Images of Tibet
in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Volume I

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TIBET AS THE SOURCE OF MESSIANIC TEACHINGS TO SAVE REPUBLICAN CHINA

THE NINTH PANCHEN LAMA, SHAMBHALA AND THE KĀLAGAKRA TANTRA

Gray Tuttle

In all the tension that now exists between Chinese and Tibetan nationalist versions of history, knowledge of the strong interest in Tibetan Buddhism in republican China has nearly disappeared from historical consciousness. Yet in 1935, one of China’s most articulate cultural spokesmen and a critic of Chinese Buddhist belief in lamas, Lin Yutang, described the attention given to Tibetan lamas in the following terms:

As late as 1933–4 the Panchen Lama of Tibet sprinkled holy water over tens of thousands of people in Peiping and Nanking, including high government—personages like Tuan Ch’üjü [Duan Qirui] and Tai Chü’ao [Dai Jitao], and was royally entertained by the Central and local governments in Nanking, Shanghai, Hangchow and Canton. As late as May, 1934, Nola Konulu [Nor Iha Khutuktu], another Tibetan lama, as official guest of the Chinese Government, publicly declared his ability to protect the people against poison gas by incantations, and actually was able to influence a certain general to change the position of his guns at his fort through his superior knowledge of astrology and numomancy. Their influence would not be so great, if the Chinese could see a clear way to repel Japanese attacks by modern military science. The Chinese reason here falters, and therefore turns to religion. Since the Chinese army cannot help the Chinese, they are willing to be helped by the Buddha.\(^1\)

\(^1\) All images in this article are courtesy of the Jacques Marchais Museum of Tibetan Art. I wish to thank the museum’s curator, Sarah Johnson, for her ready willingness to share these images and her timely scanning of them. For full references to Jacques Marchais’s interest in and purchase of articles used by the ninth Panchen Lama in China, please see Barbara Lipman and Nima Dorjee Ragnuba, Treasures of Tibetan Art: Collections of the Jacques Marchais Museum of Tibetan Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 220–223. For research time to complete this article, I wish to thank Yale University’s Council on East Asian Studies for my year as a postdoctoral associate, and Valerie Hansen for her support and encouragement throughout the year.

What form of help did the Chinese seek from Tibetan Buddhists, and how did the Tibetan lamas respond? How did this interaction help shape the Chinese reception of Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese conceptions of the place of Tibet?

I will explore these questions by examining the activities of the ninth Panchen Lama (Pan chen bla ma), Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma (1883–1937), a major political and religious figure in early twentieth century relations between Tibet and China. The significance of his life has continued to be thoroughly documented and actively debated by Chinese, Tibetan and Western scholars. Through the lens of the Chinese response to the Panchen Lama’s activities in propagating the Kalacakr tantra and the associated realm of Shambhala in 1930s China, I will examine one small aspect of how Tibetan Buddhism came to mid-twentieth century China.

The hidden realm of Shambhala, generally described as being located north of India, is said to have maintained the Kalacakr tantra since the time of the Buddha. The first king of Shambhala received this Tantra directly from the Buddha, and successive kings developed its study, eventually converting their entire kingdom to the practice. But most significantly, the last ruler of Shambhala promises to issue forth from the kingdom at the end of times and save the world from evil. One Tibetan tradition posits that this last king will be a none other than an incarnation of the Panchen Lama. Thus, through initiation into and blessings associated with this Tantra and the realm from which it issues, the Panchen Lama’s presence in China offered the hope of a future rebirth in a place and time which promised to mark the triumph of good over evil. Through this admittedly small window we can see, in a concrete manner, some of the ways that the Chinese viewed Tibet and that Tibetan lamas portrayed Tibet to others.

Part of this story is about how modern conceptions of world religions helped unite the diverse traditions that traced their origins to the historic Buddha. Through this twentieth century innovation, the distinct Buddhist communities of China and Tibet could thus partake in a shared Pan-Asian Buddhist ecumene that was more interconnected than any previous religious exchanges engendered between the two cultures.

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Fig. 1: The ninth Panchen Lama. (Jacques Marchais Museum of Tibetan Art)

Given the political tensions of the time, with China and Tibet both claiming sovereignty over Tibetan territory, this emerging supranational religious identity played an important role in the politics of the developing Chinese nation-state.

Historical Background

Unlike most of the rest of the world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Central Tibet remained free of colonization or even the semicolonization of countries such as China. Yet it did not owe this status to rapid indigenous modernization efforts to counter imperialist threats, as was the case in Thailand or Japan. Instead, Tibetans succeeded in negotiating a delicate balance between the British interest in a buffer state and Chinese inability to exert sustained military control of the region for more than fifty years. The British border challenges of the late nineteenth century and their 1904 invasion of Tibet could have set events in motion to force further colonization or at least thorough modern reforms in Tibet, as the Opium War had done in China or the 1893 French aggression had done in Thailand. However, rather than being sandwiched between rival European powers, Tibet faced Britain on one side and on the other the relatively weak Qing empire undergoing transformation into the modern Chinese nation-state. The fall of the Qing and the weakness of the new Chinese state left Tibet in an unresolved position, neither colony to an empire nor territory of a modern nation-state. Due to this unusual position, the Tibetan elite was not forced to adopt the universal rhetoric and practice of modernization and the universal enlightenment values of the now-global West. Nor did they have to develop new alternatives to these forces, such as the Japanese and Turkish ideas of Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism respectively, which tended to replicate central aspects of the very world orders that they sought to challenge.

Instead, elite Tibetans generally continued to reproduce discourse that did not reflect the global forces of modernization, nationalism or capitalism that were reshaping so much of the world. By discourse, I refer here to modes and contents of written Tibetan cultural works, which remained largely religious in orientation. For instance, in contrast to most neighboring countries at the time, Central Tibetans produced no news media. The only Tibetan language newspapers printed in Central

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3 For Thailand see Thongchai Winichakul, Siem Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1994); for Japan, see Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). Although the thirteenth Dalai Lama enacted some measures to try to introduce, with limited success, a modern military and tax administration, critical aspects of Tibetan cultural practices such as education did not significantly change.

4 See Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), first made available to me in the unpublished essay “Alternative Visions of World Orders: Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (1882-1923)” read at the conference “Borderlands and Multicultural Politics in Modern China and Japan,” Triangle East Asia Colloquium (Duke University), February 2005. I wish to thank Sucheta Mazumdar for organizing the conference and all the participants for their stimulating input, which helped me reframe this essay.

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2 For the most recent surveys of the Chinese and Tibetan bibliographic materials related to the Panchen Lama, see Fabienne Jagou, Le 9e Panchen Lama (1883–1937): Regards des relations sino-chinoises (Monographies 191 (Paris: Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, 2004); Gray Turtle, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
Tibet were Chinese government initiatives, from 1907-1910 and after 1956. The only Tibetan language newspaper produced by an ethnic Tibetan before 1950 was edited and printed outside Central Tibet in Kalimpong, by a Christian convert and British informant. The elite did not engage in debate about modernization in any written form that has been preserved or reproduced (to my knowledge). Because the center of Tibetan culture and political power remained basically unchallenged from 1913 to the mid-1950s even elite Tibetans in exile in China were able to resist significant encroachment into their discursive practices.

Since the Tibetan homeland of these exile was not threatened or transformed by colonization, the Chinese government was driven to respect traditional values in order to encourage exiled Tibetans to work with China. The example of these three newspapers, which developed only in colonial circumstances, support my contention that colonization was a critical element in developing modes of discourse, as do the example of foreign-educated Tibetans. Some fairly marginal ethnic Tibetans in exile in China were educated in modern Western-influenced educational institutions as described by Melvyn C. Goldstein and Heather Stoddard. These students were exceptional in reproducing the discourse of the West (not yet hegemonic in Tibet), insisting on the need for modernization in Tibet and evincing signs of a modern Tibetan nationalism. However, most of the lay and religious Tibetan elite declined to participate in this discourse, at least in writing, even until 1959.

To Peter Hansen’s Tibet Journal query, “Why is there no subaltern studies for Tibet?” I would reply that this is because Tibet is not (yet) postcolonial. Yet his question alerts us to the fact that until 1959, when traditional Tibetan cultural sources of educational and cultural authority were abruptly replaced in tots, Tibet was not a colony subject to the Western-based model of modern education and state practices. Hansen suggests that such an answer is too simplistic, and he is probably right in the context of the present situation (1990s-2000s), but I do think this goes a long way to explaining why, in the 1930s, the Panchen Lama and other members of the Tibetan elite in exile in China did not feel they had to reshape their identity through


\[7\] Despite the Chinese Communist military presence in Tibetan regions from 1950, and the entry of soldiers into Central Tibet in 1951, the existence of the Seventeen Point Agreement prevented major discursive shifts in Central Tibet until the uprising of 1959. For an analysis of this discursive shift dating back to the mid-1950s, especially among elite Tibetans outside Central Tibet, see Hartley, “Contextually Speaking.”

\[8\] See especially, Stoddard, Le mendiant de l’Éthiopie, Recherches sur la Haute Asie, no. 9 (Paris: Société d’Ethnographie, 1985) and Melvyn C. Goldstein, Davey Sherap, and William Siebenschaub, A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Phuntsog Wangye (Berkeley: University of California, 2004). Goldstein et al. describe oral conversations Phuntsog Wangye had with various Tibetan elite figures who were sympathetic to his arguments regarding nationalism and race’s ethnic issues.

modernist discourse. Moreover, since 1959 Tibet has been occupied and colonized by the Chinese, so that in that sense there is no postcolonial elite—save possibly the exiled community in India and elsewhere—capable of producing postcolonial literature. And, as Hansen has suggested, the domination of nationalist modes of representing “Tibetan” and “Chinese” versions of Tibet also helps to explain this lack of subaltern studies even in Euro-American scholarly circles. But I think that the reason that elite Tibetans in exile in China in the early twentieth century declined to engage significantly with the global discourse of modernity lies elsewhere. Concepts of Tibetan (or Chinese) nationalism were not what held them back.

Although some Tibetans in China in the 1930s and 1940s were subject to the Western-originated discourse of modernity (in this case, ideas of racial/ethnic identity, nationalism, and socialism), I argue that representatives of the Tibetan elite were largely immune to such influences precisely because their homeland had not been compromised by colonization. My use of these terms “immune” and “compromised” indicates a medical model of “infection” for the idea of modernity. Colonization, in this context, was the primary “vector” for the introduction of the metaphor “virus” of modernity. For my purposes, the redeployment of such terms in the world of computers (e.g. “viruses” that “infect” programs) may be a more appropriate extension of this medical metaphor. Modernity in this case would be a set of practices associated with nation-states that were expected (by those who embraced the nation-state as a necessary social institution) to operate everywhere: boundaries, sovereignty, and citizens; secular, scientific, and universal education; rational, efficient, and centralized administration. These practices were more or less deliberately introduced wherever colonial conditions were present. But the weakness of the colonial presence in Tibet until the 1950s meant that few of these expectations were fulfilled or even deemed desirable, whether by the elite or the populace at large.

Tibet’s temporary relative immunity to external forces does not mean that Tibet should be treated as an exceptional case that merits no social analysis. Nor does this mean that Tibet was a static, timeless realm that never had nor would change without outside intervention, but rather simply that the pace and direction of change were not being as forcefully dictated as in situations of strong colonial presence (as in India) or pressure (as in Thailand or China). Elsewhere I have discussed the impact of capitalist and nationalist forces on Tibet, and though they had important consequences for Tibetan society, the pressure to totally overhaul Tibetan society was minimal in comparison with most other parts of Asia. In the end, after a decade in China the Panchen Lama was willing to acknowledge that he at least was part of China, and

\[9\] Hansen, “Why is there no subaltern studies for Tibet?” The Tibet Journal 28.4 (2003): 7-22. I recognize that methods and questions raised by subaltern studies are applicable to Tibet, regardless of its colonial status, but I do agree with Hansen that the ongoing occupation and colonization of Tibet by the Chinese government does circumscribe the discourse about Tibet in significant ways, many of which include self-censorship by Tibetans in exile and Tibetan sympathizers abroad.

\[10\] Turtle, Tibetan Buddhism. I thank Peter Hansen for his insights that led me to revise my argument here and at the end of this essay.
there is some indication that he thought modern conceptions of multibehavioral harmony were a positive advance over previous relations. Yet such statements were exceptional and were specifically addressed to Chinese audiences, and failed to transform Tibetan discourse, even within the Panchen Lama’s own corpus of writings. Overall, the Panchen Lama embraced traditional patterns of interactions, in which Buddhist unity with Chinese or Mongols was paramount, and what was good and desirable was judged by Buddhist standards and not modern enlightenment schemas.

Rather than adopting such modern schemas or derivative alternatives, Tibetan lamas in China could instead insist on the continued significance of previous modes of identity and social relations. Given the importance of exiled Tibetan lamas to a Chinese government trying to establish some influence over Tibet, the Chinese state was not in a position to insist that these lamas employ a new discourse (as the present Dalai Lama does, in his appeal to universal human rights, nonviolence, and democracy). Therefore, Tibetan lamas—as opposed to other Buddhist monks in Japan, Sri Lanka, and China—were not driven, as Richard Jaffe has described the phenomenon among the Japanese, to adapt “Western scholarly ideas about Buddhism for their own apologetic purposes.”

In fact, even the incorporation of Tibetan Buddhism as a part of Pan-Asian Buddhism was largely the work of Chinese Buddhists who embraced Tibetan Buddhism for their own purposes.

Rather than offering Chinese or other Buddhists new interpretations or revisions of Tibetan Buddhism as part of a Pan-Asian Buddhism, the Panchen Lama offered very traditional teachings with almost no discernable doctrinal innovations. Even his mention of Sun Yat-sen’s ideas, drawn from his “Three Principles of the People” (race-based) nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood), described below, did not really address these modern ideas except to view them in the context of traditional ideas of adopting what is good and abandoning what is bad. Thus, as far as I can tell, the Panchen Lama’s life serves as an example of how Tibet, free from colonization, remained a site of resistant to modernity. But this was actually a curious conclusion because even the traditions and practices that the Panchen Lama tried to bring to China from the Buddhist past and the imperial precedents that he invoked were interpreted in new ways by Chinese Buddhists and politicians. Thus, though the Panchen Lama did not consciously embrace Pan-Asian Buddhism (as far as I can tell), Chinese Buddhists still inserted him and his activities into this new discourse.


12 See Turtle, Tibetan Buddhism, Chapters 3 and 4.

Transition: Qing Dynasty to Chinese Modernity

When the Panchen Lama arrived in China (Gansu) in 1924, things had not changed as much as we might imagine, given the Chinese revolution and the abdication of the Qing dynasty. Reincarnate lamas who had long enjoyed the support of the dynasty, like the 14th K’asy, Th’u’u’ khwa, and A k’ya Khurulkhu, welcomed the Panchen Lama and one even offered him the corveé labor (Tib. ‘tsug lag) that had been granted to these lamas by the now defunct dynasty.13 Remarkably, and as another sign of how slowly affairs changed on the borders of the empire, the Xining abhan, who had represented the Qing imperial household among Qinghai Tibetans and Mongols since the early eighteenth century, was still present and dealt with the coming of the Panchen Lama.14 By the time the Panchen Lama arrived in the capital Beijing in 1925 the imperial family had just recently been driven from the Forbidden City, but the lama still sometimes referred to China as “the Mahayogesho emperor’s great country” (yam dbyangs gong ma’i rgyal khab chen po).15 On the surface, the capital had probably not dramatically changed since the sixth Panchen Lama Blo bzang dpal ldan ye shes (1738-1780) had visited in the late eighteenth century. The great white stupas (Baitasi 白塔寺), built by the Mongol khans in the thirteenth century, and the more recent hilltop white stupas overlooking the Forbidden City, built by the Manchu emperors in 1652 to welcome the fifth Dalai Lama, were likely still among the highest visible landmarks of the city.

Yet already the signs of change were evident, even in the midst of continuity with the past dynastic support of Tibetan Buddhism at the capital. When the Panchen Lama taught at Yonghegong 永和宫, the former imperial palace which had been converted into a Tibetan Buddhist teaching monastery by the Qianlong emperor, he addressed a multilingual host of Tibetan Buddhists: eight to nine thousand Mongol and Tibetan lamas, two thousand Manchus, and several thousand Chinese men and women.16 Though Tibetan lamas had no doubt taught such ethnically mixed audiences before, the additional presence of so many “commoners” (as opposed to imperial clan) lay men and women was almost certainly unprecedented. An innovation associated with modern developments was reported in the same issue of the Chinese Buddhist magazine that recorded this event: the first national interfaith meeting that

13 Blo bzang thugs bstan chos kyi ngyi ma, Panchen Lama VI [X], sbya’gya mgon thams cad mnyen pa Blo bzang thugs bstan chos kyi ngyi ma dge legs rgyud rgyal bzang po’i zhul snga sus kyi thun mong la’i sugs pa’i rgyun pa rin po chen dbyung gi rgyud po’i phreng ba [The autobiography of the sixth Panchen Lama Blo bzang thugs bstan chos kyi ngyi ma], Perv sheman thams cad mnyen po ye’i bstan Blo bzang thugs bstan chos kyi ngyi ma dge legs rgyud rgyal bzang po’i gzung ’bum (The collected works of the sixth (ninth) Panchen Lama Blo bzang thugs bstan chos kyi ngyi ma), reproduced from the bkra shis lhun po blocks, 1944, 44, 71, 73, 75-76, 78.
14 Blo bzang thugs bstan chos kyi ngyi ma, sbya’gya mgon thams cad mnyen pa, 21, 24, 28, 35, 37-38, 50, 61.
15 Blo bzang thugs bstan chos kyi ngyi ma, sbya’gya mgon thams cad mnyen pa, 112.
16 Wuyi 華—the Panchen chuanfa jii 唐鏡法記 (Records of the Panchen Lama’s transmission of the Dharma), Hsiao ching 光音 [Sound of the Tide] 6.4 (1925): 11.
took place simultaneous with the Panchen Lama’s arrival in Beijing. Although the
lama did not attend the conference, he was welcomed at an event held by the United
Association of Chinese and Foreign Religions (Zhongwai Gejiao Lianhehui 中外
各教聯合會). Over two thousand people—Christians, foreign and Asian Catholics,
Muslims, Indian whisking dervishes, Daoist masters, Buddhist monks and Tibetan
lamas—were on hand to greet the Tibetan hierarch.17 Doubtless the gathering par-
ticipants saw his arrival in the context of a new tolerance and openness to different
religious traditions and beliefs that had been sweeping the world since the inception
of the idea at the 1893 Parliament of World Religions in Chicago.18 This is reflected
in the rhetoric associated with the United Association’s welcoming of the Panchen
Lama, which advocated for both the “merging of the individual traditions 融合各教”
as well as “the universal harmony of world religions 世界宗教大同.”19

Those who had attended the 1893 Parliament of World Religions would, how-
however, not be surprised that each of these traditions in China was trying to
carve out space for its own beliefs in the competitive race for recognition and respect
in a rapidly modernizing Asia. When the Panchen Lama was asked by reporters why
he had come to the capital, he replied that he hoped to spread “the Yellow Religion”
Qunmingjiao 賢教, that is, the dGe lugs pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, also
associated with the Dalai Lama. Unfortunately, he observed, there were no translators
who deeply understood the Buddhist teachings, so he was initially frustrated in this
effort.20 A group of Chinese Buddhist lamas and monks had recently formed the
Beijing Buddhist Tibetan Language Studies Institute (Foqiao Zangwen Xueyuan 佛教
藏文學院) to remedy this problem, but they encountered a similar problem, a dearth
of skilled bilingual language instructors, and transformed the school into a study-
abroad program in 1925. With one prominent exception, it would be nearly a decade
before Chinese monks fully trained in Tibetan language and Buddhism returned
from their study abroad in Tibet, and by this time, the Panchen Lama was leaving
China proper for the Tibetan borders.21

Bridging the Gap: Teaching to a Mixed Audience

In the meantime, the Panchen Lama had to make do with such translators as he
could find, because he never learned Chinese well enough to teach in that language.
In turn, for the Chinese, only the Tibetan originals of texts about the Kālacakra and

18 For a more thorough analysis of this trend, see the author’s Tibetan Buddhism, chapter 3.
21 The Panchen Lama taught at this school on March 8, 1925; see Wuyi, “Banchan chuan


Shambhala were available in the early twentieth century, and, as the Panchen Lama
had already made clear, translation of such Buddhist teachings and the concepts they
contained was a real challenge to communication.22 For the Tibetan and Mongol
audiences of course, there would already be some sense of what was meant by the
Kālacakra tantra and Shambhala, and initially the Panchen Lama addressed primar-
ily these audiences. However, from very early on in his time in China, the Panchen
Lama was addressing mixed audiences, including Chinese who might never had had
much exposure to the Kālacakra tantra or the realm of Shambhala. Based on
the Panchen Lama’s 1944 autobiography, I examine here the instances and contexts of
his teaching the Kālacakra tantra as well as the Shambhala benediction (shamb sman
lam), a shortened version of the phrase the “Shambhala aspirational prayer” (shamb bha la
sman lam). The Shambhala prayer written by the sixth Panchen Lama in the eight-
teenth century provides an example of some of the expectations associated with such
prayers. Its full title was “The prayer to be reborn at the head of the entourage when
in the future the supreme reverend lama himself takes up the form of Raudra Cakrin
in Sambhala and performs marvelous deeds,” indicating the expectation that the
Panchen Lama would be reborn as the “prophesied apocalyptic king of Sambhala.”23
To give a sense of how central these teachings were to the ninth Panchen Lama’s
exposition of Buddhist doctrine, texts devoted to these two topics make up fully a
third of the first volume of his collected writings (eighteen out of fifty-six texts).24
Shortly after the Panchen Lama first entered Gansu province, China, in 1924 he
administered refuge and taught the Shambhala aspirational prayer to some two hun-
dred Chinese and Mongols (rgya sogs).25 To my knowledge this was the first recorded

22 Since the ritual has come to prominence in the United States, Canada, and Spain in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a host of Western-language resources and
translations have been published to cater to the niche market that has grown up around this
esoteric Buddhist ritual and practice. I will not list all the Western-language publications
that deal with the Kālacakra tantra, but a quick search of the Internet revealed eleven sub-
stantial books on the subject in English, several in French, and one in German. Other mater-
ials that emphasized audio or visual (or both) elements of the Kālacakra tantra were available,
including a three-dimensional model on CD-ROM, as well as two-dimensional reproductions
of the mandala and mantra associated with the tantra. In the years since I first performed
this search (2004), a number of Chinese language books and videos concerned with this tan-
tra have also been released.
24 Blo bzang grub thob bstan chos kyi nyi ma, Panchen Lama VI [IX], Pn chen thogs rdug Bray pa 'gyur khyed brgyud chos kyi nyi ma dge legs rnamе rgyug khyed pa'i gyung 'bum [The collected works of the sixth (seventh) Panchen Lama Blo bzang grub thob bstan chos kyi nyi ma], vol. 1 (New Delhi, reproduced from the bkRa shis lugs po block, 1973 [1944]).
25 Blo bzang grub thob bstan chos kyi nyi ma, rgyes nugs thugs rdug bo byed pa, 97. In at least one case, it is clear that the Panchen Lama is referring to two distinct ethnic groups when he says “Chinese and Mongol” (rgya sogs), see p. 61, which lists the audience as comprising
“Chinese, Mongols, and foreigners” (rgya sogs phyi grum). In general however, it is possible that
the Tibetan “rgya sogs” could mean something like “sinified Mongols” or “Mongols of China,”
as similar terms (such as rgya bai, referring to Qinghai Mongols of the former Yuan dynasty
instance in which Chinese Buddhists were exposed to teachings associated with the realm of Shambhala, though such an ethnically mixed audience is not surprising on the borders between cultural regions. Thereafter, the Panchen Lama gave the same teaching seven more times to various Mongol and Tibetan monks and lay groups before he reached Beijing. Shortly after arriving there in 1925, he again instructed a group which included some two hundred Chinese and Mongols—the presence of both men and women is noted again—regarding the Shambhala aspirational prayer. In this case, the assembled audience, including more than one thousand monks, was gathered from the famous Yellow Temple (Tib. Hong zi, Ch. Huangsi 黄寺) and twenty-seven other, presumably Tibetan Buddhist, monasteries scattered in and around the capital. The inclusion of Chinese men and women in this assembly seems to indicate that even before the Panchen Lama arrived, the Chinese laity was actively engaged with the Tibetan Buddhists resident in the region and thus were drawn into this event once the Panchen Lama arrived in the capital.

As before, the instances when Chinese were involved in such instruction were far outnumbered by events attended by Mongol monks, nobles, and common people, but as the goal here is to examine the Chinese response to the Tibetan Buddhist teachings of the Panchen Lama, we need first to gain a sense of how common such occurrences were. In the first year after the Panchen Lama arrived in Beijing, he taught the Shambhala aspirational prayer some twenty-one times, and only about a third of these events seem to have included Chinese Buddhists. The number of Chinese involved also seems to have been relatively small, at least possible at the Buddhist sacred site of Mount Wutai some one hundred and fifty miles west of Beijing. There, the first notice that enumerated the ethnicity of attendees of such an event is described as “Chinese and Mongols numbering some two hundred.” Yet possibly the largest number of Chinese to attend these events were those, though not specifically enumerated, among the one thousand monks and laity who attended another session of instruction on the Shambhala prayer at Mount Wutai. Also on the mountain, some seven hundred Chinese and Mongols attended a similar event shortly thereafter, though again the exact number of Chinese was not specified.

who submitted to the Ming and Qing) have been attested to in the past. However, I consistently will take these terms as references to a mixed ethnic audience. Even if this was merely a case of addressing a group of Mongols who were somehow “Chinese,” the result would probably have been the same. Whether each individual or the group as a whole was considered “ethnically mixed,” the main point is that these conceptions of and aspirations toward Shambhala would have started to work their way into a Chinese frame of reference, where they had largely been unknown before. That “Chinese” Mongols, rather than Chinese among Mongols, might have been the vector for this knowledge would only emphasize the importance of Mongols as a mediating presence between the Chinese and Tibetans.

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36 Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nying ma, skYabs negon thams cu mkhyen pa, 124-125.
37 Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nying ma, skYabs negon thams cu mkhyen pa, 121, 125, 127, 130-131, 136, 139-141, 148, 156-157, 160, 175.
38 Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nying ma, skYabs negon thams cu mkhyen pa, 148.
39 Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nying ma, skYabs negon thams cu mkhyen pa, 156-157.
40 Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nying ma, skYabs negon thams cu mkhyen pa, 133-134.
41 Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nying ma, skYabs negon thams cu mkhyen pa, 133-134.
teaching about Shambhala. We know that in 1932 a Beiping layman came to Inner Mongolia to invite the Panchen Lama to perform the Kalacakra ritual and initiation in the former imperial capital.34

We will probably never know for certain the full range of motivations behind the Chinese invitation for the Panchen Lama to come teach the Kalacakra tantrav in China. However, if for the previous six years some hundreds of Chinese monks and lay persons had been praying for rebirth or entry in this very lifetime into the messianic realm of Shambhala, it is hardly surprising that they then wanted access to the complete teachings that were said to have been preserved in this land. Having agreed to come, on his way back the Panchen Lama taught in the Mongolian city of Hohhot. Here again he reached a mixed crowd of some two thousand Chinese and Mongol monks and taught them the Shambhala aspirational prayer.35 When the Panchen Lama returned to the former capital, he was given a hero's welcome and stayed at what is now the Chinese Communist Party's innermost sanctuary, the so-called Southern Ocean Palace (Nanhai Gong 南海宫), just west of the Forbidden City. From this point, Chinese records of what was hoped for and expected from the coming ceremony have been preserved. They reveal the despair and desires of a Chinese public disturbed by warfare, political instability, and natural disaster, which sought succor in the messianic belief in Shambhala.

Chinese Expectations: Connecting to the Past, Hope for the Future

The best way of examining the Chinese response to the Panchen Lama's religious activities is to reproduce how the Chinese themselves introduced the Kalacakra tantrav and its association with the realm of Shambhala.36 In this respect, the first Chinese language document, "A call to sponsor the Kalacakra tantrav," issued to announce this event nearly a year in advance is very revealing. First, the sponsors of the ceremony insisted on the connection of this event with similar previous religious traditions, to establish a precedent: "In the past, during the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, lamas were worshipped and presided over prayers for the country's affairs."37 So although the specific Kalacakra ritual was new to an audience of Chinese common people (as opposed to dynastic elite), the emphasis was placed here on the respect for lamas and their salvific powers in earlier, imperial times. The location for the assembly within the Forbidden City also reinforced the continuity with previous imperial occasions. Second, this ritual activity focused first

34 Danzhu Angben 丹珠昂奔 (Don 'grub dbang 'bum), Li rub Dalai lama ya Panchen erdeni niasngu 历来达赖喇嘛与班禅额尔德尼年谱 (Chronicle of the genealogy of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni) (Beijing: Zhongyang mizna dama, 1999): 641.
35 Blo bzang chub car choi kyi nying ma, Rgyal rgyal shams od nok byen pa, 672.
36 For brief descriptions of both the 1932 Beiping and 1934 Hangzhou Kalacakra ceremonies, based on different sources than I use here, and an analysis of the Panchen Lama's motivations, see Jago, Le 9e Panchen Lama (1887-1937), 117-130.
38 Changxing, "Shihun fahui quan fa qian wen," 2-3. Of course, making this statement about the Western Regions meant that the author was ignoring or ignorant of Japanese maintenance of these two traditions.
39 Changxing, "Shihun fahui quan fa qian wen," 3-5.

on alleviating the suffering of the Chinese through the power of this Tibetan master. The sponsors noted especially "natural disasters in over ten provinces" and the fact that "since the revolution of 1911, no year had been without military calamities." The Chinese sponsors clearly saw the Panchen Lama as a representative of hope from the west. Of course this was very different from the hopes of the secular Chinese who saw a promise in Western science and political traditions. The sponsors made the point that "only the Western Regions (Xiyou 西域) had all the esoteric and esoteric sects." Again, they attempted to connect these traditions to China's own past by explaining that Sanskrit esoterica (jinni 天密) had been studied in the Tang dynasty but had not been continuously transmitted in China.38 By using these terms "Sanskrit" and "Western Regions," the sponsors were subtly suggesting a radical idea that Tibet be equated with the original source of Buddhist traditions, India. Thus, rather than trying to suggest that Tibet was somehow part of China, they were associating it more with India in the imagination of Chinese Buddhists. At the same time, the sponsors were clearly suggesting a connection between Tibet and Shambhala, though they nowhere explicitly stated that these two were one and the same. Instead, they repeated that Shambhala was located north of India. Anyone familiar with Asian geography could easily make the connection: Tibet was clearly situated directly north of India. They also said those who called upon Shambhala for salvation would all be reborn there: whoever "received the initiation into the Kalacakra tantrav would, in the future, meet with conditions for being reborn in Shambhala." Yet at the same time, the sponsors had even more immediate hopes for the event: "Having received this scripture, what the country lacks and has lost can be restored." The Panchen Lama was "to make great prayers to release the spirits of the dead, to bless the living, and the past, present, and future of this Chinese land and other lands, in this and other worlds, and all types of beings in all realms."39 From this early Chinese-language source we see several concerns that would be repeated over the years: the emphasis on continuity with past traditions, both domestic imperial traditions, and antecedent Indian Buddhist traditions; a connection with the present, linking Tibet (and Chinese participants in the ritual) to Shambhala; and a focus on the salvific powers of the ritual and the Panchen Lama that were to be applied first to China, but also more broadly for the benefit of the whole world.

This first instance of a public communication about the Kalacakra ritual in Chinese also included an appendix written by a Tibetan, which allows us to see the role that Tibetan Buddhists played in portraying what Tibet had to offer to others. The appendix to the announcement, entitled "A record of the realm of Shambhala," was written in Chinese by the Thru'u kISING Khutuktu (Kal bzang dam chos nying ma, 1895/98-1959) and described the realm of Shambhala in some detail, in ways that suggested a connection to Tibet. For instance, he recommended reliance on records concerning the Western Regions' great virtuous ones' time spent in Shambhala, spe-
was made, and many of the details clearly did not describe Tibet. For instance, at the center of the kingdom was a city called Kalapa, and to its south a forest called Malay in which a three-dimensional model of the Kalachakra mandala had been built by King Sucandra (Ch. Youshen, 舊僧, Tib. Zha ba bzang po, the first king of Shambhala, traditional reign dates 879–877 BCE). The text continued in this vein, listing the seven dharma-kings (Ch. 佛王, Tib. chos rgyal) and the other thirty-six generations of past, present and future rulers of Shambhala. 49 The main import of this passage for the Chinese must have been that the original scripture of the Kalachakra tantra was transmitted to King Sucandra by Śākyamuni Buddha in India and then preserved in Shambhala through all these generations. The transmission of this teaching back to India and then to Tibet was then briefly described. In this way, this teaching, though new to the Chinese, was established as a valid Buddhist scripture. This connection was necessary to reinforce concepts of Pan-Asian Buddhism centered on the founder, Śākyamuni. Finally, the account described the great war that would come and the role of the last in the line of twenty-five kings who would emerge from Shambhala and lead its forces to defeat the forces of evil threatening to overwhelm the world. 50

Having examined these early accounts of the Kalachakra tantra and the associated realm of Shambhala in Chinese, I will now briefly examine some of the numerous additional articles and published talks drawn from the Buddhist journal Hichayoin, and also a Chinese language history of Mongol and Tibetan Buddhism, as well as a few Tibetan language sources, that echoed, amplified or criticized these ideas over the following few years. The next set of communications regarding this event was issued by both Tibetans and Chinese involved with planning the coming Kalachakra ritual in the former capital. Two letters, written in Chinese but bearing the Panchen Lama’s name, were sent to the organizing committee regarding the event in March of 1932, though they were not published in Hichayoin until August of that year. The first letter reiterated the traditions already emphasized by the previous announcement. It recalled the respect that the Tang dynasty showed for Buddhism and how the state was prosperous and the people at peace. The letter also reiterated language that Chinese Buddhists would understand as referring to the “end times,” the term “muga 末法” meaning literally “the end of [the] Buddha-dharma” that, in this context, could easily be associated with the final battle to be won by the king of Shambhala. 51

Doubledey, 1980: 270, note 4. None of these accounts seem to indicate that any of the Panchen Lamas actually visited or resided in Shambhala.


47 Banchan e'erdeni 伏藏顯而德尼 [Panchen Lama IX], “Banchan dashi zhi Shilun jin-
In the same issue of *Haichuen* that published these letters, the Chinese sponsors of the Beijing *Kalacakra* ritual included copies of a telegram, a circular letter, and a list of sponsors that they issued to announce the ritual. I have examined these documents in more detail elsewhere, so here I just want to focus on what the sponsors articulated about their expectations for the ritual. They claimed that this esoteric doctrine would confer on “those who heard the Dharma in this life protection in the future world” and recommended that the “country rely on it for peace and that the people provide funds for it in order to be blessed.” Those who took initiation into the esoteric practice “would be reborn and reside in Shambhala (shile gyuto).” These were high expectations indeed to load onto the coming encounter with the exiled Tibetan Buddhist master and these esoteric teachings.

Some Chinese, even high officials, embraced this idea wholeheartedly. The most prominent of these officials was Dai Jiaio, a close friend of Sun Yat-sen and the director of one of the Chinese Republic’s five branches of government. When the *Current Affairs Newspaper* (Shishi xinhua) wrote about this politician having said that “scriptures and mantras will save the country” (*jingzhen jingwu* 経咒數輿), the Buddhist monk Beihua 忍華 (i.e., Taihx 太樞, 1890-1947) wrote a supportive editorial in response, just a month before the *Kalacakra* ritual was to be held. As with previous discussions of the advent of Tibetan Buddhism among the Chinese, Beihua referred to the past precedents of esoteric Buddhism in the Tang dynasty. He also noted that the “Tibetan esoterica were practiced only at the Yuan, Ming and Qing courts, but had not been disseminated among the country’s people.” In the present context however, he expected that the country’s only esoteric center, Beijing’s Yonghegong monastery, would now be the source of popularization of these ideas among the common people. In fact Yonghegong was used as the office of the organization that promoted the Beijing *Kalacakra*, and two weeks before the event was to take place in October 1932 the organizers circulated another telegram around the country asking for donations and promising that the ritual would “protect the state and eliminate disaster.”

The use of language to describe this Tibetan Buddhist ritual inserted the ninth Panchen Lama’s activities into the long history of a discourse in which Buddhism protected the dynasty and averted misfortune dating back at least to the Tang period.

![Fig. 3: Peace Mandala of Shambhala on floor of Temple, Oct. 1912. (Jacques Marchais Museum of Tibetan Art)](image)

**Tibetan Teaching: Legitimacy from the Past, Lessons for the Future**

When he gave his public teachings in the Forbidden City, the Panchen Lama traced the precedents with China only back to the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty, though he did explain the entire transmission of the *Kalacakra tantra* directly from the Buddha to the present. The record of his exposition in the Forbidden City is one of his longer works, at one hundred and one folios, with the history of the transmission of the *Kalacakra tantra* making up roughly a third of the text. The Panchen Lama described how the script was taught by the Buddha to the first king of Shambhala and preserved in his realm for centuries before returning to India, and how it was brought to Tibet and eventually came to China through invitations issued by the Mongol emperors. The most detailed description of this transmission was reserved for the period in which the Tantra was handed down from teacher to disciple within the dGe lugs pa tradition, with special attention given to the sixth Panchen Lama. What could...

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60. Blo bzang thub bstanchos kyi rgyi ma, *Pas chen thams cad mkhyen pa*, 470. In his biography, he only traced the precedents back as far as the Qing dynasty, mentioning his previous incarnation the sixth Panchen Lama who visited Beijing in 1780 and noticing Qianlong’s throne in the Taiheidian, where the ceremony was held. See Blo bzang thub bstanchos kyi rgyi ma, *Khyung thugs thams cad mkhyen pa*, 637, 641.

61. For details on this, see Leonard van der Kuijff, *The Kalacakra and the Patronage of Tibetan Buddhism by the Mongol Imperial Family* (Bloomington: Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University, 2004).

all this detail mean to a Chinese audience, numbering in the tens of thousands, most of whom probably had little knowledge of the famous Tibetans who made up this centuries-old lineage? First, the clear link back to the Buddha was an important lineage to establish. But even more important was the position of Tibet and Tibetan lamas in this lineage. Two-thirds of this section, about twenty-three folios, is dedicated to setting Tibet up as the only link to this important salvific teaching. This was not time and ink idly spent listing a lot of names. Tibet was the only place that these teachings had been fully preserved (aside from Mongolia, which had received them from Tibet). And the Panchen Lama through his position as one of the two leading lamas of the dGe lugs pa tradition, as well as through associations established by his first and sixth reincarnations with the Kilaak.62 kondr and Shambhala, made him the conduit par excellence for these teachings.

So, Tibet and the Panchen Lama were established as the transmitters of these teachings, but why was this important? Precisely because these teachings offered salvation to a people literally desperate, hopeless, about their situation. We have only to look at whom the Panchen Lama wrote this text for and what he promised in it to see what a powerful psychological position the Panchen Lama occupied for some Chinese and how central Tibet would become in the imagination of how China could be saved from its problems. Throughout the text, the Panchen Lama talked about the benefits and effects of practice: clearing away sins, moral defilements, and affective emotions as well as generating gnostic wisdom, happiness, and complete enlightenment. He also discusses salvation for the world, political situation, and all suffering beings. The colophon of this text records that it was written in response to the request of three Chinese military men (a general and two army commanders) who wanted an easily understood abridgement of the source and history of the Kilaak.62 kondr teaching to distribute in Chinese. Fulfilling their request, the Panchen Lama wished that by preparing the text the moral defilements of all beings would be cleared away and they would attain buddhahood.

Aside from the spiritual hopes that the Panchen Lama held out to these military men and the assembled audience, the conclusion of his 1932 teaching also carried a political message that would have been welcomed by the Chinese audience. By using the phrase "our Chinese locality," the Panchen Lama indicated that he, and by implication Tibet, was part of this new entity. Rather than using the traditional Tibetan phrase for China (rgya nag), he used the modern Chinese term (Tib. krong sgo), Ch. Zhongguo preceded by the first-person plural possessive pronoun (Tib. rgyong cung). Though the Panchen Lama used this new term for China, he gave little indication that he understood the political ramifications of such a term. Instead krong sgo seems merely to replace earlier terms for the political entity that ruled China, such as the "Ta Ming" (for the Ming dynasty) or "the Manchu emperor's great country," without even being understood enough to translate it into Tibetan. That is, he maintained the Chinese term for state (gso) as part of the proper name (Zhongguo), and then used the Tibetan term (yul gnu) for locality in apposition, which narrowed the scope of this term considerably. Thus, where the Chinese would have heard the use of the term for their new nation-state, the Tibetans would have understood this as a localized entity, and not an expansive term. Yet his use of the first-person plural possessive adjective unmistakably included him in this new entity, however he understood it. Using this term then, he closed the text by noting, "At this time, if one says, 'What is the reason that our Chinese locality is without happiness and unsettled both the government and the people are very miserable?' then the answer is: 'There is no proper adopting and abandoning of good and evil, actions and their fruits.' (deng shags rang cung krong sgo yul gnu bde 'jigs med par rgyal khod mi zer gru bkyi dang rong byang byang pa'i rgyud gnyen zin zhe na dge shig dang las brtan sprong bblog bzhed kub mi byang ba len ba red/). Therefore, he prayed that the blessings of the Buddha and the teachings he had just explained would "give rise to the happiness of the country and the common people" (yul gnu mi zer bkyi ba shig byang). Rather than reflecting modern concerns for national "unification," he embraced more traditional, Buddhist descriptions of ideal outcomes.

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13 Blo bzang chub bstan chos kyi nyi ma, Pāy chen thams cad mkbhyen pa, 509-510, 512, 516, 519, 453, 523-529, 530.
14 Blo bzang chub bstan chos kyi nyi ma, Pāy chen thams cad mkbhyen pa, 533. The Tibetan

Tibet as the Source of Messianic Teachings to Save Republican China

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Tibet as the Source of Messianic Teachings to Save Republican China
Inserting the Panchen Lama’s Traditions into New Visions of Modern China

To judge by the later descriptions of this ceremony, many in the Chinese audience took these ideas to heart and advocated them to others. After the event, former warlord, prime minister and president of China, Duan Qirui wrote about the origins of the Kālacakra tantra, the first king of Shambhala, the text’s transmission back to India and on to Tibet, and the Panchen Lama’s role in propagating these teachings in China (Huaxia). Most significantly, he said of the Kālacakra that it had the power “on the small scale to save one country from disasters, and on the large scale to extinguish the whole world’s calamities; others and oneself could attain Buddhahood.” In a similar manner, a Huaxin article, written by an attendee three days after the Kālacakra ceremony, indicates an acceptance of all that transpired before and at the event. It repeated the language about the esoteric tradition’s prominence at the imperial court and its failure to spread to the people until the republican period. It also gave a short summary of the history of its transmission to China, with a nod to the relationship between the sixth Panchen Lama and the Qianlong emperor.

But this article added some modern twists to the mix of rhetoric surrounding these teachings. First, it sought to validate the transmission of the Kālacakra tantra to China by reference to European standards, arguing that “England, France and Germany are scientific countries yet they do not see Indo-Tibetan culture as without value but instead respect it.” In support of this assessment, the article cited the facts that German universities had eight Indo-Tibetan philosophy professors and that the English and French governments had, through several decades of management, translated many Indo-Tibetan scriptures and produced bilingual dictionaries. The article also mentioned Euro-American newspapers’ attention to the event and noted with an air of superiority that “although the West translated the scripture early on, because they lacked teachers, no one was able to make use of it as a religious teaching.” In this context then, the centrality of the Panchen Lama to fulfilling the wish that this practice and translation of scripture would long abide in China (Huaxia) became paramount: “Only the Great Master Panchen [Lama] may take responsibility for transmitting its reception.”


But even as the Chinese were losing control of the northeastern territories of what had been the Qing empire, they had some hope of renewing the control of the former southwestern Tibetan territories, a control that had lapsed with the end of the dynasty. The Panchen Lama entered into a much closer relationship with the Nationalist government after the 1932 ceremony in Beijing. And Dai Jiaozu was not the only prominent politician to seek the Panchen Lama’s aid. According
to one contemporary source, Lin Sen, who had recently become the president of China, was also concerned about the country's conflicts and invited the Panchen Lama south to hold Buddhist rituals. With the death of the Dalai Lama late in 1933, the Panchen Lama was recalled to the capital and plans were put in place to try to return him to a position of religio-political power, with Chinese and Tibetan support. The Nationalist government therefore granted him the phrase "Protector of the State" (bogun) and designated him a Commissioner of National Government (Minguo zhengfu weiyuan).67

In this very different political context, the language associated with sponsoring the ritual remained remarkably the same and only occasionally evinced a muted concern for incorporating Tibet as part of China. Overall, the new call for donations repeated the earlier discourse, sometimes almost verbatim, with generally minor alterations. China was again referred to as the Central Land (Zhongguo), and the previous Kalacakra ritual was heralded as a great success for hosting more than one hundred thousand people. Again, the donors were exhorted to rely on the previous (first) Panchen Lama's travel account to Shambhalla, adding this time that he had been one of the minor rulers within Shambhalla.68 Previous dynastic support for lamas was reiterated, but emphasis was placed on how the Panchen Lama was now the State Preceptor (gyushe 国师). In this document, discussion of eliminating domestic disaster and conflict and praying for world peace was coupled with a more concrete focus on not dividing the country's territory according to race (khusen guntn zhanqen 分国土種類). As with the Beijing ceremony, it is unclear just how many people attended the Kalacakra ritual in Hangzhou in the spring of 1934. One contemporary source said that more than two thousand people came to the event, a much smaller attendance than the Beijing ritual.69 However, more attention was given to the high officials of the Nationalist government who were involved in the event.70

Probably because of the attention that these national figures drew, there was a stronger media reaction to this event than there was to the first Kalacakra ritual in Beijing. The text of a strongly critical March 20 Current Affairs Newspaper (Shishi xinban) editorial was incorporated in an April Haichangyu article that provided a Buddhist response to the criticism. Both the critical article and the Buddhist editorial referred to the fact that important (Chinese Nationalist) Party members and other national figures were involved with the ritual. Both also tried to appeal to science and modernism, but in different ways. The newspaper article scoffed at efforts to burn incense to solve problems, suggesting that modern man (zamipai zhi ren 现代之人) would destroy veneration for the Buddha and destroy belief, relying only on science

and self-strengthening.71 The Buddhist writer's response was to ridicule the reporter for taking the superstitious views of average citizens seriously. Instead, he argued that the Buddhist theory of cause and effect was even more advanced than scientific views on the subject. His view of modernization was to see the Panchen Lama and his disciples as critical components in bringing "progress" to Mongol and Tibetan "competitors" and establishing the national government in the western borderlands. In this context, he saw the realm of Shambhala as not necessarily a dream to be pursued, but more as the future reality to be realized. Although he does not explicitly state it, his message here seems to be that the "realm of Shambhala" that is to be realized is none other than the literal territory of Tibet (and possibly Mongolia as well) becoming part of China. The implication is that holding these Kalacakra rituals in China, these territories might really become a part of the modern Chinese state.72

In a rhetorical sense at least, judging by the Panchen Lama's words at this second Kalacakra ritual, this process did come closer to becoming reality. Although the Tibetan text that records the Hangzhou teaching is only about a third as long as the Beijing text, and the colophon is even shorter, the Panchen Lama invoked, even more than in the previous instance, the language of Chinese state rhetoric. For instance, he used the phrase "our Zhongguo" (wuzi ke shuang ye) three times and in one case used this phrase in relation to a modern ethical term (Tib. nor rig, reflecting Ch. minzu) that indicated that the Panchen Lama had learned how to deploy this modern terminology, at least when addressing a Chinese audience. As with the 1932 ceremony, he mentioned Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People" and its emphasis on the principle of people's livelihood and nationality (or racial/ethnic) harmony. Although these rare instances of the Panchen Lama engaging with modern Chinese discourse do indicate that the lama was articulating conceptions we now recognize as modern, this negotiation was almost entirely on his own terms. Rather than dramatically altering his conceptions of value, he had imported these terms into a schema of Buddhist values. Again, as with the 1932 ritual, the Panchen Lama hoped through this ceremony to teach the Chinese not merely religion, but also about the Tibetan conceptions of the state. That is, how religion and the worldly matters were ultimately interconnected, an idea of long standing in the Tibetan Buddhist world view.

This was a strange message in the secular and modern state the Chinese elite had tried to set up, yet one that was welcomed by Chinese Buddhists marginalized by the state. Chinese Buddhists could imagine themselves as connected to the Panchen Lama's esoteric teachings partly because they were said to originate from the very source of Buddhist teachings, Sakyamuni Buddha himself, and partly because China already had a tradition of practicing its own forms of esoteric ritual.

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66 Miaozhou, Mengzang fujia shi, 206-207.
67 For details on these events, see Turtel, Tibetan Buddhists, Chapter 6.
68 Newman, "A brief history of the Kalacakra," p. 77 notes that the third (sixth) Panchen Lama, Blo bzang dpal Idan ye shes (1738-1780) wrote a famous "Guidebook to Shambhala (Samhâ la yi lam yig)."
69 Miaozhou, Mengzang fujia shi, 209-211. On Chinese officials associated with the event, see 207.
70 Blo bzang thub bstan chos kyi nus, rKya'bs sngon thams cad nhbyan pa, 682-683.
als from the Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. At the same time, new conceptions of world religions helped create a sense of a shared Buddhist culture that transcended any specific precedent. The occasional presence of Westerners at these events helps demonstrate just how supranational this new “global Buddhism” could be. However, when the Chinese talked about the Panchen Lama helping spread good governance to the frontiers of the “mainland” (dalu bianzhu) some practical geopolitical boundaries circumscribing this supranational identity began to reassert themselves in this broadened discursive space.  

Using the discourses of the Panchen Lama was willing to confirm a new term for territorial space, by including himself (but necessarily excluding all Westerners) as part of “our China.”

This rhetorical incorporation of Tibet as part of China by its most prominent living lamas, in the midst of rituals devoted to realizing a utopia of peace and unity under a Buddhist king, brought together a host of powerful traditional and modern ideas. Chinese politicians hoped that the Panchen Lama, upon his imminent return to Tibet, which was planned to follow shortly after this final ritual, would bring Tibet under the sway of the Nationalist Chinese state. The Tibetan government, fearing this, refused to allow the Panchen Lama’s escort of Chinese soldiers entry into Tibet and the lama died, frustrating these ambitions, on the border between China and Tibet in 1937. Yet the effects of this planning and these hopes are still being felt to this day, as the world that the Chinese politicians imagined has come to pass, while the religious expectations of Chinese or Tibetan Buddhists have not been realized. Thus the tensions from the start of the twentieth century remain in this new millennium.