

The Interference of al-Andalus

SPAIN, ISLAM, AND THE WEST

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Of the African American volunteer fighters who heeded the call of the Communist International in 1936 and went to battle Franco's fascist forces in the Spanish civil war, most were galvanized not only by socialist and anti-imperial ideals but also by a Pan-Africanist consciousness that prized Islamic Spain as a glorious era when African civilization extended into Europe. Inspired by Spain's Moorish past, these black fighters hoped to rescue tolerant, pluralist Spain from the gathering flames of European fascism. Many were thus stunned by Franco's use of Moorish troops in his anticommunist "crusade," by the rabid anti-Muslim racism of the Republican forces, and, more broadly, by how the Moor and Spain's historic relations with the Islamic world figured so centrally in a civil war fought ostensibly for domestic reasons. African American soldiers were so appalled by the hatred of Moors on the Republican side, that some—especially those who were mistaken for Moroccans and shot at by fellow Republican troops—contemplated quitting and returning to the United States. Langston Hughes was particularly intrigued by the racial dynamics of Spain's "Moorish question." "I knew that Spain once belonged to the Moors, a colored people ranging from light dark to dark white," he wrote. "Now the Moors have come again to Spain with the fascist armies as cannon fodder for Franco. But, on the loyalist side, there are many Negroes of various nationalities in the International Brigades. I want to write about both Moors and Negroes."¹

The question of Moorish influence and the so-called Black Legend, regarding Spain's oriental and African genealogy that had allegedly left the Spaniards a "sensual and inferior race,"² have preoccupied Spanish intellectuals for centuries, pitting those who proudly or lamentingly concede Islamic influence in Spain and Hispanic civilization against those who deny such vestiges and, in the words of the novelist Juan Goytisolo, prefer to believe in a "clean-shaven Hispanic civilization" ("la afeitada civilizacion hispana") free of Semitic influence. The memory of the "intrusive" Moorish presence lies deep in the Spanish psyche. And at critical moments in Spanish history—in 1898 with the collapse of the empire, in the 1930s during the Spanish civil war and its aftermath, in the late 1970s with the end of Francoism and the democratic transition, and in 1986, with

Spain's accession into the European Union—the country has gone through moments of painful self-examination about its “qualified Westernness,”³ pondering if it was the eight-hundred-year Muslim presence and Spain's subsequent cultural and ethnic hybridity that kept the country mired in poverty and despotism as the rest of Europe progressed.

The war on terror, the Iraq war, and the 3/11 attacks on Madrid, along with increasing clandestine migration from North Africa and disputes with Morocco over Spanish enclaves in that country's northern coast, have revived what in Spain is historically called the “Oriental question”: what it means to be so close to the Arab world, and Europe's “shield” against Islam. The attacks of 3/11 triggered much public agonizing about Spain's being caught in the cross fire of a clash of civilizations (“in the eye of the hurricane,”⁴ as one journalist put it), between a strident, retaliatory Western nationalism that seeks to spread democracy in the Middle East and a militant Islamism that targets Spain for partaking in the war on Iraq and views the Iberian Peninsula as a long-lost Islamic dominion, to be regained the way Zionism repossessed Palestine millennia after its loss. The international political situation after 9/11 and 3/11 has brusquely resurrected questions about Spain's location between Africa, the Orient, and the Western world, with the epoch known as “al-Andalus” appearing at the center of discordant historiographies and “imaginative geographies.”

The historian María Jesús Viguera Molins has noted the “conflictual” nature of the “historiography of al-Andalus,” with Spanish historians at different periods of their nation's history either romanticizing or denigrating the Moorish era; the influence of contemporary politics on their writing was such that, as she put it, myth risks replacing history and the present risks displacing the past.⁵ Liberal historians often romanticized al-Andalus, while conservative historians saw the Muslim presence as an interruption, an “interference” in an essentially Spanish nation and course of history. Over the past century, imperialism, decolonization, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have polarized interpretations of al-Andalus even outside Spain, with Left-leaning writers across the West adulating the tolerance of Granada and the role of Moorish culture in sparking the Renaissance, but with conservatives seeing the Moors as “enemies of learning” whose insidious influence doomed Iberia (and southern Italy) to centuries of “cultural backwardness.”

I begin this essay by discussing Spain's centuries-old disquiet about the “Islamic interregnum” and show how at critical historical moments, intellectuals have revisited the Oriental question from varying ideological standpoints. Focusing on the twentieth century, I examine how the Spanish state has mobilized the country's Islamic past and maneuvered the Spanish political and geographic imagination to use the country's proximity to

North Africa for different political purposes: to justify colonial incursions into Africa; to rally African and Arab states against the United States, Great Britain, and France after World War II; to demand membership in the European Union by underscoring Spain's historic role keeping Muslim hordes off Western soil. The Spanish state's mobilization of history and manipulation of geography richly illustrates Edward Said's argument about the political power of "imaginative geographies" and how the hardy, seemingly ageless, entities we know as "Europe," "the West," and "the Orient" are, at bottom, "ideological confections" whose contents and borders are shaped by conflicting state interests and nationalisms.⁶

Since 9/11 and 3/11, Spain is again a country facing two directions: searching for a place in the Western world and trying to define its relationship to the Orient, a process that requires the country to reexamine its ties to its historic others—Jews and Moors, two peoples who now have their own states and nationalisms. After Franco's death, the Spanish state began to reassess the dictatorship's historic amity with the Arab world and hostility toward Israel, and its leaders are still trying to negotiate a place between American and European approaches to the Orient and their differing visions of the Jew's and the Arab's relationships to the West. The current crisis has fractured Spain politically, producing different political blocs, each with a different vision of the country's position in the West, its relationship with the Orient, and of the Muslim's and Jew's places within the Spanish nation. Hughes's depiction of Spain as an ideological battleground and a country with profound racial and cultural anxieties holds true seven decades hence.

Al-Andalus and the Rise of the West

The dispute over Moorish influence in Spain touches not only on the issue of Islam in the formation of modern Spain but on broader, equally uncomfortable questions of Spain's position in Europe and the role of Islamic Spain in the formation of Europe and the rise of Western civilization. Did Andalusia, as claimed by many historians, and Arab and Muslim nationalists, serve as a conveyer of knowledge from the classical worlds of Islam and ancient Greece to Europe above the Pyrenees? Was Islamic Spain an era of cultural efflorescence that helped spark the Renaissance? Historians have bitterly contested this perspective, maintaining that Islamic Spain was neither as tolerant nor as oriental as its champions claim, nor did it have the impregnating cultural influence on the rest of Europe. The Western philosophers who developed the idea of "Europe" drew a continuous line from ancient Greece through

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Rome right up to the Renaissance, largely ignoring the role of the Judeo-Islamic centers of learning in Andalusia or Sicily that had translated and contributed to the classical heritage “rediscovered” by these modern thinkers. The ascending Christian Europe was defining itself against the Orient, principally the Arab-Muslim world, and European nationalists were not going to acknowledge a cultural debt to their main adversary. Spain, which had been occupied by Muslims, has been the least willing to acknowledge any substantive Islamic cultural influence.

But the possibility of “cultural borrowing” and “reactive adaptation” that may have occurred between 711 and 1609,⁷ after which the remaining Moriscos of Alpujarras were expelled, has bedeviled Spanish historians for centuries. If between the eighth and eleventh centuries historians portrayed “the Moor” as invariably brutal and menacing, writers from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries began to romanticize the Islamic epoch and produce a literature of “Maurophilia.”⁸ In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Spanish historians began to acknowledge the achievements of Islamic Spain, but insisted that this was the work of people who may have been outwardly oriental but were still ethnically and biologically “Spanish”; Spain, to these scholars, was the product of an unbroken cultural continuity whose origins could be traced back as far as the ancient Celtiberian past.

The debate about the Orient’s role in Spain’s formation has been most personified by the acrimonious exchange between the historians Américo Castro and Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz. Castro celebrated Spain’s mixed ancestry, arguing that Spanish cultural identity arose in the Middle Ages through the symbiosis of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian elements; Sanchez-Albornoz saw Muslim Spain as an “interruption” to an eternal “Spanish” continuum. Castro argued, in his influential *España en su historia*, written in exile after Spain’s fall to the fascists, that Spain was not an “eternal” entity but one that came into being after the Muslim invasion of 711 and the interaction of what he called the “three castes”—Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Castro celebrated Spain’s hybridity, emphasizing that Andalusia’s tricultural heritage had influenced figures like Cervantes and, in crossing the Pyrenees, affected the thought of numerous European philosophers.⁹

In *España, un enigma histórico*, Sanchez-Albornoz replied to Castro that the latter had overstated the impact and misunderstood the nature of the contact between Muslims and Christians, which was fundamentally conflictive and not amenable to positive and creative cultural exchange. He maintained that most of the components of “Spanish” culture are either idiosyncratic or consist of Roman, Gothic, and elements of non-Semitic provenance. If Castro viewed 711 as momentous in the birth

of Spain's hybridity, Sanchez-Albornoz saw the Moorish invasion as a national disaster and the principal cause of his homeland's entrapment in despotism and economic backwardness. He argued that twelve centuries have gone by, and Spain has still not been able to overcome that "tragic" and "fateful" moment of 711. The prolonged military struggle against Islam had drained Spain's economy and held the country back from the rest of Europe: "Slow-witted, barbaric Africa . . . twisted and distorted the future fate of Iberia, and took it down a path, which cost Spain dear."¹⁰ Sanchez-Albornoz insisted, though, somewhat contradictorily that Islam affected but did not modify Spain; his homeland must not be viewed as a nation with a "hereditary defect," the "base offspring of a corrupt father," "an offshoot of Islam," or "diseased because of an Oriental virus." Spain is in fact a member of Europe, and in the Middle Ages created and conveyed a vibrant civilization to the rest of Europe, but its sacrificing to shield Europe from the onslaughts of Islam and Africa left it an intolerant and impoverished society.¹¹

Curiously, both Castro and Sanchez-Albornoz saw Spanish imperialism as a response to Islamic expansionism, if not a direct Islamic influence. Castro argued that the myth of Santiago Matamoros (St. James the Moor killer) and his shrine in Compostela, which played a crucial ideological role in the Reconquista of Spain and the conquest of the New World, was itself an Islamic influence, in that it essentially mimicked the idea of a "warrior-prophet" like Muhammad with a shrine and pilgrimage center like Mecca. Castro underlines the importance of this myth in the dialogue between Christian Spain and Europe beyond the Pyrenees, and in the emergence of a European identity, since all over Western Europe Santiago's shrine was seen as a Christian Mecca ("to face the Mohammedan Kaaba") and led to the forging of a common European self against a common adversary.¹² These arguments about Spanish militarism being a necessary response to jihad, the Spanish Inquisition as a "necessary evil," the cult of Santiago as the patron saint of "fortress Spain," and Spain as protector of Europe against Islam have been made by different Spanish leaders in varying political contexts, from Franco's forays into Morocco to Spain's participation in the Iraq war.

Franco and the Colonial Imagination

The Spanish-American War of 1898 and the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines at a time when European powers were seizing territories in Africa had profound political repercussions in Spain and generated much agonizing about the country's lesser position in Europe. After 1898

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Spain would shift its attention to the European front, and to Africa where it would attempt to carve out a small empire to make up for its lost possessions in the Caribbean, beginning a long-standing practice of trying to dominate North Africa to gain acceptance in the West. The liberal prime minister Conde de Romanones put it bluntly in his memoirs, “Morocco was for Spain her last chance to keep her position in Europe.”¹³ Joaquin Costa, a noted “Africanist,” as government experts on North Africa were called, and one of the strongest proponents of *regeneracionismo*, post-1898 economic and political regeneration, would explain the 1898 defeat and loss of empire in terms of the Black Legend (“the Africa that has invaded us”), yet still argue that Spain should lay claim to some territory in Africa, since colonizing that continent, specifically Morocco, was crucial to his nation’s return to glory.¹⁴ Throughout the twentieth century, Spain would try to establish control over Morocco—or at least over the frontier with Morocco—to gain acceptance in Europe, where, paradoxically, it was excluded and seen as backward because of its historic ties to North Africa.

When Miguel Primo de Rivera became leader of Spain in 1923, the anticolonial struggle in northern Morocco was raging, and the “Moroccan question” was one of the most pressing and divisive political issues. Franco, however, adamantly opposed a withdrawal from Morocco and, during the Spanish civil war, would oddly make Spain’s Islamic past and colonial presence in Morocco central to the fascist cause against the “infidel” Republicans. Franco, who had learned Arabic while crushing the Moroccan rebellion in 1921, would lead tens of thousands of Moroccan mercenaries (“tropas mulatas”) in what the generalissimo described as his crusade against the “Red, atheist Republic.” Franco defended the use of Moroccan troops, saying the *fascist* side was defending Christian values in an alliance with Muslim believers against the “godless” communists. Moorish troops were in fact often baptized before going into battle. If the fascists used the Moroccans both as cannon fodder and as psychological weapons, the Republicans, in turn, revived the centuries-old cry of “Moros en la costa!” (“Moors on the Coast!”), warning of the savage, sexually rapacious Moorish invaders “awaited by virgins in paradise” and describing their side as defenders of Europe against *el Oriente*.¹⁵

Franco’s legitimacy and political ideology were based on a particular construction of Spain’s history and geography. When the United Nations imposed an economic boycott on Spain in December 1946, an isolated Franco would adopt a policy of amity toward the Arab world, aptly named *mozarabidad*, a term referring to the Christians of Islamic Spain who spoke Arabic and embraced Moorish culture while remaining Christian. Franco’s foreign minister on tour in the Middle East in 1952 made speeches

about Spain and the Arabs, lauding the “one blood flowing in the veins of Spaniards and Arabs, who share a single culture and a single destiny.”¹⁶ Franco presented himself (“Sidi Franco”) to the Arab world as an ally against both the imperial West and a godless Soviet bloc enamored with the Israeli “socialist” experiment in Palestine.

This position of a pro-Arab Catholic Hispanic nationalism, however, was laden with contradictions. Franco exploited Spain’s Moorish past, highlighting the country’s mixed African and Arab background to justify various foreign policy initiatives, but simultaneously negated that history by portraying Spain as a purely Christian nation with a messianic purpose. He presented Spain as a defender of Islam against Western (Anglo-American and French) imperialism as well as communism and Zionism while holding colonies in North Africa (though he made it a point to pay for his Muslim subjects to go to hajj). Franco portrayed Spain as the link between Semitic and Latin peoples, yet refused to recognize Israel in the hope that a pro-Arab policy would allow him to maintain control of northern Morocco and Western Sahara. Gustau Nerín i Abad explains this paradoxical approach by noting that modern Spanish colonial discourse tried to distinguish itself from French and British imperialism by boasting of a supposed “total absence of racist attitudes; lack of economic exploitation of the colonial territories, and presence of mestization.”¹⁷ Thus if in Franco’s imperial discourse, Spain was Latin America’s *madre patria*, in North Africa, colonial officials depicted Spain as “the older brother” (“el hermano mayor”) and its colonial rule as “soft domination” (“el suave dominio”).¹⁸ In the 1960s, while continuing to suppress any domestic celebration of Moorish Spain, Franco capitalized on Spain’s “otherness,” the propinquity to the Orient that made the country exotic and distinct from the rest of Europe: “España es diferente” became the country’s tourist slogan.¹⁹ As one critic astutely observed, “Spanish Orientalism included the Orientalizing of the Other and the assumption of the Self as Other. The paradox is at the heart of Spanish Orientalism, the narrative of a country that orientalizes and indeed colonizes the Other but which is described as Oriental itself.”²⁰

Francoist historians thus celebrated Muslim Spain and Arab-Latin cultural ties when trying to garner Arab support for a policy but would, at the same time, elide the Moorish past and excoriate the Arab world’s “vice and carnality.” But the idea that Arab and Hispanic identity are connected, deployed cynically by the fascist regime, enticed many liberal intellectuals, who after the civil war and especially following Franco’s death would begin to discover “Andalucía” and challenge the prevailing versions of Spanish history. Goytisolo, an implacable critic of Spanish nationalism and Francoist historiographers’ sleights of hand, would argue

that *Arabidad* is both an inherent part and the opposite of *Hispanidad*: “The Moor is part of the Spanish self and its opposite, in the same sense that the shadow is part of the person and its opposite,” so that the nationalists’ call for a pure *Hispanidad*, for a self-purification, is “suicidal,”²¹ since the concept of *Hispanidad* is inextricably bound up with Arabism. This view would gain more popularity after the democratic transition; even King Juan Carlos on a state visit to Fez, Morocco, in June 1979 called for a new *convivencia* and reminded all of the historical closeness of “Hispanismo” and “Arabismo.”

Democracy and the European Union

Spanish intellectuals would revisit their repressed past after Franco’s death, celebrating, even romanticizing “multicultural Andalusia,” and challenging the ancien régime’s ideological certitudes about the country’s homogenous “Western” and Christian identity. Spain’s new leaders would evoke Andalusian *convivencia* to give historical legitimacy to the pluralistic political system they were now building. With the end of the fascist dictatorship, different regional movements cropped up in southern Spain, anchoring their identity in the Islamic period and demanding autonomy or independence. In 1978 the Front for the Liberation of Andalusia (FLA) emerged, seeking to retrieve its Andalusian heritage (in part, by reviving the syncretic Hispano-Arabic *aljamia* dialect) and demanding self-determination for Andalusia, which it described as “the last colony of Spain since the loss of the possessions in America and Africa.”²² Other movements would also appear, among them the Comunidad Islamica of Seville, the Sufi order of al-Murabitun led by Aureliano Perez, and Andalucia Libre, which protested the elections for the European parliament in vain, with their slogan “no al Europeismo.” Spain’s new leaders wanted to join the European Union (EU) precisely to rein in the regional nationalisms uncorked by the democratic transition.

In 1986 Spain joined the EU and in effect became the gatekeeper of Europe, restricting the entry of immigrants from Africa into the EU labor market. Spain had sought to join Europe for various reasons: to catch up economically, to “lock in” the democratic transition, to provide an overarching identity for Spain, and to once and for all slay the Black Legend about Spain’s debatable Westernness. Regional leaders and figures across the political spectrum supported entering the EU, which was expected to help solidify a coherent national identity. The process, however, would entail a political and cultural distancing from North Africa, though, simultaneously, Spain’s proximity to Islam would help it gain influence in

the EU. Spanish leaders portrayed Spain as Europe's defender—the West's "security cordon"—against third world masses, and in effect the country went overnight from Europe's outsider to insider, by selling itself as the bulwark against Europe's real outsider, Islam. As Helen Graham and Antonio Sanchez explain, "So Spain, in spite of its own long and painful history of underdevelopment, economic emigration, and otherness, far from recognizing a commonality and attempting to integrate the experience of the marginalized into its own self-proclaimedly pluralistic culture, has instead assumed the stance of 'First World' Europe. It is almost as if constructing and adopting the same 'others' or outgroups as the rest were considered the hallmark of Spain's membership of the [European] 'club.'"²³ But ironically Spain's rapid economic development and accession into the EU in 1986 only fueled immigration from the Maghreb. Increased immigration in turn led to greater resentment of immigrants from South America and Africa, but especially toward Muslims, and would tap old questions about Jews and Moors and their place in the modern Spanish nation.

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Spain and the Semites: From 1492 to 1992

For Spain, 1992 was a year of nostalgia, anxiety, and denial. The quincentennial of 1492 offered Spain an opportunity to show that it had arrived on the world stage and joined the West. The first Arab-Israeli peace conference kicked off the commemorations in Madrid in late 1991, reminding the world of the country's special relationship with Jews and Arabs, and was followed by the Universal Exhibition (Expo) in Seville and the Olympic Games in Barcelona. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 sealed Spain's integration into Europe, bolstering the nation's Western image, but that same year Spaniards also had to revisit the Inquisition and the discoveries of 1492, by which their country led the rise of the West. The figure of Christopher Columbus was celebrated, but not much was said officially about the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews (referred to as "la partida," the departure), or about the ensuing genocides in the New World; the conquest of the Americas was euphemistically referred to as "el encuentro" (the encounter). Instead, the Spanish state held a series of ceremonies to reconcile with both Jews and Muslims. The Arab-Israeli peace conference, a major exhibition at the Alhambra, the opening of a mosque in Madrid where King Juan Carlos declared that Arabic culture "has a special place in our heart" were all meant to display Spain's new relationship with the Arab world. In 1992 the Spanish monarch also reconciled with the Jewish community in Madrid's synagogue, and in Toledo, in a ceremony named "Sefarad 1992."

Franco's relationship with Spanish Jews had been complex. To help his international image, Franco had made certain goodwill gestures to Jews of Spanish descent, such as his 1968 evocation of the expulsion edict of the Catholic kings, but he did not, as is commonly believed, grant Sephardic Jews a right of return. It was only in 1982, four years after a democratic constitution was issued guaranteeing freedom of religion, that a law was passed granting Spanish nationality to the descendants of Jews expelled in 1492.²⁴ In October 1990 the heir to the throne, Felipe, prince of Asturias, appealed to Sephardic Jews with the following words: "In the spirit of harmony of contemporary Spain, and as heir to those who signed the expulsion decree 500 years ago, I welcome you with open arms and great emotion."²⁵

But no apology or right of return was granted to the descendants of Moriscos expelled, as was evident to many Moroccan intellectuals, especially those from the former Spanish protectorate zone and the current Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco. The Spanish Moroccan author Mohamed Chakor has traced how the Spanish view of the Jew and Moor evolved from 1492 to 1992. Historically, both the Moor and the Jew were "otherized" in the Spanish imagination, with towns named Matamoros (Moor killer) existing in Spain (and across Latin America), and a village called Castrillo de Matajudios (Jew killer) near Burgos. Chakor wonders why Spain granted Sephardic Jews an apology and issued an appeal to return (in 1982, reiterated in 1992), but has not been so forthcoming with the descendants of Moors expelled in 1492. In an article penned for Spain's Jewish community, he contemplates the discrepancy:

Law 158 of July 3 1985 regarding foreign residents and citizenship in Spain has not been generous to the Moroccan community. Article 23 of the legislation makes it easier for Iberoamericanos, Portuguese, Filipinos, Andorrans, Ecuato-Guineans, Sephardic Jews and Gibraltarians to work, reside and acquire [Spanish] citizenship, etc. They are seen to have a historical link to Spain. The door is open to the Moroccan Jew from Tetuan [a former Spanish possession in northern Morocco] to enter Spain while his Muslim counterpart faces an almost closed door. [Even] Filipino Muslims are granted rights that Moroccans colonized by Spain are denied. Why discriminate against Moriscos and Andalusians who were expelled from Spain and then lived under the Spanish protectorate in Morocco? The anti-Moorish prejudice appears clearly even in legislation. Stereotypes can be amusing, but not when they affect matters as fundamental as human dignity and the right to work.²⁶

Human rights activists have in fact pointed out that in 1992, when Spanish-speaking Jews were being invited to "return," further measures were put

in place to restrict naturalizing North African immigrants.²⁷ The selective right of return seems to indicate that Spain is adopting not just the same out-group, as Sanchez and Graham suggest, but also the same in-group as other Western states.

In March 2005, Moroccan intellectuals were again puzzled by King Juan Carlos's refusal to apologize to descendants of Moriscos while on a trip to Morocco to renew the historic Hispano-Muslim *convivencia* strained by the Madrid bombings. (Both Morocco and Spain base their self-image on Andalusia's *convivencia*; André Azoulay, adviser to the Moroccan monarch, is fond of saying, "Morocco is not a land where civilizations clash, but where civilizations meet.") Descendants of Moriscos expelled in 1501 gathered in Tetuan, the old Spanish capital in northern Morocco, where they were expecting to meet with the Spanish king, but at the last minute the sovereign canceled his visit to that city. The historian Muhammad ibn Azzuz Hakim, who led the campaign for the descendants of expelled Moors, said, "We want moral reparations for the wounds we suffered. Mentally, we feel linked to the same customs and history. Spanish traditions are ours too. I have traced more than 7000 surnames in this town which derive from Spanish names." The snub was particularly poignant coming on the heels of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's refusal to apologize for Spain's use of toxic gas to quell a rebellion in the northern Rif region of Morocco in 1921.²⁸ Again, Moroccan writers have pondered this preferential treatment, why Spain apologized to descendants of Sephardic Jews but not to their Muslim counterparts. Some say fears of a demographic onslaught are unfounded, since an apology and right of return do not have to be extended to all Moroccans but, as with the Jewish "returnees," only to those who can demonstrate descent from those expelled. Others think that the Spanish authorities prefer Jewish returnees because they can be more easily assimilated than Muslim immigrants, who are "socially disruptive,"²⁹ while others see the apology and right of return as the result of Spain's entry into the club of Western states, which requires reconciliation with the Jewish community and adopting the same in-group as other Western powers.

Palestine, Israel, and al-Andalus

Ella Shohat has argued that the different places that the Moor and Jew now occupy in Spanish political discourse, and the different political treatment they received in 1992, was "largely rooted in present day Middle Eastern politics" and in the Zionist separation of Arab and Jew. For centuries, both Muslim and Jewish poets eulogized Andalusia, but "in contemporary Pal-

estinian poetry Andalusia is not simply a closed chapter of Arab grandeur, for it allegorizes Palestine.”³⁰ In other words, Muslim authors have historically lamented the fall of Andalusia, always uttering the prayer, “May Allah return it to Islam,” but after World War II, and with the loss of Palestine, al-Andalus would gain a larger symbolic and political dimension. One reason the Jewish lament for Andalusia is now viewed sympathetically in the West, while the Muslim lament for al-Andalus is considered dangerous and irrational, is because it is tied to Palestine and seen as a symptom of the Arabs’ “corrosive irredentism for Islamic lands long ago taken by the sword and then lost by the sword.”³¹ Historically, nostalgia for Andalusia existed in both the Arab-Muslim and Jewish imaginations, but the Arab lament would become more political after the Zionist conquest of Palestine and take an ominous jihadist turn in the late 1980s. Sadly, for the past half century, most scholarship about Islamic Spain seems to view al-Andalus through the prism of contemporary conflicts. Within Arab and Islamist discourses, the different interpretations of al-Andalus that exist are “ideologized,” with secularists underlining al-Andalus’s “pan-confessional humanism” and Islamists contending that it was a strict adherence to sharia that led to the rise of Islamic Spain and secular decadence that led to its ignominious downfall. A similar polarization of views exists in Jewish writing about “Sepharad,” one side extolling the “Golden Age,” the other speaking of “dhimmitude” and Arab intolerance.

After World War II and the outbreak of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Spanish leaders and intellectuals who reached out to the Arab world, speaking (sincerely) of a common Moorish past, were Left-leaning, pro-Palestinian, and anti-imperial thinkers of whom Goytisolo is the most prominent. On the other hand, the more conservative authors, like Sanchez-Albornoz, who denied all ties to the Orient, were old-fashioned anti-Semites who rejected all Semitic influence on Spain and were contemptuous of Arabs and Jews. (A pro-Zionist Spanish historiography had not yet appeared.) Sanchez-Albornoz’s anti-Semitism, his claims of Spanish Jewry’s dubious loyalties and stranglehold over the medieval economy, has been widely documented.³² The effort to distance historic Spain from both Jews and Moors is still heard today among Sanchez-Albornoz’s intellectual descendants, such as the historian Serafin Fanjul, a strong critic of the idea of a “multicultural Andalus.” Fanjul argues that the intolerance of Muslims and Jews is evident in their scriptures, in Koranic exhortations against the infidel and the Jewish notion of “chosenness,” which he considers as the “Hebrews’ contribution to racist thought.”³³ Likewise, the historian Jose Martinez Sanz opines that the expulsion of Jews in 1492 and Moriscos in 1609 generated homogeneity and allowed Spain to become a “first world power.”³⁴

But Spain's accession into the EU in 1986 and her recognition of Israel that same year revealed another vein in Spanish thought, one identified by Shohat and Chakor, which views Jews as fellow Westerners and Israel as an outpost of the West. From this perspective, Jews settling in Spain came to be seen as "returning natives," while Moroccan immigrants were still viewed as intruders and invaders. This conceptual change, which accompanied Spain's entry into the West, can be elucidated by referring to what the critic Gil Anidjar has termed the "Semitic hypothesis," wherein Spain in 1492 invented the Semite as a racial category to describe both Jews and Moors, the internal and external enemies of Christian Spain. To distinguish Europeans from both Jews and Arabs, European thinkers often lumped the latter two under the label "Semite," a category and enmity that would be projected globally onto the Orient and the New World but that would be disassembled after the Holocaust and the creation of Israel, in a conceptual-political move that brought the Jews into the West and transferred all (negative) notions of Semitism onto the Arab "other."³⁵ Edward Said identified this aspect of colonial thought—"this process of conversion," noting that "the Oriental was always like some aspect of the West," and "the Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something else into something else: he does this for himself, for the sake of his culture, in some cases for what he believes to be the sake of the Oriental." One instance of such intellectual gerrymandering was the post-World War II bifurcation of the Semite into Arab and Jew, and the latter's subsequent incorporation into the West. In Said's words, "The transference of a popular anti-Semitic animus from a Jewish to an Arab target was made smoothly, since the figure was essentially the same."³⁶

Anidjar dates the intellectual origins of this bifurcation to the end of the nineteenth century, when European colonial discourse began to separate the Jew from the Arab. For instance, with the infamous Cremieux Decree of 1870, the French colonial state conferred citizenship upon Algerian Jews claiming that they were of European ancestry, distinguishing them from the Arab and Berber majority, who were seen as a "subject race," so that to this day in French public discourse, the Algerian Jew is often confused with the *pied-noir* settler. Zionism's calls for a pro-Western Jewish state—in particular, Theodor Herzl's vision of a Jewish state in historic Palestine that would serve as a "rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism"—accepted and built upon this imperial conceptual split of Jew and Arab, with the Jew being *of* the West and the Arab as its "other." Spain's integration into the EU and the West, and changing political circumstances—Spain's recognition of and establishment of relations with Israel in 1986, and the rise of the "global

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Islamic menace”—would lead many Spanish conservatives to warm to a Jewish presence in Spanish history, accepting the idea of Jews as an in-group and the Arabs as the West’s other.

“A Moorish Reconquista?”

When Bernard Lewis cautioned last year that by the end of the century, “at the very latest,” the European continent would be “part of the Arabic west, the Maghreb,”³⁷ he was voicing the profound demographic fears of many Europeans. Spain’s angst about Muslim immigration and a “spiritual reconquista” intensified after 9/11, as was seen in the controversy surrounding the construction of the mosque in Granada in July 2003. City officials initially took issue with the symbolic location in the area of Albaicin, between a church and a convent, and across a ravine from the ramparts of the Alhambra. The city’s Catholic Association also feared that the Muslims’ goal was to build a mosque higher than Granada’s church, which commemorates the taking of the city from the Moors, and so the mosque was eventually scaled down to half its proposed size.

Many conservative political and religious leaders in southern Spain, who had been witnessing the changing complexion of Andalusia with alarm, deemed the mosque’s opening a provocation. Spanish conservatives were particularly worried that many North African migrants were settling in the same areas that the Moriscos had been expelled from centuries earlier—that is, in Valencia, Catalonia, Murcia, and pockets of Aragon, Andalusia, Extremadura, La Mancha, and Madrid—and fueling hysterical warnings of an Islamic Reconquista.³⁸ In fact, groups were opposed to the mosque’s construction at Albaicin, partly because during the Islamic era, the space was the Muslim quarter, home to the very poor (*albaicin* is Arabic for “downtrodden and hopeless”), and now Spaniards were watching in dismay as Moroccan immigrants poured into that area.

The growing Muslim community of Andalusia, made up of immigrants and Spanish converts, has also begun to flex its political muscle, as seen in its efforts to challenge the long-standing custom of celebrating 2 January, the public holiday of “La Toma” (The Capture), the day Moorish Granada fell to the Catholic monarchs in early 1492. Local Muslim leaders and some renowned intellectuals (like the late Carlos Cano) proposed that the occasion be turned into a ceremony celebrating Granada’s Christian, Muslim, and Jewish cultures to breathe life into the city’s historic *convivencia*. This suggestion was met with fierce opposition from the Catholic Church and demonstrations from right-wing parties, as was the more recent demand by Spanish Muslims to hold Friday prayers in Cordoba’s

Mezquita-Cathedral, once one of the greatest mosques of the Maghreb. One columnist angrily denounced the conservative Popular Party's passivity in face of Maghrebi immigrants, who were possibly "Saracen Reconquerers" ("Reconquistadores Sarracenos"), and quoted an Andalusian archbishop who claims that Muslim immigrants are given "petrodollars" to breed fast, so as to gain a demographic majority in Andalusia.³⁹

The carnage of 3/11 obviously inflamed passions and fears about *los Moros* even further. Spaniards realized that—whether because of Aznar's foreign policy or Islamist millennialism—their country was caught in the "clash of fundamentalisms" and that militant Islamists have more than a passing interest in Spain and Andalusia. Spanish journalists have unearthed Islamist maps showing Spain marked in green. Many Spaniards were aghast when Zacarias Moussaoui, the twentieth hijacker arrested in the United States, was granted the right to represent himself in court, and his first demand was "the return of Spain to the Moors."⁴⁰ The period since 3/11 has been painful and polarizing, with the country's divisive Moorish past at the heart of the current crisis. Spaniards, it appears, are being confronted with their Islamic and imperial history at every turn. Commemorations of the quincentennial of Queen Isabelle of Castille's death broached discussions about the tragedy of 1492 and drew some embarrassing remarks from intellectuals saying the expulsions were a necessary evil. Last year's celebrations of the quadrennial of Cervantes' *Don Quixote* also educed many unsettling hypotheses on the Arabic influences on the text and the author's putative Muslim origin.

So, once again, the Oriental question has Spain politically fragmented. As Florentino Portero, a Spanish political commentator observed, although 3/11 was a catastrophe, "what happened March 12 and 13 is what really changed the country. Spain has never been so polarized, with two distinct political blocs that cannot communicate with each other."⁴¹ Prime Minister Zapatero's decision to scrap the Aznar government's plan to make the Catholic curriculum mandatory in public schools (a feature of the Franco era that the Popular Party wanted to reinstate), along with his initiative to fund the teaching of the minority religions of Islam, Judaism, and Protestantism, has raised the hackles of the Catholic Church and other conservative groups. Spain's leading archbishop, Cardinal Antonio María Rouco Varela, denounced the new socialist government, saying its policies were taking the country back to medieval times, when Muslim invaders swept across the Strait of Gibraltar.⁴²

Reflecting this fraught political climate, a flurry of books has appeared in the past year, some lauding, others excoriating, al-Andalus. In his recently released *Islam's Routes in Andalusia (Las rutas del Islam en Andalucía)*, Emilio González Ferrín, a prominent Arabist at the University of

Seville, calls on Europe to retrieve Andalusia's heritage and denounces the demonization of al-Andalus, noting that there is no link between the epoch known as al-Andalus and contemporary conflicts about class and economic dislocation. "Al-Andalus is not culpable of the terrorism carried out by certain Islamists," he insists.⁴³ Yet last year also saw the publication of César Vidal's *Spain Faces Islam: From Muhammad to Bin Laden (España frente al Islam: de Mahoma a Ben Laden)*, which sees Spain's history from 711 to the current era as one eternal struggle to defend Spain's soul and identity from Muslim invaders. Vidal draws a parallel between the tragedy of 711 and the invasion of Kuwait, underscoring the continuity between Abderrahman the Umayyad prince who settled in Spain, Abdelkrim Khattabi who lead the Rif rebellion in 1921, and Saddam Hussein.⁴⁴

The political climate after 9/11 and 3/11 has polarized the already contentious scholarship about Islamic Spain even outside Spain. While the Spanish Left is claiming a connection with the Arab world, and liberals across the West point to Andalusian pluralism as an important precedent for Islamic democracy, conservatives are scorning the latter's "retrospective utopianism" and accusing them of distorting history. One American reviewer of Maria Menocal's acclaimed *Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain*, criticized the general "impulse to idealize" Islamic Spain, noting that the founding Umayyad dynasty "was far from enlightened" and that the Alhambra may be "a monument to the Andalusian sublime. . . . But [it] is hardly a model for contemporary aspirations. It does not frame the world; it divides it."⁴⁵ In response to the myth of Andalusia as "interfaith utopia" put forth by European leftists, Arab nationalists, and Islamists, a cohort of Spanish, European, and American historians are promoting through publications and Web sites a countermyth of al-Andalus as an intolerant "apartheid society."

Al-Andalus and the War on Terror

The war on terror and the ongoing Iraq war have led many European conservatives to want to demonstrate their pro-American politics and their Westernness, most often by distancing themselves from Islam. It is perhaps no coincidence that the shrillest indictments of Islam have come from Italy and Spain, the European states with the closest cultural and historic ties to the "Orient." Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi publicly declared Western civilization's "superiority" to Islam,⁴⁶ and the journalist Oriana Fallaci's book, *The Rage and the Pride*, which became a best seller in Italy, warns of Muslim immigrants who "multiply like rats"

and of a future “Eurabia” unless Europe allies with America against the enemy: “America is us. If America collapses, Europe collapses, the whole of the West collapses.”⁴⁷ Like their Spanish counterparts, Italian nationalists have a historic anxiety about the Islamic presence, in the latter’s case in medieval Sicily and southern Italy’s “mixed ancestry,” a fear revived poignantly in the national memory by the United States’ use of Moroccan troops during the Allied landing in Italy.⁴⁸

Likewise, it was Spain’s prime minister José María Aznar, another strong Bush ally, who spearheaded the effort to insert a reference to Europe’s Christian roots in the EU’s constitution, a measure that rankled Andalusian and Catalan nationalists who resented how Aznar’s government had made Catholicism central to the state’s identity. Aznar also incensed the socialist opposition—and Muslims the world over—when his Ministry of Defense issued “Santiago Matamoros” crosses for Spanish and Latin American troops in Iraq to wear.⁴⁹ When the daily *El Mundo* splashed the crimson, spear-tipped cross on its front page, with an editorial stating that having Spanish soldiers wear St. James the Moor Killer emblems as they patrolled the holy sites of Karbala and Najaf was offensive, Defense Minister Federico Trillo casually defended the emblem: “This is the symbol of the Spanish army.”⁵⁰

The debate between the historians Castro and Sanchez-Albornoz is very much alive in Spain’s post-3/11 political discourse, providing historical justifications for political camps with radically different visions of Spain’s future relations with the Muslim world. Speaking at the fifty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 21 September 2004, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero said that the fusion of Islam and Christianity had “created and enriched” Spain, and he called for “an institutional dialogue” and “an alliance of civilizations between the Western world and the Arab and Muslim world” that Spain for historic reasons could spearhead.⁵¹ On the same day, Aznar, a visiting scholar at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, delivered his inaugural lecture, telling a distinguished audience that the objective of “Islamic terrorism” is “the establishment of its Caliphate [which] involves enslaving us all, in all respects.” And then, channeling Sanchez-Albornoz, he added,

“The problem Spain has with al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism did not begin with the Iraq Crisis. In fact, it has nothing to do with government decisions. You must go back no less than 1300 years, to the early 8th century, when a Spain recently invaded by the Moors refused to become just another piece in the Islamic world and began a long battle to recover its identity. This Reconquista process was very long, lasting some 800 years. However, it ended successfully. There are many radical Muslims who continue to recall that defeat, many more than any rational Western mind might suspect.”⁵²

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The pundits who depict Moorish Spain as harshly tyrannical and violent see the 3/11 attacks as merely the latest expression of a centuries-old struggle by Muslims to reconquer Spain. But as Gilles Kepel has argued, the jihadist claim on al-Andalus began only in the late 1980s: “After the victory of Afghanistan, the U.S.-supported and oil-backed militants, in particular Tanzim al-Jihad, declared holy war on countries and regions that were Muslim but were now in the hands of the ‘ungodly.’ Their list included Israel, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Spain.”⁵³ It is not clear why al-Andalus appeared on the jihadi irredentist agenda in the 1980s, whether it was because of the rise of the transnational Salafist/Wahabi network in Afghanistan or because Spain, long viewed sympathetically in the Arab political imagination as a counter to Anglo-American and French imperialism, had established relations with Israel and granted the right of return to Jews, but the fact is, contrary to Aznar’s contention, the Salafist-Jihadist claim on Spain is not an ancient, millennial one. It was only in the late 1980s that jihad in the Iberian Peninsula became a “binding duty,” and Spain and Portugal, like Israel and Bosnia, entered the jihadi imagination as Islamic lands snatched by infidels. Even Samuel Huntington, writing in the mid-1990s, did not see the Spanish-Moroccan frontier as a bloody “civilizational faultline.”⁵⁴

In summary, the ongoing conflict has reawakened “Memories of Alhambra” in the West and the Muslim world, with different states, nationalisms, and political interests either laying claim to Moorish Spain or dissociating themselves from it, romanticizing the *convivencia* or showing how al-Andalus was as “despotic” as any other Islamic polity. Nuanced, dispassionate scholarship of Islamic Spain, and its influence beyond the Pyrenees, is drowned out by “the clash of civilizations” rhetoric. Scholars who write positively about Moorish Spain, and its cultural influence in Spain and beyond, are accused of being “creative utopianists” or simply “pro-Arab,” and their work is all too often lumped together with the outlandish assertions of some Islamists and Arab nationalists.

Liberal intellectuals worldwide continue to stress the urgency and importance of understanding the role of Islam in Spanish history. Goytisolo recently reiterated his long-held belief that Spain urgently needs to come to terms with its “mudejar history” and cease committing “memoricidio.”⁵⁵ But the conservative call to distance Spain from Islam—and downplay, if not erase the Moorish era—has been gaining prominence. Many Spanish commentators have echoed Fanjul’s statement, saying the Arabs should stop wallowing in victimhood, bemoaning the “paradise lost” of al-Andalus, and directly confront their problems. An acknowledgment of Islam’s contribution to the formation of Spain would, in this view, implicate Spain in the political and economic agonies of the Arab region. This

desire to forget the Islamic past, by a country that for centuries either ruled or was ruled by Muslims, and that still holds territories in North Africa, has many Spanish Muslim intellectuals shaking their heads. Author Said Alami, who heads the Association of Arab Journalists in Spain, writes: “At times, it appears as if this nation would like to self-mutilate, amputate a large part of its history and physiognomy, in an extreme measure to transform itself, to become as European as Germany and as North American as Minnesota.”⁵⁶ But as a country whose history is so deeply interwoven with Africa and the Orient, Spain’s past will continue to stir political imaginations the world over, and al-Andalus will continue to be one of the most disputed epochs of human history, an era that not only connects but also separates the West from the Orient, splits Left and Right in Spain and Europe, pits Islamists against secularists in the Muslim world, and provides raw material for sundry political movements and nationalisms on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Notes

I am grateful to Richard Bulliet for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

1. Langston Hughes would publish a poem called “Letter from Spain” about Franco’s Moroccan troops: “We captured a wounded Moor today / He was just as dark as me. / I said, ‘Boy what you been doing here / Fighting against the free?’” (Arnold Rampersad, *The Life of Langston Hughes, Volume I: 1902–1941, I, Too, Sing America* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], 349–51).

2. See Ricardo Garcia Carcel, *La Leyenda Negra: Historia y opinion* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992). The Black Legend is often attributed to Alexandre Dumas, who noted that “Africa begins in the Pyrenees.”

3. Luce López-Baralt, *Islam in Spanish Literature: From the Middle Ages to the Present*, trans. Andrew Hurley (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 1.

4. Javier Valenzuela, “España, en el ojo del huracán,” *Temas de Hoy*, 2 February 2002.

5. María Jesús Viguera Molins, “Al-Andalus como interferencia,” in *Comunidades islámicas en Europa*, ed. Montserrat Abumalham (Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 1995), 61–70.

6. Edward W. Said, “The Public Role of Writers and Intellectuals,” *Nation*, 17 September 2001, www.thenation.com/doc/20010917/essay.

7. Thomas F. Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 296.

8. See Barbara Fuchs, *Mimesis and Empire: The New World, Islam, and European Identities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

9. Américo Castro, *España en su historia: Cristianos, moros y judíos* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1948).

10. Luce López-Baralt, *Islam in Spanish Literature*, 28.

11. Ibid.
12. See Emilio Gonzalez-Lopez, "The Myth of Saint James and Its Functional Reality," in *Américo Castro and the Meaning of Spanish Civilization*, ed. José Rubia García (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
13. Cited in Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1808–1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 518.
14. Angel G. Loureiro, "Spanish Nationalism and the Ghost of Empire," *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 4, no. 1 (2003): 65–76.
15. Eloy Martín Corrales, *La imagen del magrebi en España: Una perspectiva histórica, siglos XVI-XX* (Barcelona: Ediciones Bellaterra, 2002), 158.
16. Cited in Raanan Rein, "In Pursuit of Votes and Economic Treaties: Francoist Spain and the Arab World, 1945–56," in *Spain and the Mediterranean since 1898*, ed. Raanan Rein (London: Cass, 1999), 207.
17. Gustau Nerín i Abad, "Mito Franquista y realidad de la colonización de la Guinea Española," *Estudios de Asia y Africa* 32, no. 1 (1997): 11, cited in Ignacio Tofino-Quesada, "Spanish Orientalism: Uses of the Past in Spain's Colonization in Africa," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 23, nos. 1–2 (2003): 141–48.
18. Martín Corrales, *La imagen del magrebi en España*, 189.
19. Dorothy Kelly, "Selling Spanish 'Otherness' since the 1960s," in *Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies*, ed. Barry Jordan and Rikki Morgan-Tamosunas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 29–37.
20. Tofino-Quesada, "Spanish Orientalism," 143.
21. Abigail Lee Six, *Juan Goytisolo: The Case for Chaos* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 215.
22. Rafael Valencia, "Acerca de las comunidades musulmanas en Andalucía occidental," in Abumalham, *Comunidades islámicas en Europa*, 175.
23. Helen Graham and Antonio Sanchez, "The Politics of 1992," in *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Jo Labanyi and Helen Graham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 412. See also Tony Morgan, "1992: Memories and Modernities," in *Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies*, ed. Barry Jordan and Rikki Morgan-Tamosunas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 58.
24. *Boston Globe*, 31 October 1991.
25. *Independent*, 31 March 1992.
26. Mohamed Chakor, "El Moro en el imaginario español," *Raíces: Revista Judía de Cultura*, no. 38 (1999): 46.
27. Matthew Carr, "The Year of Spain," *Race and Class* 34 (1993): 71–77. Carr writes, "The underlying direction of official [immigration] policy was made clear by 1992's six-month amnesty for long-term illegal residents, in which African immigrants were not eligible for the five-year residence permits which their Latin American counterparts were able to apply for" (75).
28. "King Snubs Moorish Plea for Apology," *Daily Telegraph*, 20 January 2005. The Moroccan-based Association for the Defense of the Victims of the Rif War claims that the Rif region has higher cancer rates because of Spain's use of chemical weapons in the 1920s (*BBC.com*, 19 January 2002).
29. In "Europe's Back Doors" (*Atlantic Monthly*, January 2000, 26–33), George Stolz writes, "The Spanish government, which considers sub-Saharan Africans less socially disruptive than Moroccans and Algerians, no doubt had this in mind when it decided to use the enclaves [in northern Morocco] as a sort of waiting room in which to screen for able-bodied potential workers."

30. Ella Shohat, "Columbus, Palestine, and Arab-Jews: Towards a Relational Approach to Community Identity," in *Cultural Readings of Imperialism*, ed. Benita Parry and Judith Squires (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1997), 110.

31. Charles Krauthammer, "Parsley and Pride," *Washington Post*, 19 July 2002.

32. The historian P. E. Russell has said of Sanchez-Albornoz: "When Sanchez-Albornoz turns to the Jews the inherent racialism of the book takes on a more familiar and far uglier form. Here we move into a Nazi-like world of Jewish plots against the innocent Christian Spaniards, both in the Middle Ages and, it is hinted, now." Sanchez-Albornoz would refer to the Jewish presence in Spain as "always negative . . . the Jews were natural usurers." Cited in James T. Monroe, *Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship (Sixteenth Century to the Present)* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 144.

33. Serafin Fanjul, "El mito de las tres culturas," *Revista de Occidente*, January 2000, www.ortegaygasset.edu/revistadeoccidente/revista.html.

34. Y. José L. Martínez, "El mito de la España de las tres culturas," *Hesperides* 12 (1997), cited in José L. Rodríguez Jiménez, *Antisemitism and the Extreme Right in Spain (1962–1997)*, Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism 15 (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1999), <http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/15spain.html>.

35. Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). For a discussion of the "Semitic hypothesis," see Gil Anidjar, interview by Nermeen Shaikh, Asia Source, www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/anidjar2.cfm (accessed January 12, 2006).

36. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 67, 286.

37. But as a columnist for the *Economist* wrote: "A glance at the figures suggests that Mr. Lewis is a better Arabist than mathematician. At present there are not more than 13 million Muslims in the EU, out of a total population of 457 million. Even if there is a massive surge of immigration and the fertility of white Europeans falls even further, it is difficult to see how this would lead to a merger between Europe and North Africa." See Charlemagne, "A Civil War on Terrorism," *Economist*, 25 November 2004, www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3427223.

38. Barnabe Lopez Garcia, "El retorno de los Moriscos," *El Pais*, 5 November 1992.

39. Javier Valenzuela, "España, en el ojo del huracán."

40. For more on al-Andalus in the imagination of urban social movements in the West, see Hishaam Aidi, "Let Us Be Moors: Islam, Race, and 'Connected Histories,'" *Middle East Report*, no. 229 (2003), www.merip.org/mer/mer229/229_aidi.html.

41. Geoff Pingree, "Spanish Leader Makes Bid to Reshape the War on Terror," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 December 2004.

42. Giles Tremlett, "Spain Being 'Taken Back to Moorish Times,'" *Guardian*, 7 July 2004.

43. Emilio González Ferrín, *Las rutas del Islam en Andalucía* (Seville: La Fundación José Manuel Lara, 2004).

44. César Vidal, *España frente al Islam: de Mahoma a Ben Laden* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2004).

45. See "Was the Islam of Old Spain Truly Tolerant?" *New York Times*, 27 September 2003.

46. Andrew Osborn and Rory Carroll, "Scorn Poured on Berlusconi Views," *Guardian*, 28 September 2001.
47. Oriana Fallaci, *The Rage and the Pride* (New York: Rizzoli, 2001), 87.
48. Arnaldo Nesti, "La presencia islamica en Italia fenomenologia y tendencias," in Abumalham, *Comunidades islamicas en Europa*, 385.
49. Ian Gibson, "Desconcierto general," *El Pais*, 29 July 2003.
50. "Spanish Crusader Emblem 'Offensive,'" *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 July 2003.
51. Paddy Woodworth, "'Alliance of Civilisations' Not So Easy," *Irish Times*, 15 March 2005.
52. See José María Aznar, "Seven Theses on Today's Terrorism" (lecture, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 21 September 2004), www3.Georgetown.edu/president/aznar/inauguraladdress.html.
53. Gilles Kepel, "La 'yihad' de Al Andalus," *El Pais*, 18 March 2004.
54. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 166.
55. "Goytisoló dice que España sigue sin reconocer su identidad árabe," EFE News Service, 25 March 2004, 4.233.161.104/search?q=cache:DRDxGB0quisJ:noticias.ya.com/cultura/2004/03/25/5973735.html+%22espana+sigue+sin+reconocer+su+identidad+arabe&hl=es&lr=&strip=1; Ricard Perez Casado, "El vecino necesario," *El Pais*, 23 May 2004.
56. Said Alami, "La comunidad musulmana española y el racismo," in Abumalham, *Comunidades islamicas en Europa*, 137.