
took on to produce the needed soft-
ware and hardware, sharing their
success and failures. The partici-
pants found themselves involved "in a
kind of group sport." Felsenstein
explains: "Like Athletes, they strove
to do what had never been done, to
exceed their known limits and to
share their successes and efforts
with each other in the hopes that all
would gain." (ibid.)
"We ran ahead of the lumbering
giants," Felsenstein writes, explain-
ing how the Homebrewers did not wait
for the big corporations in the com-
puter industry to give them an af-
fordable computer. He describes how
the Homebrewers "frantically staked
out our territory. We learned," he
emphasizes, "as pioneers must, to
rely on each other." (ibid.)
Felsenstein then describes what
happened when IBM produced "the
breadbox of incompatibility" in 1978,
the 5100. IBM found they couldn't
sell it. When they produced their
next personal computer, the 5150 in
1981, IBM demonstrated that they had
learned that they had to play by the
rules established by the Homebrewers.
They had to make the architecture and
executive code as public as possible
and to encourage individuals to write
software and add-ons. Felsenstein
summarizes the victory of the Home-
brewers, "We didn't give the Corpo-
rate Establishment free rein in the
hopes that they would bless us with
innovations. We trampled all over
their organized way of doing things."
(ibid.) Thus the birth of the per-
sonal computer was the victory of the
Homebrewers' computers for the people
movement over the dinosaurs of the
corporate world.
In his article "Thinking about
Thinking Machines," (ibid. pg 253)
Tom Stonier comments on the techno-
logical advance represented by the
personal computer. He writes:
In the course of history, human
ingenuity has created many a wondrous
device, none so marvelous, however,
as the computer. In that long road of
human technology which among other
things, flaked stone; mastered fire;
developed speech; domesticated plants
and animals; forged bronze; created
those great ancient civilizations and
all the technology needed for them;
invented Francis Bacon's famous trio
– gunpowder, the compass, and the
printing press – and then moved on-
wards to fashion the steam engine,
balloons, factories, railways, steel,
electricity, telephones, horseless
carriages, airplanes, rockets, radio
and television... in that long road,
no invention will prove to be as
profound as the computer.... Thus,
the modes of production are changing
once again – this time as a result of
automation and the increasing use of
robots.... The introduction of the
computer into the productive process
is therefore at least as profound as
the Industrial Revolution. (Creative
Computing, Nov. 1984, pg. 252)
But as with the Industrial Revolu-
tion, so now, a curious phenomenon
has developed. The skilled, experi-
enced workers of the industrial
heartland are being heaved out of
their jobs and factories. The myth of
the workerless factory has exploded
in the face of General Motors. They
can't introduce the new technology
without involving workers in the
process and allowing workers to ob-
tain the technological education and
knowledge that will enable today's
workers to make the new machines
function. Instead there is the myth
that supervisors or engineers will
program the machines and get rid of
the workers. But the supervisors and
engineers are not the skilled or
unskilled workers who know how to
make the machines work. The result of
this attempt by management to inter-
fere with automation has resulted in
serious dislocations of workers and
industry. (See, for example, a letter
to the editor in the Flint Journal,
Flint, MI, April 4, 1987, "Halt Ram-
pant Mismanagement at Buick City.")
Computers are not a replacement
for people. And if knowledge of how
the computer functions and is pro-
grammed is purposely kept from work-
ers, disasters of technological inep-
titude like that which have occurred
at GM and Ford will be repeated ten-
fold.
John Kemeny, the creator of BASIC,
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