The Amateur

Computerist

Fall 2009 Netizen Journalism and North Korea Volume 18 No. 1

Editorial: Netizen Journalism

Counters Media Myths

This issue of the Amateur Computerist is a

follow-up to the Vol. 16 No. 1 issue

, the first issue

exploring Netizen Journalism and the United Nations.

In that issue we raised the question of whether

the Internet and netizen media make it possible to

counter the "false narratives" in the mainstream

media, like those which provided the pretext for the

U.S. government to invade Iraq.

This issue continues the focus on news and

feature articles about the Democratic People’s Repub-

lic of Korea (DPRK) also known as North Korea. In

general the subject of the DPRK is treated by the U.S.

government and the mainstream media with hostility

toward both the country and its policies. Many myths

are presented about the DPRK, like it is a reclusive

isolated state, even though it has relations with most

other countries of the world and participates in many

international organizations.

This is similar to how Iraq was treated by the

U.S. government and mainstream media. The U.S.

mainstream media reported that there were Weapons

Table of Contents

Editorial.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1

Overseas Koreans Remember 6.15.. . . . . . . . Page 2

U.S. Policy Fails to Engage.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4

UN SC Increases Tension on Korean .. . . . . . Page 7

UN SC Controversy: N.K. Satellite. . . . . . . . Page 8

U.S. Media: Breakdown in 6-Party Talks. . . Page 10

N.Y. Philharmonic: Between 2 Peoples. . . . Page 12

N.Y. Philharmonic Accepts N.K. Invitation. Page 13

Review: Hidden History of Korean War.. . . Page 14

N.K. Woodblock Prints Exhibit. . . . . . . . . . Page 16

Webpage:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn18-1.pdf

of Mass Destruction in Iraq. There were no such

weapons. The media coverage was contrary to the

facts.

With regard to the DPRK, the hostile mainstream

media coverage supports the U.S. government’s

unwillingness to relate to the DPRK as a normal

country with a different political system. Such cover-

age is a road block to the accurate information needed

so there can be public support for a constructive

national policy toward the DPRK.

The question raised in Vol. 16 No. 1 was, "Does

the Net give the power of the reporter to netizens to

counter the fictitious accounts that often make up

much of the news?" This continues as the question for

this issue.

In November 2009, Robert Carlin came to the

United Nations to speak with journalists as part of a

program sponsored by the United Nations Correspon-

dents’ Association (UNCA). In the 1990s during the

presidency of Bill Clinton, Carlin was part of the U.S.

government team negotiating with the DPRK. At his

UNCA presentation, Carlin described how negotiating

with DPRK officials was fruitful.

Of the 22 different

sets of substantial negotiations, 16 were successful.

With the election in Nov. 2000 of George W. Bush

and the change in the U.S. administration, however

these agreements reached under the Clinton presi-

dency were abandoned. So far, President Obama has

only increased the hostile policy which sees the

DPRK as an enemy state. (See “U.S. Policy Toward

North Korea Fails to Engage” in this issue.)

Carlin expressed his view that accurate press

coverage in the U.S. is needed if there is going to be

a change from the current hostile policy of the U.S.

government toward the DPRK. The myths support the

hard line, while an accurate reporting would support

the development of normal relations between the U.S.

and DPRK. We present this issue of the Amateur

Computerist as a step toward that more accurate

Webpage: http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Page 1

coverage.

Several of the articles report on the circumstances

of the negative treatment of the DPRK by the UN

Security Council. Another article considers the

change in policy made by President Obama which

even increased the hard line against the DPRK. A

book review of the Hidden History of the Korean War

documents some of the background of the U.S.

aggressive policy toward the DPRK.

In contrast to these negative events, this issue

contains two articles about the concert by the NY

Philharmonic Orchestra in Pyongyang in February

2008. It also contains an article about a conference on

June 15, 2009 of overseas Koreans celebrating the

historic friendly meeting between Kim Dae Jung, the

president of the ROK (Republic of Korea also known

as South Korea) and Kim Jong Il, the leader of the

DPRK in June 2000. This is after the bitter legacy

bequeath to all Koreans by the forceful separation of

the nation of Korea into two separate countries. An

artistic view of DPRK life is represented in the article

about the exhibit of wood block prints. All the articles

in this issue originally appeared in OhmyNews Inter-

national.

Notes:

1. Winter 2007.

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn16-1.pdf

2. See, “Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007”

http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/negotiating_with_north_kor

ea_19922007/

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on June 17, 2009]

Overseas Koreans Remem-

ber 6.15 Joint Declaration

Conference Discusses Struggle for

Peace and Reunification of Korean

Peninsula

by Ronda Hauben

Though the Sunshine Policy that has officially

guided the struggle for Korean Reunification since

June 15, 2000 (6.15) may be under siege by the

current government of South Korea, the U.S. govern-

ment, and the United Nations Security Council, it was

very much alive at the Overseas Koreans Conference

for Peace and Reunification of Korea held in Wash-

ington, D.C. The conference, marking the 9

anniver-

sary of the historic agreement between the Heads of

State of North and South Korea, was held on June

12-14.

It was with a sigh of relief that I left New York

on Friday morning June 12 to travel to Washington,

D.C. where the June 15 Joint Korea Declaration

Overseas Committee for Peace and Reunification of

Korea was hosting this three-day event.

At noon, in New York City on Friday, June 12,

the United Nations Security Council passed SC

Resolution 1874 imposing harsh sanctions against

North Korea. The voice of reason has been drowned

out in a sea of “waiting for Obama” sentiment, giving

the Obama administration license to continue and

even outdo the anti democratic policies of the Bush

administration.

For example, Obama’s administration has in-

creased the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan, and

encouraged extensive military actions displacing the

civilian population in Pakistan. But when it comes to

North Korea, government policy has been especially

harsh. This has been documented in an earlier article

in OhmyNews International: U.S. Policy Toward

North Korea Fails to Engage.

The presentations and discussion at the 6.15

anniversary conference helped to put what is happen-

ing at the UN into the bigger framework of U.S.,

Korean relations and North Korea-South Korea

relations.

This broad focus is one where several

generations of Koreans have grown up since the

rivalry between U.S. and Soviet Union following

World War II, imposed arbitrary separation on the

Korean Peninsula.

“The separation itself is violent,” explained Park

Soh-eyn, the first speaker at the Saturday morning

panel, who came to the conference from Germany.

Conference participants

Page 2

She observed that the June 15 Declaration had a

significant symbolic effect. It provided a common

approach toward reunification for both North Korea

and South Korea. After 60 years of separation, just to

be able to look at the North Korean and South Korean

flags in the same space was touching, she recalled.

Part of the impact in South Korea of the 6.15

Joint Declaration was to legalize discussions of

reunification which had been previously forbidden

and criminalized by the National Security Law. The

6.15 Declaration had also broadened the reunification

movement so that people from different sectors of

society participated, including diverse religious

organizations, and diverse non-religious organizations

including conservative and progressive political

groups. Park Soh-eyn pointed out that there have been

many exchanges between the Koreas since the 6.15

Joint Declaration.

Park Soh-eyn offered the analogy that if we

consider the separation like a disease with its harmful

effects, the reunification process provides a medica-

tion, with curing qualities.

On Friday evening there had been a short set of

talks at the dinner held at a Korean restaurant in

Tysons Corner, Virginia. U.S. Congressman Eni

Faleomavaega of American Samoa, who is the Chair-

man of the Foreign Affairs Committee on Asia, the

Pacific and the Global Environment, gave a short

presentation about his support for the Sunshine Policy

and his respect for the work done by former South

Korean President Kim Dae Jung.

I was invited to present a greeting at the dinner.

I described how as a featured writer for OhmyNews

International, I have reported on UN events, particu-

larly focusing on the frustrations among delegates and

others with the actions of the UN Security Council. I

noted the widespread feeling that there is a need for

an English language publication to counter media

myths as about North Korea.

Another talk at the Saturday Conference was

presented by Kim Chang-soo, who had been on the

South Korean National Security Council in the Roh

Moo-hyun administration. Kim Chang-soo reviewed

some of the recent events in the relations between the

two Koreas. President Lee Myung-bak has not recog-

nized the June 15, 2000 or October 4, 2007 agree-

ments with North Korea negotiated by the previous

two governments. The Lee regime, in abandoning the

Sunshine policy, turned to criticizing North Korea as

well as conducting military exercises with the U.S.

that are viewed as hostile activities by North Korea.

The media has focused on internal problems in

North Korea, failing to take into account broader

issues and context. North Korea has indicated it is

willing to talk about the nuclear issues with the U.S.

on a one to one basis, which would include talking

about U.S. protection of South Korea under the U.S.

nuclear umbrella. Kim Chang-soo proposed that

North Korea is trying to get diplomatic recognition

from the U.S. as well as to address its economic

issues. But the current world media focuses on prob-

lems with North Korea, rather than why the U.S. is

not doing anything to encourage negotiations.

Kim Chang-soo suggested that the upcoming

summit between Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama

was important and has the potential to have serious

military implications. He cautioned against Obama

failing to realize that Lee Myung-bak is considered as

a repressive dictator and that there is a long tradition

of the U.S. government supporting dictatorial regimes

in South Korea. Such support for Lee Myung-bak by

the U.S. government would remind the people of

South Korea of this past history, including the resent-

ment that spread across South Korea in 2002 when

two middle school girls were killed by a U.S. military

tank. Kim Chang-soo advised Obama to keep this all

in mind when he meets the President of South Korea.

Kim Chang-soo offered some observations about

the current tense situation created between the U.S.

and North Korea by U.S. support for the harsh Secu-

rity Council Resolution that has recently passed at the

UN. He referred to several analogous periods when

the U.S. made progress in normalizing relations. One

such example was when China and the U.S. began to

U.S. Congressman Eni Faleomavaega of American Samoa

Page 3

normalize relations in the early 1970s. Similarly

despite the hostility of the Bush administration years,

negotiations with North Korea began in earnest

toward the latter part of Bush’s tenure in office.

The current sanctions, against North Korea, are

problematic. They even go beyond the mandate of the

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that in itself has

the potential to provoke military encounters. The

Security Council’s sanctions present a contradiction

with the Armistice Agreement between North Korea

and the UN Command, which forbids one side from

blockading the other side. The provision to forcibly

inspect North Korean ships contradicts the terms of

the Armistice, as do the provisions cutting off finan-

cial interactions with North Korea.

Kim Chang-soo observed that Obama’s policy is

similar to Bush’s earlier policy. We need to ask for a

fresh policy approach from the Obama administration,

he suggested. He advised that there is a need for a

very special high level envoy to go to North Korea to

change the direction. Also he proposed that an ex-

change of cultural events and people to people inter-

actions could be helpful.

For the upcoming meeting between the U.S. and

South Korean presidents, Kim Chang-soo proposed

that relations with North Korea need to address not

only denuclearization, but also diplomatic recogni-

tion, inter Korea exchanges, and forging peace in

Northeast Asia. Kim Chang-soo advised that Lee

Myung-bak recognize the significance of the June 15

Declaration and continue to implement that spirit and

to promote this spirit when he meets with Obama,

rather than a tough military approach to North Korea.

In thinking about the impact of the events at the

conference, it seems that U.S. and North Korean

relations are at a particularly low point with the

danger of a military confrontation. At such a time, it

is particularly important to consider the achievements

of the Sunshine Policy and the 6.15 Joint Declaration

as a means to support peace and reunification, rather

than war, on the Korean Peninsula.

The continuing tragedy of the two Koreas is a

serious problem for the world, not just for the Korean

people. Also the U.S. government’s refusal to

negotiate a peace treaty to end the Korean war means

that there is a particularly dangerous situation on the

Korean Peninsula. The Armistice is but a temporary

truce, not a means of more permanently preventing a

return to military action.

A number of conversations at the conference,

however, emphasized that people in Korea have faced

many hardships over the years so that this difficult

time is not unusual for them.

One speaker on Friday evening summing up this

sentiment admitted, “I feel sometimes hopeless.” But

along with this sentiment, he explained his belief that

there is a basis for hope. He reminded those at the

conference, “But our people have been through so

many hardships…. We shouldn’t be passive. As our

voices get bigger, we’ll get more power. We should-

n’t appeal to Lee Myung-bak. We should appeal to

the people.”

Note:

1. Most of the talks presented at the conference and dinner were

in Korean. This account of the conference is based on transla-

tions from Korean into English provided by several colleagues.

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on June 12, 2009]

U.S. Policy Toward North

Korea Fails to Engage

[Opinion] UN Security Council Should

be Neutral in its Dealings with North

Korea

by Ronda Hauben

U.S. policy toward North Korea since Barack

Obama assumed the U.S. presidency is very different

from the promises of engagement which he made

during his election campaign. This policy presents a

striking example of the disparity between pre election

promises and the action taken thus far during the

Ronda Hauben speaks at conference

Page 4

Obama presidency.

On the first day of the new administration,

sanctions were authorized against three North Korean

firms under the Arms Export Control Act, along with

several nonproliferation executive orders. The three

firms were KOMID, which had been sanctioned by

other administrations, Sino-Ki and Moksong Trading

Company, which were being sanctioned for the first

time.

The hostile direction of Obama’s policy, how-

ever, has been signaled most clearly by the change

made when the new administration failed to reappoint

Christopher Hill to his position as Undersecretary of

State for East Asia and the head of the U.S. negotia-

tion team for the six-party talks with North Korea.

Not only was Hill not reappointed, but the role of

U.S. negotiator with North Korea was downgraded

and split among several different officials. A part time

position was created for an envoy. Another person

would be the U.S. representative to the six-party talks.

And still another official was to be appointed to the

position of Undersecretary of State for East Asia,

which was Hill’s former position.

Stephen Bosworth accepted the position as

envoy. His official title is Special Representative for

North Korea Policy. Bosworth did so on a part time

basis. At the same time, he maintained his full time

position as Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy at Tufts University along with his new

part time job.

There has been little public discussion about why

the Obama administration made such significant

changes. The Boston Globe, in an article about

Bosworth’s appointment, refers to the concerns

expressed by Leon Sigal, the director of the Northeast

Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social

Science Research Council in New York. The article

quotes Sigal saying that there are officials in the new

administration, “who don’t think we can get any-

where, so they don’t want to do the political heavy

lifting to try.”

In contrast to the loss of Hill as a negotiator with

North Korea, the Obama administration reappointed

Stuart Levey, as the Undersecretary of Treasury for

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Levey’s office

in the Treasury Department, was created in 2004

under George W. Bush. This office was used to

impose economic sanctions on North Korea. One such

action was the freezing of funds that North Korea had

in a bank in Macao, China, the Banco Delta Asia

(BDA).

North Korea was not only denied access to U.S.

$25 million, but it was also denied the use of the

international banking system. This freezing of North

Korean funds was announced shortly after North

Korea and the five other nations who were part of the

six-party talks signed the September 19, 2005 agree-

ment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

The

announcement by the Treasury Department sabotaged

the implementation of this important agreement

which would have gone a long way toward the goal of

denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. North Korea

withdrew from the six-party talks until the $25

million was returned.

It is significant here to note that Levey and his

office briefly came under public scrutiny in 2006

when the New York Times published an article expos-

ing how the office has access to and uses the SWIFT

Data Base to do intelligence work targeting people

and transactions that it claims are in violation of U.S.

law.

The SWIFT Data Base contains the transactions

and identification information for the hundreds of

thousands of people and entities that do electronic

banking transactions using the SWIFT system.

The action by the U.S. Treasury using a section

of the Patriot Act against the Banco Delta Asia Bank,

however, demonstrated that the U.S. government has

the ability to use this data base information against

those it wants to target politically, rather than those

who have committed any actual illegal acts. Testi-

mony by former U.S. government officials to the U.S.

Congress, and documents submitted to the U.S.

government by the bank owner and his lawyer,

demonstrated that there was never any evidence

offered of any illegal acts. Instead the Patriot Act had

been used to allow the U.S. government to act against

this bank for political objectives. (See “Behind the

Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed

at targeting China as well as North Korea?”)

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_vi

ew.asp?menu=c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1

The new positions, designated to negotiate with

North Korea, are at a lower administrative level than

was Hill’s former position. In addition, the Obama

administration, by not reappointing Hill, has lost his

valuable expertise. Hill had effectively countered the

sabotage to negotiations caused by Levey’s office

during the Bush administration.

Hill was met with opposition from some in the

Bush administration at each step along the way.

Page 5

Remarkably, Hill effectively countered much of this

opposition, making progress in the negotiations. In

August 2008, however, the Bush administration

unilaterally changed what it claimed North Korea’s

obligations were as part of Phase 2 of the six-party

Feb 2007 agreement, and falsely declared that North

Korea was in violation.

With Hill gone from the North Korean desk at the

State Department, and Levey reappointed to his

position at the Treasury Department, it is significant

that Obama sent an inter-agency group to visit the

capitals of Japan, South Korea and China to discuss

punishments for North Korea. Levey was featured as

one of the U.S. government officials on the trip.

But is punishment appropriate? There has been

no similar effort to open negotiations with North

Korea.

Instead, the U.S. administration has given its

support to Levey and others whose actions have

sabotaged the success of the six-party talks. This

failure of the Obama administration is similar to

previous U.S. policy on North Korea.

Robert Carlin, part of the U.S. government

negotiation team with North Korea under the Clinton

Administration, documents that there were significant

and successful negotiations on 22 issues carried out in

the period between 1993 and 2000.

These achieve-

ments, however, could not survive into the transition

to the Bush Administration.

Similarly, Mike Chinoy, a former CNN journalist,

in his book Meltdown, documents both the Clinton

years and much of the Bush years. He chronicles how

negotiations were torpedoed not by North Korea, but

by forces within the U.S. government itself.

In addition, the U.S. conducts frequent military

maneuvers close to North Korea which North Korea

has claimed as a threat to its peace and security.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea test launched a

communications satellite using a rocket of advanced

design. This test broke no international law or treaty

to which North Korea is a party.

Still the launch was

condemned by the UN Security Council in a Presiden-

tial Statement. Also new sanctions were imposed on

North Korea, stating as authority, a previous Security

Council Resolution 1718.

North Korea has been the target of hostile acts by

the U.S. North Korea has tested rockets and has done

tests of two nuclear devices, which it claims it needs

as a deterrent. The U.S. has military agreements with

Japan and South Korea, including them under the

protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. There is only

an armistice ending the fighting of the Korean War.

The U.S. as the head of the UN command has not

been willing to negotiate a treaty ending the Korean

War.

The failure of the UN Security Council to explore

North Korea’s problems in trying to check U.S.

hostility demonstrates its failure to carry out its

obligations under the UN charter. The failure of the

Security Council to protect Iraq from U.S. invasion is

a warning that the Security Council should reform its

processes so that it doesn’t just become a vehicle for

the political targeting of a nation as happened with

Iraq.

In his comments to journalists in response to the

sanctions put on North Korea in April 2009, the

Deputy Ambassador to the UN from North Korea,

Pak Tok Hun said, “The recent activity of the security

council concerning the peaceful use of outer space by

my country shows that unless the security council is

totally reformed and democratized we expect nothing

from it.”

The challenge to the nations of the UN is to

provide a more neutral and considered investigation

of the problem it is trying to solve rather than just

carrying out the punishment a P-5 nation may en-

deavor to inflict on another nation.

Notes:

1. Karin Lee and Julia Choi, “North Korea: Unilateral and

Multilateral Economic Sanctions and U.S. Department of

Treasury Actions, 1955-April 2009," National Committee on

North Korea, (Paper last updated April 28, 2009), p.26.

http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09035LeeChoi.pdf

2. James F. Smith, “In role as envoy, Tufts dean carries

hard-earned lessons,” The Boston Globe, May 26, 2009,

http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/05/26/in_rol

e_as_envoy_tufts_dean_carries_hard_earned_lessons/?comme

nts=all

3. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Asia: Another Abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act,” OhmyNews

International, March 3, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=351525&rel_no=1

4. Ronda Hauben, “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia:

Is the policy aimed at targeting China as well as North Korea?,”

OhmyNews International, May 18, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=362192&rel_no=1

5. Erick Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data Is Sifted by

U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,” New York Times, June 23, 2006.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html?

_r=1

Page 6

6. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the

Six-Party Talks,” OhmyNews International, September 28, 2008.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=383769&rel_no=1

7. Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons

Learned and Forgotten,” “Korea Yearbook 2007,” Edited by

Rudiger Frank et al, Brill, 2007, p. 235-251.

8. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown, St. Martin’s Press, 2008,

9. Ronda Hauben, “Controversy at UN Over North Korea’s

Launch: Reconvening six-party talks or penalizing Pyongyang?

“, OhmyNews International, April 10, 2009.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=385061&rel_no=1

10. Ronda Hauben, “Security Council’s Ad Hoc Actions Increase

Tension on Korean Peninsula: [Analysis] North Korea responds

by withdrawing from six-party talks as promised,” OhmyNews

International, April 17, 2009.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=385093&rel_no=1

11. Seumas Milne, “After Iraq It’s Not Just North Korea that

Wants a Bomb,” Guardian Comment Is Free, May 29, 2009.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/27/north-

korea-nuclear-weapons-us

12. Pak Tok Hun, Informal Comments to the Media at the UN

Media Stakeout, April 24, 2009.

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2009/so0904

24pm2.rm

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on April 17, 2009]

Security Council’s Ad Hoc

Actions Increase Tension on

Korean Peninsula

[Analysis] North Korea Responds by

Withdrawing from Six-Party Talks as

Promised

by Ronda Hauben

On April 13, the UN Security Council (UNSC)

issued a presidential statement condemning North

Korea’s satellite launch on April 5. The Security

Council statement declared the launch “in contraven-

tion” of UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006), even though

there was no wording in the 2006 statement against

satellite launches. In the 2009 statement, the Security

Council demanded North Korea not conduct further

launches, including of satellites. The presidential

statement also mandated that new sanctions would be

added to the sanctions list in the 2006 resolution.

Usually, a presidential statement issued by the

Security Council is considered a non binding state-

ment. Suddenly, the Security Council has changed its

processes, using a presidential statement to deny

North Korea the right to launch satellites, and to

impose a new set of sanctions.

South Korea has recently noted that the trajectory

of the North Korean launch was indeed the trajectory

for a satellite launch.

Lee Sang-hee, the South

Korean Defense Minister, in response to a question

asked during a hearing held in South Korea’s National

Assembly, replied that “The rocket launched by the

North followed the trajectory of a satellite and later

separated in its final two stages before crashing into

the Pacific Ocean.” South Korea’s Yonhap News

Agency reported the minister’s remarks, adding that

these remarks were an official acknowledgment that

the rocket was the effort to launch a satellite, not a

ballistic missile.

UNSC resolution 1718 (2006) demands North

Korea not conduct any launch of ballistic missiles, but

does not refer to satellite launches.

Pak Tok-hun, the North Korean Deputy Ambas-

sador to the UN, referred to the fact that his country

is being denied a right that other countries have, and

that this treatment is not “fair.” In an interview with

Aljazeera, the Ambassador said that if the Security

Council acted against his country for its satellite

launch, North Korea would respond with harsh

measures.

The Ambassador noted that Japan has launched

satellites more than 100 times and other countries like

the U.S. have launched satellites and the Security

Council has not taken up the issue. He complained

that North Korea is being treated in a way that is

different from how other countries are treated.

Some of what is striking about the action by the

Security Council is the closed process used to con-

sider the issue. There was no public discussion. There

were several closed meetings, called consultations,

among the P-5 members and Japan. During these

meetings journalists were told the P-5 and Japan

discussed what the response of the Security Council

should be to North Korea’s launch.

After there was agreement among the P-5 and

Japan on what was to be contained in a presidential

statement on the launch, the statement was presented

to the other elected members of the Security Council

for their approval. Despite the obligation specified in

Article 32 of the UN Charter that a nation that is a

party to an issue being discussed by the Security

Page 7

Council be invited to the Security Council for the

discussion, no such invitation was made, according to

sources on the Security Council.

Similarly, though several of the nations on the

Security Council indicated that they favored the

resumption of the six-party talks as a way to deal with

the launch by North Korea, there was no indication

that there was any consideration by the Security

Council of what led to the breakdown of the six-party

talks. The U.S. government’s effort to require verifi-

cation in Phase 2 of the six-party Feb 2007

agreement, rather than in Phase 3, as had been agreed

to by the six-parties was not discussed in the Security

Council.

Instead of the Security Council members consid-

ering the problem which derailed the talks, they

agreed to impose new sanctions on North Korea.

Since no new Security Council resolution was being

issued, there was no appropriate means of issuing new

sanctions. They resorted to acting in an ad-hoc man-

ner when they announced they would use a presiden-

tial statement to add new sanctions to Security Coun-

cil resolution 1718 issued in 2006.

One journalist, at the press stakeout after the

Security Council meeting issuing the presidential

statement, asked:

“Mr. Ambassador, Does this

presidential statement set a precedent whereby in the

future, if you want to adjust the sanctions, supposedly

for example for Iran, you can issue another presiden-

tial statement to change the content of the sanctions in

a resolution? Is this legally speaking, a precedent?”

Baki Ilkin, Turkey’s Ambassador to the UN, who

is the head of the UNSC Resolution 1718 sanctions

committee, responded: “I am a newcomer. I wish you

had asked the previous speakers (Several Security

Council Ambassadors had spoken before Ambassador

Ilkin at the stakeout-ed).”

After the Security Council issued its presidential

statement, North Korea announced it is leaving the

six-party talks. It announced that it does not recognize

the actions of the Security Council condemning its

satellite launch. There is justification for North Ko-

rea’s actions. Yet much of the mainstream media in

the U.S. frames North Korea’s reasonable response as

but an indication of how unreasonable it behaves.

North Korea has asked that the IAEA and U.S.

inspectors leave North Korea. It says it will resume its

nuclear deterrent development, as North Korean

Deputy Ambassador Pak Tok-hun promised would

happen if the Security Council acted to condemn

North Korea. The Ambassador told Aljazeera and

other media that the Security Council could expect

strong measures in response to any action against

North Korea. “We don’t say empty talk. What we say

is what we do,” the Ambassador told journalists.

Notes:

1. S Korean govt. admits DPRK rocket followed satellite

trajectory, Xinhuanet, April 14, 2009.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/14/content_11185

140.htm

2. Ronda Hauben, “Every country has the inalienable right to use

the outer space peacefully: UN Security Council Controversy

over North Korean Satellite Launch,” Telepolis, April 8, 2009.

http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/30/30099/1.html

3. Aljazeera Interview with North Korean Deputy Ambassador

to the UN, Pak Tok-hun, April 14, 2009.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjEIvw7I5Ow

4. UN Media Stakeout: Informal comments to the Media by the

Permanent Representative of Turkey, H.E. Mr. Baki Ilkin, on

Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. April

13, 2009.

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2009/so0904

13pm7.rm

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on April 10, 2009]

UN Security Council Contro-

versy over North Korean

Satellite Launch

Reconvening Six-party Talks or

Penalizing Pyongyang?

by Ronda Hauben

There has been a controversy among the mem-

bers of the UN Security Council (UNSC) over how to

react to the April 5 launch of a satellite by North

Korea. The Security Council met for emergency

consultations on Sunday, April 5, while the P-5 and

Japan have met in other consultations after the

Sunday meeting.

Japan and the U.S. have encouraged the UNSC to

take strong measures against North Korea to punish it

for launching the satellite. The Russian Ambassador

to the UN, Vitaly I. Churkin warned against a “knee

jerk” reaction and proposed that the crucial goal was

to ensure the continuation of the six-party talks

toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Page 8

These talks broke down during the Bush administra-

tion and have not yet been resumed.

The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Zhang

Yesui said that the reaction of the Security Council

had to be “cautious and proportionate.” He said that

his delegation would be most willing to consider

constructive responses.

U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice, called the launch

by North Korea, “a clear-cut violation of UN Security

Council Resolution 1718.”

She said that it is the view of the U.S. govern-

ment “that this action merits a clear and strong

response from the United Nations Security Council.”

Her position was that SC Resolution 1718

“prohibited missile related activity and called on the

DPRK to halt further missile related activity.”

Vietnam, one of the elected members of the

Security Council, called for a “prudent reaction.” A

spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry said that

Vietnam “hopes the relevant parties have a prudent

reaction, find a reasonable solution and do not com-

plicate the situation and affect peace and stability in

the Northeast Asia region.”

While Vietnam said that it was opposed to the

proliferation of nuclear weapons, an earlier statement

indicated that Vietnam supports “the rights of coun-

tries to use science and technology for peaceful

purposes.”

The Japanese Ambassador to the UN, Yukio

Takasu requested an emergency consultative session

of the Security Council on Sunday, April 5. His

position was that North Korea’s launch of a satellite

was banned by SC Resolution 1718 which demands

that North Korea suspend all activities “related to its

ballistic missile program.”

While SC Resolution 1718 explicitly demands

that North Korea not conduct any “launch of a ballis-

tic missile,” the members of the Security Council

disagree about whether SC Resolution 1718 forbids

the launch of a communication satellite.

Countries advocating the position that North

Korea violated SC Resolution 1718, point to parts

five and 8(a)ii of the resolution as the parts violated.

Part 5 reads that the Security Council: “Decides

that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to

its ballistic missile program and in this context

re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a morato-

rium on missile launch.” (SC Resolution 1718, p.2)

Section 8(a)ii is about member states preventing

the sale or transfer to North Korea of “materials,

equipment, goods and technology as set out in the

lists…which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-

related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of

mass-destruction related programs.” (SC Resolution

1718, p. 2-3)

North Korea was not invited to participate in the

emergency consultations of the Security Council,

despite the fact that Article 32 of the UN charter

requires that a “party to a dispute under consideration

by the Security Council shall be invited to participate,

without vote, in the discussion relating to the dis-

pute….”

Speaking to reporters at the UN on Tuesday,

April 7, the Deputy Ambassador to the UN from the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North

Korea), Pak Tok Hun said:

“Every country has the

right, the inalienable right to use the outer space

peacefully. Not a few countries, many countries, they

have already launched satellites several hundred

times.”

“Does it mean it would be OK for them to launch

satellites but we are not allowed to do that? It’s not

fair. It’s not fair.”

“This is a satellite. Everyone can distinguish (a)

satellite with a missile. It’s not a missile. I know most

of the countries now recognize it’s not a missile.”

A reporter asked, “But you use ballistic technol-

ogy. You need ballistic technologies.”

Pak responded: “Those countries who launch

satellites use similar technology and if the Security

Council, they take any kind of step whatever, this is

infringement on the sovereignty of our country and

the next option will be ours and necessary and strong

steps will follow that.”

Along with the dispute in the Security Council

over whether or not the North Korea’s action is an

actual violation of SC Resolution 1718, there is a

controversy over whether the thrust of the Security

Council action should be toward getting the six-party

talks reconvened, or toward penalizing North Korea

in some way.

The resolution of this controversy depends

predominantly upon the U.S. because it can be argued

that the U.S. was responsible for the current break-

down of the six-party talks.

In a talk at the Korea Society in NYC last Fall,

Leon Sigal of the Social Science Research Council

(SSRC) explained how the six-party talks broke down

over the issue of verification. The U.S. government

had changed the terms of the agreement unilaterally,

Page 9

imposing a condition on North Korea that was not

part of the original agreement.

The second phase of the six-party February 2007

agreement required disabling the reactor, and other

processes at Yongbyon and declaring the nuclear

material and equipment which were to be eliminated

in Phase 3 of the agreed actions.

The Bush administration was obligated to pro-

vide ‘action for action’ in response to North Korea’s

disabling the reactor and other steps.

The verification was to occur only later in the

six-party talk process, in Phase 3 “when the disman-

tling of the North’s nuclear facilities and elimination

of any plutonium or weapons it has would be taken

up.” Instead the U.S. continued to press for a verifica-

tion agreement during Phase 2 of the agreement.

Most of the mainstream U.S. media, with the

exception of an important article in the Washington

Post, failed to explain the reason for the breakdown in

the talks.

The Washington Post article which docu-

mented how the hostile U.S. State Department envi-

ronment eroded the process of negotiation between

the U.S. government and North Korea, was only

carried on page 20 of the newspaper. It described how

U.S. government hardliners fashioned a verification

procedure to be imposed on North Korea which was

in the words of an expert in nuclear disarmament akin

to “a license to spy on any military site they (North

Korea) have.”

By launching a satellite rather than a ballistic

missile, North Korea has avoided violation of the

ballistic missile sections of SC Resolution 1718. This

gives the U.S. a chance to respond by returning to the

six-party-talks and seeking to finish Phase 2 before

requiring verification in Phase 3 of the process.

The Security Council has this opportunity to call

for all parties to cease any obstruction and to return to

the six-party talks and to intensify their efforts to

complete Phase 2 and enter the next phase of the

agreed path to the denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula.

Notes:

1. Vietnam calls for ‘prudent’ reaction to DPRK rocket, April 5,

2009.

2. Pak Tok Hun, Deputy Ambassador from the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to the UN, speaking

to reporters at the UN on Tuesday, April 7, 2009.

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2009/so0904

07pm2.rm

3. Ronda Hauben, U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the

Six-Party Talks, OhmyNews International, Sept. 29, 2008.

4. Glenn Kessler, “Far reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea

Deal: Demands Began to Undo Nuclear Accord,” Washington

Post, Friday, Sept. 26, 2008; Page A20

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Sept. 29, 2008]

U.S. Media and the Break-

down in the Six-Party Talks

America Reneges on Action for

Action Obligation to North Korea

by Ronda Hauben

While much of the mainstream U.S. media has

blamed North Korea for any problems that develop in

the six-party talks, a significant article has appeared

in the Washington Post documenting part of the

problem that has led to the recent breakdown in

negotiations and which threatens to end the six-party

talk process if it isn’t reversed.

The article, which should be a front page story,

instead appears on page 20 and has drawn little

attention. The article by Glenn Kessler documents the

hostile U.S. State Department environment that has

eroded the process of negotiation with North Korea.

It describes how U.S. hardliners fashioned a verifica-

tion procedure to be imposed on North Korea which

was, in the words of an expert in nuclear disarma-

ment, akin to “a license to spy on any military site

they (North Korea) have.”

Overruling Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secre-

tary of State who has been the lead negotiator for the

U.S. in the six-party talks, and in spite of warnings

from China and Russia, that this was not advisable,

U.S. negotiators presented North Korea with a disre-

spectful verification plan that if accepted would

jeopardize North Korean sovereignty. A copy of the

four page verification presentation is online.

(

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/do

cuments/kesslerdoc_092608.pdf?sid=ST200809260

0020&s_pos=list )

In addition, the U.S. President, George Bush,

failed to fulfill on his obligation to remove North

Korea from the nations that sponsor terrorism list.

Bush had given notice to Congress on June 26 that he

was requesting that North Korea be delisted, giving

Page 10

Congress the required 45 day notice to enable him to

carry out the delisting. Subsequently, however, when

the 45 days passed for Congress to respond, and there

was no objection, Bush failed to delist North Korea,

claiming the need for North Korea to agree to a

verification plan.

The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of North

Korea, Pak Kil Yon, in a speech

(

http://www.un.org/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/dprkor

ea_en.pdf ) to the UN General Assembly on Saturday,

Sept. 27, explained, the U.S. is now using the “pretext

of verification as an excuse to hold off on removing

the country from its list of State sponsors of terrorism

even after officially declaring that the DPRK (North

Korea-ed) is not such a nation.”

Discussing the responsibility the Bush adminis-

tration bears for the break down in the six-party talks,

Leon Sigal of the Social Science Research Council

described the obligation of the Bush administration to

provide action for action in response to North Korea

(D.P.R.K.) meeting its obligations in a talk he pre-

sented at the Korea Society on Monday, Sept. 22.

(

http://www.koreasociety.org/contemporary_issues/

contemporary_issues/updates_on_north_korea_a_re

port_from_the_peace_foundation.html )

Sigal detailed how the second phase of the

six-party agreement required of North Korea the

“disabling the reactor, reprocessing facility and fuel

fabrication plant at Yongbyon and declaring the

nuclear material and equipment that were to be

eliminated in phase three.” Also North Korea pledged

“not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or

know-how” to third parties. The United States, as its

action for action obligation, promised to “begin the

process of removing the designation of the D.P.R.K.

as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the

process of terminating the application of the Trading

with the Enemy Act with respect to the D.P.R.K.”

Verification, according to Sigal, was “left to

phase three of negotiations when the dismantling of

the North’s nuclear facilities and elimination of any

plutonium or weapons it has would be taken up.”

Sigal pointed out that the first sign that the

administration had “yielded to hardliners” was on

July 30 when a National Security Council official,

Dennis Wilder, told reporters that the delisting of

North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism

would require North Korea agreeing to a verification

protocol. Then in a speech on Aug. 7, Sigal explained,

Bush informed North Korea, that North Korea would

have to agree to a verification agreement in order to

be delisted.

The U.S. government changed the terms of

agreement unilaterally, imposing a condition on North

Korea that was not part of the original agreement.

The failure of most of the mainstream U.S. media

to inform the public of this arbitrary change by the

U.S. government, demonstrates once again the role

this media plays in helping the U.S. government

deceive the public. A similar role the media per-

formed in spreading the Bush administration’s false

narrative that Iraq possessed weapons of mass de-

struction has since drawn much criticism.

Despite the widespread critique of the past failure

of the U.S. media, there is a reluctance on the part of

the media to expose what the dispute is about with

respect to the recent breakdown of the six-party talks.

For example, UPI offered the view of an alleged

expert in North Korea from a London think tank

advising that North Korea is trying to divide the

countries involved in the six-party talks.

Other press reports describe how Chris Hill, the

U.S. official for the six-party talks is to go to North

Korea to try to salvage the talks from the current

break down, but little or no explanation is offered of

the problem that has led to the breakdown. And even

when there is a news report like the Washington Post

exposure of the harshness of the verification process

presented to North Korea, it is buried in the pages of

the newspaper, instead of getting the front page

coverage such a story deserves.

Notes:

1. “Far reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal; Demands

Began to Undo Nuclear Accord,” by Glenn Kessler, Washington

Post Staff Writer, Friday, September 26, 2008; Page A20.

2. A similar situation with the mainstream U.S. media is docu-

mented in the lead-up to the Iraq war. Articles promoting the

U.S. government’s false claim that Iraq possessed weapons of

mass destruction appeared on page one of newspapers like the

Washington Post and the NY Times but articles challenging this

view would not appear, would be relegated to some later section

of the newspaper. One such example is the White House

“disinformation campaign” incident when Tony Blair and

George Bush held a press conference at Camp David on Sept. 7

2002. They cited a “new report” from the IAEA alleging that

Iraq was six months away from building a nuclear weapon. The

fact that no such report existed was not reported by the press,

except for an article in the Washington Times by Joseph Curl

which was carried on page 16, and an article in the Washington

Post by Karen DeYoung about the press conference quoted an

IAEA spokesperson saying that there was no such report, but that

Page 11

was not featured in her article, but was relegated to the later part

of her report 21 paragraphs down.

See “Lies We Bought” The Columbia Journalism Review,

May/Jun 2003 by MacArthur, John R

(

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3613/is_200305/ai_n9

239827 ).

3. EU: Iran close to nuclear capability

A version of this article appears on netizenblog.

(

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/09/24/EU_Iran_close_t

o_nuclear_capability/ UPI-37861222306006/ ).

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Feb. 27, 2008]

New York Philharmonic Per-

forms Arirang in Pyongyang

Concert as a Normalizing of Relations

Between the Two Peoples

by Ronda Hauben

The people of the United States and the people of

North Korea want friendly relations with each other.

This was the sweet message that the New York Phil-

harmonic’s concert in Pyongyang on Tuesday, Feb.

26 made concrete. Not only was an audience present

in the wonderful concert hall that the North Koreans

had decked with flowers. Significantly the concert

could be heard and viewed on radio and television not

only in North Korea, but in the U.S. as well.

The program was broadcast on the public televi-

sion station on Tuesday evening at 8:00 p.m. in New

York. Not only did the broadcast capture the orchestra

and its program, but it also gave viewers a glimpse of

the audience of North Koreans, and their western

guests who had traveled with the orchestra.

Watching the concert, one could think that this

was just another concert by the New York Philhar-

monic. The conductor with his baton flying, as if

across the screen, the cellists, the violins, the flutes,

the drums, they were all there. But the surface impres-

sion is often different from the reality. The reality in

this situation was that this was a remarkable event, an

event that is rare, and is to be a memorable experience

for those who are able to take part in it. The concert

was in fact a remarkable event, remarkable because it

made normal what should be normal. Why shouldn’t

there be a performance of the New York Philhar-

monic in Pyongyang, North Korea? And there was

indeed a performance, just as there should be.

The choice of the music was also remarkable,

though on the surface this, too, was not evident. For

example, the music of Antonin Dvorak’s “New World

Symphony” makes one wonder if this does mark the

beginning of a new world, a world where friendly

relations will replace the hostile relations the U.S. has

maintained since the Korean war in relation to North

Korea. The trumpets, the violins, the drums, and then

the television cameras focus on the audience for a few

brief seconds.

Those watching catch a glimpse of others in what

for decades has been only a far away land, listening.

Or they are clapping. Or they are standing and cheer-

ing. This is also as it should be, that the audience at a

concert in North Korea is sharing in the experience of

a concert with others around the world.

The musicians, they are intent on their perfor-

mance. It is only after the concert is over, if one reads

certain of the reports of the journalists who could be

there in person, that one learns of the waving back

and forth between the members of the orchestra and

the audience. Or one learns that many of the perform-

ers were especially moved by the five minutes of

applause that their performance evoked.

For those in the orchestra, it was a thrill we are

told. They felt that something special happened with

their audience. For those of us who could watch in

our homes, it was remarkable. It was a normalizing of

relations between two peoples of two different lands.

For its final encore, the Philharmonic played

“Arirang” the beautiful folksong of Korea. For a few

moments the vision of a Korea united some time in

Page 12

the future comes into view. The lovely strains of the

music herald that something new is coming, though

how and when is still unknown. And in that future,

the people of the United States will have the privilege

to have friendly relations with the peoples of Korea,

however they choose to relate with each other.

While it is a significant event that the concert was

presented and was greeted with such warmth and such

a welcoming, it was also a sign that the peoples of the

two countries want their governments to find a way to

transform the hostility of the relationship into one of

reconciliation. It was only disappointing that the U.S.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and the Chief

U.S. Negotiator Christopher Hill weren’t part of the

audience. Had they been, perhaps they would better

understand that they have an obligation to the peoples

of the two countries to find a means to bring the

peace. Sixty years is too long not to have a peace

treaty that will finally end the Korean War.

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Dec. 13, 2007]

New York Philharmonic

Accepts North Korea

Invitation

Concert to Help Show the Way Music

Can Unite People

by Ronda Hauben

The press conference held at the Avery Fisher

Hall at Lincoln Center in New York City on Tuesday

Dec. 11, was a rare event in a number of ways. First

was the importance of the subject. The press confer-

ence was called to officially announce that the New

York Philharmonic Orchestra had accepted the

invitation it received from the Ministry of Culture in

North Korea to bring the orchestra to North Korea for

a concert to be given on Feb. 26.

This would be the first such U.S. cultural event in

North Korea and would be an event in line with the

role that cultural and sports events played to help

establish diplomatic relations between the U.S. and

the Soviet Union in the 1950s and between the U.S.

and China during the Nixon era.

Also it was rare for the North Korean Ambassa-

dor to the United Nations, Pak Gil Yon, to appear at

a press conference in New York. He, along with Zarin

Mehta, President and Executive Director of the

Orchestra, and Paul B. Guenter, Chairman of the New

York Philharmonic, provided substantial time for

questions from journalists.

In his remarks, Ambassador Pak welcomed the

official decision to accept the invitation. When asked

about the origin of the invitation to the orchestra, Pak

said that it had been made by the Ministry of Culture,

and that the Philharmonic would be welcomed as the

first guest of the New Year of 2008.

Pak believed that the visit would be the first of its

kind, and would mark a significant occasion in the

relations between the U.S. and North Korea. When

asked why North Korea extended the invitation, the

Ambassador responded that it had been extended in

the hopes of encouraging friendly relations between

North Korean ambassador to the UN Pak Gil Yon (right)

shakes hands with heads of the New York Philharmonic

Zarin Mehta and Paul Guenter (left).

Page 13

the peoples of the two countries and to help to pro-

mote the bi-lateral relations between the U.S. and

North Korea.

The orchestra received many invitations, said

Mehta, in his remarks. One concern the orchestra had

was whether the concert would contribute to the

success of the multinational six-party talks. When the

U.S. State Department was consulted, it encouraged

the Philharmonic to agree to the invitation. There

were a number of other questions to be answered,

however, before deciding whether the Philharmonic

could agree to the concert, Mehta explained.

He led a small delegation on a five-day visit to

Pyongyang in October to determine if the difficulties

of such a concert could be effectively handled. For

example, he had to know that they would be able to

provide for 150 musicians and many instruments,

some of which are large instruments. He had to see if

there were adequate hotel accommodations and a

concert hall large enough for the concert. During this

exploratory visit, Mehta was able to determine that

these needs could be satisfied.

On his trip, Mehta had a chance to meet conser-

vatory school students. While in Pyongyang, the

members of the orchestra will offer master classes for

North Korean music students. They will also hold an

open rehearsal of the orchestra.

On his trip to Pyongyang in October, Mehta saw

an after-school program that provided activities for

5,000 children including calligraphy, choirs and

playing instruments. He found the experience fasci-

nating.

Mehta also saw a performance of the mass

games, which he said was “quite spectacular.” This

involved a thousand people performing. There was

music and dancing.

During his five-day visit to Pyongyang, Mehta

found that North Koreans “do things that we can’t do,

which were mind boggling.” In music and art, he

observed, we all have things to learn from each other.

Describing his hopes for the concerts, Guenter

explained that “the February concerts on the Korean

Peninsula are unique – they grow out of the Philhar-

monic’s tradition of speaking on a world stage, on

significant occasions, in the international language of

music. From the historic 1959 tour to the Soviet

Union, to the 2005 celebration of Dresden’s rebuilt

Frauenkirche, to the February concerts, it is our hope

that the music of the Philharmonic, can, in some way,

serve as a catalyst for positive change.”

The program for the concert will be Wagner’s

“Prelude to Act III of Lohengrin,” Dvorak’s “Sym-

phony No. 9 from the New World” and Gershwin’s

“An American in Paris.”

The symphony will be performed at the East

Pyongyang Grand Theater, a hall that can seat 1,500

people. Also the concert will be broadcast to people

throughout North Korea. Mehta explained that the

Philharmonic encourages the broadcasting of its

concerts. “We like to have our concerts diffused to as

many people as possible, especially with a first perfor-

mance,” he said.

After the concert in North Korea, the orchestra

will fly to Seoul, South Korea where it will give one

concert. The program will be Beethoven’s 5th Sym-

phony.

When asked about the importance of the planned

concert in North Korea and the subsequent concert

planned for South Korea toward Korean reunification,

he replied that “One small symphony is a giant leap.”

“What follows from that is up to the diplomats to

deal with, and government officials.”

He said the Philharmonic hoped this would help

to show the way music can unite people.

Responding to a journalist who asked, “Do you

think this visit will go down in history as a mile-

stone,” Mehta said, “I expect it will, yes.”

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Feb.14, 2007]

[Book Review]: The Hidden

History of the Korean War

by Jay Hauben

The Hidden History of the Korean War, by I. F.

Stone, 364 pages. Monthly Review Press. 1952, 1970.

The controversial book, The Hidden History of

the Korean War by I. F. Stone was originally pub-

lished in 1952 during the Korean War (1950-1953)

and republished in 1970 during the Vietnam War

(1960-1975). It raised questions about the origin of

the Korean War, made a case that the United States

government manipulated the United Nations, and

gave evidence that the U.S. military and South Ko-

rean oligarchy dragged out the war by sabotaging the

peace talks.

Page 14

Publishing such a book in the U.S. during the

time of

McCarthyism, while the war was still continu-

ing was an act of journalistic courage. Forty years

later, declassified U.S., Soviet and People’s Republic

of China documents both confirmed some and cor-

rected some of Stone’s story.

Until his death in 1989, Stone was an experi-

enced and respected, independent, left-wing journalist

and iconoclast. This book-length feat of journalism,

with over 600 citations for his quotes and materials,

is a testament to Stone’s search for a way to

strengthen his readers to think for themselves, rather

than be overwhelmed by official stories and war

propaganda.

The standard telling was that the Korean War

was an unprovoked aggression by the North Koreans

beginning on June 25, 1950, undertaken at the behest

of the Soviet Union to extend the Soviet sphere of

influence to the whole of Korea, completely surpris-

ing the South Koreans, the U.S., and the U.N.

But was it a surprise? Could an attack by 70,000

men using at least 70 tanks launched simultaneously

at four different points have been a surprise?

Stone gathers contemporary reports from South

Korean, U.S. and U.N. sources documenting what

was known before June 25. The head of the U.S. CIA,

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenloetter, is reported to

have said on the record, “that American intelligence

was aware that ‘conditions existed in Korea that could

have meant an invasion this week or next.’” (p. 2)

Stone writes that “America’s leading military com-

mentator, Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times, a

trusted confidant of the Pentagon, reported that they

[U.S. military documents] showed ‘a marked buildup

by the North Korean People’s Army along the 38th

Parallel beginning in the early days of June.’” (p. 4)

How and why did U.S. President Truman so

quickly decide by June 27 to commit the U.S. military

to battle in South Korea? Stone makes a strong case

that there were those in the U.S. government and

military who saw a war in Korea and the resulting

instability in East Asia as in the U.S. national interest.

Stone presents the ideas and actions of them, includ-

ing John Foster Dulles, General Douglas MacArthur,

President Syngman Rhee and Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek, which appear to amount to a willingness to

see the June 25 military action by North Korea as

another

Pearl Harbor in order to “commit the United

States more strongly against Communism in the Far

East.” (p. 21). Their reasoning may have been, Stone

thought, the sooner a war with China and/or Russia

the better before both become stronger. President

Truman removed Secretary of Defense

Louis John-

son, according to Stone’s account, because Johnson

had been selling this doctrine of a preventive war. (p.

93)

Stone shows that Truman committed the U.S.

military to the war in Korea, then went to the U.N. for

sanctions against North Korea. “It was neither honor-

able nor wise,” Stone argues, “for the U.N. under

pressure from an interested great power to condemn

a country for aggression without investigation and

without hearings its side of the case.” (p. 50) But that

is what the U.S. insisted should happen using, Stone

argues, distorted reports to rush its case.

Then when the war came to a stalemate at the

38th Parallel, Stone makes a strong case that U.S.

Army headquarters provoked or created incidents to

derail the cease-fire negotiations. When the North

Koreans and Chinese had ceded on Nov. 4, 1952 to

the three demands of the U.N. side, the U. S. military

spread a story that “The Communists had brutally

murdered 5,500 American prisoners.” The talks were

being dragged out, the U.S. military argued, because

“The communists don’t want to have to answer

questions about what happened to their prisoners” and

they are lower than “barbarians.” (pp. 324-25) At no

time after these reports were these “atrocities” re-

ported again or documented. But hope of a cease-fire

subsided.

Stone takes the story in time only a little beyond

the dismissal of MacArthur on April 11, 1951. He

quotes press reports as late as January 1952 that

“there still could be American bombing and naval

blockade of Red China if Korean talks fail.”

The evidence which Stone presents is solid but

circumstantial. What else could it be, with the official

documents still unavailable? In the 1960s, the Rand

Corporation, a major think tank originally funded by

the U.S. Air Force, conducted studies with additional

information and according to one reviewer came to

“almost identical conclusions” as Stone.

Stone’s telling of the history of the Korean War,

emphasizing the opportunistic response by the forces

in the U.S. advocating rollback and also downplaying

the role of the Soviet Union challenged the dominant

assumption that this was Stalin’s war. “Until the

release of Western documents in the 1970s, prompted

a new wave of literature on the war, his remained a

minority view.”

Page 15

Then in the 1990s, documents from the former

Soviet archives became available, as did telegrams

and other sources from the PRC archives. Scholars

examining these documents and fitting the pieces

together were able to make the case that Kim Il-sung

had sought and eventually received Soviet support for

a military effort to unify Korea. Stone had been

wrong to suspect that General MacArthur and John

Foster Dulles somehow colluded in the start of the

Korean War.

But Stone did a service by documenting the role

of sectors of U.S. policymakers looking for an oppor-

tunity to push the USSR and the PRC back from

Northeast Asia. Bruce Cummings studied the detailed

policy debate in the U.S. which lead to the policy of

active containment. Cummings’s book, The Origins

of the Korean War, Volume II gives substance to the

internal fight between supporters of rollback and

those who supported containment, which for Stone

was journalistic speculation.

In 1952 when it was published, The Hidden

History of the Korean War met with almost a com-

plete press blackout and boycott. But that included no

rebuttals or answers from official U.S. sources. There

was a republication in 1970 and the book has been

translated at least into Spanish, Italian, and Japanese.

Some chapters also appeared in French. Used copies

are still available, especially from online booksellers.

I. F. Stone’s case is thought provoking and

helpful, especially when tensions are being stirred up

again on the Korean Peninsula, and manipulated wars

are still in style. Perhaps however journalism like that

of Stone’s and lessons from the first Korean War are

making a second Korean War less likely.

Notes:

1. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 1952

2. Stephen E. Ambrose, Professor of Maritime History at the

Naval College in the Baltimore Sun

3. Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War:

The State of Historical Knowledge,” in The Korean War in

World History, edited by William Stueck, University Press of

Kentucky, 2004, page 63.

4. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II:

The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950, Princeton University

Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990.

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Sept. 10, 2008]

North Korean Woodblock

Prints on Exhibit at Korea

Society in NYC

Exhibit Helps to Highlight Need for

More Cultural Exchanges Between

North Korea and Other Countries

by Ronda Hauben

The Korea Society in New York is hosting an exhibit

of North Korean woodcut printing. The exhibit which will

be on display at their gallery until Dec. 12 will then travel

to other sites around the U.S. The exhibit features 24 prints

from the Nicholas Bonner collection. The exhibit spans

three decades of North Korean woodcut art. The cuts offer

a rare glimpse into the life and customs in North Korea.

A number of the woodcuts were from the 1988-1989

period. There are also a few which are from the 1990s. One

of the few woodcuts from the early 1990s shows a factory

scene where the workers at the factory continued to work

during the difficult period of the famine and economic

crisis that gripped the country after the breakup of the

Soviet bloc countries.

In other woodcuts there are scenes of women workers

harvesting shellfish, of workers from all over North Korea

who are part of the effort to build a railroad through the

mountains, of families with their children, and one

woodcut of a teacher being eagerly greeted by her students.

The fact the woodcuts show various aspects of life in

North Korea helps to remind the viewer how rare it has

been to have any knowledge of the life and experiences of

North Koreans. This is in good part the situation because

of the hostile policy of the U.S. government toward North

Korea. The activities of the Korea Society in holding such

an exhibit are especially welcome as the exhibit is helping

to spread some of the little knowledge that exists in the

U.S. about the life and culture of North Koreans. The

colors in the prints are vibrant. There are different textures

portrayed. But most special are the details of working life

shown in the prints that the exhibit presents. Working life

is not often enough the subject of art, despite how central

it is to the life of every society. The prints show working

life in both urban and rural settings and the integration of

the two, as for example, is depicted when soldiers or

volunteers go to a rural area to help with a harvest or

workers from around the country go to help dig through a

mountain so as to make possible a railway.

Page 16

May 1989: May is the time for transplanting rice

in Northern Korea. Collective farmers working in

a rice paddy.

Building a railway thru mountains: Trough the

1980s workers from all over North Korea came to

help build a railroad through the country’s northern

mountains. Suspended on a sheer cliff high above a

raging river and buffeted by wind and snow the

figures pursue their work.

May Day Stadium construction 1988.

1999: Potato flower flagrance of Taehongden Province

in the North of the country is a major source of North

Korea’s potato crop Soldiers and sailors who have

completed their military service have volunteered to

come and help work in the field.

Page 17

Propaganda Van Girl: She is congratulating

jubilant workers for exceeding quotas by

270%.

Shallow sea harvester 1988: Lifting and sorting shell

fish which are used widely as part of the Korean’s

food died, these women who harvest them are

helping to feed the nation.

Constellation of Lake Samji Village: Power from

recently built hydro electric station on Lake Samji

lights up the windows of a nearby village which

presents as a pattern of glowing stars.

Happiness of the Miners: Young miners

enthusiastically read newspaper article describing

their success in exceeding production quotas.

Page 18

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben

(1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

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