Winter 2007 Netizen Journalism and the United Nations Volume 16 No. 1

Challenging the False

Narratives as Basis for a

Netizen Press

One particular vision of the role for the press is that

it acts as a watchdog over government.

This is not a role

that the press often succeeds in fulfilling. Writing in the

early 1990s, Michael Hauben observed that the Net

“gives the power of the reporter to the netizen.”

What is

this power? Can the Net make it possible for the press to

be such a watchdog so that the problems of the society

can be brought to the surface and the means found to

solve them?

This issue of the Amateur Computerist is a collec-

tion of articles which explore the potential of the Internet

to make possible a journalism which will function as a

watchdog. These articles appeared in the online newspa-

per OhmyNews International

(

http://english.ohmynews.com) and sometimes in the

online magazine Telepolis (http://www.heise.de/tp).

Table of Contents

Challenging the False Narrative .. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1

Security Council Problem Facing the U.N... . . . Page 2

Future of the Korean Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5

Attack on UNDP Aid to North Korea . . . . . . . . Page 7

U.N. Reform: What Role Will Ban Play? . . . . . Page 9

ElBaradei: Negotiation With Iran . . . . . . . . . . Page 11

U.S., N. Korea Move to Open Ties . . . . . . . . . Page 13

North Korea and Banco Delta Asia . . . . . . . . . Page 15

Behind the Blacklisting of BDA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17

WMD Syndrome and the Press . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19

Does Ban Ki-Moon Have a U.N. Vision? . . . . Page 21

Status of the Six-Party Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 27

North Korea Addresses U.N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 30

U.N. Supporting Inter-Korean Summit . . . . . . Page 31

Net Gives Netizens Reporter Power. . . . . . . . . Page 34

They are an effort to explore what the power of the

reporter makes possible.

The articles cover events over a one year period

of time. They have been selected so as to focus on

what has happened with the North Korean situation

at the United Nations (U.N.) and in the regional

efforts related to the Six-Party Talks in Beijing. They

are an effort to contribute to a form of press coverage

that will provide an accurate narrative of the events

that make up the news.

On October 9, 2006, the South Korean Minister

of Foreign Affairs, Ban Ki-moon, won the Security

Council nomination to become the eighth Secretary

General of the United Nations. The General Assem-

bly voted in favor of the Security Council recom-

mendation on October 19 to make Ban the next U.N.

Secretary General.

This was a historic event for South Korea. This

was an evolving story. How would Ban fulfill the

obligations of the UN charter as Secretary General?

Could the problems of the Korean peninsula, espe-

cially the struggle for Korean reunification make

steps forward during the period while Ban would be

at the helm of the U.N.?

A few months earlier, claiming that it had to

protect itself from the hostile actions of the United

States, North Korea had tested a nuclear device. The

very next day after the General Assembly vote in

favor of the Security Council’s recommendation of

Ban to be the next Secretary General, the Security

Council began its work to pass Resolution 1718, to

impose sanctions on North Korea. The Security

Council’s actions against North Korea were reminis-

cent of its actions against Iraq just a few years

earlier.

Was there a story developing here? How would

Ban do as Secretary General? Would the problems of

the Korean peninsula, especially the tension over

denuclearization and the struggle for Korean reunifi-

cation make steps toward resolution or would there

Page 1

be greater instability in the region?

By fall of 2007, the U.N. General Assembly passed

a resolution supporting the reunification of Korea and

the Joint Declaration North and South Korea had issued

at their October 2007 summit.

The articles in this issue present an account of what

happened in the period between these events. During this

period, much of the mainstream media in the U.S.

supported the U.S. government’s hostile treatment of

North Korea, blaming North Korea for any delays that

developed in the Six-Party Talks. Such framing helped

to create a false narrative reminiscent of the fake claim

that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The

articles in this issue, instead are an effort to accurately

document the events as they unfold.

During the period leading up to the U.S. invasion of

Iraq in March 2003, much of the mainstream press in the

U.S. wrote articles about Iraq’s ‘Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD)’ and how Iraq was a threat to the

international community. The investigative journalist

and author Robert Parry calls this activity the creation of

a ‘false narrative’. Parry explores the role of much of the

mainstream media in helping the U.S. government to

establish a pretext for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

This situation raises a number of questions. When

the U.S. President George Bush described Iraq as part of

an ‘axis of evil’, he included Iran and North Korea in

this same category. Would the Iraq scenario be repeated

with respect to North Korea and Iran? Is it possible for

the Internet and netizens press to provide a means to

counter the ‘false narrative’ that the U.S. government

was creating to support its hostile policy objectives?

In his article, “Why I write,” the writer George

Orwell explains that for every piece he writes, “…there

is some lie that I want to expose, some fact to which I

want to draw attention, and my initial concern is to get

a hearing.”

Orwell is describing how he strives for

truthfulness in his work.

Does the Net give the power of the reporter to the

netizens to counter the fictitious accounts that often

make up much of the news? These articles are an effort

to explore the nature of this power and whether the Net

can present the needed challenge to the false narratives

presented by much of the mainstream U.S.

Notes:

1. “The Computer as a Democratizer” in Netizens: On the History

and Impact of Usenet and the Internet

http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/netbook/

2. “The Computer as a Democratizer” in Netizens: On the History

and Impact of Usenet and the Internet

http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/netbook/

3. Robert Parry, “Why We Write,”

http://www.consortiumnews.com/2007/111207.html

4. George Orwell, “Why I write,”

http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/wiw/english/e_wiw

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on October 17, 2006]

The Problem Facing

the U.N.

Can Ban Ki-moon Help Solve the

Problem With the Security Council?

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

The official selection on Oct. 13, 2006 of Ban

Ki-moon of South Korea as the new secretary gen-

eral of the United Nations could not come at a more

propitious time. Why, one may ask? Hailing from the

Republic of Korea (South Korea), Ban will have

before him the daunting task of bringing the best

possible contributions from the international commu-

nity to bear on many of the difficult problems that

erupt in the world. Along with his appointment to the

post at the U.N. this past week, and the congratula-

tions from diplomats from many regions of the world

at a ceremony held at the General Assembly, was the

event that took place the following day: the imposi-

tion of article 41, chapter 7 sanctions on North Korea

by the Security Council as punishment for the test of

a nuclear device several days earlier.

Though Ban does not take office for his new

position until Jan. 1, 2007, a crisis has already

developed that will require the best efforts and

resources he can muster. In congratulating him on

his selection, several of the diplomats noted the great

achievements of South Korea in having transformed

itself from “the status of least developed country, to

an industrialized highly developed nation” and “as

the 11th largest economy in the world” (in the words

of Gambian Ambassador to the U.N. Crispin Grey-

Johnson). Speaking about Ban, Grey-Johnson, who

is chairman of the African regional group at the

U.N., “the developments in his own region of the

world call for wisdom and cautious diplomacy” in

order to be able to “mediate this very complex

Page 2

security situation that is now unfolding in the Korean

Peninsula.”

In his acceptance speech to the General Assembly

upon his appointment as the eighth secretary general of

the U.N., Ban acknowledged that he was following “in

a line of remarkable leaders.” That “each of the men in

his own way, came on board at the U.N. at a critical

juncture in the organization’s history.” That “each

wondered what the coming years would require as they

took over the leadership role of the preeminent interna-

tional organization.”

The secretary general elect expressed his respect for

the role played by the current secretary general, Kofi

Annan, and promised to build on his legacy. Explaining

the need to hear the views and concerns of all the

member nations of the U.N., Ban pledged to consult

widely in his preparations for assuming his new position.

“I will listen attentively to your concerns, expectations

and admonitions,” he promised the 192 member states.

Congratulating Ban, South African Ambassador to

the U.N. Dumisani Kumalo proposed that in order for

the secretary general elect to be able to act in the interest

of the entire membership, he will need to “listen to the

views of each and every member state.”

How the future secretary general can help to solve

the problems that come before the U.N. is not only a

critical question for the international community, but

also a critical task in the face of the increased tension

being experienced on the Korean Peninsula.

While several of the speeches at the General Assem-

bly ceremony spoke to the need for wide ranging consul-

tations and discussions in order to diffuse tensions and

determine how to solve difficult problems, recent actions

at the Security Council the day after the appointment of

Ban demonstrate that a very different process is prac-

ticed by that body.

Only after an agreement was achieved among the

five permanent members of the Security Council and

supported by the 10 temporary members, and voted on,

did the Council agree to hear the party to the problem

that was before them. And only after hearing the views

of all the permanent members of the Security Council –

the U.S., France, Britain, China and Russia – and some

of the temporary members about why they voted for the

sanctions on North Korea did the council allow the

representative from the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (North Korea), Pak Gil Yon, to have a few

minutes to speak. His talk was followed by a brief

statement from the South Korean ambassador to the

U.N., who spoke in support of the sanctions.

In the brief opportunity he had to speak, Pak

indicated that his country felt it was the victim of

hostile acts by the U.S. and that it had a sovereign

right to defend itself from such hostile acts. Also, he

indicated that the process of the Security Council in

mandating sanctions on his country was more like

the activity of gangsters than an activity representing

a legitimate means of investigating a dispute and

determining how to diffuse a tense situation.

Thus, the speeches supporting discussion and

investigation in the General Assembly on Friday,

Oct. 13, and the closed decision-making process that

culminated the following day in the issuing of

sanctions against North Korea, are in stark contrast

to each other.

The statements by several of the five permanent

members of the Security Council, the members who

have the power to veto Security Council decisions,

emphasized that their resolution imposing sanctions

against North Korea reflected the condemnation of

the “international community” and that all the

nations of the U.N. now had a legal obligation to

carry out the provisions of the sanctions.

While the Security Council does indeed have the

power to impose such sanctions on a country in the

name of the U.N., the process by which the sanctions

were decided, is a sorry demonstration of power

politics that involves very few of the 192 member

countries that make up the U.N.

The chairman of the Latin American and Carib-

bean regional group, in his comments to the future

secretary general, explained that there are important

challenges for the U.N. in the role it plays in “to-

day’s world.”

“International public opinion demands that the

Security Council and other bodies of the organiza-

tion should perform a much better job. There is a

trend at this time for great and infinite opportunities

as well as unprecedented risks,” explained Ecuador-

ian Ambassador to the U.N. Diego Cordovez.

“The United Nations, it is said, should be a base,

a forum, a mode that would enable the international

community to take advantage of those transcendental

opportunities and foresee and neutralize potential

risks,” Cordovez added. “For those reasons, it is

important to insist on the need to reform thoroughly

and deeply the organization and undoubtedly, that

would be the main task and responsibility of our new

secretary general.” (He was referring to the failure of

the member countries to reform the Security Coun-

Page 3

cil.)

“It is inconceivable,” he said, “that we are discuss-

ing the reform of the Security Council for decades,

preparing infinite numbers of formulas, doing report

after report on that item, and yet it remains – immutable

and impossible to the critics for its lack of representation

and its parsimonious conduct to confront [the] world’s

crises.”

The act of bringing sanctions against a member state

by the Security Council, with no investigation into the

grievances that motivated North Korea’s actions, stands

as an egregious example of the failure of the obligation

of the U.N. to hear from each member state and to

provide a place where problems can be heard and

discussed to find a solution.

North Korea says its problems are with the U.S. and

that it has developed nuclear devices because of its need

to defend itself from the U.S. That is a serious statement

requiring investigation to see who has caused the prob-

lem and who merits the imposition of sanctions.

Another aspect of the current process that ended in

sanctions is that the five permanent members of the

Security Council are powerful countries that possess

nuclear weapons. These very countries have failed to

meet their obligations under the Nuclear Non-prolifera-

tion Treaty to carry out disarmament.

Some scholars and diplomats explain that they are

not surprised that North Korea believes it needs to

develop a nuclear capacity in order to protect itself from

danger. Given the actions of the U.S. government in

branding North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” and

attacking another, Iraq, which it had similarly branded,

is but one of the reasons some scholars believe the U.S.

government provided North Korea with a legitimate

justification to develop nuclear weapons.

In its brief talk

at the Security Council meeting, North Korea expressed

one of its disappointments:

“It was gangster-like for the Security Council to

adopt such a coercive resolution against the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea while neglecting the nuclear

threat posed by the United States against his country….

The council was incapable of offering a single word of

concern when the United States threatened to launch

nuclear pre-emptive attacks, reinforced its armed forces

and conducted large-scale military exercises near the

Korean Peninsula.”

It must be remembered that the five permanent

members of the Security Council possess thousands of

nuclear weapons.

Although commentators and scholars who feel there

is justification for North Korea’s actions want to

discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they

explain that punishing North Korea, while ignoring

those countries who are in the club of nations pos-

sessing nuclear weapons, can only breed cynicism

and hostility to nonproliferation and enforcement

efforts.

That North Korea can claim that it felt com-

pelled to develop a nuclear device, is a signal that the

current regime of power politics is not working in a

way that provides alternatives for a small nation that

feels threatened by the nations that are nuclear

powers. North Korea’s situation is a demonstration

that there is need for serious discussion by the 192

member states of the U.N. to understand the prob-

lems that North Korea claims compel it to develop

nuclear weapons as a means of securing its borders

and protecting its sovereignty.

There is indeed an international community, and

there is indeed a serious challenge facing it. The five

big nuclear powers who wield veto power on the

Security Council can bring to bear punishment upon

a small nation that endeavors to develop nuclear

capability. This, however, will only compound the

problem as it will only increase the hostility and

resentment that the small nation feels from such

unequal treatment at the hands of those who them-

selves possess nuclear weapons and who use the

power this capability bestows on them in such a

self-serving manner.

The two Koreas have brought to the world stage

the need for a truly international organization, one

that will consider all its members’ concerns and

needs, and find ways to support serious consideration

of the problems such nations have but are unable to

solve themselves.

The urgent problem facing the U.N. at this

juncture in its history is not whether North Korea has

developed and tested a nuclear device. It is the

breakdown reflected by the lack of participation and

investigation by the international community into

how a crisis will be handled once it develops, and

whether the concerns and problems of those who are

involved in the crisis will be considered as part of the

process of seeking a solution. It is how the U.N.

functions when tensions reach a point where serious

attention is needed to help to understand and solve a

problem.

Unfortunately for the world, and for North

Korea, there was no such process in the decision to

Page 4

impose sanctions on North Korea. The decision to

impose sanctions on North Korea was not made by the

international community. It was the decision of a small

set of nuclear countries. Who was responsible for the

crisis was not explored before determining blame, and

thus the proclaimed solution is likely only to worsen the

problem rather than solve it. Yet the actual problem

exists and the fact that people of the world recognize it

is highlighted by a recent poll taken in South Korea,

which showed that 43 percent of the population blames

the U.S. government for North Korea’s test of a nuclear

device, while only 37.2 percent blame the North Kore-

ans.

The actions in the Security Council to punish North

Korea occurred without the needed exploration of what

had motivated North Korea to turn to nuclear weapons as

a means of self-defense. Can the U.N. be changed in the

needed ways so that it will be able to handle such

problems? This is the urgent issue facing the U.N. as the

future secretary general takes over the post in January.

This is one of the challenges facing Ban Ki-moon,

member nations and people who are part of the U.N.

organization as it embarks on a new chapter in the

history of this needed global organization.

Notes:

1. See “Pyongyang’s Nuke Test Sparks Fission Over Response.”

http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/140740/1

2. See “What About North Korea’s sovereignty?”

http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=518268

3. See “U.S. Most Responsible for Nuclear Test: Poll.”

http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200610/kt2006101517230

011990.htm

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=32

3351&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on October 24, 2006]

The Future of the Korean

Peninsula

South Korean Ambassador

to the U.N. Choi Young-jin

Participates in Columbia Seminar*

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

A seminar about the problems of the Korean

Peninsula with the South Korean Ambassador to the

U.N., Choi Young-jin, was held at Columbia Univer-

sity in New York, on Thursday, Oct. 19.

Ambassa-

dor Choi opened the seminar by presenting what he

proposed as a framework in which to understand the

current problems facing the peninsula, the primary

one of which is how to understand North Korea.

The world, Choi proposed, is divided into coun-

tries that are interdependent or isolated. The U.S. is

the most interdependent country in the world. He

gave North Korea as an example of an isolated

country. What is happening in the Korean peninsula,

he said, is a microcosm of the problems the world is

facing in the 21

century.

There is a North-South divide, and the Korean

peninsula is characteristic of this divide, only the

characteristics that are represented by countries of

the North and South are reversed. The divide is one

of “haves” and “have nots.” North Korea is an

example of the countries of the South, which are

countries in economic difficulty. At the heart of the

question of North Korea, Choi proposed, is the

dilemma of “political survival and economic re-

vival.”

North Korea’s factories are only running at

20-30 percent of capacity. Electricity production is

a problem. North Korea, he explained, cannot sur-

vive such economic difficulties. How then is it pos-

sible to revive its economy? The only way, Choi

explained, was to accept trade. Like Vietnam, North

Korea needs to open up its society and accept trade

with other countries. According to Choi, the threat

for North Korea is an internal threat, the threat of

self-imposed isolation.

Choi proposed, however, that North Korea, on

its own could not choose to change this situation.

That unless a peaceful means could be found to help

Page 5

change the situation, the problem faced by North Korea

becomes the problem of the international community.

“How do you manage this complex problem?” he

asked. He proposed two different approaches, one that

the U.S. was pursuing and one that China was taking.

The U.S., he explained, is geographically distant from

North Korea and so it would not be affected if there was

a clash with North Korea. Thus the U.S. position was to

promote “containment with engagement.” The U.S.

position is that North Korea cannot be accepted as a

nuclear state. It advocated sanctions including the

interdiction of North Korean cargo suspected of being

related to its nuclear program.

What if, however, it was Mexico not North Korea

that had become a nuclear state and threatened to sell

nuclear technology to other countries? If the country the

U.S. was dealing with was geographically closer to the

U.S., what would be the U.S. policy then? Would the

U.S. accept interdiction of suspected cargo if it could

lead to a military clash?

Choi described the second approach, the approach

that China was taking. Since China is so close, if a clash

happened, the first victim would be China not the U.S.

Similarly, South Korea is geographically close to North

Korea. China and South Korea have a lot to lose if

something happens. That is why China insisted that the

sanctions not be military, but only under Article 41 of

Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Also China

favored that the interdiction of suspected cargo would

not be “mandatory” but “as necessary.”

The situation, however, Choi explained, is murky.

He asked if North Korea knows what it wants. Also for

China and South Korea the desire is that North Korea not

be a nuclear state. They want co-existence and that the

Korean peninsula be a nuclear free peninsula. He also

raised the question of whether the other countries who

had been involved in the Six-Party Talks had a strategy.

No country appeared to have a clear strategy. The

situation appeared dangerous because an explosion

would affect the whole region.

The program was opened for questions from the

people attending the seminar. The first question was

about an article in the Oct. 16 issue of the German

publication “Der Spiegel.” The writer quoted an anon-

ymous source that said that North Korea had asked

China to guarantee that if it were attacked, it would

retaliate on behalf of North Korea. North Korea would

have stopped developing its nuclear weapons if the

Chinese had agreed to this request. The question was

whether Choi knew anything about this report.

Choi’s response was that he didn’t know any-

thing about this report but that he didn’t think that

North Korea saw its major problem as security. His

view was that North Korea wanted economic assis-

tance, economic cash.

Professor Samuel Kim, who had introduced the

speaker, disagreed that North Korea was not con-

cerned with its national security. Kim referred to an

account by Ambassador Charles “Jack” Pritchard.

Pritchard said that he was struck by something that

Kim Jong Il said to Madeleine Albright about the

importance of security to North Korea. When com-

paring the experience of China and North Korea

regarding economic development, Kim Jong Il

explained that China had been able to focus its

resources on economic development because it

didn’t face any security threat. North Korea, how-

ever, saw the U.S. as threatening its security and so

could not focus its efforts on economic development.

North Korea felt it was under a U.S. nuclear threat,

and had been for the past 50 years, going back to the

period of the Korean War.

Responding to a comment that North Korea had

not supported coming to an agreement in the 2005

Six-Party Talks, Professor Kim explained that it was

the U.S. not North Korea that was the problem. No

sooner was the ink dry, the U.S. imposed financial

sanctions on North Korea. These sanctions created a

financial stranglehold. Even during the talks, it was

the U.S. that was the holdout. It took the U.S. a few

days to sign the agreement reached during the

Six-Party Talks, and it only did so when it was

threatened that the fact it was the U.S. which was

delaying the signing of the agreement would be

made public.

Answering a question about the fact that a

significant percentage of the South Korean popula-

tion sees the U.S. as responsible for the North Ko-

rean nuclear test, Choi explained that people in

South Korea are divided over how to deal with the

situation. The official position of the URI party in

South Korea, is that the U.S. is to blame. Many

people in South Korea think of North Korea as a

brother. Others see the U.S. as an ally and North

Korea as an enemy. The framework he gave at the

beginning of the seminar, however, is intended to

establish that there is a genuine problem and that the

U.S. is forced to work within the context of this

genuine problem.

Choi was asked whether it would help that the

Page 6

new secretary-general of the United Nations was from

South Korea. He answered that he believed it would

definitely help as South Korea has an understanding of

the need to work with North Korea.

In response to the question whether any country had

previously changed from pursuing nuclear ambitions

because of sanctions, some examples were given of

countries like Brazil and Argentina which responded to

packages that included security guarantees and economic

incentives. Another comment made by a participant in

the seminar was that it was important that South Korea

continue its economic relations with North Korea. It was

important for North Korea to be able to make a legiti-

mate living exporting legitimate products and not be

forced by sanctions or a boycott to turn to military

exports.

One of the problems raised during the question

period was that North Korea is looking toward the U.S.

not South Korea for a way to solve the problems. Criti-

cism of the U.S. was mounting for not being willing to

talk with North Korea. The North Korean focus on the

U.S. could be seen perhaps as a fatal attraction.

Responding to the characterization of North Korea

as having trouble making strategic decisions, Professor

Kim expressed his disagreement. He pointed to the

decision by North Korea in 1994 to enter into the Agreed

Framework with the U.S., and then the decision to

launch the missile test, and the test of a nuclear weapon.

These were offered as examples that North Korea was

quite capable of making what it deemed strategic deci-

sions.

The seminar provided the participants with an

opportunity to exchange views and concerns over what

is happening in Northeast Asia. The issues were consid-

ered with a seriousness and concern that was encourag-

ing. The discussion in the seminar resulted in recognition

of North Korea’s concern over the threat it perceives

from the U.S., both militarily and economically. The

actions of the U.S. toward North Korea coupled with the

fact that North Korea therefore feels the need to have a

way to respond to the hostile acts, results in a tense

situation. The nations that share geographic proximity

with North Korea find themselves faced with an increas-

ingly unstable situation. The actions of the U.S. and the

pressures from the U.S. on the countries that are in

geographic proximity to North Korea, have as their

result intensified instability rather than the amelioration

of the instability.

The seminar demonstrated the importance of serious

discussion among those who are concerned for the safety

and stability of the Korean Peninsula. Ambassador

Choi Young-jin, Professor Samuel Kim, and those

who attended the seminar, all contributed to creating

an environment where fruitful discussion was wel-

comed. This is an encouraging sign that with the

efforts of concerned people, perhaps the issues

involved can be clarified, and the needed action can

be taken to support a just resolution of the problems

that have contributed to the current crisis.

Note:

1 .

h t t p : / / c a l e n d a r . c o l u m b i a . e d u / s u n d i a l /

webapi/get.php?brand=sipa&id=10714&vt=detail&context=s

tandalone

*Columbia University Weatherhead East Asia Institute

(WEAI) Center fro Korean Research “Contemporary Korean

Affairs Seminar – The Korean Peninsular in the 21st Century”

with Ambassador Choi Young-jin, Permanent Representative of

the Republic of Korea to the United Nations.

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=324790&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on February 7, 2007]

Hardliners Attack U.N.D.P.

Aid to North Korea

Allegations of Corruption Seen

as Attempt to Undermine

Engagement

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

“We didn’t give them any money to squander,”

explains Ghulam Faruq Achikzad, who worked as

the resident representative for the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) in North Korea from

1993 to 1996. Though the program that Achikzad

worked in differs from the current program, his

description of his experience is helpful in under-

standing the nature of the UNDP country program in

North Korea.

The responsibility for the integrity of the pro-

gram rests with the resident coordinator, says

Achikzad. Working for the U.N., he saw himself as

Page 7

an international civil servant who was responsible for the

funds for the program and would not let them be used for

anything else.

On Jan. 19, The Wall Street Journal and Fox News

published articles

containing a series of unsubstantiated

allegations about mismanagement and abuse of UNDP

funds by the North Korean government. The allegations

in the two articles repeated allegations made in letters

made available by the U.S. mission to the U.N. in New

York. Fox News provided a link

to a letter from a

Deputy Ambassador at the U.S. mission to the U.N.,

Mark Wallace, to the UNDP. Wallace’s letter claimed

that “at least since 1998 the UNDP DPRK program has

been systematically perverted for the benefit of the Kim

Jong Il regime.” In his letter, Wallace further alleged that

“the UNDP DPRK program has for years operated in

blatant violation of U.N. rules, served as a steady and

large source of hard currency and other resources for the

DPRK government with minimal or no assurance that

UNDP funds and resources are utilized for legitimate

development activities.” No actual evidence was offered

to support the allegations.

Achikzad explains that while he was in North

Korea, there was no abuse of the UNDP program. The

program utilized relatively little money, approximately

$5 million a year. The money was mostly aimed at

technical assistance and training. The North Koreans

needed foreign exchange so he helped them to under-

stand that it was important for them to learn about

international trade. When they expressed their reluctance

because they didn’t want to be capitalist, he would

advise them that they didn’t have to be capitalist to be

involved in foreign trade, but they needed knowledge

about it to be able to participate. Achikzad even arranged

a training session for them with people from the World

Bank so they could learn about the operations of the

World Bank.

The programs while he was there had to do with

international economics, energy, and modernization of

agricultural. Also Achikzad explains that there was no

abuse of foreign currency going to North Korea when he

was in charge of the program. Much of the program

involved bringing in people from outside of North Korea

to provide training and education.

Neither The Wall Street Journal nor Fox News

provided support for their charges, other than Wallace’s

letter containing the allegations. Neither these articles,

nor most of the articles that appeared in the days that

followed in the U.S. press, provided any consideration of

the allegations to try to determine if they were well

founded. The UNDP Associate Administrator Ad

Melkert, and David Morrison, the Director of Com-

munications of UNDP, responded

to the charges of

illegality in the Wallace letter, but their explanations

were in general ignored by much of the media.

Melkert said that the accusation that the UNDP

operated “in blatant violation of U.N. rules” was not

true. Under UNDP financial regulations, he

explained, the authority to decide the practices to

follow was delegated to the resident coordinator in a

country. Also misleading was the accusation that the

UNDP program was providing hard currency to be

misused by the North Korean government. As long

as the UNDP operates a program in a country where

the currency is not exchangeable outside of the

country, there is a need to buy the currency of the

country from the central bank. It is not possible to

have a program in such a country without buying

currency from the bank.

While press reports in the U.S. often just re-

peated or exaggerated the original allegations, a few

other publications provided a different perspective.

For example, the Korean newspaper Voice of the

People pointed out that the allegations of UNDP

mismanagement appeared just as the North Korean

and U.S. representatives had had productive negotia-

tions in Berlin. The Voice of the People asked why

the U.S. Mission to the U.N. was raising these issues

“at this time.”

“Despite the totally unfounded allegation by the

hawks,” the editors write, “it has a political effect for

freezing (the) bilateral relationship between Wash-

ington and Pyongyang.

In response to similar allegations by the Heri-

tage Foundation about a program between South

Korea and North Korea, the South Korean Unifica-

tion Minister Lee Jae-joung responded, “this criti-

cism is based on unidentified assumptions (rather)

than on firm ground.” He went on to point out that

the economic cooperation that South Korean aid to

North Korea funds “is a short cut to maintain peace

on the Korean peninsula.”

In summing up the lessons from his experience

in the UNDP program, Achikzad emphasized that

just as it is important that the resident coordinator in

charge of the country program for the UNDP be

chosen carefully, it is similarly important that the

U.N. continue to conduct programs in North Korea

and other countries because the U.N. he explained is

“a neutral institution. It’s an institution belonging to

Page 8

all of us, not one powerful country.”

Notes:

1. Melanie Kirkpatrick, “United Nations Dictator’s Program” WSJ,

Jan. 19, 2007. The article says: “The hard currency supplied by the

UNDP almost certainly goes into one big pot marked ‘Dear Leader’

which Kim can use for whatever he wants, including his weapons

programs.”

George Russell, “U.S. State Department Reveals North

Korea’s Misuse of U.N. Development Program Funds and Opera-

tions,” Foxnews.com, Friday, January 19, 2007

http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,244799,0

0.html

2. http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/WallaceonNoKo.pdf

3. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/pressconference/pc070119.rm

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=

c10400&no=344001&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

TELEPOLIS on February 14, 2007]

What Role Will

Ban Ki-moon Play?

[Analysis] The Struggle Over Reform at

the U.N.

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

As soon as Ban Ki-moon took office as the 8th

secretary general of the United Nations, his comments

sparked controversy. A statement about Saddam

Hussein’s execution, namely that capital punishment was

a decision to be made by each nation, drew condemna-

tion from those who compared it with previous U.N.

statements, while it was supported by John Bolton, the

former U.S. ambassador to the U.N., who praised Ban’s

statement about capital punishment as the “right

instinct.”

Kofi Annan, Ban’s predecessor, had been willing at

times to condemn what he deemed violations of the U.N.

charter. For example, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq,

Annan warned that such “a military action would violate

the U.N. charter.”

Similarly, during the 2006 Israeli

invasion of Lebanon, Annan stated that Israel’s “‘dispro-

portionate’ use of force and collective punishment of the

Lebanese people must stop.”

This was a means of

condemning Israeli actions as illegal.

Such actions earned Annan praise for being

willing to tell “the truth to the powerful”, from

Dumisani Kumalo, the South African Ambassador to

the U.N., speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 (G-

77). These actions, on the other hand, were con-

demned by Bolton who criticized Annan as the

U.N.’s “chief moralizer,” whose activities “were not

ultimately helpful to the world body.”

Even before he took office, Ban had said he

would be open with the press, promising that he

could be “a pretty straight shooter when I need to.”

Coming to the U.N. from his former position as the

foreign minister of South Korea, Ban brought with

him a reputation for dodging questions from the

press when he deemed that beneficial. This trait led

South Korean journalists to nickname him “slippery

eel.”

Already during his short term in office, there

have been several instances when Ban praised the

powerful and dodged questions from reporters when

asked to explain the basis for his praise.

One example occurred after Ban met with the

U.S. President George Bush in Washington on

January 16, 2007. At the press conference following

the meeting, Ban referred to Bush as a “a great

leader.” When Ban returned to the U.N., a reporter

asked him why he had used these words to describe

Bush. Ban responded: “In diplomacy, it is appropri-

ate to address any Head of State or Government with

due respect and courtesy. I hope you will understand

what this diplomatic practice is.”

Such comments have earned Ban a reputation as

someone who “is an enigma to media and diplomats

alike”

and whose “statements” are as hard to follow

as “a Delphic Oracle.” Bolton, on the other hand, has

expressed his approval for what Ban has done or has

freely offered his advice on what to do differently.

For example, Bolton characterized as a “courageous

decision”

Ban’s call for the resignations of 60

senior-level officials in the secretariat. Since the

contracts of these officials were to expire anyway at

the end of February, several reporters wondered why

Ban asked for their resignation. When Ban was

asked for his response to Bolton’s comments, Ban

responded that he agreed with some of them. He did

not elaborate.

One of the first promises of the new Secretary

General was that he would carry out reform at the

U.N. There are different views among the member

nations of the U.N. on what reform is needed.

Page 9

For the U.S. government, as Bolton explains, the

purpose of reform is to make the U.N. a better tool

among others “to implement American foreign policy.”

For a number of other nations, the purpose of reform

is to foster a multilateral process

to prevent war and

hostilities among nations. Nations which are part of the

group known as the G-77 define a reform agenda quite

differently from the agenda promoted by the U.S. and

what the G-77 describe as “other developed nations from

the North.”

The G-77, originally formed in 1964 when 77

developing nations signed a Joint Declaration at the end

of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD), has a reform agenda that focuses

development issues and on promoting the importance of

the U.N. as the preeminent international institution.

There are now 130 nations that are part of the G-77.

Many of these nations are also part of the Non-Aligned

Movement.

During Ban’s first few weeks in his new position, he

has appeared to vacillate between the reform agenda of

the G-77 and the reform agenda supported by the U.S.

and other powerful developed nations. The U.S. wants

the U.N. to be run more like a business, with business

processes and management goals, Bolton said in a talk

he gave at Columbia University in April 2006. Other

nations differ.

Describing how the U.N. differs from a business

organization, in a talk also given at Columbia University,

Choi Young-jin, the Ambassador to the U.N. from South

Korea, explained that there are 192 nations belonging to

the U.N. and “every one is on the board of governors.”

Choi maintained that you can’t run an organization

with 192 members on the board the same way you can

run a business. While a business has a goal of generating

profit, “the strongest point of the U.N.,” Choi said, “is its

moral authority. The focus of any reform has to be on

that moral authority, not on ‘efficiencies.’”

Another characteristic of the differences in the

reform agenda of the different nations is the importance

with which many nations view the need for a reform of

the Security Council. In December 2006 there was a

debate in the General Assembly about reform of the

Security Council that drew 70 speakers and substantial

proposals for changing its composition and working

methods.

Subsequently at the first meeting

of the new year

of the Security Council on Jan. 8, 2007, several of the

non-permanent members raised

the need for Security

Council reform. One nation’s representative explained

that the issues taken up by the Security Council

should be more carefully chosen so they do not to

encroach on the mandate of other U.N. organs.

Similarly, he proposed that the Security Council

should not fail to act in situations consistent with its

mandate, situations that pose a threat to international

peace and security, such as in the “Palestine-Israeli

issue.” Other issues raised during the Jan. 8 meeting

included the desirability of involving regional and

subregional groups in solving problems when feasi-

ble, that diplomatic solutions should be utilized

before resorting to sanctions, and that nations like

Iran and North Korea should not be denied the right

to undertake research and development for the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This meeting was also Ban’s first official meet-

ing with the Security Council. He gave a brief

presentation.

Though he spoke about U.N. reform,

he didn’t mention Security Council reform. Later at

a press conference

with Ban’s spokesperson, a

reporter asked if Ban deliberately choose not to

mention Security Council reform. The spokesperson

responded: “I don’t think it was deliberate. I think he

is certainly interested in the issue – definitely con-

cerned about the issue. He has talked about it before,

but as you know with Security Council reforms there

was a proposal made, and now, it is in the hands of

the Member States.”

In general, the mainstream U.S. media provides

little coverage of the controversy over reform at the

U.N. Allegations of U.N. mismanagement, however,

are pursued with a vengeance, just as they had been

in the “Oil for Food” scandal.

More recently articles by Fox News

and in The

Wall Street Journal

alleged that tens of millions of

dollars of hard currency had been subverted by the

government of North Korea from the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) and used to fund

North Korea’s nuclear program. Also the press

reports charged that the UNDP had kept the scam

secret. Fox News asked if Kim Jung II “subverted the

UNDP program” and possibly stole “tens of millions

of dollars of hard currency in the process.” In their

article “United Nations Dictators Program”, the WSJ

alleged that “the hard currency supplied by the

UNDP almost certainly goes into one big pot marked

‘Dear Leader’ which Kim can use for whatever he

wants.”

These allegations were made without any actual

evidence to back them up, but just in time to coin-

Page 10

cide with the UNDP Executive Board meeting that was

to approve the programs for 2007 and on. The result of

the articles was to block the approval of the 2007-8

UNDP program in North Korea, and to exert pressure so

that the Secretary General recommended an external

audit of all U.N. programs, beginning with the North

Korean UNDP program. Headlines alleging North

Korean abuse of U.N. programs quickly spread in the

U.S. and international media.

Subsequently, the U.N. announced that their audit

plans were focused on North Korea. There is to be an

external audit of all U.N. programs in North Korea. The

audit is “to be completed by the Board of Auditors

within a three-month time frame, as per the Secretary

General’s proposal of 22 January 2007.”

Both the U.S. and the Group of 77 supported Ban’s

candidacy for the position of Secretary-General. Now

that he is in the position, he is faced with the ongoing

struggle of contending forces over the U.N.’s reform

agenda. How he will handle the different pressures is one

of the important challenges he and the U.N. face in the

coming months and years of his term.

Notes:

1. “Iraq war was illegal and breached U.N. charter, says Annan,”

The Guardian, Sept. 16, 2004.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1305709,00.html

2. “Kofi Annan Addresses Middle East Violence” (Transcript), The

Washington Post, July 20, 2006.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/

20/AR2006072000912.html

3. “Don’t Ban Your Instincts, Ban Ki-moon,” The Washington Post,

Jan. 14, 2007.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/

12/AR2007011202061.html

4. “Press Conference by Secretary-General-designate,” Dec. 14,

2006.

http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sg_elect/press_conf_14dec06

.htm

5. “Secretary-General’s press encounter upon entering U.N.

Headquarters following visit to Washington, DC” (unofficial

transcript, New York, Jan. 17, 2007).

http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=968

6. “Spinning the Moon,” The Guardian, Jan. 18, 2007.

http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ian_williams/2007/01/the_m

oon_must_spin.html

7. The Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2007.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/

12/AR2006011202061.html

8. “John Bolton: U.N. Reform Remains Vital But Unlikely,” Human

Events, Jan. 22, 2007.

http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=19042

9. U.N. General Assembly document, Sept. 15, 2005 (pdf file).

http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/A60L.pdf

10. “A Commentary on ‘Renewing the United Nations: A

Programme for Reform,’” policy brief prepared by the South

Centre at the request of the Group of 77.

http://www.g77.org/Docs/policy%20brief.htm

11. “John Bolton Says Proposed U.N. Reforms Do Not Go Far

Enough,” Columbia News, May 31, 2006.

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/06/05/bolton.html

12. “Conceptual Framework for International Relations,”

OhmyNews International, April 24, 2006.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=&no=287732&rel_no=1&back_url=

13. U.N. Security Council document, Jan. 8, 2007.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8933.doc.htm

14. “States Call for Security Council Reform,” OhmyNews

International, Jan. 10, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?ar

ticle_class=7&no=339250&rel_no=1

15. “Secretary-General’s remarks at the Security Council

meeting on Threats to International Peace and Security,” Jan. 8,

2007.

http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2397

16. U.N. Spokesperson’s news briefing, Jan. 8, 2007.

http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/db070108.doc.

htm

17. Fox News.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,3566,244799,00.html

18. “United Nations Dictator’s Program,” RealClear Politics,

Jan. 19, 2007.

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/give_top_t

eachers_a_bonus.html

The above article can be seen at:

http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/html/result.xhtml?url=/tp/r4/artikel/

24/24577/1.html&words=Hauben&T=hauben

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on March 1, 2007]

ElBaradei Argues for

Negotiation With Iran

Sees “Window of Opportunity”

to Diffuse Crisis

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

Many nations use nuclear fuel to generate

electricity. Nations like South Africa who use nu-

clear energy have to buy the enriched uranium from

nations that can do the enrichment. The Director

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei, says there are 12 or 13

countries with the technical capability to do the 5

Page 11

percent uranium enrichment needed for nuclear energy

fuel production. Iran says that given the difficulties it has

had in having access to advanced technology, it needs to

be able to enrich uranium for its own generation of

electricity.

The U.S. government claims that Iran has other

intentions and that once Iran masters uranium enrich-

ment for peaceful purposes it will acquire a capability

that can lead to the creation of nuclear weapons. The

U.S. government has taken the position that the right to

do uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is a

loophole in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT).

The production of nuclear weapons requires signifi-

cantly greater technical capacity than the ability to do 5

percent enrichment of uranium. The U.S., however,

wants to stop Iran from any development of uranium

enrichment technology. The U.N. Security Council

supported this effort by imposing sanctions against Iran

in December 2006 as part of Security Council Resolution

1737. For the sanctions to end, Iran would have to stop

its enrichment activity.

Iran, for its part, insists that it has the right to master

the technology needed for the peaceful production of

nuclear energy and that it won’t stop its peaceful enrich-

ment program. As a signatory of the NPT, Iran has the

right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful pur-

poses.

The Iranian government says it is willing to negoti-

ate but it is not willing to accept the precondition that it

cease enrichment activity before being able to negotiate.

It is in this context that the drama is unfolding at the

U.N. in the Security Council.

In an interview

with the Financial Times, IAEA

Director General ElBaradei argues for negotiations with

Iran rather than hostile actions that will further polarize

the underlying disagreements. ElBaradei maintains that

hostile actions are counterproductive to the aims of the

NPT.

ElBaradei oversees the inspection and monitoring of

nuclear activity of all countries that are signatories to the

NPT. Explaining why he is in favor of dialog and of

negotiation, ElBaradei says, “I know if you engage

people, you moderate their behavior. If you isolate them

you radicalize them.”

“What is really important to have,” says ElBaradei,

is “a proper diagnosis of the problem, assess the problem

properly.”

ElBaradei explains that the hostile actions and

words against a nation are a pressure that can provoke a

nation to feel it needs a nuclear deterrent. Applying

such reasoning to the situation with Iran he explains:

“Even if they were not going to develop a

nuclear weapon today, this would be a sure

recipe for them to go down that route.”

ElBaradei advises the U.S. give Iran security guaran-

tees, “Then we should also stop calling names and

threatening regime change.”

When Ban Ki-moon, the U.N. Secretary Gen-

eral, visited Vienna on Feb. 23, he met with

ElBaradei. When asked if there is anything the Sec-

retary General is doing to encourage negotiation in

this period. Ban’s spokesperson Michele Montas

replied:

“The Secretary General met with ElBaradei.

They discussed it and Mr. ElBaradei is doing

that effort you are talking about.”

ElBaradei notes that the IAEA has issued its report

as required by Security Council Resolution 1737, but

that the report will not be acted on until March 6,

2007 when the IAEA Council meets and the IAEA

member nations vote to approve or reject the report.

Until that date he can change the report. “I can add

or reverse judgments there until the March 6,” said

ElBaradei. This means, he explained, that the period

between Feb. 22 and March 6 presents a “window of

opportunity” for negotiations with Iran.

He urged Iran and the nations on the Security

Council to utilize this opportunity to find a way to

have engagement based on dialog to reconcile their

differences.

Iran has indicated it is willing to negotiate but

will not agree to the precondition that it suspend its

enrichment before such negotiations take place.

Hans Blix, the former chief weapons inspector

in Iraq has explained that it is a “humiliating” and a

“neocolonial attitude” to demand that Iran cease its

enrichment activity before any negotiations are

possible.

Iran contends that 5 percent enrichment of

uranium is its right under the NPT. And that it is

being singled out and denied the right that the NPT

provides.

ElBaradei explains that as long as Iran’s enrich-

ment activities are carried out under the IAEA,

oversight to limit the degree of enrichment to 5

percent can be maintained. Also he would like to get

Iran to agree to the Additional Protocol which would

provide the IAEA with additional authority for other

forms of inspection. Iran had voluntarily signed the

Page 12

Additional Protocol but withdrew from it when the

IAEA 35 nation board voted to require Iran to suspend

enrichment activity. ElBaradei says that Iran’s agree-

ment to accept the Additional Protocol would give the

IAEA the authority it needs to better inspect the manu-

facture of equipment.

On Sunday, Feb. 25, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator

Ali Larijani met with South African President Thabo

Mbeki and explained that: “Setting a precondition for

negotiation means reaching a conclusion ahead of the

talks, which has been an unsuccessful policy.”

South Africa is currently a non-permanent member

on the U.N. Security Council and holds the presidency of

the Council during the month of March. South Africa has

one nuclear plant for the production of nuclear energy

and has “voiced its firm decision to build a second

nuclear power plant.” It intends to study various methods

of uranium enrichment to produce the fuel needed by its

power plants rather than only rely on foreign sources.

Italy is also a non-permanent member of the Coun-

cil. On Sunday, Feb. 25 and Monday Feb. 26 the Century

Foundation sponsored a program at the Millennium U.N.

Plaza Hotel on “Weapons threats and International

Security: Rebuilding an Unraveled Consensus”

The

Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the U.N. provided

the idea and support for the program. Both Blix and

Iran’s Ambassador to the U.N. Javad Zarif spoke during

the events of the conference.

The upcoming deliberations in the Security Council

also come at a time of discussion about the need for

reform of the Security Council’s practices and composi-

tion by a number of U.N. member states, including

several of the non-permanent members of the current

Security Council.

Among the issues being raised by those advocating

reform, is the concern that the Security Council takes up

issues that are not appropriate under its mandate and

doesn’t take up other issues that are appropriate.

Iran contends that the issue of its enrichment

activity is an issue that belongs in the IAEA not in the

Security Council. It has complained that transferring the

issue of how it adheres to the obligations under the NPT

to the Security Council has served to politicize what is a

technical process.

Whether the U.S. and other proponents of sanctions

against Iran will prevail in the Security Council delibera-

tions, or whether the voices of those nations which argue

for a negotiated process to find a solution to the dispute

will succeed, will become apparent in upcoming devel-

opments in the Security Council. But the controversy

over whether under the NPT a nation is allowed to

develop a 5 percent uranium enrichment capacity to

make possible the production of nuclear fuel for

nuclear energy generation is a controversy that

merits public understanding and consideration.

ElBaradei, stressing the importance of keeping

Iran’s nuclear development within the confines of

the oversight of the IAEA and the NPT explains: “to

aim at denying a country knowledge is almost

impossible, to say the least. And there’s a big differ-

ence between acquiring the knowledge for enrich-

ment and developing a bomb.”

Notes:

1. “Hostile Act” Telepolis 12/30/2006

http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/24/24319/1.html

2. Transcript of the Director General’s Interview on Iran and

DPRK, Financial Times with Daniel Dombey Feb. 19 2007

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2007/ft190207.

html

3. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/pressbriefing/brief070226.rm

starting at 16:57

4. “Larijani returns home from S. African visit” from Islamic

Republic News Agency, IRNA Feb. 27

http://www2.irna.com/en/news/view/line-22/0702270655174

113.htm

5. http://www.presstv.ir/pop/print.aspx?id=858

6. http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=EV&pubid=176

7. States Call for Security Council Reform

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=339250&rel_no=1

The above article article can be seen at:

http://engdev.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=347904&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on March 7, 2007]

U.S., North Korea Move to

Open Ties

Christopher Hill and Kim Kye-gwan

Hold Meeting in New York

on First Steps

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

“This process, not unlike a video game, gets

more and more difficult as you get to different lev-

Page 13

els,” said Christopher Hill, U.S. Assistant Secretary of

State, speaking at a press conference held at the Foreign

Press Center in New York City shortly after he had

finished two days of meetings with North Korea’s lead

negotiator for the Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-gwan. Hill

is the chief negotiator for the U.S. The Six-Party Talks

include the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China,

Russia and Japan

Hill characterized the activities of the past two days

as “good discussions” which were “very comprehen-

sive.” Both sides were optimistic that they would get

through the first 60-day period’s tasks that were outlined

in the Feb. 13 agreement signed in Beijing.

A reason for the optimism, Hill explained, was that

his talks with Kim not only discussed the issues that had

to be resolved at this 30-day stage, but they also ex-

plored what they would need to do to go forward after

the 60-day period, which will end in mid-April.

Hill explained that five working groups have been

set up. His working group with Kim on normalizing

U.S.-North Korean relations finished their tasks within

the 30-day time schedule that they had set for the five

groups to begin their process. Another group, the bilat-

eral group between North Korea and Japan will meet in

Hanoi and the three other groups will be meeting in

Beijing.

Hill was interested in the efforts to get an agreement

between the U.S. and North Korea in the 1990s and had

learned some of the background from his discussions

with Kim.

A focus of their talks, Hill explained, was on the

upcoming meetings that would take place with the six

parties in Beijing and how to make those productive.

“The ministers from each of the six parties to the talks

will be meeting in Beijing then and assessing where we

will go the next 60 days,” Hill said.

Hill was asked how this negotiation was different

from previous ones with North Korea. He described how

the tight deadlines were one aspect. Another was that the

agreement involved the six parties and the bilateral talks

between the U.S. and North Korea and the other parties

were within this framework.

Also Hill credited the close work between the U.S.

and China for some of the progress. Not only did the

U.S. and China have the common goal of denuclearizing

the Korean peninsula, he explained, but also the two

countries shared a similar strategy and even tactics.

Negotiators from both countries worked closely together,

even on the text for the agreement.

When he was asked, “What support will you have

that will keep this on track?” Hill replied that he had

tremendous support from Secretary of State

Condoleeza Rice. She kept on top of all the details

and he would be briefing her shortly on the recent

discussions. “I feel I’ve got a lot of support,” he said,

“and as long as I can show some results I’ll get more

support. Diplomatic negotiation is sort of like man-

aging a baseball game. As long as you win,

everyone’s happy.”

Hill emphasized that there would be the need to

keep the process moving and showing some prog-

ress.

When asked if he had been invited to visit North

Korea, Hill said that his counterpart had raised the

idea in a general sense but nothing specific had been

discussed as they focused on Beijing and the upcom-

ing round of Six-Party Talks.

With regard to how to manage the

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, Hill said

they discussed how to get experts in on the matter.

There would need to be some technical discussions.

It was a good step, Hill said, that Director General

Mohamed El-Baradei of the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) had been invited to North

Korea and was planning a trip soon.

Hill indicated that the problem with Banco Delta

Asia would be solved soon. The U.S. has committed

itself to find a solution within the first 30-day period.

Hill stressed that the historical background of

the particular situation with North Korea was impor-

tant to keep in mind and not to draw too many

analogies with other situations.

He compared the negotiations to someone

always pushing a rock uphill, and the rock always

seems to come down to the base of the hill. The

discussion he just had with Ambassador Kim, Hill

said, reflected the sense that “we can get through

this.” He had been encouraged by his counterpart to

look ahead.

Because the negotiators are getting to know each

other from so many different meetings, when issues

come up, they don’t need to reiterate points. That

way they are able to cover more ground.

The atmosphere in the room during the press

conference captured some of the excitement that the

negotiations between Hill and Kim were another step

toward the fulfillment of the September 2005

Six-Party agreement. This represents significant

activity toward the peaceful resolution of the hostil-

ity between the U.S. and North Korea that has

Page 14

lingered for the past 50 years, since the days of the

Korean war.

The above article article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=

c10400&no=348974&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on March 21, 2007]

North Korea’s $25 Million and

Banco Delta Asia

[Opinion] Another Abuse Under

the U.S. Patriot Act (2001)

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

A little known provision in the U.S. Patriot Act

(2001) has been used by the Bush administration against

North Korea to freeze $25 million dollars of its funds

and to deny it access to the international banking system

and to hard currency. Actions under this provision of the

Patriot Act effectively stymied progress in disarmament

talks between the U.S., North Korea, South Korea,

China, Russia and Japan for over 18 months. North

Korea says that only when the seized $25 million and

access to the international banking system are restored is

it willing to continue negotiations under the Six-Party

agreement concerning security and denuclearization of

the Korean peninsula.

The little known provision of the Patriot Act is

Section 311. It is also known as the “International

Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-

Terrorism Act of 2001.”

The original purpose was allegedly related to the

prevention, detection and prosecution of money launder-

ing connected to the financing of terrorism. The law has

rarely been used for its original purpose. Instead it has

been used by the Bush administration as a means of

unchecked political power against financial institutions

like the Banco Delta Asia. This case has an impact on

those nations or institutions who used the bank, like

North Korea.

Two other sections of the Patriot Act currently

under scrutiny, the use of the Patriot Act to illegally

obtain personal information on U.S. citizens, and the use

of a provision in the Patriot Act to replace U.S. Attor-

neys, have been identified as being used by the Bush

administration for expanding and abusing executive

power. Section 311 provides another means for

sidestepping international and national legal prac-

tices and substituting an ad hoc set of processes that

leave the victims with no means of due process or

defense.

Section 311 has been called by its supporters “a

diplomatic sledgehammer that gets results” and by

its critics a provision that denies the accused “due

process and presumes guilt.”

Critics say that this provision of the Patriot Act

applies U.S. law to the financial institutions of other

countries. In a proceeding under Section 311 of the

Patriot Act (2001) the U.S. Treasury Department acts

as accuser and judge, in international jurisdictions.

Also, often the evidence used by the Treasury De-

partment is classified and thus not available for

examination by the accused so that it can’t be re-

futed.

This provision gives the U.S. Treasury the

ability to use an Executive Branch administrative

procedure rather than a legal proceeding as a way to

accuse a financial institution that is part of another

nation’s regulatory system of wrong doing, and then

to find it guilty. Under this provision of the Patriot

Act, the accused is denied knowledge of the evi-

dence against it and is denied the right to speak in its

own defense. Section 311 of the Patriot Act (2001)

was used against the BDA, a small bank in Macau,

to freeze substantial financial assets of North Korea

and also to deny North Korea access to the interna-

tional banking system.

The case against the BDA

was instituted in September 2005 just after the U.S.

had signed the Six-Party agreement.

The accused under Section 311 is presumed to

be guilty and the burden falls on it to prove its

innocence without being able to know the evidence

or charges.

Invoking Section 311 against the BDA effec-

tively sabotaged the implementation of the Six-Party

agreement of September 2005 for 18 months as BDA

did not have a process to challenge the Treasury

Department action, nor did those whose accounts at

the bank had been frozen, like North Korea. It was

only after North Korea conducted a missile test in

July 2006 and the test of a nuclear device in October

2006, that the Bush administration was willing to

agree to negotiations over the Treasury action.

Negotiations in Berlin between the U.S. govern-

Page 15

ment and North Korea in January 2007 and then in

Beijing in February 2007 with the U.S., South Korea,

China, Russia and Japan, resulted in the Six-Party

agreement announced on Feb. 13, 2007.

The difference that most analysts point to in

comparing the Feb. 13 2007 Six-Party agreement with

the Six-Party agreement of September 2005 is that the

more recent agreement includes a series of processes and

a time table. The critical difference that has been over-

looked, however, is that a requirement of the Feb. 13

agreement was that the U.S. restore the funds that were

frozen by the actions of the U.S. Treasury Department.

Also North Korea’s access to the international financial

system was to be restored.

These requirements caused “intense friction” in

Washington between officials in the State Department

and “officials in the Treasury Department and in the

Office of Vice President Dick Cheney who were said to

favor maintaining maximum pressure” on North Korea.

There were reports of urgent telephone calls between

officials in the State Department and the Treasury.

Assistant Secretary of State John Negroponte finally got

a decision from the Treasury Department by Friday,

March 16. The Treasury Department had ruled against

the BDA. U.S. banks would not be allowed to do busi-

ness with it. The U.S. government announcement said

that it would be up to the Macau authorities to decide if

they would unfreeze and restore some or all of North

Korea’s funds.

By the weekend of March 17, a behind the scenes

drama continued to unfold. China announced that it

regretted the U.S. action. The owner of the Macao bank

said he would go to court to attempt to challenge the

decision. Getting off the plane in Beijing on Saturday to

attend the next stage of Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-gwan,

North Korea’s lead negotiator for the Six-Party Talks,

told reporters that all of the $25 million had to be

returned if North Korea was to go to the next step of the

Six-Party Talks.

Hill announced that he would explain the settlement

to the Chinese and North Korean negotiators. China

announced that a settlement had been reached but that

the details of it couldn’t yet be revealed. Subsequently,

there was an announcement that all of the $25 million in

funds would be returned to North Korea and deposited in

China in an account held by the North Korea’s Foreign

Trade Bank at the Bank of China in Beijing. U.S.

Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser, in a press conference

held with Hill, confirmed the U.S. government decision.

It was unknown he said, when the funds would actually

be put in the North Korean bank account.

Subsequently, diplomats who were in Beijing to

continue the Six-Party Talks told reporters that North

Korean diplomats said the funds had to be in the

bank account for them to continue with negotiations.

Though there have been many newspaper

articles reporting the standoff in the Six-Party Talks

caused by the dispute over the use of Section 311

against North Korea, few of the articles provide an

understanding of the underlying issues involved. A

commentator on BBC, for example, demonstrating a

serious lack of understanding of the use of Section

311 and the abuse of power it represents said this is

an example of the high price that North Korea will

extract for its cooperation in the talks.

It is not without cause then, that in describing

the process of the Six-Party Talks Hill compared the

process to a video game. He warned: “This process,

not unlike a video game gets more and more difficult

as you get to different levels.”

Notes:

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/Section301.html

2. “Treasury Casts a Wide Net Under Patriot Act”

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnist

s/kevin_g_hall/16889790.htm

3. “The U.S. government has never publicly detailed evidence

behind its charges. Nor has it sought to initiate legal action,

relying instead on Section 311 of the Patriot Act, which critics

say extends U.S. laws to cover other countries.” “Bush Admin-

istration Plan May Unfreeze North Korean Funds”

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnist

s/kevin_g_hall/16904105.htm

4. “Administration Reconsiders Some North Korea Restric-

tions”

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnist

s/warren_p_strobel/16554751.htm

5. “U.S., North Korea Move to Open Ties”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=348974&rel_no=1

The above article article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=351525&rel_no=1

Page 16

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on May 19, 2007]

Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia

Is the Policy Aimed at Targeting

China as Well as North Korea?

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill,

speaking at the Korea Society’s 50

Anniversary dinner

in New York City on May 15, said that he was deter-

mined not to “allow $26 million or $25 million get

between us and a deal that will finally do something

about nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.” He

promised that Kathleen Stephens at the Korea desk at the

State Department was working on the problem and that

“we are going to keep after this problem till we solve it.”

His statement didn’t give further details about how this

problem was to be solved, a problem that had interrupted

the progress that seemed at last possible in the Feb. 13

Six-Party agreement.

Just two days later, on May 17, the U.S. Wachovia

Bank announced that it is exploring a request from the

State Department to transfer the funds from the BDA

(Banco Delta Asia) to North Korea. Wachovia Bank

reported that it would require the necessary approvals

from bank regulators to do the transfer.

Until this latest announcement, banks have been

unwilling to do the transfer because of the legal action

that the U.S. government took against the BDA, by

ruling that it was involved in criminal activity under

Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. Banks which deal

with a bank that has been found guilty of such illegal

acts risk losing their access to the international financial

system. North Korea has said that the denuclearization

and other aspects of the Six-Party agreement that it has

been part of can only go forward when the BDA situa-

tion is resolved. “To make the money transfer possible

freely just like before has been our demand…from the

beginning,” a spokesperson from North Korea said.

In his daily press briefing on May 17, Scott

McCormack at the U.S. State Department said, “We all

want to see the BDA issue resolved, obviously resolved

within the laws and regulations of the United States as

well as the international financial system, and we’d like

to move on and get back to the business of the Six-Party

Talks, which is really focused on the issue of

denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether this latest development with Wachovia

Bank will provide the needed breakthrough, it is too

soon to tell. But there are other developments which

may provide the needed pressures on the U.S. gov-

ernment to decriminalize the $25 million it has

frozen of North Korean funds and restore North

Korea’s access to the international banking system.

Their access was severely impeded by the action that

the U.S. Treasury Department took against the BDA.

The developments I am referring to are the

release in the public domain of several documents

related to the U. S. Treasury Department’s actions

against BDA. One of the documents is a sworn

statement by the owner of the BDA, Mr. Stanley Au,

in support of his petition to revoke the rule imposing

the special measures taken by the U.S. Treasury

Department against his bank. Another document is

the petition in support of his case. Also the Treasury

Department finding against the bank has been put

online. These documents have been made available

on the blog “China Matters.”

In his statement, Au explains the history of his

bank’s relations with North Korea and how there was

only one experience, which occurred in June 1994,

when there was a problem with counterfeit U.S.

dollars. At the time, the bank reported this incident

to the U.S. government. Agents from the U.S. gov-

ernment came to the bank and questioned Au. He

answered their questions and asked if the agents

recommended that the bank “desist from doing

business with North Korean entities.” The agents

said “they would like us to continue to deal with

them as it was better that we conducted this business

than another financial entity that may not be so

cooperative with the United States government.”

Au explains that there was no further experience

with counterfeit money showing up in the transac-

tions of the bank. All “large value deposits of U.S.

dollar bills from North Korean sources” were sent to

the Hong Kong branch of the Republic National

Bank of New York (which became HSBC) to be

certified that they were authentic via advanced

technology possessed by that bank. Smaller quanti-

ties of bills were examined in accord with common

banking practices by the bank itself.

Au also explains that he had not been

approached by U.S. government agents alerting him

to any problem or illegal activity. The first he

learned that his bank was being charged as a bank

Page 17

engaged in “illicit activities” came when he saw a report

in the Asian Wall Street Journal in September 2005 that

his bank was a candidate for a U.S. money laundering

blacklist. He tells how “this news came as a bolt out of

the blue – the Bank had never been informed by the

United States that its practices were a cause of any

money laundering concern, and the counterfeiting event

that the media reported as the basis for the designation

had occurred more than ten years earlier and had been

promptly reported to the authorities by Banco Delta

Asia.”

Stanley Au’s statement is in sharp contrast with the

account in the U.S. government’s Federal Register of the

finding against the bank by the U.S. Treasury Depart-

ment.

The Federal Register finding states that the bank had

provided financial services for more than 20 years to

multiple North Korean-related individuals and entities

that were engaged in illicit activities. It provides no

specific details of what such illicit activities were. It

claims that the entities paid a fee to Banco Delta Asia for

their access to the bank. The finding claims that the bank

facilitated wire transfers and helped a front company.

In his statement, Stanley Au maintained that the

BDA did not charge a fee for its services nor did it

conduct illicit services for North Korea or any other

customer. The bank was only one of the banks in Macau

that did business with North Korea. The business his

bank had with North Korea began in the mid 1970s and

was to assist North Korea with its foreign trade transac-

tions. Also Au described North Korea as a gold produc-

ing country and that in the late 1990s the bank had acted

as a “gold bullion trader on behalf of the North Kore-

ans”. Also the BDA bought or sold foreign currency

notes for North Korea, including U.S. dollars, because

North Korea had a limited banking system and so it

couldn’t do such transactions itself (see Statement, pp.

3-4).

The petition submitted to the U.S. Dept of the

Treasury to challenge the finding against BDA proposes

that BDA was targeted not because of any “voluminous”

evidence of money laundering but “because it was an

easy target in the sense that it was not so large that its

failure would bring down the financial system.”

In the substantial and prolific analysis of the BDA

problem that has been developed on the blog “China

Matters”, there is the assessment that North Korea has

legitimate financial activity and that the BDA was

legitimately serving as one of the banks for that activity.

Even with the U.N.’s sanctions, it was not appropriate to

target for blacklisting the legitimate financial activi-

ties of North Korea. The sanctions that the

U.N.-imposed against North Korea were to be aimed

at its activity that was related to nuclear weapon

development, not to normal financial transactions.

The author of China Matters blog writes

“The alternative view…is that legitimate North

Korean financial activity does exist, BDA had a

right to solicit North Korean accounts and

handle North Korean transactions, and Stanley

Au should be allowed to run his bank as long as

he conforms to the laws of his jurisdiction--and

(the bank) not be used as a political football in

Washington’s dealings with Pyongyang.”

To put it more succinctly, the blog China Mat-

ters quotes David Ascher, who had been the coordi-

nator for the Bush Administration working group on

North Korea and a senior adviser in East Asian

affairs in the State Department, in testimony to the

U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Ter-

rorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on April 18,

2007, explaining why Banco Delta was chosen to be

blacklisted from the international banking system

“Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We were

trying to kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.

And the monkeys were big Chinese banks doing

business in North Korea…and we’re not talking

about tens of millions, we’re talking hundreds of

millions.”

The purpose of the action against the BDA

appears not only to have been to target North Korea

and its access to the international banking system,

but also to send a message to China.

Therefore it would appear that the action against

BDA is a carefully crafted political action and that it

will be necessary that there be public understanding,

discussion and debate about what is behind this

action in order to find a way to have the policy that

gave rise to the BDA action changed.

Instead of the U.S. mainstream press carrying

out the needed investigation about why BDA has

been targeted and what is behind this action, there

have been continual condemnations of North Korea.

Fortunately there are journalists like those who work

with the McClatchy News Service who have made

an effort to probe what is happening behind-the-

scenes in the BDA affair and blogs like China

Matters which have taken the time and care to begin

uncovering what the BDA affair is really all about.

This is but one of the stories of what is really going

Page 18

on behind the scenes within the U.S. government that

has been hidden from the public. This is one of the

stories yet to be unraveled by bloggers, and citizen

journalists.

Notes:

1. See earlier article “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Asia.”

http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?menu

=A11100&no=351525&rel_no=1&back_url=%3Cbr%3E

2. “North Korea says work to transfer bank funds under way,” AFP,

May 15, 2007

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/27

6391/1/.html

(3) Scott McCormack, Daily Press Briefing, Washington DC, May

17, 2007

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/may/85132.htm

4. “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations.”

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-c

ase-for-banco.html%3Cbr%3E

5. Statement of Mr. Stanley Au in Support of Petition to Revoke

Rule Imposing Special Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, p. 7.

http://www.fileden.com/files/2007/5/15/1081304/Statement_of_St

anley_Au.PDF

See also Kevin G. Hall, “Bank owner disputes money-laundering

allegations,” McClatchy Newspapers, May 16, 2007.

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17236073.htm

6. Department of the Treasury, 31 CFR Part 103/ RIN 1506-AA83,

Federal Register/ Vol 72, No. 52/ Monday, March 19, 2007/ Rules

and Regulations.

http://www.fileden.com/files/2007/5/15/108134/bda_final_rule%5

B1%5D.pdf

7. Petition of Mr. Stanley Au and Delta Asia Group (Holdings) Ltd.

to Rescind Final Rule, p. 12.

http://www.fileden.com/files/2007/5/15/1081304/Petition_to_Res

cind_Final_Rule.pdf

8. “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia,” Tuesday,

May 15, 2007

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-c

ase-for-banco.html%3Cbr%3E

9. “David Asher’s Dead End,” Saturday, April 28, 2007

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-end.

html

See also “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its role

in addressing the nuclear and missile situations in both nations,”

Hearing, Sept 14, 2006, Nov. 2006, p. 115-116.

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/sept_14/0

6_09_14_trans.pdf

10. Ronda Hauben, “Bill Moyers and the Emergence of U.S. Citizen

Journalism: Power of government creates need for investigative

news.”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/%3Cbr%3Ehttp://englis

h.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=360069&rel_n

o=1

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=

c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on June 24, 2007]

Weapons of Mass

Destruction Syndrome

and the Press

[Analysis] How Does One Prove a

Negative?

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

April 5, 2006. Congressman Ron Paul (Texas)

makes a speech “Iran: The Next Neo-con Target.”

He reviews the scenario of how the invasion of Iraq

was prepared in the U.S. “We demand that Iran

prove it is not in violation of nuclear agreements,

which is asking them impossibly to prove a nega-

tive,” Paul observes.

Mohamed ElBareidei, the IAEA Director, Paul

explains, has supported Iran’s contention that it has

been in compliance with its rights under the nuclear

Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) IAEA safeguard

agreement.

What have we learned from the experience in

Iraq, Paul asks?

Four years have passed since the U.S. govern-

ment mobilized much of the U.S. press to create the

“spin” which provided a pretext for the March 2003

invasion of Iraq. The U.S. government accused Iraq

of having “Weapons of Mass Destruction.” How

could Iraq prove they didn’t have any of a whole

catalogue of things that they were accused of hav-

ing? There was no way for Iraq to disprove the

accusations. Thus much of the U.S. press, in cooper-

ation with various U.S. government officials, used

the impossibility of proving a negative to create a

media environment in which the U.S. government

could falsely claim they had a justification for a war

against Iraq.

Fast forward to April 18, 2007. The same U.S.

Congressman’s comments seem like a lone voice of

reason during a hearing in a U.S. House of Represen-

tatives Foreign Affairs subcommittee about how to

craft financial sanctions against North Korea and

Iran.

In this hearing, the witnesses and some of the

Page 19

Congressmen discuss what they claim is the great

success that the sanctions against North Korea have

been. They review how the U.S. Treasury Department

froze $25 million of North Korea’s funds in a bank

account at the Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in

Macau China. The action by the U.S. Treasury Depart-

ment against this bank resulted in North Korea losing

access to the international banking system. David Asher,

one of the witnesses, tells how he was part of a team

carefully planning such consequences of an action taken

by the U.S. Treasury Department under Section 311 of

the U.S. Patriot Act.

Asher acknowledges that he was involved in insti-

gating investigations against North Korea in a whole

variety of law enforcement entities.

“Sanctions are an act of war,” Congressman Paul

inserts into the hearing.

They mostly harm innocent

citizens, he points out and they are used by governments

preparing the population of their country to accept a war.

The Chair of the hearing wonders aloud whether such

sanctions hurt the people of a country versus whether

they bring regime change.

This hearing and other U.S. government activities

demonstrate that the U.S. Treasury Department’s action

against Banco Delta Asia was a carefully prepared

political act calculated to accomplish a political end.

was not an unintended consequence of some legitimate

legal process. It was not the result of a judicial process

which gathered evidence, made allegations, presented its

evidence and rendered a decision by an impartial judge

based on the evidence. Instead the Treasury Department

was the accuser and the judge and never presented any

evidence. The accused was automatically declared

guilty. Even after the guilty verdict there were few

avenues available to challenge the whole procedure. The

blacklisting of the Banco Delta Asia and of North Korea

from the international banking system was done with no

due process procedure.

It is therefore all the more revealing to see the many

press accounts which accepted that North Korea was

guilty of crimes and was unreasonable in turning to its

sovereign right to self defense. Similarly it is revealing

to see how most of the U.S. media treat Iran’s right to

develop and operate nuclear enrichment technology for

peaceful purposes. Zbigniew Brzezinski, appearing on

the Charlie Rose show on Friday, June 15, acknowl-

edged that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) Iran has the right to the peaceful development of

nuclear technology and hence to do nuclear enrichment

for nuclear energy production.

Yet much of the U.S. media, to the contrary,

pronounces Iran guilty of producing nuclear weapons

though there is no proof that this is true. It is left to

Iran to prove it isn’t true, something which would

not be possible for any country to do.

Just as the New York Times and other U.S.

media unswervingly presented the accusations

against Iraq in the run up to the Iraq war, so similar

press reports abound accusing North Korea of illicit

activity and Iran of preparing to produce nuclear

weapons. It is up to the accused to disprove the

accusations, despite the fact that no evidence has

been presented to support the accusations.

There is no way to prove a negative. That is why

the legal system is premised on the obligation of the

accuser to present the evidence of a crime and the

accused is presumed to be innocent until proven

guilty. In the reversal of these norms, however, the

accuser makes unsubstantiated allegations and much

of the mainstream media repeats the allegations,

without any investigation to determine if there is any

factual basis for the allegations.

Thus much of the U.S. media has become

complicit in carefully preparing the court of public

opinion against the countries the U.S. government

has labeled as part of the so called “axis of evil.”

Judith Miller was a New York Times reporter

who reported unsubstantiated allegations accusing

Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction.

When she was confronted with the proof that her

stories were false but were used to create a pretext

for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, she responded that she

wasn’t an intelligence agent who was able to deter-

mine what was true or false. A journalist, however,

has an obligation to present the public with accurate

information, contrary to Miller’s protestations to the

contrary.

What is the significance of such drumbeats for

war being orchestrated so freely? With regard to the

Banco Delta Asia accusations, there are a few excep-

tions to the general acceptance by much of the media

of unsubstantiated allegations. Publications like the

McClatchy publications, OhmyNews International,

and some blogs like China Matters have provided

articles challenging the dominant media barrage.

Similarly, there are a few publications presenting the

right of Iran to peaceful development of nuclear

energy under the NPT and the fact that there is no

proof for the allegation that it is developing nuclear

weapons. These publications include Seymour

Page 20

Hersh’s articles in the New Yorker Magazine and Herb

Blix’s recent book Target Iran: The Truth about the

White House’s Plans for Regime Change (Nation Books,

2006) .

Why haven’t more of the U.S. media devoted

resources to investigate the actual circumstances of the

allegations being so freely and doggedly circulated by

U.S. government officials to back up their political

objectives against North Korea and Iran?

The group known as the White House Iraq Group,

a group created inside the White House itself, conducted

a campaign to spread the case for an attack on Iraq and

to discredit critics of its pro war propaganda.

The growing online community of citizens in the

U.S. challenged the White House and mainstream

media’s drumbeats for war. The online community was

a force, though not strong enough to prevent the war

against Iraq.

The strategy of the White House to involve the

mainstream media in the process of creating a false set

of allegations in order to prepare the population for a war

has been exposed in the aftermath of the invasion of

Iraq. Historically and currently in the U.S. there is a need

for a press that challenges such government propaganda

campaigns and provides the needed questioning and

debate on vital issues of public policy. Part of the vision

inspiring the birth of the Internet was that the Internet

would make possible more political participation of the

citizens in the critical issues of the day.

Whether the

online community of netizens can succeed in building

the kind of investigatory press so critically needed in the

U.S. is a challenge still to be met.

Notes:

1. See Paul’s speech

http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2006/cr040506.htm

2. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-

proliferation, and Trade, April 18, 2007, Isolating Proliferators and

Sponsors of Terror: The Use of Sanctions and the International

Financial System to Change Regime Behavior

3. “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia” [Opinion]

Another abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act(2001)

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article

_class=3&no=351525&rel_no=1

4. Webcast of April 18, 2007 hearing (17:30)

http://boss.streamos.com/real/international/56_tn041807.smi

5. “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed

at targeting China as well as North Korea?”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article

_class=13&no=362192&rel_no=1

6. McClatchy publications:

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/kevin_hall/story/16472.html

China Matters

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-

end.html

OhmyNews International: See for example

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1&back_url=

and

http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?

menu=A11100&no=351525&rel_no=1&back_url=

7. “Heat Is On for CIA Leak Probe Prosecutor”:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?ar

ticle_class=3&no=253530&rel_no=1

With his Grand Jury term about to expire, Washington is

wondering if Patrick Fitzgerald will indict

8. “Citizen Model for the Study of the Internet”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=296646&rel_no=1

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=368433&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: June 30, 2007 marked the first six

months that Ban Ki-moon has held the position as

Secretary-General of the United Nations. The fol-

lowing article is an effort to look at the role of the

Secretary General and some of the challenges he

faces. The article appeared in two parts on

OhmyNews International , June 30, 2007 and July 4,

2007]

Ban Ki-Moon’s Role of

U.N. Secretary General

Ronda Hauben Asks if There

is a Guiding Vision in the

Organization

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

Part 1

Introduction

Ban Ki-moon’s nomination by the Security

Council to be the 8th Secretary General of the United

Nations was sent to the General Assembly on Oct.

13, 2006. Ban succeeded in winning the nomination

after a difficult and contested campaign.

But his trial

by fire was only just beginning. Ban had succeeded

in winning the votes of China and of the U.S. Win-

Page 21

ning the votes of these two nations, who are permanent

members of the Security Council, was seen by a number

of commentators as the critical step needed to win the

nomination for Secretary General.

Would this very achievement, especially the

achievement of winning the vote of the U.S. government

in the Security Council, become a handicap that would

negatively affect Ban’s ability to succeed in the position

as the 8th Secretary General of the United Nations?

Goals Expressed in Hankyoreh Interview

An interview with Ban Ki-moon on Oct. 30, 2006,

shortly after Ban won appointment by the General

Assembly as the new Secretary General, and in the

interval before he would assume the office in January

2007, offers a rare glimpse of how the

soon-to-be-appointed Secretary General viewed his

hopes and goals for his new position.

The interview was conducted in the offices of the

Korean newspaper Hankyoreh, by Moon Chung-in, a

Professor at Yonsei University and an Envoy for Interna-

tional Stability.

The interview was done in Korean, and

translated and published in the English edition of

Hankyoreh. The goals Ban outlined in this interview

provide a yardstick to measure how successfully he is in

fulfilling the obligations of his new position.

In the interview, Ban describes a recent visit to the

White House shortly after he won the appointment as

Secretary General. President Bush greeted him as “Mr.

Landslide” congratulating him on his victory. The plan

had been for Ban to see Steve Hadley, the U.S. National

Security Advisor and if time permitted, to briefly meet

Bush. Instead he spoke with Bush for more than 20

minutes.

Ban recounts how he and Bush spoke about U.N.

reform and the North Korean nuclear program. “Bush,”

Ban says, “requested that I drive forth with U.N. re-

forms, assuring me that the U.S. would actively lend its

support.” In the interview, Bush promised to work with

the South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to peacefully

resolve the North Korean nuclear problem.

Ban also visited China. He describes his meeting

with the Chinese President Hu Jintao on this visit. Hu

told Ban that “the role of a newly appointed Secretary

General is very important and that China would be of

active assistance.” Ban revealed that during his cam-

paign for the nomination, China “could not make public

its support,” but that it had “actively helped out behind

the scenes.” Though it is not yet apparent how China’s

support for Ban’s nomination affects Ban’s actions as

Secretary General, U.S. support for Ban’s nomina-

tion appears to have a significant effect on his

activity as Secretary General.

During the Hankyoreh interview Ban expressed

a belief he has reiterated many times since, that the

U.S. is “the U.N.’s most important member.” Ban

proposed that the U.N. needed the “proactive partici-

pation” of the U.S. in order to function properly, just

as he believed the U.S. needed the U.N. for its

interests.

Also during the interview, Ban expressed his

commitment as Secretary General to work to help

resolve the problems with North Korea. “I will

appoint a politician or diplomat,” he asserted, “with

the confidence of the international community,

someone who has the trust of both North and South

Korea to actively push the issue forward. This en-

voy,” he explained, “must be one to impel the

Six-Party Talks to action when they stagnate, and

must be prepared to play a direct role when neces-

sary. I am ever ready to intervene directly when

intervention is called for.” Ban also proposed that the

U.N. had to find a means to help with transforming

the cease-fire that was signed by the U.S. and North

Korea at the end of the Korean War into a more

permanent peace agreement.

Ban promised to present a blueprint for what he

hoped to accomplish in his first 100 days, in his first

year, and in his five year term. His priority, he

explained, would be in the appointments he would

make for U.N. personnel and that these would “raise

morale and cultivate professionalism.”

Ban’s goal at the end of his five year term or ten

years if he were to win reappointment for a second

term, would be “to create a U.N. reborn as an organi-

zation that enjoys much greater international confi-

dence. I will make the U.N. into a body fit for the

challenges and themes of the 21

century,” he

promised. To obtain this objective, he proposed to

support “development”, especially, “development in

Africa and the Millennium Development Plan.” His

aim would be to “make certain that the U.N. has a

role at the center of multilateral diplomacy.”

In the interview, Ban also describes how Roh

Moo-hyun and the South Korean press helped his

candidacy to succeed by “campaigning for me at

every opportunity while meeting with foreign heads

of state.” The South Korean media “also helped a

great deal,” Ban notes. Ban was aware, too, that it

was a particular source of pride for Korea that the 8

Page 22

Secretary General would be from Korea.

Comments on Ban’s 100-day Anniversary

By Ban’s 100 day anniversary, April 10, media

commentary on his accomplishments documented the

frustration he had experienced. Comments from several

diplomats were testimony to the mistakes made as he

and his advisors rushed to put their reform agenda into

effect.

The Chinese Ambassador to the U.N., Wong

Guangya commented on how Ban tried to impose

changes in the structure of the U.N. Secretariat, only to

meet opposition from a number of countries, observes,

“His intentions are good. He is trying to make the

Secretariat work more effectively. But personally I feel

he’s a new comer and he does not understand the culture

and the environment in this house. You have to identify

who are the stakeholders and how to test the temperature

before jumping in. He hasn’t done that and he has felt

the heat.”

Similarly, South African Ambassador Dumisani

Kumalo is quoted as being frustrated by Ban’s “‘decide

first, consult afterward’ behavior.”

Even the American Ambassador, Alejandro D.

Wolff, who originally replaced John Bolton, said that

there were those “convinced that Ban was ‘essentially

responding to American demands.’”

This impression,

Wolff explained, helped to generate distrust in the

reforms Ban is trying to implement.

Role of Secretary General

The role of Secretary General has a number of

constraints. It also is a role that carries certain obliga-

tions. During his inauguration, Ban took an oath that he

would uphold the interests of the United Nations above

any national interests and “not to seek or accept instruc-

tions in regard to the performance of my duties from any

government or other authority external to the Organiza-

tion.”

In a “Report to the Preparatory Commission of the

U.N. 23 Dec 1945,” a set of duties and responsibilities

are elaborated as a means of stating what is explicit and

implicit in the Secretary General’s role as provided for

by the U.N. charter.

While the Report specifies administrative and

executive functions for the Secretary General, it also

states that “He is the channel of all communication with

the United Nations in any of its organs. He must en-

deavor, within the scope of his functions, to integrate the

activity of the whole complex of United Nations

organs and see that the machine runs smoothly and

effectively.”

Along with the obligation for internal smooth

functioning of the U.N., the report proposes an

external function. It says, “the Secretary General,

more than anyone else, will stand for the United

Nations as a whole. In the eyes of the world, no less

than the eyes of his own staff, he must embody the

principles and ideals of the charter to which the

organization seeks to give effect.”

Elements for Creating a Vision

Shashi Tharoor, one of the other candidates for

the nomination by the Security Council for the

position of Secretary General maintained that ema-

nating from the job description for the Secretary

General that each Secretary General wrote for

himself, “must shine the vision of the incumbent of

the office,” a vision which transcends the more

practical aspects of the job.

Describing the nature of the job, Tharoor pro-

posed that what was needed was a person with the

ability and talent to respond to a wide range of issues

“and to know where to go for expert judgment when

he or she feels unqualified or uninformed on specific

issues. Somebody who recognizes he does not have

all the answers but trusts himself to ask the right

questions.”

Tharoor, who had worked at the U.N. for almost

28 years, said that for him the U.N. was more than a

job. “It has always been a cause…. For me the U.N.

is far more than an institution…. It represents the

vision and foresight of the leaders of the world who

wanted to make the second half of the twentieth

century better than the first.”

He described how the

U.N. was formed in response to a world that had

experienced two world wars, a number of civil wars,

several instances of mass population displacements,

genocide, the holocaust, and Hiroshima. “The U.N.

was part of an attempt to genuinely make a better

world and I believe for all its limitations and failures,

it did succeed in doing so,” he noted.

When Ban outlined the beginning elements for

the new role he was to assume in the Hankyoreh

interview, he planned for the U.N. to play a construc-

tive role in helping to facilitate the Six-Party Talks

between North Korea, South Korea, China, the U.S.,

Japan, and Russia. He had expressed his determina-

tion to appoint an envoy to help overcome obstacles

Page 23

that might impede the Six-Party process. This provided

an example of a goal he was bringing to his new role at

the U.N. How he would carry out this goal would be a

concrete sign of whether he could be guided by a vision

for his role as Secretary General.

Part 2

Impact of the Press

How has the role of the press affected the actions of

the new Secretary General? There is an important

example that has developed which helps to demonstrate

the impact that the press has had on Ban Ki-moon.

In the interview with Hankyoreh before he took

office,

Ban described how he would act to support a

solution to the problem of relations between North Korea

and the Northeast Asia region, and the disarmament of

the Korean peninsula.

On January 19, 2007, just a few weeks after Ban

became Secretary General, there were news reports of a

breakthrough in negotiations between the Christopher

Hill for the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan for North Korea.

The International Herald Tribune reported

“The movement toward a possible breakthrough

came during the talks in Berlin between Hill and Kim,

Chosun Ilbo reported, citing unidentified officials in

Seoul and Beijing.”

Timed, it appeared, to coincide with the break-

through, however, was the publication in the Wall Street

Journal (WSJ) of an article “United Nations Dictator’s

Program” by Melanie Kirkpatrick. A similar article was

published by Fox News. These articles alleged that North

Korea was manipulating funds from the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) in North Korea. These

press accounts reported that UNDP funds were being

used by Kim Jong-il, for whatever he wanted, including

“his weapons program.”

No proof was provided for this

accusation. The articles included other unsupported

allegations.

While most of the press reports in the U.S. just

repeated or exaggerated the original allegations, a few

Korean publications provided a different perspective.

The Korean newspaper Voice of the People pointed out

that the allegations of UNDP mismanagement appeared

just as the North Korean and U.S. representatives had

had productive negotiations in Berlin.

The Voice of the

People asked why the U.S. Mission to the U.N. was

raising these issues “at this time.”

“Despite the totally unfounded allegation by the

hawks,” the editors write, “it has a political effect for

freezing (the) bilateral relationship between Wash-

ington and Pyongyang.”

Ban Ki-moon’s response to the WSJ and Fox

News articles was to call immediately for an audit of

all U.N. programs. The audit was to start with an

audit of all programs in North Korea. A few days

later the call for an audit of all U.N. programs was

dropped. The audit was to be only of North Korea’s

UNDP program.

Some Background

A difficult period for Ban’s predecessor, Secre-

tary General Kofi Annan was caused by the “Oil for

Food Scandal.” Annan had refused to support a U.S.

backed Security Council resolution authorizing an

invasion of Iraq. Annan held that such an invasion

would be a violation of the U.N.’s charter. Reports

say that in response, right wing neoconservatives in

the U.S. government brought forward accusations

that there had been corruption in the U.N.’s adminis-

tration of the “Oil for Food” program.

This pro-

gram had been created by the Security Council

supposedly to alleviate some of the harmful effects

on civilians of the Security Council sanctions against

Iraq.

While the “Oil for Food Scandal” investigation

recommended systemic reforms, there was little

evidence of corrupt activity by members of the U.N.

Secretariat. The investigation created, however, a

difficult environment for Annan and other U.N.

officials.

When the WSJ articles appeared in January 2007

alleging corruption in the UNDP program, they

brought up memories of the difficult situation cre-

ated for the U.N. during the “Oil for Food Scandal.”

South Korean Press Responses to Alle-

gations

Several articles appeared in the South Korean

press which analyzed rather than just repeating the

allegations of mismanagement in the UNDP program

in North Korea. One article in JoongAng Ilbo on

January 22, for example, described what happened

after the news reports appeared on January 19. Ban

met with the Associate Administrator of the UNDP,

Ad Melkert, and “vowed a thorough investigation.”

The JoongAng Ilbo article, in addition, however,

noted that this accusation came at a “sensitive time

Page 24

in negotiations” between the U.S. and North Korea.

The article also noted that this action by the UNDP

“might be considered another financial sanction by

Washington against North Korea just as the six party

anti-nuclear talks were expected to resume.” The report-

ers reminded readers that the “financial sanctions

brought by the U.S. treasury office on Banco Delta Asia

which led to freezing $24 million of North Korean

funds” had become a “major sticking point” causing a

deadlock in the Six-Party Talks.

Similarly, the article in Voice of the People on

January 30, 2007, asked, “Now we have to see who’s

intriguing against whom because somebody is suffering

from pain for it. We should not listen to the shameless

and unscrupulous who are trying to curtail humanitarian

aid for those who are in need of food.”

An article in OhmyNews International (OMNI) and

a report by the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea

(Peacekorea) explain that UNDP administrators had

denied that there were violations of UNDP policy in the

North Korean program.

Both articles referred to the

fact that the Resident Coordinator of the UNDP Program

in North Korea had the authority to decide the financial

practices to follow. Another report by Peacekorea noted

many people think that Ban is “kind of pro American.”

Peacekorea advocated support for restarting the

Six-Party Talks and not letting the U.S. accusations

against North Korea divert from support for the unifica-

tion of the Korean peninsula. Such a policy is presented

as a long term vision. Also the report explains that

development aid to North Korea is preferable to humani-

tarian aid, as development aid sets a basis for self

sufficiency, while humanitarian aid is expended after it

is given.

The Six-Party Talks did resume and came to an

agreement on February 13, 2007. Peacekorea offered a

critique of the conservative South Korean newspapers

which “made comments devaluing the agreement.”

The

report explained, “Korea’s major newspapers spread a

hostile perspective of North Korea on the Korean

peninsula. This is not helpful toward gaining

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” The report

proposes that “Under Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship, North

Korea, a weak nation, has developed nuclear weapons as

a deterrent against the threat of an American attack, as

exemplified by the Iraq war, and as a diplomatic tool for

bilateral contact with the U.S.”

Alternative Approach to Ban’s Policy on

Korea

Such accounts in the South Korean press dem-

onstrate an alternative approach to the policy that the

Secretary General is implementing regarding the

North Korean situation. For now Ban is not carrying

out the policy he had proposed in the Hankyoreh

interview with regard to the Korean peninsula. To

the contrary, coinciding with pressure from the U.S.

press and the U.S. government, he has adopted a

policy which has allowed the politicization of the

UNDP program that was in North Korea. This has

resulted in an audit of previous UNDP programs in

North Korea and the ending of the current UNDP

program in North Korea.

Similarly, for more than four months, from

February through the end of June, the Six-Party

Talks hit a deadlock over the decision by the U.S.

government to find a small bank in Macau in viola-

tion of provisions in the U.S. Patriot Act. The bank

complained that it never saw the evidence against it

nor did it have a chance to refute the evidence.

Yet

by using Section 311 of the Patriot Act against this

bank, the U.S. Treasury Department was able to

freeze $25 million of North Korean funds and

impede North Korea’s access to the international

banking system.

Much of the U.S. press has been promoting a

hostile policy toward North Korea.

Some of the

South Korean press echo what appears in the U.S.

press, or reprint articles from the conservative

interests who are trying to impede further negotia-

tions. Other South Korean publications, however,

provide a critique of the hostile attitude of the U.S.

press toward North Korea. For example, an article by

Tim Savage in OMNI documents the internal strug-

gle within the U.S. government between the interests

which are hostile to negotiations with North Korea in

contrast to the efforts at negotiations by Christopher

Hill.

Though he has occupied the office of Secretary

General for over six months, Ban has yet to imple-

ment the program he proposed before taking office,

the program of active U.N. support for a negotiated

agreement in the Six-Party Talks. Ban’s original plan

was to appoint a diplomat or politician who would be

available to intervene when needed to keep the

negotiation process on track. Instead the U.N.’s

Secretariat has become embroiled in the controversy

Page 25

generated by unsubstantiated charges from the U.S.

mission to the U.N. about the UNDP funding of North

Korea’s UNDP program.

‘We Can’t Prove a Negative’

The U.S. press continues to echo the U.S. govern-

ment’s unsubstantiated charges against North Korea and

the UNDP, in a way reminiscent of how the same press

supported the unsubstantiated and inaccurate U.S.

government claims that Iraq possessed “Weapons of

Mass Destruction”. The unsubstantiated allegations

being spread by the U.S. press about the UNDP, have the

effect of politicizing the UNDP program rather than

providing the public with the accurate information that

is needed to understand the problems and challenges

faced by such a program.

David Morrison, the press spokesman for the

UNDP, explained that “the point I’m trying to make is

we can’t prove a negative,”

at a press conference held

to answer the June 2007 set of unsubstantiated allega-

tions made by the U.S. mission against the UNDP

program in North Korea. This set of allegations appeared

in the U.S. press just before the beginning of the June

UNDP Executive Board meeting in a way reminiscent of

how the previous set of allegations first appeared in the

U.S. press just before the January UNDP Executive

Board meeting.

Just as the impossibility of proving a negative

created a media environment in which the U.S. govern-

ment could falsely claim they had a justification for a

war against Iraq, so a hostile environment is being

created to impede the Six-Party Talks by the unsubstanti-

ated allegations against North Korea and the UNDP.

Ban’s original plan for the region provided a means

to counter those interests which might impede a negoti-

ated solution to the North Korean conflict. Much of the

U.S. press has maintained a hostile attitude toward North

Korea, even though there are signs that within the U.S.

government there are forces interested in pursuing a

negotiated settlement. The South Korean media land-

scape, however, presents a broader spectrum of opinion

on what should be done with regard to North Korea, a

spectrum of views which includes support for the policy

that Ban originally proposed to implement for the region

when he became Secretary General.

Conclusion

There are many people in Korea and elsewhere, who

are watching Ban Ki-moon and are hopeful that he will

do good as Secretary General. As the experience of

former Secretaries General demonstrates, however,

there is a need for a vision to guide him if he is to be

able to fulfill on these expectations.

Notes:

1. See for example: Ayca Arlyoruk, “Korean Minister Likely

Candidate to Replace Kofi Annan, but Will the General

Assembly Approve?”, UNA-USA

http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=

2116545

Ban was chosen as Secretary General in a process that is

basically secret with voting by the members of the Security

Council that is not public. The five Permanent members hold

the ability to veto a candidate at a certain stage in the process.

Questions have been raised about what criteria are used and

what is traded with whom is left as an open question.

Also there were allegations that the South Korean govern-

ment used grants and various financial rewards to gain support

for its candidate from several of the nonpermanent nations that

were on the Security Council at the time of the voting for the

next Secretary General. See for example:

Richard Beeston, Richard Lloyd Parry, and James Bone,

“Millions of dollars and a piano may put Korean in U.N.’s top

job”, Times Online, September 29, 2006

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6544

79.ece

Tran Van Loi, “ROK Buying U.N. Post: Times Millions

of dollars have been spent in lobbying for Ban ki-moon, says

British newspaper”, OhmyNews International. October 1, 2006

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=320700&rel_no=1

2. See for example, “Restoring the Vitality of the United

Nations”

http://www.cfr.org/publication/10833/restoring_the_vitality_

of_the_united_nations_rush_transcript_federal_news_service

_inc.html

3. [Interview] Next U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. in

conversation with Moon Chung-in, translated by Daniel

Rakove, The Hankyoreh. November 3, 2006.

http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=169339

4. Maggie Farley, “New Secretary General Is Still Finding His

Footing at the U.N.”, LA Times, April 9, 2007

http://www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/ban/2007/0409footing.htm

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ronda Hauben, “Ban Ki-moon Inaugurated, Pledges to

uphold the interests of the United Nations above all else”,

OhmyNews International, December 15, 2006.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=334916&rel_no=1

8. “Report to the Preparatory Commission of the U.N. 23 Dec

1945,” in Secretary or General: The U.N. Secretary-General in

World Politics?, edited by Simon Chesterman, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 243-244

9. Ibid., p. 245

10. Shashi Tharoor, in Secretary or General: The U.N. Secre-

tary-General in World Politics?, edited by Simon Chesterman,

Page 26

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 46.

11. Lydia Swart, “Shashi Tharoor Sees his 28 Years at the United

Nations as an Asset”, Center for U.N. Reform Education, interview

done 12 July 2006.

http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/61/print

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14.[Interview] Next U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. in

conversation with Moon Chung-in, translated by Daniel Rakove,

The Hankyoreh. November 3, 2006.

http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=169339

15. “U.S.-DPRK talks end, no comments on resuming 6-party talks”,

CCTV.com Jan 19, 2007,

http://www.cctv.com/english/20070119/101358.shtml

16. “U.S. envoy confident in North Korea nuclear talks”, Interna-

tional Herald Tribune, January 22, 2007

http://www.cctv.com/english/20070119/101358.shtml

17. Melanie Kirkpatrick, “United Nations Dictator’s Program”, WSJ,

January 19, 2007.

18. “The U.S. Stands in the Way of Pyongyang”, Voice of the

People, January 30, 2007.

19. Ibid.

20. Ronda Hauben, “Hardliners Attack UNDP Aid to North

Korea:Allegations of corruption seen as attempt to undermine

engagement”, OMNI, February 7, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=34

4001&rel_no=1

21. Thalif Deen, “Will the New U.N. Chief Stand Up to Big

Powers”, Inter Press News Agency, December 12, 2006.

http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35814

22. Nam Jeong-ho and Lee Sang-eon, “Report Says Kim Jong-il

Cashed in on U.N. Office”, JoongAng Ilbo, January 22, 2007.

23. Ibid., Voice of the People.

24. Ronda Hauben, “Hardliners Attack UNDP Aid to North Korea

Allegations of corruption seen as attempt to undermine engage-

ment”, OMNI, February7, 2007. See also: Soohyun Lee, “UNDP’s

aid toward North Korea”, peacekorea, January 23, 2007

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article

_class=2&no=344001&rel_no=1

25. Soohyun Lee, UNDP’s aid toward North Korea, peacekorea,

February 13, 2007

26. Ibid.

27. Ji-Hyun Lee, “The Ghost of Anti-communism Reflected in

South Korean Media”, peacekorea , May 7, 2007

28. Ibid.

29. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Asia: Another abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act (2001)”, OMNI,

March 21, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article

_class=3&no=351525&rel_no=1

30. The McClatchy Newspapers have been an exception. See for

example articles like

“Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations” Kevin G. Hall

about the BDA affair.

31. Tim Savage, “Six-Party Talks Resume: Expectations high for

progress in Beijing,” OMNI, February 8, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=

c10400&no=344245&rel_no=1

32. David Morrison, Press Conference, June 11, 2007, See Minutes:

38:46

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/pressbriefing/brief070611.rm

33. Ronda Hauben, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Syndrome

and the Press [Analysis] How does one prove a negative?”,

OMNI, June 24, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=368433&rel_no=1

The above article can be seen in 2 parts at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=369577&rel_no=1

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=369577&rel_no=2

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on October 4, 2007]

On the Status of the

Six-Party Talks

‘It’s Never Been an Easy Sell

in Washington,’ Says Chris Hill

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

At a press conference held in New York City on

Tuesday, Oct. 2, 2007, U.S. Assistant Secretary of

State Christopher Hill answered questions and

outlined some of his concerns regarding the recent

session of the Six-Party Talks

held in Beijing, Sept.

27-30.

Hill said that originally there was not to be a

formal statement of agreement, but that on Sunday

morning before the session was to end, the Chinese

hosts distributed a draft of a short statement for the

six parties to consider. Hill said that each of the

parties took the statement back to their capitols to

seek approval. For Hill, this meant flying to New

York City to meet with Secretary of State Rice who

had been attending U.N. related events. Then the

proposal was brought to President Bush for his ap-

proval.

When Hill was asked how difficult was the

process of getting an agreement from Washington,

he said “It’s never been an easy sell in Washington.”

Hill explained the agreement in general terms, as the

press conference was held before the statement was

officially released.

By Dec. 31, 2007, Hill said North Korea agreed

to disable its Nyongbyon nuclear facilities. Also by

Page 27

that date, there was an agreement to provide an accurate

accounting for how much fissile material was produced

by North Korea. In 2008, the Six-Party Talks will move

toward the issue of dismantling the plutonium producing

facility. As an outcome of the talks, Hill hoped for the

creation of a North East Asian Peace structure, but he

felt there was still a long way to go to get to that goal.

When asked about whether the U.S. had agreed to

remove North Korea from the U.S. government’s State

Sponsors of Terrorists list, Hill said that was something

“we are working on with the DPRK.” He said that “from

our point of view any time we can work with a country

to get them off the list, that’s what we want to do.” Hill

also said that North Korea was being encouraged to

improve DPRK-Japan relations. He did not say whether

efforts were being made to encourage Japan to improve

Japan-DPRK relations.

In response to another question about removing the

designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terror-

ism, Hill said that the U.S. wanted to “work through the

past history that had led to the DPRK being put on that

list.”

A reporter asked what it would take to move from

the armistice of the Korean war to a peace agreement

ending the war.

“From the U.S. point of view if the DPRK is pre-

pared to denuclearize we are prepared to reach a peace

agreement,” replied Hill. There would need to be a

number of issues considered, he explained, to reach a

peace settlement. When questioned about North Korea’s

concern that there be an end of hostility by the U.S.

toward it, Hill said that the U.S. was hostile to prolifera-

tion and that there was no hostile policy of the U.S. to

North Korea.

When asked about the problems that had existed

regarding the U.S. Treasury Department’s action freez-

ing North Korean assets in the Banco Delta Asia

, Hill

said that that situation related to the need of the U.S. to

protect its financial system and its currencies. “We

would like them (North Korea-ed) to have access to the

international financial system,” he explained, “but they

have to play by the rules everyone else plays by.”

He didn’t elaborate further on this issue or on

whether North Korea’s regaining access to the interna-

tional banking system was a matter being considered in

the negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea.

In response to a question about why it seemed

negotiations were entering a sensitive stage, he explained

that what was happening was to have the U.S. on the

ground involved in disabling the nuclear facility. It was

“not just paper any more,” he observed.

Another reporter asked Hill what problems he

saw in the future that he was concerned about. Hill

responded that what keeps him awake is that they are

focusing on the step to be taken but that “the process

won’t be successful unless we reach the goal.” The

DPRK will need to give up its fissile material and

weapons, explained Hill, so he was concerned that

there were those in the army in North Korea who

might not want to get to the last step.

“When we finish this job”, Hill said, the parties

will have come to understand what it means to come

together and solve the problems. In this process, Hill

felt that North Korea would get the sense of “what it

means to be part of a community.”

Notes:

1. For an earlier press conference by Hill about the talks, see

“U.S., North Korea Move to Open Ties Christopher Hill and

Kim Kye-gwan hold meeting in New York on first steps”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=348974&rel_no=1

2. While the $25 million of North Korean funds have now been

returned to North Korea, the problem of North Korea being

denied access to the international banking system has not yet

been resolved. Describing some of the problems that the U.S.

Treasury Department action against the Banco Delta Asia posed

as an obstacle to the progress of the Six-Party Talks, see for

example: North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia,

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia, Weapons of Mass

Destruction Syndrome and the Press?

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1

Full Text of the Joint Document

The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the

Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the Peo-

ple’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the

Russian Federation and the United States of America

from 27 to 30 September 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of

Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Mr. Kenichiro Sasae,

Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Chun

Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean

Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexan-

der Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of

the Russian Federation, and Mr. Christopher Hill,

Page 28

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of

the Department of State of the United States, attended

the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the

talks.

The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of

the five Working Groups, confirmed the implementation

of the initial actions provided for in the February 13

agreement, agreed to push forward the Six-Party Talks

process in accordance with the consensus reached at the

meetings of the Working Groups and reached agreement

on second-phase actions for the implementation of the

Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the goal of which

is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Penin-

sula in a peaceful manner.

I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear

facilities subject to abandonment under the September

2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 agreement.

The disablement of the 5 megawatt Experimental

Reactor at Yongbyon, the Reprocessing Plant

(Radiochemical Laboratory) at Yongbyon and the

Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon will

be completed by 31 December 2007. Specific measures

recommended by the expert group will be adopted by

heads of delegation in line with the principles of being

acceptable to all Parties, scientific, safe, verifiable, and

consistent with international standards. At the request of

the other Parties, the United States will lead disablement

activities and provide the initial funding for those

activities. As a first step, the U.S. side will lead the

expert group to the DPRK within the next two weeks to

prepare for disablement.

2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct

declaration of all its nuclear programs in accordance

with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007.

3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer

nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.

II. On Normalization of Relations between

Relevant Countries

1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to

improving their bilateral relations and moving towards

a full diplomatic relationship. The two sides will in-

crease bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual

trust. Recalling the commitments to begin the pro-

cess of removing the designation of the DPRK as a

state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process

of terminating the application of the Trading with the

Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the United

States will fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in

parallel with the DPRK’s actions based on consen-

sus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on

Normalization of DPRK-U.S. Relations.

2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to

normalize their relations expeditiously in accor-

dance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis

of the settlement of the unfortunate past and the

outstanding issues of concern. The DPRK and Japan

committed themselves to taking specific actions

toward this end through intensive consultations

between them.

III. On Economic and Energy Assistance

to the DPRK

In accordance with the February 13 agreement,

economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to

the equivalent of one million tons of HFO (inclusive

of the 100,000 tons of HFO already delivered) will

be provided to the DPRK. Specific modalities will be

finalized through discussion by the Working Group

on Economy and Energy Cooperation.

IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting

The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Minis-

terial Meeting will be held in Beijing at an appropri-

ate time.

The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation

meeting prior to the Ministerial Meeting to discuss

the agenda for the Meeting.

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=380575&rel_no=1

Page 29

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on October 4, 2007]

North Korea Addresses

U.N. 62nd Session

U.N. Officials Express Their Support

for Inter-Korean Summit

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

Explaining that North Korea was making a sincere

effort to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean penin-

sula, Choe Su Hon, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made his

nation’s presentation at the General Debate opening the

session of the United Nations General Assembly on

Tuesday, Oct. 2, 2007.

He described how North Korea had acted in self

defense as a small nation, to safeguard its “national

sovereignty and dignity in the face of U.S. threats of

preemptive nuclear strikes and harsh economic sanc-

tions.”

Choe told the United Nations General Assembly that

the principle of “words for words and actions for ac-

tions” was the basis for progress in the Six-Party Talks

that were going on between North Korea, South Korea,

the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. This required, he

explained, removing the “deep rooted hostile U.S.

policy” toward his country that had persisted for “over

half a century.” This also would involve the normalizing

of bilateral relations between the U.S. and North Korea.

With respect to Japan, Choe said there was the need for

it to “discard its hostility toward the DPRK as they have

pledged to do.”

While Choe was speaking to the member states of

the United Nations in New York City, the inter Korean

Summit was taking place in Pyongyang. Choe told his

international audience that “the north-south summit now

under way in Pyongyang will be of great significance.”

He said it would take the “inter-Korean relations to a

higher stage.” As long as the north and south sit face to

face, in the spirit of national independence and love for

the country and nation, he proposed that all problems

between the north and south “can be surely resolved in

the interests of our nation regardless of differences in

ideas and systems.” (1)

The Summit between the north and south was

greeted by others at the United Nations with support and

encouragement. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon ex-

pressed his hope for the success of the summit so

that it “will lead to increased inter-Korean reconcili-

ation and cooperation, as well as promoting

co-prosperity.” He said that “the United Nations

stands ready to provide assistance as may be

required.” (2)

Srgjan Kerim, the President of the General

Assembly also offered his congratulations and good

wishes for the success of the Summit. His spokes-

man told the press that, “the President wishes to

commend the two leaders for their brave initiative

and further encourages them to use the opportunity

of their meeting to make progress on promoting

peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and on

inter-Korean reconciliation.” He said that “it is in the

interest of all Member States of the United Nations

to achieve progress on those issues,” emphasizing

that “it is through dialogue that differences between

Member States can best be resolved.” (3)

Notes:

(1) Press Release, Statement , by H.E. Mr. Choe Su Hon, Vice

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Delegation of

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in the General

Debate of the 62nd Session of the United Nations General

Assembly, Oct 2, 2007

http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/2007/pdfs/DPRK-eng.pdf

(2) Secretary-General welcomes upcoming summit in

pyongyang

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11197.doc.htm

(3) Statement on Inter-Korean Summit Attributable to Spokes-

person

http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/db071001.doc.

htm

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?m

enu=c10400&no=380581&rel_no=1

Page 30

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on November 1, 2007]

U.N. Passes Resolution

Supporting Inter-Korean

Summit

Document A/62/L4 Entitled ‘Peace,

Security and Reunification

on the Korean Peninsula’

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

Just a little over a year ago I began covering the

United Nations as a featured writer for OhmyNews

International. My first day was when Ban Ki-moon’s

nomination for Secretary General of the U.N. was

approved by the General Assembly. For South Korea

this was an exciting event.

The next day, however, the Security Council im-

posed sanctions against North Korea.

The dilemma of

a Korea divided North and South was a glaring contra-

diction facing the international community with the

appointment of a Secretary General from the Korean

peninsula. Similarly, however, this was a challenge to

the international community to support unification on the

Korean peninsula.

A little more than one year later, the General

Assembly held an event to provide needed support for

Korean reunification. In the General Assembly on

Wednesday, Oct. 31, the international community

approved a resolution supporting the motion toward

reunification of the two Koreas and applauding the

Second Inter-Korean Summit held October 2-4, 2007

and the joint Declaration issued by the presidents of the

two Koreas.

The event was held during the afternoon session of

the U.N.’s General Assembly. The U.N. delegate from

North Korea, Pak Gil Yon introduced the resolution,

saying “Mr. President, I have the honor to introduce a

draft resolution contained in document A/62/L4 entitled

‘Peace, security and reunification on the Korean penin-

sula’.”

He described the Oct. 2-4 summit and the declara-

tion that resulted, explaining that the U.N. resolution

being proposed “welcomes and supports the

inter-Korean summit including the Declaration and

encourages both sides to implement it faithfully and in

good faith, inviting member States to support and assist

the current positive process.”

The U.N. delegate from South Korea, Kim Hyun

Chong was the next speaker. As joint sponsor of the

resolution with the delegate from North Korea, Kim

described several aspects of the peace accord that the

two parties agreed to in their declaration at the end of

the Inter-Korean Summit. “Through its various

provisions,” he explained, “the Declaration points

the way forward for common prosperity, eventual

peaceful reunification on the Korean peninsula, and

the resolution of longstanding regional concerns.”

Among those speaking in support of the resolu-

tion were Portugal on behalf of the European Union,

China, Vietnam, Japan, the U.S., New Zealand,

Yemen, Germany, Indonesia, Thailand, Canada,

Guatemala, Belarus, Russia, Chile, Poland, Mongo-

lia, Mynmar, Benin, Brazil, Italy, Bangladesh,

Egypt, and Cuba.

Yemen and Germany spoke about the difficul-

ties they had experienced as divided nations, and

offered whatever support they could provide to the

Korean reunification efforts. The German ambassa-

dor said that “what we have learned from our own

experience is: the separation of a nation is not

irreversible. The two Koreas will have to find their

own way of tackling these issues, but Germany

stands ready, upon request, to share its own experi-

ence from the years of German-German relations.”

The ambassador of Yemen said that his country

had had a long history of division, which was

changed with the unification in May 1990. He

explained that the unification was difficult and not

without defects. He understood the suffering of the

divided families and duplication of resources that the

division represented and said that his country would

do what it could to support the efforts of the two

Koreas to implement fully the declaration they had

issued.

The ambassador from Vietnam noted that the

Summit and the resulting Declaration were of “great

historic significance.” He said that Vietnam “wel-

comes and highly appreciates the encouraging

outcomes of these developments.” He noted that the

events of Oct. 2-4 represented an important mile-

stone in the process of the improvement and devel-

opment of relations between the two Koreans which

would bring them “closer to their long-held dreams

of national reunification and prosperity.” The ambas-

sador from Vietnam noted that his country had good

relations with the two Koreas.

Page 31

The ambassador from Thailand also noted the

historic nature of the recent Summit and concluded that

“this historic resolution has called for many countries to

readjust the attitude and the policy toward the situation

in the Korean peninsula.”

Indonesia’s U.N. ambassador similarly noted that

his country has had close ties with both North and South

Korea. He, too, saw the Summit of October 2007 as a

“major milestone in inter-Korean relations.” He called

for support from member nations to the process of

“inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation and reunifica-

tion.”

The U.N. ambassador from Portugal said that the

EU stands ready to contribute to the efforts.

Several nations spoke about having been part of

KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization in 1996 and wanting to continue to help in

the ways they could. The ambassador from Italy said that

his country had worked to support Inter-Korean dia-

logue. Also Italy was offering to provide the help it

could, and had established a way to provide aid to North

Korea shortly before the Summit. Italy had been a

supporter of KEDO, as had Chile.

Benin’s U.N. ambassador explained that his country,

too, had friendly relations with the two sister republics

on the Korean Peninsula. He described how Benin had

been working to promote peaceful reunification of the

Koreas for a number of decades. He endorsed the current

developments and said that reunification would “put an

end to one of the most painful relics of the Second

World War.”

Brazil expressed its support for the resolution and

reminded those in the General Assembly that Brazil had

been a co-sponsor for the General Assembly Resolution

55/11 seven years earlier supporting the first Inter-

Korean Summit of June 15, 2000.

The U.S. ambassador to the U.N. said that the U.S.

was pleased with the draft resolution being discussed by

the General Assembly. He stressed that dialogue be-

tween the two Koreas was essential for better relations.

He explained that this dialogue process was supportive

to and complementary to the Six-Party Talks going on.

The Japanese ambassador also expressed his na-

tion’s strong support for the draft resolution. In his talk

he referred to some of the specifics of the Six-Party

Talks.

The ambassador to the U.N. from Chile expressed

his sentiments that Korea had one past and one destiny.

The declaration from the Inter-Korean Summit was the

outcome of a difficult and sensitive process. He ex-

plained that no state should fail to join the noble

effort to support the Korean people’s desire to

become one nation.

The ambassador from Cuba to the U.N. was the

final speaker in the discussion before action was to

be taken on the resolution. He explained that “Cuba

has always supported and will continue to support

the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.”

Also he explained that the Summit Conference of the

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) held last year in

Havana stressed the importance of peace on the

Korean peninsula. Similarly the NAM Summit

“expressed its support toward efforts to reunify the

Korean peninsula through the genuine aspirations

and concerted efforts of the Korean peoples them-

selves.”

The resolution was approved by acclamation.

Ban Ki-moon was present in the General Assembly

during the discussion of the resolution. After it was

approved, he made a statement congratulating the

representatives of the two Koreas.

“Today’s date,” he explained, “coincides exactly

with the date seven years ago when the General

Assembly adopted resolution 55/11, following the

June 2000 summit of the DPRK and the ROK. I

welcome this coincidence. In my homeland of

Korea, it is an ancient custom to choose an auspi-

cious day for any celebration or new endeavor.”

“Today,” he continued, “I feel a personal obliga-

tion to do all I can to encourage and facilitate the

continuing work for peace, security and reunification

on the Korean peninsula. I am convinced that the

historic inter-Korean summit will pave the way for

a permanent peace regime and eventual reunifica-

tion.”

“As Secretary-General, I stand ready to provide

every assistance required, in close cooperation with

the international community,” he said, concluding

his statement.

During the press encounter he had outside of the

General Assembly, Ban was asked, “[Y]ou just said

that you would like to do everything to support peace

on the Korean peninsula. Do you have any special

plan in mind, as head of the United Nations, and if

so, can you please give the details?”

In response, Ban said, “At this time I do not

have any detailed or specific plans, but in principle,

as Secretary-General, I have a broad mandate and

duty to assist any parties to the problems for smooth

and harmonious resolution. For that matter, since I

Page 32

served as Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea in

the past, and I have expertise and knowledge and experi-

ence, whenever I am needed, I will do whatever I can.”

The U.N. resolution supporting the movement

toward reunification of the two Koreas, passed on the

last day of October 2007 by the General Assembly, may

not seem particularly significant, but it is actually an

important event. It reflects the support of the interna-

tional community for the peaceful reunification of the

Korean peninsula, which is one of the important out-

standing problems of our times. As the ambassador from

Benin profoundly noted, the reunification of the two

Koreas would “put an end to one of the most painful

relics of the Second World War.”

The U.N. was created to facilitate such events.

Passing this resolution supporting the recent

Inter-Korean Summit is a fitting way for the U.N. to

mark the one year anniversary since the General Assem-

bly appointed a new Secretary General. The challenge is

now for the people of the two Koreas, the Secretary

General and the member nations to do what is needed to

support the continuing motion toward peaceful reconcili-

ation and Korean reunification.

Notes:

1. Ronda Hauben, “The Problem Facing the U.N. Can Ban Ki-moon

help solve the problem with the Security Council?”, OhmyNews

International, October 17, 2006.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article

_class=3&no=323351&rel_no=1

2. The United Nations A/62/L.4, General Assembly, Sixty-second

session, Agenda item 167 Peace, security and reunification on the

Korean peninsula Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and

Republic of Korea draft resolution reads:

Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 55/11 of 31 October

2000, in which it welcomed and supported the inter-Korean summit

and the joint declaration adopted on 15 June 2000 by the two

leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the

Republic of Korea,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United

Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and

security,

Convinced that inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation are essential

for consolidating peace and security on the Korean peninsula and

also contribute to peace and stability in the region and beyond, in

conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Recognizing that the summit meeting held in Pyongyang from 2 to

4 October 2007 between the two leaders of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea and their Decla-

ration on the Advancement of North-South Korean Relations,

Peace and Prosperity represent a major milestone in improving

inter-Korean relations and in advancing peace and common

prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in the wider region as

well,

Recalling the statements welcoming the inter-Korean summit

made on 1 October 2007 by the Secretary-General and the

President of the General Assembly, and recalling also the

statement welcoming the adoption of the Declaration made on

4 October 2007 by the Secretary-General,

1. Welcomes and supports the inter-Korean summit held from

2 to 4 October 2007 and the Declaration on the Advancement

of North-South Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity

adopted on 4 October 2007 by the two leaders of the Demo-

cratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea’

2. Encourages the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and

the Republic of Korea to implement the Declaration fully and

in good faith, thereby consolidating peace on the Korean

peninsula and laying a solid foundation for peaceful reunifica-

tion’

3. Invites Member States to continue to support and assist, as

appropriate, the process of inter-Korean dialogue, reconcilia-

tion and reunification so that it may contribute to peace and

security not only on the Korean peninsula but also in northeast

Asia and the world as a whole.

A/62/L.4

3. Ban’s statement

http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2828

The above article can be seen at:

http://engdev.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?a

rticle_class=13&no=380842&rel_no=1

Page 33

[Editor’s note: In August 2007, Ronda Hauben made a

presentation at the World Fellowship in New Hampshire,

U.S. She spoke about covering the U.N. as a featured

writer for OMNI. In the following section from her

presentation, she shows there can be a power in netizen

reporting.]

The Net Gives the Power of the

Reporter to the Netizen

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

An Example from My Experience Covering

the U.N. for OhmyNews International

BDA Story

This spring as a featured writer for OhmyNews

International I covered the 50th anniversary dinner in

New York City of the Korea Society. One of the speak-

ers at the dinner was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State

Christopher Hill. He explained the problem of $25

million of North Korean money being frozen as part of

a U.S. Treasury Department proceeding against a bank

in Macau, China, the Banco Delta Asia (BDA). This is

a problem that was at the time holding up the implemen-

tation of the Six-Party agreement to denuclearize the

Korean Peninsula. Hill committed himself to work on

this problem until it was solved.

There were several Korean journalists covering the

event for their publications. They were particularly

interested in what Hill said, but Hill’s talk in itself did

not seem to represent a newsworthy event.

In the next few days, however, an important story

was developing.

In the process of trying to unravel the unfolding

developments, I found a story online about the activity

the bank had engaged in for North Korea. It documented

that this was legitimate banking activity, not illegal

activity. The news organization which published the

story was the McClatchy Newspapers. I also found links

on the blog, “China Matters,” to some documents

refuting the Treasury Department’s charges against the

bank.

I now had the documents in the case. The U.S.

government’s findings were general statements provid-

ing no specific evidence of wrong doing on the part of

the bank. The bank’s statements and refutation gave

significant documentation refuting charges of illegal

activity on the part of the bank. The refutation also made

the case that there were political motives for the U.

S. governments’ allegations rather than actual illegal

activity on the part of the bank. The U.S. government

had targeted a small Macau bank to scare the many

banks in China. “To kill the chicken to scare the

monkeys,” as the government document explained,

quoting an old Chinese proverb.

At last I had the news peg for an important

story. I wrote an article, submitting it online around

5 a.m. my time on May 18 to OhmyNews Interna-

tional (OMNI), using the software OMNI provides

for submitting articles. Also on May 18, the Wall

Street Journal carried an Op Ed by the former U.S.

Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton. His article

scolded the U.S. government for negotiating to

return the $25 million to North Korea. By noon that

day, my story appeared on OMNI. So an Internet

search that day gave people who searched two

substantially different analyses to consider. (See

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia this

issue p. 17)

This short description was part of a talk that I

gave in San Francisco in May 2007 at the Interna-

tional Communications Association (ICA) annual

conference.

During the conference, I summed up my experi-

ence working on this issue with the conclusion:

There is not yet an OhmyNews (OMN) in the

U.S. So my story about the connection of the

U.S. government’s policy toward China and the

U.S. government actions against the Macau

bank is not yet likely to be able to impact how

the mainstream news media in the U.S. frames

the story with North Korea and the Six-Party

Talks. But the need for a U.S. model of OMN

becomes all the more urgent when one partici-

pates in OMNI and thus has the experience of

exploring the potential of what it will make

possible.

Next Episode

Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San

Francisco, however, that this story was not ending,

but a new aspect was developing.

When I returned home from the ICA conference,

I did a follow-up story to my two earlier stories

about the BDA issue.

A short time later, on June 11, I found a surpris-

ing email in my mailbox. The email was from a

reporter who said she worked for the Korean Service

Page 34

of the Voice of America News (VOA News).

She wrote:

Hello Ms. Hauben

She introduced herself as being a reporter with the Voice

of America News in Washington D.C.

Her email said:

While I was working on a story about BDA issue, I read

your report, ‘Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta

Asia.’ I thought you made some valuable points about

the BDA issue in this report, I was wondering if I could

have a conversation with you in this matter. Since I am

on deadline, I’m trying very hard to get a hold of you. So

I would really appreciate it if you call or email me back

ASAP….

She gave her phone number.

The Voice of American News is now part of the U.S.

State Department.

I called her as she had asked and she said she

wanted to interview me by phone. I asked her to let me

know what she would want to speak with me about. She

sent me an email elaborating:

The questions I am planning to ask you during the

interview are going to be about both the content of your

article and how you did it. Although I’d like to ask you,

first of all, how you came up with the idea of writing this

article, the focus of this interview is not just on how you

prepared the article.

The purpose of this interview is to let our listeners

know what is going on regarding the BDA issue and how

the BDA issue is developing. When I read your article,

I thought you made valuable and critical points about

the BDA issue, and I thought it might be very important

to let your idea about the BDA issue be heard by our

listeners.

She listed questions she would ask me in the inter-

view.

1. How you came up with the idea of writing this article?

How you prepared it? About your sources

2. Briefly summarize your findings or main points of the

article?

3. What you are trying to accomplish by writing this

article? What needs to be done to resolve the BDA

issue?

She wrote ending the email:

Finally, I wanted to ask you if we could do this interview

sometime between 9am and 9:30am.... Thanks again.

She did indeed call and we had a substantial phone

conversation discussing my stories, the Internet sources

I had used, and what I saw as the problem with the

American government’s freezing the Banco Delta

Asia funds.

Afterwards she asked specifically for the urls to

follow up on the Internet sources I had cited. These

were basically material I had found including a blog,

several government documents, and copies of the

legal documents submitted by the Bank owner to

appeal the Treasury Department ruling against the

Bank, all on the Internet.

This was all happening at a time when there

were new efforts to find a solution to the roadblock

that freezing the BDA funds belonging to North

Korea represented to the continuation of the Six-

Party Talks.

The Voice of America News reporter said she

would consider contacting the former U.S. govern-

ment officials who were responsible for crafting the

plan to freeze North Korea’s assets at Banco Delta

Asia.

Just at this time, the U.S. goverment announced

a new possible arrangement for returning the funds

to North Korea via the international banking system.

In the following week it proved successful.

The Voice of American News reporter wrote me

saying she had other stories to do and was not for

now going to pursue this story any longer.

I can only speculate that perhaps her contacting

me and interviewing me was part of an effort by

some people within the U.S. government to put

preassure on others within the government who were

creating the roadblocks.

Regardless of her motivation, the Voice of

America News reporter had contacted me before the

situation was resolved. Whether the contact had any

impact on the resolution I can only speculate. At the

very least, the articles I had done had caught the

attention of someone at the Voice of America News

which is part of the U.S. State Dept. I was given the

chance to explain how I framed the story of the BDA

and what I saw the controversy surrounding it to be.

So my story did indeed have more of an impact

than I thought possible when I gave my talk at the

ICA in San Francisco. OMNI and the Internet in

general gave these stories about the BDA a power

they would not otherwise have had.

Page 35

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben

(1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

The Amateur Computerist invites submissions. Articles

can be submitted via e-mail: [email protected]

A two issue surface mail subscription costs $10.00

(U.S.). Send e-mail to [email protected] for details.

Permission is given to reprint articles from this issue in

a non profit publication provided credit is given, with

name of author and source of article cited.

The opinions expressed in articles are those of their

authors and not necessarily the opinions of the

Amateur Computerist newsletter. We welcome sub-

missions from a spectrum of viewpoints.

ELECTRONIC EDITION

All issues of the Amateur Computerist are on-line and

available via e-mail. To obtain a free copy of any issue

or a free e-mail subscription, send a request to:

[email protected] or [email protected]

Back issues of the Amateur Computerist are

available on the World Wide Web:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/Back_Issues/

Page 36