIGION TO FOREIGNERS

Rather than playing prominent roles in the politics of a fragmented China, during their early years in China, the Panchen Lama and the Nor Iha Hutukhtu were involved almost exclusively in spreading Tibetan Buddhist teachings. The Panchen Lama was careful to maintain a low political profile at first. Part of the tension between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama had been over the latter’s relations with the Qing state and the British in India. During his early years in China, while the Panchen Lama was still hoping to quickly return to Tibet, he did not want to add to the accusations that could be leveled against him. The fourteenth Dalai Lama was to face a similar dilemma in both 1951 and 1957. At these times, his acceptance of proffered American aid would only have confirmed the Chinese condemnation of imperialist intrigue in Tibet, while he still held out hope for a working relationship with the Chinese. The Dalai Lama was also careful not to meet directly with these foreign agents. Likewise, in his early years in China, the Panchen Lama only sent representatives to deal with political officials, while he propagated religion.

The Panchen Lama’s first teachings were directed at Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chinese adherents of Tibetan Buddhism at the sites of the old imperially supported Tibetan Buddhist temples in and around the capital, Beijing. However, he quickly moved into contexts that were purely Chinese, both ethnically and in terms of the form of Buddhism practiced. In these communities, the Panchen Lama largely focused on teaching about Buddhist figures that were shared with his Chinese Buddhist brethren. At the same time, he infused his teachings with elements unique to Tibetan Buddhism, especially emphasizing the esoteric aspects of the Buddhist figures. Once he had won a substantial following and the government’s recognition of his religious status, the Panchen Lama sought to create a bureaucratic administration to support his interests.

Meanwhile, the Nor Iha Hutukhtu pursued Chinese government assistance in claiming his domains but failed to secure it. At best, he was given permission to try, but without resources this was an impossible task. As there was no way to return to the combined political and religious position that had formerly been his, the Nor Iha Hutukhtu was also limited temporarily to religious activities among the Chinese. Unlike the Panchen Lama, however, he seems to have focused on presiding over rituals whose precedents were of long standing in imperial China. As the Qing elite were no longer a viable audience, he adapted these traditions by making them available to the Chinese Buddhist laity. Although a prominent local politician aided him, his actual support appears to have come from a very broad base of the Chinese Buddhist community in Sichuan province. In these early years in China, then, these two prominent Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs focused their attention primarily on spreading Tibetan Buddhism among the Chinese, without ever losing sight of their longer-term goals.

When the Dalai Lama first came to America, he was allowed entry only as a religious leader and not as the leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Even in this capacity, his entry into the United States was blocked until 1979. As early as 1977 a student of Tibetan Buddhism in the Carter administration had secured official permission for the Dalai Lama to come to America, but it was two years before all obstacles were cleared. Like the two lamas in China, the Dalai Lama initially spent his time abroad in religious contexts, offering Buddhist teachings to relatively small crowds from 1979 to 1985. In 1981, he brought esoteric Tibetan Buddhism to America in the form of an elaborate ceremony and practice known as the Kalachakra Tantra. The first group to attend this ritual numbered only twelve hundred, but this number nearly doubled each time the event reoccurred over the next decade. As will become clear, the Dalai Lama was not the first to share this esoteric ritual with a foreign culture in modern times; in this, too, he followed a precedent. Thus, the Dalai Lama—like the lamas in exile in China—was only able to participate directly in American politics after he had built up a religious base of support abroad.

The Panchen Lama’s first activities in China were perfectly consonant with his being a prominent religious leader. Seeing the death and destruction caused by the ravages of warlord battles, he offered prayers for those killed. Shortly thereafter he sent an open telegram to all the warlords, requesting that they cease fighting one another so that peace and prosperity might return to China. He favored no side but made only vague statements about his support of the central government based in Beijing. Moreover, when the government invited the Panchen Lama to the National Reconstruction Meeting in 1925—which brought together the rulers
of northern China with the “father” of Republican China, Sun Yat-sen—he studiously avoided becoming too involved in Chinese politics. He sent a representative to the conference while he stopped at the sacred Buddhist pilgrimage site of Mount Wutai and gave Buddhist teachings there until the conference ended.\textsuperscript{15}

This instance of first contact with the central Chinese government set the pattern that the Panchen Lama was to follow for several years: sending representatives to deal with political matters while he frequented temples and expounded on Buddhist topics, thus eschewing direct involvement in politics. Aside from considering how the Tibetan government would respond to his having dealings with that of China, the Panchen Lama also might have been aware of the Chinese condemnation of monks who involved themselves in political affairs. Unlike Tibetan society, Chinese culture had little tolerance for religious figures who were active in politics.\textsuperscript{16} For instance, Taixu was pejoratively labeled a “political monk.”

At least at first, the expectations governing the behavior of the fourteenth Dalai Lama in America largely mirrored this Chinese attitude. The Dalai Lama was limited to traveling abroad only as a religious figure with restrictions placed on what he could say and do.\textsuperscript{17} For example, in 1987 he was reprimanded by the U.S. State Department for addressing the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Somehow this activity was deemed “inconsistent with his status as a respected religious leader” and a violation of the terms of his visa.\textsuperscript{18} This has certainly changed in recent years, as it did for the Panchen Lama in his later years in China. Yet, despite the fact that the fourteenth Dalai Lama has obviously embraced a very political role in America, emphasizing this fact—as this essay consistently does—will no doubt be perceived by some as insulting to Tibetan Buddhism in general and the current Dalai Lama in particular. Yet he himself has said that “I find no contradiction at all between politics and religion.”\textsuperscript{19} In any case, the pattern followed by the Dalai Lama for many years was very similar to that of the Panchen Lama upon his arrival in China: he acted as a religious figure, visiting local political leaders wherever he went but taking no direct role in politics.

When the Panchen Lama first arrived in Beijing, he taught at Yonghe Gong, which had served as the main imperial Tibetan Buddhist temple under the Qing dynasty. Though some ethnic Chinese were pursuing the study of Tibetan Buddhism at Yonghe Gong at that time, the audience would have been primarily ethnic Mongolian Tibetan Buddhists, as this group comprised the principal monastic population of the temple. This instance demonstrates the subtle yet significant role Mongols continued to play in “globalizing” Tibetan Buddhism. Just as the earliest Chinese scholar of Tibetan Buddhism (Yu Daoquan) studied at the ethnically Mongol Tibetan Buddhist monastery of Yonghe Gong, so the first American scholars of Tibetan Buddhism (Robert Thurman and Jeffrey Hopkins) studied in an ethnically Mongol Tibetan Buddhist monastery in New Jersey. This monastery, by far the earliest one in America, catered to and was supported by an immigrant Kalmyk Mongolian community.\textsuperscript{20}

The Panchen Lama’s first contact with a purely ethnic Chinese audience seems to have taken place in the first few months of 1925. His two-and-a-half-month-long southern tour into the heartland of Chinese culture in Jiangnan, south of the Yangtze River, marked the first instance of a Tibetan Buddhist reaching large ethnically Chinese audiences. This visit to Jiangsu and Zhejiang was especially significant because the region was the heart of active Chinese Buddhist education and training. Holmes Welch has described how these two provinces represented the best and the brightest of Chinese Buddhism. In fact, according to his figures, the number of Buddhist monks and laity in these two provinces outnumbered those in most of the other provinces combined.\textsuperscript{21}

In April of 1925, the Panchen Lama transmitted the long-life (Amitayus) Buddha’s mantra according to the esoteric tradition. The long-life Buddha cycle of teachings was especially significant coming from him, as he was understood to be an emanation of Amitabha, who is closely associated with Amitayus. This transmission linked the recipients to the Panchen Lama through a powerful set of religious beliefs; he was the master and they the disciples. The Panchen Lama clearly built a religious following oriented toward Tibetan Buddhist practice, though initially he did this through Buddhist teachings and deities shared by Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism.

The Panchen Lama also traveled to a second of the four Buddhist sacred mountains in China, the island Mount Putuo. The island was home to a very concentrated Chinese Buddhist monastic population that was well known for the intensity of its study and practice.\textsuperscript{22} He blessed with the touch of his hand the fourteen hundred monks who had gathered to see him; to each he also gave two silver dollars. This was a significant financial contribution at the time, especially for a refugee who had fled home due to lack of funds.\textsuperscript{23} On the next day, he lectured to two thousand monks on the Buddhist theories of birth, old age, sickness, and death, as well as on the three trainings in ethics, meditation, and wisdom. He also transmitted the esoteric mantras of Tara and Avalokiteśvara. This gathering was a historic occasion, marking as it does the first time in the history of Sino-Tibetan relations that a Tibetan Buddhist taught so many Chinese monks.

In late July 1925, the provisional chief executive of China and temporarily the dominant warlord of north China, Duan Qirui, invited the Panchen Lama to the capital to receive the government’s official recognition. Duan’s recognition
of the Panchen Lama was based on earlier models dating back as far as the Yuan dynasty. The tradition since the Mongol rule of China had been that rulers of China — whether Mongol, Han, or Manchu — would award revered Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs eloquent religious titles and accompanying symbols of respect. The most recent example, which Duan followed fairly closely, was the Qing court’s treatment of the thirteenth Dalai Lama: “the Qing court, by imperial decree, conferred on him an additional title, inscribed in a gold leaf album, of ‘The Loyally Submissive Viceregent, Great, Good, Self-Existential Buddha of Heaven.’” On August 1, Duan bestowed the title “Propagator of Honesty, Savior of the World” on the Panchen Lama and gave him a certificate printed on plates of gold and a golden seal as symbols of his new honor. Thus, Duan demonstrated no new ability to “utilize” the Panchen Lama’s presence in China in the service of the struggling Chinese nation-state. Though aware of the need to preserve the integrity of the former Qing dynasty’s borders, he was unable to conceive of any modern methods of employing Tibet’s second most famous hierarch to this end. In fact, the only innovation that came about as a result of the Panchen Lama’s interaction with this conservative leader of China was undertaken at the Panchen Lama’s request. After receiving these honors, the Panchen Lama requested that he be permitted to set up his own offices within China.

The Nor Iha Hutukhutu, on the other hand, had little success either gaining assistance from the government or teaching the Chinese in his early years in the north. His lack of a common language seems to have hindered his ability to communicate, especially in north China. He was from the eastern Tibetan region of Kham, which had its own dialects. In addition, the Nor Iha Hutukhutu was trained in the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism, whereas most of the Tibetans living in China proper at that time were adherents of the Geluk school. These differences may well have made it difficult for the Nor Iha Hutukhutu to find disciples or venues in which to teach.

The Nor Iha Hutukhutu’s one successful contact with a Chinese politician while living in Beijing is described in two separate biographical accounts printed in a single volume. One account tells how he reached the president of China, Duan Qini, through the practice of a great “dharma” which “in response to a need (ganying da fa).” Duan was said to be very surprised by this, and the event apparently increased his respect for the Nor Iha Hutukhutu. The biography also implied that Duan studied the Buddha Dharma with the lama, though it does not state this directly and no other source confirms it.

In addition, Duan apparently “gave the Nor Iha Hutukhutu permission to return to Kham to try to retake his lost territory” (fol. 4v). The language of the biography suggests that the Nor Iha Hutukhutu was seeking support for his former rule, rather than that the Chinese were seeking to utilize his good services to retake the area. The northern Chinese had their own problems at the time, and Tibet was far away and far from a priority. Another version of the Nor Iha Hutukhutu’s biography adds that Duan gave him one thousand Chinese yuan in cash (fol. 8v). Be that as it may, by the autumn of 1925, Duan was already losing the support of the warlords who had placed him in control of the Beijing government. When Duan resigned his office in April 1926, the Nor Iha Hutukhutu was left without even this weak patronage.

This problem was solved when a warlord leader of Sichuan province, named Liu Xiang, heard about the Nor Iha Hutukhutu. His career as a teacher to Chinese Buddhists blossomed in the next three years, during which time he built up a huge following in Chongqing. We are told that after the Nor Iha Hutukhutu transmitted the esoteric teachings, his disciples numbered over ten thousand. In the words of his biographer, “the Guru went from none to an abundance of students.”

The one English-language biography I have found of the Nor Iha Hutukhutu simply states that he “was invited to Szechuan by Gen. Liu Hsiang to preach Buddhism [in] 1926 and won many converts to the faith.” It is doubtful whether the Nor Iha Hutukhutu would have considered his disciples “converts,” as most were probably already Buddhists, but Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism probably appeared different enough to the Western observer to merit this term.

The Nor Iha Hutukhutu’s ritual activities were marked by a combination of tradition and modernity that is remarkably similar to Tibetan Buddhist practices in the West today. For example, in the spring of 1927, he held a “Dharma assembly for peace (heping fa hui)” that lasted forty-nine days. The event was held on the second floor of a Chinese company’s office in Chongqing. Common laypeople were permitted to attend the esoteric ceremony. Both of these conditions were new in the realm of Sino-Tibetan relations. Under the auspices of the Qing dynasty, such rituals were performed at court-supported temples dedicated to the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Only the Buddhist elite and the imperial family would have taken part in such ceremonies, though they too had been for the benefit of both the dynasty (and by extension, the country) and the people.

In other respects this situation also anticipated the modern, and soon to be global, diffusion of Tibetan Buddhism. Instead of being initiated by the state, these ceremonies were privately sponsored by common people with business connections. At the same time, they were public events, open to anyone, rather being restricted to an imperial elite. Westerners accept as normal the events of 1991, when the Dalai Lama taught in New York’s Madison Square Garden and a sand man-
dala was displayed at the IBM office building, but the Nor Iha Hutukhtu was the pioneer in this move into nonreligious space. Even the Panchen Lama continued to teach in temples or imperial palaces until the 1930s.

The next spring, in 1928, the Nor Iha Hutukhtu held a one-hundred-day “great Dharma assembly for prayers (qidao da fa hui)” (fol. 4v). At this assembly, a vajra-mandala was constructed. Though such mandalas had previously been constructed in imperially sponsored temples or within the imperial palace, this new public construction of a mandala again anticipated exiled Tibetan Buddhist activities on the global stage. In introducing this phenomenon’s appearance in America, Jensine Andresen noted that the first public display of a sand mandala took place in China, and this particular occurrence predates the one she noted by four years. As in the United States, where some fifty mandalas were constructed between 1988 and 1997, this became somewhat of a regular practice in China. Moreover, this activity did not merely draw an anonymous fringe of Chinese Buddhists; many officials sent either telegrams or representatives to attend such ceremonies.

If the Nor Iha Hutukhtu’s main goal in coming to China had been to regain power in his native region of Kham, he had made little direct progress in his first five years of exile. He gained permission to make the attempt and secured limited financial support, but far from the contested region and from a warlord on his way out of power. Nevertheless, his time was not entirely wasted, as he built up a large following among the Chinese in Sichuan. In the end, the Nor Iha Hutukhtu’s efforts at cultivating Chinese Buddhists as his disciples had the positive result of bringing him to the attention of the central government. As was the case for the Panchen Lama, only after all of China united under the Nationalist government was the Nor Iha Hutukhtu’s influence actually brought to bear on political questions.

Sometime after the Panchen Lama had received his title and honors from the government, he requested the right to set up offices to handle his affairs. The first such office was apparently located in a temple in Beijing with government approval. However, at that time, the government neither funded nor otherwise oversaw the offices. Far from being part of a government ploy to enlist the services of this prominent Tibetan Buddhist in Chinese schemes, the offices were the result of Tibetan initiative. On the basis of linguistic evidence, the Panchen Lama appears to have adapted an old Qing institution to his own purposes. I suspect that their principal reason for existence was to handle the business affairs that accompanied the massive donations made by the Panchen Lama’s Buddhist followers. For most of 1926, the Panchen Lama was teaching in Chinese Buddhist temples around the capital. In mid-September he gave an initiation into the tantric practice of the Amitabha Buddha to lay and monastic Buddhists. One feature of tantric initiation is the often substantial donations made to the teacher of such liberating techniques. It seems likely that these initiates’ donations provided both the reason and the funding for creating offices that would handle the Panchen Lama’s affairs.

From late 1926 until early 1929, the Panchen Lama lived among the Mongol adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in Inner Mongolia. During this period, he started to perform initiations into the Kalachakra Tantra. The ceremonies that conferred these initiations attracted enormous crowds (eighty thousand Mongols were said to have attended each of the first three initiations into this tantra) and brought the Panchen Lama much prestige and many rich donations. As Andresen noted in researching the Kalachakra tantra in America, “economically, western patronage of Kalachakra provides an important source of financial support for exiled Tibetans.” The growth of the number and the institutional development of the Panchen Lama’s offices were no doubt given great impetus by similar donations.

THE POLITICIZATION OF THE TIBETAN BUDDHIST MISSIONS ABROAD

The real politicization of the Tibetan Buddhist leaders in China did not occur until 1929, after the success of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition had suppressed the warlords of north China and opened the way for a truly centralized government. The new Nationalist government was much more willing to involve these Tibetan Buddhist lamas in the politics of China. The Panchen Lama had sent his envoys to offer his congratulations to the new regime in Nanjing in the spring of 1928. By January 11 of the following year, the “Office of the Panchen’s resident in [the capital] Nanjing to handle official affairs (Banchan zhu [Nanjing hangong cha])” was officially established. For the first time in the history of modern China, the government had created a special office for a Tibetan Buddhist hierarch. To mark the establishment of this office, the government issued a proclamation of its opening, a chart of the organization of the office, and detailed rules and regulations to guide how affairs were to be managed there. In the meantime, the Panchen Lama established additional offices, one in Taiyuan (located on the main road between Inner Mongolia and Nanjing) and one in Kham. In this way, the previously religious nature of the Panchen Lama’s role in exile was transformed into an official one, with a political administration.

After having established these offices, the Panchen Lama remained in Inner Mongolia for two more years. During this period, he communicated with Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of China. Judging from the content of the letters exchanged
between the two men, it seems that the Panchen Lama was trying to see what sort of political support he could gain from Chiang Kai-shek. Specifically, in April 1930, he requested military supplies—five thousand rifles, a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition, five thousand uniforms, and funds to pay soldiers—to be used against a bogus Nepalese “invasion” of Tibet.7 The Nationalists, who probably understood this request as the attempt to create a private army that it was, shrewdly linked the supplying of these items to the Panchen Lama’s agreement to provisions that would have eliminated Tibetan autonomy entirely, at least in principle. So he refused these conditions and received no military aid. Despite the official cooperation and ongoing communication between these two men, neither the Nationalist government nor the Panchen Lama was to have their wishes fulfilled at that time. The similarity between this situation and the negotiations that arose between the Tibetan government and the CIA in 1951 is remarkable and will be discussed later.

In 1929, just months after having established the Panchen Lama’s office in the capital, the central government summoned the Nor Iha Hutukhtu from Sichuan province to the capital in Nanjing. Once there, he was made a member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. An office similar to the Panchen Lama’s, called the “Office of the Hutukhtu’s resident in [the capital] Nanjing to handle affairs (Hutukhtu zhǔ [Nanjīng hùshì chū],)”38 was then established, while three branch offices were eventually set up in Chongqing, Chengdu, and Kangding. The concentration of these three offices in the single province of Sichuan demonstrates the more limited scope of the Nor Iha Hutukhtu’s influence compared to that of the Panchen Lama.39 Because his influence was most important for securing the loyalty of the Tibetans in Kham, he was also made a member of the commission to establish the province of Xikang.

The Nor Iha Hutukhtu’s presence in the capital was also important for the foreign community. The Nationalist government could counter Tibetan claims that the contested Tibetan region of Kham belonged to Tibet if they had a spokesman from that region within their own government. In the 1933 supplement to Who’s Who in China, the compilers gullibly reported that the Nor Iha Hutukhtu was the “former secular and religious ruler of Hskang [Kham].”40 This was an obvious error in fact, as the Nor Iha Hutukhtu had only ruled a small portion of Kham. Nevertheless, the ignorance of westerners living in China and the prestige conferred on this individual by the Chinese government were a powerful combination. Not only was the Nor Iha Hutukhtu given positions within institutions that dealt with Inner Asia, he was also made a member of the legislature (lǐjī wèi-yuán). Though this governmental body was actually powerless in the Nationalist party-state, few foreigners were fully aware of this at the time. Thus, after an initial period of avoidance of or exclusion from the political realm, both the Panchen Lama and the Nor Iha Hutukhtu had been welcomed into the Chinese government bureaucracy. However, although their influence was brought to bear on the ethnic and territorial problems China faced at that time, these men were pursuing their own interests as well.

While the Panchen Lama and the Nor Iha Hutukhtu were being officially recognized in these various capacities by Chiang Kai-shek, the Dalai Lama was also in communication with China’s new leader. In 1928 the Nationalist government claimed that it would remain true to Sun Yat-sen’s policy of “equality for all nationalities of the country.” Encouraged by this stance, the Dalai Lama sent his resident representative to Nanjing. This exchange, which was heralded as “the beginning of contact between Tibet and the KMT [Nationalist] government,” followed the initiative of the Panchen Lama by almost half a year, giving the impression that the central Tibetans were trying to keep up with the Panchen Lama’s efforts.41

Given the presence of the Panchen Lama’s office in the capital since early 1929, the central Tibetan government must have begun to worry about the possibility that he could undermine de facto independence by cooperating too closely with the Chinese. Later that year, the abbot of the Yonghe Gong monastery in Beijing, who had been appointed to the post by the Dalai Lama, went to Nanjing and conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek that the Tibetan government was friendly to China and welcomed the Panchen Lama’s return. The abbot, Kön chok jung nay, continued on to Tibet, carrying Chiang’s message to the Dalai Lama. When he returned to China in 1931, he was made the Dalai Lama’s chief resident representative in Nanjing. Adapting a former Qing reliopolitical institution to the modern context of overtly political offices, the Dalai Lama transferred an abbot at what had been the primary imperial Tibetan Buddhist temple in the old capital in Beijing to serve as his representative to the Chinese government at the new capital. Thus, in 1931 an “Office of Tibet” was set up in Nanjing.42 Originally, the Chinese had wanted the office to be called merely the “Dalai Lama’s Representative Office” (Tib. Tā lai don ggod khang), which would have put it on par with the Panchen Lama’s office. However, his representatives insisted that the office represented Tibet and not merely the Dalai Lama.43

The creation of this office in China was a significant precedent for the later globalization of such offices. At present, the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile has Offices of Tibet in New York, Geneva, London, New Delhi, Paris, Zurich, Budapest, Moscow, Tokyo, Taipei, Washington, D.C., and Kathmandu, as well as in South Africa and Australia.44 The first of these overseas offices were CIA-
sponsored centers for the coordination of a National Security Agency (NSA) Special Group program built "around the Dalai Lama to heighten a sense of nation among his refugee constituency and to keep his cause before the international community." This 1.7-million-dollar program was funded by the NSA. An annual budget of US$150,000 was given to the fourteenth Dalai Lama's older brother, Oya lo don drub, to run the first two offices set up in New York and Geneva. Ken Knaus, the former CIA officer in charge of Tibetan operations, reported that in 1963 the U.S. State Department was willing to allow a New York office as an "unofficial embassy" for Tibet and informed India of this permission (Knaus 1999: 283, 310). Unlike the Panchen Lama and the Nor lha Huttukhtu's offices, these new Offices of Tibet are similar to the Dalai Lama's office in China, having served political purposes from the start.

Knaus credited an American adviser to the Tibetans with the idea of creating these offices, though he acknowledged that Oya lo don drub "readily recognized that they would provide the Dalai Lama with unofficial representation" (ibid: 282). Given that Oya lo don drub had been intimately familiar with the offices in China, I suspect that he played a significant role in the creation of these CIA-funded offices. In any case, the Dalai Lama's offices in China, and initially in the United States and elsewhere, were very different from those of the Panchen Lama and the Nor lha Huttukhtu in China in that they did not provide for a religious mission. They were purely political offices, functioning principally as unofficial embassies. Since 1974, when the United States eliminated such aid to the Tibetans as part of its renewed relations with China (ibid: 310), the various Offices of Tibet have come to coordinate both the religious and political roles of the Dalai Lama. In this respect they now resemble those of his fellow Tibetans in China earlier in the century.

UNITING RELIGION AND POLITICS

Although I have been able to periodize the Tibetan Buddhist mission to China into neatly divided "religious" and "political" sections, the men examined here would certainly not have compartmentalized their lives in the same way. I suspect that they would have felt neither that they were using religion to achieve political ends nor that their involvement in politics was merely some "expedient means" to be employed in the spread of religion. Rather, they likely felt that the political and religious concerns were linked in a most natural way. They were Buddhist leaders and had been ousted from their rightful place in the cultural context in which they were raised. Given these circumstances, they did whatever was nec-

essay and appropriate within the confines of the situation and their worldview to restore themselves to power. In the meantime, spreading Tibetan Buddhism allowed them both to practice the religion so central to their world and to build up the political power that accompanies being a celebrity in the modern world.

From 1931 to 1935, the Nor lha Huttukhtu's popularity grew immensely. His biography states that he had disciples from all provinces of China. He traveled and taught in Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Nanchang, Wuhan, and Changsha, while being based in the capital, Nanjing (fol. 9r). He taught an impressive array of Tibetan tantric cycles over the six years when he was based in the capital. These included cycles of teachings dedicated to Amitabha Buddha, the Medicine Buddha, the bodhisattvas Avalokitesvara and Green Tara, Padmasambhava, and a host of tantric deities previously unknown to the Chinese. His disciples set up the the Nor lha Students' Society to provide funds to support his living and travel expenses, as well as for the publication of his teachings. We are told that he initiated twenty thousand disciples into the esoteric teachings of Tibetan Buddhism. Although no gender ratio can be determined, the Nor lha Huttukhtu's biography, unlike those of other figures in China at that time, does mention that he had women disciples. His experience anticipated that of dozens of teachers who have come to America: without the status of the Panchen or Dalai Lamas, such men have relied on a devoted following of students. Devotees supporting their lama was certainly nothing new to the Tibetan Buddhist tradition; however, the formation of particular societies dedicated to this purpose appears to be a modern phenomenon that has reached new heights in America.

Prior to 1929, the Nor lha Huttukhtu had had a decidedly local influence tied closely to his home region, as it was nominally controlled from the very provincial capital in which he lived. After 1929, the Nor lha Huttukhtu became a national figure for the Chinese. He represented the interests of the nation and not just the local concerns of an exiled Tibetan Buddhist leader. By embracing this role, he both gave the Chinese Nationalists his religious and political support and earned for himself their trust. The differences between the current Dalai Lama's relationship to foreign governments and the Nor lha Huttukhtu's relationship with the Chinese government are most pronounced in this respect. Although the Dalai Lama has become an international figure, he has never been offered or accepted a position or title from any other government body.

For the Nor lha Huttukhtu, the culmination of this trust was the Nationalist government's conferral of the title Pacification Commissioner of Xikang. This abrupt assignment to an officially political role was occasioned by the Commu-
nist Long March through the Nor lha Hrubukhti's native Tibetan region of Khams. In August 1935, the Nor lha Hrubukhti went to Kangding and assembled the important religious and political figures of the region to explain the position of the Nationalist government and the threat of the Communists. Nevertheless, he failed to prevent the Communist advance, or even to return to his homeland before his death in 1936. In the end, although the Nor lha Hrubukhti was able to use the influence gained over all his years of missionizing in China to secure the support of the Chinese government in returning to his homeland, he failed to retake his former domains.

Meanwhile, the differences between the Panchen Lama and Chiang Kai-shek had been resolved by February 1931, when the Nationalists invited the Panchen Lama to the National Conference to be held later that year. He accepted and on May 4 was welcomed to Nanjing by a huge crowd of people—official representatives from all government ministries, councils, and commissions, as well as "several tens of thousands of citizens and students." The next day the Panchen Lama met with Chiang Kai-shek and throughout the period was housed in his headquarters. From that time, the Panchen Lama took a stand in support of Chinese policy toward Tibet while the Chinese government solidly backed the Panchen Lama. No doubt this open and public acknowledgment of the position that China had consistently maintained toward Tibet was the deciding factor in the close relations the Chinese government now adopted toward the Panchen Lama. A similar situation governed the United States' support for the Dalai Lama. In 1951, when the fourteenth Dalai Lama was in India trying to decide whether to return to an occupied Tibet, the State Department conditioned support for Tibetan autonomy upon the Dalai Lama's disavowal of the Seventeen Point Agreement made with the Chinese, as well as a promise to resist the Communist regime. At that time, the Dalai Lama refused to agree to such externally imposed conditions and was refused overt aid by the Americans.

By late 1932, the Nationalist government rewarded the Panchen Lama for his support of China's titular sovereignty over Tibet. They publicly granted him a title that suggested a more political orientation while preserving the religious elements of its precedents, Protector of the Nation, Propagator of Transformation, Great Master of Infinite Wisdom. With such government recognition, he enjoyed an enormous surge in popularity. The Chinese government also committed itself to supplying an annual subsidy of 120,000 yuan to the Panchen Lama. Likewise, when the Dalai Lama repudiated the Seventeen Point Agreement in 1959, the U.S. government agreed to support him and his government-in-exile with a yearly subsidy of US$175,000.

As with the Nor lha Hrubukhti, the conferral of official recognition brought with it a whole new level of missionizing activity. The most important were Kalachakra rituals. Although the Panchen Lama had given the Kalachakra initiation to enormous crowds in Tibetan Buddhist Inner Mongolia, the practice of this ritual among the Chinese was unprecedented. The first ceremony, held in the Forbidden City in Beijing, accommodated as many as one hundred thousand people by some estimates. The second, held in 1934 in Hangzhou, was said to have been attended by some seventy thousand. Admittedly, these numbers represent a tiny proportion of the Chinese population at that time (roughly 500 million), nevertheless, it represents over 150 times the proportion of Americans who have attended the Dalai Lama's Kalachakra ceremonies in the United States. Few Americans or Tibetans are aware that the performance of the Kalachakra for foreign audiences was first popularized in China.

The growth of the Panchen Lama's religious popularity was accompanied by an increasing political importance. At the end of 1932, he was granted a purely political office for the first time. He was to serve as the Western Borderland Publicity Commissioner, whose job it was to publicize the desires of the central government to the borderland... and to propagate, with the help of religious belief, the Three People's Principles, teachings of the late Director-General Sun Yat-sen. In this way, the Tibetan Buddhists had brought the Chinese around to their perspective: religion and politics had to go hand in hand when trying to settle relations between China and Tibet. Following a different tradition, in the United States propaganda was handled by a public relations firm hired by the CIA to help the Tibetans make their anti-Communist case in 1959.

In return for his help, throughout 1933 the Chinese government assisted the Panchen Lama in negotiating with the Tibetan government permission for the Panchen Lama's return to Tibet. His last major public appearance in China, just days after the second Kalachakra ceremony, was to be his best attended event. According to Chinese sources, he lectured in Shanghai to a crowd of three hundred thousand on the topic "Mongolia and Tibet are China's important frontiers." By July 1934 he had set off for the western borderlands to carry out his duties and, it was hoped, return to Tibet. Like the Nor lha Hrubukhti, the Panchen Lama had finally secured the support of the Chinese government in his attempt to return to his former domains. Also like the Nor lha Hrubukhti, he was ultimately to die (in 1937, in the borderlands between China and Tibet) unsuccessful in his effort to return to his former position of authority.
CONCLUSION

Despite their cooperation with Chinese politicians, these Tibetan Buddhists were pursuing their own goals. In order to return to their previous positions, they sought the financial and military backing that only the Chinese government could have provided. In fact, as religious figures cooperating with the Chinese government, they established an important pattern for the future of Sino-Tibetan relations. As is still the case today, Chinese politicians were forced to work with the religious leaders of Tibet to try to maintain control over the populace in the region.

At the same time, these men invented and adapted strategies for dealing with the new challenges of a modernized world. They taught religion and gathered disciples when there was no way to enter into the political life, but accepted and often initiated political contacts and institutions when this was possible. Finally, they succeeded in combining religion and politics in an almost seamless fashion, linking their religious activities with their political causes.

For those who are privy to the world of Tibetan Buddhism in America today, this may well sound a familiar note. With regard to nationalism, the current Dalai Lama—whether or not he coordinated his plans with the American government—has fulfilled the 1963 goal of the NSA’s Special Group: he continues to serve as the key rallying point for the Tibetan nationalist movement. And, like the lamas in China, he taught religion to foreigners as long as he felt that that was his only option. In his The Making of Modern Tibet, Grunfeld cynically (though probably accurately) described this early period as one in which “[Tibetan] Buddhist monasteries, study groups, rural communes, and even an accredited college . . . have converted hundreds, if not thousands, to their religious beliefs—thereby creating a large, receptive audience for their political beliefs.”38 He also prophetically noted, as he completed the writing for the first edition in 1985, that the Dalai Lama’s “spiritual role . . . far outweighs his political functions—for the time being” (Grunfeld 1996:210).

This balance of religion and politics did change after 1985. As Grunfeld reported in his second edition, the Dalai Lama has always officially come to the United States only as a religious leader of the Tibetan people. However, since the “Tibet lobby” has enlisted a powerful law firm to serve as its United States agents for the Tibetan government-in-exile, the Dalai Lama has had decidedly more of an international political force.39 At present, he, like the lamas before him in China, has also succeeded in unifying religion and politics abroad, as anyone who has attended one of his large public events will readily acknowledge. Whatever the different causes that resulted in these diverse missions to China and now to the world, the strategies have remained true to tradition while at the same time evolving in new—but surprisingly parallel—directions.

Notes


2. Ruegg, Ordre spirituel, 34-37.


9. Han Daizai, Kang-Zang Foiao yu Xibang Nona Hutuketu yinghua shilue [Brief account of Khams-Tibetan Buddhism and the manifestation of the Nor Iha Hutuketu of Khams] (1937), fols. 4r, 8v. I want to thank Professor Lawrence Epstein and Peng Wenbin of the University of Washington for alerting me to the presence of this text.

10. Two conflicting dates are given in Han (Kang-Zang Foiao) for his arrival in Beijing: Mar. 15, 1924 (fol. 4v) and Oct. 15, 1925 (fol. 8v). Other sources, including Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, Harvard East Asian Series, 33 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 175, indicate that he was present in Beijing in 1924, so I have accepted this date.

11. Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 86-103, 140. Instead, a chain of intermediaries informed him (at least partially) of the negotiations of his older brothers. However, it should be noted that they were not officially the Dalai Lama’s representatives and at times followed their own agenda.

12. Roger Hicks and Ngakpa Chogyam, Great Ocean: An Authorized Biography of the Bud-


22. Ibid., 239.

23. These were probably Mexican silver dollars.

24. For photographs of Qing examples of a golden certificate, see entry 74, and of a golden seal, entry 71, in *A Collection of the Historical Archives of Tibet* (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1995).


27. Han, *Kang-Zang Fojiao*, fol. 4v. What exactly occurred is left to the reader’s imagination.


29. Han, *Kang-Zang Fojiao*, fol. 4v, 8v-9r.


33. For details, see Tuttle, "Faith and Nation," 198.

34. Andresen, "Kalacakra," 17.


36. In May 1929 and April 1930, respectively; see Danzhu Angfen, *Nianpu*, 640.


38. In Tibetan, this institution was simply called Northa’s Representative Office (Nor i la don gcud khang); see Thub bstan sangs rgyas, *Rgya nag tu Bod kyi sku tshab*, 44.


42. Ya, *Dalai Lamas*, 342, 345-346; Goldstein, 214, 219; Thub bstan sangs rgyas, *Rgya nag tu Bod kyi sku tshab*, 55 provides an English translation of this office’s name in Tibetan transcription, the "Bureau of Tibet" (Tib. Be ’u tu ’u/ Ob Kri bri).

43. For a full history of the office, see Thub bstan sangs rgyas, *Rgya nag tu Bod kyi sku tshab*.

44. The official web site of the Tibetan Government-in-exile: www.tibet.com


47. Han, *Kang-Zang Fojiao*, fol. 5v.


49. Han, *Kang-Zang Fojiao*, fols. 3r, 6v. He also tried to improve the status of women in Khams.


51. Han, *Kang-Zang Fojiao*, fol. 9r.

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