The Amateur

Computerist

Fall 2016 Ten Years: Ban Ki-moon, UN, Tension in Korea Volume 28 No. 1

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Security Council Problem Facing the UN. . . . . . . Page 3

UN Reform: What Role Will Ban Play? . . . . . . . . Page 6

Does Ban Ki-moon Have a UN Vision? . . . . . . . . Page 8

North Korea and Banco Delta Asia . . . . . . . . . . Page 14

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia . . . Page 16

Status of the Six-Party Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19

UN Resolution Supporting Inter-Korean Summit . . . Page 21

UN SC Controversy: North Korea Satellite . . . . Page 24

UN SC Increases Tension in Korea . . . . . . . . . Page 26

U.S. Policy Toward N. K. Fails to Engage . . . . . Page 27

U.S. Misrepresents Role as ‘UN Command’ . . . Page 30

United Nations Command As Camouflage . . . . Page 32

Review: The Hidden History of the Korean War . . . . Page 38

Introduction

This is the first part of two related issues of the

Amateur Computerist, Vol. 28 No. 1 and No. 2. The

two are our effort to look back over the 10 years that

Ban Ki-moon was UN Secretary-General so as to be

able to view with some perspective the achievements

and failures of his time in this high office at the

United Nations.

The two issues will explore how the UN has

acted to determine an appropriate response to the

tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the result of

such actions.

Presenting the Problem

Vol. 28 No. 1 of the Amateur Computerist will

look at a set of articles, many of which were written

for and published by the English language edition,

OhmyNews International (OMNI) of the Korean

online newspaper known as OhmyNews. These

articles basically cover the period fall 2006 to sum-

mer 2010. OhmyNews ended its English edition in

2010. Articles written after 2010 appeared on the blog

known as netizenblog at the taz.de website, which is

the website of the German newspaper Tageszeitung.

Though the newspaper is published in German, the

articles on the netizenblog covering the UN appeared

in English.

The articles in this issue cover a significant set

of developments that it is important to review and

examine.

The articles document that when Ban Ki-moon

became the new Secretary-General in January 2007,

he had substantial background and experience from

the South Korean perspective to understand and to be

able to make some contribution to the problem of

extreme tension on the Korean Peninsula. The 6-party

talks had recently broken down. The U.S. had imme-

diately sabotaged the September 19, 2005 agreement.

Instead of supporting the agreement that it signed

along with the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Demo-

cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Peo-

ple’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and

Japan, the U.S. put sanctions on a bank that held

DPRK funds and made it impossible for the DPRK to

use the international banking system. The DPRK left

the 6-party talks and took other measures in response

to this U.S. action.

On October 13, 2006 the UN General Assembly

approved the Security Council recommendation to

appoint Ban Ki-moon to the position of the next

Secretary-General. At that time, South African

Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo advised the incoming

Secretary-General about the need to “listen to the

views of each and every member state if he is to be

able to act in the interest of the entire membership.”

At the time, Ban pledged to consult widely in

his preparations for his new position. “I will listen to

your concerns, expectations and admonitions,” he

promised UN member states. The very next day,

October 14, 2006, an event took place which demon-

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Page 1

strated that for Ban to successfully carry out his

promise, he would have to undertake another difficult

task. On October 14, the Security Council held a

meeting to approve a resolution that would impose

harsh sanctions on the DPRK to punish it for the

nuclear test it had carried out just a few days earlier,

on October 9, 2006.

In response to the Security Council sanctions,

the UN Ambassador for the DPRK stated his objec-

tion. He was only called on to speak after the Security

Council members had voted to approve Security

Council Resolution 1718 mandating that all members

of the UN implement the sanctions.

His statement indicated that there was a deep

problem in the functioning of the Security Council.

He indicated that the Security Council members had

not done any investigation about the problem that had

led the DPRK to carry out its nuclear test. The DPRK

explained that it needed a nuclear defense against

what it explained were hostile acts by the U.S. against

it. The DPRK maintained that it had a sovereign right

to seek such a means of defense.

What this situation demonstrated was that there

was a serious problem at the UN with the workings of

the Security Council. If Ban Ki-moon was to live up

to the commitment he made to listen to the views of

each and every member, he would need to find a way

to support Security Council reform that ensured that

each member state was invited to make its position

known as part of the consultations and discussion

before the Security Council voted on any action that

would affect that member state. Given that this

problem was identified, the question was raised as to

what would happen in the 10 years that Ban Ki moon

would preside at the helm of the UN. Would he make

any progress on supporting the expression of views of

all members and of helping to support the needed

reform of the Security Council? If he did that it might

have made it possible for the Security Council to hear

such views as required by Chapter V, Article 32 of

the UN Charter.

The articles in this issue document the chal-

lenges Ban Ki-moon faced as he served his two 5 year

terms as Secretary-General. There are examples of the

contending pressures he was faced with as well as the

advice or criticism he received that could have been

helpful in his efforts to negotiate a path through these

challenges.

The articles demonstrate that the Secretary-

General can be a focal point of communication among

the United Nations' various and contending interests

and that his ability to fulfill on this role can be of

critical importance to the organization.

Throughout many of the events documented on

the following pages, however, there was a failure to

do the necessary diplomatic negotiation to support the

needed work despite various promises made by the

Secretary-General to help.

For example in 2007 when there was the Roh

Moo-hyun and Kim Jung-il Korean North South

summit, Ban Ki moon welcomed the event:

Today, as Secretary-General, I feel a

much more personal obligation to do all I

can to encourage and facilitate the contin-

uing work for peace, security and reunifi-

cation on the Korean peninsula. I am

convinced that the historic inter-Korean

summit will pave the way for a permanent

peace regime and eventual reunification.

It will lead to increased inter-Korean

reconciliation, cooperation, and shared

prosperity. I also believe it will act as a

catalyst for continued progress in the six-

party talks on the denuclearization of the

Korean peninsula.

He concluded his statement: “As Secretary-

General, I stand ready to provide every assistance

required, in close cooperation with the international

community.”

This promise, however, failed to be fulfilled as

had many other such promises that Ban Ki-moon

made as Secretary-General. The articles in this issue

document that failure.

The next issue of the Amateur Computerist will

shed further light on this problem by looking at when

such efforts were made by forces other then the UN

Secretary-General. Lessons from such efforts are

sorely needed in the future functioning of the UN

Security Council.

Notes

1. Article 32 Any Member of the United Nations which is not a

member of the Security Council or any state which is not a

Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under

consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to

participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.

The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems

just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the

United Nations.

http://www.un/org/press/en/2007/sgsm11250.doc.htm

Page 2

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on October 17, 2006]

The Problem Facing the UN

Can Ban Ki-moon Help Solve the

Problem With the Security Council?

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

The official selection on Oct. 13, 2006 of Ban

Ki-moon of South Korea as the new Secretary-

General of the United Nations could not come at a

more propitious time. Why, one may ask? Hailing

from the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Ban will

have before him the daunting task of bringing the best

possible contributions from the international commu-

nity to bear on many of the difficult problems that

erupt in the world. Along with his appointment to the

post at the UN this past week, and the congratulations

from diplomats from many regions of the world at a

ceremony held at the General Assembly, was the

event that took place the following day: the imposi-

tion of Article 41, Chapter 7 sanctions on North

Korea by the Security Council as punishment for the

test of a nuclear device several days earlier.

Though Ban does not take office for his new

position until Jan. 1, 2007, a crisis has already devel-

oped that will require the best efforts and resources he

can muster. In congratulating him on his selection,

several of the diplomats noted the great achievements

of South Korea in having transformed itself from “the

status of least developed country, to an industrialized

highly developed nation” and “as the 11

largest

economy in the world” (in the words of Gambian

Ambassador to the UN Crispin Grey-Johnson).

Speaking about Ban, Grey-Johnson, who is chairman

of the African regional group at the UN, “the develop-

ments in his own region of the world call for wisdom

and cautious diplomacy” in order to be able to

“mediate this very complex security situation that is

now unfolding in the Korean Peninsula.”

In his acceptance speech to the General Assem-

bly upon his appointment as the eighth Secretary-

General of the UN, Ban acknowledged that he was

following “in a line of remarkable leaders.” That

“each of the men in his own way, came on board at

the UN at a critical juncture in the organization’s

history.” That “each wondered what the coming years

would require as they took over the leadership role of

the preeminent international organization.”

The Secretary-General elect expressed his

respect for the role played by the current Secretary-

General, Kofi Annan, and promised to build on his

legacy. Explaining the need to hear the views and

concerns of all the member nations of the UN, Ban

pledged to consult widely in his preparations for

assuming his new position. “I will listen attentively to

your concerns, expectations and admonitions,” he

promised the 192 member states.

Congratulating Ban, South African Ambassador

to the UN Dumisani Kumalo proposed that in order

for the Secretary-General elect to be able to act in the

interest of the entire membership, he will need to

“listen to the views of each and every member state.”

How the future Secretary-General can help to

solve the problems that come before the UN is not

only a critical question for the international commu-

nity, but also a critical task in the face of the in-

creased tension being experienced on the Korean

Peninsula.

While several of the speeches at the General

Assembly ceremony spoke to the need for wide-

ranging consultations and discussions in order to

diffuse tensions and determine how to solve difficult

problems, recent actions at the Security Council the

day after the appointment of Ban demonstrate that a

very different process is practiced by that body.

Only after an agreement was achieved among

the five permanent members of the Security Council

and supported by the 10 temporary members, and

voted on, did the Council agree to hear the party to

the problem that was before them. And only after

hearing the views of all the permanent members of

the Security Council – the U.S., France, Britain,

China and Russia – and some of the temporary

members about why they voted for the sanctions on

North Korea did the council allow the representative

from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(North Korea), Pak Gil Yon, to have a few minutes to

speak. His talk was followed by a brief statement

from the South Korean ambassador to the UN, who

spoke in support of the sanctions.

In the brief opportunity he had to speak, Pak

indicated that his country felt it was the victim of

hostile acts by the U.S. and that it had a sovereign

right to defend itself from such hostile acts. Also, he

Page 3

indicated that the process of the Security Council in

mandating sanctions on his country was more like the

activity of gangsters than an activity representing a

legitimate means of investigating a dispute and

determining how to diffuse a tense situation.

Thus, the speeches supporting discussion and

investigation in the General Assembly on Friday, Oct.

13, and the closed decision-making process that

culminated the following day in the issuing of sanc-

tions against North Korea, are in stark contrast to each

other.

The statements by several of the five permanent

members of the Security Council, the members who

have the power to veto Security Council decisions,

emphasized that their resolution imposing sanctions

against North Korea reflected the condemnation by

the “international community” and that all the nations

of the UN now had a legal obligation to carry out the

provisions of the sanctions.

While the Security Council does indeed have the

power to impose such sanctions on a country in the

name of the UN, the process by which the sanctions

were decided, is a sorry demonstration of power

politics that involves very few of the 192 member

countries that make up the UN.

The chairman of the Latin American and Carib-

bean regional group, in his comments to the future

Secretary-General, explained that there are important

challenges for the UN in the role it plays in “today’s

world.”

“International public opinion demands that the

Security Council and other bodies of the organization

should perform a much better job. There is a trend at

this time for great and infinite opportunities as well as

unprecedented risks,” explained Ecuadorian Ambas-

sador to the UN Diego Cordovez.

“The United Nations, it is said, should be a base,

a forum, a mode that would enable the international

community to take advantage of those transcendental

opportunities and foresee and neutralize potential

risks,” Cordovez added. “For those reasons, it is

important to insist on the need to reform thoroughly

and deeply the organization and undoubtedly, that

would be the main task and responsibility of our new

Secretary-General.” (He was referring to the failure of

the member countries to reform the Security Council.)

“It is inconceivable,” he said, “that we are

discussing the reform of the Security Council for

decades, preparing infinite numbers of formulas,

doing report after report on that item, and yet it

remains – immutable and impossible to the critics for

its lack of representation and its parsimonious con-

duct to confront [the] world’s crises.”

The act of bringing sanctions against a member

state by the Security Council, with no investigation

into the grievances that motivated North Korea’s

actions, stands as an egregious example of the failure

of the obligation of the UN to hear from each member

state and to provide a place where problems can be

heard and discussed to find a solution.

North Korea says its problems are with the U.S.

and that it has developed nuclear devices because of

its need to defend itself from the U.S. That is a

serious statement requiring investigation to see who

has caused the problem and who merits the imposition

of sanctions.

Another aspect of the current process that ended

in sanctions is that the five permanent members of the

Security Council are powerful countries that possess

nuclear weapons. These very countries have failed to

meet their obligations under the Nuclear Nonprolifer-

ation Treaty to carry out disarmament.

Some scholars and diplomats explain that they

are not surprised that North Korea believes it needs to

develop a nuclear capacity in order to protect itself

from danger. Given the actions of the U.S. govern-

ment in branding North Korea as part of the “axis of

evil” and attacking another, Iraq, which it had sim-

ilarly branded, is but one of the reasons some scholars

believe the U.S. government provided North Korea

with a legitimate justification to develop nuclear

weapons.

In its brief talk at the Security Council

meeting, North Korea expressed one of its disappoint-

ments:

It was gangster-like for the Security Coun-

cil to adopt such a coercive resolution

against the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea while neglecting the nuclear

threat posed by the United States against

his country…. The council was incapable

of offering a single word of concern when

the United States threatened to launch

nuclear pre-emptive attacks, reinforced its

armed forces and conducted large-scale

military exercises near the Korean Penin-

sula.

It must be remembered that the five permanent

members of the Security Council possess thousands

of nuclear weapons.

Although commentators and scholars who feel

Page 4

there is justification for North Korea’s actions want to

discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they

explain that punishing North Korea, while ignoring

those countries who are in the club of nations possess-

ing nuclear weapons, can only breed cynicism and

hostility to nonproliferation and enforcement efforts.

That North Korea can claim that it felt com-

pelled to develop a nuclear device, is a signal that the

current regime of power politics is not working in a

way that provides alternatives for a small nation that

feels threatened by the nations that are nuclear pow-

ers. North Korea’s situation is a demonstration that

there is need for serious discussion by the 192 mem-

ber states of the UN to understand the problems that

North Korea claims compel it to develop nuclear

weapons as a means of securing its borders and

protecting its sovereignty.

There is indeed an international community, and

there is indeed a serious challenge facing it. The five

big nuclear powers who wield veto power on the

Security Council can bring to bear punishment upon

a small nation that endeavors to develop nuclear

capability. This, however, will only compound the

problem as it will only increase the hostility and

resentment that the small nation feels from such

unequal treatment at the hands of those who them-

selves possess nuclear weapons and who use the

power this capability bestows on them in such a

self-serving manner.

The two Koreas have brought to the world stage

the need for a truly international organization, one

that will consider all its members’ concerns and

needs, and find ways to support serious consideration

of the problems such nations have but are unable to

solve themselves.

The urgent problem facing the UN at this

juncture in its history is not whether North Korea has

developed and tested a nuclear device. It is the break-

down reflected by the lack of participation and

investigation by the international community into how

a crisis will be handled once it develops, and whether

the concerns and problems of those who are involved

in the crisis will be considered as part of the process

of seeking a solution. It is how the UN functions

when tensions reach a point where serious attention is

needed to help to understand and solve a problem.

Unfortunately for the world, and for North

Korea, there was no such process in the decision to

impose sanctions on North Korea. The decision to

impose sanctions on North Korea was not made by

the international community. It was the decision of a

small set of nuclear countries. Who was responsible

for the crisis was not explored before determining

blame, and thus the proclaimed solution is likely only

to worsen the problem rather than solve it. Yet the

actual problem exists and the fact that people of the

world recognize it is highlighted by a recent poll

taken in South Korea, which showed that 43 percent

of the population blames the U.S. government for

North Korea’s test of a nuclear device, while only

37.2 percent blame the North Koreans.

The actions in the Security Council to punish

North Korea occurred without the needed exploration

of what had motivated North Korea to turn to nuclear

weapons as a means of self-defense. Can the UN be

changed in the needed ways so that it will be able to

handle such problems? This is the urgent issue facing

the UN as the future Secretary-General takes over the

post in January. This is one of the challenges facing

Ban Ki-moon, member nations and people who are

part of the UN organization as it embarks on a new

chapter in the history of this needed global organiza-

tion.

Notes

1. See “Pyongyang’s Nuke Test Sparks Fission Over Response.”

http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/140740/1

2. See “What About North Korea’s sovereignty?”

http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=518268

3. See “U.S. Most Responsible for Nuclear Test: Poll.”

http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200610/kt2006101517

230011990.htm

The above article can be seen at: http://english.ohmynews.com/

articleview/article_view.asp?no=323351&rel_no=1

Page 5

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

TELEPOLIS on February 14, 2007]

What Role Will Ban Ki-moon

Play?

The Struggle Over Reform at the UN

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

As soon as Ban Ki-moon took office as the 8

Secretary-General of the United Nations, his com-

ments sparked controversy. A statement about

Saddam Hussein’s execution, namely that capital

punishment was a decision to be made by each nation,

drew condemnation from those who compared it with

previous UN statements opposing capital punishment

as a cruel and inhuman practice. Meanwhile it was

supported by John Bolton, the former U.S. ambassa-

dor to the UN, who praised Ban’s statement about

capital punishment as the “right instinct.”

Kofi Annan, Ban’s predecessor, had been

willing at times to condemn what he deemed viola-

tions of the UN charter. For example, before the U.S.

invasion of Iraq, Annan warned that such “a military

action would violate the UN charter.”

Similarly,

during the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Annan

stated that Israel’s “‘disproportionate’ use of force

and collective punishment of the Lebanese people

must stop.”

This was a means of condemning Israeli

actions as illegal.

Such actions earned Annan praise for being

willing to tell “the truth to the powerful,” from

Dumisani Kumalo, the South African Ambassador to

the UN, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 (G-

77). These actions, on the other hand, were con-

demned by Bolton who criticized Annan as the UN’s

“chief moralizer,” whose activities “were not ulti-

mately helpful to the world body.”

Even before he took office, Ban had said he

would be open with the press, promising that he could

be “a pretty straight shooter when I need to.” Coming

to the UN from his former position as the foreign

minister of South Korea, Ban brought with him a

reputation for dodging questions from the press when

he deemed that beneficial. This trait led South Korean

journalists to nickname him “slippery eel.”

Already

during his short term in office, there have been

several instances when Ban praised the powerful and

dodged questions from reporters when asked to

explain the basis for his praise.

One example occurred after Ban met with the

U.S. President George Bush in Washington on Janu-

ary 16, 2007. At the press conference following the

meeting, Ban referred to Bush as “a great leader.”

When Ban returned to the UN, a reporter asked him

why he had used these words to describe Bush. Ban

responded:

In diplomacy, it is appropriate to address

any Head of State or Government with

due respect and courtesy. I hope you will

understand what this diplomatic practice

is.

Such comments have earned Ban a reputation as

someone who “is an enigma to media and diplomats

alike”

and whose “statements” are as hard to follow

as “a Delphic Oracle.” Bolton, on the other hand, has

expressed his approval for what Ban has done or has

freely offered his advice on what to do differently.

For example, Bolton characterized as a “courageous

decision”

Ban’s call for the resignations of 60 se-

nior-level officials in the secretariat. Since the con-

tracts of these officials were to expire anyway at the

end of February, several reporters wondered why Ban

asked for their resignation. When Ban was asked for

his response to Bolton’s comments, Ban responded

that he agreed with some of them. He did not elabo-

rate.

One of the first promises of the new Secretary-

General was that he would carry out reform at the UN

There are different views among the member nations

of the UN on what reform is needed.

For the U.S. government, as Bolton explains, the

purpose of reform is to make the UN a better tool

among others “to implement American foreign pol-

icy.”

For a number of other nations, the purpose of

reform is to foster a multilateral process

to prevent

war and hostilities among nations. Nations which are

part of the group known as the G-77 define a reform

agenda quite differently from the agenda promoted by

the U.S. and what the G-77 describe as “other devel-

oped nations from the North.”

The G-77, originally formed in 1964 when 77

developing nations signed a Joint Declaration at the

end of the UN Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD), has a reform agenda that focuses

development issues and on promoting the importance

of the UN as the preeminent international institution.

There are now 130 nations that are part of the G-77.

Page 6

Many of these nations are also part of the Non-

Aligned Movement.

During Ban’s first few weeks in his new posi-

tion, he has appeared to vacillate between the reform

agenda of the G-77 and the reform agenda supported

by the U.S. and other powerful developed nations.

The U.S. wants the UN to be run more like a business,

with business processes and management goals,

Bolton said in a talk

he gave at Columbia University

in April 2006. Other nations differ.

Describing how the UN differs from a business

organization, in a talk also given at Columbia Univer-

sity, Choi Young-jin, the Ambassador to the UN from

South Korea, explained that there are 192 nations

belonging to the UN and “everyone is on the board of

governors.”

Choi maintained that you can’t run an organiza-

tion with 192 members on the board the same way

you can run a business. While a business has a goal of

generating profit, “the strongest point of the UN,”

Choi said, “is its moral authority. The focus of any

reform has to be on that moral authority, not on

‘efficiencies.’”

Another characteristic of the differences in the

reform agenda of the different nations is the impor-

tance with which many nations view the need for a

reform of the Security Council. In December 2006

there was a debate in the General Assembly about

reform of the Security Council that drew 70 speakers

and substantial proposals for changing its composition

and working methods.

Subsequently at the first meeting

of the new

year of the Security Council on Jan. 8, 2007, several

of the nonpermanent members raised

the need for

Security Council reform. One nation’s representative

explained that the issues taken up by the Security

Council should be more carefully chosen so they do

not to encroach on the mandate of other UN organs.

Similarly, he proposed that the Security Council

should not fail to act in situations consistent with its

mandate, situations that pose a threat to international

peace and security, such as in the “Palestine-Israeli

issue.” Other issues raised during the Jan. 8 meeting

included the desirability of involving regional and

subregional groups in solving problems when feasible

that diplomatic solutions should be utilized before

resorting to sanctions, and that nations like Iran and

North Korea should not be denied the right to under-

take research and development for the peaceful uses

of nuclear energy.

This meeting was also Ban’s first official meet-

ing with the Security Council. He gave a brief presen-

tation.

Though he spoke about UN reform, he didn’t

mention Security Council reform. Later at a press

conference

with Ban’s spokesperson, a reporter

asked if Ban deliberately choose not to mention

Security Council reform. The spokesperson

responded:

I don’t think it was deliberate. I think he is

certainly interested in the issue – defi-

nitely concerned about the issue. He has

talked about it before, but as you know

with Security Council reforms there was a

proposal made, and now, it is in the hands

of the Member States.

In general, the mainstream U.S. media provides

little coverage of the controversy over reform at the

UN. Allegations of UN mismanagement, however,

are pursued with a vengeance, just as they had been in

the “Oil for Food” scandal.

More recently articles by Fox News

and in The

Wall Street Journal

alleged that tens of millions of

dollars of hard currency had been subverted by the

government of North Korea from the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) and used to fund

North Korea’s nuclear program. Also the press reports

charged that the UNDP had kept the scam secret. Fox

News asked if Kim Jung II “subverted the UNDP

program” and possibly stole “tens of millions of

dollars of hard currency in the process.” In their

article “United Nations Dictators Program,” the WSJ

alleged that “the hard currency supplied by the UNDP

almost certainly goes into one big pot marked ‘Dear

Leader’ which Kim can use for whatever he wants.”

These allegations were made without any actual

evidence to back them up, but just in time to coincide

with the UNDP Executive Board meeting that was to

approve the programs for 2007 and on. The result of

the articles was to block the approval of the 2007-8

UNDP program in North Korea, and to exert pressure

so that the Secretary-General recommended an

external audit of all UN programs, beginning with the

North Korean UNDP program. Headlines alleging

North Korean abuse of UN programs quickly spread

in the U.S. and international media.

Subsequently, the UN announced that their audit

plans were focused on North Korea. There is to be an

external audit of all UN programs in North Korea.

The audit is “to be completed by the Board of Audi-

tors within a three-month time frame, as per the

Page 7

Secretary-General’s proposal of 22 January 2007.”

Both the U.S. and the Group of 77 supported

Ban’s candidacy for the position of Secretary-Gen-

eral. Now that he is in the position, he is faced with

the ongoing struggle of contending forces over the

UN’s reform agenda. How he will handle the different

pressures is one of the important challenges he and

the UN face in the coming months and years of his

term.

Notes

1. “Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter, says Annan,”

The Guardian, Sept. 16, 2004.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/

Story/0,2763,1305709,00.html

2. “Kofi Annan Addresses Middle East Violence” (Transcript),

The Washington Post, July 20, 2006. http://www.washington

post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/20/AR20060720009

12.html

3. “Don’t Ban Your Instincts, Ban Ki-moon,” The Washington

Post, Jan. 14, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2007/01/12/AR2007011202061.html

4. “Press Conference by Secretary-General-designate,” Dec. 14,

2006.

http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sg_elect/press_

conf_14dec06.htm

5. “Secretary-General’s press encounter upon entering UN

Headquarters following visit to Washington, D.C.” (an unofficial

transcript, New York, Jan. 17, 2007).

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2007-01-

17/secretary-generals-press-encounter-upon-entering-un

6. “Spinning the Moon,” The Guardian, Jan. 18, 2007.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/jan/18/the

moonmustspin

7. The Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2007.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/

01/12/AR2007011202061.html

8. “John Bolton: UN Reform Remains Vital But Unlikely,”

Human Events, Jan. 22, 2007.

http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=19042

9. UN General Assembly document, Sept. 15, 2005 (pdf file).

http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/A60L.pdf

10. “A Commentary on ‘Renewing the United Nations: A

Programme for Reform,’” policy brief prepared by the South

Centre at the request of the Group of 77.

http://www.g77.org/doc/policy%20brief.htm

11. “John Bolton Says Proposed UN Reforms Do Not Go Far

Enough,” Columbia News, May 31, 2006.

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/06/05/bolton.html

12. “Conceptual Framework for International Relations,”

OhmyNews International, April 24, 2006.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=&no=287732&rel_no=1&back_url=

13. UN Security Council document, Jan. 8, 2007.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8933.doc.htm

14. “States Call for Security Council Reform,” OhmyNews

International, Jan. 10, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?arti

cle_class=7&no=339250&rel_no=1

15. “Secretary-General’s remarks at the Security Council

meeting on Threats to International Peace and Security,” Jan. 8,

2007.

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2007-01-08/sec

retary-generals-remarks-security-council-meeting-threats

16. UN Spokesperson’s news briefing, Jan. 8, 2007.

http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/db070108.doc.htm

17. Fox News. http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/01/19/us-

state-department-reveals-north-korearsquos-misuse-un-develop-

ment-program.html

18. “United Nations Dictator’s Program,” WSJ on Real Clear

Politics, Jan. 19, 2007. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/

2007/01/give_top_teachers_a_bonus.html

The above article can be seen at:

https://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/24/24577/1.html

[Editor’s note: June 30, 2007 marked the first six

months that Ban Ki-moon had held the position as

Secretary-General of the United Nations. The fol-

lowing article was an effort to look at the role of the

Secretary-General and some of the challenges he

faced. The article appeared in two parts on

OhmyNews International, June 30, 2007 and July 4,

2007]

Ban Ki-moon’s Role of UN

Secretary-General

Is There a Guiding Vision in the

Organization?

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

Part One

Introduction

Ban Ki-moon’s nomination by the Security

Council to be the 8

Secretary-General of the United

Nations was sent to the General Assembly on Oct. 13,

2006. Ban succeeded in winning the nomination after

a difficult and contested campaign.

But his trial by

fire was only just beginning. Ban had succeeded in

winning the votes of China and of the U.S. Winning

the votes of these two nations, who are permanent

members of the Security Council, was seen by a

number of commentators as the critical step needed to

win the nomination for Secretary-General.

Would this very achievement, especially the

achievement of winning the vote of the U.S. govern-

Page 8

ment in the Security Council, become a handicap that

would negatively affect Ban’s ability to succeed in the

position as the 8

Secretary-General of the United

Nations?

Goals Expressed in Hankyoreh Interview

An interview with Ban Ki-moon on Oct. 30,

2006, shortly after Ban won appointment by the

General Assembly as the new Secretary-General, and

in the interval before he would assume the office in

January 2007, offers a rare glimpse of how the soon-

to-be-appointed Secretary-General viewed his hopes

and goals for his new position.

The interview was conducted in the offices of

the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh, by Moon

Chung-in, a Professor at Yonsei University and an

Envoy for International Stability.

The interview was

done in Korean, and translated and published in the

English edition of Hankyoreh. The goals Ban outlined

in this interview provide a yardstick to measure how

successfully he is in fulfilling the obligations of his

new position.

In the interview, Ban describes a recent visit to

the White House shortly after he won the appointment

as Secretary-General. President Bush greeted him as

“Mr. Landslide” congratulating him on his victory.

The plan had been for Ban to see Steve Hadley, the

U.S. National Security Advisor and if time permitted,

to briefly meet Bush. Instead he spoke with Bush for

more than 20 minutes.

Ban recounts how he and Bush spoke about UN

reform and the North Korean nuclear program.

“Bush,” Ban says, “requested that I drive forth with

UN reforms, assuring me that the U.S. would actively

lend its support.” In the interview, Bush promised to

work with the South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun

to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear

problem.

Ban also visited China. He describes his meet-

ing with the Chinese President Hu Jintao on this visit.

Hu told Ban that “the role of a newly appointed

Secretary-General is very important and that China

would be of active assistance.” Ban revealed that

during his campaign for the nomination, China “could

not make public its support,” but that it had “actively

helped out behind the scenes.” Though it is not yet

apparent how China’s support for Ban’s nomination

affects Ban’s actions as Secretary-General, U.S.

support for Ban’s nomination appears to have a

significant effect on his activity as Secretary-General.

During the Hankyoreh interview Ban expressed

a belief he has reiterated many times since, that the

U.S. is “the UN’s most important member.” Ban

proposed that the UN needed the “proactive participa-

tion” of the U.S. in order to function properly, just as

he believed the U.S. needed the UN for its interests.

Also during the interview, Ban expressed his

commitment as Secretary-General to work to help

resolve the problems with North Korea. “I will

appoint a politician or diplomat,” he asserted, “with

the confidence of the international community,

someone who has the trust of both North and South

Korea to actively push the issue forward. This en-

voy,” he explained, “must be one to impel the

Six-Party Talks to action when they stagnate, and

must be prepared to play a direct role when necessary.

I am ever ready to intervene directly when interven-

tion is called for.” Ban also proposed that the UN had

to find a means to help with transforming the

cease-fire that was signed by the U.S. and North

Korea at the end of the Korean War into a more

permanent peace agreement.

Ban promised to present a blueprint for what he

hoped to accomplish in his first 100 days, in his first

year, and in his five year term. His priority, he ex-

plained, would be in the appointments he would make

for UN personnel and that these would “raise morale

and cultivate professionalism.”

Ban’s goal at the end of his five year term or ten

years if he were to win reappointment for a second

term, would be “to create a UN reborn as an organiza-

tion that enjoys much greater international confi-

dence. I will make the UN into a body fit for the

challenges and themes of the 21

century,” he prom-

ised. To obtain this objective, he proposed to support

“development,” especially, “development in Africa

and the Millennium Development Plan.” His aim

would be to “make certain that the UN has a role at

the center of multilateral diplomacy.”

In the interview, Ban also describes how Roh

Moo-hyun and the South Korean press helped his

candidacy to succeed by “campaigning for me at

every opportunity while meeting with foreign heads

of state.” The South Korean media “also helped a

great deal,” Ban notes. Ban was aware, too, that it was

a particular source of pride for Korea that the 8

Secretary-General would be from Korea.

Comments on Ban’s 100-day Anniversary

By Ban’s 100 day anniversary, April 10, media

Page 9

commentary on his accomplishments documented the

frustration he had experienced. Comments from

several diplomats were testimony to the mistakes

made as he and his advisors rushed to put their reform

agenda into effect.

The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Wong

Guangya commented on how Ban tried to impose

changes in the structure of the UN Secretariat, only to

meet opposition from a number of countries. Ambas-

sador Wong observes, “His intentions are good. He is

trying to make the Secretariat work more effectively.

But personally I feel he’s a new comer and he does

not understand the culture and the environment in this

house. You have to identify who are the stakeholders

and how to test the temperature before jumping in. He

hasn’t done that and he has felt the heat.”

Similarly, South African Ambassador Dumisani

Kumalo is quoted as being frustrated by Ban’s “‘de-

cide first, consult afterward’ behavior.”

Even the American Ambassador, Alejandro D.

Wolff, who originally replaced John Bolton, said that

there were those “convinced that Ban was ‘essentially

responding to American demands.’”

This impression,

Wolff explained, helped to generate distrust in the

reforms Ban is trying to implement.

Role of Secretary-General

The role of Secretary-General has a number of

constraints. It also is a role that carries certain obliga-

tions. During his inauguration, Ban took an oath that

he would uphold the interests of the United Nations

above any national interests and “not to seek or accept

instructions in regard to the performance of my duties

from any government or other authority external to

the Organization.”

In a “Report to the Preparatory Commission of

the UN 23 Dec. 1945,” a set of duties and responsibil-

ities are elaborated as a means of stating what is

explicit and implicit in the Secretary-General’s role as

provided for by the UN charter.

While the Report specifies administrative and

executive functions for the Secretary-General, it also

states that “He is the channel of all communication

with the United Nations in any of its organs. He must

endeavor, within the scope of his functions, to inte-

grate the activity of the whole complex of United

Nations organs and see that the machine runs

smoothly and effectively.”

Along with the obligation for internal smooth

functioning of the UN, the report proposes an external

function. It says, “the Secretary-General, more than

anyone else, will stand for the United Nations as a

whole. In the eyes of the world, no less than the eyes

of his own staff, he must embody the principles and

ideals of the charter to which the organization seeks

to give effect.”

Elements for Creating a Vision

Shashi Tharoor, one of the other candidates for

the nomination by the Security Council for the posi-

tion of Secretary-General maintained that emanating

from the job description for the Secretary-General

that each Secretary-General wrote for himself, “must

shine the vision of the incumbent of the office,” a

vision which transcends the more practical aspects of

the job.

Describing the nature of the job, Tharoor pro-

posed that what was needed was a person with the

ability and talent to respond to a wide range of issues

“and to know where to go for expert judgment when

he or she feels unqualified or uninformed on specific

issues. Somebody who recognizes he does not have

all the answers but trusts himself to ask the right

questions.”

Tharoor, who had worked at the UN for almost

28 years, said that for him the UN was more than a

job. “It has always been a cause…. For me the UN is

far more than an institution…. It represents the vision

and foresight of the leaders of the world who wanted

to make the second half of the twentieth century

better than the first.”

He described how the UN was

formed in response to a world that had experienced

two world wars, a number of civil wars, several

instances of mass population displacements,

genocide, the holocaust, and Hiroshima. “The UN

was part of an attempt to genuinely make a better

world and I believe for all its limitations and failures,

it did succeed in doing so,” he noted.

When Ban outlined the beginning elements for

the new role he was to assume in the Hankyoreh

interview, he planned for the UN to play a construc-

tive role in helping to facilitate the Six-Party Talks

between North Korea, South Korea, China, the U.S.,

Japan, and Russia. He had expressed his determina-

tion to appoint an envoy to help overcome obstacles

that might impede the Six-Party process. This pro-

vided an example of a goal he was bringing to his

new role at the UN. How he would carry out this goal

would be a concrete sign of whether he could be

guided by a vision for his role as Secretary-General.

Page 10

Part Two

Impact of the Press

How has the role of the press affected the

actions of the new Secretary-General? There is an

important example that has developed which helps to

demonstrate the impact that the press has had on Ban

Ki-moon.

In the interview with Hankyoreh before he took

office,

Ban described how he would act to support

a solution to the problem of relations between North

Korea and the Northeast Asia region, and the disar-

mament of the Korean peninsula.

On January 19, 2007, just a few weeks after Ban

became Secretary-General, there were news reports of

a breakthrough in negotiations between the Christo-

pher Hill for the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan for North

Korea.

The International Herald Tribune reported:

The movement toward a possible break-

through came during the talks in Berlin

between Hill and Kim, Chosun Ilbo re-

ported, citing unidentified officials in

Seoul and Beijing.

Timed, it appeared, to coincide with the break-

through, however, was the publication in the Wall

Street Journal (WSJ) of an article “United Nations

Dictator’s Program” by Melanie Kirkpatrick. A

similar article was published by Fox News. These

articles alleged that North Korea was manipulating

funds from the United Nations Development Program

(UNDP) in North Korea. These press accounts re-

ported that UNDP funds were being used by Kim

Jong-il, for whatever he wanted, including “his

weapons program.”

No proof was provided for this

accusation. The articles included other unsupported

allegations.

While most of the press reports in the U.S. just

repeated or exaggerated the original allegations, a few

Korean publications provided a different perspective.

The Korean newspaper Voice of the People pointed

out that the allegations of UNDP mismanagement

appeared just as the North Korean and U.S. represen-

tatives had productive negotiations in Berlin.

The

Voice of the People asked why the U.S. Mission to the

UN was raising these issues “at this time.”

“Despite the totally unfounded allegation by the

hawks,” the editors write, “it has a political effect for

freezing (the) bilateral relationship between Washing-

ton and Pyongyang.”

Ban Ki-moon’s response to the WSJ and Fox

News articles was to call immediately for an audit of

all UN programs. The audit was to start with an audit

of all programs in North Korea. A few days later the

call for an audit of all UN programs was dropped. The

audit was to be only of North Korea’s UNDP pro-

gram.

Some Background

A difficult period for Ban’s predecessor,

Secretary-General Kofi Annan was caused by the “Oil

for Food Scandal.” Annan had refused to support a

U.S. backed Security Council resolution authorizing

an invasion of Iraq. Annan held that such an invasion

would be a violation of the UN’s charter. Reports say

that in response, right wing neo-conservatives in the

U.S. government brought forward accusations that

there had been corruption in the UN’s administration

of the “Oil for Food” program.

This program had

been created by the Security Council supposedly to

alleviate some of the harmful effects on civilians of

the Security Council sanctions against Iraq.

While the “Oil for Food Scandal” investigation

recommended systemic reforms, there was little

evidence of corrupt activity by members of the UN

Secretariat. The investigation created, however, a

difficult environment for Annan and other UN offi-

cials.

When the WSJ articles appeared in January 2007

alleging corruption in the UNDP program, they

brought up memories of the difficult situation created

for the UN during the “Oil for Food Scandal.”

South Korean Press Responses to Alle-

gations

Several articles appeared in the South Korean

press which analyzed rather than just repeating the

allegations of mismanagement in the UNDP program

in North Korea. One article in JoongAng Ilbo on

January 22, for example, described what happened

after the news reports appeared on January 19. Ban

met with the Associate Administrator of the UNDP,

Ad Melkert, and “vowed a thorough investigation.”

The JoongAng Ilbo article, in addition, however,

noted that this accusation came at a “sensitive time in

negotiations” between the U.S. and North Korea.

The article also noted that this action by the

UNDP “might be considered another financial sanc-

tion by Washington against North Korea just as the

six party anti nuclear talks were expected to resume.”

Page 11

The reporters reminded readers that the “financial

sanctions brought by the U.S. treasury office on

Banco Delta Asia which led to freezing $24 million of

North Korean funds” had become a “major sticking

point” causing a deadlock in the Six-Party Talks.

Similarly, the article in Voice of the People on

January 30, 2007, asked, “Now we have to see who’s

intriguing against whom because somebody is suffer-

ing from pain for it. We should not listen to the

shameless and unscrupulous who are trying to curtail

humanitarian aid for those who are in need of food.”

An article in OhmyNews International (OMNI)

and a report by the Civil Network for a Peaceful

Korea (Peacekorea) explain that UNDP administra-

tors had denied that there were violations of UNDP

policy in the North Korean program.

Both articles

referred to the fact that the Resident Coordinator of

the UNDP Program in North Korea had the authority

to decide the financial practices to follow. Another

report by Peacekorea noted many people think that

Ban is “kind of pro American.”

Peacekorea advocated support for restarting the

Six-Party Talks and not letting the U.S. accusations

against North Korea divert from support for the

unification of the Korean peninsula. Such a policy is

presented as a long term vision. Also the report

explains that development aid to North Korea is

preferable to humanitarian aid, as development aid

sets a basis for self sufficiency, while humanitarian

aid is expended after it is given.

The Six-Party Talks did resume and came to an

agreement on February 13, 2007. Peacekorea offered

a critique of the conservative South Korean newspa-

pers which “made comments devaluing the agree-

ment.”

The report explained, “Korea’s major news-

papers spread a hostile perspective of North Korea on

the Korean peninsula. This is not helpful toward

gaining denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”

The report proposes that “Under Kim Jong Il’s

dictatorship, North Korea, a weak nation, has devel-

oped nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the threat

of an American attack, as exemplified by the Iraq

war, and as a diplomatic tool for bilateral contact with

the U.S.”

Alternative Approach to Ban’s Policy on

Korea

Such accounts in the South Korean press dem-

onstrate an alternative approach to the policy that the

Secretary-General is implementing regarding the

North Korean situation. For now Ban is not carrying

out the policy he had proposed in the Hankyoreh

interview with regard to the Korean peninsula. To the

contrary, coinciding with pressure from the U.S. press

and the U.S. government, he has adopted a policy

which has allowed the politicization of the UNDP

program that was in North Korea. This has resulted in

an audit of previous UNDP programs in North Korea

and the ending of the current UNDP program in North

Korea.

Similarly, for more than four months, from

February through the end of June, the Six-Party Talks

hit a deadlock over the decision by the U.S. govern-

ment to find a small bank in Macau in violation of

provisions in the U.S. Patriot Act. The bank com-

plained that it never saw the evidence against it nor

did it have a chance to refute the evidence.

Yet by

using Section 311 of the Patriot Act against this bank,

the U.S. Treasury Department was able to freeze $25

million of North Korean funds and impede North

Korea’s access to the international banking system.

Much of the U.S. press has been promoting a

hostile policy toward North Korea.

Some of the

South Korean press echo what appears in the U.S.

press, or reprint articles from the conservative inter-

ests who are trying to impede further negotiations.

Other South Korean publications, however, provide a

critique of the hostile attitude of the U.S. press toward

North Korea. For example, an article by Tim Savage

in OMNI documents the internal struggle within the

U.S. government between the interests which are

hostile to negotiations with North Korea in contrast to

the efforts at negotiations by Christopher Hill.

Though he has occupied the office of Secretary-

General for more than six months, Ban has yet to

implement the program he proposed before taking

office, the program of active UN support for a negoti-

ated agreement in the Six-Party Talks. Ban’s original

plan was to appoint a diplomat or politician who

would be available to intervene when needed to keep

the negotiation process on track. Instead the UN’s

Secretariat has become embroiled in the controversy

generated by unsubstantiated charges from the U.S.

mission to the UN about the funding of North Korea’s

UNDP program.

‘We Can’t Prove a Negative’

The U.S. press continues to echo the U.S. govern-

ment’s unsubstantiated charges against North Korea

Page 12

and the UNDP, in a way reminiscent of how the same

press supported the unsubstantiated and inaccurate

U.S. government claims that Iraq possessed “Weap-

ons of Mass Destruction.” The unsubstantiated

allegations being spread by the U.S. press about the

UNDP, have the effect of politicizing the UNDP

program rather than providing the public with the

accurate information that is needed to understand the

problems and challenges faced by such a program.

David Morrison, the press spokesman for the

UNDP, explained that “the point I’m trying to make

is we can’t prove a negative,”

at a press conference

held to answer the June 2007 set of unsubstantiated

allegations made by the U.S. mission against the

UNDP program in North Korea. This set of allega-

tions appeared in the U.S. press just before the begin-

ning of the June UNDP Executive Board meeting in

a way reminiscent of how the previous set of allega-

tions first appeared in the U.S. press just before the

January UNDP Executive Board meeting.

Just as the impossibility of proving a negative

created a media environment in which the U.S.

government could falsely claim they had a justifica-

tion for a war against Iraq, so a hostile environment is

being created to impede the Six-Party Talks by the

unsubstantiated allegations against North Korea and

the UNDP.

Ban’s original plan for the region provided a

means to counter those interests which might impede

a negotiated solution to the North Korean conflict.

Much of the U.S. press has maintained a hostile

attitude toward North Korea, even though there are

signs that within the U.S. government there are forces

interested in pursuing a negotiated settlement. The

South Korean media landscape, however, presents a

broader spectrum of opinion on what should be done

with regard to North Korea, a spectrum of views

which includes support for the policy that Ban origi-

nally proposed to implement for the region when he

became Secretary-General.

Conclusion

There are many people in Korea and elsewhere,

who are watching Ban Ki-moon and are hopeful that

he will do well as Secretary-General. As the experi-

ence of former Secretaries General demonstrates,

however, there is a need for a vision to guide him if

he is to be able to fulfill on these expectations.

Notes

1. See for example: Ayca Ariyoruk, “Korean Minister Likely

Candidate” Global Policy Forum,

https://www.globalpolicy.org/

component/content/article/228/32548.html

Ban was chosen as Secretary-General in a process that is

basically secret with voting by the members of the Security

Council that is not public. The five Permanent members hold the

ability to veto a candidate at a certain stage in the process.

Questions have been raised about what criteria are used. What is

traded with whom is left as an open question.

Also there were allegations that the South Korean

government used grants and various financial rewards to gain

support for its candidate from several of the nonpermanent

nations that were on the Security Council at the time of the

voting for the next Secretary-General. See for example:

Richard Beeston, Richard Lloyd Parry, and James Bone,

“Millions of dollars and a piano may put Korean in UN’s top

job,” Times Online, September 29, 2006.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6544

79.ece

Tran Van Loi, “ROK Buying UN Post: Times, Millions of

dollars have been spent in lobbying for Ban Ki-moon, says

British newspaper,” OhmyNews International. October 1, 2006.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=320700&rel_no=1

2. See for example, “Restoring the Vitality of the United Na-

tions”

http://www.cfr.org/publication/10833/restoring_the_vitality_of

_the_united_nations_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_in

c.html

3. [Interview] Next UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. in

conversation with Moon Chung-in, translated by Daniel Rakove,

The Hankyoreh. November 3, 2006.

http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=169339

4. Maggie Farley, “New Secretary-General Is Still Finding His

Footing at the UN,” LA Times, April 9, 2007.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/ban/2007/0409footing.htm

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ronda Hauben, “Ban Ki-moon Inaugurated, Pledges to uphold

the interests of the United Nations above all else,” OhmyNews

International, December 15, 2006.

http://english.ohmynews.com

/articleview/article_view.asp?no=334916&rel_no=1

8. “Report to the Preparatory Commission of the UN 23 Dec.

1945,” in Secretary or General: The UN Secretary-General in

World Politics?, Edited by Simon Chesterman, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 243-244.

9. Ibid., p. 245.

10. Shashi Tharoor, in Secretary or General: The UN Secretary-

-General in World Politics?, Edited by Simon Chesterman,

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 46.

11. Lydia Swart, “Shashi Tharoor Sees his 28 Years at the

United Nations as an Asset,” Center for UN Reform Education,

interview done 12 July 2006.

http://www.centerforunreform.org/node/61/print

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. [Interview] Next UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. in

conversation with Moon Chung-in, translated by Daniel Rakove,

Page 13

The Hankyoreh. November 3, 2006.

http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=169339

15. “U.S.-DPRK talks end, no comments on resuming 6-party

talks,” CCTV.com Jan. 19, 2007.

http://www.cctv.com/english/20070119/101358.shtml

16. “U.S. envoy confident in North Korea nuclear talks,”

International Herald Tribune, January 22, 2007.

http://www.cctv.com/english/20070119/101358.shtml

17. Melanie Kirkpatrick, “United Nations Dictator’s Program,”

WSJ, January 19, 2007.

18. “The U.S. Stands in the Way of Pyongyang,” Voice of the

People, January 30, 2007.

19. Ibid.

20. Ronda Hauben, “Hardliners Attack UNDP Aid to North

Korea: Allegations of corruption seen as attempt to undermine

engagement,” OhmyNews International, February 7, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=344001&rel_no=1

21. Thalif Deen, “Will the New UN Chief Stand Up to Big

Powers,” Inter Press News Agency, December 12, 2006.

http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35814

22. Nam Jeong-ho and Lee Sang-eon, “Report Says Kim Jong-il

Cashed in on UN Office,” JoongAng Ilbo, January 22, 2007.

23. Ibid., note 18, Voice of the People.

24. Ronda Hauben, “Hardliners Attack UNDP Aid to North

Korea Allegations of corruption seen as attempt to undermine

engagement,” OhmyNews International, February7, 2007. See

also: Soohyun Lee, “UNDP’s aid toward North Korea,”

peacekorea, January 23, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.

com/articleview/article_view.asp?article_class=2&no=344001

&rel_no=1

25. Soohyun Lee, UNDP’s aid toward North Korea, peacekorea,

February 13, 2007.

26. Ibid.

27. Ji-Hyun Lee, “The Ghost of Anti-communism Reflected in

South Korean Media,” peacekorea, May 7, 2007.

28. Ibid.

29. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Asia: Another abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act (2001),”

OhmyNews International, March 21, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?arti

cle_class=3&no=351525&rel_no=1

30. The McClatchy Newspapers have been an exception. See for

example articles like “Bank owner disputes money-laundering

allegations” Kevin G. Hall about the BDA affair.

31. Tim Savage, “Six-Party Talks Resume: Expectations high for

progress in Beijing,” OhmyNews International, February 8,

2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=344245&rel_no=1

32. David Morrison, Press Conference, June 11, 2007, See

Minutes: 38:46.

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/pressbriefing/brief070611.rm

33. Ronda Hauben, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Syndrome

and the Press [Analysis] How does one prove a negative?,”

OhmyNews International, June 24, 2007.

http://english.ohmy

news.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=368433&rel_no=1

The above article can be seen in two parts at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=369577&rel_no=1

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=369577&rel_no=2

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on March 21, 2007]

North Korea’s $25 Million

and Banco Delta Asia

[Opinion] Another Abuse Under

the U.S. Patriot Act (2001)

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

A little known provision in the U.S. Patriot Act

(2001) has been used by the Bush administration

against North Korea to freeze $25 million of its funds

and to deny it access to the international banking

system and to hard currency. Actions under this

provision of the Patriot Act effectively stymied

progress in disarmament talks between the U.S.,

North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan

for over 18 months. North Korea says that only when

the seized $25 million and access to the international

banking system are restored is it willing to continue

negotiations under the Six-Party agreement concern-

ing security and denuclearization of the Korean

peninsula.

The little known provision of the Patriot Act is

Section 311. It is also known as the “International

Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-

Terrorism Act of 2001.”

The original purpose was allegedly related to the

prevention, detection and prosecution of money

laundering connected to the financing of terrorism.

The law has rarely been used for its original purpose.

Instead it has been used by the Bush administration as

a means of unchecked political power against finan-

cial institutions like the Banco Delta Asia. This case

has an impact on those nations or institutions who

used the bank, like North Korea.

Two other sections of the Patriot Act currently

under scrutiny, the use of the Patriot Act to illegally

obtain personal information on U.S. citizens, and the

use of a provision in the Patriot Act to replace U.S.

Attorneys, have been identified as being used by the

Page 14

Bush administration for expanding and abusing

executive power. Section 311 provides another means

for sidestepping international and national legal

practices and substituting an ad hoc set of processes

that leave the victims with no means of due process or

defense.

Section 311 has been called by its supporters “a

diplomatic sledgehammer that gets results” and by its

critics a provision that denies the accused “due

process and presumes guilt.”

Critics say that this provision of the Patriot Act

applies U.S. law to the financial institutions of other

countries. In a proceeding under Section 311 of the

Patriot Act (2001) the U.S. Treasury Department acts

as accuser and judge, in international jurisdictions.

Also, often the evidence used by the Treasury Depart-

ment is classified and thus not available for examina-

tion by the accused so that it can’t be refuted.

This provision gives the U.S. Treasury the

ability to use an Executive Branch administrative

procedure rather than a legal proceeding as a way to

accuse a financial institution that is part of another

nation’s regulatory system of wrong doing, and then

to find it guilty. Under this provision of the Patriot

Act, the accused is denied knowledge of the evidence

against it and is denied the right to speak in its own

defense. Section 311 of the Patriot Act (2001) was

used against the BDA, a small bank in Macau, to

freeze substantial financial assets of North Korea and

also to deny North Korea access to the international

banking system.

The case against the BDA was

instituted in September 2005 just after the U.S. had

signed the Six-Party agreement.

The accused under Section 311 is presumed to

be guilty and the burden falls on it to prove its inno-

cence without being able to know the evidence or

charges.

Invoking Section 311 against the BDA effec-

tively sabotaged the implementation of the Six-Party

agreement of September 2005 for 18 months as BDA

did not have a process to challenge the Treasury

Department action, nor did those whose accounts at

the bank had been frozen, like North Korea. It was

only after North Korea conducted a missile test in

July 2006 and the test of a nuclear device in October

2006, that the Bush administration was willing to

agree to negotiations over the Treasury action.

Negotiations in Berlin between the U.S. govern-

ment and North Korea in January 2007 and then in

Beijing in February 2007 with the U.S., South Korea,

China, Russia and Japan, resulted in the Six-Party

agreement announced on Feb. 13, 2007.

The difference that most analysts point to in

comparing the Feb. 13, 2007 Six-Party agreement

with the Six-Party agreement of September 2005 is

that the more recent agreement includes a series of

processes and a time table. The critical difference that

has been overlooked, however, is that a requirement

of the Feb. 13 agreement was that the U.S. restore the

funds that were frozen by the actions of the U.S.

Treasury Department. Also North Korea’s access to

the international financial system was to be restored.

These requirements caused “intense friction” in

Washington between officials in the State Department

and “officials in the Treasury Department and in the

Office of Vice President Dick Cheney who were said

to favor maintaining maximum pressure” on North

Korea.

There were reports of urgent telephone calls

between officials in the State Department and the

Treasury. Assistant Secretary of State John

Negroponte finally got a decision from the Treasury

Department by Friday, March 16. The Treasury

Department had ruled against the BDA. U.S. banks

would not be allowed to do business with it. The U.S.

government announcement said that it would be up to

the Macau authorities to decide if they would un-

freeze and restore some or all of North Korea’s funds.

By the weekend of March 17, a behind the

scenes drama continued to unfold. China announced

that it regretted the U.S. action. The owner of the

Macao bank said he would go to court to attempt to

challenge the decision. Getting off the plane in

Beijing on Saturday to attend the next stage of

Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-gwan, North Korea’s lead

negotiator for the Six-Party Talks, told reporters that

all of the $25 million had to be returned if North

Korea was to go to the next step of the Six-Party

Talks.

Hill announced that he would explain the

settlement to the Chinese and North Korean negotia-

tors. China announced that a settlement had been

reached but that the details of it couldn’t yet be

revealed. Subsequently, there was an announcement

that all of the $25 million in funds would be returned

to North Korea and deposited in China in an account

held by the North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank at the

Bank of China in Beijing. U.S. Treasury Secretary

Daniel Glaser, in a press conference held with Hill,

confirmed the U.S. government decision. It was

unknown he said, when the funds would actually be

Page 15

put in the North Korean bank account.

Subsequently, diplomats who were in Beijing to

continue the Six-Party Talks told reporters that North

Korean diplomats said the funds had to be in the bank

account for them to continue with negotiations.

Though there have been many newspaper

articles reporting the standoff in the Six-Party Talks

caused by the dispute over the use of Section 311

against North Korea, few of the articles provide an

understanding of the underlying issues involved. A

commentator on BBC, for example, demonstrating a

serious lack of understanding of the use of Section

311 and the abuse of power it represents said this is

an example of the high price that North Korea will

extract for its cooperation in the talks.

It is not without cause then, that in describing

the process of the Six-Party Talks, Hill compared the

process to a video game. He warned:

This process, not unlike a video game gets

more and more difficult as you get to

different levels.

Notes

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/Section301.html

2. “Treasury Casts a Wide Net Under Patriot Act.”

http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/69267:treasury

-casts-a-wide-net-under-patriot-act

3. “The U.S. government has never publicly detailed evidence

behind its charges. Nor has it sought to initiate legal action,

relying instead on Section 311 of the Patriot Act, which critics

say extends U.S. laws to cover other countries.” “Bush Adminis-

tration Plan May Unfreeze North Korean Funds.”

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/latest-news/article24461644.html

4. “Administration Reconsiders Some North Korea Restrictions.”

5. “U.S., North Korea Move to Open Ties.”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=348974&rel_no=1

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=351525&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on May 19, 2007]

Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia

Is the Policy Aimed at Targeting

China as Well as North Korea?

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher

Hill, speaking at the Korea Society’s 50

Anniversary

dinner in New York City on May 15, 2007, said that

he was determined not to “allow $26 million or $25

million get between us and a deal that will finally do

something about nuclear weapons on the Korean

peninsula.” He promised that Kathleen Stephens at

the Korea desk at the State Department was working

on the problem and that “we are going to keep after

this problem till we solve it.” His statement didn’t

give further details about how this problem was to be

solved, a problem that had interrupted the progress

that seemed at last possible in the Feb. 13 Six-Party

agreement.

Just two days later, on May 17, the U.S.

Wachovia Bank announced that it is exploring a

request from the State Department to transfer the

funds from the BDA (Banco Delta Asia) to North

Korea. Wachovia Bank reported that it would require

the necessary approvals from bank regulators to do

the transfer.

Until this latest announcement, banks have been

unwilling to do the transfer because of the legal action

that the U.S. government took against the BDA, by

ruling that it was involved in criminal activity under

Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. Banks which deal

with a bank that has been found guilty of such illegal

acts risk losing their access to the international

financial system. North Korea has said that the

denuclearization and other aspects of the Six-Party

agreement that it has been part of can only go forward

when the BDA situation is resolved. “To make the

money transfer possible freely just like before has

been our demand…from the beginning,” a spokes-

person from North Korea said.

In his daily press briefing on May 17, Scott

McCormack at the U.S. State Department said, “We

all want to see the BDA issue resolved, obviously

Page 16

resolved within the laws and regulations of the United

States as well as the international financial system,

and we’d like to move on and get back to the business

of the Six-Party Talks, which is really focused on the

issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether this latest development with Wachovia

Bank will provide the needed breakthrough, it is too

soon to tell. But there are other developments which

may provide the needed pressures on the U.S. govern-

ment to decriminalize the $25 million it has frozen of

North Korean funds and restore North Korea’s access

to the international banking system. Their access was

severely impeded by the action that the U.S. Treasury

Department took against the BDA.

The developments I am referring to are the

release in the public domain of several documents

related to the U. S. Treasury Department’s actions

against BDA. One of the documents is a sworn

statement by the owner of the BDA, Mr. Stanley Au,

in support of his petition to revoke the rule imposing

the special measures taken by the U.S. Treasury

Department against his bank. Another document is the

petition in support of his case. Also the Treasury

Department finding against the bank has been put

online. These documents have been made available on

the blog “China Matters.”

In his statement, Au explains the history of his

bank’s relations with North Korea and how there was

only one experience, which occurred in June 1994,

when there was a problem with counterfeit U.S.

dollars. At the time, the bank reported this incident to

the U.S. government. Agents from the U.S. govern-

ment came to the bank and questioned Au. He an-

swered their questions and asked if the agents recom-

mended that the bank “desist from doing business

with North Korean entities.” The agents said “they

would like us to continue to deal with them as it was

better that we conducted this business than another

financial entity that may not be so cooperative with

the United States government.”

Au explains that there was no further experience

with counterfeit money showing up in the transactions

of the bank. All “large value deposits of U.S. dollar

bills from North Korean sources” were sent to the

Hong Kong branch of the Republic National Bank of

New York (which became HSBC) to be certified that

they were authentic via advanced technology pos-

sessed by that bank. Smaller quantities of bills were

examined in accord with common banking practices

by the bank itself.

Au also explains that he had not been

approached by U.S. government agents alerting him

to any problem or illegal activity. The first he learned

that his bank was being charged as a bank engaged in

“illicit activities” came when he saw a report in the

Asian Wall Street Journal in September 2005 that his

bank was a candidate for a U.S. money laundering

blacklist. He tells how “this news came as a bolt out

of the blue – the Bank had never been informed by

the United States that its practices were a cause of any

money laundering concern, and the counterfeiting

event that the media reported as the basis for the

designation had occurred more than ten years earlier

and had been promptly reported to the authorities by

Banco Delta Asia.”

Stanley Au’s statement is in sharp contrast with

the account in the U.S. government’s Federal Register

of the finding against the bank by the U.S. Treasury

Department.

The Federal Register finding states that the bank

had provided financial services for more than 20 years

to multiple North Korean-related individuals and

entities that were engaged in illicit activities. It

provides no specific details of what such illicit activi-

ties were. It claims that the entities paid a fee to

Banco Delta Asia for their access to the bank. The

finding claims that the bank facilitated wire transfers

and helped a front company.

In his statement, Stanley Au maintained that the

BDA did not charge a fee for its services nor did it

conduct illicit services for North Korea or any other

customer. The bank was only one of the banks in

Macau that did business with North Korea. The

business his bank had with North Korea began in the

mid 1970s and was to assist North Korea with its

foreign trade transactions. Also Au described North

Korea as a gold producing country and that in the late

1990s the bank had acted as a “gold bullion trader on

behalf of the North Koreans.” Also the BDA bought

or sold foreign currency notes for North Korea,

including U.S. dollars, because North Korea had a

limited banking system and so it couldn’t do such

transactions itself (see Statement, pp. 3-4).

The petition submitted to the U.S. Dept. of the

Treasury to challenge the finding against BDA pro-

poses that BDA was targeted not because of any

“voluminous” evidence of money laundering but

“because it was an easy target in the sense that it was

not so large that its failure would bring down the

financial system.”

Page 17

In the substantial and prolific analysis of the

BDA problem that has been developed on the blog

“China Matters,” there is the assessment that North

Korea has legitimate financial activity and that the

BDA was legitimately serving as one of the banks for

that activity. Even with the UN’s sanctions, it was not

appropriate to target for blacklisting the legitimate

financial activities of North Korea. The sanctions that

the UN-imposed against North Korea were to be

aimed at its activity that was related to nuclear

weapon development, not to normal financial transac-

tions.

The author of China Matters blog writes:

The alternative view…is that legitimate

North Korean financial activity does exist,

BDA had a right to solicit North Korean

accounts and handle North Korean trans-

actions, and Stanley Au should be allowed

to run his bank as long as he conforms to

the laws of his jurisdiction--and (the bank)

not be used as a political football in Wash-

ington’s dealings with Pyongyang.

To put it more succinctly, the blog China

Matters quotes David Ascher, who had been the

coordinator for the Bush Administration working

group on North Korea and a senior adviser in East

Asian affairs in the State Department, in testimony to

the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on April 18,

2007, explaining why Banco Delta was chosen to be

blacklisted from the international banking system:

Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We

were trying to kill the chicken to scare the

monkeys. And the monkeys were big

Chinese banks doing business in North

Korea…and we’re not talking about tens

of millions, we’re talking hundreds of

millions.

The purpose of the action against the BDA

appears not only to have been to target North Korea

and its access to the international banking system, but

also to send a message to China.

Therefore it would appear that the action against

BDA is a carefully crafted political action and that it

will be necessary that there be public understanding,

discussion and debate about what is behind this action

in order to find a way to have the policy that gave rise

to the BDA action changed.

Instead of the U.S. mainstream press carrying

out the needed investigation about why BDA has been

targeted and what is behind this action, there have

been continual condemnations of North Korea.

Fortunately there are journalists like those who work

with the McClatchy News Service who have made an

effort to probe what is happening behind-the-scenes

in the BDA affair and blogs like China Matters which

have taken the time and care to begin uncovering

what the BDA affair is really all about. This is but one

of the stories of what is really going on behind the

scenes within the U.S. government that has been

hidden from the public. This is one of the stories yet

to be unraveled by bloggers, and citizen journalists.

Notes

1. See an earlier article “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco

Delta Asia.”

http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?m

enu=A11100&no=351525&rel_no=1&back_url=%3Cbr%3E

2. “North Korea says work to transfer bank funds under way,”

AFP, May 15, 2007.

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/

afp_asiapacific/view/276391/1/.html

3. Scott McCormack, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, D.C.,

May 17, 2007.

4. “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations.”

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-hi

s-case-for-banco.html

5. Statement of Mr. Stanley Au in Support of Petition to Revoke

Rule Imposing Special Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, p.

http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Jones_Day_Pet

ition_Rescind_BDA_Rule.pdf

See also Kevin G. Hall, “Bank owner disputes money-laundering

allegations,” McClatchy Newspapers, May 16, 2007.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article

24463246.html

6. Department of the Treasury, 31 CFR Part 103/ RIN 1506-

AA83, Federal Register/ Vol. 72, No. 52/ Monday, March 19,

2007/ Rules and Regulations.

https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/bda_final_rul

e.pdf

7. Petition of Mr. Stanley Au and Delta Asia Group (Holdings)

Ltd. to Rescind Final Rule, p. 12.

http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Jones_Day_Petiti

on_Rescind_BDA_Rule.pdf

8. “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia,” Tuesday,

May 15, 2007. http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-

au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html

9. “David Asher’s Dead End,” Saturday, April 28, 2007.

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-e

nd.html

See also “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its

role in addressing the nuclear and missile situations in both

nations,” Hearing, Sept. 14, 2006, Nov. 2006, p. 115-116.

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/sept_1

4/06_09_14_trans.pdf

10. Ronda Hauben, “Bill Moyers and the Emergence of U.S.

Citizen Journalism: Power of government creates need for

Page 18

investigative news.”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=360069&rel_no=1

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on October 4, 2007]

On the Status of the

Six-Party Talks

‘It’s Never Been an Easy Sell

in Washington,’ Says Chris Hill

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

At a press conference held in New York City on

Tuesday, Oct. 2, 2007, U.S. Assistant Secretary of

State Christopher Hill answered questions and out-

lined some of his concerns regarding the recent

session of the Six-Party Talks

held in Beijing, Sept.

27-30.

Hill said that originally there was not to be a

formal statement of agreement, but that on Sunday

morning before the session was to end, the Chinese

hosts distributed a draft of a short statement for the

six parties to consider [See page 18 below “Full Text

of the Joint Document”]. Hill said that each of the

parties took the statement back to their capitol to seek

approval. For Hill, this meant flying to New York

City to meet with Secretary of State Rice who had

been attending UN related events. Then the proposal

was brought to President Bush for his approval.

When Hill was asked how difficult was the

process of getting an agreement from Washington, he

said “It’s never been an easy sell in Washington.” Hill

explained the agreement in general terms, as the press

conference was held before the statement was offi-

cially released.

By Dec. 31, 2007, Hill said North Korea agreed

to disable its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Also by

that date, there was an agreement to provide an

accurate accounting for how much fissile material

was produced by North Korea. In 2008, the Six-Party

Talks will move toward the issue of dismantling the

plutonium producing facility. As an outcome of the

talks, Hill hoped for the creation of a North East

Asian Peace structure, but he felt there was still a long

way to go to get to that goal.

When asked about whether the U.S. had agreed

to remove North Korea from the U.S. government’s

State Sponsors of Terrorists list, Hill said that was

something “we are working on with the DPRK.” He

said that “from our point of view any time we can

work with a country to get them off the list, that’s

what we want to do.” Hill also said that North Korea

was being encouraged to improve DPRK-Japan

relations. He did not say whether efforts were being

made to encourage Japan to improve Japan-DPRK

relations.

In response to another question about removing

the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of

terrorism, Hill said that the U.S. wanted to “work

through the past history that had led to the DPRK

being put on that list.”

A reporter asked what it would take to move

from the armistice of the Korean war to a peace

agreement ending the war.

“From the U.S. point of view if the DPRK is

prepared to denuclearize, we are prepared to reach a

peace agreement,” replied Hill. There would need to

be a number of issues considered, he explained, to

reach a peace settlement. When questioned about

North Korea’s concern that there be an end of hostil-

ity by the U.S. toward it, Hill said that the U.S. was

hostile to proliferation and that there was no hostile

policy of the U.S. to North Korea.

When asked about the problems that had existed

regarding the U.S. Treasury Department’s action

freezing North Korean assets in the Banco Delta

Asia,

Hill said that that situation related to the need

of the U.S. to protect its financial system and its

currencies. “We would like them (North Korea-ed) to

have access to the international financial system,” he

explained, “but they have to play by the rules every-

one else plays by.”

He didn’t elaborate further on this issue or on

whether North Korea’s regaining access to the inter-

national banking system was a matter being consid-

ered in the negotiations between the U.S. and North

Korea.

In response to a question about why it seemed

negotiations were entering a sensitive stage, he

explained that what was happening was to have the

U.S. on the ground involved in disabling the nuclear

Page 19

facility. It was “not just paper anymore,” he observed.

Another reporter asked Hill what problems he

saw in the future that he was concerned about. Hill

responded that what keeps him awake is that they are

focusing on the step to be taken but that “the process

won’t be successful unless we reach the goal.” The

DPRK will need to give up its fissile material and

weapons, explained Hill, so he was concerned that

there were those in the army in North Korea who

might not want to get to the last step.

“When we finish this job,” Hill said, the parties

will have come to understand what it means to come

together and solve the problems. In this process, Hill

felt that North Korea would get the sense of “what it

means to be part of a community.”

Notes

1. For an earlier press conference by Hill about the talks, see

“U.S., North Korea Move to Open Ties Christopher Hill and

Kim Kye-gwan hold meeting in New York on first steps.”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=348974&rel_no=1

2. While the $25 million of North Korean funds have now been

returned to North Korea, the problem of North Korea being

denied access to the international banking system has not yet

been resolved. Describing some of the problems that the U.S.

Treasury Department action against the Banco Delta Asia posed

as an obstacle to the progress of the Six-Party Talks, see for

example: North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia,

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia, Weapons of Mass

Destruction Syndrome and the Press?

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1

Full Text of the Joint Document

The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party

Talks was held in Beijing among the People’s Republic of China,

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic

of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of

America from 27 to 30 September, 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

DPRK, Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and

Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr.

Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula

Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of

Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Christopher

Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the

Department of State of the United States, attended the talks as

heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of the five

Working Groups, confirmed the implementation of the initial

actions provided for in the February 13 agreement, agreed to

push forward the Six-Party Talks process in accordance with the

consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Groups and

reached agreement on second-phase actions for the implementa-

tion of the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, the goal of

which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

in a peaceful manner.

I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities

subject to abandonment under the September 2005 Joint State-

ment and the February 13 agreement.

The disablement of the 5-megawatt Experimental Reactor

at Yongbyon, the Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical

Laboratory) at Yongbyon and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication

Facility at Yongbyon will be completed by December 31, 2007.

Specific measures recommended by the expert group will be

adopted by heads of delegation in line with the principles of

being acceptable to all Parties, scientific, safe, verifiable, and

consistent with international standards. At the request of the

other Parties, the United States will lead disablement activities

and provide the initial funding for those activities. As a first step,

the U.S. side will lead the expert group to the DPRK within the

next two weeks to prepare for disablement.

2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declara-

tion of all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February

13 agreement by December 31, 2007.

3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear

materials, technology, or know-how.

II. On Normalization of Relations between Relevant

Countries

1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to

improving their bilateral relations and moving towards a full

diplomatic relationship. The two sides will increase bilateral

exchanges and enhance mutual trust. Recalling the commitments

to begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as

a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminat-

ing the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with

respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its commit-

ments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK’s actions based on

consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on

Normalization of DPRK-U.S. Relations.

2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to normalize

their relations expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang

Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of the unfortunate

past and the outstanding issues of concern. The DPRK and

Japan committed themselves to taking specific actions toward

this end through intensive consultations between them.

III. On Economic and Energy Assistance to the DPRK

In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic,

energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one

million tons of HFO (inclusive of the 100,000 tons of HFO

already delivered) will be provided to the DPRK. Specific

modalities will be finalized through discussion by the Working

Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation.

Page 20

IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting

The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial

Meeting will be held in Beijing at an appropriate time.

The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation meeting

prior to the Ministerial Meeting to discuss the agenda for the

Meeting.

The above article can be seen at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?me

nu=c10400&no=380575&rel_no=1

UN Passes Resolution

Supporting Inter-Korean

Summit

Document A/62/l4 Entitled ‘Peace,

Security and Reunification on the Ko-

rean Peninsula’

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

Just a little over a year ago I began covering the

United Nations as a featured writer for OhmyNews

International. My first day was when Ban Ki-moon’s

nomination for Secretary-General of the UN was

approved by the General Assembly. For South Korea

this was an exciting event.

The next day, however, the Security Council

imposed sanctions against North Korea.

The di-

lemma of a Korea divided North and South was a

glaring contradiction facing the international commu-

nity with the appointment of a Secretary-General

from the Korean peninsula. Similarly, however, this

was a challenge to the international community to

support unification on the Korean peninsula.

A little more than one year later, the General

Assembly held an event to provide needed support for

Korean reunification. In the General Assembly on

Wednesday, Oct. 31, the international community

approved a resolution supporting the motion toward

reunification of the two Koreas and applauding the 2

Inter-Korean Summit held October 2-4, 2007, and the

joint Declaration issued by the presidents of the two

Koreas.

The event was held during the afternoon session

of the UN’s General Assembly. The UN delegate

from North Korea, Pak Gil Yon introduced the

resolution, saying “Mr. President, I have the honor to

introduce a draft resolution contained in document

A/62/L4 entitled ‘Peace, security and reunification on

the Korean peninsula.’”

He described the Oct. 2-4 summit and the

declaration that resulted, explaining that the UN

resolution being proposed “welcomes and supports

the inter-Korean summit including the Declaration

and encourages both sides to implement it faithfully

and in good faith, inviting member States to support

and assist the current positive process.”

The UN delegate from South Korea, Kim Hyun

Chong was the next speaker. As joint sponsor of the

resolution with the delegate from North Korea, Kim

described several aspects of the peace accord that the

two parties agreed to in their declaration ending the

Inter-Korean Summit. “Through its various provi-

sions,” he explained, “the Declaration points the way

forward for common prosperity, eventual peaceful

reunification on the Korean peninsula, and the resolu-

tion of longstanding regional concerns.”

Among those speaking in support of the resolu-

tion were Portugal on behalf of the European Union,

China, Vietnam, Japan, the U.S., New Zealand,

Yemen, Germany, Indonesia, Thailand, Canada,

Guatemala, Belarus, Russia, Chile, Poland, Mongolia,

Mynmar, Benin, Brazil, Italy, Bangladesh, Egypt, and

Cuba.

Yemen and Germany spoke about the difficul-

ties they had experienced as divided nations, and

offered whatever support they could provide to the

Korean reunification efforts. The German ambassador

said that “what we have learned from our own experi-

ence is: the separation of a nation is not irreversible.

The two Koreas will have to find their own way of

tackling these issues, but Germany stands ready, upon

request, to share its own experience from the years of

German-German relations.”

The ambassador of Yemen said that they had

had a long history of division, which was changed

with the unification in May 1990. He explained that

the unification was difficult and not without defects.

He understood the suffering of the divided families

and duplication of resources that the division repre-

sented and said that his country would do what it

could to support the efforts of the two Koreas to

implement fully the declaration they had issued.

The ambassador from Vietnam noted that the

Summit and the resulting Declaration were of “great

historic significance.” He said that Vietnam “wel-

Page 21

comes and highly appreciates the encouraging out-

comes of these developments.” He noted that the

events of Oct. 2-4 represented an important milestone

in the process of the improvement and development

of relations between the two Koreans which would

bring them “closer to their long-held dreams of

national reunification and prosperity.” The ambassa-

dor from Vietnam noted that his country had good

relations with the two Koreas.

The ambassador from Thailand also noted the

historic nature of the recent Summit and concluded

that “this historic resolution has called for many

countries to readjust the attitude and the policy toward

the situation in the Korean peninsula.”

Indonesia’s UN ambassador similarly noted that

his country has had close ties with both North and

South Korea. He, too, saw the Summit of October

2007 as a “major milestone in inter-Korean relations.”

He called for support from member nations to the

process of “inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation and

reunification.”

The UN ambassador from Portugal said that the

EU stands ready to contribute to the efforts.

Several nations spoke about having been part of

KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization in 1996 and wanting to continue to help

in the ways they could. The ambassador from Italy

said that his country had worked to support Inter-

Korean dialogue. Also Italy was offering to provide

the help it could, and had established a way to provide

aid to North Korea shortly before the Summit. Italy

had been a supporter of KEDO, as had Chile.

Benin’s UN ambassador explained that his

country, too, had friendly relations with the two sister

republics on the Korean Peninsula. He described how

Benin had been working to promote peaceful reunifi-

cation of the Koreas for a number of decades. He

endorsed the current developments and said that

reunification would “put an end to one of the most

painful relics of the Second World War.”

Brazil expressed his support for the resolution

and reminded those in the General Assembly that

Brazil had been a co-sponsor for the General Assem-

bly Resolution 55/11 seven years earlier supporting

the first Inter-Korean Summit of June 15, 2000.

The U.S. ambassador to the UN said that the

U.S. was pleased with the draft resolution being

discussed by the General Assembly. He stressed that

dialogue between the two Koreas was essential for

better relations. He explained that this dialogue

process was supportive to and complementary to the

six-party talks going on.

The Japanese ambassador also expressed his

nation’s strong support for the draft resolution. In his

talk he referred to some of the specifics of the six-

party talks.

The ambassador to the UN from Chile expressed

his sentiments that Korea had one past and one

destiny. The declaration from the Inter-Korean

Summit was the outcome of a difficult and sensitive

process. He explained that no state should fail to join

the noble effort to support the Korean people’s desire

to become one nation.

The ambassador from Cuba to the UN was the

final speaker in the discussion before action was to be

taken on the resolution. He explained that “Cuba has

always supported and will continue to support the

peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.” Also

he explained that the Summit Conference of the Non-

Aligned Movement (NAM) held last year in Havana

stressed the importance of peace on the Korean

peninsula. Similarly the NAM Summit “expressed its

support toward efforts to reunify the Korean penin-

sula through the genuine aspirations and concerted

efforts of the Korean peoples themselves.”

The resolution was approved by acclamation.

Ban Ki-moon was present in the General Assembly

during the discussion of the resolution. After it was

approved, he made a statement congratulating the

representatives of the two Koreas.

“Today’s date,” he explained, “coincides exactly

with the date seven years ago when the General

Assembly adopted resolution 55/11, following the

June 2000 summit of the DPRK and the ROK. I

welcome this coincidence. In my homeland of Korea,

it is an ancient custom to choose an auspicious day for

any celebration or new endeavor.”

“Today,” he continued, “I feel a personal

obligation to do all I can to encourage and facilitate

the continuing work for peace, security and reunifica-

tion on the Korean peninsula. I am convinced that the

historic inter-Korean summit will pave the way for a

permanent peace regime and eventual reunification.”

“As Secretary-General, I stand ready to provide

every assistance required, in close cooperation with

the international community,” he said, concluding his

statement.

During the press encounter he had outside of the

General Assembly, Ban was asked, “[Y]ou just said

that you would like to do everything to support peace

Page 22

on the Korean peninsula. Do you have any special

plan in mind, as head of the United Nations, and if so,

can you please give me the details?”

In response, Ban said, “At this time I do not

have any detailed or specific plans, but in principle, as

Secretary-General, I have a broad mandate and duty

to assist any parties to the problems for smooth and

harmonious resolution. For that matter, since I served

as Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea in the

past, and I have expertise and knowledge and experi-

ence, whenever I am needed, I will do whatever I

can.”

The UN resolution supporting the movement

toward reunification of the two Koreas, passed on the

last day of October 2007 by the General Assembly,

may not seem particularly significant, but it is actu-

ally an important event. It reflects the support of the

international community for the peaceful reunification

of the Korean peninsula, which is one of the impor-

tant outstanding problems of our times. As the ambas-

sador from Benin profoundly noted, the reunification

of the two Koreas would “put an end to one of the

most painful relics of the Second World War.”

The UN was created to facilitate such events.

Passing this resolution supporting the recent Inter-

Korean Summit is a fitting way for the UN to mark

the one year anniversary since the General Assembly

appointed a new Secretary-General. The challenge is

now for the people of the two Koreas, the Secretary-

General and the member nations to do what is needed

to support the continuing motion toward peaceful

reconciliation and Korean reunification.

Notes

1. Ronda Hauben, “The Problem Facing the U.N. Can Ban Ki-

moon help solve the problem with the Security Council?,”

OhmyNews International, October 17, 2006.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?arti

cle_class=3&no=323351&rel_no=1

2. The Resolution reads:

United Nations A/62/L.4

General Assembly

Sixty-second session

Agenda item 167

Peace, security and reunification on the Korean

peninsula

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Re-

public of Korea: draft resolution

Peace, security and reunification on the Korean

peninsula

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution

55/11 of 31 October 2000, in which it welcomed

and supported the inter-Korean summit and the

joint declaration adopted on 15 June 2000 by the

two leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea and the Republic of Korea,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the

Charter of the United Nations regarding the main-

tenance of international peace and security, Con-

vinced that inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation

are essential for consolidating peace and security

on the Korean peninsula and also contribute to

peace and stability in the region and beyond, in

conformity with the purposes and principles of the

Charter,

Recognizing that the summit meeting held in

Pyongyang from 2 to 4 October 2007 between the

two leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea and the Republic of Korea and their Decla-

ration on the Advancement of North-South Korean

Relations, Peace and Prosperity represent a major

milestone in improving inter-Korean relations and

in advancing peace and common prosperity on the

Korean peninsula and in the wider region as well,

Recalling the statements welcoming the inter-

Korean summit made on 1 October 2007 by the

Secretary-General and the President of the General

Assembly, and recalling also the statement wel-

coming the adoption of the Declaration made on 4

October 2007 by the Secretary-General,

1. Welcomes and supports the inter-Korean sum-

mit held from 2 to 4 October 2007 and the Declara-

tion on the Advancement of North-South Korean

Relations, Peace and Prosperity adopted on 4

October 2007 by the two leaders of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of

Korea;

A/62/L.4

2 07-55752

2. Encourages the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea and the Republic of Korea to implement the

Declaration fully and in good faith, thereby consol-

idating peace on the Korean peninsula and laying

a solid foundation for peaceful reunification;

3. Invites Member States to continue to support

and assist, as appropriate, the process of inter-

Korean dialogue, reconciliation and reunification

so that it may contribute to peace and security not

only on the Korean peninsula but also in northeast

Asia and the world as a whole.

A/62/L.4

3. Ban’s statement:

http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sgsm1120.

doc.htm

Page 23

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on April 10, 2009]

UN Security Council

Controversy over North

Korean Satellite Launch

Reconvening Six-party Talks or

Penalizing Pyongyang?

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

There has been a controversy among the mem-

bers of the UN Security Council (UNSC) over how to

react to the April 5 launch of a satellite by North

Korea. The Security Council met for emergency

consultations on Sunday, April 5, while the P-5 and

Japan have met in other consultations after the

Sunday meeting.

Japan and the U.S. have encouraged the UNSC

to take strong measures against North Korea to punish

it for launching the satellite. The Russian Ambassador

to the UN, Vitaly I. Churkin warned against a “knee

jerk” reaction and proposed that the crucial goal was

to ensure the continuation of the six-party talks

toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

These talks broke down during the Bush administra-

tion and have not yet been resumed.

The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Zhang

Yesui said that the reaction of the Security Council

had to be “cautious and proportionate.” He said that

his delegation would be most willing to consider

constructive responses.

U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice, called the launch

by North Korea, “a clear-cut violation of UN Security

Council Resolution 1718.”

She said that it is the view of the U.S. govern-

ment “that this action merits a clear and strong

response from the United Nations Security Council.”

Her position was that S.C. Resolution 1718

“prohibited missile related activity and called on the

DPRK to halt further missile related activity.”

Vietnam, one of the elected members of the

Security Council, called for a “prudent reaction.” A

spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry said that

Vietnam “hopes the relevant parties have a prudent

reaction, find a reasonable solution and do not com-

plicate the situation and affect peace and stability in

the Northeast Asia region.”

While Vietnam said that it was opposed to the

proliferation of nuclear weapons, an earlier statement

indicated that Vietnam supports “the rights of coun-

tries to use science and technology for peaceful

purposes.”

The Japanese Ambassador to the UN, Yukio

Takasu requested an emergency consultative session

of the Security Council on Sunday, April 5. His

position was that North Korea’s launch of a satellite

was banned by S.C. Resolution 1718 which demands

that North Korea suspend all activities “related to its

ballistic missile program.”

While S.C. Resolution 1718 explicitly demands

that North Korea not conduct any “launch of a ballis-

tic missile,” the members of the Security Council

disagree about whether S.C. Resolution 1718 forbids

the launch of a communication satellite.

Countries advocating the position that North

Korea violated S.C. Resolution 1718, point to parts

five and 8(a)ii of the resolution as the parts violated.

Part 5 reads that the Security Council:

Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all

activities related to its ballistic missile

program and in this context reestablish its

pre-existing commitments to a morato-

rium on missile launch. (S.C. Resolution

1718, p.2)

Section 8(a)ii is about member states preventing

the sale or transfer to North Korea of “materials,

equipment, goods and technology as set out in the

lists…which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-

related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of

mass-destruction related programs.” (S.C. Resolution

1718, p. 2-3)

North Korea was not invited to participate in the

emergency consultations of the Security Council,

despite the fact that Article 32 of the UN charter

requires that a “party to a dispute under consideration

by the Security Council shall be invited to participate,

without vote, in the discussion relating to the dis-

pute….”

Speaking to reporters at the UN on Tuesday,

April 7, the Deputy Ambassador to the UN from the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North

Korea), Pak Tok Hun said:

Every country has the right, the inalien-

able right to use the outer space peace-

fully. Not a few countries, many coun-

tries, they have already launched satellites

several hundred times.

Page 24

Does it mean it would be OK for them to

launch satellites but we are not allowed to

do that? It’s not fair. It’s not fair.

This is a satellite. Everyone can distin-

guish (a) satellite with a missile. It’s not a

missile. I know most of the countries now

recognize it’s not a missile.

A reporter asked, “But you use ballistic technol-

ogy. You need ballistic technologies.”

Pak responded:

Those countries who launch satellites use

similar technology and if the Security

Council, they take any kind of step what-

ever, this is infringement on the sover-

eignty of our country and the next option

will be ours and necessary and strong

steps will follow that.

Along with the dispute in the Security Council

over whether or not the North Korea’s action is an

actual violation of S.C. Resolution 1718, there is a

controversy over whether the thrust of the Security

Council action should be toward getting the six-party

talks reconvened, or toward penalizing North Korea

in some way.

The resolution of this controversy depends

predominantly upon the U.S. because it can be argued

that the U.S. was responsible for the current break-

down of the six-party talks.

In a talk at the Korea Society in NYC last Fall,

Leon Sigal of the Social Science Research Council

(SSRC) explained how the six-party talks broke down

over the issue of verification. The U.S. government

had changed the terms of the agreement unilaterally,

imposing a condition on North Korea that was not

part of the original agreement.

The second phase of the six-party February

2007 agreement required disabling the reactor, and

other processes at Yongbyon and declaring the

nuclear material and equipment which were to be

eliminated in Phase 3 of the agreed actions.

The Bush administration was obligated to

provide ‘action for action’ in response to North

Korea’s disabling the reactor and other steps.

The verification was to occur only later in the

six-party talk process, in Phase 3 “when the disman-

tling of the North’s nuclear facilities and elimination

of any plutonium or weapons it has would be taken

up.” Instead the U.S. continued to press for a verifica-

tion agreement during Phase 2 of the agreement.

Most of the mainstream U.S. media, with the

exception of an important article in the Washington

Post, failed to explain the reason for the breakdown in

the talks.

The Washington Post article which docu-

mented how the hostile U.S. State Department envi-

ronment eroded the process of negotiation between

the U.S. government and North Korea, was only

carried on page 20 of the newspaper. It described how

U.S. government hardliners fashioned a verification

procedure to be imposed on North Korea which was

in the words of an expert in nuclear disarmament akin

to “a license to spy on any military site they (North

Korea) have.”

By launching a satellite rather than a ballistic

missile, North Korea has avoided violation of the

ballistic missile sections of S.C. Resolution 1718.

This gives the U.S. a chance to respond by returning

to the six-party-talks and seeking to finish Phase 2

before requiring verification in Phase 3 of the process.

The Security Council has this opportunity to call

for all parties to cease any obstruction and to return to

the six-party talks and to intensify their efforts to

complete Phase 2 and enter the next phase of the

agreed path to the denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula.

Notes

1. Vietnam calls for ‘prudent’ reaction to DPRK rocket, April 5,

2009.

2. Pak Tok Hun, Deputy Ambassador from the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to the UN, speaking

to reporters at the UN on Tuesday, April 7, 2009. http://webcast.

un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2009/so090407pm2.rm

3. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the

Six-Party Talks,” OhmyNews International, Sept. 29, 2008.

4. Glenn Kessler, “Far reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea

Deal: Demands Began to Undo Nuclear Accord,” Washington

Post, Friday, Sept. 26, 2008; Page A20.

Page 25

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on April 17, 2009]

Security Council’s Ad Hoc

Actions Increase Tension on

Korean Peninsula

[Analysis] North Korea Responds by

Withdrawing from Six-Party Talks as

Promised

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

On April 13, 2009, the UN Security Council

(UNSC) issued a presidential statement condemning

North Korea’s satellite launch on April 5. The Secu-

rity Council statement declared the launch “in contra-

vention” of UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006), even

though there was no wording in the 2006 statement

against satellite launches. In the 2009 statement, the

Security Council demanded North Korea not conduct

further launches, including of satellites. The presiden-

tial statement also mandated that new sanctions would

be added to the sanction’s list in the 2006 resolution.

Usually, a presidential statement issued by the

Security Council is considered a non binding state-

ment. Suddenly, the Security Council has changed its

processes, using a presidential statement to deny

North Korea the right to launch satellites, and to

impose a new set of sanctions.

South Korea has recently noted that the trajec-

tory of the North Korean launch was indeed the

trajectory for a satellite launch.

Lee Sang-hee, the

South Korean Defense Minister, in response to a

question asked during a hearing held in South Korea’s

National Assembly, replied that “The rocket launched

by the North followed the trajectory of a satellite and

later separated in its final two stages before crashing

into the Pacific Ocean.” South Korea’s Yonhap News

Agency reported the minister’s remarks, adding that

these remarks were an official acknowledgment that

the rocket was the effort to launch a satellite, not a

ballistic missile.

UNSC resolution 1718 (2006) demands North

Korea not conduct any launch of ballistic missiles, but

does not refer to satellite launches.

Pak Tok-hun, the North Korean Deputy Ambas-

sador to the UN, referred to the fact that his country

is being denied a right that other countries have, and

that this treatment is not “fair.” In an interview with

Aljazeera, the Ambassador said that if the Security

Council acted against his country for its satellite

launch, North Korea would respond with harsh

measures.

The Ambassador noted that Japan has launched

satellites more than 100 times and other countries like

the U.S. has launched satellites and the Security

Council has not taken up the issue. He complained

that North Korea is being treated in a way that is

different from how other countries are treated.

Some of what is striking about the action by the

Security Council is the closed process used to con-

sider the issue. There was no public discussion. There

were several closed meetings, called consultations,

among the P-5 members and Japan. During these

meetings journalists were told the P-5 and Japan

discussed what the response of the Security Council

should be to North Korea’s launch.

After there was agreement among the P-5 and

Japan on what was to be contained in a presidential

statement on the launch, the statement was presented

to the other elected members of the Security Council

for their approval. Despite the obligation specified in

Article 32 of the UN Charter that a nation that is a

party to an issue being discussed by the Security

Council be invited to the Security Council for the

discussion, no such invitation was made, according to

sources on the Security Council.

Similarly, though several of the nations on the

Security Council indicated that they favored the

resumption of the six-party talks as a way to deal with

the launch by North Korea, there was no indication

that there was any consideration by the Security

Council of what led to the breakdown of the six-party

talks. The U.S. government’s effort to require verifi-

cation in Phase 2 of the six-party Feb. 2007 agree-

ment, rather than in Phase 3, as had been agreed to by

the six-parties was not discussed in the Security

Council.

Instead of the Security Council members con-

sidering the problem which derailed the talks, they

agreed to impose new sanctions on North Korea.

Since no new Security Council resolution was being

issued, there was no appropriate means of issuing new

sanctions. They resorted to acting in an ad-hoc man-

ner when they announced they would use a presiden-

tial statement to add new sanctions to Security Coun-

cil resolution 1718 issued in 2006.

Page 26

One journalist, at the press stakeout after the

Security Council meeting issuing the presidential

statement, asked:

Mr. Ambassador, Does this presidential

statement set a precedent whereby in the

future, if you want to adjust the sanctions,

supposedly for example for Iran, you can

issue another presidential statement to

change the content of the sanctions in a

resolution? Is this legally speaking, a

precedent?

Baki Ilkin, Turkey’s Ambassador to the UN,

who is the head of the UNSC Resolution 1718 sanc-

tions committee, responded:

I am a newcomer. I wish you had asked

the previous speakers (Several Security

Council Ambassadors had spoken before

Ambassador Ilkin at the stakeout-ed).

After the Security Council issued its presidential

statement, North Korea announced it is leaving the

six-party talks. It announced that it does not recognize

the actions of the Security Council condemning its

satellite launch. There is justification for North Ko-

rea’s actions. Yet much of the mainstream media in

the U.S. frames North Korea’s reasonable response as

but an indication of how unreasonable it behaves.

North Korea has asked that the IAEA and U.S.

inspectors leave North Korea. It says it will resume its

nuclear deterrent development, as North Korean

Deputy Ambassador Pak Tok-hun promised would

happen if the Security Council acted to condemn

North Korea. The Ambassador told Aljazeera and

other media that the Security Council could expect

strong measures in response to any action against

North Korea. “We don’t say empty talk. What we say

is what we do,” the Ambassador told journalists.

Notes

1. “S. Korean govt. admits DPRK rocket followed satellite tra-

jectory,” Xinhuanet, April 14, 2009.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2009-04/14/content_11185140.htm

2. Ronda Hauben, “Every country has the inalienable right to use

the outer space peacefully: UN Security Council Controversy

over North Korean Satellite Launch,” Telepolis, April 8, 2009.

http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/30/30099/1.html

3. Aljazeera Interview with North Korean Deputy Ambassador

to the UN, Pak Tok-hun, April 14, 2009.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjEIvw7I5Ow

4. “UN Media Stakeout: Informal comments to the Media by the

Permanent Representative of Turkey, H. E. Mr. Baki Ilkin, on

Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. April

13, 2009.”

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/

2009/ so090413pm7.rm

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on June 12, 2009]

U.S. Policy Toward North

Korea Fails to Engage

[Opinion] UN Security Council Should

be Neutral in its Dealings with North

Korea

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

U.S. policy toward North Korea since Barack

Obama assumed the U.S. presidency is very different

from the promises of engagement which he made

during his election campaign. This policy presents a

striking example of the disparity between pre election

promises and the action taken thus far during the

Obama presidency.

On the first day of the new administration,

sanctions were authorized against three North Korean

firms under the Arms Export Control Act, along with

several nonproliferation executive orders. The three

firms were KOMID, which had been sanctioned by

other administrations, Sino-Ki and Moksong Trading

Company, which were being sanctioned for the first

time.

The hostile direction of Obama’s policy, how-

ever, has been signaled most clearly by the change

made when the new administration failed to reappoint

Christopher Hill to his position as Assistant Secretary

of State for East Asia and the head of the U.S. negoti-

ation team for the six-party talks with North Korea.

Not only was Hill not reappointed, but the role

of U.S. negotiator with North Korea was downgraded

and split among several different officials. A part time

position was created for an envoy. Another person

would be the U.S. representative to the six-party talks.

And still another official was to be appointed to the

position of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia,

which was Hill’s former position.

Stephen Bosworth accepted the position as

envoy. His official title is Special Representative for

North Korea Policy. Bosworth did so on a part time

Page 27

basis. At the same time, he maintained his full time

position as Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy at Tufts University along with his new

part time job.

There has been little public discussion about

why the Obama administration made such significant

changes. The Boston Globe, in an article about

Bosworth’s appointment, refers to the concerns

expressed by Leon Sigal, the director of the Northeast

Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social

Science Research Council in New York. The article

quotes Sigal saying that there are officials in the new

administration, “who don’t think we can get any-

where, so they don’t want to do the political heavy

lifting to try.”

In contrast to the loss of Hill as a negotiator

with North Korea, the Obama administration reap-

pointed Stuart Levey, as the Under Secretary of the

Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.

Levey’s office in the Treasury Department, was

created in 2004 under George W. Bush. This office

was used to impose economic sanctions on North

Korea. One such action was the freezing of funds that

North Korea had in a bank in Macao, China, the

Banco Delta Asia (BDA).

North Korea was not only denied access to U.S.

$25 million, but it was also denied the use of the

international banking system. This freezing of North

Korean funds was announced shortly after North

Korea and the five other nations who were part of the

six-party talks signed the September 19, 2005 agree-

ment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

The

announcement by the Treasury Department sabotaged

the implementation of this important agreement

which would have gone a long way toward the goal of

denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. North Korea

withdrew from the six-party talks until the $25

million was returned.

It is significant here to note that Levey and his

office briefly came under public scrutiny in 2006

when the New York Times published an article expos-

ing how the office has access to and uses the SWIFT

Data Base to do intelligence work targeting people

and transactions that it claims are in violation of U.S.

law.

The SWIFT Data Base contains the transactions

and identification information for the hundreds of

thousands of people and entities that do electronic

banking transactions using the SWIFT system.

The action by the U.S. Treasury using a section

of the Patriot Act against the Banco Delta Asia Bank,

however, demonstrated that the U.S. government has

the ability to use this data base information against

those it wants to target politically, rather than those

who have committed any actual illegal acts. Testi-

mony by former U.S. government officials to the U.S.

Congress, and documents submitted to the U.S.

government by the bank owner and his lawyer,

demonstrated that there was never any evidence

offered of any illegal acts. Instead the Patriot Act had

been used to allow the U.S. government to act against

this bank for political objectives. (See “Behind the

Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed

at targeting China as well as North Korea?”)

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_vi

ew.asp?menu=c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1

The new positions, designated to negotiate with

North Korea, are at a lower administrative level than

was Hill’s former position. In addition, the Obama

administration, by not reappointing Hill, has lost his

valuable expertise. Hill had effectively countered the

sabotage to negotiations caused by Levey’s office

during the Bush administration.

Hill was met with opposition from some in the

Bush administration at each step along the way.

Remarkably, Hill effectively countered much of this

opposition, making progress in the negotiations. In

August 2008, however, the Bush administration

unilaterally changed what it claimed North Korea’s

obligations were as part of Phase 2 of the six-party

Feb. 2007 agreement, and falsely declared that North

Korea was in violation.

With Hill gone from the North Korean desk at

the State Department, and Levey reappointed to his

position at the Treasury Department, it is significant

that Obama sent an inter-agency group to visit the

capitals of Japan, South Korea and China to discuss

punishments for North Korea. Levey was featured as

one of the U.S. government officials on the trip.

But is punishment appropriate? There has been

no similar effort to open negotiations with North

Korea.

Instead, the U.S. administration has given its

support to Levey and others whose actions have

sabotaged the success of the six-party talks. This

failure of the Obama administration is similar to

previous U.S. policy on North Korea.

Robert Carlin, part of the U.S. government

negotiation team with North Korea under the Clinton

Administration, documents that there were significant

and successful negotiations on 22 issues carried out in

Page 28

the period between 1993 and 2000.

These achieve-

ments, however, could not survive into the transition

to the Bush Administration.

Similarly, Mike Chinoy, a former CNN journal-

ist, in his book Meltdown, documents both the Clinton

years and much of the Bush years. He chronicles how

negotiations were torpedoed not by North Korea, but

by forces within the U.S. government itself.

In addition, the U.S. conducts frequent military

maneuvers close to North Korea which North Korea

has claimed as a threat to its peace and security.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea test launched a

communications satellite using a rocket of advanced

design. This test broke no international law or treaty

to which North Korea is a party.

Still the launch was

condemned by the UN Security Council in a Presiden-

tial Statement. Also new sanctions were imposed on

North Korea, stating as authority, a previous Security

Council Resolution 1718.

North Korea has been the target of hostile acts

by the U.S. North Korea has tested rockets and has

done tests of two nuclear devices, which it claims it

needs as a deterrent. The U.S. has military agreements

with Japan and South Korea, including them under

the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. There is

only an armistice ending the fighting of the Korean

War. The U.S. as the head of the UN command has

not been willing to negotiate a treaty ending the

Korean War.

The failure of the UN Security Council to

explore North Korea’s problems in trying to check

U.S. hostility demonstrates its failure to carry out its

obligations under the UN Charter. The failure of the

Security Council to protect Iraq from U.S. invasion is

a warning that the Security Council should reform its

processes so that it doesn’t just become a vehicle for

the political targeting of a nation as happened with

Iraq.

In his comments to journalists in response to the

sanctions put on North Korea in April 2009, the

Deputy Ambassador to the UN from North Korea,

Pak Tok Hun said, “The recent activity of the security

council concerning the peaceful use of outer space by

my country shows that unless the security council is

totally reformed and democratized we expect nothing

from it.”

The challenge to the nations of the UN is to

provide a more neutral and considered investigation

of the problem it is trying to solve rather than just

carrying out the punishment a P-5 nation may en-

deavor to inflict on another nation.

Notes

1. Karin Lee and Julia Choi, “North Korea: Unilateral and Multi-

lateral Economic Sanctions and U.S. Department of the Treasury

Actions, 1955-April 2009,” National Committee on North Korea,

p. 26.

http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/09035Lee

Choi.pdf

2. James F. Smith, “In role as envoy, Tufts dean carries hard-

earned lessons,” The Boston Globe, May 26, 2009.

http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/05/26/in_r

ole_as_envoy_tufts_dean_carries_hard_earned_lessons/

3. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Asia: Another Abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act,” OhmyNews

International, March 3, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/

articleview/article_view.asp?no=351525&rel_no=1

4. Ronda Hauben, “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia:

Is the policy aimed at targeting China as well as North Korea?,”

OhmyNews International, May 18, 2007.

http://english.ohmy

news.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=362192&rel_no=1

5. Erick Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data Is Sifted by

U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,” New York Times, June 23, 2006.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html?

_r=1

6. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the Six-

Party Talks,” OhmyNews International, September 28, 2008.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no

=383769&rel_no=1

7. Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons

Learned and Forgotten,” Korea Yearbook 2007, Edited by

Rudiger Frank et al, Brill, 2007, p. 235-251.

8. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown, St. Martin’s Press, 2008.

9. Ronda Hauben, “Controversy at UN Over North Korea’s

Launch: Reconvening six-party talks or penalizing Pyongyang?,”

OhmyNews International, April 10, 2009.

http://english.ohmy

news.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=385061&rel_no=1

10. Ronda Hauben, “Security Council’s Ad Hoc Actions Increase

Tension on Korean Peninsula: [Analysis] North Korea responds

by withdrawing from six-party talks as promised,” OhmyNews

International, April 17, 2009.

http://english.ohmynews.com/

articleview/article_view.asp?no=385093&rel_no=1

11. Seumas Milne, “After Iraq It’s Not Just North Korea that

Wants a Bomb,” Guardian Comment Is Free, May 29, 2009.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/27/north-

korea-nuclear-weapons-us

12. Pak Tok Hun, Informal Comments to the Media at the UN

Media Stakeout, April 24, 2009.

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/

ondemand/stakeout/2009/so090424pm2.rm

Page 29

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on

the netizenblog on June 26, 2013 at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/06/26/us-misr

epresents-its-role-as-un-command/]

U.S. Misrepresents its Role

in Korean War and in

Armistice Agreement as UN

Command

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

July 27 of this year will be an important anni-

versary. It will be the 60

anniversary of the Armi-

stice Agreement which provided the means to end the

hostilities of the Korean War.

The armistice was recognized as a temporary

means to stop the military action. It included a recom-

mendation that it be followed by a political confer-

ence three months later to hammer out a political

agreement which would serve as a peace treaty ending

the Korean war. The political conference has never

been held. And no means has yet been created to

settle the unresolved issues of the Korean War.

At the UN on Friday, June 21, the permanent

mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North

Korea, held a press conference.

Sin Son Ho, DPRK’s

Ambassador to the United Nations, presented journal-

ists with a statement outlining the background of a

serious problem remaining from the Korean War, a

problem that needs to be resolved if the tension on the

Korean Peninsula is not to escalate.

He documented how the United States, without

any authority from the United Nations, changed the

name of the Unified Command it was to direct, to the

name ‘UN Command’. This change falsifies the

nature of the U.S. role in the Korean War and in the

Armistice, making it appear that the U.S. is acting

under the authority of the United Nations. The deci-

sions made by what is called the ‘UN Command’ are

made by the U.S. The U.S. is not acting as a subsid-

iary or representative of the UN when it acts under the

name of the “UN Command.” Yet the false appear-

ance given is that the U.S. is acting under the author-

ity of the UN.

The DPRK Ambassador explained how this

misrepresentation was accomplished by the U.S. in

July 1950. On July 7, a Security Council Resolution

(S.C. 84, 1950) was passed putting the U.S. as the

head of what was called in the resolution the Unified

Command, but with no oversight obligations by the

UN for the actions of the U.S. On July 25, 1950, the

U.S. submitted a report to the Security Council in

which it replaced the name Unified Command with

the name ‘UN Command.’

Subsequently, the U.S. uses the designation UN

Command despite the fact that this creates a false

impression that there is a role played by the UN in

Korean Armistice activities. The U.S. even uses UN

Command as its designation in the actual Armistice

Agreement.

The DPRK has at various times tried to get the

U.S. to drop its misleading use of the title UN Com-

mand. In November 1975, Resolution 3390 (XXX) B

was passed by the UN General Assembly calling for

negotiations between the relevant parties so that the

U.S. would no longer use the misleading designation

‘UN Command’ to represent the U.S. military role.

The U.S. has not fulfilled on the obligation to carry

out these negotiations. Instead the U.S. at the time

argued that changing its designation as the UN

Command would affect the oversight provisions

provided for in the Armistice Agreement.

Subsequently, the DPRK points out that in the

60 years since the Armistice Agreement was signed,

any oversight provisions it may have included no

longer exist and the actual decisions regarding the

agreement currently are made through negotiations

between the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the

U.S. military authority.

In view of the facts, Ambassador Sin said, the

existence of the UN Command is an “anachronism.”

Instead of agreeing to dissolve it, however, he ex-

plained, the U.S. is projecting that it can serve as a

“multinational force command” which would consti-

tute the “matrix of an Asian version of NATO.”

Two former UN Secretary-Generals have

spoken out against the continuing use by the U.S.

military of the name ‘UN Command.’ Ambassador

Sin noted that both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi

Annan have gone on record confirming that there is

no UN military activity related to the U.S. claim that

it is the UN Command.

At the June 21 noon press briefing by the

Deputy Spokesman for UN Secretary-General Ban

Ki-moon, a question was raised asking for Ban Ki-

moon’s views on the issue. The journalist asked:

Page 30

As I am sure you know, just now, Sin Son

Ho, the Permanent Representative of the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

held a press conference in which he said

he called for the dismantling of the “UN

Command” uh, in South Korea, and he

said it is not really a UN body at all, and

quoted Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi

Annan to that effect. So what I wonder is

as, as, the office of the Secretary-General,

Ban Ki-moon, as the head of the UN

system, has, does he, what is his position

on the legal status in terms of the UN of

the ‘UN Command’? And separately, does

he have any, what…would be, what’s his

response to a call to, to dismantle this

entity?

In apparent agreement with the DPRK, Deputy

Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, Eduardo del

Buey responded:

But the United Nations has never had any

role in the command of any armed forces

deployed in the Korean peninsula. In

particular, the United Nations did not at

any time have any role in the command of

the forces that operated in Korea under the

Unified Command between 1950 and

1953.

In response, to the part of the question relating

to Ban Ki-moon’s view on the U.S. representing itself

as the UN Command, the Deputy Spokesperson

promised a future reply. He noted that:

Well, first of all, as you know, the

Secretary-General is just getting off the

plane from China now, so he is going to

be reading the transcript of the statement

by the Permanent Representative of the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

and we’ll have something later on to say.

To an e-mail asking for further clarification of the

Secretary-General’s view about the DPRK’s call for

the dissolution of the ‘UN Command,’ the Deputy

Spokesperson answered by referring to the Secretary-

General’s view that with respect to an issue related to

the Armistice Agreement:

This is a matter for the parties to the

Agreement. The United Nations is not

party to the Armistice Agreement.

Does this mean Ban Ki-moon believes that the

misuse of the UN name by the U.S. is an issue to be

solved by the parties to the Armistice Agreement, and

is not a concern for the UN?

In his press briefing Ambassador Sin said that if

the U.S. did not dissolve the UN Command, the

DPRK is considering once again pursuing this issue

at the UN General Assembly, which in November

1975 had already urged the U.S. to dissolve the UN

Command (See 3390(XXX)B 1975).

Ambassador Sin explained that “due to the

existence of the ‘UN Command’, the security mecha-

nism on the Korean peninsula has become war-

oriented not peace-oriented.”

“In other words,” he elaborated, “the existence

of the ‘UN Command’ is not serving the peace

building efforts on the Korean peninsula. On the

contrary, it is the root of evil or tumor laying a step-

ping stone for the U.S. armed forces of aggression

toward the DPRK and the realization of the America’s

Pivot to Asia strategy.”

Ambassador Sin proposed that “If the United

States has real intention to put an end to hostile

relation with the DPRK, it should make the right

decision to dissolve the ‘UN Command’ and replace

the Armistice Agreement with a peace regime as

proposed by the DPRK this year when we mark the

year since the Armistice Agreement was signed.”

Notes

1. Press conference June 21, 2013, Ambassador Sin Son Ho at

the UN.

http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/watch/

ambassador-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-representative-of-the-

democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-the-un-press-

conference/2498682301001

A text version of the statement presented is online at:

http://www.4thmedia.org/2013/06/26/illegitimacy-and-injustice-

of-the-un-command-in-south-korea-dprk-calls-for-its-immediate-

dissolution/ For an earlier version of the statement, see: KCNA,

“DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum” January 14,

2013.

2. Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the

Secretary-General June 21, 2013.

http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2013/db130621.doc.htm

3. E-mail from Eduardo del Buey on June 25, 2013.

Page 31

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on

the netizenblog on August 31, 2013 at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/08/31/united-n

ations-command-as-camouflage/]

United Nations Command As

Camouflage:

On the Role of the UN in the

Unending Korean War

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

I – Some Background

The story of the Korean War is a story not often

told. Yet sixty years after the agreement to end the

military hostilities on July 27, 1953, there is not yet a

peace treaty to end the war. This article on the occa-

sion of the 60

Anniversary of the Armistice Agree-

ment is intended as a contribution to the body of

research and study needed to find the underlying

cause of the bottleneck impeding the negotiation of a

peace treaty so a breakthrough can be made.

Korea, which had been one nation for over 1000

years, had been forcibly divided at the end of WWII.

By the UN legitimating an election in the South of

Korea in May 1948 which was boycotted by many

Koreans and from which all North Koreans and many

South Koreans were excluded, a formal structural

division was created which continues until today.

The significant aspect of the UN supported election

was that it led to an official government structure for

only the southern part of Korea, thus solidifying the

division of Korea. The government structure created

in the South by the election was a repressive govern-

ment structure. One view of the military conflict that

became known as the Korean War was that it was a

civil war that was trying to restore Korea as one

country.

The U.S. Government response to the fighting

which broke out in June 1950 in Korea was to perpet-

uate support for the repressive government that the

U.S. and UN had put in place as the Republic of

Korea (more commonly known as South Korea). This

is the context in which the United Nations Security

Council resolutions of June and July 1950 authorizing

UN participation in the Korean War took place.

The question that led me to begin this study

was:

What Was the Role of the UN in the Korean War and

What Should be the Role of the UN in Bringing an

End to the War?

It is important to take into account that before

any action was taken on the part of the UN on June

27, 1950 authorizing intervention in the Korean War,

the U.S. had decided and began to send military

support to the South Korean side of the conflict. The

independent journalist, I.F. Stone in his book, “The

Hidden History of the Korean War,” describes this

U.S. action as forcing the UN Security Council to

support the U.S. Government action in Korea.

Stone writes:

When Truman ‘ordered the United States

air and sea forces to give the Korean

Government troops cover and support’ he

was in effect imposing military sanctions

before they had been authorized by the

Security Council. The Council had to vote

sanctions or put itself in the position of

opposing the action taken by the United

States. For governments dependent on

American bounty and themselves fearful

of Soviet expansion, that was too much to

expect, though again Yugoslavia had the

courage to vote ‘No,’ an act of principle

for which it got no credit from the Soviet

bloc while antagonizing the United States

to which it owed its Council seat.

By acting before the Security Council could act,

the U.S. was in violation of Article 2(7) of the UN

Charter which requires a Security Council action

under Chapter VII before there is any armed interven-

tion into the internal affairs of another nation unless

the arms are used in self-defense. (See Article 51 of

the UN Charter. The U.S. armed intervention in

Korea was clearly not an act of self defense for the

U.S.) Also the actions of the UN have come to be

referred to as the actions of the “United Nations Com-

mand”(UNC), but this designation is not to be found

in the June and July 1950 Security Council resolu-

tions authorizing participation in the Korean War.

What is the significance of the U.S. using the UN in

these ways?

The current U.S. military command in South

Korea claims to wear three hats: Command of U.S.

troops in South Korea, Combined Forces Command

(U.S. and South Korean troops), and “United Nations

Command” with responsibilities with respect to the

Page 32

Armistice. The United Nations, however, has no role

in the oversight or decision making processes of the

“United Nations Command.” The U.S. Government is

in control of the “United Nations Command.” The use

by the U.S. of the designation “United Nations

Command,” however, creates and perpetuates the

misconception that the UN is in control of the actions

and decisions taken by the U.S. under the “United

Nations Command.”

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(more commonly referred to as North Korea) has

called for disbanding the “United Nations Com-

mand”(UN Command). At a press conference held at

the United Nations on June 21, 2013, the North

Korean Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Sin Son

Ho argued that the actions of the U.S. Government

using the designation “United Nations Command” are

not under any form of control by the United Nations.

Since the UN has no role in the decision making

process of what the U.S. does under the title of the

“United Nations Command,” North Korea contends

the U.S. should cease its claim that it is acting as the

“United Nations Command.”

II – UN Authorized “Unified Command”

Looking at the Security Council resolutions

related to Korea that were passed in June and July

1950, it is clear that the content of these resolutions

supports North Korea’s argument. During this period

the UN Security Council passed four resolutions.

They are:

S.C. 82 (V)-S/1501 on June 25, 1950

S.C. 83 (V)-S/1511 on June 27, 1950

S.C. 84 (V)-S/1588 on July 7, 1950

S.C. 85 (V)-S/1657 July 31, 1950

None of these resolutions refers to a “United

Nations Command” or gives the United States per-

mission to call itself the United Nations Command.

The last two of these resolutions refer to a

“Unified Command.” S.C. Resolution 84 of July 7,

1950 is the first Security Council resolution to refer to

the creation of a “Unified Command.” The language

of the resolution says that the Security Council,

“Recommends that all members providing forces and

other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security

Council resolution make such forces and other assis-

tance available to a Unified Command under the

United States of America.”

The resolution states that the Security Council

requests the United States to designate the com-

mander of such forces, and it authorizes the “Unified

Command” at its discretion to use the United Nations

flag “concurrently with the flags of the various

nations participating.”

S.C. Resolution 84 also made the request that

“the United States…provide the Security Council

with reports as appropriate on the course of action

taken under the Unified Command.”

In subsequent action by the Security Council

during this period, the members of the Security

Council, were careful to refer to the U.S. command of

the Korean War forces related to the United Nations

as the “Unified Command.”

Therefore, when reviewing the action by the

U.S. to designate itself as the “United Nations Com-

mand,” the question is raised as to how, why and by

whom the designation “United Nations Command”

was substituted for the Security Council designation

of a “Unified Command.”

S.C. Resolution 84 was passed on July 7 using

the designation “Unified Command.” The following

day, on July 8, the U.S. President Harry Truman

appointed General Douglas MacArthur to head this

Command. A Memo referring to this appointment,

states that with this appointment, General MacArthur

was designated as the Commander of the “Unified

Command.”

In the period immediately following the passing

of UN Security Council Resolution 84, U.S. Ambas-

sador Warren Austin refers to the U.S. government

command as the “Unified Command.”

For example, “A Letter to the UN Secretary-

General from Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the

UN,” on July 12, says:

(…)I have the honor to inform you that

the President of the United States, in

response to the Security Council resolu-

tion of 7 July 1950, has on 8 July desig-

nated General Douglas MacArthur as the

Commanding General of the military

forces which the Members of the United

Nations place under the Unified Com-

mand of the United States pursuant to the

United Nations effort to assist the Repub-

lic of Korea.

Similarly the “Unified Command” was the

designation used in a letter dated 24 July 1950 trans-

mitting the first Report from General MacArthur to

the Security Council. The Report is titled, “First

Report to the Security Council by the United States

Page 33

Government on the course of action taken under the

Unified Command (USG).”

III – U.S. Substitutes “United Nations

Command” as Camouflage

It appears that it was in a U.S. Government

communiqué dated July 25 that the designation “UN

Command” was first officially used in a U.S. Govern-

ment communication to the UN. This document was

titled, “Communique Number 135 of the Far East

Command S/1629 25 July 1950.” It states:

The United Nations Command with Head-

quarters in Tokyo was officially estab-

lished today with General Douglas Mac-

Arthur as Commander-in-Chief. The

announcement was made in General Order

No. 1, General Headquarters, United

Nations Command. The order reads:

1. In response to the resolution of the

Security Council of the United Nations of

July 7, 1950, the President of the United

States has designated the undersigned

Commander-in-Chief of the Military

Forces this date the United Nations Com-

mand. Pursuant thereto, there is estab-

lished this date the United Nations Com-

mand, with General Headquarters in To-

kyo, Japan.

According to this communiqué dated July 25,

1950, it is the President of the United States not the

United Nations that was responsible for creating the

designation “United Nations Command,” as a replace-

ment for the UN authorized “Unified Command.” The

communiqué alleges that this was done to fulfill the

obligations of S.C. Resolution 84 of July 7. It is

evident, however, from reading the resolution of July

7 that there is no reference in that resolution to a

“United Nations Command.”

Why did the U.S. government substitute the

designation “United Nations Command” for the

Security Council designation “Unified Command”

after initially referring to the designation of “Unified

Command,” language which was actually provided

for in the Security Council resolution of July 7?

There are accounts that are helpful in under-

standing what was going on behind the scenes at the

time that can give clues to solve this puzzle. One such

account is provided by an article by James W Houck

titled, “The Command and Control of United Nation

Forces In the Era of Peace Enforcement.”

At the time

he wrote this article in the early 1990s, Houck was

Force Judge Advocate for the Commander of the U.S.

Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain.

Houck writes that UN Secretary-General Trygve

Lie and some of the countries on the Security Coun-

cil, namely the U.K., France and Norway were in

favor of creating a structure to provide for a United

Nations role in the Korean operations.

Houck describes how, “During the negotiations

preceding authorization of the unified command,

Secretary-General Trygve Lie had proposed a ‘com-

mittee as coordination of assistance for Korea’

consisting of troop contributing states and the Repub-

lic of Korea.”

While the explicit purpose of the committee,

Secretary-General Lie explained, was, “to stimulate

and coordinate offers of assistance, its deeper purpose

was to keep the United Nations ‘in the picture’,” as

Lie himself writes in his recollections of his seven-

year term as UN Secretary-General. He explains that

his purpose was, “to promote continuing United

Nations participation in and supervision of the mili-

tary security action in Korea of a more intimate and

undistracted character than the Security Council could

be expected to provide.”

The U.S., however, was opposed to the idea of

such a supervisory committee and had the power to

turn it down. This effectively left the U.S. in control

of the decisions regarding what was to be done in the

UN authorized operations of the Korean War.

“From the start of the Korean conflict,” Houck

explains, “the United States exercised both political

control and strategic direction over the operation.”

Though the Security Council authorized the U.S.

intervention in the Korean War, the Security Council

failed to fulfill its obligation under the UN Charter to

act as the political authority for military actions taken

under the authority of the UN Security Council.

Implicit in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter is that it is the

Security Council that can exercise force not that it can

cede its authority to others.

Instead of the United Nations fulfilling its

charter obligations, however, as Houck documents,

“The United Nations, did not interfere at all in the

purely military aspects of the operation and even in

political matters it confined itself to making recom-

mendations.”

Corroborating Houck’s account, a military

historian, James Schnabel in his account of the first

Page 34

year of the Korean War, describes why the U.S.

government was opposed to the Committee favored

by Trygve Lie and several Security Council members.

Schnabel explains that the response of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff was to oppose such a project. They

were hostile to the potential of such a committee to

try to control military operations.

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Schnabel writes,

“wanted a command arrangement in which the United

States, as executive agent for the United Nations,

would direct the Korean operation, with no positive

contact between the field commander and the United

Nations.”

Though the U.S. Government had turned down

the political oversight committee proposed by the

Secretary-General, there was, according to Schnabel,

a recognition that the unilateral political and military

control the U.S. Government exercised over the

“Unified Command” was problematic. The Chiefs of

Staff directed MacArthur “to avoid any appearance of

unilateral American action in Korea.”

As Schnabel writes,”For worldwide political

reasons,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed that, “it is

important to emphasize repeatedly the fact our opera-

tions are in support of the United Nations Security

Council.”

According to Schnabel, “this led General

MacArthur to identify himself whenever practicable

as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command

(CINCUNC), and whenever justified, would empha-

size in his communiqués the activities of forces of

other member nations.”

Noting that the State Department proposed to

the Secretary of Defense that reports be sent to the

Security Council each week, Schnabel writes, “These

would keep world attention on the fact that the United

States was fighting in Korea for the United Nations,

not itself.” But these reports were not required and

were not a mechanism for UN supervision over the

U.S. activities or decision making processes.

Decisions on the operations of MacArthur’s

command were made by the U.S. Government, writes

Schnabel. The United Nations at no time in the

Korean War sought to interfere in the control of

operations which were the responsibility of the United

States. As MacArthur later testified to a Senate

investigating committee, “…my connections with the

United Nations was largely nominal…everything I

did came from our own Chiefs of Staff…. The con-

trols over me were exactly the same as though the

forces under me were all Americans. All of my

communications were to the American high command

here.”

IV – “United Nations Command” as

Achilles Heel

UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, however,

points out that the insistence on unilateral control of

the conduct of the War waged in Korea by the U.S.

had its Achilles heel. Lie wrote, “As the Korean War

developed, Washington complained, and had reason

to complain, that the United States was carrying too

much of a burden; but its unwillingness, in those early

days, when the pattern of the police action was being

set, to accord the United Nations a larger measure of

direction and thereby participation no doubt contrib-

uted to the tendency of the Members to let Washing-

ton assume most of the responsibility for the fight-

ing.”

So an interesting anomaly emerges. The UN

resolution authorizing military action in Korea spoke

about a “Unified Command” and the original resolu-

tion the UN Secretary-General proposed included a

mechanism for the UN to supervise the military

action. This control was rejected by the U.S. govern-

ment, and it appears, the UN never pressed to exert its

supervision over the conduct of the Korean War. This

control was thus ceded to the U.S. government.

While the U.S. government had total control

over the Korean campaign it was waging, it appears

that it also needed a means to camouflage the unilat-

eral nature of this operation. The designation “United

Nations Command,” which the U.S. government

assigned to its operation, replaced the designation of

the “Unified Command” described in Security Coun-

cil Resolution 84. This change of name provided the

camouflage to hide the unilateral nature of the U.S.

command and control and of its conduct of the war

against North Korea.

The U.S. Government needed the appearance

that its unilateral actions were on behalf of and under

the United Nations. This was provided by changing

the designation of the Command from the “Unified

Command” to the “United Nations Command.” The

change of name helped to create the needed mislead-

ing appearance. Similarly, the reports that the U.S.

Government voluntarily submitted to the UN Security

Council were titled, “Reports of the United Nations

Command.” This made it appear that the U.S. was

Page 35

conducting the war on behalf of the UN and under its

supervision.

This misleading designation continues to exist

today over 60 years after it was created, thereby

continuing to give the world the false impression that

the campaign waged by the U.S. in Korea was and

continues to be a United Nations operation and that

even today the UN has a presence on the Korean

Peninsula.

While the UN did not participate in the decision

making process of the military campaign carried out

in its name, it played a role then and continues to play

a role by allowing the U.S. Government to appropri-

ate the United Nations name as a camouflage cover

for the actions of the U.S. Government. What is the

UN responsibility in such a matter for what was done,

and for what continues to be done in its name? That is

the essence of the question raised by North Korea’s

call that the “United Nations Command” be dissolved.

V – Conclusion

The research represented in this paper presents

a curious, but significant irony. The UN authorized

Member States to intervene in the Korean War, to

form the “Unified Command,” to use the UN flag

along with the flags of the member states participat-

ing in the “Unified Command,” and it authorized the

U.S. to appoint a Commander in Chief for the “Uni-

fied Command.”

According to the obligation required under the

UN Charter, and to the original efforts of Trygve Lie,

with support from three Security Council members,

namely, the U.K., France, and Norway, there was an

effort to set up a political entity that would oversee

the Korean War operation for the Security Council.

The U.S., however, rejected the proposal and

succeeded in controlling the political and the strategic

direction for the Korean War. After rejecting the UN

proposal for UN supervision over U.S. actions and

decisions, the U.S. put itself forward as the “United

Nations Command.” Thus assuming the cloak of the

United Nations, by referring to itself as the United

Nations. This mechanism served as a means to mis-

represent the U.S. Government’s unilateral actions

and decision making processes in the Korean War.

Recently several UN Secretary-Generals,

including Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Gali,

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon have acknowledged that the U.S. was in

charge of the Command structure of the Korean War

activity taken under the authority of the “Unified

Command,” and that the United Nations had no role

in overseeing the actions undertaken in the name of

the UN. The statement is made that the UN “never

had any role in the command of any armed forces

deployed in the Korean peninsula.”

The difficulty raised by such a claim, however,

is that it evades the salient fact that the Security

Council authorized the U.S. to assume this role in

violation of the obligations implicit in the UN Charter

that the UN exercise supervision over the political,

and strategic decision making processes of an action

approved under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Therefore, there is some truth to the statements

of Boutros Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan, and Ban Ki-

moon that the UN had no role in the command of the

military activity carried out under its name in Korea.

Specifically as the Spokesperson for Ban Ki-moon

stated recently,”The UN did not at any time have any

role in the command of the forces that operated in

Korea in 1950-1953.”

But what this leaves out is that the UN autho-

rized the U.S. to designate the Commander of the

“Unified Command.” Then, however, under pressure

from the U.S., the UN failed to exercise its obligation

to supervise the actions of the “Unified Command.”

Subsequently, the UN continues to evade

fulfilling its obligations by continuing to allow the

U.S. to claim that it is the “United Nations Com-

mand” in Korea and in failing to provide its political

supervision over what the U.S. has done and contin-

ues to do in Korea in the name of the UN.

The DPRK proposal is that the U.S. cease to call

itself the “United Nations Command.” It is important

to include a recognition of how the U.S. Government

activity represents a continuing violation of the UN

Charter.

Recently, in response to a question, the Spokes-

person for Ban Ki-moon said that the issues of the

Korean Armistice are issues that do not concern the

United Nations as the United Nations is not a party to

the Armistice.

Why then has the United Nations

allowed the U.S. to continue to use the designation,

“United Nations Command” to misrepresent itself as

acting under the control of the UN in the Armistice?

Unless the UN takes responsibility for allowing

the U.S. to claim the authority of the United Nations

in its continuing actions as part of the Armistice, the

UN is continuing to allow actions in violation of the

UN Charter. If there is a “United Nations Command”

Page 36

that is part of the Korean Armistice Agreement, such

a command must be under the political and strategic

direction of the UN Security Council. Otherwise, the

authority of the UN Charter is being treated as a

charade to justify U.S. Government unilateral activity

under the camouflage of the UN name. It is as if the

UN is but a set of words to hide the illegal acts of one

of the Great Powers.

VI – Epilogue

There is another significant aspect of the con-

duct of the U.S. government with respect to its initiat-

ing and intervening into the Korean War. This has to

do with the role played by the U.S. Government in

bypassing not only the requirements of the UN

Charter, but also the requirement of the U.S. Constitu-

tion.

The UN Charter specifies that all military action

taken to intervene in another country requires a

resolution of the Security Council under Chapter 7.

Yet the U.S. government made the decision and began

to act on that decision to intervene in the Korean

conflict before there was any such action by the UN

Security Council. This represented a violation by the

U.S. Government of the UN Charter.

Similarly, the U.S. Executive Branch violated

the provision of the U.S. Constitution requiring that

no decision to go to war can be made without a

Congressional Declaration of War. There was no such

declaration with respect to the U.S. Government

waging war on the Korean peninsula.

There is a provision in the UN Charter, Article

43(3) which states that member states participating in

military actions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter

are obliged to have such actions “subject to the

signatory states in accordance with their respective

constitutional processes,”

In his article “The Korean War: On what Legal

Basis Did Truman Act?” Louis Fisher who is a

specialist in Constitutional Law, points to the consti-

tutional violation represented by Truman’s sending

U.S. troops to the Korean War.

Truman used as an illegitimate excuse that the

act had been authorized by the UN Security Council.

Fisher’s article describes the extensive debate in the

U.S. Congress before joining the UN to consider if it

was appropriate for the U.S. government to claim that

a Security Council resolution justified bypassing U.S.

Constitutional obligations.

In his appearance before the House Committee

on Foreign Relations then Under Secretary of State

Dean Acheson explained that “only after the President

receives the approval of Congress is he ‘bound to

furnish that contingent of troops to the Security

Council’.”

Not only did Truman commit troops and aid to

South Korea before the Security Council called it a

military action, but more importantly, no action of the

Security Council authorizes the U.S. government to

violate the U.S. Constitution. For the U.S. govern-

ment to wage war, the U.S. Constitution requires that

the U.S. Congress make the decision that authorizes

that war.

Though other artifices were employed to evade

U.S. Constitutional obligation, such as calling the

Korean War a “police action,” U.S. Courts rejected

such subterfuges.

Responding to these subterfuges, Vito

Marcantonio, the American Congressman from N.Y.

for the American Labor Party said, “When we agreed

to the United Nations Charter we never agreed to

supplant our Constitution with the United Nations

Charter. The power to declare and make war is vested

in the representations of the people, in the Congress

of the United States.

Commenting on this same situation, Justice

Felix Frankfurter argued, “Illegality cannot attain

legitimacy through practice. Presidential acts of war,

including Truman’s initiative in Korea can never be

accepted as constitutional or as a legal substitute for

Congressional approval.”

Notes

1. See for example: Jay Hauben, “Is the UN Role in Korea 1947-

1953 the Model Being Repeated Today?”

http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/UN-Role-in-Korea.doc

2. I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New

York, 1952, p. 75. By August 1, 1950, the Soviet Union had

returned to the Security Council ending its 6-month boycott and

so there were no further UN resolutions authorized by the

Security Council supporting UN participation in the Korean War.

3. See for example: Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Misrepresents its Role

in Korean War and in Armistice Agreement as UN Command,”

taz blogs, June 26, 2013.

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/06/

26/ us-misrepresents-its-role-as-un-command

4. Press conference June 21, 2013, Ambassador Sin Son Ho at

the UN. http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/

watch/ambassador-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-representative-of-

the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-the-un-press-

conference/2498682301001 A text version of the statement

presented is online at: http://www.4thmedia.org/2013/06/26/

illegitimacy-and-injustice-of-the-un-command-in-south-korea-

Page 37

dprk-calls-for-its-immediate-dissolution/

5. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War

Policy and Direction: The First Year, available at:

ht t p : / /www .h is t or y. a r my . mi l / h t ml / b o o k s / 0 2 0/ 2 0 -

1/CMH_Pub_20-1.pdf. See p. 102, f/n 6 “Memo, JCS for Secy.

Defense, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Designation of a United Nations Unified

Comdr by the United States.”

6. James W. Houck, “The Command and Control of United

Nations Forces in the Era of ‘Peace Enforcement’,” Duke

Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 4, No 1,

1993.

7. See Houck, p. 13 f/n 51.

8. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, New York, p. 334.

9. Houck, p. 12. “None of the resolutions (referring to the June

and July S.C. resolutions-ed),” writes Houck, provided for

Security Council control over the ensuing operation despite the

fact that it would be conducted under Security Council authoriza-

tion.”

10. See Articles 42, 44, 46 and 48 of the UN Charter. These

articles authorize the Security Council to use force. There is no

article in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which authorizes the

Security Council to cede political decision making to a member

state to carry out a Chapter 7 action.

11. Schnabel, p. 103, Rad, WAR 85743, DA to CINCFE, Jul. 12,

50.

12. Schnabel, p. 104, f/n 10. See MacArthur Hearings, p. 10.

13. Lie, p. 334.

14. Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for

the Secretary-General, June 21, 2013.

http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2013/db130621.doc.htm

15. E-mail received from Eduardo del Buey on June 25, 2013.

16. See I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New

York, 1952, p. 75.

17. Louis Fisher, “The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did

Truman Act?,” American Journal of International Law, Jan.

1995. (89 Am J. Int’l L. 21), p. 30.

18. Fisher, p. 34.

19. Fisher, p. 35.

20. Fisher, p. 38.

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Feb.14, 2007]

Book Review: The Hidden

History of the Korean War*

by Jay Hauben

[email protected]

The Hidden History of the Korean War

By I. F. Stone

364 pages. Monthly Review Press. 1952, 1970.

The controversial book, The Hidden History of

the Korean War by I. F. Stone was originally pub-

lished in 1952 during the Korean War (1950-1953)

and republished in 1970 during the Vietnam War

(1960-1975). It raised questions about the origin of

the Korean War, made a case that the United States

government manipulated the United Nations, and

gave evidence that the U.S. military and South Ko-

rean oligarchy dragged out the war by sabotaging the

peace talks.

Publishing such a book in the U.S. during the

time of

McCarthyism, while the war was still continu-

ing was an act of journalistic courage. Forty years

later, declassified U.S., Soviet and People’s Republic

of China (PRC) documents both confirmed some and

corrected some of Stone’s story.

Until his death in 1989, Stone was an experi-

enced and respected, independent, left-wing journalist

and iconoclast. This book-length feat of journalism,

with over 600 citations for his quotes and materials,

is a testament to Stone’s search for a way to

strengthen his readers to think for themselves, rather

than be overwhelmed by official stories and war

propaganda.

The standard telling was that the Korean War

was an unprovoked aggression by the North Koreans

beginning on June 25, 1950, undertaken at the behest

of the Soviet Union to extend the Soviet sphere of

influence to the whole of Korea, completely surpris-

ing the South Koreans, the U.S., and the UN.

But was it a surprise? Could an attack by 70,000

men using at least 70 tanks launched simultaneously

at four different points have been a surprise?

Stone gathers contemporary reports from South

Korean, U.S. and UN sources documenting what was

known before June 25. The head of the U.S. CIA,

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenloetter, is reported to

have said on the record, “that American intelligence

was aware that ‘conditions existed in Korea that could

have meant an invasion this week or next.’” (p. 2)

Stone writes that “America’s leading military com-

mentator, Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times, a

trusted confidant of the Pentagon, reported that they

[U.S. military documents] showed ‘a marked buildup

by the North Korean People’s Army along the 38

Parallel beginning in the early days of June.’” (p. 4)

How and why did U.S. President Truman so

quickly decide by June 27 to commit the U.S. military

to battle in South Korea? Stone makes a strong case

that there were those in the U.S. government and

military who saw a war in Korea and the resulting

instability in East Asia as in the U.S. national interest.

Page 38

Stone presents the ideas and actions of them, includ-

ing John Foster Dulles, General Douglas MacArthur,

President Syngman Rhee and Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek, which appear to amount to a willingness to

see the June 25 military action by North Korea as

another Pearl Harbor in order to “commit the United

States more strongly against Communism in the Far

East.” (p. 21). Their reasoning may have been, Stone

thought, the sooner a war with China and/or Russia

the better, before both become stronger. President

Truman removed Secretary of Defense Louis John-

son, according to Stone’s account, because Johnson

had been selling this doctrine of a preventive war. (p.

93)

Stone shows that Truman committed the U.S.

military to the war in Korea, then went to the UN for

sanctions against North Korea. “It was neither honor-

able nor wise,” Stone argues, “for the UN under

pressure from an interested great power to condemn

a country for aggression without investigation and

without hearings its side of the case.” (p. 50) But that

is what the U.S. insisted should happen using, Stone

argues, distorted reports to rush its case.

Then when the war came to a stalemate at the

Parallel, Stone makes a strong case that U.S.

Army headquarters provoked or created incidents to

derail the cease-fire negotiations. When the North

Koreans and Chinese had ceded on Nov. 4, 1952 to

the three demands of the UN side, the U. S. military

spread a story that “The Communists had brutally

murdered 5,500 American prisoners.” The talks were

being dragged out, the U.S. military argued, because

“The communists don’t want to have to answer

questions about what happened to their prisoners” and

they are lower than “barbarians.” (pp. 324-25) At no

time after these reports were these “atrocities” re-

ported again or documented. But hope of a cease-fire

subsided.

Stone takes the story in time only a little beyond

the dismissal of MacArthur on April 11, 1951. He

quotes press reports as late as January 1952 that

“there still could be American bombing and naval

blockade of Red China if Korean talks fail.”

The evidence which Stone presents is solid but

circumstantial. What else could it be, with the official

documents still unavailable? In the 1960s, the Rand

Corporation, a major think tank originally funded by

the U.S. Air Force, conducted studies with additional

information and according to one reviewer came to

“almost identical conclusions” as Stone.

Stone’s telling of the history of the Korean War,

emphasizing the opportunistic response by the forces

in the U.S. advocating rollback and also downplaying

the role of the Soviet Union challenged the dominant

assumption that this was Stalin’s war. “Until the

release of Western documents in the 1970s, prompted

a new wave of literature on the war, his remained a

minority view.”

Then in the 1990s, documents from the former

Soviet archives became available, as did telegrams

and other sources from the PRC archives. Scholars

examining these documents and fitting the pieces

together were able to make the case that Kim Il-sung

had sought and eventually received Soviet support for

a military effort to unify Korea. Stone had been

wrong to suspect that General MacArthur and John

Foster Dulles somehow colluded in the start of the

Korean War.

But Stone did a service by documenting the role

of sectors of U.S. policymakers looking for an oppor-

tunity to push the USSR and the PRC back from

Northeast Asia. Bruce Cummings studied the detailed

policy debate in the U.S. which lead to the policy of

active containment. Cummings’s book, The Origins

of the Korean War, Volume II gives substance to the

internal fight between supporters of rollback and

those who supported containment, which for Stone

was journalistic speculation.

In 1952 when it was published, The Hidden

History of the Korean War met with almost a com-

plete press blackout and boycott. But that included no

rebuttals or answers from official U.S. sources. There

was a republication in 1970 and the book has been

translated at least into Spanish, Italian, and Japanese.

Some chapters also appeared in French. Used copies

are still available, especially from online booksellers.

I. F. Stone’s case is thought provoking and

helpful, especially when tensions are being stirred up

again on the Korean Peninsula, and manipulated wars

are still in style. Perhaps however journalism like that

of Stone’s and lessons from the first Korean War can

make a second Korean War less likely.

Notes

1. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 1952.

2. Stephen E. Ambrose, Professor of Maritime History at the

Naval College in the Baltimore Sun.

3. Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War:

The State of Historical Knowledge,” in The Korean War in

World History, edited by William Stueck, University Press of

Page 39

Kentucky, 2004, page 63.

4. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II:

The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950, Princeton University

Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990.

* This book review originally appeared on OhmyNews Interna-

tional at: http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/

article_view.asp?no=345425&rel_no=1

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben (1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

The Amateur Computerist invites submissions.

Articles can be submitted via e-mail:

mailto:[email protected]

Permission is given to reprint articles from this issue in a

non profit publication provided credit is given, with name

of author and source of article cited.

The opinions expressed in articles are those of their

authors and not necessarily the opinions of the Amateur

Computerist newsletter. We welcome submissions from

a spectrum of viewpoints.

ELECTRONIC EDITION

ACN Webpage:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

All issues from1988 to present of the Amateur Computerist

are on-line at:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/NewIndex.pdf

Page 40