
more people could afford to buy cars.
Instead, U.S. autos were downsized and redesigned,
and some of auto company profits were used to set up
so called "joint" labor-management labor relations
programs or to invest in other companies or abroad.
(See for example, "Labor Relations Hoax", vol 2, no. 4)
U.S. auto companies instituted a plethora of cost cutting
initiatives which removed the incentive for investment
in new technology. For a company to invest in modern
technology, labor saving devices must cost less than the
labor they are replacing. (See "Shorter Hours Are
Needed....", vol 2, no. 3)
Record profits had been reported in the industry in the
1980s. Yet Wall Street analysts like Maryann Keller
sharply criticized new technology being introduced into
companies like GM. Instead GM adopted the model of
Japanese labor relations introduced into Toyota in the
1950s. This model had been developed based on re-
search that GM conducted during a 1947 labor relations
experiment which they called the "My Jobs Contest."
(See "When Will Their Walls Come Tumbling Down,"
vol 3 no. 1) Once again in the 1980s and now in the
1990s such labor relations schemes are being heralded
as the savior of a "failing General Motors" and as a
model for the rest of U.S. industry. For example, the
design for GM's new Saturn plant was premised on
GM's commitment to making labor more intense rather
than introducing labor saving technology. A spokesper-
son explains Saturn's philosophy:
"In Saturn, we believe that to automate... does not
make good business sense. When you consider the
capital investment required for robots or other auto-
mated systems, you have to look at the variable labor
cost as an alternative. Automated equipment is limited!
On the other hand, people, if properly trained, can and
have taken costs out of an operation when given the
opportunity." (Joseph F. Malotke, Labor Law Journal,
Aug. 1985,p. 568)
GM's Saturn model is a reversal of lessons learned
over the past 50 years about the social benefits of new
machinery. As Howard Foster, a UAW pioneer in Flint,
describing the benefits of modern machinery, explained:
"When mass production methods were introduced in the
automobile industry, the price of cars went down. This
was because the labor time on each car was greatly
reduced. Yet we auto workers got higher wages through
our union." (See "Technology: To Develop or Stagnate,"
vol 1, no 2)
In opposition to similar labor relations experiments,
G.M. auto workers in Flint, MI, in 1947-48, success-
fully campaigned for wage increases that would match
inflation. Their battle against GM management and the
UAW International Union officialdom who opposed
such wage increases, was victorious. Thus pattern
setting wage increases known as C.O.L.A. (Cost of
Living Adjustment) and A.I.F. (Annual Improvement
Factor) were introduced into the UAW-GM contract in
1948. These wage increases made it profitable for GM
to introduce new machinery and update production
methods in GM plants.(See "Technology, to Develop or
Stagnate" vol I, no 2)
By 1950, contract language describing the A.I.F.
affirmed the social desirability of using new technology
to decrease the labor needed to produce an auto. The
1950 GM-UAW contract granted workers a wage
increase based "on technological progress, better tools,
methods, processes and equipment and a cooperative
attitude on the part of all parties in such progress. It
further recognizes the principle that to produce more
with the same amount of human effort is a sound and
economic and social objective." (See "Upcoming
Elections and Computers," vol. I, no.3)
Union-management jointness experiments of the
1980s are a violation of the principle "that to produce
more is a sound and economical objective." The UAW-
Ford National Development and Training Center
founded in 1982, and similar experiments at GM and
Chrysler, are labor relations experiments. Their aim is
to "promote training, retraining and development
activities," instead of "technological progress, better
tools, processes and equipment," (See "Labor Relations
Hoax," vol. 2, no. 4)
Because their aim is not education in high technology,
there was a battle at the Dearborn Engine Plant over the
cancellation of computer programming classes. UAW
members wrote: "How can UAW members be trained
in high technology by cutting computer classes out... we
sent letters everywhere. We are tired of being denied
benefits we're entitled to. We are tired of being shuffled
from one person to another to cover up who we're
fighting...we can't sit back and let happen at the Rouge
what has happened at GM - the wholesale closing of
plants...WE NEED AN INVESTIGATION INTO
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE UAW FORD PRO-
GRAM at the Dearborn Engine Plant. (See "When Will
Their Walls Come Down, vol. 3, no. 1)
In a subsequent issue of the Amateur Computerist,
Floyd Hoke-Miller contributed articles explaining why
there is more thinking needed among those who do the
work of the society. "We, as the working class," he
wrote, "are the `low men on the totem pole' or like
Atlas `bearing the world on our shoulders'." (See "Pass
the Profits, Please," vol. 1, no. 2) He championed the
need for fewer hours of work to have any benefit from
new technology and reminded workers that they are still
working at least the same 8 hour day "gained by a hard
struggle of the transportation unions prior to WWI."
(Ibid., See also "Shorter Hours are Needed for Comput-
ers to Benefit Labor", vol 2, no. 3)
The problem of the 1990s is similar to the problem of
the early post W.W.II years - how to utilize significant
new technological developments to make life better for
the people of the society. Large scale industry needs to
be under some form of social control and strict regula-
tion for technological progress to serve the society.
The birth of the personal computer in 1974 and its
development and evolution into the 1990s has put the
promise of a better world on the horizon for people in
2