The Amateur
Computerist
Spring 2015 DPRK: Out-of-the-Box Diplomacy Volume 25 No. 1
Table of Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 1
Diplomacy to Build a Dialogue with North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Women Plan Peace Walk Across DMZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Media War Why Netizen Journalism Matters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
DPRK UN Briefing Challenges U.S. Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 35
Contesting UN HR Report on North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 41
13 Observations about North Korea .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 45
Enemy Image: What the DPRK Is Really Like. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 52
USA, North Korea and Hollywood.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 58
Global Citizens’ Declaration and Call.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 63
Introduction: North Korea and the Need
for Out-of-the-Box Diplomacy
This year, 2015, marks seventy years since the end of WWII and
since the division of Korea. From 1950-1953 a war was fought to unite
Korea. That war failed to solve the problem of the division of Korea and
the war-like tension that still continues. Years of hostility between the
U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly
known as North Korea) also failed to achieve any improvement for
Korea. This issue of the Amateur Computerist begins with suggestions
that what is needed for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and
as a step toward reunification is a new approach.
The first article, “Out of the Box Diplomacy to Build a Dialogue
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/
Page 1
with North Korea” counters the myth that talks with the DPRK can only
be fruitless. It reports on a program at the Asia Society in New York
City exploring the search for peace between the U.S. and North Korea.
At the program, former Governor of New Mexico, Bill Richardson and
Donald Gregg, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea stressed the
need for engagement rather than the U.S. policy of ‘strategic patience.’
They made a serious effort to propose both the reasons and the possible
means to build a dialogue between North Korea and the U.S.
The second article reports on just such an effort at out-of-the-box
diplomacy. “Women Plan Walk Across the DMZ to Support Peace and
Korean Unification” tells about a plan by 30 women to walk from North
Korea to South Korea through the DMZ. The group plans to hold
women’s peace symposia in each of the Koreas and publicize the
aspirations of Korean women for peace and for unification. The walk
will express the desire for unification and the need to end the Korean
War. The armistice in 1953 only ended the fighting.
Other examples of an emerging alternative force affecting diplo-
macy are analyzed in the article, “The Media War at the UN and the
DPRK: Why Netizen Journalism Matters.” The article presents two case
studies of Korea, the U.S. and the UN relations. In September 2005, just
when an agreement had been reached in the six-party talks on
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. government acted
against the agreement by sanctioning the Banco Delta Asia bank thus
freezing DPRK funds held by that bank. Online and off line journalists,
however uncovered much of the background story. Subsequently the
U.S. arranged to unfreeze the funds.
The other case study involves South Korea. In 2010, South Korea
accused North Korea of sinking the South Korean navel ship Cheonan
and took that accusation to the UN. Especially online but also by letters
to the UN Security Council, South Korea’s case was challenged and
discredited. Netizens in several countries found discrepancies and
questionable aspects of the alleged U.S.-South Korean investigation. In
this situation the Security Council set up separate meetings to hear from
both sides, unusual for the UN. In a situation where the views of both
Koreas had been presented and where there was worldwide discussion
online of the situation, the Security Council decided that it was a
Page 2
question for the two sides to settle peacefully among themselves. While
the media in the U.S. had ignored the critique of the South Korean
government’s investigation that was being discussed online and spread
around the world, there were delegates at the UN who were aware of it.
The article describes the concept of the netizen (net citizen)
introduced by the research done online by Michael Hauben. As early as
1993, Hauben predicted that netizens would be creating a broader and
more widespread media. The two case studies help to demonstrate that
Hauben’s prediction is proving accurate. In both cases the potential of
a new form for journalism described as ‘netizen journalism’ made
possible a policy supporting peace instead of war. The article proposes,
“that the response of netizens to the problems raised by the investigation
of the Cheonan incident is but a prelude to the potential of netizens in
different countries to work together across national borders to solve the
problems of our times.”
In addition to documenting out-of-the-box diplomacy, this issue of
the Amateur Computerist returns to a topic to which we devoted two
previous issues, Winter 2007 (Vol. 16, No1) and Fall 2009 (Vol. 18, No
1),* namely, challenging the false narrative in the Western mainstream
media about North Korea. This issue explores and documents the role of
netizen journalism toward lessening the tension between the U.S. and
the DPRK and on the Korean Peninsula.
In general the subject of the DPRK is treated by the U.S. govern-
ment and mainstream media with hostility toward both the country and
its policies. Many myths are presented about the DPRK, like its people
suffer from great poverty and even famine. Two articles in this issue,
“Enemy Image: What the DPRK Is Really Like” and “13 Observations
about North Korea by a Western Visitor” present evidence of ordinary
life in the DPRK similar to elsewhere. The hope one author expresses is
that an accurate portrayal of life in the DPRK will become the basis “for
friendly relations and cultural and people-to-people exchanges in the
near future between people from the DPRK and the western countries.”
In the past year, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have been
heightened. In September 2014, the U.S. intensified its campaign at the
UN and elsewhere to portray the DPRK as a human rights violating
state. The DPRK defended itself from these accusations. Two articles in
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this issue, “DPRK Human Rights Briefing at UN Challenges U.S.
Unending War Strategy” and “Outside and Inside the UN Contesting the
UN Human Rights COI Report on North Korea” report about the
DPRK’s response and other challenges to the U.S. and UN allegations.
Both articles connect the Human Rights COI Report to the U.S. hostile
policy toward the DPRK since there is a lack of credible evidence of HR
violations. The articles document the politicization by some UN member
states of the human rights question.
The article analyzing the events surrounding the November 2014
computer hack attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment Corporation,
“USA, North Korea and Hollywood (II)” compared the U.S. government
rush to blame the DPRK to the way the DPRK was accused of sinking
of the South Korean warship Cheonan. In both cases credible evidence
was never produced. The article raises the question: is the main goal
again to find “pretexts to introduce new sanctions against North Korea”?
The articles in this issue document the need and even provide an
example as in the case of the Cheonan and the Security Council, for how
a more accurate journalism can help create a more peace oriented
diplomacy.
There is a role being played by netizens and netizen journalism to
present a more accurate picture of North Korean society and to under-
stand better the role played by the U.S. government and media in
increasing the tensions between the U.S. and the DPRK and on the
Korean Peninsula.
* The two previous issues covering this topic can be seen at:
Page 4
Out of the Box Diplomacy to Build a
Dialogue with North Korea*
by Ronda Hauben
It was an unusual event. On Thursday, July 11, 2013, the Asia
Society in New York City presented a program about the Search for
Peace with North Korea. The official title of the program was “Avoiding
Apocalypse: Searching for Peace with North Korea.”
1
Such a title is in
itself an unusual event for a program about North Korea as it stresses the
desire for peace with North Korea, instead of focusing on the all too
often claims of the impossibility of progress in improving the U.S.-
North Korean relationship.
Former Governor of New Mexico, Bill Richardson and Ambassador
Donald Gregg, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea were
the speakers with ABC’s Jon Williams in the role of moderator. The
program did indeed stand out in the sense that the speakers made a
serious effort to propose both the reasons and the possible means to
build a dialogue between North Korea and the U.S.
Governor Richardson opened the program by asking the question,
“How do we improve the relationship?” He argued that, “Isolating North
Korea doesn’t work.” Instead, he proposed the need for what he called
“out of the box diplomacy.”
One such proposal he made was the need for a special UN envoy to
help find a peaceful resolution to the Korean Peninsula conflicts. He
recalled that the UN used to have an envoy, a Canadian, Maurice Strong.
Richardson suggested that the current UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-
moon appoint an envoy. Richardson also considered the potential of a
sports diplomacy, or something along the lines of the N.Y. Philharmonic
concerts in the DPRK that had been so successful a few years ago.
Richardson gave as an example of the need for serious attention to
the problem of the poor relationship with North Korea, the recent
experience of shutting down Kaesong, the joint Korean program which
provides 50,000 jobs for North Koreans in factories owned by South
Koreans. This is the first time in the history of that program that the bad
Page 5
relations led to the shutdown of this program, he noted.
“Some creative thinking is needed,” Governor Richardson argued.
“Whether that be the appointment of a special envoy, or something else
to be done by the UN, or something by the media, some kind of thinking
has to evolve,” Richardson explained. “What’s happening now is not
good,” he concluded.
Ambassador Donald Gregg’s contributions to the program reflected
a similar sense that the U.S. needed to do more to engage with the North
Koreans. Gregg spoke about how Syracuse University had set up a
program more than 10 years ago providing information technology
training for North Koreans. Gregg was critical of the U.S. failure to
recognize that the U.S. had the potential to influence the situation,
instead of handcuffing “themselves” with policies like “strategic
patience.”
Ambassador Gregg related how when Kim Jung Un first came on
the scene, Gregg had encouraged the U.S. government to invite him to
visit the U.S. This proposal, however, like others Gregg made to the U.S.
government, was not accepted by U.S. officials.
Another example described by Gregg recalled an incident in the
early 1990s. Recognizing the antagonism of the North Koreans to the
U.S.-South Korean military exercises each year, Ambassador Gregg had
gotten the Pentagon to cancel the exercises one year. This was wel-
comed by the North Koreans and provided an opening for talks. Instead,
however, without consulting Ambassador Gregg, the then U.S. Secretary
of Defense, Dick Cheney got the military exercises put back. The result
was that North Korea threw out the IAEA inspectors and a crisis
developed. Describing this experience, the U.S. State Department
country director for Korea at the time, Charles Kartman commented,
“People were looking for clubs not solutions.”
In response to a question about the nuclear umbrella that the U.S.
provides to protect South Korea and Japan, Gregg related an incident
where North Koreans suggested that they be included under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella as a means for them not to feel the need to have their
own nuclear program. Ambassador Gregg proposed that there is a need
for an understanding to develop between the U.S. and North Korea and
that such an understanding can only come as a result of contact.
Page 6
Governor Richardson proposed that new players were needed who
could help develop a relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. He
answered positively to a question from the audience about whether
ASEAN might be able to play a bigger role. In general, Richardson
advocated that those from the region be a source of help in opening up
the relationship with North Korea.
A video of the July 11 program has been put online at the Asia
Society. The title is, “Searching for Peace with North Korea.”
2
Notes
1
http://asiasociety.org/new-york/events/avoiding-apocalypse-search-
ing-peace-north-korea-0
2
http://asiasociety.org/video/policy/searching-peace-north-korea-complete
* This article appeared on July 15, 2013, on the Netizenblog at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/07/15/out-of-the-box-diplomacy-to-build-a-
dialogue-with-north-korea/
Page 7
Women Plan Walk Across the DMZ to
Support Peace and Korean Unification
by Ronda Hauben
On March 11, 2015, women who were planning to cross the DMZ
separating the two Koreas held a press conference at the United Nations.
They explained that 30 women from around the world would hold a
walk for peace in Korea in May 2015. The group hoped to meet with
North Korean women in North Korea and then cross the DMZ into
South Korea and meet with South Korean women. They proposed to
hold peace symposiums with women in North and South Korea. They
hoped to learn from women in both Koreas about their hopes and
aspirations for peace and for unification.
This year, 2015, is the 70
th
anniversary of the division of Korea into
two separate entities. Prior to the division of Korea, there was one Korea
for more than a thousand years.
1
The division of Korea set the stage for
the Korean War in 1950-1953. While an armistice in 1953 ended the
fighting, it did not end the war. The promised activities to resolve
outstanding issues were to take place soon afterwards, but instead the
discord has continued and in the absence of a peace treaty, there are
continuing hostile encounters between the two Koreas.
In order to work toward unification, a peace framework is needed.
Also a peace treaty ending the Korean War would help resolve outstand-
ing problems so as to make peace on the Korean peninsula more of a
possibility. The group of international women hope their trip will
contribute toward such efforts.
In October 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
UNSCR 1325 which recognizes the contribution women can make
toward creating peaceful resolutions of conflicts.
2
The significant aspect
of this Security Council resolution is that it calls for an important role
for women not only in preventing and resolving conflicts, but as part of
the decision making processes.
The preamble to the resolution states:
Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and
Page 8
resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the
importance of their equal participation and full involvement in
all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and
security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making
with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.
This language is reinforced in the text of the resolution, which urges
in Paragraph 1 that member states increase the role of women in all
decision making levels of conflict resolution and peace processes.
The Resolution:
1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of
women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and
international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention,
management, and resolution of conflict;
To support this effort by member states, the UN is urged to act in
a complementary way.
The Resolution:
2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic
plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the
participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict
resolution and peace processes;
Hence the activity of women is not narrowed down only to acting
on issues related to the impact of conflict and war on women, but the
role envisioned for women is one of active and empowered participants
in all levels of the peace making and conflict resolution processes.
In a recent article Ann Wright, one of the women who will be part
of the group of 30 women walking for peace in Korea, wrote that the
group had received tentative support for their trip from North Korea and
a response from the United Nations Command (UN Command) at the
DMZ that if South Korea is agreeable with the proposal, the UN
Command will approve it.
While the UN has continually supported UN Resolution 1325
through follow up resolutions or presidential statements from the UN
Security Council each year since the passage of UNSCR 1325, there has
not been any indication from the UN Secretary General yet of support
for the trip. A question was raised to his spokesperson on March 11 as
to whether the announced “plans for a peace march through the
Page 9
demilitarized zone between North and South Korea is something that the
Secretary General would support.” The Secretary General’s spokesper-
son responded: “Let me take a look at what was announced, and I will
get back to you a bit later.” After three weeks no response had yet been
provided.
Similarly, the day after the group’s press conference at the UN
announcing its plans, the question of whether or not South Korea would
support the trip was raised to the South Korean Minister of Gender
Equality and Family who was visiting the UN at the time. She promised
to get back to the journalist raising the question by e-mail, but there was
no response from her.
Though the group had not yet gotten official approval from South
Korea, according to Ann Wright, there are some signs that it will get a
positive response.
In her article, Ann Wright writes
3
:
You might wonder, what will this peace walk do? For one,
it has already conveyed several important messages: 1. The
Korean War must end with a peace treaty; 2. Women can and
must be involved at all levels of peacemaking; and 3. We must
act now to reunite millions of families tragically divided by a
man-made division. If the barbed wire fences lining the DMZ
were erected by men more than 60 years ago, men and women
have the power to bring them down.
After the above was written, an article by AP reported that Christine
Ahn who is co-organizer of Women Cross DMZ, the group planning the
peace march had returned from a trip to North Korea.
4
During her visit,
she met with officials from North Korea’s Overseas Korean Committee
and Democratic Women’s Union. As a result of Ahn’s visit to Pyong-
yang, North Korea gave permission for the peace walk. Also Ahn
indicated that she received support to hold a symposium in North Korea
on women and peace building.
Notes
1
United Nations Command As Camouflage: On the Role of the UN in the Unending
Korean War:
Page 10
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/08/31/united-nations-command-as-camouflage
2
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1325%20%282000%29
3
Ann Wright, Women Walk for Peace in Korea, March 28, 2015, at:
PopularResistance.org:
https://www.popularresistance.org/women-walk-for-peace-in-korea
4
AP, North Korea supports Gloria Steinem-led women’s walk across the DMZ, The
Guardian, April 3, 2015:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/03/north-korea-dmz-charity-walk-wom
en-gloria-steinem
A version of this article appeared on March 31, 2015 on the Netizenblog at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2015/03/31/women-plan-walk-across-the-dmz-to-
support-peace-and-korean-unification/
Page 11
The Media War at the UN and the DPRK
Why Netizen Journalism Matters
Notes for a Talk*
by Ronda Hauben
[Author’s Note: The following are slightly edited Notes prepared for a
talk presented at Stony Brook University on December 4, 2013. The talk
was part of a series of talks in fall 2013 sponsored by the Center for
Korean Studies at Stony Brook focusing on North Korea. The talk was
presented with slides which are available at the website given at the end
of these Notes. Comments are welcomed.]
I – Preface
I am honored to be here today and to give this talk as part of the
series of talks on North Korea.
In October of 2006, I began covering the United Nations first as a
journalist for the English edition of the South Korean online newspaper
OhmyNews International. When OhmyNews ended its English edition
in 2010, I became a correspondent covering the UN for an English
language blog
German newspaper Die Tageszeitung. Both OhmyNews International
and my blog at the taz.de website are online publications.
With Michael Hauben, I am a co-author of the book Netizens: On
the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet. The book was first
published online in January 1994. On May 1, 1997, the print edition of
the book Netizens was published in English. Later that year, in October,
a Japanese translation was published. Netizens was the first book to
recognize that along with the development of the internet, a new form
of citizenship, called netizenship had emerged. This is a form of
citizenship that has developed based on the broader forms of political
participation made possible by the Net (i.e., the internet).
I want to share some of the background about the origin, use and
impact of the netizen concept and its relation to what I call netizen
Page 12
journalism before presenting two case studies of how netizen journalism
has affected the media war at the UN.
II – Introduction
While now many people are interested in the impact of the internet
on society, pioneering research was done by my co-author Michael
Hauben in the early 1990s when the internet was first beginning to
spread and to connect people around the world.
In his research, Hauben recognized that there were people who
appreciated the communication the internet made possible and that these
people worked to spread the Net and to do what they felt needed for it
to help to create a better world. Taking the common network term,
“net.citizen” used online at the time, Hauben proposed that these people
who worked to contribute to the Net and the bigger world it was part of
were “netizens.”
In an article he wrote on the impact of the Net on journalism,
Hauben recognized that many people online were frustrated with the
mainstream media and that the netizens would be creating a broader and
more widespread media.
Hauben recognized in the early 1990s that “the collective body of
people assisted by (the Net)…has grown larger than any individual
newspaper….” I want to look at two news events about North Korea and
the UN in the context of this prediction. Then I will consider the
implication of these case studies for the kind of journalism about North
Korea that I propose netizens and the internet are making possible.
III – Korea
In February of 2003 I was glancing at the front page summaries of
the articles in an issue of the Financial Times. I saw a surprising
headline for an article continued later in the issue. The article said that
in 2002 netizens in South Korea had elected the president of the country,
Roh Moo-hyun. He had just taken office on February 25, 2003. The new
president had even promised that the internet would be influential in the
form of government he established. Also I learned that an online Korean
newspaper called OhmyNews had been important making these
Page 13
developments possible. Colleagues encouraged me to get in contact with
OhmyNews and to learn more about the netizens activities in South
Korea and about OhmyNews.
I was able to get in contact with OhmyNews. I began to submit
articles to it. They would be printed along with a few other English
language articles others were submitting. By 2004 OhmyNews began an
English language online edition called OhmyNews International. I began
to write for it. I soon became the first woman columnist for the English
edition.
I subsequently learned that both South Korea and China are places
where the role of netizens is important in building more democratic
structures for society. I began to pay attention to both of these netizen
developments. South Korea, for example, has been an advanced model
of grassroots efforts to create examples of netizen forms for a more
participatory decision making processes. I wrote several research papers
documenting the achievements and activities of Korean netizens.
IV – Reporting on the UN
By October 2006, the second five-year term for Kofi Annan as the
Secretary General of the United Nations was soon to end. One of the
main contenders to become the 8
th
Secretary General of the UN was the
Foreign Minister of South Korea, Ban Ki-moon.
I had covered one previous United Nations event which I had found
of great interest. That event was the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) which encouraged access to the internet for everyone.
The event took place in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2005. Also I had
watched with interest some of the press reports of the speeches made by
heads of state at the 2006 opening of the General Assembly session.
These events gave me the sense that it probably would be interesting to
go to the UN and cover the activities for OhmyNews if the new Secretary
General would be the Korean candidate.
On October 9, 2006, Ban Ki-moon won the Security Council
nomination. This nomination was to be approved by the General
Assembly on October 13.
I thought this would be a historic event for South Korea.
By 2006, I was writing regularly as a featured columnist for
Page 14
OhmyNews International (OMNI).
I asked the Editor of OhmyNews International if I could get a letter
for a press credential to cover the UN for OMNI. He agreed and I was
able to get my credential in time to go to the General Assembly meeting
when the General Assembly voted to accept the Security Council’s
nomination of Ban Ki-moon.
I was surprised that some of the speeches welcoming Ban Ki-moon
as the Secretary General elect were meaningful speeches referring to
actual problems at the UN such as the need for reform of the Security
Council. Conversely the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, made
no pretense of both welcoming Ban and of expressing his dissatisfaction
with Kofi Annan, the outgoing Secretary General who had condemned
the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A significant focus of the comments to the
new Secretary General from member states emphasized the importance
of communication at the UN, that it was critical for the incoming
Secretary General to listen to all states and to hear their views.
It was a thrill to be at the UN witnessing the vote for a new
Secretary General who was from South Korea. I wondered if the internet
would be able to have any impact on the new Secretary General and on
what happened at the United Nations, since the internet had been able to
make it possible for netizens in South Korea to impact politics.
The very next day after Ban Ki-moon’s nomination was approved
by the General Assembly, the Security Council took up to condemn the
recent nuclear test by North Korea. This had been North Korea’s first
nuclear test. The Security Council imposed sanctions on North Korea,
not giving the North Korean Ambassador to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, a
chance to respond until after the sanctions had been voted on. When the
North Korean Ambassador responded, he referred among other issues,
to financial sanctions that the U.S. had imposed on North Korea. No one
in the Security Council asked him what he was referring to or how this
affected the issues the Security Council had acted on with respect to
North Korea.
It impressed me that just as a new Secretary General from South
Korea was being chosen as the new Secretary General of the UN, at the
same time sanctions were being imposed on North Korea. The Security
Council acted against North Korea before hearing its views on the issue
Page 15
they were considering. This was in sharp contrast to the emphasis
member nations had put on the importance of hearing the views of all
members when member nations welcomed Ban Ki-moon to the United
Nations in the meeting just one day earlier in the General Assembly.
The article I wrote for OhmyNews International described this
situation. It explained:
The urgent problem facing the UN at this juncture in history is
not whether North Korea has developed and tested a nuclear
device. It is the breakdown reflected by the lack of participa-
tion and investigation by the international community into how
a crisis will be handled once it develops, and whether the
concerns and problems of those involved in the crisis will be
considered as part of the process of seeking a solution. It is
how the UN functions when tensions reach a point where
serious attention is needed to help to understand and solve a
problem. (Quoted from “The Problem Facing the UN,” OMNI,
October 17, 2006).
In general when at the UN, I paid attention to Security Council
developments, particularly with regard to the meetings imposing
sanctions on North Korea and also on Iran. Also, I particularly followed
the meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly when
Security Council reform was being discussed.
V – Some Mainstream Media Created a Story
Soon after Ban Ki-moon took office as Secretary General at the
beginning of January 2007, a story appeared in the Wall Street Journal
(WSJ) accusing North Korea of using UN funds from the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) for its nuclear program. An editorial in
the January 19 issue of the WSJ by Melanie Kirkpatrick had the
headline: “United Nations Dictators.”
No evidence was presented in the WSJ, just accusations. This
situation was reminiscent of how the WSJ and some other mainstream
media had accused the former Secretary General, Kofi Annan, of
misusing UN funds in Iraq, and how this had mushroomed into what had
come to be known as the “Food for Oil” scandal.
The significance of this story for me, was to see that some of the
Page 16
mainstream media were active creating stories and accusations with no
real evidence, while only very few media appeared to be investigating
the actual underlying issues that had led the North Korean government
to carry out its first nuclear test.
VI – The Six-Party Talks and the Banco Delta Asia Story
In January 2007 there were reports in the press about a meeting that
had taken place in Berlin between Christopher Hill, the Assistant
Secretary of State for the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan, the Deputy Foreign
Minister of North Korea.
Around this time I learned some of the background behind what had
led to North Korea carrying out its first nuclear test. An agreement had
been reached on September 19, 2005 between the six parties to talks
about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The six parties were
North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Russia and China. Shortly
after the agreement was signed in Sept 2005, the U.S. Treasury
Department announced that it was freezing the assets of the Banco Delta
Asia (BDA) a bank in Macao, China, which held $25 million of North
Korean funds.
The result of this action was that North Korea lost access to $25
million of its bank funds, and also to the use of the international banking
system. North Korea’s response was to leave the six-party talks to
protest this action which it considered hostile and politically motivated.
North Korea was encouraged by some parties to the six-party talks
to have bilateral negotiations with the U.S. over the financial sanctions.
The U.S., however, refused to negotiate. Unable to find a way to
negotiate with the U.S. over this situation, North Korea, in July 2006,
tested a missile. The response of the UN Security Council was to
condemn North Korea by passing UN Resolution 1695 but not to
investigate what the problem was that led North Korea to carry out a
missile test.
Then on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried out its first nuclear
test. Once again the Security Council failed to investigate what was
behind this action. Instead the Security Council passed Resolution 1718
imposing more sanctions on North Korea.
Only after this nuclear test did the U.S. demonstrate a willingness
Page 17
to negotiate with the DPRK over the financial sanctions imposed on
Banco Delta Asia.
On January 16 and 17, 2007, Christopher Hill and Kim Kye-gwan
held talks in Berlin and came to an agreement. Though not officially
announced, it was believed that they agreed that the $25 million being
held in the Macau BDA, along with access to the international banking
system would be restored to North Korea. In exchange North Korea
would return to the six-party talks. The Berlin meeting appeared to break
the deadlock and the six-party talks were held again starting on February
8, 2007. Another agreement was announced five days later on February
13, 2007.
Then on March 5 and 6, Hill and Kim held bilateral talks in New
York City. Despite the agreement reached in Berlin, however, the U.S.
Treasury Department issued a finding on March 19 against the BDA
under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. This move again deadlocked
the six-party talks, even as the delegates arrived for the talks in Beijing.
The deadlock continued for the next few months, with much of the
mainstream U.S. press blaming North Korea for continuing to insist that
its $25 million be returned via a banking transaction, before it would
agree to any further steps in the six-party talks. The North Korean
delegate said he understood that the agreement in Berlin with Christo-
pher Hill had provided for the return of the $25 million from the BDA
as a money transfer via the international banking system.
The U.S. Treasury Department officials claimed that their decision
against the BDA left it up to the bank to return the funds. The decision
against the bank, however, meant that it had no means to return the
funds as a money transfer as the Section 311 finding against the bank
meant that it lost access to the international banking system.
During this period, there were rumors that a bank in China had been
asked by the U.S. State Department to make the transfer. The bank
allegedly considered the request. Eventually, however, the bank refused
based on its fear that it too would be frozen out of the international
banking system by the U.S. Treasury Department, as the BDA had been,
if it offered to help make the transfer of funds back to North Korea.
The McClatchy Newspaper Company, in a way that is different
from much of the rest of the mainstream U.S. media, carried articles
Page 18
which helped to investigate the issues underlying this dispute between
the U.S. and North Korea. Other banks in Macau, an article in the
McClatchy Newspapers explained, had played a similar role with regard
to North Korea, helping North Korea to sell its gold, but only the BDA
had been singled out for sanctions. The article suggested that the U.S.
Treasury Department’s actions were not based on actual criminal
activity by the bank or by North Korea, but instead were motivated by
a political objective.
One of the McClatchy newspaper articles described some docu-
ments that the newspaper had acquired including the BDA’s complaint
challenging the U.S. Treasury Department decision against the bank.
Also, the McClatchy newspaper article referred to a statement filed by
the owner of the BDA to protest the Treasury Department action.
I tried to find a way to get copies of the documents. I tried to
contact the law firm and even wrote to the McClatchy reporter, but none
of these efforts succeeded.
I did, however, find a copy of the Patriot Act on the internet, and
read Section 311, the section being used against the bank. I was able to
see that the section of the law was such that the U.S. government did not
have to present any proof for its actions.
In March 2007, I did a story titled “North Korea’s $25 Million and
Banco Delta Asia,” documenting how the use of Section 311 of the
Patriot Act against the bank was a political act, rather than a criminal
determination. The U.S. Treasury Department did not have to provide
any evidence and acted as the accuser and judge in the case. Even
though there had been an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea
to return the $25 million to North Korea, nothing happened.
The stalemate continued.
In May 2007, I covered the 50
th
Anniversary dinner celebration of
the Korea Society. Chris Hill gave a short talk as part of the program. He
indicated that he would persevere until a means was found to break the
impasse over the $25 million so as to make it possible for the six-party
talks to continue.
Several journalists covered the event for other South Korean
publications. They were particularly interested in what Hill said, but
Hill’s talk in itself did not seem to represent a newsworthy event.
Page 19
In the next few days, however, it appeared that an important story
was developing. An article by Kevin Hall titled, “Bank Owner Disputes
Money-Laudering Allegations,” published by the McClatchy Newspaper
Company said that the blog “China Matters” had published links to some
documents refuting the Treasury Department’s charges against the bank.
“China Matters” is a blog about U.S.-China policy. The links that
the blog made available included to an appeal submitted by the lawyer
for Banco Delta Asia to an administrative hearing at the Treasury
Department and to a statement by the owner of the Bank in Macao,
Stanley Au.
I now had the documents in the case. The U.S. government’s
findings were general statements providing no specific evidence of
wrongdoing on the part of the bank. The bank’s statements and
refutation gave significant documentation refuting charges of illegal
activity on the part of the bank. The refutation also made the case that
there were political motives for the U.S. government’s allegations rather
than actual illegal activity on the part of the bank.
Also the blogger at China Matters who uses the pseudonym China
Hand or Peter Lee posted some of the Congressional testimony by David
Asher, a former U.S. government official who had helped to plan and
enforce the U.S. Treasury Department sanctions against the Banco Delta
Asia.
Asher explained that the U.S. government had targeted a small
Macau bank to scare the banks in China. “To kill the chicken to scare the
monkeys,” the ex-government official explained, quoting an old Chinese
proverb in his testimony in a U.S. Congressional hearing.
I wanted to verify the testimony of Asher and understand its
implications, so I searched online and found an earlier government
document from November 2006. Asher had testified in a similar vein at
a Congressional hearing titled “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and
Iran, and Its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Situations in
Both Countries,” on September 14, 2006. This document was the
transcript of that hearing.
The hearing was held by a special Congressional Commission about
the U.S. China relationship which held hearings semi annually.
What was most surprising in this document, however, was the
Page 20
explanation that the Banco Delta Asia sanctions was an issue that was
only secondarily aimed at North Korea? The primary issue that was of
interest to the U.S. government officials involved in the Commission
Hearing was what was China’s foreign policy and how closely did
China’s behavior match the foreign policy goals set out by the U.S.
In the discussion at the September 2006 hearing about the Banco
Delta Asia, David Asher described the political objectives of the action.
Speaking about China, Asher said:
They get the message on the financial angle…there’s an old
saying in Chinese, ‘You kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.’
We didn’t go out and cite a multitude of Chinese financial
institutions that have been publicly identified as working with
North Korea over the years….
We did need to designate one small one though, and that one
small one sent a message to all the others, that they had to get
in line, and it was timed to coincide with other information that
we were making public….
I think they got the message…. We need to try to align our
financial and economic interests. I do think, though the use of
some pressure, including veiled pressure is effective. (Hearing
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Com-
mission, 2006, p. 115-116)
The Commission hearing clarified that the purpose of freezing
North Korean funds in the Banco Delta Asia was not about stopping
criminal activity by that bank or by North Korea, as there was never any
proof presented of any such activity. Instead it was an act with a political
objective which was to pressure China to act in conformity with U.S.
policy goals in general and in its actions toward North Korea in
particular.
At last I had the news peg for an important story. I wrote the article,
“Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the Policy Aimed at
Targeting China as Well as North Korea?” submitting it around 5:00
a.m. my time to OhmyNews International. By noon the next day, my
story appeared. That was May 18.
Also on May 18, the Wall Street Journal carried an Op Ed by the
former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton. The article scolded the
Page 21
U.S. government for negotiating to return the $25 million to North
Korea
In late May I was an invited speaker at the International Communi-
cations Association (ICA 2007) conference in San Francisco. I summed
up my experience writing for OhmyNews International, particularly
describing the BDA story and the helpful role of online media in making
it possible to present an alternative narrative as opposed to that of the
mainstream U.S. media about the situation.
VII – Voice of America News Service
Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San Francisco, however,
that my experience with this story was not ending, but actually a new
episode was beginning.
A short time later, on June 11, I received a surprising e-mail
message. The message was from a reporter who said she worked for
Voice of America News Korea (VOA News Korean Service). VOA is
the official U.S. government news broadcasting service.
She began:
“Hello Ms. Hauben.”
She introduced herself as a reporter with the Korean Service of the
Voice of America News in Washington, D.C.
Her e-mail continued:
While I was working on a story about BDA issue, I read your
report, ‘Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia.’ I
thought you made some valuable points about the BDA issue
in this report, I was wondering if I could have a conversation
with you in this matter. Since I am on a deadline, I’m trying
very hard to get a hold of you. So I would really appreciate it
if you call or e-mail me back ASAP.
She gave her phone number.
The VOA News had become part of the U.S. State Department. I
wondered if it was advisable to speak with her as VOA News has a
reputation of being a promoter of U.S. government policy, rather than a
news service seeking the facts. I asked my editors at OhmyNews
International and I also spoke with a Korean journalist I know who
covers stories at the UN for another Korean newspaper. They all
Page 22
encouraged me to speak with her.
I called her as she had asked. She said she wanted to interview me
by phone. I asked her to let me know what she would want to speak with
me about. She sent me an e-mail message elaborating.
Her message explained:
The purpose of this interview is to let our listeners know what
is going on regarding the BDA issue and how the BDA issue
is developing.
When I read your article, I thought you made valuable and
critical points about the BDA issue, and I thought it might be
very important to let your idea about the BDA issue be heard
by our listeners.
She listed questions she would ask me in the interview. They were:
1. How you came up with the idea of writing this article. How
you prepared it. About your sources.
2. Briefly summarize your findings or main points of the article.
3. What you are trying to accomplish by writing this article?
What needs to be done to resolve the BDA issue?
“Finally,” she wrote, “I wanted to ask you if we could do this
interview sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.… Thanks again,”
she ended the e-mail message.
She called at the arranged time.
She told me her listeners were in North Korea. I was surprised that
a reporter for a U.S. government media would offer to do a story about
the hidden political objectives of U.S. policy against North Korea which
was being camouflaged by false criminal accusations against North
Korea.
We had a half hour telephone conversation discussing my stories,
the sources I had used and the problem represented by the American
government freezing the BDA funds. She also asked for the URLs to
follow up on the sources I had cited. These were basically material I had
found on the internet, including several government documents, and
copies of the legal documents submitted by the bank owner to appeal the
U.S. Treasury Department ruling against the bank.
The VOA News reporter said she was interested in contacting
former U.S. government officials like David Asher who was responsible
Page 23
for crafting the plan to freeze North Korea’s bank account assets. She
wanted to ask them to respond to my article.
Just as this contact with the VOA News journalist was happening,
there were news stories describing the ongoing efforts to find a solution
to the roadblock that the frozen North Korean funds represented.
Soon there were reports that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
had agreed to transfer the funds from the BDA to an account held by a
Russian bank for North Korea. In the following weeks, the funds transfer
was done.
The VOA News reporter wrote me saying she had other stories to
do and was not for now going to pursue this story any longer.
Whether the contact had any impact on the resolution of the
stalemate, I can only speculate. Regardless of her motivation, however,
the VOA News reporter had contacted me before the situation was
resolved. At the very least, an article I had done had caught the attention
of someone connected to the Voice of America News, which was part of
the U.S. State Department. I was given the chance to explain what I had
learned about the BDA story and to explain how I understood the
controversy surrounding it. So my story did indeed have more of an
impact than I had understood when I gave my talk at the ICA 2007 in
San Francisco.
The experience I had with my BDA story and the encounter with
the Korean News Service of the VOA News demonstrates that the
internet makes it possible not only to spread an accurate narrative among
the public, but also to reach government officials with an interest in the
issues being critiqued.
The reason I have taken the time to tell this story is that it represents
for me a taste of the impact that such online journalism makes possible.
VIII – The Phenomenon of Netizen Journalism
In the research I have been doing and the experiences I have had
exploring the potential of what I call netizen journalism, the question has
been raised:
What is this new form of news and what are its characteristics?
Is there something different from traditional journalism?
Is there some significant new aspect represented by netizen
Page 24
journalism?
Essentially I have found that there is an important research
component of what I call netizen journalism. Netizen journalism, as a
socially oriented journalism, is a journalism that is oriented toward a
public purpose. As such, at times there is a need to do serious research
into the background, context and political significance of conflicts. By
revealing the actual forces at work, netizen journalism provides a more
accurate grasp of whose interests are being served, and what is at stake
in the events that make up the news.
Traditionally, the press can function as a watchdog for society by
exposing the use and abuse of power. Or, the press can act to support the
abuse of political power.
Netizens, whether journalists or citizens who turn to journalism to
challenge problems in their society, have demonstrated in a number of
instances that they are able to bring public attention to situations needing
change, and exert the needed pressure for the change so that the change
gets made.
If netizen journalism can provide a more accurate understanding of
conflicts, it can help make more likely the peaceful resolution of these
conflicts.
Also as an aside, my stories about the U.S.-BDA-North Korea-UN
conflict led to my being short-listed for one of the journalism awards
presented each year by the United Nations Correspondence Association
(UNCA) for the best journalism articles about the UN for 2007. While
I did not get the award in 2007, I did get it the following year, in 2008.
IX – The Cheonan – Some Background
The Cheonan conflict, which was brought to the UN in 2010,
provides another interesting example how netizen journalism affected
the media war and helped to make a significant contribution to a
peaceful resolution of the conflict by the Security Council.
The Cheonan incident concerns a South Korean war ship which
broke in two and sank on March 26, 2010. Forty-six of the crew died. At
the time, the ship was involved in naval exercises with the U.S. military
in an area in the West Sea/Yellow Sea between North Korea and China.
This is a situation that had been the subject of much discussion on the
Page 25
internet.
Initially the South Korean government and the U.S. government
said there was no indication that North Korea was involved. Then at a
press conference on May 20, 2010, the South Korean government
claimed that a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine exploded in
the water near the Cheonan, causing a pressure wave that was responsi-
ble for the sinking. Many criticisms of this scenario have been raised.
There was no direct evidence of any North Korean submarine in the
vicinity of the Cheonan. Nor was there any evidence that a torpedo was
actually fired causing a pressure wave phenomenon. Hence the South
Korean government had no actual case that could be presented in a court
of law to support its claims.
In fact, if this claim of a pressure wave were true even those
involved in the investigation of the incident acknowledge that “North
Korea would be the first to have succeeded at using this kind of a bubble
jet torpedo action in actual fighting.”
X – The Cheonan Press Conference and the Local
Election
The press conference held by the South Korean government on May
20, to announce that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the
Cheonan came, it turns out, at the start of the local election period. Many
South Koreans were suspicious that the accusation was a ploy to help the
ruling party candidates win in the local elections. The widespread
suspicions about the government’s motives led to the ruling party losing
many of the local election contests. These election results demonstrated
the deep distrust among the South Korean population of the motives
behind the South Korean government’s accusations about North Korea’s
responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan.
XI – The Cheonan and Netizen Journalism
Netizens who live in different countries and speak different
languages, however, took up to critique the claims of the South Korean
government about the cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. This netizen
activity had an important effect. It appears to have acted as a catalyst
Page 26
affecting the actions of the UN Security Council in its treatment of the
Cheonan dispute.
There were substantial analyses by non governmental organizations
like Spark, PSPD, Peaceboat, and others posted on the internet, either in
English and in Korean or in both languages. Some of these online posts
were in the form of letters that were also sent to the members of the UN
Security Council. At the time, I saw discussions and critiques of the
Korean government’s claims at American, Japanese and Chinese
websites, in addition to conversation and postings about the Cheonan on
South Korean websites.
One such critique included a three part analysis by the South
Korean NGO People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD).
This analysis raised a number of questions and problems with the South
Korean government’s case. The PSPD document was posted widely on
the internet and also sent to the President of the United Nations Security
Council for distribution to those Security Council members interested
and to the South Korean Mission to the UN.
While there were many blog comments about the Cheonan issue in
Korean, there were also some bloggers writing in English who became
active in critiquing the South Korean investigation and the role of the
U.S. in the conflict.
One blogger, Scott Creighton who uses the pen name Willy Loman,
or American Everyman, wrote a post titled “The Sinking of the
Cheonan: We are being lied to.”
The South Korean government had claimed that the diagram it
displayed above the glass case containing the alleged torpedo shaft was
from a North Korean weapons sales brochure which offered the torpedo.
The torpedo was identified as the CHT-02D.
In a post he titled “A Perfect Match?,” Creighton showed how there
was a discrepancy between the diagram displayed by the South Korean
government in the press conference, and the part of the torpedo it had on
display in the glass case below the diagram. He demonstrated that the
diagram did not match the part of the torpedo on display because one of
the components of the torpedo shown was in the propeller section, but
in the diagram, the component appeared in the shaft section. There were
many comments in response to this post, including some from netizens
Page 27
in South Korea. Also the mainstream conservative media in South Korea
carried accounts of this blogger’s critique. Three weeks later, at a news
conference, a South Korean government official acknowledged that the
diagram presented by the South Korean government was not of the same
torpedo as the part displayed in the glass case. Instead the diagram
displayed was of the PT97W torpedo, not the CHT-02D torpedo as
claimed.
In a post titled “Thanks to Valuable Input” describing the signifi-
cance of having documented one of the fallacies in the South Korean
government’s case, Creighton writes:
(I)n the end, thanks to valuable input from dozens of con-
cerned people all across the world…. Over 100,000 viewers
read that article and it was republished on dozens of sites all
across the world (even translated). A South Korean MSM
outlet even posted our diagram depicting the glaring discrepan-
cies between the evidence and the drawing of the CHT-O2D
torpedo, which a high-ranking military official could only
refute by stating he had 40 years military experience and to his
knowledge, I had none. But what I had, what we had, was
literally thousands of people all across the world, scientists,
military members, and just concerned investigative bloggers
who were committed to the truth and who took the time to
contribute to what we were doing here.
‘40 years military experience’ took a beating from ‘we the
people WorldWide’ and that is the way it is supposed to be.
This is just one of a number of serious questions and challenges that
were raised about the South Korean government’s scenario of the
sinking of the Cheonan.
Other influential events which helped to challenge the South
Korean government’s claims were a press conference in Japan held on
July 9 by two academic scientists. The two scientists presented results
of experiments they had done which challenged the results of experi-
ments the South Korean government used to support its case. These
scientists also wrote to the Security Council with their findings.
Also a significant challenge to the South Korean government report
was the finding of a Russian team of four sent to South Korea to look at
Page 28
the data from the investigation and to do an independent evaluation of
it. The team of Russian navy experts visited South Korea from May 30
to June 7. The Russian team did not accept the South Korean govern-
ment’s claim that a pressure wave from a torpedo caused the Cheonan
to sink. Getting a leaked copy of the Russian team’s report, the
Hankyoreh newspaper in South Korea reported that the Russian
investigators determined that the ship had come in contact with the
ocean floor and a propeller and shaft became entangled in a fishing net.
Also the investigators thought it likely that an old underwater mine had
exploded near the Cheonan adding to the factors that led to it sinking.
Such efforts along with online posts and discussions by many
netizens provided a catalyst for the actions of the UN Security Council
concerning the Cheonan incident.
When the UN Security Council took up the Cheonan issue in June
2010, I was surprised to learn that some of the members of the Council
knew of the criticism of the South Korean government investigation
blaming North Korea for sinking the ship.
XII – The Cheonan and the UN Security Council
South Korea brought the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan to
the United Nations Security Council. The Mexican Ambassador to the
UN, Claude Heller, was President of the Security Council for the month
of June 2010. (The presidency rotates each month to a different Security
Council member nation.) In a letter to the Security Council dated June
4, South Korea asked the Council to take up the Cheonan dispute. Park
Im-kook, then the South Korean Ambassador to the UN, requested that
the Security Council consider the matter of the Cheonan and respond in
an appropriate manner. The letter described the investigation into the
sinking of the Cheonan carried out by South Korean government and
military officials. The conclusion of the South Korean investigation was
to accuse North Korea of sinking the South Korean ship.
How would the Mexican Ambassador as President of the Security
Council during the month of June handle this dispute? This was a
serious issue facing Ambassador Heller as he began his presidency.
Ambassador Heller adopted what he referred to as a “balanced”
approach to treat both governments on the Korean peninsula in a fair and
Page 29
objective manner. He held bilateral meetings with each member of the
Security Council which led to support for a process of informal
presentations by both of the Koreas to the members of the Security
Council. He arranged for the South Korean Ambassador to make an
informal presentation to the members of the Security Council. Ambassa-
dor Heller also invited the North Korean Ambassador to make a separate
informal presentation to the members of the Security Council. Sin Son
Ho was the UN Ambassador from North Korea.
In response to the invitation from the President of the Security
Council, the North Korean Ambassador to the UN sent a letter dated
June 8 to the Security Council which denied the allegation that his
country was to blame. His letter urged the Security Council not to be the
victim of deceptive claims, as had happened with the U.S. presentation
by Colin Powell on Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to
support his government’s call to be able to examine the evidence and to
be involved in a new and more independent investigation on the sinking
of the Cheonan.
In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North Korea referred to
the widespread international sentiment questioning the conclusions of
the South Korean government’s investigation. The North Korean
Ambassador wrote: “It would be very useful to remind ourselves of the
ever-increasing international doubts and criticisms, going beyond the
internal boundary of south Korea, over the ‘investigation result’ from the
very moment of its release….”
What Ambassador Heller called “interactive informal meetings”
were held on June 14 with the South Koreans and the North Koreans in
separate sessions attended by the Security Council members, who had
time to ask questions and then to discuss the presentations.
At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s presentations ended,
Ambassador Heller said that it was important to have received the
detailed presentation by South Korea and also to know and learn the
arguments of North Korea. He commented that “it was very important
that North Korea approached the Security Council.”
In response to a question about his view on the issues presented, he
replied, “I am not a judge. I think we will go on with the consultations
to deal in a proper manner on the issue.”
Page 30
Ambassador Heller also explained that, “the Security Council
issued a call to the parties to refrain from any act that could escalate
tensions in the region, and makes an appeal to preserve peace and
stability in the region.”
Though the North Korean Ambassador to the UN rarely speaks to
the media, the North Korean UN delegation scheduled a press confer-
ence for Tuesday, June 15, the day following the interactive informal
meeting. During the press conference, the North Korean Ambassador
presented his government’s refutation of the allegations made by South
Korea. Also he explained North Korea’s request to be able to send an
investigation team to the site where the sinking of the Cheonan occurred.
South Korea had denied the request. During its press conference, the
North Korean Ambassador noted that there was widespread condemna-
tion of the investigation in both South Korea and around the world.
The press conference held on June 15 was a lively event. Many of
the journalists who attended were impressed and requested that there be
future press conferences with the North Korean Ambassador.
During his presidency of the Security Council in the month of June,
Ambassador Heller held meetings with the UN ambassadors from each
of the two Koreas and then with Security Council members about the
Cheonan issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he was
asked by a reporter what was happening about the Cheonan dispute. He
responded that the issue of contention was over the evaluation of the
South Korean government’s investigation.
Ambassador Heller described how he introduced what he refers to
as “an innovation” into the Security Council process. As the month of
June ended, the issue was not yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a
basis to build on the progress that was achieved during the month of his
presidency.
The “innovation” Ambassador Heller referred to, was a summary
he made of the positions of each of the two Koreas on the issue, taking
care to present each objectively. Heller explained that this summary was
not an official document, so it did not have to be approved by the other
members of the Council. This summary provided the basis for further
negotiations. He believed that it had a positive impact on the process of
consideration in the Council, making possible the agreement that was
Page 31
later to be expressed in the Presidential Statement on the Cheonan that
was issued by the Security Council on July 9.
Ambassador Heller’s goal, he explained, was to “at all times be as
objective as possible” so as to avoid increasing the conflict on the
Korean peninsula. Such a goal is the Security Council’s obligation under
the UN Charter.
In the Security Council’s Presidential Statement (PRST) on the
Cheonan, what stands out is that the statement follows the pattern of
presenting the views of each of the two Koreas and urging that the
dispute be settled in a peaceful manner.
In the PRST, the members of the Security Council did not blame
North Korea. Instead they refer to the South Korean investigation and its
conclusion, expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings” of the
investigation.
The PRST explains that “The Security Council takes note of the
responses from other relevant parties, including the DPRK, which has
stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”
With the exception of North Korea, it is not indicated who “the
other relevant parties” are. It does suggest, however, that it is likely there
were some Security Council members, not just Russia and China, which
did not agree with the conclusions of the South Korean investigation.
Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Korean newspaper
Hankyoreh noted that the statement “allows for a double interpretation
and does not blame or place consequences on North Korea.” Such a
possibility of a “double interpretation” allows for different interpreta-
tions.
The Security Council action on the Cheonan took place in a
situation where there had been a wide-ranging international critique,
especially in the online media, about the problems of the South Korean
investigation, and of the South Korean government’s failure to make
public any substantial documentation of its investigation, along with its
practice of harassing critics of the South Korean government claims. The
Security Council action included hearing the positions of the different
parties to the conflict.
The result of such efforts was something that is unusual in the
process of recent Security Council activity. The Security Council
Page 32
process in the Cheonan issue provided for an impartial analysis of the
problem and an effort to hear from those with an interest in the issue.
The effort in the Security Council was described by the Mexican
Ambassador, as upholding the principles of impartiality and respectful
treatment of all members toward resolving a conflict between nations in
a peaceful manner. It represents an important example of the Security
Council acting in conformity with its obligations as set out in the UN
charter.
In the July 9 Presidential Statement, the Security Council urged that
the parties to the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan find a means
to peacefully settle the dispute. The statement says:
The Security Council calls for full adherence to the Korean
Armistice Agreement and encourages the settlement of
outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means
to resume direct dialogue and negotiation through appropriate
channels as early as possible, with a view to avoiding conflicts
and averting escalation.
The mainstream U.S. media for the most part, chose to ignore the
many critiques which have appeared. These critiques of the South
Korean government’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have
appeared mainly on the internet, not only in Korean, but also in English,
in Japanese, and in other languages. They present a wide-ranging
challenge of the veracity and integrity of the South Korean investigation
and its conclusions.
An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28 noted the fact,
however, that the media in the U.S. had ignored the critique of the South
Korean government investigation that was being discussed online and
spread around the world.
In this example, the netizen community in South Korea and
internationally were able to provide an effective challenge to the
misrepresentations by the South Korean government on the Cheonan.
In conclusion, I want to propose that the response of netizens to the
problems raised by the investigation of the Cheonan incident is but a
prelude to the potential of netizens in different countries to work
together across national borders to solve the problems of our times.
Page 33
XIII – Conclusion
Describing the frustration of many netizens with the traditional
media that they had to rely on before the internet, Hauben wrote:
“Today, similarly, the need for a broader and more cooperative
gathering and reporting of the News has helped create the new online
media that is gradually supplementing traditional forms of journalism.”
In an article about the power of the internet, Hauben recognized that
the Net gives the power of the reporter to the netizen. This represents a
diffusion of a power formerly held by the few, placing it in hands that
are different from its former masters.
Speaking about the potential for such a journalism Hauben
predicted, “As people continue to connect to Usenet and other discussion
forums, the collective population will contribute back to the human
community this new form of news.” He recognized that, “The Net has
opened a channel for talking to the whole world to an even wider set of
people than did the printed books.”
In one of the press conferences at the UN when Li Baodong was the
Chinese Ambassador to the UN, he told the media, “You are the 16
th
member of the Security Council.” He was in general speaking to the
traditional media. The case studies I have however, described, demon-
strate the potential for this new media, the netizen media, to assume that
membership.
* The slides used for this talk are online at:
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/stony-brook/Stony-Brook-Slides-12-04-2013.pdf.
The url for the online version of “Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and
the Internet” is:
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120. A version of these Notes appeared
on December 17, 2013 on the Netizenblog at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/12/17/why-netizen-journalism-matters/
Page 34
DPRK Human Rights Briefing at UN
Challenges U.S.
Unending War Strategy*
by Ronda Hauben
The briefing held at the United Nations by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly known as North Korea) on
Tuesday, October 7, 2014 was an opportunity to hear the DPRK’s
response to U.S. and E.U. initiatives targeting the DPRK. The U.S. and
the E.U. have been using the UN to try to demonize the DPRK as a
perpetrator of grave human rights violations and to rally the UN Security
Council to refer the DPRK to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
1
In the previous few months, the DPRK Mission to the UN had held
several press conferences alerting journalists to threats to international
peace and security taking place on the Korean Peninsula. The October
7 briefing, however, was not only open to the press covering the UN, but
to UN member nations and also to NGO’s with access to UN Headquar-
ters in New York.
At the briefing, the DPRK made a presentation about the “Report
of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies” (Report) that it had
published on September 13 about human rights in the DPRK.
The DPRK Deputy Ambassador at the UN, Ri Tong Il, opened the
briefing by introducing the Report. Also taking part in the presentation
were Choe Myong Nam, Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the DPRK and Kim Song, Counselor to the DPRK
UN Mission.
Ambassador Ri explained that there has been an increasing
tendency to carry on a human rights campaign against the DPRK. He
referred in particular to a meeting organized by U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry to discuss allegations of human rights abuse in the DPRK.
The U.S.-sponsored meeting was held on September 23 at a hotel near
the UN Headquarters. The DPRK was not invited to the meeting, and it
was denied the right to attend when it asked to participate.
Page 35
Ambassador Ri said that the purpose of this briefing being held by
the DPRK was to focus on correcting the misinformation being spread
about human rights in the DPRK and to provide a more accurate
understanding of the situation of human rights in countries with differing
social and political systems. He pointed out that the UN with 193
member states is made up of nations with different political systems,
different values and different ideologies.
Ambassador Ri listed the five chapters in the Report giving a brief
introduction to each of the chapters. Then he welcomed questions or
statements from those present. Diplomats from several missions at the
UN, including the Cuban and Venezuelan Missions, responded, thanking
the DPRK for the briefing. They referred to the criticism made at the UN
about those nations who sponsor country-specific human rights
resolutions. Experience has demonstrated that such resolutions are most
often politically motivated, and not geared toward improving conditions
for people. Instead the purpose is an illegitimate political objective, such
as regime change. The Human Rights Council had adopted the Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) procedure, as an effort to counter such abuse
and instead to treat all countries impartially. While many countries focus
on the UPR procedure, a few nations continue to sponsor country-
specific resolutions thus politically targeting other nations.
An example of such political motivation was provided by Choe
Myong Nam in response to a question. He described how in 1993 after
a breakdown in negotiations with the U.S. led the DPRK to pull out of
the IAEA, the U.S. pressured the E.U. to bring a resolution against the
DPRK for human rights violations.
A copy of the Report was distributed to those who attended the
October 7 briefing.
Chapter I of the Report explores the general nature of human rights
so that each nation can determine what the application will be in their
situation. For the DPRK this entails making a critique of how the U.S.
and certain other nations are trying to impose their view of what the
standards should be for other nations. “Nobody in the international
community empowered them to establish the international ‘human rights
standards’,” the Report notes. (p. 12) Instead, the Report maintains that
human rights standards in a country are the prerogative of the people of
Page 36
that country. “In every country,” the Report explains, “those who
demand the human rights and campaign (for) them are the people….” (p.
12)
The Report refers to the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (COI) recently sponsored
by the Human Rights Council. The content and framework of the Report
provides background that is helpful toward grasping the underlying
fallacy of the COI. The Report maintains that the ‘COI’ is an attempt “to
bring down the DPRK by collecting prejudiced ‘data’ without any
scientific accuracy and objectivity in the content….” (p. 12)
All of Korea has been the victim of anti human rights actions by an
occupying power, notes the Report. This was during the period of the
Japanese occupation of Korea (1910-1945). “Each and every law
manufactured by Japan in Korea in the past were…anti human rights
laws aimed at depriving Korean people of all political freedoms and
rights, and forcing colonial slavery upon them.” (p. 13) The Report
explains that these anti-Korean laws created by the Japanese colonial
rule were abolished and a new foundation established legally and
politically in order to provide protection and empowerment for the
Korean people. The Report argues that this demonstrates the DPRK is
concerned with the question of human rights. (See pp. 14-15)
The Report proposes that the protection of human rights in the
DPRK requires putting the political development of the DPRK into its
historical context. Throughout the Report historical background is
provided to put current developments into such a perspective. The
Report documents various forms of hostile actions by the U.S. showing
the effect such actions have had on the DPRK development after the end
of WWII and the end of Japanese colonial rule over Korea. One such
example that the Report provides is explaining that “sanctions were
imposed on Korea after Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial
rule.”(p. 93) The U.S. imposed sanctions against the socialist countries
including the DPRK as part of its Cold War politics even before the
Korean War. (p. 93)
The Report also documents recent hostile acts by the U.S. against
the DPRK. The DPRK puts the anti human rights campaign by the “U.S.
and its followers” in the context of the effort to “defame the image of the
Page 37
DPRK in the international arena and dismantle the socialist system
under the pretext of ‘protection of human rights’.” (p. 98)
A question was raised during the briefing about what was the
relationship between the fact the U.S. is unwilling to negotiate a peace
treaty with the DPRK to end the Korean War and the U.S. led allega-
tions of human rights abuse against the DPRK. A possible motivation
for such a question is a recent journal article by University of California
Professor Christine Hong. The article offers a helpful analysis of this
relationship which is at the heart of the ability to understand the nature
of the U.S. campaign against the DPRK. Her article, “The Mirror of
North Korean Human Rights,” published in Critical Asian Studies,
captures the intimate connection between the U.S. government’s
unending hostility against the DPRK, and the U.S. claims of gross
human rights violations in the DPRK.
2
The article explains that the U.S. has been and is technically and in
practice at war with the DPRK. There has been an unending set of
economic, political and cultural sanctions imposed on the DPRK either
by the U.S. Congress or by the UN particularly the UNSC in the recent
past. There have been massive military drills close to the DPRK by the
U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) and more recently including
Japan, France, the U.K., Canada and other U.S. allies. More than 28,000
U.S. troops have been permanently stationed in the ROK since the
Korean war.
In such a situation, the U.S. claims of DPRK human rights
violations provide a convenient and effective discourse to cloak the
image of U.S. war activities on the Korean Peninsula in a humanitarian
sounding dress. Hong writes that the ‘axis of evil’ narrative introduced
by the Bush administration against Iraq, Iran and the DPRK provided a
means whereby “war politics proceeded under the mantle of rescue
politics.” (Hong, p. 564)
Hong maintains that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) narrative
provides the means by which “would-be rescuers lay claim to a
monopoly on the virtuous use of violence….”
A fallacious WMD narrative which was provided to the U.S.
government by defectors and politicized intelligence was used to
camouflage the U.S. regime change invasion of Iraq. Again, a false
Page 38
narrative using unverifiable claims of defectors and politicized intelli-
gence is being dusted off for use against the DPRK.
Keeping in mind such recent examples as Iraq and Libya, Hong
observes that the claims of noble goals provide a level of protection to
the perpetrators of invasions using the mantle of R2P. Instead of being
“viewed as human rights violations in themselves” when they engage in
acts of war like aerial bombardment, military invasion, or an embargo
on essential goods, they are provided with the appearance of acting as
saviors.
Taken in such a context one can understand the reluctance of
nations like the DPRK to take the claims of those promoting R2P and
human rights as exhibiting any but aggressive intentions.
Hong goes on to point out that any legitimate U.S. concerns over
human rights violations regarding the people of the DPRK would have
to begin by addressing the massive destruction against the civilian
population and civilian infrastructure of the DPRK carried out by the
U.S. and its allies during the Korean War and harm to the civilian
population since by its sanctions.
The Report the DPRK has produced refers not only to the anti
human rights activities against the Korean people during the 35 years of
Japanese occupation but also to the continuing saga of U.S. hostile
activities before and after the Korean War Armistice. The Report is
available as an official document of the UN General Assembly
(A/69/383) and of the UN Security Council (S/2014/668).
3
The October 7 briefing by the DPRK broadened the spectrum of
understandings of the human rights question available to delegates and
journalists at the UN. More such briefings should be welcomed and
encouraged.
Notes
1
Such a strategy with Libya resulted in ICC cases against key Libyan officials
weakening their fight against the NATO invasion that brought regime change and
subsequently a state of serious instability to Libya. Discussing the Libyan example of
regime change, Joseph S. Nye, Jr explained that it is not the facts that matter in “the
information age.” Instead soft power, which includes how the narrative describing a
situation is framed, is as important as, or even more important than military action, in
Page 39
gaining one’s objectives. As he says in an online article, “In a global information age,
success is not determined just by who has the biggest army, but also by who has the
best story.” See the article On Libya, Soft Power, and the Protection of Civilians as
Pretext.
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/04/30/libya_and_protection_civilians_as_pretext/
2
Christine Hong, “The Mirror of North Korean Human Rights,” Critical Asian Studies,
45:4, 561-592.
3
You can see the “Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies” as an
UN document at:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/668
* A version of this article appeared on October 14, 2014 on the Netizenblog at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2014/10/14/dprk-human-rights-briefing-un/.
Page 40
Outside and Inside the UN Contesting
the UN Human Rights COI Report on
North Korea*
by Ronda Hauben
A small demonstration that took place across the street from the UN
on Wednesday, October 22, 2014 was a sign of the problem represented
by the Commission of Inquiry (COI) report by the UN Human Rights
Council on North Korea. The COI report had been issued in March
2014.
The demonstrators carried posters challenging the action by the UN.
The posters portrayed the sentiment that the report and UN actions
around the report represented an injustice. These posters included
statements such as:
“Stop Using N. Korean Human Right as a Weapon for Another
Korean War,” “Stop Shameful Hypocrisy Pretending Human Rights
Defenders,” “Stop Psychological Warfare on the Korean Peninsula,”
“Remember S. Korean National Security Law an Extreme Human Rights
Violation!,” “Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp, Human Rights???,”
“Human Rights, Why Only N. Korea???,” “Mind Your Business in the
U.S.A.???”
The reason the issues raised by the demonstration are important is
that the UN has not attempted any impartial investigation of the Korean
conflict to determine its roots and how to find a resolution. The signs
carried by these demonstrators provide clues to the context in which this
Commission of Inquiry operated. If the COI report is intended as a
weapon to start another Korean War, as one of the signs proposed, then
the actions of the Human Rights Council are but a pretext for an
aggressive action against a sovereign nation. Another poster asked if the
Human Rights Council had considered violations of human rights such
as the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp by the U.S. or the National
Security Law by South Korea? These are well-documented examples of
serious Human Rights abuses, but instead of doing something to
Page 41
condemn such documented abuses, the Human Rights Council is
targeting North Korea where there is little actual evidence that could be
recognized in a court of law of any such human rights abuses. Instead
the kinds of claims being substituted for evidence are testimony of
defectors, and supposed satellite images. In the Iraq case in 2003, such
so called evidence proved inaccurate, yet provided a pretext for the U.S.
invasion and regime change activity. Similarly, false claims were used
as a pretext for the NATO war against Libya in 2011.
The protest in October held outside the UN at noon was in response
to an event being held at the UN later in the day. The event, sponsored
by the permanent missions of Panama, Botswana, and Australia was
held to present the testimony of two North Koreans who had defected to
South Korea and who were making a plea that member states support an
upcoming resolution by the EU and Japan against North Korea.
The DPRK had not been invited to offer its position, but its
representatives did attend the event. They were called on only as part of
the question period at the end of the event.
During the question period, the DPRK representatives raised the
criticism that the COI report did not make any effort to be an all-sided
report. Instead it only presented the testimony of the defectors, of critics
of North Korea.
The content of the testimony presented at the October 22 UN
meeting included often repeated claims of harsh treatment, but missing
were clear statements of what the circumstances were of the situations
being described. Nor was there any effort to provide factual evidence
supporting the claims.
The head of the Commission of Inquiry, the Australian Judge
Michael Kirby played a major role in this meeting at the UN. In
response to a comment from the DPRK representatives that the soliciting
of the testimony from the defector witnesses was politically motivated,
Judge Kirby responded that his experience as a judge was such that he
knew how to conduct such questioning.
His response failed to acknowledge that the role he is playing in the
UN process is not the same as in a national court of law, where there are
expected to be standards for evidence and due process for the accused.
Also in a national court of law there are in general appeals processes for
Page 42
the accused, as well as the right of the accused to confront those who are
making the accusations. No such rights are accorded to the accused by
the process that Judge Kirby is involved in. Instead he is acting as a
prosecutor with no rights for the accused to provide a defense.
At the UN meeting, the representatives of both Panama and
Botswana spoke about their interest in fulfilling the obligations of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework as part of why they are
supporting taking action against North Korea. The problem with such
statements is that they are ignoring the abuse that occurred by NATO in
Libya under the mantle of R2P.
This event at the UN on October 22 was directed at urging support
for actions at the UN directed against North Korea. But another event a
few days earlier demonstrated a very different approach to the question
of the stalemate in efforts to resolve the conflicts that exist between the
U.S./EU and North Korea.
This other event, which took place on October 20, was sponsored
by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and was chaired by
Donald Gregg, a former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea.
1
The CFR program featured Gregg interviewing Jang Il Hun who is
the Deputy Ambassador for the DPRK Mission to the UN, with time
provided for questions from those in the audience. Ambassador Jang is
the DPRK representative for the New York channel for contact between
the DPRK and the U.S. The U.S. has no formal diplomatic relations with
the DPRK.
The tone of most of the CFR event provided a striking contrast to
the UN meeting held a few days later.
Introducing the topic of the program, Ambassador Gregg referred
to a previous program held earlier in the year with Judge Kirby
discussing the COI report process. During this earlier program at CFR,
Ambassador Gregg reported he had asked Judge Kirby if he had noticed
any improvement in the situation in North Korea. Judge Kirby re-
sponded that he had observed improvement under Kim Jung Un. Gregg
noted, however, this judgment was not reflected in the COI report.
2
Also, the issue of the stalemate in relations between the U.S. and
the DPRK was raised. Ambassador Jang was asked what could be done
to help to make a breakthrough to end the stalemate. In general it was
Page 43
agreed that neither accusations regarding human rights problems nor
efforts to revive the long stalled six party talks process would be a
helpful direction. Instead a visit by a friendly group organized by the
Council of Foreign Relations was proposed and Ambassador Jang
responded that if he received a detailed proposal for such a visit, he
could make recommendations about it to his capital.
3
These three situations demonstrate that there are substantive issues
to be discussed through a diplomatic process with the DPRK. The
program at the CFR in particular demonstrated that if an effort is made
to resolve problems with the DPRK, progress is possible. Meanwhile
actions being taken by nations like Japan and by the EU in particular
who are threatening to bring a resolution against the DPRK, can only
deepen the conflicts. And holding meetings inside or outside the UN
where defector witnesses are encouraged to urge member nations of the
UN to condemn the DPRK are but acts to fan the flames of hostility and
conflict. The demonstration in front of the UN and the CFR meeting,
though held outside the UN, reveals that the obligations of the UN
Charter are obligations that can be met. And that the process of conflict
resolution needs the broad participation of all those who can contribute
to its success. There seem to be two tactics being used in international
relations with the DPRK. Either hold punishment meetings or encourage
dialogue. The UN Charter supports only the latter efforts.
Notes
1
http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/conversation-jang-il-hun/p33642
2
Gregg: “And I asked him, as I was the commentator, about 50 years, and have you
noticed any changes during that period? And he said, yes, there have been improve-
ments under Kim Jong-un, which I wish he’d said that in his report, but he at least said
it in response to my — to my question.”
3
JANG: Yes. If I receive any detailed proposal concerning the proposed visit, then I
can make recommendations for my colleagues in the capital.
* This article appeared on Oct. 25, 2014 on the Netizenblog at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2014/10/25/outside-and-inside-the-un/
Page 44
13 Observations about North Korea by
a Western Visitor*
by Marcel Cartier
I had the unique opportunity to spend several days in three different
parts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, more commonly
just referred to as ‘North’ Korea. This was an exceptionally life-changi-
ng experience that challenged many of the preconceptions that myself
and fellow western visitors who accompanied me from Beijing had
going in. Here are some things about North Korea that may surprise you,
as many of them surprised me, as well.
1. Americans Are Not Hated, But Welcomed
The Koreans have a very high level of class consciousness, and do
not equate the American people with our government. They make no
secret of their contempt for U.S. imperialism, but if you say you’re an
American, the conversation will usually revolve around culture or sports
more than politics. At the Grand People’s Study House in Pyongyang
(think your local library on steroids, with more than 30 million books),
the most popular CD is The Beatles’ ‘Greatest Hits’, although Linkin
Park is also requested a lot among local youth. The young men seem
fascinated with the NBA, and know a lot more about the league than just
Dennis Rodman.
2. Customs and Border Patrol Were a Smooth, Easy
Experience
Many of the westerners who traveled to Pyongyang from Beijing
with me were concerned that the immigration procedure would be a long
and intense one. Everyone seemed quite surprised that passports were
stamped with no questions asked, and that only a handful of passengers
had a few items in their bags looked at. Prior to traveling, it is strongly
advised by tour companies that people not bring any kind of books on
the Korean War or items that have American flags on them. This may be
solid advice, but immigration didn’t really seem too concerned about
Page 45
what was brought into the country.
3. Pyongyang Is Beautiful, Clean and Colorful
Probably the most gorgeous city in the world, Pyongyang is
incredibly well kept. Considering that the entire city was carpet bombed
by U.S. forces in the Korean War (what they call the Fatherland
Liberation War) and that only two buildings remained in 1953, it is an
impressive accomplishment. The statues and grand buildings are
awe-inspiring, as are the large green spaces where you can see people
relaxing. There are many new apartment buildings sprouting up across
the city, but even the ones that are evidently older are maintained well.
It is often said that Pyongyang at night is dark, and although it may be
compared to a western city, it does have beautiful lights that illuminate
much of the downtown area.
4. Kim Jong Un Haircuts are Practically Non-Existent
There was one man who sported the Kim cut who I saw while en
route from the airport to the city center, and it wasn’t a good look on
him at all! The haircut was rumoured by BBC and Time, who picked up
on a South Korean tabloid story, to now be mandatory for all North
Korean men of university age. Not only is this story not true, so is the
allegation that the men in the DPRK only have some select few styles to
choose from at the barber shop that are ‘state sanctioned.’ It really works
just as it would in the west – there are flyers at barbershops where styles
are pictured, making it easier for customers to say, “I want a number
seven cut.” But, just as in a New York barber shop, that doesn’t mean
that you are restricted to that particular look.
5. North Koreans Laugh, Smile and Joke – a Lot
The question you are asking is probably, “but isn’t that for show?”
It would be a mighty accomplishment indeed if with all of the genuine
laughs I shared with Koreans, they were putting on an act. Not only that,
but for vehicles speeding by on the streets, those Koreans do an
impressive job of making sure they’re aware when there are foreigners
passing so they can pretend to laugh! Koreans have jokes for just about
Page 46
everything, from Canadians and ice hockey (“why did the Canadians
have sex from the back? So they can watch the hockey game”) to
Americans at the DMZ (“an American passes a DPRK soldier a cigarette
across the demarcation line. The solider smokes it, but the American
asks why if he hates Americans he is smoking something from the U.S.
The solider replies, I am not smoking it but rather burning it.”)
6. Monolithic Ideology Does Not Mean Monolithic
Personality
This is a good reminder that individualism and individuality are not
one in the same. In fact, observing people interact with one another in
North Korea provided the impression that a diversity of personality
types was just as strong there as it is in the ‘open’ west. People have a
divergence of interests, from sports to culture, and are free to pick what
they enjoy and dislike.
7. People are Incredibly Well Dressed Across the
Country
Even in the countryside, Koreans dress in a very dignified manner.
There was not one place I traveled to where people appeared in the least
bit sloppy, or wearing clothes that appeared to be old. Men and women
also don’t all wear the same style of clothing, as we are often condi-
tioned to think. It is common to see women wearing very bright clothes,
including pink business suits as well as more traditional Korean dresses.
Men may often wear ties, collared shirts and suit coats, but it is also
common to see them in more casual wear such as tracksuits depending
on the occasion.
8. Children Begin to Learn English at the Age of Seven
The people’s command of English, particularly among the younger
generation, is very impressive. While in previous decades, high school
was the time when English began to be learnt, this has been changed to
the third grade. Although many children are shy (they don’t see that
many foreigners, after all), I was able to get many of them to shake my
hand and even exchange a few words in English. Popular languages that
Page 47
are studied in high school include Chinese and German.
9. Tourism Will be Boosted in the Near Future
One of the aspects of the economy that will be prioritized in the
future appears to be tourism. The entire Pyongyang Airport is under
construction at the moment and in the midst of major expansion. The
Koreans are keen to open up to the outside world, but they are also
certain to do it in a very different way than the Chinese (after being in
Beijing, the omnipotence of some of the worst aspects of western culture
there gives them every reason to be cautious in this regard). Air Koryo,
which was given the only one-star rating by the company SkyTrax, was
in reality much better in terms of service and comfort than at least a
dozen other airlines I had previously flown on. They have a new fleet of
Russian planes that fly between Pyongyang and Beijing, provide in-
flight entertainment throughout the journey (the children’s cartoon
Clever Raccoon Dog is hilarious), and serve a ‘hamburger’ (not so good,
but edible) and an assortment of drinks (coffee, tea, beer, juice). The
whole experience was at least worthily of three-stars if we had to go the
rating route!
10. Koreans are Keen to Talk About the Country Can-
didly
People are very open about the problems facing the country, and
don’t shy away from discussing some of the more difficult aspects of
life. For instance, they would speak about the ‘Arduous March’ (think
the ‘Special Period’ in Cuba) where drought, famine and floods coupled
with the loss of the majority of the country’s trading partners brought
big setbacks to a country that until the 1980s had a higher standard of
living than the South. They will also discuss the narratives regarding the
Korean War and are keen for a betterment of relations with South Korea
in the eventual hope of reunification. However, they are also very firm
on the fact that they will never renounce their socialist principles in
order to facilitate this reunification.
Page 48
11. Beer is Considered a Soft Drink, Micro Breweries
Are Popular
Almost every district in the country now has a local brewery that
provides beer to the local area. There are a variety of different kinds that
are enjoyed around the country, and most meals are served with a small
quantity of beer. At Kim Il Sung Stadium where the Pyongyang
Marathon started and ended, it was common to see locals having a drink
as they watched the exhibition matches between DPRK football teams.
Think Yankee Stadium, just without the aggressiveness of the crowd.
12. Most of the Tabloid Stories About the DPRK are
Utterly False
There were probably at least one hundred Americans in Pyongyang
at the same time as me, due in large part to foreign amateur runners
being allowed to compete for the first time in the marathon. One couple
testified how this was their second visit after having traveled to DPRK
the year before. They mentioned how they were a bit scared to come the
previous time, because it was right after a story had hit the news about
Kim Jong Un having had his ex-girlfriend and others killed for making
a porn tape. The couple talked about how they walked into an Opera in
Pyongyang, and as they sat down noticed that the very women who were
supposed to be dead were sitting directly across from them. Walking
dead, indeed! Other recent stories to hit the western press via South
Korean tabloids regarding mass executions in stadiums or Kim Jong
Un’s uncle being fed to a pack of hungry dogs are also said to be
nonsense by westerners who travel there frequently and know the
country’s situation well. This isn’t to say anything about the existence
of political reeducation camps or prisons, but an all-out demonization
campaign against the country that completely distorts it is of no service
to the Korean people.
13. Koreans Will not Hesitate to Make You Join in Their
Fun
There were a number of events organized in Pyongyang on the
occasion of Kim Il Sung’s birthday, which is a national holiday where
Page 49
people have two days off of work. Some of these were publically
organized, like the ‘mass dances’ where hundreds of people dance in
large squares to popular Korean songs. Others involved people in the
park having family lunches while the kids bought ice cream from
vendors and drunk grannies danced hilariously because they had far too
much homemade soju. But, just like in any authoritarian state, you must
participate! Being shy is not an option, as they will pull you by the arm
and teach you every dance move even if they themselves are not quite
doing it correctly.
In short, I found the Korean people in the north to be some of the
warmest, most authentic human beings I’ve ever had the chance to
interact with. It would be silly to refer to the country as a ‘workers
paradise’ due to the depth of problems it faces. As in all societies, there
are positive aspects and negative ones. However, considering that they
have overcome centuries of imperial domination, the loss of about a
quarter of their population in the Korean War, and continue to maintain
their social system in the face of a continued state of war, they have
done tremendously well. The accomplishments in free education through
university, the nonexistence of homelessness, and a proud and dignified
people should be presented in order to gain a fuller, more nuanced
picture of the country.
I must say that the way that the DPRK is portrayed in the western
bourgeois media actually says a great deal more about the effectiveness
of our propaganda apparatuses and brainwashing techniques than it does
about theirs. The fact that I even have to write about the surprising
things I witnessed in DPRK is evidence of the serious lack of under-
standing we have about the country. The problems facing Korea are
never contexualized as they should be as an oppressed nation aiming to
free itself from servitude to big powers intent on gobbling up every
remaining state free from a dying unipolarity.
Oh, and I almost forgot about nuclear weapons! Well, let’s consider
if the North Korean military was holding military drills annually off the
coast of New York that simulated the carpet bombing of Manhattan and
the occupation of the entirety of the country, of which they already
controlled the western half. Would it not be sensible given that context
for Americans to develop a nuclear deterrent? The Koreans are not war
Page 50
hungry or even ‘obsessed’ with the army or military. However, given the
way that the situation in Libya played out, they are all the more
convinced – rightfully so – that the only reason their independent state
continues to stand is due to the Songun (‘military first’ policy) and the
existence of nuclear capabilities. To be sure, they have no intention of
using it unless put in that position to have to do so.
It is my sincere desire that there will be continued cultural and
people-to-people exchanges in the near future between people from the
DPRK and the western countries. Pretty much all of the people who
traveled with me back to Beijing were in awe of just how different their
experience was compared to what they had expected. They – like
myself – gained a great deal from the humanizing experience of
interacting with Koreans. Although westerners are relatively free to
travel much more so than DPRK citizens, it’s ironic how the Koreans
seemingly know a great deal more about us than we know about them.
That will need to change in the years to come.
* This post appeared on the Existence is Resistance blog on April 21, 2014 at:
http://www.existenceisresistance.org/archives4222. Marcel Cartier is a political rapper
from the South Bronx, NYC.
Page 51
Enemy Image:
What the DPRK Is Really Like*
by Konstantin Asmolov
North Korea is one of the most unusual countries in the world. In
the West they call it a pariah state, and President George Bush Junior
even included the DPRK in the “axis of evil.” The demonization of the
image of North Korea is promoted by the closed nature of the state and
also the fact that Pyongyang deliberately cultivates a reputation as a
“tough” regime that it is better to have no contact with. It is only natural
that in these conditions myths proliferate around the DPRK and totally
implausible “canards” about the lives of citizens of that country and the
ways of the North Korean authorities regularly turn up in the
press. Lenta.ru
1
has tried to get to the bottom of the most widespread
false impressions about the DPRK.
Let us begin with poverty and famine. Undoubtedly the situation in
the DPRK is not ideal in this respect, but neither extreme poverty nor
constant hunger and its associated problems exist in the country.
References are frequently made to statistics according to which the
Northerners are shorter than their Southern brothers. This is attributed
to their not receiving enough protein in their childhood. This is a half
truth, because it is not only a question of the shortage of protein-rich
food in the North but also the change in the nutritional regime and the
departure from the traditional diet in the South, where European cuisine
is popular.
Another assertion becomes tiresome: “The inhabitants of North
Korea gather grass to feed themselves.” This is equivalent to the
following statement: “In modern-day Russia the food situation is so bad
that even urban dwellers are obliged to travel to rural localities to collect
mushrooms.” Shepherd’s purse and a number of other grasses are
traditional elements of Korean cuisine, and gathering them has nothing
to do with the availability or otherwise of food.
The existence of the developed “parallel economy” in the DPRK
also remains a secret to many people in the West, although North
Korean migrants in China (shuttle traders rather than refugees) bring the
Page 52
country more foreign currency than the Kaesong Industrial Complex,
which is frequently positioned as the sole source of foreign currency
(100 million dollars as against 80 million dollars). And if you listen not
to propagandist horror stories but to the opinion of specialists, it
transpires that in practice there is, if anything, more economic freedom
in today’s DPRK than there was in the USSR at the time of Perestroika.
Illegal economic ties permeate the whole of society, and a significant
number of state enterprises are essentially private. The regime gives the
“capitalist” most-favored status, and he fulfills its strategic instructions
and shares the profits with it.
The “primary accumulation of capital” is in full swing in Pyong-
yang now. Residents of the city have begun to dress better and expensive
restaurants and stores selling foreign-made goods are opening. The new
multistory housing districts in Pyongyang are indistinguishable from
those in Busan, South Korea,
The famine of 1995-1997 occupies perhaps the main place in the
demonization of the DPRK. According to the calculations of certain
particularly “competent” authors the number of casualties reached three
million or even four million. However, these figures were obtained by
a highly original method: The “assumed estimates of the situation in the
worst-affected individual regions” were extrapolated to the whole
country. Moreover, losses not directly connected with the famine are
added to the victims (for instance, mortality from diseases in the context
of reduced immunity).
People in the West write that “the bodies of people dead from
hunger were piled up right there on the streets.” As in South Korea, in
the DPRK they prefer to bury the deceased not in cemeteries but in
places that are favorable from the viewpoint of geomancy. Therefore
when famine hit the country, in order to combat possible epidemics, it
was recommended that the bodies be buried in mass graves: A truck
would drive around the villages collecting the bodies of the deceased,
who would be carried to the roadside beforehand. Journalists saw this
and interpreted it in their own way.
Another “beautiful image” connected with the DPRK is the well-
known “satellite photograph” where, against the bright lights of the
South, the DPRK looks like a big, totally black patch. This is a very
Page 53
interesting illustration of the way in which the staffers of Radio Free
Asia achieved the opposite result to what they were hoping for. Taking
a real NASA image, they painted over some of the illuminations in the
North so that the difference would look bigger, but while doing so they
inadvertently blacked out Vladivostok and several Chinese border cities,
which apparently also have no light at night.
The belief that in a state like the DPRK there can be neither culture,
nor science, nor any other successes except perhaps the military kind is
equally absurd. False premises produce false results. Sometimes quite
comical ones. Thus, when North Korean archaeologists excavated the
“Unicorn Cave” site, so called because the mythical founder of the state
of Koguryo (an ancient state on the site where the DPRK now is)
supposedly kept this animal there, the Western press started saying
sarcastically: “North Korean scientists have proved the existence of
unicorns.”
The author of these lines even came across articles about the
“Potemkin” nature of the Pyongyang Metro. Apparently there are only
three stations, between which they ferry foreigners, while locals are not
allowed in at all. But actually the North Korean metro is a year older
than South Korea’s. Incidentally, the Northerners are also in the lead in
the missile race and even in another indicator, the literacy of the
population: 99 per cent of the population as against 97.9 per cent in the
Republic of Korea.
The DPRK is also not infrequently accused of destroying the
cultural heritage, the accusation being that practically no architectural
monuments of past eras remain in the country and Pyongyang was
completely rebuilt as a tribute to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Yet it is
somehow forgotten that the cultural sites were destroyed during the
Korean War of 1950-1953, toward the end of which the U.S. Air Force
officially stated that it had bombed everything it could, including
barrages and dams, while Pyongyang was practically completely
destroyed, so there was basically nothing there to demolish.
Now let us talk about the cruelty of the regime. Here critics of the
DPRK have become detached from reality to a lesser extent. Although,
in the context of the traditional Confucian mentality that is characteristic
of many countries of the Far East, notions of freedom and the relation-
Page 54
ship between the interests of the individual and the collective differ
significantly from both European and Soviet notions. Furthermore the
DPRK is in the position of a “besieged fortress,” which in itself
presupposes numerous restrictions.
Nonetheless, the degree of state interference in the private lives of
citizens of the DPRK should not be exaggerated. An example of this
exaggeration is the reports that female inhabitants of North Korea are
forbidden to wear short skirts or pants, although pants are standard attire
for the Far Eastern woman, while in photographs of Pyongyang from
various years it is clear that Korean women certainly do not only wear
traditional dress. There was a similar story about haircuts when, on the
basis of photographs of examples of women’s and men’s haircuts and
hairstyles that were hanging on the wall in a hairdresser’s, it was
concluded that citizens of DPRK are only allowed those haircuts. The
recent “canard” – “everyone must have the same haircut as the leader”
– only continues this trend.
One of the most widespread recent fables about North Korea is the
stories about the incredible cruelty of its ruler Kim Jong Un. Thus, there
was a lot of ballyhoo about a report that an official was shot by mortar
fire on his orders. None of those who reproduced this news was bothered
by the fact that it is impossible in principle to shoot somebody with
mortar fire. The news that Comrade Kim fed his own uncle to hungry
dogs comes into the same category; it turned out to be a joke by a
Chinese blogger.
One should also treat with scepticism many stories about torture in
the DPRK. The defector Sin Don Khek [name as transliterated], for
instance, was famous for describing such horrors. He reported in
particular how they tortured him by hanging him on a hook over a fire.
True, it is rather difficult to believe that Sin actually went through all
this: Surviving after such things is problematic, and not becoming
disabled is entirely unrealistic. But all the same, the naive reader takes
the testimony of such “victims” at face value even though their health,
having been undermined in the “Korean Gulag,” is sufficient for press
conferences lasting many hours and propaganda tours during which they
speak several times a day.
There is a widespread impression that the DPRK threatens its
Page 55
neighbors or possibly the whole world. Pyongyang lays no claim to
other countries’ territories. Admittedly it regards the Republic of Korea
as an occupied territory, but Seoul also regards the peninsula as a single
country, part of which is temporary occupied by an “anti state organiza-
tion.”
It is not only the North Korean missile and nuclear programs that
are subjected to mythological exaggeration, but the DPRK Army as a
whole. It is emphasized that it ranks fourth in the world in terms of
numerical strength, but the fact that on this same list the Republic of
Korea comes sixth, while the South Korean military budget exceeds
North Korea’s by a factor of 23-26[?],
2
is left out. While from the
viewpoint of a simple comparison of troop numbers the North appears
not to have a decisive superiority, if you take into account the quality of
the armaments the correlation of forces is simply disastrous for the
North. DPRK Air Force pilots have only 10-25 hours’ flying time a year
(for comparison, NATO’s pilots have a minimum of 200). In the 1990s
there were about 200 tanks at Pyongyang’s disposal (there are more than
8,000 in the American Army today). As one military expert with whom
this author is acquainted put it, “the DPRK may have enough tanks to
take Seoul, but I am not sure they have enough fuel to get there.” The
DPRK has fuel for 30 days and food for 60 days of war.
A “sensation” about the latest unmasked plan for a terrorist act
being prepared by Pyongyang turns up in the media at least once a year.
Thus, in 2006 in the context of the first epidemic of bird flu it was
reported that “the DPRK is planning to develop a bacteriological
weapon based on this virus and has established contacts with Al-Qaida
in this connection.” In 2009 “Japan’s intelligence services have learned
of a planned DPRK missile strike against U.S. territory, scheduled for
4 July 2009.” In 2012 the DPRK “decided to disrupt the Seoul G20
summits, for which purpose it was planned to release balloons against
the South, filled with poisonous gases or the spores of dangerous
microorganisms.”
Why is this mythologization, this distortion of the image of the
DPRK, dangerous? Scourging the vices of this or that regime is fine
when the vices are real and we are talking about the real North Korea,
not its counterpart “in another universe.” However, today the comic
Page 56
image of the DPRK is encroaching on reality and supplanting it. This
may be no bad thing for propaganda, but because of the grotesqueness
of the image that has been constructed for North Korea, that country,
with its inhabitants and their problems, becomes an object of jibes and
not sympathy. And the fact that fake news about the DPRK is regularly
exposed only intensifies this effect.
But there is an even more serious problem: The distorted image of
the DPRK is becoming established not only among ordinary people but
also in the heads of the people who make the decisions and even the
propagandists themselves. So real political strategies, which theoreti-
cally should be based on an understanding of the opponent, are built on
the basis of a “cartoon” image. And attempts by specialists to explain
what is what, meet with a hostile reception because “everyone already
knows what is happening there!”
Notes
1
Lenta.ru is a Moscow based, Russian language news site with over a reported 600,000
hits per day.
2
In 2012, the reported military budget of South Korea was approx. $26.1 billion, that
of North Korea was approx. $8.2 billion giving a ration of more than 3:1 in favor of
South Korea.
* This article appeared in Russian on the news website Lenta.ru on Feb 2, 2015.
Konstantin Asmolov is a scientific staffer at the Center for Korean Studies, the Institute
of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Page 57
[Editor’s Note: The following article from the Strategic Culture website
analyzes the relation between the U.S. and the DPRK and the cyber
attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment known as the ‘Sony Hack’. This
is Part II of a 2-part article. Part I can be seen at:
http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/01/06/usa-north-korea-an
d-hollywood-i.html.]
USA, North Korea and
Hollywood (II)*
by Alexander Vorontsov
The hackers’ attack against Sony Pictures on November 24, 2014
threw the entire studio of the Hollywood giant into disarray with the
computers wiped out. Media called it the biggest corporate hack in
history. A group purporting to be the Guardians of Peace took responsi-
bility for the act.
1
The data stolen by hackers included personal
information about Sony Pictures employees and their families, e-mails
between employees, information about executive salaries at the
company, copies of unreleased Sony films and other information to be
made accessible via internet. The perpetrators demanded to cancel the
planned release of the film The Interview
2
and threatened to attack
moviegoers. A message from the Guardians of Peace group posted
online warned of a 9/11-like attack on movie theaters that screen the
Sony Pictures Entertainment film.
3
At some point people panicked. After
the threats of a terrorist attack the New York premiere of the Sony
movie was cancelled. Screenings have also been cancelled at thousands
of theaters across the country. The U.S. administration was really
concerned over the goings-on. After some time it peremptorily accused
Pyongyang of complicity with no evidence to substantiate the claim. It
only cited the results of the FBI investigation.
4
The accusations were as
groundless as in the case of the Malaysian Boeing airliner that went
down in Ukraine. They followed the same pattern: “We know who is
guilty, we possess the facts that cannot be made public because it’s
hush-hush information. So you have to take our word for it.” Here is
another example of the same tactics in use. In 2003 America accused
Page 58
Iraq of pursuing a WMD (weapons of mass destruction) program though
the U.S. administration knew it was not true.
North Korea has twice flatly rejected such accusations. It offered its
cooperation in finding the truth but Washington refused. Instead it said
Pyongyang was welcome to compensate for the losses suffered by Sony
Pictures. In 2006-2007 the U.S. Treasury Department conducted an
operation against what it called North Korea’s illegal economic
activities. It froze the Delta Asia bank accounts in Macao. The move
negatively affected the six-party nuclear talks held in Beijing at the time.
The U.S. never provided any proof of the bank’s illegal activities or its
connection to North Korea’s nuclear program. Pyongyang offered to
launch a joint investigation but Washington refused as it did in the case
of Cheonan – the South Korean corvette sank off the country’s west
coast in the Yellow Sea. Back then the United Nations Security Council
held an emergency session called upon South Korea’s initiative. The
evidence provided by Seoul was not sufficient to blame North Korea for
the tragedy. The U.S. regularly refuses to hold joint investigations with
North Korea. It makes the accusations of North Korean complicity in the
hackers’ attack against Sony Pictures not credible. The Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs statement says “Pyongyang suggested conducting a
joint investigation of the incident which would open up additional
opportunities for easing the tension. In fact, the step is evidence of the
North Korean side’s sincere striving for investigating the issue in every
detail.”
Scared by threats movie theater owners delayed the screening of
The Interview. President Barack Obama authorized additional sanctions
on North Korea in the wake of the “destructive and coercive”
cyber-attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. “We take seriously North
Korea’s attack that aimed to create destructive financial effects on a U.S.
company and to threaten artists and other individuals with the goal of
restricting their right to free expression,” the White House statement
said. It called the sanctions “a response to the Government of North
Korea’s ongoing provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions and
policies, particularly its destructive and coercive cyber-attack on Sony
Pictures Entertainment.” Obama said the attack was technologically
complex and unprecedented in scope. He promised to take punitive
Page 59
actions including returning North Korea to the list of terrorist sponsors.
The U.S. turns a blind eye to the fact that some details don’t fit into the
version of North Korean complicity in the hackers’ attack. The opinions
differ even inside the United States. Stylometric analysis says the
linguistic features are not North Korean, for instance, some digital crime
perpetrators could even be Russian speakers. Another version is based
on the facts ignored by Washington. The Guardians of Peace told media
they collaborated with the company’s staffers to make Sony Pictures pay
for criminal business-practices. According to the stolen data, there was
only one woman out of 17 managers with salaries exceeding one million
dollars. There is ground to believe that the attack was staged by former
Sony employees disgruntled with the management policies.
The third version is related to the Chinese factor. The United States
asked China to help in the investigation as the North Korean traffic that
goes through Chinese cyber space. Beijing never detected any North
Korean trace.
The U.S. version states that the attack was technologically
complicated and it took about a year to prepare it. It means there were
many collaborators inside Sony Pictures. In this case Washington has to
admit that Pyongyang was able to create a broad net of agents working
in the United States and it possesses a capability to organize wide-scale
subversive actions.
One way or another, experts believe Washington’s reaction was
disproportional. Digital crimes have become routine but nobody ever
tried “to punish” sovereign states for such nefarious deeds. A close
scrutiny of the incident against the background of U.S. policy toward
North Korea may provide some clue. It is called the policy of “strategic
patience” which various American experts believe to be a version of
“strategy of containment” aimed at toppling the North Korean govern-
ment. Many researchers point out it was a surprise when Obama took a
tougher stance on the issue than his predecessor George Bush. The
instruments used to implement the “strategic patience” policy include
increased pressure, sanctions, isolation and rejection of meaningful
dialogue and “engagement policy.” In 2014 many peace initiatives put
forward by Pyongyang were rebuffed by Washington and Seoul as acts
of propaganda. The previous year Pyongyang abstained from nuclear
Page 60
tests and long-range ballistic missile trials. Still, the United States and
the allies continued to conduct large-scale exercises near the North
Korean border. The military activities serve as means of political
pressure. The campaign against human rights violations in North Korea
has gained unprecedented proportions. It had never been that tense, as
well as it had never been made part of the United Nations General
Assembly’s agenda with an aim to refer the case to the International
Court in the Hague. No matter the United Nations structures have
strictly divided responsibilities, the North Korean issue was added to the
agenda of the United Nations Security Council. The very idea that the
alleged or real human rights violations in North Korea could pose a
threat to international security and become an issue for consideration by
the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter
is ridiculous. The Security Council will hardly come up with a unani-
mous ruling due to the opposition of Russia and China – the states which
adamantly oppose the politicization of the human rights issue in relation
to North Korea. At that the pressure on North Korea continues. The
hackers’ attack against Sony Pictures is used for the same purpose. The
main goal is finding new pretexts to introduce new sanctions against
North Korea. If the other countries don’t join in, the U.S. will do
unilaterally.
Many experts believe that the goal of unfriendly actions undertaken
by Washington and its allies is to provoke North Korea into renewal of
nuclear tests. It will make it easier for the West to introduce a new
package of anti-North Korean sanctions. It is worth to note what North
Korean experts say. They are sure that since the autumn of 2014 the
United States started another offensive to impede the ongoing economic
progress in North Korea that has been lasting for a few years now. Under
the leadership of Kim Jong-un the country has achieved economic
growth. Many social programs have been implemented, including high
quality housing for the researchers of the Academy of Sciences, the
professors of universities in Pyongyang, a water park, modern skiing
resort, an equestrian sports complex, etc.
For North Korea 2014 was a year of growing tensions, as well as
the time of continuous economic growth that the country reached even
being under international sanctions. It was also the year when military
Page 61
and political leadership consolidated its ranks thanks to the efforts of
young Kim Jong-un. In 2014 a three-year mourning period for the late
leader Kim Jong Il, the father of Kim Jong-un, ended. It was also the
time of increasing cooperation with friendly states, first of all Russia and
China. Perhaps all these things will make the regime’s opponents realize
that the hopes for regime change in North Korea are groundless. Perhaps
it will help to revive a substantive dialogue on the problems of the
Korean Peninsula.
Notes:
1
Donnelly, Matt. “Sony Hackers Have Flashed A ‘Disturbing’ New Warning On Staff
Computers,” Business Insider, December 11, 2014,
http://www.businessinsider.com/sony-hackers-new-warning-on-computers-2014-12.
2
http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/rolling_news/2014/12/141208_rn_hackers_sony_kim
(in Russian)
3
“Sony hackers threaten theaters with 9/11-style attack,” USA Today, December 16,
2014.
http://www.wcnc.com/story/news/2014/12/16/sony-hackers-threaten-theaters-with-9
11-style-attack/20490371/ contains the original article but now the original link goes
to “New York premiere of ‘The Interview’ canceled.”
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2014/12/16/sony-hackers-threaten-movi
e-theaters/20485591/
4
“U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony,” The New York Times,
December 17, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacki
ng.html?_r=0
* This article appeared in the Strategic Culture Foundation on-line journal, Feb 7, 2015,
http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2015/01/07/usa-north-korea-and-hollywood-ii
.html.
Page 62
[Editor’s Note: The following Global Citizens’ Declaration and Call
were received while this issue of the Amateur Computerist was being
edited. The Declaration and Call were being circulated by two South
Korean NGOs, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
and Solidarity for Peace and Reconciliation of Korea (SPARK).
Endorsements were requested from individuals and organization.*]
Global Citizens’ Declaration: A Call for
an End to the Korean War and the
Elimination of Nuclear Threats on the
Korean Peninsula
Let’s Create a Nuclear-Free World
by Signing the Peace Treaty and
Declaring a Nuclear-Free Zone
This declaration proposes a fundamental and comprehensive resolution
of military tensions and the nuclear crisis around the Korean peninsula,
which make it difficult to achieve a region and a world without nuclear
weapons.
Our Proposals
!First: Immediately reconvene the lapsed Six-Party Talks in order
to find ways to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula to
resolve the nuclear crisis.
!Second: Parallel to, or preceding, the Six-Party Talks, the
countries involved – including South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., and
China – should conduct negotiations that would lead to ending the
armistice system and replacing it with a permanent peace system, based
on the conclusion of a peace treaty.
!Third: Parallel to, or preceding, the Six-Party Talks, North
Korea-U.S., and North Korea-Japan bilateral talks should be initiated in
order to comprehensively improve relations between these states.
Page 63
!Fourth: The two Koreas should expand their dialogue and
cooperation with each other, with the active support and encouragement
of neighboring countries.
!Fifth: There must be an end to the U.S.-Japan-ROK military
cooperation, including the missile defense system, which perpetuates the
arms race on the peninsula and in the wider East Asian region.
!Sixth: Japan must be prevented from exercising the right of
collective self-defense, as interpreted by the Abe administration, because
this would nullify the Japanese peace constitution, particularly article 9,
which has served as an anchor of peace in East Asia.
!Seventh: Together with the conclusion of the Korean peninsula
peace treaty, hostile military alliances must be phased out, stage by
stage, and replaced by peaceful reciprocal relations, in order to contrib-
ute to the common security of the Korean peninsula and all East Asian
countries.
A Call for an End to the Korean War
and the Elimination of Nuclear Threats
on the Korean Peninsula
Seventy years ago, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki brought catastrophic humanitarian consequences, not only to
the Japanese people, but also to around 70,000 Korean workers who had
been forcibly taken to Japan by the colonial-imperial government. As a
result of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula was divided and finally
torn apart by the Korean War. Under the unstable armistice system, the
Korean peninsula has become the powder keg of East Asia, with the
world’s most concentrated accumulation of weapons-including nuclear
weapons. The fear of nuclear war continues.
Page 64
Conflicts and Mutual Distrust in the Last 20 years
Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Program
21 years have passed since the Agreed Framework between the
United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea was signed in 1994. Since then there have been several additional
agreements to peacefully resolve the nuclear problems on the Korean
peninsula, but no agreement has been fully implemented. As a result,
North Korea has carried out nuclear tests on three different occasions.
The U.S. and South Korean governments have argued that it was
North Korea that broke the agreement and developed nuclear weapons
while dialogues were proceeding. However, this argument is not
persuasive, because it is not based on observed facts. The history of
interaction between North Korea and the U.S. shows numerous instances
when the U.S., a major nuclear power, broke agreements to give
negative security assurance to North Korea, or provoked the North by
implementing rigid, hostile policies. The nuclear crisis on the Korean
peninsula has been aggravated because of accumulated distrust between
the U.S. and North Korea, North Korea and South Korea, and neighbor-
ing countries and North Korea. It is not the fault of only one country. All
must accept responsibility.
An Unrealistic Resolution Ended in Failure: Hostility and
Containment
In the last 20 years, unilateral hostile U.S. policies against North
Korea, such as pressure and containment, the reinforced nuclear
umbrella for South Korea and conventional weapons, have been put into
effect in concert with the U.S.’ partners and allies. These have proved
ineffective in the effort to resolve North Korean nuclear issues. The
history of conflicts that have developed around North Korea's nuclear
program demonstrates that when dialogue and negotiations were
pursued, Pyeongyang slowed or suspended its nuclear program. The
reverse was the case when the North saw itself as the target of pressure
and isolation in the name of “hostile neglect” or “strategic patience.” In
those conditions North Korea intensified its nuclear program activities
and developed long-range missile capabilities. In particular, the situation
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has become worse whenever the policy has been to halt dialogue, in the
vain hope that regime collapse or transition was imminent.
The U.S. and South Korean governments insist that they are “open
to dialogue, but only when North Korea shows that it is sincerely willing
to give up its nuclear weapons.” However, demanding that North Korea
must make the first move, by dismantling its nuclear program as a
prerequisite to any dialogue, automatically perpetuates the long-standing
deadlock. This attitude does nothing to help solve problems related to
North Korea. The North has carried out three series of nuclear tests in
defiance of sanctions. In order to elicit a positive response from North
Korea, new methods must be applied. We need to bring into a new level
of dialogue the kinds of bold, constructive proposals that are acceptable
to both sides.
A New, Comprehensive Solution: Signing a Peace
Treaty, Normalizing Relations, Establishing a Nuclear-
Free Zone
Above all, we must present comprehensive solutions that will link
the transition from the current armistice system to a peace system on the
Korean peninsula, normalize relations between North Korea and the
U.S., and between North Korea and Japan, and eliminate North Korea’s
nuclear program. This is because the nuclear crisis on the Korean
peninsula is ultimately due to the continuation of the armistice system.
Once that is understood, it can be seen that the first step toward
resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is to resume talks
among the states concerned, which aim to bring about the conclusion of
a Korean peninsula peace treaty. The treaty would be based on six-party
agreement on a joint statement and on bilateral talks that would lead to
normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S., and
between North Korea and Japan.
Second: Following this, we should go beyond Korean denucleari-
zation and seek a more comprehensive solution that would definitively
eliminate all the nuclear threats facing Northeast Asian countries.
Resolving the Korean peninsula nuclear crisis is not an end in itself, but
a necessary component of dealing with the Northeast Asian and global
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nuclear crises. The most effective way to eliminate nuclear threats on the
Korean peninsula and in the larger Northeast Asian region is to establish
a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia, not only on the Korean peninsula.
Third: We should make an effort in order to change the various
disputes and military conflicts on the Korean peninsula into reciprocal,
cooperative relationships. The unstable, fragile armistice system resulted
from historical conflicts created after World War II. If this historical
context is ignored, allowing Japan to exercise its right to collective
self-defense, and reinforcing U.S.-Japan-ROK military cooperation
using the justification of nuclear and missile threats from North Korea,
it will intensify the already extreme military tension and accelerate the
vicious cycle of the regional arms race. Key elements in creating an East
Asian peace and cooperation system are the preservation of Japan's
peace constitution and the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace
treaty.
For more information or media inquiry, please contact:
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), Ms. Gayoon Baek,
[email protected], +82 (0)10 9436 0316
Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK), Ms. Hyeran Oh,
spark946@hanmail.net, +82 (0)2 711 7292
* Those wishing to endorse the declaration were asked to send their name/organization
and country to gay[email protected]rg
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EDITORIAL STAFF
Ronda Hauben
William Rohler
Norman O. Thompson
Michael Hauben (1973-2001)
Jay Hauben
The Amateur Computerist invites submissions.
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Permission is given to reprint articles from this issue in a non profit
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cited.
The opinions expressed in articles are those of their authors and not
necessarily the opinions of the Amateur Computerist newsletter. We
welcome submissions from a spectrum of viewpoints.
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