The Amateur
Computerist
Winter 2007 Netizen Journalism and the United Nations Volume 16 No. 1
Table of Contents
Challenging the False Narrative .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Security Council Problem Facing the U.N.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Future of the Korean Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Attack on UNDP Aid to North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
U.N. Reform: What Role Will Ban Play? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
ElBaradei: Negotiation With Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
U.S., N. Korea Move to Open Ties .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 28
North Korea and Banco Delta Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 31
Behind the Blacklisting of BDA .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 35
WMD Syndrome and the Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 41
Does Ban Ki-Moon Have a U.N. Vision? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 46
Status of the Six-Party Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 59
North Korea Addresses U.N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 64
U.N. Supporting Inter-Korean Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 66
Net Gives Netizens Reporter Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 72
Challenging the False Narratives
as Basis for a Netizen Press
One particular vision of the role for the press is that it acts as a
watchdog over government.
1
This is not a role that the press often
succeeds in fulfilling. Writing in the early 1990s, Michael Hauben
observed that the Net “gives the power of the reporter to the netizen.”
2
What is this power? Can the Net make it possible for the press to be such
a watchdog so that the problems of the society can be brought to the
Webpage: http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/
Page 1
surface and the means found to solve them?
This issue of the Amateur Computerist is a collection of articles
which explore the potential of the Internet to make possible a journalism
which will function as a watchdog. These articles appeared in the online
and sometimes in the online magazine Telepolis
(http://www.heise.de/tp). They are an effort to explore what the power
of the reporter makes possible.
The articles cover events over a one year period of time. They have
been selected so as to focus on what has happened with the North
Korean situation at the United Nations (U.N.) and in the regional efforts
related to the Six-Party Talks in Beijing. They are an effort to contribute
to a form of press coverage that will provide an accurate narrative of the
events that make up the news.
On October 9, 2006, the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Ban Ki-moon, won the Security Council nomination to become the
eighth Secretary General of the United Nations. The General Assembly
voted in favor of the Security Council recommendation on October 19
to make Ban the next U.N. Secretary General.
This was a historic event for South Korea. This was an evolving
story. How would Ban fulfill the obligations of the UN charter as
Secretary General? Could the problems of the Korean peninsula,
especially the struggle for Korean reunification make steps forward
during the period while Ban would be at the helm of the U.N.?
A few months earlier, claiming that it had to protect itself from the
hostile actions of the United States, North Korea had tested a nuclear
device. The very next day after the General Assembly vote in favor of
the Security Council’s recommendation of Ban to be the next Secretary
General, the Security Council began its work to pass Resolution 1718,
to impose sanctions on North Korea. The Security Council’s actions
against North Korea were reminiscent of its actions against Iraq just a
few years earlier.
Was there a story developing here? How would Ban do as Secretary
General? Would the problems of the Korean peninsula, especially the
tension over denuclearization and the struggle for Korean reunification
make steps toward resolution or would there be greater instability in the
Page 2
region?
By fall of 2007, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution
supporting the reunification of Korea and the Joint Declaration North
and South Korea had issued at their October 2007 summit.
The articles in this issue present an account of what happened in the
period between these events. During this period, much of the main-
stream media in the U.S. supported the U.S. government’s hostile
treatment of North Korea, blaming North Korea for any delays that
developed in the Six-Party Talks. Such framing helped to create a false
narrative reminiscent of the fake claim that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). The articles in this issue, instead are an effort to
accurately document the events as they unfold.
During the period leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March
2003, much of the mainstream press in the U.S. wrote articles about
Iraq’s ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)’ and how Iraq was a
threat to the international community. The investigative journalist and
author Robert Parry calls this activity the creation of a ‘false narrative.’
Parry explores the role of much of the mainstream media in helping the
U.S. government to establish a pretext for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
3
This situation raises a number of questions. When the U.S.
President George Bush described Iraq as part of an ‘axis of evil,’ he
included Iran and North Korea in this same category. Would the Iraq
scenario be repeated with respect to North Korea and Iran? Is it possible
for the Internet and netizens press to provide a means to counter the
‘false narrative’ that the U.S. government was creating to support its
hostile policy objectives?
In his article, “Why I write,” the writer George Orwell explains that
for every piece he writes, “…there is some lie that I want to expose,
some fact to which I want to draw attention, and my initial concern is to
get a hearing.”
4
Orwell is describing how he strives for truthfulness in
his work.
Does the Net give the power of the reporter to the netizens to
counter the fictitious accounts that often make up much of the news?
These articles are an effort to explore the nature of this power and
whether the Net can present the needed challenge to the false narratives
presented by much of the mainstream U.S.
Page 3
Notes:
1. “The Computer as a Democratizer” in Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet
and the Internet http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/netbook/
2. “The Computer as a Democratizer” in Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet
and the Internet
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/netbook/
3. Robert Parry, “Why We Write,” http://www.consortiumnews.com/2007/111207.html
4. George Orwell, “Why I write,”
http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/wiw/english/e_wiw
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on October 17, 2006]
The Problem Facing the U.N.
Can Ban Ki-moon Help Solve the
Problem With the Security Council?
by Ronda Hauben
The official selection on Oct. 13, 2006 of Ban Ki-moon of South
Korea as the new secretary general of the United Nations could not
come at a more propitious time. Why, one may ask? Hailing from the
Republic of Korea (South Korea), Ban will have before him the daunting
task of bringing the best possible contributions from the international
community to bear on many of the difficult problems that erupt in the
world. Along with his appointment to the post at the U.N. this past week,
and the congratulations from diplomats from many regions of the world
at a ceremony held at the General Assembly, was the event that took
place the following day: the imposition of article 41, chapter 7 sanctions
on North Korea by the Security Council as punishment for the test of a
nuclear device several days earlier.
Though Ban does not take office for his new position until Jan. 1,
2007, a crisis has already developed that will require the best efforts and
resources he can muster. In congratulating him on his selection, several
of the diplomats noted the great achievements of South Korea in having
Page 4
transformed itself from “the status of least developed country, to an
industrialized highly developed nation” and “as the 11
th
largest economy
in the world” (in the words of Gambian Ambassador to the U.N. Crispin
Grey-Johnson). Speaking about Ban, Grey-Johnson, who is chairman of
the African regional group at the U.N., “the developments in his own
region of the world call for wisdom and cautious diplomacy” in order to
be able to “mediate this very complex security situation that is now
unfolding in the Korean Peninsula.”
In his acceptance speech to the General Assembly upon his
appointment as the eighth secretary general of the U.N., Ban acknowl-
edged that he was following “in a line of remarkable leaders.” That
“each of the men in his own way, came on board at the U.N. at a critical
juncture in the organization’s history.” That “each wondered what the
coming years would require as they took over the leadership role of the
preeminent international organization.”
The secretary general elect expressed his respect for the role played
by the current secretary general, Kofi Annan, and promised to build on
his legacy. Explaining the need to hear the views and concerns of all the
member nations of the U.N., Ban pledged to consult widely in his
preparations for assuming his new position. “I will listen attentively to
your concerns, expectations and admonitions,” he promised the 192
member states.
Congratulating Ban, South African Ambassador to the U.N.
Dumisani Kumalo proposed that in order for the secretary general elect
to be able to act in the interest of the entire membership, he will need to
“listen to the views of each and every member state.”
How the future secretary general can help to solve the problems that
come before the U.N. is not only a critical question for the international
community, but also a critical task in the face of the increased tension
being experienced on the Korean Peninsula.
While several of the speeches at the General Assembly ceremony
spoke to the need for wide ranging consultations and discussions in
order to diffuse tensions and determine how to solve difficult problems,
recent actions at the Security Council the day after the appointment of
Ban demonstrate that a very different process is practiced by that body.
Only after an agreement was achieved among the five permanent
Page 5
members of the Security Council and supported by the 10 temporary
members, and voted on, did the Council agree to hear the party to the
problem that was before them. And only after hearing the views of all
the permanent members of the Security Council – the U.S., France,
Britain, China and Russia – and some of the temporary members about
why they voted for the sanctions on North Korea did the council allow
the representative from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea), Pak Gil Yon, to have a few minutes to speak. His talk
was followed by a brief statement from the South Korean ambassador
to the U.N., who spoke in support of the sanctions.
In the brief opportunity he had to speak, Pak indicated that his
country felt it was the victim of hostile acts by the U.S. and that it had
a sovereign right to defend itself from such hostile acts. Also, he
indicated that the process of the Security Council in mandating sanctions
on his country was more like the activity of gangsters than an activity
representing a legitimate means of investigating a dispute and determin-
ing how to diffuse a tense situation.
Thus, the speeches supporting discussion and investigation in the
General Assembly on Friday, Oct. 13, and the closed decision-making
process that culminated the following day in the issuing of sanctions
against North Korea, are in stark contrast to each other.
The statements by several of the five permanent members of the
Security Council, the members who have the power to veto Security
Council decisions, emphasized that their resolution imposing sanctions
against North Korea reflected the condemnation of the “international
community” and that all the nations of the U.N. now had a legal
obligation to carry out the provisions of the sanctions.
While the Security Council does indeed have the power to impose
such sanctions on a country in the name of the U.N., the process by
which the sanctions were decided, is a sorry demonstration of power
politics that involves very few of the 192 member countries that make
up the U.N.
The chairman of the Latin American and Caribbean regional group,
in his comments to the future secretary general, explained that there are
important challenges for the U.N. in the role it plays in “today’s world.”
“International public opinion demands that the Security Council and
Page 6
other bodies of the organization should perform a much better job. There
is a trend at this time for great and infinite opportunities as well as
unprecedented risks,” explained Ecuadorian Ambassador to the U.N.
Diego Cordovez.
“The United Nations, it is said, should be a base, a forum, a mode
that would enable the international community to take advantage of
those transcendental opportunities and foresee and neutralize potential
risks,” Cordovez added. “For those reasons, it is important to insist on
the need to reform thoroughly and deeply the organization and undoubt-
edly, that would be the main task and responsibility of our new secretary
general.” (He was referring to the failure of the member countries to
reform the Security Council.)
“It is inconceivable,” he said, “that we are discussing the reform of
the Security Council for decades, preparing infinite numbers of
formulas, doing report after report on that item, and yet it remains –
immutable and impossible to the critics for its lack of representation and
its parsimonious conduct to confront [the] world’s crises.”
The act of bringing sanctions against a member state by the Security
Council, with no investigation into the grievances that motivated North
Korea’s actions, stands as an egregious example of the failure of the
obligation of the U.N. to hear from each member state and to provide a
place where problems can be heard and discussed to find a solution.
North Korea says its problems are with the U.S. and that it has
developed nuclear devices because of its need to defend itself from the
U.S. That is a serious statement requiring investigation to see who has
caused the problem and who merits the imposition of sanctions.
Another aspect of the current process that ended in sanctions is that
the five permanent members of the Security Council are powerful
countries that possess nuclear weapons. These very countries have failed
to meet their obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to
carry out disarmament.
1
Some scholars and diplomats explain that they are not surprised that
North Korea believes it needs to develop a nuclear capacity in order to
protect itself from danger. Given the actions of the U.S. government in
branding North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” and attacking another,
Iraq, which it had similarly branded, is but one of the reasons some
Page 7
scholars believe the U.S. government provided North Korea with a
legitimate justification to develop nuclear weapons.
2
In its brief talk at
the Security Council meeting, North Korea expressed one of its
disappointments:
“It was gangster-like for the Security Council to adopt such a
coercive resolution against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
while neglecting the nuclear threat posed by the United States against his
country…. The council was incapable of offering a single word of
concern when the United States threatened to launch nuclear
pre-emptive attacks, reinforced its armed forces and conducted
large-scale military exercises near the Korean Peninsula.”
It must be remembered that the five permanent members of the
Security Council possess thousands of nuclear weapons.
Although commentators and scholars who feel there is justification
for North Korea’s actions want to discourage the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, they explain that punishing North Korea, while ignoring those
countries who are in the club of nations possessing nuclear weapons, can
only breed cynicism and hostility to nonproliferation and enforcement
efforts.
That North Korea can claim that it felt compelled to develop a
nuclear device, is a signal that the current regime of power politics is not
working in a way that provides alternatives for a small nation that feels
threatened by the nations that are nuclear powers. North Korea’s
situation is a demonstration that there is need for serious discussion by
the 192 member states of the U.N. to understand the problems that North
Korea claims compel it to develop nuclear weapons as a means of
securing its borders and protecting its sovereignty.
There is indeed an international community, and there is indeed a
serious challenge facing it. The five big nuclear powers who wield veto
power on the Security Council can bring to bear punishment upon a
small nation that endeavors to develop nuclear capability. This,
however, will only compound the problem as it will only increase the
hostility and resentment that the small nation feels from such unequal
treatment at the hands of those who themselves possess nuclear weapons
and who use the power this capability bestows on them in such a
self-serving manner.
Page 8
The two Koreas have brought to the world stage the need for a truly
international organization, one that will consider all its members’
concerns and needs, and find ways to support serious consideration of
the problems such nations have but are unable to solve themselves.
The urgent problem facing the U.N. at this juncture in its history is
not whether North Korea has developed and tested a nuclear device. It
is the breakdown reflected by the lack of participation and investigation
by the international community into how a crisis will be handled once
it develops, and whether the concerns and problems of those who are
involved in the crisis will be considered as part of the process of seeking
a solution. It is how the U.N. functions when tensions reach a point
where serious attention is needed to help to understand and solve a
problem.
Unfortunately for the world, and for North Korea, there was no such
process in the decision to impose sanctions on North Korea. The
decision to impose sanctions on North Korea was not made by the
international community. It was the decision of a small set of nuclear
countries. Who was responsible for the crisis was not explored before
determining blame, and thus the proclaimed solution is likely only to
worsen the problem rather than solve it. Yet the actual problem exists
and the fact that people of the world recognize it is highlighted by a
recent poll taken in South Korea, which showed that 43 percent of the
population blames the U.S. government for North Korea’s test of a
nuclear device, while only 37.2% blame the North Koreans.
3
The actions in the Security Council to punish North Korea occurred
without the needed exploration of what had motivated North Korea to
turn to nuclear weapons as a means of self-defense. Can the U.N. be
changed in the needed ways so that it will be able to handle such
problems? This is the urgent issue facing the U.N. as the future secretary
general takes over the post in January. This is one of the challenges
facing Ban Ki-moon, member nations and people who are part of the
U.N. organization as it embarks on a new chapter in the history of this
needed global organization.
Notes:
Page 9
1. See “Pyongyang’s Nuke Test Sparks Fission Over Response.”
http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/140740/1
2. See “What About North Korea’s sovereignty?”
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=518268
3. See “U.S. Most Responsible for Nuclear Test: Poll.”
http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200610/kt2006101517230011990.htm
The above article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=323351&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on October 24, 2006]
The Future of the Korean Peninsula
South Korean Ambassador to the U.N.
Choi Young-jin Participates in Columbia Seminar*
by Ronda Hauben
A seminar about the problems of the Korean Peninsula with the
South Korean Ambassador to the U.N., Choi Young-jin, was held at
Columbia University in New York, on Thursday, Oct. 19.
1
Ambassador
Choi opened the seminar by presenting what he proposed as a frame-
work in which to understand the current problems facing the peninsula,
the primary one of which is how to understand North Korea.
The world, Choi proposed, is divided into countries that are
interdependent or isolated. The U.S. is the most interdependent country
in the world. He gave North Korea as an example of an isolated country.
What is happening in the Korean peninsula, he said, is a microcosm of
the problems the world is facing in the 21
st
century.
There is a North-South divide, and the Korean peninsula is
characteristic of this divide, only the characteristics that are represented
by countries of the North and South are reversed. The divide is one of
“haves” and “have nots.” North Korea is an example of the countries of
Page 10
the South, which are countries in economic difficulty. At the heart of the
question of North Korea, Choi proposed, is the dilemma of “political
survival and economic revival.”
North Korea’s factories are only running at 20-30 percent of
capacity. Electricity production is a problem. North Korea, he explained,
cannot survive such economic difficulties. How then is it possible to
revive its economy? The only way, Choi explained, was to accept trade.
Like Vietnam, North Korea needs to open up its society and accept trade
with other countries. According to Choi, the threat for North Korea is an
internal threat, the threat of self-imposed isolation.
Choi proposed, however, that North Korea, on its own could not
choose to change this situation. That unless a peaceful means could be
found to help change the situation, the problem faced by North Korea
becomes the problem of the international community.
“How do you manage this complex problem?” he asked. He
proposed two different approaches, one that the U.S. was pursuing and
one that China was taking. The U.S., he explained, is geographically
distant from North Korea and so it would not be affected if there was a
clash with North Korea. Thus the U.S. position was to promote
“containment with engagement.” The U.S. position is that North Korea
cannot be accepted as a nuclear state. It advocated sanctions including
the interdiction of North Korean cargo suspected of being related to its
nuclear program.
What if, however, it was Mexico not North Korea that had become
a nuclear state and threatened to sell nuclear technology to other
countries? If the country the U.S. was dealing with was geographically
closer to the U.S., what would be the U.S. policy then? Would the U.S.
accept interdiction of suspected cargo if it could lead to a military clash?
Choi described the second approach, the approach that China was
taking. Since China is so close, if a clash happened, the first victim
would be China not the U.S. Similarly, South Korea is geographically
close to North Korea. China and South Korea have a lot to lose if
something happens. That is why China insisted that the sanctions not be
military, but only under Article 41 of Chapter 7 of the United Nations
Charter. Also China favored that the interdiction of suspected cargo
would not be “mandatory” but “as necessary.”
Page 11
The situation, however, Choi explained, is murky. He asked if North
Korea knows what it wants. Also for China and South Korea the desire
is that North Korea not be a nuclear state. They want co-existence and
that the Korean peninsula be a nuclear free peninsula. He also raised the
question of whether the other countries who had been involved in the
Six-Party Talks had a strategy. No country appeared to have a clear
strategy. The situation appeared dangerous because an explosion would
affect the whole region.
The program was opened for questions from the people attending
the seminar. The first question was about an article in the Oct. 16 issue
of the German publication “Der Spiegel.” The writer quoted an anon-
ymous source that said that North Korea had asked China to guarantee
that if it were attacked, it would retaliate on behalf of North Korea.
North Korea would have stopped developing its nuclear weapons if the
Chinese had agreed to this request. The question was whether Choi knew
anything about this report.
Choi’s response was that he didn’t know anything about this report
but that he didn’t think that North Korea saw its major problem as
security. His view was that North Korea wanted economic assistance,
economic cash.
Professor Samuel Kim, who had introduced the speaker, disagreed
that North Korea was not concerned with its national security. Kim
referred to an account by Ambassador Charles “Jack” Pritchard.
Pritchard said that he was struck by something that Kim Jong Il said to
Madeleine Albright about the importance of security to North Korea.
When comparing the experience of China and North Korea regarding
economic development, Kim Jong Il explained that China had been able
to focus its resources on economic development because it didn’t face
any security threat. North Korea, however, saw the U.S. as threatening
its security and so could not focus its efforts on economic development.
North Korea felt it was under a U.S. nuclear threat, and had been for the
past 50 years, going back to the period of the Korean War.
Responding to a comment that North Korea had not supported
coming to an agreement in the 2005 Six-Party Talks, Professor Kim
explained that it was the U.S. not North Korea that was the problem. No
sooner was the ink dry, the U.S. imposed financial sanctions on North
Page 12
Korea. These sanctions created a financial stranglehold. Even during the
talks, it was the U.S. that was the holdout. It took the U.S. a few days to
sign the agreement reached during the Six-Party Talks, and it only did
so when it was threatened that the fact it was the U.S. which was
delaying the signing of the agreement would be made public.
Answering a question about the fact that a significant percentage of
the South Korean population sees the U.S. as responsible for the North
Korean nuclear test, Choi explained that people in South Korea are
divided over how to deal with the situation. The official position of the
URI party in South Korea, is that the U.S. is to blame. Many people in
South Korea think of North Korea as a brother. Others see the U.S. as an
ally and North Korea as an enemy. The framework he gave at the
beginning of the seminar, however, is intended to establish that there is
a genuine problem and that the U.S. is forced to work within the context
of this genuine problem.
Choi was asked whether it would help that the new
secretary-general of the United Nations was from South Korea. He
answered that he believed it would definitely help as South Korea has an
understanding of the need to work with North Korea.
In response to the question whether any country had previously
changed from pursuing nuclear ambitions because of sanctions, some
examples were given of countries like Brazil and Argentina which re-
sponded to packages that included security guarantees and economic
incentives. Another comment made by a participant in the seminar was
that it was important that South Korea continue its economic relations
with North Korea. It was important for North Korea to be able to make
a legitimate living exporting legitimate products and not be forced by
sanctions or a boycott to turn to military exports.
One of the problems raised during the question period was that
North Korea is looking toward the U.S. not South Korea for a way to
solve the problems. Criticism of the U.S. was mounting for not being
willing to talk with North Korea. The North Korean focus on the U.S.
could be seen perhaps as a fatal attraction.
Responding to the characterization of North Korea as having trouble
making strategic decisions, Professor Kim expressed his disagreement.
He pointed to the decision by North Korea in 1994 to enter into the
Page 13
Agreed Framework with the U.S., and then the decision to launch the
missile test, and the test of a nuclear weapon. These were offered as
examples that North Korea was quite capable of making what it deemed
strategic decisions.
The seminar provided the participants with an opportunity to
exchange views and concerns over what is happening in Northeast Asia.
The issues were considered with a seriousness and concern that was
encouraging. The discussion in the seminar resulted in recognition of
North Korea’s concern over the threat it perceives from the U.S., both
militarily and economically. The actions of the U.S. toward North Korea
coupled with the fact that North Korea therefore feels the need to have
a way to respond to the hostile acts, results in a tense situation. The
nations that share geographic proximity with North Korea find them-
selves faced with an increasingly unstable situation. The actions of the
U.S. and the pressures from the U.S. on the countries that are in
geographic proximity to North Korea, have as their result intensified
instability rather than the amelioration of the instability.
The seminar demonstrated the importance of serious discussion
among those who are concerned for the safety and stability of the
Korean Peninsula. Ambassador Choi Young-jin, Professor Samuel Kim,
and those who attended the seminar, all contributed to creating an
environment where fruitful discussion was welcomed. This is an
encouraging sign that with the efforts of concerned people, perhaps the
issues involved can be clarified, and the needed action can be taken to
support a just resolution of the problems that have contributed to the
current crisis.
Note:
1 . h t t p : / / c a l e n d a r . c o l u m b i a . e d u / s u n d i a l /
webapi/get.php?brand=sipa&id=10714&vt=detail&context=standalone
*Columbia University Weatherhead East Asia Institute (WEAI) Center fro Korean
Research “Contemporary Korean Affairs Seminar – The Korean Peninsular in the 21st
Century” with Ambassador Choi Young-jin, Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Korea to the United Nations.
Page 14
The above article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=324790&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on February 7, 2007]
Hardliners Attack U.N.D.P.
Aid to North Korea
Allegations of Corruption Seen
as Attempt to Undermine Engagement
by Ronda Hauben
“We didn’t give them any money to squander,” explains Ghulam
Faruq Achikzad, who worked as the resident representative for the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in North Korea from
1993 to 1996. Though the program that Achikzad worked in differs from
the current program, his description of his experience is helpful in
understanding the nature of the UNDP country program in North Korea.
The responsibility for the integrity of the program rests with the
resident coordinator, says Achikzad. Working for the U.N., he saw
himself as an international civil servant who was responsible for the
funds for the program and would not let them be used for anything else.
On Jan. 19, The Wall Street Journal and Fox News published
articles
1
containing a series of unsubstantiated allegations about
mismanagement and abuse of UNDP funds by the North Korean
government. The allegations in the two articles repeated allegations
made in letters made available by the U.S. mission to the U.N. in New
York. Fox News provided a link
2
to a letter from a Deputy Ambassador
at the U.S. mission to the U.N., Mark Wallace, to the UNDP. Wallace’s
letter claimed that “at least since 1998 the UNDP DPRK program has
been systematically perverted for the benefit of the Kim Jong Il regime.”
In his letter, Wallace further alleged that “the UNDP DPRK program has
for years operated in blatant violation of U.N. rules, served as a steady
Page 15
and large source of hard currency and other resources for the DPRK
government with minimal or no assurance that UNDP funds and
resources are utilized for legitimate development activities.” No actual
evidence was offered to support the allegations.
Achikzad explains that while he was in North Korea, there was no
abuse of the UNDP program. The program utilized relatively little
money, approximately $5 million a year. The money was mostly aimed
at technical assistance and training. The North Koreans needed foreign
exchange so he helped them to understand that it was important for them
to learn about international trade. When they expressed their reluctance
because they didn’t want to be capitalist, he would advise them that they
didn’t have to be capitalist to be involved in foreign trade, but they
needed knowledge about it to be able to participate. Achikzad even
arranged a training session for them with people from the World Bank
so they could learn about the operations of the World Bank.
The programs while he was there had to do with international
economics, energy, and modernization of agricultural. Also Achikzad
explains that there was no abuse of foreign currency going to North
Korea when he was in charge of the program. Much of the program
involved bringing in people from outside of North Korea to provide
training and education.
Neither The Wall Street Journal nor Fox News provided support for
their charges, other than Wallace’s letter containing the allegations.
Neither these articles, nor most of the articles that appeared in the days
that followed in the U.S. press, provided any consideration of the
allegations to try to determine if they were well founded. The UNDP
Associate Administrator Ad Melkert, and David Morrison, the Director
of Communications of UNDP, responded
3
to the charges of illegality in
the Wallace letter, but their explanations were in general ignored by
much of the media.
Melkert said that the accusation that the UNDP operated “in blatant
violation of U.N. rules” was not true. Under UNDP financial regulations,
he explained, the authority to decide the practices to follow was
delegated to the resident coordinator in a country. Also misleading was
the accusation that the UNDP program was providing hard currency to
be misused by the North Korean government. As long as the UNDP
Page 16
operates a program in a country where the currency is not exchangeable
outside of the country, there is a need to buy the currency of the country
from the central bank. It is not possible to have a program in such a
country without buying currency from the bank.
While press reports in the U.S. often just repeated or exaggerated
the original allegations, a few other publications provided a different
perspective. For example, the Korean newspaper Voice of the People
pointed out that the allegations of UNDP mismanagement appeared just
as the North Korean and U.S. representatives had had productive
negotiations in Berlin. The Voice of the People asked why the U.S.
Mission to the U.N. was raising these issues “at this time.”
“Despite the totally unfounded allegation by the hawks,” the editors
write, “it has a political effect for freezing (the) bilateral relationship
between Washington and Pyongyang.
In response to similar allegations by the Heritage Foundation about
a program between South Korea and North Korea, the South Korean
Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung responded, “this criticism is based
on unidentified assumptions (rather) than on firm ground.” He went on
to point out that the economic cooperation that South Korean aid to
North Korea funds “is a short cut to maintain peace on the Korean
peninsula.”
In summing up the lessons from his experience in the UNDP
program, Achikzad emphasized that just as it is important that the
resident coordinator in charge of the country program for the UNDP be
chosen carefully, it is similarly important that the U.N. continue to
conduct programs in North Korea and other countries because the U.N.
he explained is “a neutral institution. It’s an institution belonging to all
of us, not one powerful country.”
Notes:
1. Melanie Kirkpatrick, “United Nations Dictator’s Program” WSJ, Jan. 19, 2007. The
article says: “The hard currency supplied by the UNDP almost certainly goes into one
big pot marked ‘Dear Leader’ which Kim can use for whatever he wants, including his
weapons programs.”
George Russell, “U.S. State Department Reveals North Korea’s Misuse of U.N.
Development Program Funds and Operations,” Foxnews.com, Friday, January 19, 2007
Page 17
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,244799,00.html
2. http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/WallaceonNoKo.pdf
3. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/pressconference/pc070119.rm
The above article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3440
01&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in TELEPOLIS on
February 14, 2007]
What Role Will Ban Ki-moon Play?
[Analysis] The Struggle Over Reform at the U.N.
by Ronda Hauben
As soon as Ban Ki-moon took office as the 8
th
secretary general of
the United Nations, his comments sparked controversy. A statement
about Saddam Hussein’s execution, namely that capital punishment was
a decision to be made by each nation, drew condemnation from those
who compared it with previous U.N. statements, while it was supported
by John Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the U.N., who praised
Ban’s statement about capital punishment as the “right instinct.”
Kofi Annan, Ban’s predecessor, had been willing at times to
condemn what he deemed violations of the U.N. charter. For example,
before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Annan warned that such “a military
action would violate the U.N. charter.”
1
Similarly, during the 2006
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Annan stated that Israel’s “‘disproportion-
ate’ use of force and collective punishment of the Lebanese people must
stop.”
2
This was a means of condemning Israeli actions as illegal.
Such actions earned Annan praise for being willing to tell “the truth
to the powerful,” from Dumisani Kumalo, the South African Ambassa-
dor to the U.N., speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 (G-77). These
actions, on the other hand, were condemned by Bolton who criticized
Page 18
Annan as the U.N.’s “chief moralizer,” whose activities “were not
ultimately helpful to the world body.”
3
Even before he took office, Ban had said he would be open with the
press, promising that he could be “a pretty straight shooter when I need
to.” Coming to the U.N. from his former position as the foreign minister
of South Korea, Ban brought with him a reputation for dodging
questions from the press when he deemed that beneficial. This trait led
South Korean journalists to nickname him “slippery eel.”
4
Already
during his short term in office, there have been several instances when
Ban praised the powerful and dodged questions from reporters when
asked to explain the basis for his praise.
One example occurred after Ban met with the U.S. President George
Bush in Washington on January 16, 2007. At the press conference
following the meeting, Ban referred to Bush as a “a great leader.” When
Ban returned to the U.N., a reporter asked him why he had used these
words to describe Bush. Ban responded: “In diplomacy, it is appropriate
to address any Head of State or Government with due respect and
courtesy. I hope you will understand what this diplomatic practice is.”
5
Such comments have earned Ban a reputation as someone who “is
an enigma to media and diplomats alike”
6
and whose “statements” are
as hard to follow as “a Delphic Oracle.” Bolton, on the other hand, has
expressed his approval for what Ban has done or has freely offered his
advice on what to do differently. For example, Bolton characterized as
a “courageous decision”
7
Ban’s call for the resignations of 60 se-
nior-level officials in the secretariat. Since the contracts of these
officials were to expire anyway at the end of February, several reporters
wondered why Ban asked for their resignation. When Ban was asked for
his response to Bolton’s comments, Ban responded that he agreed with
some of them. He did not elaborate.
One of the first promises of the new Secretary General was that he
would carry out reform at the U.N. There are different views among the
member nations of the U.N. on what reform is needed.
For the U.S. government, as Bolton explains, the purpose of reform
is to make the U.N. a better tool among others “to implement American
foreign policy.”
8
For a number of other nations, the purpose of reform is to foster a
Page 19
multilateral process
9
to prevent war and hostilities among nations.
Nations which are part of the group known as the G-77 define a reform
agenda quite differently from the agenda promoted by the U.S. and what
the G-77 describe as “other developed nations from the North.”
The G-77, originally formed in 1964 when 77 developing nations
signed a Joint Declaration at the end of the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), has a reform agenda that focuses
10
on
development issues and on promoting the importance of the U.N. as the
preeminent international institution. There are now 130 nations that are
part of the G-77. Many of these nations are also part of the Non-Aligned
Movement.
During Ban’s first few weeks in his new position, he has appeared
to vacillate between the reform agenda of the G-77 and the reform
agenda supported by the U.S. and other powerful developed nations. The
U.S. wants the U.N. to be run more like a business, with business
processes and management goals, Bolton said in a talk
11
he gave at
Columbia University in April 2006. Other nations differ.
Describing how the U.N. differs from a business organization, in a
talk also given at Columbia University, Choi Young-jin, the Ambassador
to the U.N. from South Korea, explained that there are 192 nations
belonging to the U.N. and “every one is on the board of governors.”
12
Choi maintained that you can’t run an organization with 192
members on the board the same way you can run a business. While a
business has a goal of generating profit, “the strongest point of the
U.N.,” Choi said, “is its moral authority. The focus of any reform has to
be on that moral authority, not on ‘efficiencies.’”
Another characteristic of the differences in the reform agenda of the
different nations is the importance with which many nations view the
need for a reform of the Security Council. In December 2006 there was
a debate in the General Assembly about reform of the Security Council
that drew 70 speakers and substantial proposals for changing its
composition and working methods.
Subsequently at the first meeting
13
of the new year of the Security
Council on Jan. 8, 2007, several of the non-permanent members raised
14
the need for Security Council reform. One nation’s representative
explained that the issues taken up by the Security Council should be
Page 20
more carefully chosen so they do not to encroach on the mandate of
other U.N. organs. Similarly, he proposed that the Security Council
should not fail to act in situations consistent with its mandate, situations
that pose a threat to international peace and security, such as in the
“Palestine-Israeli issue.” Other issues raised during the Jan. 8 meeting
included the desirability of involving regional and subregional groups
in solving problems when feasible, that diplomatic solutions should be
utilized before resorting to sanctions, and that nations like Iran and
North Korea should not be denied the right to undertake research and
development for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
This meeting was also Ban’s first official meeting with the Security
Council. He gave a brief presentation.
15
Though he spoke about U.N.
reform, he didn’t mention Security Council reform. Later at a press
conference
16
with Ban’s spokesperson, a reporter asked if Ban deliber-
ately choose not to mention Security Council reform. The spokesperson
responded: “I don’t think it was deliberate. I think he is certainly
interested in the issue – definitely concerned about the issue. He has
talked about it before, but as you know with Security Council reforms
there was a proposal made, and now, it is in the hands of the Member
States.”
In general, the mainstream U.S. media provides little coverage of
the controversy over reform at the U.N. Allegations of U.N. mismanage-
ment, however, are pursued with a vengeance, just as they had been in
the “Oil for Food” scandal.
More recently articles by Fox News
17
and in The Wall Street
Journal
18
alleged that tens of millions of dollars of hard currency had
been subverted by the government of North Korea from the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and used to fund North Korea’s
nuclear program. Also the press reports charged that the UNDP had kept
the scam secret. Fox News asked if Kim Jung II “subverted the UNDP
program” and possibly stole “tens of millions of dollars of hard currency
in the process.” In their article “United Nations Dictators Program”, the
WSJ alleged that “the hard currency supplied by the UNDP almost
certainly goes into one big pot marked ‘Dear Leader’ which Kim can use
for whatever he wants.”
These allegations were made without any actual evidence to back
Page 21
them up, but just in time to coincide with the UNDP Executive Board
meeting that was to approve the programs for 2007 and on. The result of
the articles was to block the approval of the 2007-8 UNDP program in
North Korea, and to exert pressure so that the Secretary General
recommended an external audit of all U.N. programs, beginning with the
North Korean UNDP program. Headlines alleging North Korean abuse
of U.N. programs quickly spread in the U.S. and international media.
Subsequently, the U.N. announced that their audit plans were
focused on North Korea. There is to be an external audit of all U.N.
programs in North Korea. The audit is “to be completed by the Board of
Auditors within a three-month time frame, as per the Secretary General’s
proposal of 22 January 2007.”
Both the U.S. and the Group of 77 supported Ban’s candidacy for
the position of Secretary-General. Now that he is in the position, he is
faced with the ongoing struggle of contending forces over the U.N.’s
reform agenda. How he will handle the different pressures is one of the
important challenges he and the U.N. face in the coming months and
years of his term.
Notes:
1. “Iraq war was illegal and breached U.N. charter, says Annan,” The Guardian, Sept.
16, 2004.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1305709,00.html
2. “Kofi Annan Addresses Middle East Violence” (Transcript), The Washington Post,
July 20, 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/20/AR2006072000
912.html
3. “Don’t Ban Your Instincts, Ban Ki-moon,” The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 2007.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/12/AR2007011202
061.html
4. “Press Conference by Secretary-General-designate,” Dec. 14, 2006.
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sg_elect/press_conf_14dec06.htm
5. “Secretary-General’s press encounter upon entering U.N. Headquarters following
visit to Washington, DC” (unofficial transcript, New York, Jan. 17, 2007).
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=968
6. “Spinning the Moon,” The Guardian, Jan. 18, 2007.
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ian_williams/2007/01/the_moon_must_spin.html
7. The Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2007.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/12/AR2006011202
Page 22
061.html
8. “John Bolton: U.N. Reform Remains Vital But Unlikely,” Human Events, Jan. 22,
2007. http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=19042
9. U.N. General Assembly document, Sept. 15, 2005 (pdf file).
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/A60L.pdf
10. “A Commentary on ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform,’”
policy brief prepared by the South Centre at the request of the Group of 77.
http://www.g77.org/Docs/policy%20brief.htm
11. “John Bolton Says Proposed U.N. Reforms Do Not Go Far Enough,” Columbia
News, May 31, 2006.
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/06/05/bolton.html
12. “Conceptual Framework for International Relations,” OhmyNews International,
April 24, 2006.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=&no=287732&rel
_no=1&back_url=
13. U.N. Security Council document, Jan. 8, 2007.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8933.doc.htm
14. “States Call for Security Council Reform,” OhmyNews International, Jan. 10, 2007.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=7&no=339
250&rel_no=1
15. “Secretary-General’s remarks at the Security Council meeting on Threats to
International Peace and Security,” Jan. 8, 2007.
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2397
16. U.N. Spokesperson’s news briefing, Jan. 8, 2007.
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/db070108.doc.htm
18. “United Nations Dictator’s Program,” RealClear Politics, Jan. 19, 2007.
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/give_top_teachers_a_bonus.html
The above article can be seen at:
http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/html/result.xhtml?url=/tp/r4/artikel/24/24577/1.html&wor
ds=Hauben&T=hauben
Page 23
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on March 1, 2007]
ElBaradei Argues for
Negotiation With Iran
Sees “Window of Opportunity” to Diffuse Crisis
by Ronda Hauben
Many nations use nuclear fuel to generate electricity. Nations like
South Africa who use nuclear energy have to buy the enriched uranium
from nations that can do the enrichment. The Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei, says
there are 12 or 13 countries with the technical capability to do the 5
percent uranium enrichment needed for nuclear energy fuel production.
Iran says that given the difficulties it has had in having access to
advanced technology, it needs to be able to enrich uranium for its own
generation of electricity.
The U.S. government claims that Iran has other intentions and that
once Iran masters uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes it will
acquire a capability that can lead to the creation of nuclear weapons. The
U.S. government has taken the position that the right to do uranium
enrichment for peaceful purposes is a loophole in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
1
The production of nuclear weapons requires significantly greater
technical capacity than the ability to do 5% enrichment of uranium. The
U.S., however, wants to stop Iran from any development of uranium
enrichment technology. The U.N. Security Council supported this effort
by imposing sanctions against Iran in December 2006 as part of Security
Council Resolution 1737. For the sanctions to end, Iran would have to
stop its enrichment activity.
Iran, for its part, insists that it has the right to master the technology
needed for the peaceful production of nuclear energy and that it won’t
stop its peaceful enrichment program. As a signatory of the NPT, Iran
has the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Page 24
The Iranian government says it is willing to negotiate but it is not
willing to accept the precondition that it cease enrichment activity before
being able to negotiate. It is in this context that the drama is unfolding
at the U.N. in the Security Council.
In an interview
2
with the Financial Times, IAEA Director General
ElBaradei argues for negotiations with Iran rather than hostile actions
that will further polarize the underlying disagreements. ElBaradei
maintains that hostile actions are counterproductive to the aims of the
NPT.
ElBaradei oversees the inspection and monitoring of nuclear activity
of all countries that are signatories to the NPT. Explaining why he is in
favor of dialog and of negotiation, ElBaradei says, “I know if you
engage people, you moderate their behavior. If you isolate them you
radicalize them.”
“What is really important to have,” says ElBaradei, is “a proper
diagnosis of the problem, assess the problem properly.”
ElBaradei explains that the hostile actions and words against a
nation are a pressure that can provoke a nation to feel it needs a nuclear
deterrent. Applying such reasoning to the situation with Iran he explains:
“Even if they were not going to develop a nuclear weapon today,
this would be a sure recipe for them to go down that route.”
ElBaradei advises the U.S. give Iran security guarantees, “Then we
should also stop calling names and threatening regime change.”
When Ban Ki-moon, the U.N. Secretary General, visited Vienna on
Feb. 23, he met with ElBaradei. When asked if there is anything the Sec-
retary General is doing to encourage negotiation in this period. Ban’s
spokesperson Michele Montas replied:
“The Secretary General met with ElBaradei. They discussed it and
Mr. ElBaradei is doing that effort you are talking about.”
3
ElBaradei notes that the IAEA has issued its report as required by
Security Council Resolution 1737, but that the report will not be acted
on until March 6, 2007 when the IAEA Council meets and the IAEA
member nations vote to approve or reject the report. Until that date he
can change the report. “I can add or reverse judgments there until the
March 6,” said ElBaradei. This means, he explained, that the period
between Feb. 22 and March 6 presents a “window of opportunity” for
Page 25
negotiations with Iran.
He urged Iran and the nations on the Security Council to utilize this
opportunity to find a way to have engagement based on dialog to
reconcile their differences.
Iran has indicated it is willing to negotiate but will not agree to the
precondition that it suspend its enrichment before such negotiations take
place.
Hans Blix, the former chief weapons inspector in Iraq has explained
that it is a “humiliating” and a “neocolonial attitude” to demand that Iran
cease its enrichment activity before any negotiations are possible.
Iran contends that 5% enrichment of uranium is its right under the
NPT. And that it is being singled out and denied the right that the NPT
provides.
ElBaradei explains that as long as Iran’s enrichment activities are
carried out under the IAEA, oversight to limit the degree of enrichment
to 5% can be maintained. Also he would like to get Iran to agree to the
Additional Protocol which would provide the IAEA with additional
authority for other forms of inspection. Iran had voluntarily signed the
Additional Protocol but withdrew from it when the IAEA 35 nation
board voted to require Iran to suspend enrichment activity. ElBaradei
says that Iran’s agreement to accept the Additional Protocol would give
the IAEA the authority it needs to better inspect the manufacture of
equipment.
On Sunday, Feb. 25, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani met
with South African President Thabo Mbeki and explained that: “Setting
a precondition for negotiation means reaching a conclusion ahead of the
talks, which has been an unsuccessful policy.”
4
South Africa is currently a non-permanent member on the U.N.
Security Council and holds the presidency of the Council during the
month of March. South Africa has one nuclear plant for the production
of nuclear energy and has “voiced its firm decision to build a second
nuclear power plant.” It intends to study various methods of uranium
enrichment to produce the fuel needed by its power plants rather than
only rely on foreign sources.
5
Italy is also a non-permanent member of the Council. On Sunday,
Feb. 25 and Monday Feb. 26 the Century Foundation sponsored a
Page 26
program at the Millennium U.N. Plaza Hotel on “Weapons threats and
International Security: Rebuilding an Unraveled Consensus”
6
The Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the U.N. provided the idea and support for
the program. Both Blix and Iran’s Ambassador to the U.N. Javad Zarif
spoke during the events of the conference.
The upcoming deliberations in the Security Council also come at a
time of discussion about the need for reform of the Security Council’s
practices and composition by a number of U.N. member states, including
several of the non-permanent members of the current Security Council.
7
Among the issues being raised by those advocating reform, is the
concern that the Security Council takes up issues that are not appropriate
under its mandate and doesn’t take up other issues that are appropriate.
Iran contends that the issue of its enrichment activity is an issue that
belongs in the IAEA not in the Security Council. It has complained that
transferring the issue of how it adheres to the obligations under the NPT
to the Security Council has served to politicize what is a technical
process.
Whether the U.S. and other proponents of sanctions against Iran will
prevail in the Security Council deliberations, or whether the voices of
those nations which argue for a negotiated process to find a solution to
the dispute will succeed, will become apparent in upcoming develop-
ments in the Security Council. But the controversy over whether under
the NPT a nation is allowed to develop a 5% uranium enrichment
capacity to make possible the production of nuclear fuel for nuclear
energy generation is a controversy that merits public understanding and
consideration.
ElBaradei, stressing the importance of keeping Iran’s nuclear
development within the confines of the oversight of the IAEA and the
NPT explains: “to aim at denying a country knowledge is almost
impossible, to say the least. And there’s a big difference between
acquiring the knowledge for enrichment and developing a bomb.”
Notes:
1. “Hostile Act” Telepolis 12/30/2006
http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/24/24319/1.html
2. Transcript of the Director General’s Interview on Iran and DPRK, Financial Times
Page 27
with Daniel Dombey Feb. 19 2007
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2007/ft190207.html
3. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/pressbriefing/brief070226.rm starting at 16:57
4. “Larijani returns home from S. African visit” from Islamic Republic News Agency,
IRNA Feb. 27
http://www2.irna.com/en/news/view/line-22/0702270655174113.htm
5. http://www.presstv.ir/pop/print.aspx?id=858
6. http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=EV&pubid=176
7. States Call for Security Council Reform
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3392
50&rel_no=1
The above article article can be seen at:
http://engdev.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=347904&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on March 7, 2007]
U.S., North Korea Move to Open Ties
Christopher Hill and Kim Kye-gwan
Hold Meeting in New York on First Steps
by Ronda Hauben
“This process, not unlike a video game, gets more and more
difficult as you get to different levels,” said Christopher Hill, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State, speaking at a press conference held at the
Foreign Press Center in New York City shortly after he had finished two
days of meetings with North Korea’s lead negotiator for the Six-Party
Talks, Kim Kye-gwan. Hill is the chief negotiator for the U.S. The
Six-Party Talks include the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China,
Russia and Japan.
Hill characterized the activities of the past two days as “good
discussions” which were “very comprehensive.” Both sides were
Page 28
optimistic that they would get through the first 60-day period’s tasks that
were outlined in the Feb. 13 agreement signed in Beijing.
A reason for the optimism, Hill explained, was that his talks with
Kim not only discussed the issues that had to be resolved at this 30-day
stage, but they also explored what they would need to do to go forward
after the 60-day period, which will end in mid-April.
Hill explained that five working groups have been set up. His
working group with Kim on normalizing U.S.-North Korean relations
finished their tasks within the 30-day time schedule that they had set for
the five groups to begin their process. Another group, the bilateral group
between North Korea and Japan will meet in Hanoi and the three other
groups will be meeting in Beijing.
Hill was interested in the efforts to get an agreement between the
U.S. and North Korea in the 1990s and had learned some of the
background from his discussions with Kim.
A focus of their talks, Hill explained, was on the upcoming
meetings that would take place with the six parties in Beijing and how
to make those productive. “The ministers from each of the six parties to
the talks will be meeting in Beijing then and assessing where we will go
the next 60 days,” Hill said.
Hill was asked how this negotiation was different from previous
ones with North Korea. He described how the tight deadlines were one
aspect. Another was that the agreement involved the six parties and the
bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea and the other parties
were within this framework.
Also Hill credited the close work between the U.S. and China for
some of the progress. Not only did the U.S. and China have the common
goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, he explained, but also the
two countries shared a similar strategy and even tactics. Negotiators
from both countries worked closely together, even on the text for the
agreement.
When he was asked, “What support will you have that will keep this
on track?” Hill replied that he had tremendous support from Secretary
of State Condoleeza Rice. She kept on top of all the details and he would
be briefing her shortly on the recent discussions. “I feel I’ve got a lot of
support,” he said, “and as long as I can show some results I’ll get more
Page 29
support. Diplomatic negotiation is sort of like managing a baseball
game. As long as you win, everyone’s happy.”
Hill emphasized that there would be the need to keep the process
moving and showing some progress.
When asked if he had been invited to visit North Korea, Hill said
that his counterpart had raised the idea in a general sense but nothing
specific had been discussed as they focused on Beijing and the upcom-
ing round of Six-Party Talks.
With regard to how to manage the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula, Hill said they discussed how to get experts in on the matter.
There would need to be some technical discussions. It was a good step,
Hill said, that Director General Mohamed El-Baradei of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been invited to North Korea and
was planning a trip soon.
Hill indicated that the problem with Banco Delta Asia would be
solved soon. The U.S. has committed itself to find a solution within the
first 30-day period.
Hill stressed that the historical background of the particular
situation with North Korea was important to keep in mind and not to
draw too many analogies with other situations.
He compared the negotiations to someone always pushing a rock
uphill, and the rock always seems to come down to the base of the hill.
The discussion he just had with Ambassador Kim, Hill said, reflected the
sense that “we can get through this.” He had been encouraged by his
counterpart to look ahead.
Because the negotiators are getting to know each other from so
many different meetings, when issues come up, they don’t need to
reiterate points. That way they are able to cover more ground.
The atmosphere in the room during the press conference captured
some of the excitement that the negotiations between Hill and Kim were
another step toward the fulfillment of the September 2005 Six-Party
agreement. This represents significant activity toward the peaceful
resolution of the hostility between the U.S. and North Korea that has
lingered for the past 50 years, since the days of the Korean war.
Page 30
The above article article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3489
74&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on March 21, 2007]
North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco
Delta Asia
[Opinion] Another Abuse Under
the U.S. Patriot Act (2001)
by Ronda Hauben
A little known provision in the U.S. Patriot Act (2001) has been
used by the Bush administration against North Korea to freeze $25
million dollars of its funds and to deny it access to the international
banking system and to hard currency. Actions under this provision of the
Patriot Act effectively stymied progress in disarmament talks between
the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan for over
18 months. North Korea says that only when the seized $25 million and
access to the international banking system are restored is it willing to
continue negotiations under the Six-Party agreement concerning security
and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
The little known provision of the Patriot Act is Section 311. It is
also known as the “International Money Laundering Abatement and
Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001.”
1
The original purpose was allegedly related to the prevention,
detection and prosecution of money laundering connected to the
financing of terrorism. The law has rarely been used for its original
purpose. Instead it has been used by the Bush administration as a means
of unchecked political power against financial institutions like the Banco
Delta Asia. This case has an impact on those nations or institutions who
Page 31
used the bank, like North Korea.
Two other sections of the Patriot Act currently under scrutiny, the
use of the Patriot Act to illegally obtain personal information on U.S.
citizens, and the use of a provision in the Patriot Act to replace U.S.
Attorneys, have been identified as being used by the Bush administration
for expanding and abusing executive power. Section 311 provides
another means for sidestepping international and national legal practices
and substituting an ad hoc set of processes that leave the victims with no
means of due process or defense.
Section 311 has been called by its supporters “a diplomatic
sledgehammer that gets results” and by its critics a provision that denies
the accused “due process and presumes guilt.”
Critics say that this provision of the Patriot Act applies U.S. law to
the financial institutions of other countries. In a proceeding under
Section 311 of the Patriot Act (2001) the U.S. Treasury Department acts
as accuser and judge, in international jurisdictions. Also, often the
evidence used by the Treasury Department is classified and thus not
available for examination by the accused so that it can’t be refuted.
This provision gives the U.S. Treasury the ability to use an
Executive Branch administrative procedure rather than a legal proceed-
ing as a way to accuse a financial institution that is part of another
nation’s regulatory system of wrong doing, and then to find it guilty.
Under this provision of the Patriot Act, the accused is denied knowledge
of the evidence against it and is denied the right to speak in its own
defense. Section 311 of the Patriot Act (2001) was used against the
BDA, a small bank in Macau, to freeze substantial financial assets of
North Korea and also to deny North Korea access to the international
banking system.
2
The case against the BDA was instituted in September
2005 just after the U.S. had signed the Six-Party agreement.
The accused under Section 311 is presumed to be guilty and the
burden falls on it to prove its innocence without being able to know the
evidence or charges.
3
Invoking Section 311 against the BDA effectively sabotaged the
implementation of the Six-Party agreement of September 2005 for 18
months as BDA did not have a process to challenge the Treasury
Department action, nor did those whose accounts at the bank had been
Page 32
frozen, like North Korea. It was only after North Korea conducted a
missile test in July 2006 and the test of a nuclear device in October
2006, that the Bush administration was willing to agree to negotiations
over the Treasury action.
Negotiations in Berlin between the U.S. government and North
Korea in January 2007 and then in Beijing in February 2007 with the
U.S., South Korea, China, Russia and Japan, resulted in the Six-Party
agreement announced on Feb. 13, 2007.
The difference that most analysts point to in comparing the Feb. 13
2007 Six-Party agreement with the Six-Party agreement of September
2005 is that the more recent agreement includes a series of processes and
a time table. The critical difference that has been overlooked, however,
is that a requirement of the Feb. 13 agreement was that the U.S. restore
the funds that were frozen by the actions of the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment. Also North Korea’s access to the international financial system
was to be restored.
These requirements caused “intense friction” in Washington
between officials in the State Department and “officials in the Treasury
Department and in the Office of Vice President Dick Cheney who were
said to favor maintaining maximum pressure” on North Korea.
4
There
were reports of urgent telephone calls between officials in the State
Department and the Treasury. Assistant Secretary of State John
Negroponte finally got a decision from the Treasury Department by
Friday, March 16. The Treasury Department had ruled against the BDA.
U.S. banks would not be allowed to do business with it. The U.S.
government announcement said that it would be up to the Macau
authorities to decide if they would unfreeze and restore some or all of
North Korea’s funds.
By the weekend of March 17, a behind the scenes drama continued
to unfold. China announced that it regretted the U.S. action. The owner
of the Macao bank said he would go to court to attempt to challenge the
decision. Getting off the plane in Beijing on Saturday to attend the next
stage of Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-gwan, North Korea’s lead negotiator
for the Six-Party Talks, told reporters that all of the $25 million had to
be returned if North Korea was to go to the next step of the Six-Party
Talks.
Page 33
Hill announced that he would explain the settlement to the Chinese
and North Korean negotiators. China announced that a settlement had
been reached but that the details of it couldn’t yet be revealed. Subse-
quently, there was an announcement that all of the $25 million in funds
would be returned to North Korea and deposited in China in an account
held by the North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank at the Bank of China in
Beijing. U.S. Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser, in a press conference
held with Hill, confirmed the U.S. government decision. It was unknown
he said, when the funds would actually be put in the North Korean bank
account.
Subsequently, diplomats who were in Beijing to continue the
Six-Party Talks told reporters that North Korean diplomats said the
funds had to be in the bank account for them to continue with negotia-
tions.
Though there have been many newspaper articles reporting the
standoff in the Six-Party Talks caused by the dispute over the use of
Section 311 against North Korea, few of the articles provide an
understanding of the underlying issues involved. A commentator on
BBC, for example, demonstrating a serious lack of understanding of the
use of Section 311 and the abuse of power it represents said this is an
example of the high price that North Korea will extract for its coopera-
tion in the talks.
It is not without cause then, that in describing the process of the
Six-Party Talks Hill compared the process to a video game. He warned:
“This process, not unlike a video game gets more and more difficult as
you get to different levels.”
5
Notes:
1. http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/Section301.html
2. “Treasury Casts a Wide Net Under Patriot Act”
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnists/kevin_g_hall/168897
90.htm
3. “The U.S. government has never publicly detailed evidence behind its charges. Nor
has it sought to initiate legal action, relying instead on Section 311 of the Patriot Act,
which critics say extends U.S. laws to cover other countries.” “Bush Administration
Plan May Unfreeze North Korean Funds”
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnists/kevin_g_hall/169041
Page 34
05.htm
4. “Administration Reconsiders Some North Korea Restrictions”
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnists/warren_p_strobel/165
54751.htm
5. “U.S., North Korea Move to Open Ties”
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=348974&rel_no=1
The above article article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3515
25&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on May 19, 2007]
Behind the Blacklisting of
Banco Delta Asia
Is the Policy Aimed at Targeting
China as Well as North Korea?
by Ronda Hauben
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, speaking at the
Korea Society’s 50
th
Anniversary dinner in New York City on May 15,
said that he was determined not to “allow $26 million or $25 million get
between us and a deal that will finally do something about nuclear
weapons on the Korean peninsula.” He promised that Kathleen Stephens
at the Korea desk at the State Department was working on the problem
and that “we are going to keep after this problem till we solve it.” His
statement didn’t give further details about how this problem was to be
solved, a problem that had interrupted the progress that seemed at last
possible in the Feb. 13 Six-Party agreement.
1
Just two days later, on May 17, the U.S. Wachovia Bank announced
that it is exploring a request from the State Department to transfer the
funds from the BDA (Banco Delta Asia) to North Korea. Wachovia
Page 35
Bank reported that it would require the necessary approvals from bank
regulators to do the transfer.
Until this latest announcement, banks have been unwilling to do the
transfer because of the legal action that the U.S. government took
against the BDA, by ruling that it was involved in criminal activity
under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. Banks which deal with a bank
that has been found guilty of such illegal acts risk losing their access to
the international financial system. North Korea has said that the
denuclearization and other aspects of the Six-Party agreement that it has
been part of can only go forward when the BDA situation is resolved.
“To make the money transfer possible freely just like before has been
our demand…from the beginning,” a spokesperson from North Korea
said.
2
In his daily press briefing on May 17, Scott McCormack at the U.S.
State Department said, “We all want to see the BDA issue resolved,
obviously resolved within the laws and regulations of the United States
as well as the international financial system, and we’d like to move on
and get back to the business of the Six-Party Talks, which is really
focused on the issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”
3
Whether this latest development with Wachovia Bank will provide
the needed breakthrough, it is too soon to tell. But there are other
developments which may provide the needed pressures on the U.S.
government to decriminalize the $25 million it has frozen of North
Korean funds and restore North Korea’s access to the international
banking system. Their access was severely impeded by the action that
the U.S. Treasury Department took against the BDA.
The developments I am referring to are the release in the public
domain of several documents related to the U. S. Treasury Department’s
actions against BDA. One of the documents is a sworn statement by the
owner of the BDA, Mr. Stanley Au, in support of his petition to revoke
the rule imposing the special measures taken by the U.S. Treasury
Department against his bank. Another document is the petition in
support of his case. Also the Treasury Department finding against the
bank has been put online. These documents have been made available
on the blog “China Matters.”
4
In his statement, Au explains the history of his bank’s relations with
Page 36
North Korea and how there was only one experience, which occurred in
June 1994, when there was a problem with counterfeit U.S. dollars. At
the time, the bank reported this incident to the U.S. government. Agents
from the U.S. government came to the bank and questioned Au. He
answered their questions and asked if the agents recommended that the
bank “desist from doing business with North Korean entities.” The
agents said “they would like us to continue to deal with them as it was
better that we conducted this business than another financial entity that
may not be so cooperative with the United States government.”
Au explains that there was no further experience with counterfeit
money showing up in the transactions of the bank. All “large value
deposits of U.S. dollar bills from North Korean sources” were sent to the
Hong Kong branch of the Republic National Bank of New York (which
became HSBC) to be certified that they were authentic via advanced
technology possessed by that bank. Smaller quantities of bills were
examined in accord with common banking practices by the bank itself.
Au also explains that he had not been approached by U.S. govern-
ment agents alerting him to any problem or illegal activity. The first he
learned that his bank was being charged as a bank engaged in “illicit
activities” came when he saw a report in the Asian Wall Street Journal
in September 2005 that his bank was a candidate for a U.S. money
laundering blacklist. He tells how “this news came as a bolt out of the
blue – the Bank had never been informed by the United States that its
practices were a cause of any money laundering concern, and the
counterfeiting event that the media reported as the basis for the
designation had occurred more than ten years earlier and had been
promptly reported to the authorities by Banco Delta Asia.”
5
Stanley Au’s statement is in sharp contrast with the account in the
U.S. government’s Federal Register of the finding against the bank by
the U.S. Treasury Department.
6
The Federal Register finding states that the bank had provided
financial services for more than 20 years to multiple North Korean-
related individuals and entities that were engaged in illicit activities. It
provides no specific details of what such illicit activities were. It claims
that the entities paid a fee to Banco Delta Asia for their access to the
bank. The finding claims that the bank facilitated wire transfers and
Page 37
helped a front company.
In his statement, Stanley Au maintained that the BDA did not
charge a fee for its services nor did it conduct illicit services for North
Korea or any other customer. The bank was only one of the banks in
Macau that did business with North Korea. The business his bank had
with North Korea began in the mid 1970s and was to assist North Korea
with its foreign trade transactions. Also Au described North Korea as a
gold producing country and that in the late 1990s the bank had acted as
a “gold bullion trader on behalf of the North Koreans.” Also the BDA
bought or sold foreign currency notes for North Korea, including U.S.
dollars, because North Korea had a limited banking system and so it
couldn’t do such transactions itself (see Statement, pp. 3-4).
The petition submitted to the U.S. Dept of the Treasury to challenge
the finding against BDA proposes that BDA was targeted not because
of any “voluminous” evidence of money laundering but “because it was
an easy target in the sense that it was not so large that its failure would
bring down the financial system.”
7
In the substantial and prolific analysis of the BDA problem that has
been developed on the blog “China Matters,” there is the assessment that
North Korea has legitimate financial activity and that the BDA was
legitimately serving as one of the banks for that activity. Even with the
U.N.’s sanctions, it was not appropriate to target for blacklisting the
legitimate financial activities of North Korea. The sanctions that the
U.N.-imposed against North Korea were to be aimed at its activity that
was related to nuclear weapon development, not to normal financial
transactions.
The author of China Matters blog writes:
8
“The alternative view…is that legitimate North Korean financial
activity does exist, BDA had a right to solicit North Korean
accounts and handle North Korean transactions, and Stanley Au
should be allowed to run his bank as long as he conforms to the
laws of his jurisdiction – and (the bank) not be used as a political
football in Washington’s dealings with Pyongyang.”
To put it more succinctly, the blog China Matters quotes David
Ascher, who had been the coordinator for the Bush Administration
working group on North Korea and a senior adviser in East Asian affairs
Page 38
in the State Department, in testimony to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on April 18,
2007, explaining why Banco Delta was chosen to be blacklisted from the
international banking system:
9
“Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We were trying to kill the
chicken to scare the monkeys. And the monkeys were big Chinese
banks doing business in North Korea…and we’re not talking about
tens of millions, we’re talking hundreds of millions.”
The purpose of the action against the BDA appears not only to have
been to target North Korea and its access to the international banking
system, but also to send a message to China.
Therefore it would appear that the action against BDA is a carefully
crafted political action and that it will be necessary that there be public
understanding, discussion and debate about what is behind this action in
order to find a way to have the policy that gave rise to the BDA action
changed.
Instead of the U.S. mainstream press carrying out the needed
investigation about why BDA has been targeted and what is behind this
action, there have been continual condemnations of North Korea.
Fortunately there are journalists like those who work with the
McClatchy News Service who have made an effort to probe what is
happening behind-the-scenes in the BDA affair and blogs like China
Matters which have taken the time and care to begin uncovering what
the BDA affair is really all about. This is but one of the stories of what
is really going on behind the scenes within the U.S. government that has
been hidden from the public. This is one of the stories yet to be
unraveled by bloggers, and citizen journalists.
10
Notes:
1. See earlier article “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia.”
http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?menu=A11100&no=35
1525&rel_no=1&back_url=%3Cbr%3E
2. “North Korea says work to transfer bank funds under way,” AFP, May 15, 2007
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/276391/1/.html
3. Scott McCormack, Daily Press Briefing, Washington DC, May 17, 2007
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/may/85132.htm
Page 39
4. “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations.”
http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html
%3Cbr%3E
5. Statement of Mr. Stanley Au in Support of Petition to Revoke Rule Imposing Special
Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, p. 7.
http://www.fileden.com/files/2007/5/15/1081304/Statement_of_Stanley_Au.PDF
See also Kevin G. Hall, “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations,”
McClatchy Newspapers, May 16, 2007.
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17236073.htm
6. Department of the Treasury, 31 CFR Part 103/ RIN 1506-AA83, Federal Register/
Vol 72, No. 52/ Monday, March 19, 2007/ Rules and Regulations.
http://www.fileden.com/files/2007/5/15/108134/bda_final_rule%5B1%5D.pdf
7. Petition of Mr. Stanley Au and Delta Asia Group (Holdings) Ltd. to Rescind Final
Rule, p. 12.
http://www.fileden.com/files/2007/5/15/1081304/Petition_to_Rescind_Final_Rule.pdf
8. “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia,” Tuesday, May 15, 2007
http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html
%3Cbr%3E
9. “David Asher’s Dead End,” Saturday, April 28, 2007
http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-end.html
See also “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its role in addressing the
nuclear and missile situations in both nations,” Hearing, Sept 14, 2006, Nov. 2006, p.
115-116.
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/sept_14/06_09_14_trans.pdf
10. Ronda Hauben, “Bill Moyers and the Emergence of U.S. Citizen Journalism: Power
of government creates need for investigative news.”
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/%3Cbr%3Ehttp://english.ohmynews.com/
articleview/article_view.asp?no=360069&rel_no=1
The above article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3621
92&rel_no=1
Page 40
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on June 24, 2007]
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Syndrome and the Press
[Analysis] How Does One Prove a Negative?
by Ronda Hauben
April 5, 2006. Congressman Ron Paul (Texas) makes a speech
“Iran: The Next Neo-con Target.”
1
He reviews the scenario of how the
invasion of Iraq was prepared in the U.S. “We demand that Iran prove
it is not in violation of nuclear agreements, which is asking them
impossibly to prove a negative,” Paul observes.
Mohamed ElBareidei, the IAEA Director, Paul explains, has
supported Iran’s contention that it has been in compliance with its rights
under the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) IAEA safeguard
agreement.
What have we learned from the experience in Iraq, Paul asks?
Four years have passed since the U.S. government mobilized much
of the U.S. press to create the “spin” which provided a pretext for the
March 2003 invasion of Iraq. The U.S. government accused Iraq of
having “Weapons of Mass Destruction.” How could Iraq prove they
didn’t have any of a whole catalogue of things that they were accused of
having? There was no way for Iraq to disprove the accusations. Thus
much of the U.S. press, in cooperation with various U.S. government
officials, used the impossibility of proving a negative to create a media
environment in which the U.S. government could falsely claim they had
a justification for a war against Iraq.
Fast forward to April 18, 2007. The same U.S. Congressman’s
comments seem like a lone voice of reason during a hearing in a U.S.
House of Representatives Foreign Affairs subcommittee about how to
craft financial sanctions against North Korea and Iran.
2
In this hearing,
the witnesses and some of the Congressmen discuss what they claim is
the great success that the sanctions against North Korea have been. They
Page 41
review how the U.S. Treasury Department froze $25 million of North
Korea’s funds in a bank account at the Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank
in Macau China. The action by the U.S. Treasury Department against
this bank resulted in North Korea losing access to the international
banking system. David Asher, one of the witnesses, tells how he was
part of a team carefully planning such consequences of an action taken
by the U.S. Treasury Department under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot
Act.
3
Asher acknowledges that he was involved in instigating investiga-
tions against North Korea in a whole variety of law enforcement entities.
“Sanctions are an act of war,” Congressman Paul inserts into the
hearing.
4
They mostly harm innocent citizens, he points out and they are
used by governments preparing the population of their country to accept
a war. The Chair of the hearing wonders aloud whether such sanctions
hurt the people of a country versus whether they bring regime change.
This hearing and other U.S. government activities demonstrate that
the U.S. Treasury Department’s action against Banco Delta Asia was a
carefully prepared political act calculated to accomplish a political end.
5
It was not an unintended consequence of some legitimate legal process.
It was not the result of a judicial process which gathered evidence, made
allegations, presented its evidence and rendered a decision by an
impartial judge based on the evidence. Instead the Treasury Department
was the accuser and the judge and never presented any evidence. The
accused was automatically declared guilty. Even after the guilty verdict
there were few avenues available to challenge the whole procedure. The
blacklisting of the Banco Delta Asia and of North Korea from the
international banking system was done with no due process procedure.
It is therefore all the more revealing to see the many press accounts
which accepted that North Korea was guilty of crimes and was unrea-
sonable in turning to its sovereign right to self defense. Similarly it is
revealing to see how most of the U.S. media treat Iran’s right to develop
and operate nuclear enrichment technology for peaceful purposes.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, appearing on the Charlie Rose show on Friday,
June 15, acknowledged that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Iran has the right to the peaceful development of nuclear
technology and hence to do nuclear enrichment for nuclear energy
Page 42
production.
Yet much of the U.S. media, to the contrary, pronounces Iran guilty
of producing nuclear weapons though there is no proof that this is true.
It is left to Iran to prove it isn’t true, something which would not be
possible for any country to do.
Just as the New York Times and other U.S. media unswervingly
presented the accusations against Iraq in the run up to the Iraq war, so
similar press reports abound accusing North Korea of illicit activity and
Iran of preparing to produce nuclear weapons. It is up to the accused to
disprove the accusations, despite the fact that no evidence has been
presented to support the accusations.
There is no way to prove a negative. That is why the legal system
is premised on the obligation of the accuser to present the evidence of
a crime and the accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.
In the reversal of these norms, however, the accuser makes unsubstanti-
ated allegations and much of the mainstream media repeats the allega-
tions, without any investigation to determine if there is any factual basis
for the allegations.
Thus much of the U.S. media has become complicit in carefully
preparing the court of public opinion against the countries the U.S.
government has labeled as part of the so called “axis of evil.”
Judith Miller was a New York Times reporter who reported
unsubstantiated allegations accusing Iraq of possessing weapons of mass
destruction. When she was confronted with the proof that her stories
were false but were used to create a pretext for the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
she responded that she wasn’t an intelligence agent who was able to
determine what was true or false. A journalist, however, has an
obligation to present the public with accurate information, contrary to
Miller’s protestations to the contrary.
What is the significance of such drumbeats for war being orches-
trated so freely? With regard to the Banco Delta Asia accusations, there
are a few exceptions to the general acceptance by much of the media of
unsubstantiated allegations. Publications like the McClatchy publica-
tions, OhmyNews International, and some blogs like China Matters have
provided articles challenging the dominant media barrage.
6
Similarly,
there are a few publications presenting the right of Iran to peaceful
Page 43
development of nuclear energy under the NPT and the fact that there is
no proof for the allegation that it is developing nuclear weapons. These
publications include Seymour Hersh’s articles in the New Yorker
Magazine and Herb Blix’s recent book Target Iran: The Truth about the
White House’s Plans for Regime Change (Nation Books, 2006) .
Why haven’t more of the U.S. media devoted resources to investi-
gate the actual circumstances of the allegations being so freely and
doggedly circulated by U.S. government officials to back up their
political objectives against North Korea and Iran?
The group known as the White House Iraq Group, a group created
inside the White House itself, conducted a campaign to spread the case
for an attack on Iraq and to discredit critics of its pro war propaganda.
7
The growing online community of citizens in the U.S. challenged
the White House and mainstream media’s drumbeats for war. The online
community was a force, though not strong enough to prevent the war
against Iraq.
The strategy of the White House to involve the mainstream media
in the process of creating a false set of allegations in order to prepare the
population for a war has been exposed in the aftermath of the invasion
of Iraq. Historically and currently in the U.S. there is a need for a press
that challenges such government propaganda campaigns and provides
the needed questioning and debate on vital issues of public policy. Part
of the vision inspiring the birth of the Internet was that the Internet
would make possible more political participation of the citizens in the
critical issues of the day.
8
Whether the online community of netizens can
succeed in building the kind of investigatory press so critically needed
in the U.S. is a challenge still to be met.
Notes:
1. See Paul’s speech
http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2006/cr040506.htm
2. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
April 18, 2007, Isolating Proliferators and Sponsors of Terror: The Use of Sanctions
and the International Financial System to Change Regime Behavior.
3. “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia” [Opinion] Another abuse under
the U.S. Patriot Act(2001).
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=3&no=351
Page 44
525&rel_no=1
4. Webcast of April 18, 2007 hearing (17:30).
5. “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed at targeting China
as well as North Korea?”
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=13&no=36
2192&rel_no=1
6. McClatchy publications:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/kevin_hall/story/16472.html
China Matters
http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-end.html
OhmyNews International: See for example:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3621
92&rel_no=1&back_url=
and
http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?menu=A11100&no=35
1525&rel_no=1&back_url=
7. “Heat Is On for CIA Leak Probe Prosecutor”:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=3&no=253
530&rel_no=1
With his Grand Jury term about to expire, Washington is wondering if Patrick
Fitzgerald will indict.
8. “Citizen Model for the Study of the Internet.”
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=2966
46&rel_no=1
The above article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3684
33&rel_no=1
Page 45
[Editor’s note: June 30, 2007 marked the first six months that Ban
Ki-moon has held the position as Secretary-General of the United
Nations. The following article is an effort to look at the role of the
Secretary General and some of the challenges he faces. The article
appeared in two parts on OhmyNews International , June 30, 2007 and
July 4, 2007]
Ban Ki-Moon’s Role of
U.N. Secretary General
Ronda Hauben Asks if There is a Guiding Vision in
the Organization
by Ronda Hauben
Part 1
Introduction
Ban Ki-moon’s nomination by the Security Council to be the 8
th
Secretary General of the United Nations was sent to the General
Assembly on Oct. 13, 2006. Ban succeeded in winning the nomination
after a difficult and contested campaign.
1
But his trial by fire was only
just beginning. Ban had succeeded in winning the votes of China and of
the U.S. Winning the votes of these two nations, who are permanent
members of the Security Council, was seen by a number of commenta-
tors as the critical step needed to win the nomination for Secretary Gen-
eral.
2
Would this very achievement, especially the achievement of
winning the vote of the U.S. government in the Security Council,
become a handicap that would negatively affect Ban’s ability to succeed
in the position as the 8
th
Secretary General of the United Nations?
Goals Expressed in Hankyoreh Interview
An interview with Ban Ki-moon on Oct. 30, 2006, shortly after Ban
won appointment by the General Assembly as the new Secretary
General, and in the interval before he would assume the office in
Page 46
January 2007, offers a rare glimpse of how the soon-to-be-appointed
Secretary General viewed his hopes and goals for his new position.
The interview was conducted in the offices of the Korean newspa-
per Hankyoreh, by Moon Chung-in, a Professor at Yonsei University
and an Envoy for International Stability.
3
The interview was done in
Korean, and translated and published in the English edition of
Hankyoreh. The goals Ban outlined in this interview provide a yardstick
to measure how successfully he is in fulfilling the obligations of his new
position.
In the interview, Ban describes a recent visit to the White House
shortly after he won the appointment as Secretary General. President
Bush greeted him as “Mr. Landslide” congratulating him on his victory.
The plan had been for Ban to see Steve Hadley, the U.S. National
Security Advisor and if time permitted, to briefly meet Bush. Instead he
spoke with Bush for more than 20 minutes.
Ban recounts how he and Bush spoke about U.N. reform and the
North Korean nuclear program. “Bush,” Ban says, “requested that I
drive forth with U.N. reforms, assuring me that the U.S. would actively
lend its support.” In the interview, Bush promised to work with the
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun to peacefully resolve the North
Korean nuclear problem.
Ban also visited China. He describes his meeting with the Chinese
President Hu Jintao on this visit. Hu told Ban that “the role of a newly
appointed Secretary General is very important and that China would be
of active assistance.” Ban revealed that during his campaign for the
nomination, China “could not make public its support,” but that it had
“actively helped out behind the scenes.” Though it is not yet apparent
how China’s support for Ban’s nomination affects Ban’s actions as
Secretary General, U.S. support for Ban’s nomination appears to have
a significant effect on his activity as Secretary General.
During the Hankyoreh interview Ban expressed a belief he has
reiterated many times since, that the U.S. is “the U.N.’s most important
member.” Ban proposed that the U.N. needed the “proactive participa-
tion” of the U.S. in order to function properly, just as he believed the
U.S. needed the U.N. for its interests.
Also during the interview, Ban expressed his commitment as
Page 47
Secretary General to work to help resolve the problems with North
Korea. “I will appoint a politician or diplomat,” he asserted, “with the
confidence of the international community, someone who has the trust
of both North and South Korea to actively push the issue forward. This
envoy,” he explained, “must be one to impel the Six-Party Talks to
action when they stagnate, and must be prepared to play a direct role
when necessary. I am ever ready to intervene directly when intervention
is called for.” Ban also proposed that the U.N. had to find a means to
help with transforming the cease-fire that was signed by the U.S. and
North Korea at the end of the Korean War into a more permanent peace
agreement.
Ban promised to present a blueprint for what he hoped to accom-
plish in his first 100 days, in his first year, and in his five year term. His
priority, he explained, would be in the appointments he would make for
U.N. personnel and that these would “raise morale and cultivate
professionalism.”
Ban’s goal at the end of his five year term or ten years if he were to
win reappointment for a second term, would be “to create a U.N. reborn
as an organization that enjoys much greater international confidence. I
will make the U.N. into a body fit for the challenges and themes of the
21
st
century,” he promised. To obtain this objective, he proposed to
support “development”, especially, “development in Africa and the
Millennium Development Plan.” His aim would be to “make certain that
the U.N. has a role at the center of multilateral diplomacy.”
In the interview, Ban also describes how Roh Moo-hyun and the
South Korean press helped his candidacy to succeed by “campaigning
for me at every opportunity while meeting with foreign heads of state.”
The South Korean media “also helped a great deal,” Ban notes. Ban was
aware, too, that it was a particular source of pride for Korea that the 8
th
Secretary General would be from Korea.
Comments on Ban’s 100-day Anniversary
By Ban’s 100 day anniversary, April 10, media commentary on his
accomplishments documented the frustration he had experienced.
Comments from several diplomats were testimony to the mistakes made
as he and his advisors rushed to put their reform agenda into effect.
Page 48
The Chinese Ambassador to the U.N., Wong Guangya commented
on how Ban tried to impose changes in the structure of the U.N.
Secretariat, only to meet opposition from a number of countries,
observes, “His intentions are good. He is trying to make the Secretariat
work more effectively. But personally I feel he’s a new comer and he
does not understand the culture and the environment in this house. You
have to identify who are the stakeholders and how to test the tempera-
ture before jumping in. He hasn’t done that and he has felt the heat.”
4
Similarly, South African Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo is quoted
as being frustrated by Ban’s “‘decide first, consult afterward’
behavior.”
5
Even the American Ambassador, Alejandro D. Wolff, who
originally replaced John Bolton, said that there were those “convinced
that Ban was ‘essentially responding to American demands.’”
6
This
impression, Wolff explained, helped to generate distrust in the reforms
Ban is trying to implement.
Role of Secretary General
The role of Secretary General has a number of constraints. It also is
a role that carries certain obligations. During his inauguration, Ban took
an oath that he would uphold the interests of the United Nations above
any national interests and “not to seek or accept instructions in regard to
the performance of my duties from any government or other authority
external to the Organization.”
7
In a “Report to the Preparatory Commission of the U.N. 23 Dec.
1945,” a set of duties and responsibilities are elaborated as a means of
stating what is explicit and implicit in the Secretary General’s role as
provided for by the U.N. charter.
While the Report specifies administrative and executive functions
for the Secretary General, it also states that “He is the channel of all
communication with the United Nations in any of its organs. He must
endeavor, within the scope of his functions, to integrate the activity of
the whole complex of United Nations organs and see that the machine
runs smoothly and effectively.”
8
Along with the obligation for internal smooth functioning of the
U.N., the report proposes an external function. It says, “the Secretary
Page 49
General, more than anyone else, will stand for the United Nations as a
whole. In the eyes of the world, no less than the eyes of his own staff, he
must embody the principles and ideals of the charter to which the
organization seeks to give effect.”
9
Elements for Creating a Vision
Shashi Tharoor, one of the other candidates for the nomination by
the Security Council for the position of Secretary General maintained
that emanating from the job description for the Secretary General that
each Secretary General wrote for himself, “must shine the vision of the
incumbent of the office,” a vision which transcends the more practical
aspects of the job.
10
Describing the nature of the job, Tharoor proposed that what was
needed was a person with the ability and talent to respond to a wide
range of issues “and to know where to go for expert judgment when he
or she feels unqualified or uninformed on specific issues. Somebody
who recognizes he does not have all the answers but trusts himself to ask
the right questions.”
11
Tharoor, who had worked at the U.N. for almost 28 years, said that
for him the U.N. was more than a job. “It has always been a cause….
For me the U.N. is far more than an institution…. It represents the vision
and foresight of the leaders of the world who wanted to make the second
half of the twentieth century better than the first.”
12
He described how
the U.N. was formed in response to a world that had experienced two
world wars, a number of civil wars, several instances of mass population
displacements, genocide, the holocaust, and Hiroshima. “The U.N. was
part of an attempt to genuinely make a better world and I believe for all
its limitations and failures, it did succeed in doing so,” he noted.
13
When Ban outlined the beginning elements for the new role he was
to assume in the Hankyoreh interview, he planned for the U.N. to play
a constructive role in helping to facilitate the Six-Party Talks between
North Korea, South Korea, China, the U.S., Japan, and Russia. He had
expressed his determination to appoint an envoy to help overcome
obstacles that might impede the Six-Party process. This provided an
example of a goal he was bringing to his new role at the U.N. How he
would carry out this goal would be a concrete sign of whether he could
Page 50
be guided by a vision for his role as Secretary General.
Part 2
Impact of the Press
How has the role of the press affected the actions of the new
Secretary General? There is an important example that has developed
which helps to demonstrate the impact that the press has had on Ban
Ki-moon.
In the interview with Hankyoreh before he took office,
14
Ban
described how he would act to support a solution to the problem of
relations between North Korea and the Northeast Asia region, and the
disarmament of the Korean peninsula.
On January 19, 2007, just a few weeks after Ban became Secretary
General, there were news reports of a breakthrough in negotiations
between the Christopher Hill for the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan for North
Korea.
15
The International Herald Tribune reported
16
:
“The movement toward a possible breakthrough came during the
talks in Berlin between Hill and Kim, Chosun Ilbo reported, citing
unidentified officials in Seoul and Beijing.”
Timed, it appeared, to coincide with the breakthrough, however,
was the publication in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) of an article
“United Nations Dictator’s Program” by Melanie Kirkpatrick. A similar
article was published by Fox News. These articles alleged that North
Korea was manipulating funds from the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) in North Korea. These press accounts reported that
UNDP funds were being used by Kim Jong-il, for whatever he wanted,
including “his weapons program.”
17
No proof was provided for this
accusation. The articles included other unsupported allegations.
While most of the press reports in the U.S. just repeated or
exaggerated the original allegations, a few Korean publications provided
a different perspective. The Korean newspaper Voice of the People
pointed out that the allegations of UNDP mismanagement appeared just
as the North Korean and U.S. representatives had had productive
negotiations in Berlin.
18
The Voice of the People asked why the U.S.
Mission to the U.N. was raising these issues “at this time.”
Page 51
“Despite the totally unfounded allegation by the hawks,” the editors
write, “it has a political effect for freezing (the) bilateral relationship
between Washington and Pyongyang.”
19
Ban Ki-moon’s response to the WSJ and Fox News articles was to
call immediately for an audit of all U.N. programs. The audit was to start
with an audit of all programs in North Korea. A few days later the call
for an audit of all U.N. programs was dropped. The audit was to be only
of North Korea’s UNDP program.
20
Some Background
A difficult period for Ban’s predecessor, Secretary General Kofi
Annan was caused by the “Oil for Food Scandal.” Annan had refused to
support a U.S. backed Security Council resolution authorizing an
invasion of Iraq. Annan held that such an invasion would be a violation
of the U.N.’s charter. Reports say that in response, right wing
neoconservatives in the U.S. government brought forward accusations
that there had been corruption in the U.N.’s administration of the “Oil
for Food” program.
21
This program had been created by the Security
Council supposedly to alleviate some of the harmful effects on civilians
of the Security Council sanctions against Iraq.
While the “Oil for Food Scandal” investigation recommended
systemic reforms, there was little evidence of corrupt activity by
members of the U.N. Secretariat. The investigation created, however, a
difficult environment for Annan and other U.N. officials.
When the WSJ articles appeared in January 2007 alleging corruption
in the UNDP program, they brought up memories of the difficult
situation created for the U.N. during the “Oil for Food Scandal.”
South Korean Press Responses to Allegations
Several articles appeared in the South Korean press which analyzed
rather than just repeating the allegations of mismanagement in the
UNDP program in North Korea. One article in JoongAng Ilbo on
January 22, for example, described what happened after the news reports
appeared on January 19. Ban met with the Associate Administrator of
the UNDP, Ad Melkert, and “vowed a thorough investigation.”
22
The
Page 52
JoongAng Ilbo article, in addition, however, noted that this accusation
came at a “sensitive time in negotiations” between the U.S. and North
Korea.
The article also noted that this action by the UNDP “might be
considered another financial sanction by Washington against North
Korea just as the six party anti-nuclear talks were expected to resume.”
The reporters reminded readers that the “financial sanctions brought by
the U.S. treasury office on Banco Delta Asia which led to freezing $24
million of North Korean funds” had become a “major sticking point”
causing a deadlock in the Six-Party Talks.
Similarly, the article in Voice of the People on January 30, 2007,
asked, “Now we have to see who’s intriguing against whom because
somebody is suffering from pain for it. We should not listen to the
shameless and unscrupulous who are trying to curtail humanitarian aid
for those who are in need of food.”
23
An article in OhmyNews International (OMNI) and a report by the
Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea (Peacekorea) explain that UNDP
administrators had denied that there were violations of UNDP policy in
the North Korean program.
24
Both articles referred to the fact that the
Resident Coordinator of the UNDP Program in North Korea had the
authority to decide the financial practices to follow. Another report by
Peacekorea noted many people think that Ban is “kind of pro
American.”
25
Peacekorea advocated support for restarting the Six-Party Talks and
not letting the U.S. accusations against North Korea divert from support
for the unification of the Korean peninsula. Such a policy is presented
as a long term vision. Also the report explains that development aid to
North Korea is preferable to humanitarian aid, as development aid sets
a basis for self sufficiency, while humanitarian aid is expended after it
is given.
26
The Six-Party Talks did resume and came to an agreement on
February 13, 2007. Peacekorea offered a critique of the conservative
South Korean newspapers which “made comments devaluing the
agreement.”
27
The report explained, “Korea’s major newspapers spread
a hostile perspective of North Korea on the Korean peninsula. This is not
helpful toward gaining denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” The
Page 53
report proposes that “Under Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship, North Korea, a
weak nation, has developed nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the
threat of an American attack, as exemplified by the Iraq war, and as a
diplomatic tool for bilateral contact with the U.S.”
28
Alternative Approach to Ban’s Policy on Korea
Such accounts in the South Korean press demonstrate an alternative
approach to the policy that the Secretary General is implementing
regarding the North Korean situation. For now Ban is not carrying out
the policy he had proposed in the Hankyoreh interview with regard to
the Korean peninsula. To the contrary, coinciding with pressure from the
U.S. press and the U.S. government, he has adopted a policy which has
allowed the politicization of the UNDP program that was in North
Korea. This has resulted in an audit of previous UNDP programs in
North Korea and the ending of the current UNDP program in North
Korea.
Similarly, for more than four months, from February through the
end of June, the Six-Party Talks hit a deadlock over the decision by the
U.S. government to find a small bank in Macau in violation of provi-
sions in the U.S. Patriot Act. The bank complained that it never saw the
evidence against it nor did it have a chance to refute the evidence.
29
Yet
by using Section 311 of the Patriot Act against this bank, the U.S.
Treasury Department was able to freeze $25 million of North Korean
funds and impede North Korea’s access to the international banking
system.
Much of the U.S. press has been promoting a hostile policy toward
North Korea.
30
Some of the South Korean press echo what appears in the
U.S. press, or reprint articles from the conservative interests who are
trying to impede further negotiations. Other South Korean publications,
however, provide a critique of the hostile attitude of the U.S. press
toward North Korea. For example, an article by Tim Savage in OMNI
documents the internal struggle within the U.S. government between the
interests which are hostile to negotiations with North Korea in contrast
to the efforts at negotiations by Christopher Hill.
31
Though he has occupied the office of Secretary General for over six
months, Ban has yet to implement the program he proposed before
Page 54
taking office, the program of active U.N. support for a negotiated
agreement in the Six-Party Talks. Ban’s original plan was to appoint a
diplomat or politician who would be available to intervene when needed
to keep the negotiation process on track. Instead the U.N.’s Secretariat
has become embroiled in the controversy generated by unsubstantiated
charges from the U.S. mission to the U.N. about the UNDP funding of
North Korea’s UNDP program.
‘We Can’t Prove a Negative’
The U.S. press continues to echo the U.S. government’s unsubstan-
tiated charges against North Korea and the UNDP, in a way reminiscent
of how the same press supported the unsubstantiated and inaccurate U.S.
government claims that Iraq possessed “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
The unsubstantiated allegations being spread by the U.S. press about the
UNDP, have the effect of politicizing the UNDP program rather than
providing the public with the accurate information that is needed to
understand the problems and challenges faced by such a program.
David Morrison, the press spokesman for the UNDP, explained that
“the point I’m trying to make is we can’t prove a negative,”
32
at a press
conference held to answer the June 2007 set of unsubstantiated
allegations made by the U.S. mission against the UNDP program in
North Korea. This set of allegations appeared in the U.S. press just
before the beginning of the June UNDP Executive Board meeting in a
way reminiscent of how the previous set of allegations first appeared in
the U.S. press just before the January UNDP Executive Board meeting.
Just as the impossibility of proving a negative created a media
environment in which the U.S. government could falsely claim they had
a justification for a war against Iraq, so a hostile environment is being
created to impede the Six-Party Talks by the unsubstantiated allegations
against North Korea and the UNDP.
33
Ban’s original plan for the region provided a means to counter those
interests which might impede a negotiated solution to the North Korean
conflict. Much of the U.S. press has maintained a hostile attitude toward
North Korea, even though there are signs that within the U.S. govern-
ment there are forces interested in pursuing a negotiated settlement. The
South Korean media landscape, however, presents a broader spectrum
Page 55
of opinion on what should be done with regard to North Korea, a
spectrum of views which includes support for the policy that Ban
originally proposed to implement for the region when he became
Secretary General.
Conclusion
There are many people in Korea and elsewhere, who are watching
Ban Ki-moon and are hopeful that he will do good as Secretary General.
As the experience of former Secretaries General demonstrates, however,
there is a need for a vision to guide him if he is to be able to fulfill on
these expectations.
Notes:
1. See, for example: Ayca Arlyoruk, “Korean Minister Likely Candidate to Replace
Kofi Annan, but Will the General Assembly Approve?”, UNA-USA
http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b= 2116545
Ban was chosen as Secretary General in a process that is basically secret with
voting by the members of the Security Council that is not public. The five Permanent
members hold the ability to veto a candidate at a certain stage in the process. Questions
have been raised about what criteria are used and what is traded with whom is left as
an open question.
Also there were allegations that the South Korean government used grants and
various financial rewards to gain support for its candidate from several of the
nonpermanent nations that were on the Security Council at the time of the voting for
the next Secretary General. See for example:
Richard Beeston, Richard Lloyd Parry, and James Bone, “Millions of dollars and
a piano may put Korean in U.N.’s top job”, Times Online, September 29, 2006
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article654479.ece
Tran Van Loi, “ROK Buying U.N. Post: Times Millions of dollars have been
spent in lobbying for Ban ki-moon, says British newspaper,” OhmyNews International.
October 1, 2006
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3207
00&rel_no=1
2. See for example, “Restoring the Vitality of the United Nations”
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10833/restoring_the_vitality_of_the_united_nations_
rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html
3. [Interview] Next U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. in conversation with Moon
Chung-in, translated by Daniel Rakove, The Hankyoreh. November 3, 2006.
http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=169339
Page 56
4. Maggie Farley, “New Secretary General Is Still Finding His Footing at the U.N.”,
LA Times, April 9, 2007
http://www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/ban/2007/0409footing.htm
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ronda Hauben, “Ban Ki-moon Inaugurated, Pledges to uphold the interests of the
United Nations above all else”, OhmyNews International, December 15, 2006.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=334916&rel_no=1
8. “Report to the Preparatory Commission of the U.N. 23 Dec 1945,” in Secretary or
General: The U.N. Secretary-General in World Politics?, edited by Simon Chesterman,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 243-244
9. Ibid., p. 245.
10. Shashi Tharoor, in Secretary or General: The U.N. Secretary-General in World
Politics?, edited by Simon Chesterman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007,
p. 46.
11. Lydia Swart, “Shashi Tharoor Sees his 28 Years at the United Nations as an Asset”,
Center for U.N. Reform Education, interview done 12 July 2006.
http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/61/print
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14.[Interview] Next U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. in conversation with Moon
Chung-in, translated by Daniel Rakove, The Hankyoreh. November 3, 2006.
http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=169339
15. “U.S.-DPRK talks end, no comments on resuming 6-party talks,” CCTV.com Jan
19, 2007,
http://www.cctv.com/english/20070119/101358.shtml
16. “U.S. envoy confident in North Korea nuclear talks,” International Herald Tribune,
January 22, 2007.
http://www.cctv.com/english/20070119/101358.shtml
17. Melanie Kirkpatrick, “United Nations Dictator’s Program”, WSJ, January 19, 2007.
18. “The U.S. Stands in the Way of Pyongyang”, Voice of the People, January 30,
2007.
19. Ibid.
20. Ronda Hauben, “Hardliners Attack UNDP Aid to North Korea:Allegations of
corruption seen as attempt to undermine engagement,” OMNI, February 7, 2007.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=344001&rel_no=1
21. Thalif Deen, “Will the New U.N. Chief Stand Up to Big Powers,” Inter Press News
Agency, December 12, 2006.
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35814
22. Nam Jeong-ho and Lee Sang-eon, “Report Says Kim Jong-il Cashed in on U.N.
Office”, JoongAng Ilbo, January 22, 2007.
23. Ibid., Voice of the People.
24. Ronda Hauben, “Hardliners Attack UNDP Aid to North Korea Allegations of
Page 57
corruption seen as attempt to undermine engagement,” OMNI, February7, 2007. See
also: Soohyun Lee, “UNDP’s aid toward North Korea,” peacekorea, January 23, 2007
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=2&no=344
001&rel_no=1
25. Soohyun Lee, UNDP’s aid toward North Korea, peacekorea, February 13, 2007.
26. Ibid.
27. Ji-Hyun Lee, “The Ghost of Anti-communism Reflected in South Korean Media,”
peacekorea, May 7, 2007.
28. Ibid.
29. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia: Another abuse
under the U.S. Patriot Act (2001),” OMNI, March 21, 2007.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=3&no=351
525&rel_no=1
30. The McClatchy Newspapers have been an exception. See, for example, articles like
“Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations” Kevin G. Hall about the BDA
affair.
31. Tim Savage, “Six-Party Talks Resume: Expectations high for progress in Beijing,”
OMNI, February 8, 2007.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3442
45&rel_no=1
32. David Morrison, Press Conference, June 11, 2007, See Minutes: 38:46
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/pressbriefing/brief070611.rm
33. Ronda Hauben, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Syndrome and the Press [Analysis]
How does one prove a negative?,” OMNI, June 24, 2007.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=368433&rel_no=1
The above article can be seen in 2 parts at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3695
77&rel_no=1
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3695
77&rel_no=2
Page 58
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on October 4, 2007]
On the Status of the Six-Party Talks
‘It’s Never Been an Easy Sell
in Washington,’ Says Chris Hill
by Ronda Hauben
At a press conference held in New York City on Tuesday, Oct. 2,
2007, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill answered
questions and outlined some of his concerns regarding the recent session
of the Six-Party Talks
1
held in Beijing, Sept. 27-30.
Hill said that originally there was not to be a formal statement of
agreement, but that on Sunday morning before the session was to end,
the Chinese hosts distributed a draft of a short statement for the six
parties to consider. Hill said that each of the parties took the statement
back to their capitols to seek approval. For Hill, this meant flying to
New York City to meet with Secretary of State Rice who had been
attending U.N. related events. Then the proposal was brought to
President Bush for his approval.
When Hill was asked how difficult was the process of getting an
agreement from Washington, he said “It’s never been an easy sell in
Washington.” Hill explained the agreement in general terms, as the press
conference was held before the statement was officially released.
By Dec. 31, 2007, Hill said North Korea agreed to disable its
Nyongbyon nuclear facilities. Also by that date, there was an agreement
to provide an accurate accounting for how much fissile material was
produced by North Korea. In 2008, the Six-Party Talks will move
toward the issue of dismantling the plutonium producing facility. As an
outcome of the talks, Hill hoped for the creation of a North East Asian
Peace structure, but he felt there was still a long way to go to get to that
goal.
When asked about whether the U.S. had agreed to remove North
Korea from the U.S. government’s State Sponsors of Terrorists list, Hill
Page 59
said that was something “we are working on with the DPRK.” He said
that “from our point of view any time we can work with a country to get
them off the list, that’s what we want to do.” Hill also said that North
Korea was being encouraged to improve DPRK-Japan relations. He did
not say whether efforts were being made to encourage Japan to improve
Japan-DPRK relations.
In response to another question about removing the designation of
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, Hill said that the U.S.
wanted to “work through the past history that had led to the DPRK being
put on that list.”
A reporter asked what it would take to move from the armistice of
the Korean war to a peace agreement ending the war.
“From the U.S. point of view if the DPRK is prepared to
denuclearize we are prepared to reach a peace agreement,” replied Hill.
There would need to be a number of issues considered, he explained, to
reach a peace settlement. When questioned about North Korea’s concern
that there be an end of hostility by the U.S. toward it, Hill said that the
U.S. was hostile to proliferation and that there was no hostile policy of
the U.S. to North Korea.
When asked about the problems that had existed regarding the U.S.
Treasury Department’s action freezing North Korean assets in the Banco
Delta Asia,
2
Hill said that that situation related to the need of the U.S. to
protect its financial system and its currencies. “We would like them
(North Korea -ed) to have access to the international financial system,”
he explained, “but they have to play by the rules everyone else plays
by.”
He didn’t elaborate further on this issue or on whether North
Korea’s regaining access to the international banking system was a
matter being considered in the negotiations between the U.S. and North
Korea.
In response to a question about why it seemed negotiations were
entering a sensitive stage, he explained that what was happening was to
have the U.S. on the ground involved in disabling the nuclear facility. It
was “not just paper any more,” he observed.
Another reporter asked Hill what problems he saw in the future that
he was concerned about. Hill responded that what keeps him awake is
Page 60
that they are focusing on the step to be taken but that “the process won’t
be successful unless we reach the goal.” The DPRK will need to give up
its fissile material and weapons, explained Hill, so he was concerned that
there were those in the army in North Korea who might not want to get
to the last step.
“When we finish this job,” Hill said, the parties will have come to
understand what it means to come together and solve the problems. In
this process, Hill felt that North Korea would get the sense of “what it
means to be part of a community.”
Notes:
1. For an earlier press conference by Hill about the talks, see “U.S., North Korea Move
to Open Ties Christopher Hill and Kim Kye-gwan hold meeting in New York on first
steps”
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3489
74&rel_no=1
2. While the $25 million of North Korean funds have now been returned to North
Korea, the problem of North Korea being denied access to the international banking
system has not yet been resolved. Describing some of the problems that the U.S.
Treasury Department action against the Banco Delta Asia posed as an obstacle to the
progress of the Six-Party Talks, see for example: North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco
Delta Asia, Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Syndrome and the Press?
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3621
92&rel_no=1
Full Text of the Joint Document
The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was
held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian
Federation and the United States of America from 27 to 30 September
2007.
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr.
Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Mr.
Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs,
Page 61
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special
Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexander Losyukov,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr.
Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the Department of State of the United States, attended the talks as
heads of their respective delegations.
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.
The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of the five Working
Groups, confirmed the implementation of the initial actions provided for
in the February 13 agreement, agreed to push forward the Six-Party
Talks process in accordance with the consensus reached at the meetings
of the Working Groups and reached agreement on second-phase actions
for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the
goal of which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
in a peaceful manner.
I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to
abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the
February 13 agreement.
The disablement of the 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor at
Yongbyon, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) at
Yongbyon and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon
will be completed by 31 December 2007. Specific measures recom-
mended by the expert group will be adopted by heads of delegation in
line with the principles of being acceptable to all Parties, scientific, safe,
verifiable, and consistent with international standards. At the request of
the other Parties, the United States will lead disablement activities and
provide the initial funding for those activities. As a first step, the U.S.
side will lead the expert group to the DPRK within the next two weeks
to prepare for disablement.
2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of
Page 62
all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement
by 31 December 2007.
3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear
materials, technology, or know-how.
II. On Normalization of Relations between Relevant
Countries
1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their
bilateral relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship.
The two sides will increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual
trust. Recalling the commitments to begin the process of removing the
designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance
the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its commit-
ments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK’s actions based on
consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normaliza-
tion of DPRK-U.S. Relations.
2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to normalize their
relations expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration,
on the basis of the settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding
issues of concern. The DPRK and Japan committed themselves to taking
specific actions toward this end through intensive consultations between
them.
III. On Economic and Energy Assistance to the DPRK
In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic, energy
and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of
HFO (inclusive of the 100,000 tons of HFO already delivered) will be
provided to the DPRK. Specific modalities will be finalized through
discussion by the Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation.
IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting
The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will
Page 63
be held in Beijing at an appropriate time.
The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation meeting prior to
the Ministerial Meeting to discuss the agenda for the Meeting.
The above article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3805
75&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on October 4, 2007]
North Korea Addresses
U.N. 62
nd
Session
U.N. Officials Express Their Support
for Inter-Korean Summit
by Ronda Hauben
Explaining that North Korea was making a sincere effort to resolve
the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, Choe Su Hon, the Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea made his nation’s presentation at the General Debate opening the
62
nd
session of the United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday, Oct.
2, 2007.
He described how North Korea had acted in self defense as a small
nation, to safeguard its “national sovereignty and dignity in the face of
U.S. threats of preemptive nuclear strikes and harsh economic sanc-
tions.”
Choe told the United Nations General Assembly that the principle
of “words for words and actions for actions” was the basis for progress
in the Six-Party Talks that were going on between North Korea, South
Korea, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. This required, he explained,
removing the “deep rooted hostile U.S. policy” toward his country that
Page 64
had persisted for “over half a century.” This also would involve the
normalizing of bilateral relations between the U.S. and North Korea.
With respect to Japan, Choe said there was the need for it to “discard its
hostility toward the DPRK as they have pledged to do.”
While Choe was speaking to the member states of the United
Nations in New York City, the inter Korean Summit was taking place in
Pyongyang. Choe told his international audience that “the north-south
summit now under way in Pyongyang will be of great significance.” He
said it would take the “inter-Korean relations to a higher stage.” As long
as the north and south sit face to face, in the spirit of national independ-
ence and love for the country and nation, he proposed that all problems
between the north and south “can be surely resolved in the interests of
our nation regardless of differences in ideas and systems.”
1
The Summit between the north and south was greeted by others at
the United Nations with support and encouragement. Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon expressed his hope for the success of the summit so that
it “will lead to increased inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, as
well as promoting co-prosperity.” He said that “the United Nations
stands ready to provide assistance as may be required.”
2
Srgjan Kerim, the President of the General Assembly also offered
his congratulations and good wishes for the success of the Summit. His
spokesman told the press that, “the President wishes to commend the
two leaders for their brave initiative and further encourages them to use
the opportunity of their meeting to make progress on promoting peace
and security on the Korean Peninsula and on inter-Korean reconcilia-
tion.” He said that “it is in the interest of all Member States of the
United Nations to achieve progress on those issues,” emphasizing that
“it is through dialogue that differences between Member States can best
be resolved.”
3
Notes:
1. Press Release, Statement, by H. E. Mr. Choe Su Hon, Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Chairman of the Delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
in the General Debate of the 62
nd
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Oct
2, 2007,
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/2007/pdfs/DPRK-eng.pdf
2. Secretary-General welcomes upcoming summit in pyongyang
Page 65
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11197.doc.htm
3. Statement on Inter-Korean Summit Attributable to Spokesperson
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/db071001.doc.htm
The above article can be seen at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=3805
81&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews Interna-
tional on November 1, 2007]
U.N. Passes Resolution Supporting
Inter-Korean Summit
Document A/62/L4 Entitled
‘Peace, Security and Reunification
on the Korean Peninsula’
by Ronda Hauben
Just a little over a year ago I began covering the United Nations as
a featured writer for OhmyNews International. My first day was when
Ban Ki-moon’s nomination for Secretary General of the U.N. was
approved by the General Assembly. For South Korea this was an
exciting event.
The next day, however, the Security Council imposed sanctions
against North Korea.
1
The dilemma of a Korea divided North and South
was a glaring contradiction facing the international community with the
appointment of a Secretary General from the Korean peninsula.
Similarly, however, this was a challenge to the international community
to support unification on the Korean peninsula.
A little more than one year later, the General Assembly held an
event to provide needed support for Korean reunification. In the General
Page 66
Assembly on Wednesday, Oct. 31, the international community
approved a resolution supporting the motion toward reunification of the
two Koreas and applauding the Second Inter-Korean Summit held
October 2-4, 2007 and the joint Declaration issued by the presidents of
the two Koreas.
2
The event was held during the afternoon session of the U.N.’s
General Assembly. The U.N. delegate from North Korea, Pak Gil Yon
introduced the resolution, saying “Mr. President, I have the honor to
introduce a draft resolution contained in document A/62/L4 entitled
‘Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula’.”
He described the Oct. 2-4 summit and the declaration that resulted,
explaining that the U.N. resolution being proposed “welcomes and
supports the inter-Korean summit including the Declaration and
encourages both sides to implement it faithfully and in good faith,
inviting member States to support and assist the current positive
process.”
The U.N. delegate from South Korea, Kim Hyun Chong was the
next speaker. As joint sponsor of the resolution with the delegate from
North Korea, Kim described several aspects of the peace accord that the
two parties agreed to in their declaration at the end of the Inter-Korean
Summit. “Through its various provisions,” he explained, “the Declara-
tion points the way forward for common prosperity, eventual peaceful
reunification on the Korean peninsula, and the resolution of longstand-
ing regional concerns.”
Among those speaking in support of the resolution were Portugal on
behalf of the European Union, China, Vietnam, Japan, the U.S., New
Zealand, Yemen, Germany, Indonesia, Thailand, Canada, Guatemala,
Belarus, Russia, Chile, Poland, Mongolia, Mynmar, Benin, Brazil, Italy,
Bangladesh, Egypt, and Cuba.
Yemen and Germany spoke about the difficulties they had experi-
enced as divided nations, and offered whatever support they could
provide to the Korean reunification efforts. The German ambassador
said that “what we have learned from our own experience is: the
separation of a nation is not irreversible. The two Koreas will have to
find their own way of tackling these issues, but Germany stands ready,
upon request, to share its own experience from the years of Ger-
Page 67
man-German relations.”
The ambassador of Yemen said that his country had had a long
history of division, which was changed with the unification in May
1990. He explained that the unification was difficult and not without
defects. He understood the suffering of the divided families and
duplication of resources that the division represented and said that his
country would do what it could to support the efforts of the two Koreas
to implement fully the declaration they had issued.
The ambassador from Vietnam noted that the Summit and the
resulting Declaration were of “great historic significance.” He said that
Vietnam “welcomes and highly appreciates the encouraging outcomes
of these developments.” He noted that the events of Oct. 2-4 represented
an important milestone in the process of the improvement and develop-
ment of relations between the two Koreans which would bring them
“closer to their long-held dreams of national reunification and prosper-
ity.” The ambassador from Vietnam noted that his country had good
relations with the two Koreas.
The ambassador from Thailand also noted the historic nature of the
recent Summit and concluded that “this historic resolution has called for
many countries to readjust the attitude and the policy toward the
situation in the Korean peninsula.”
Indonesia’s U.N. ambassador similarly noted that his country has
had close ties with both North and South Korea. He, too, saw the
Summit of October 2007 as a “major milestone in inter-Korean rela-
tions.” He called for support from member nations to the process of
“inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation and reunification.”
The U.N. ambassador from Portugal said that the EU stands ready
to contribute to the efforts.
Several nations spoke about having been part of KEDO, the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization in 1996 and wanting to
continue to help in the ways they could. The ambassador from Italy said
that his country had worked to support Inter-Korean dialogue. Also Italy
was offering to provide the help it could, and had established a way to
provide aid to North Korea shortly before the Summit. Italy had been a
supporter of KEDO, as had Chile.
Benin’s U.N. ambassador explained that his country, too, had
Page 68
friendly relations with the two sister republics on the Korean Peninsula.
He described how Benin had been working to promote peaceful
reunification of the Koreas for a number of decades. He endorsed the
current developments and said that reunification would “put an end to
one of the most painful relics of the Second World War.”
Brazil expressed its support for the resolution and reminded those
in the General Assembly that Brazil had been a co-sponsor for the
General Assembly Resolution 55/11 seven years earlier supporting the
first Inter-Korean Summit of June 15, 2000.
The U.S. ambassador to the U.N. said that the U.S. was pleased with
the draft resolution being discussed by the General Assembly. He
stressed that dialogue between the two Koreas was essential for better
relations. He explained that this dialogue process was supportive to and
complementary to the Six-Party Talks going on.
The Japanese ambassador also expressed his nation’s strong support
for the draft resolution. In his talk he referred to some of the specifics of
the Six-Party Talks.
The ambassador to the U.N. from Chile expressed his sentiments
that Korea had one past and one destiny. The declaration from the
Inter-Korean Summit was the outcome of a difficult and sensitive
process. He explained that no state should fail to join the noble effort to
support the Korean people’s desire to become one nation.
The ambassador from Cuba to the U.N. was the final speaker in the
discussion before action was to be taken on the resolution. He explained
that “Cuba has always supported and will continue to support the
peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.” Also he explained that
the Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) held last
year in Havana stressed the importance of peace on the Korean
peninsula. Similarly the NAM Summit “expressed its support toward
efforts to reunify the Korean peninsula through the genuine aspirations
and concerted efforts of the Korean peoples themselves.”
The resolution was approved by acclamation. Ban Ki-moon was
present in the General Assembly during the discussion of the resolution.
After it was approved, he made a statement congratulating the represen-
tatives of the two Koreas.
3
“Today’s date,” he explained, “coincides exactly with the date seven
Page 69
years ago when the General Assembly adopted resolution 55/11,
following the June 2000 summit of the DPRK and the ROK. I welcome
this coincidence. In my homeland of Korea, it is an ancient custom to
choose an auspicious day for any celebration or new endeavor.”
“Today,” he continued, “I feel a personal obligation to do all I can
to encourage and facilitate the continuing work for peace, security and
reunification on the Korean peninsula. I am convinced that the historic
inter-Korean summit will pave the way for a permanent peace regime
and eventual reunification.”
“As Secretary-General, I stand ready to provide every assistance
required, in close cooperation with the international community,” he
said, concluding his statement.
During the press encounter he had outside of the General Assembly,
Ban was asked, “[Y]ou just said that you would like to do everything to
support peace on the Korean peninsula. Do you have any special plan in
mind, as head of the United Nations, and if so, can you please give the
details?”
In response, Ban said, “At this time I do not have any detailed or
specific plans, but in principle, as Secretary-General, I have a broad
mandate and duty to assist any parties to the problems for smooth and
harmonious resolution. For that matter, since I served as Foreign
Minister of the Republic of Korea in the past, and I have expertise and
knowledge and experience, whenever I am needed, I will do whatever
I can.”
The U.N. resolution supporting the movement toward reunification
of the two Koreas, passed on the last day of October 2007 by the
General Assembly, may not seem particularly significant, but it is
actually an important event. It reflects the support of the international
community for the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, which
is one of the important outstanding problems of our times. As the
ambassador from Benin profoundly noted, the reunification of the two
Koreas would “put an end to one of the most painful relics of the Second
World War.”
The U.N. was created to facilitate such events. Passing this
resolution supporting the recent Inter-Korean Summit is a fitting way for
the U.N. to mark the one year anniversary since the General Assembly
Page 70
appointed a new Secretary General. The challenge is now for the people
of the two Koreas, the Secretary General and the member nations to do
what is needed to support the continuing motion toward peaceful
reconciliation and Korean reunification.
Notes:
1. Ronda Hauben, “The Problem Facing the U.N. Can Ban Ki-moon help solve the
problem with the Security Council?,” OhmyNews International, October 17, 2006.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=3&no=323
351&rel_no=1
2. The United Nations A/62/L.4, General Assembly, Sixty-second session, Agenda item
167 Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea draft resolution reads:
Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula
The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 55/11 of 31 October 2000, in which it
welcomed and supported the inter-Korean summit and the joint declaration adopted
on 15 June 2000 by the two leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
the Republic of Korea,
Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding
the maintenance of international peace and security,
Convinced that inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation are essential for consolidating
peace and security on the Korean peninsula and also contribute to peace and stability
in the region and beyond, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the
Charter,
Recognizing that the summit meeting held in Pyongyang from 2 to 4 October 2007
between the two leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the
Republic of Korea and their Declaration on the Advancement of North-South Korean
Relations, Peace and Prosperity represent a major milestone in improving
inter-Korean relations and in advancing peace and common prosperity on the Korean
peninsula and in the wider region as well,
Recalling the statements welcoming the inter-Korean summit made on 1 October 2007
by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, and recalling
also the statement welcoming the adoption of the Declaration made on 4 October 2007
by the Secretary-General,
1. Welcomes and supports the inter-Korean summit held from 2 to 4 October 2007 and
Page 71
the Declaration on the Advancement of North-South Korean Relations, Peace and
Prosperity adopted on 4 October 2007 by the two leaders of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea’
2. Encourages the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea
to implement the Declaration fully and in good faith, thereby consolidating peace on
the Korean peninsula and laying a solid foundation for peaceful reunification’
3. Invites Member States to continue to support and assist, as appropriate, the process
of inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation and reunification so that it may contribute to
peace and security not only on the Korean peninsula but also in northeast Asia and the
world as a whole.
A/62/L.4
3. Ban’s statement,
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2828
The above article can be seen at:
http://engdev.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?article_class=13&no=3
80842&rel_no=1
[Editor’s note: In August 2007, Ronda Hauben made a presentation at the World
Fellowship in New Hampshire, U.S. She spoke about covering the U.N. as a featured
writer for OMNI. In the following section from her presentation, she shows there can
be a power in netizen reporting.]
The Net Gives the Power of the
Reporter to the Netizen
by Ronda Hauben
An Example from My Experience Covering the U.N. for
OhmyNews International
BDA Story
This spring as a featured writer for OhmyNews International I
Page 72
covered the 50
th
anniversary dinner in New York City of the Korea
Society. One of the speakers at the dinner was U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State Christopher Hill. He explained the problem of $25 million of
North Korean money being frozen as part of a U.S. Treasury Department
proceeding against a bank in Macau, China, the Banco Delta Asia
(BDA). This is a problem that was at the time holding up the implemen-
tation of the Six-Party agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
Hill committed himself to work on this problem until it was solved.
There were several Korean journalists covering the event for their
publications. They were particularly interested in what Hill said, but
Hill’s talk in itself did not seem to represent a newsworthy event.
In the next few days, however, an important story was developing.
In the process of trying to unravel the unfolding developments, I
found a story online about the activity the bank had engaged in for North
Korea. It documented that this was legitimate banking activity, not
illegal activity. The news organization which published the story was the
McClatchy Newspapers. I also found links on the blog, “China Matters,”
to some documents refuting the Treasury Department’s charges against
the bank.
I now had the documents in the case. The U.S. government’s
findings were general statements providing no specific evidence of
wrong doing on the part of the bank. The bank’s statements and
refutation gave significant documentation refuting charges of illegal
activity on the part of the bank. The refutation also made the case that
there were political motives for the U. S. governments’ allegations rather
than actual illegal activity on the part of the bank. The U.S. government
had targeted a small Macau bank to scare the many banks in China. “To
kill the chicken to scare the monkeys,” as the government document
explained, quoting an old Chinese proverb.
At last I had the news peg for an important story. I wrote an article,
submitting it online around 5 a.m. my time on May 18 to OhmyNews
International (OMNI), using the software OMNI provides for submitting
articles. Also on May 18, the Wall Street Journal carried an Op Ed by
the former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton. His article
scolded the U.S. government for negotiating to return the $25 million to
North Korea. By noon that day, my story appeared on OMNI. So an
Page 73
Internet search that day gave people who searched two substantially
different analyses to consider. (See Behind the Blacklisting of Banco
Delta Asia this issue p. 17)
This short description was part of a talk that I gave in San Francisco
in May 2007 at the International Communications Association (ICA)
annual conference.
During the conference, I summed up my experience working on this
issue with the conclusion:
There is not yet an OhmyNews (OMN) in the U.S. So my story
about the connection of the U.S. government’s policy toward China
and the U.S. government actions against the Macau bank is not yet
likely to be able to impact how the mainstream news media in the
U.S. frames the story with North Korea and the Six-Party Talks. But
the need for a U.S. model of OMN becomes all the more urgent
when one participates in OMNI and thus has the experience of
exploring the potential of what it will make possible.
Next Episode
Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San Francisco, however,
that this story was not ending, but a new aspect was developing.
When I returned home from the ICA conference, I did a follow-up
story to my two earlier stories about the BDA issue.
A short time later, on June 11, I found a surprising e-mail in my
mailbox. The e-mail was from a reporter who said she worked for the
Korean Service of the Voice of America News (VOA News).
She wrote:
Hello Ms. Hauben
She introduced herself as being a reporter with the Voice of America
News in Washington D.C.
Her e-mail said:
While I was working on a story about BDA issue, I read your report,
‘Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia.’ I thought you made some
valuable points about the BDA issue in this report, I was wondering if
I could have a conversation with you in this matter. Since I am on
deadline, I’m trying very hard to get a hold of you. So I would really
Page 74
appreciate it if you call or e-mail me back ASAP….
She gave her phone number.
The Voice of American News is now part of the U.S. State Depart-
ment.
I called her as she had asked and she said she wanted to interview
me by phone. I asked her to let me know what she would want to speak
with me about. She sent me an e-mail elaborating:
The questions I am planning to ask you during the interview are going
to be about both the content of your article and how you did it. Although
I’d like to ask you, first of all, how you came up with the idea of writing
this article, the focus of this interview is not just on how you prepared
the article.
The purpose of this interview is to let our listeners know what is
going on regarding the BDA issue and how the BDA issue is developing.
When I read your article, I thought you made valuable and critical
points about the BDA issue, and I thought it might be very important to
let your idea about the BDA issue be heard by our listeners.
She listed questions she would ask me in the interview.
1. How you came up with the idea of writing this article? How you
prepared it? About your sources.
2. Briefly summarize your findings or main points of the article?
3. What you are trying to accomplish by writing this article? What needs
to be done to resolve the BDA issue?
She wrote ending the e-mail:
Finally, I wanted to ask you if we could do this interview sometime
between 9a.m. and 9:30a.m..... Thanks again.
She did indeed call and we had a substantial phone conversation
discussing my stories, the Internet sources I had used, and what I saw as
the problem with the American government’s freezing the Banco Delta
Asia funds.
Afterwards she asked specifically for the urls to follow up on the
Internet sources I had cited. These were basically material I had found
including a blog, several government documents, and copies of the legal
documents submitted by the Bank owner to appeal the Treasury
Department ruling against the Bank, all on the Internet.
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This was all happening at a time when there were new efforts to find
a solution to the roadblock that freezing the BDA funds belonging to
North Korea represented to the continuation of the Six-Party Talks.
The Voice of America News reporter said she would consider
contacting the former U.S. government officials who were responsible
for crafting the plan to freeze North Korea’s assets at Banco Delta Asia.
Just at this time, the U.S. government announced a new possible
arrangement for returning the funds to North Korea via the international
banking system. In the following week it proved successful.
The Voice of American News reporter wrote me saying she had
other stories to do and was not for now going to pursue this story any
longer.
I can only speculate that perhaps her contacting me and interview-
ing me was part of an effort by some people within the U.S. government
to put pressure on others within the government who were creating the
roadblocks.
Regardless of her motivation, the Voice of America News reporter
had contacted me before the situation was resolved. Whether the contact
had any impact on the resolution I can only speculate. At the very least,
the articles I had done had caught the attention of someone at the Voice
of America News which is part of the U.S. State Dept. I was given the
chance to explain how I framed the story of the BDA and what I saw the
controversy surrounding it to be.
So my story did indeed have more of an impact than I thought
possible when I gave my talk at the ICA in San Francisco. OMNI and the
Internet in general gave these stories about the BDA a power they would
not otherwise have had.
The opinions expressed in articles are those of their authors and not
necessarily the opinions of the Amateur Computerist newsletter. We
welcome submissions from a spectrum of viewpoints.
Page 76
EDITORIAL STAFF
Ronda Hauben
William Rohler
Norman O. Thompson
Michael Hauben (1973-2001)
Jay Hauben
The Amateur Computerist invites submissions. Articles can be
submitted via e-mail:
[email protected] Permission is given to reprint articles from
this issue in a non profit publication provided credit is given, with name of
author and source of article cited.
ELECTRONIC EDITION
ACN Webpage:
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ All issues of the Amateur
Computerist are on-line. Back issues of the Amateur Computerist are available at:
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/Back_Issues/
All issues can be accessed from the Index at:
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/NewIndex.pdf
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