
1981, p173)
She goes on to quote from an arti-
cle by Henry Tropp "The Effervescent
Years" (IEEE Spectrum, Feb. 1974, p
76) where Tropp shows how big corpo-
rations refused to develop high tech-
nology. Tropp describes what hap-
pened:
“The National Cash Register Com-
pany offers a particularly intriguing
industrial ‘might have been.’ NCR
actually had an electronic computing
device constructed during the late
1930s. It was a high-speed arithmetic
machine which could add, subtract and
multiply electronically, and presum-
ably this machine could have become
the first commercial electronic com-
puter had the company wished to pio-
neer in this field. However, NCR
management was not interested in
automatic computing per se, but only
in improving its existing line of
office equipment.”
(quoted in Stern, Ibid.)
Tropp cites other examples of
major industrial firms that failed to
take any initiative in developing
electronic devices:
"If one examines the environment at
major U.S. corporations during the
1940s, there is a striking lack of
interest in any aspect of automatic
computing. I have yet to see a publi-
cation from that period that reveals
an interest in putting research and
development funds into finding better
ways of doing automatic computation.
At Bell Laboratories, for instance,
Stibitz's Model I Calculator might
well have been the last in the series
if it hadn't been for the pressure of
wartime needs and the accompanying
government support. IBM was similarly
uninterested in advancing the com-
puter art.... The company seems to
have been primarily interested in
improving existing products and
building a strong patent position for
possible future applications. I have
been able to discern no evidence of a
vision of IBM – or any other corpora-
tion -- in those days that was compa-
rable to that held by Aiken,
Maunchly, Stibitz, Atanasoff, J.
Presper Eckert or Wallace Eckert"
[pioneers in the 1940s in developing
computers - ed].
Nancy Stern observes that "IBM's
failure to undertake any research
projects in this area is particularly
surprising, since it was the major
manufacturer of calculating equipment
and was the company which would be
most affected by the availability of
commercial computers." She attributes
this anti-high technology policy to
the highest levels of IBM management,
the Chairman of IBM, Tom Watson, Sr.
She explains, "Yet no work on elec-
tronic digital computers was under-
taken by that organization in the
1940s despite interoffice memos writ-
ten by IBM engineers recommending
such work." Two of the inventors of
the ENIAC AND UNIVAC computers,
Eckert and Mauchly desperately needed
money to continue their pioneering
work. They went to IBM and asked for
financial assistance. Scientists at
IBM, Stern notes, were impressed by
the men and their work and recom-
mended the support. "But," she re-
ports, "word came uptown from galac-
tic headquarters to brush them off.
There was [to be - ed], in the words
of Watson's decision relayed to the
Laboratory, no reasonable interaction
between Eckert-Mauchly, and IBM."
(Ibid.)
Gordon Bell, who worked at DEC,
and helped develop the first
mini-computer, the PDP-8, and the
first commercial time-sharing system,
drew a similar conclusion. The indus-
try, he decided, "was unconcerned
about the `science' of computing."
Meanwhile, in 1963, a decision was
made at Dartmouth College to make an
introduction to computers a part of
the Liberal Arts curriculum.
Two Dartmouth professors, John
Kemeny and Thomas Kurtz, devised what
is known as the Dartmouth Time-Shar-
ing System (DTSS) so students could
get access to a computer. And they
designed the computer language BASIC
so that novices could learn to pro-
gram. Kemeny recalling those years,
writes:"We designed a few simple
instructions for the lay user to
enable him to write his first few
computer programs with very little
training." (Man and the Computer, p
21)
He goes on to explain the ratio-
nale used to develop the programming
language BASIC (Beginner's All--
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