The Amateur
Computerist
Winter 2017 Forces Working for Peaceful Conflict Resolution Volume 28 No. 2
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 1
Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan Tragedy. . Page 2
Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Controversy Page 5
Security Council Acts in Accord with UN Charter. Page 9
UN Acts to Calm Tension on Korean Peninsula . . . . Page 13
Diplomacy to Build Dialogue with North Korea. . Page 19
BKM Asked to Initiate Korea Peace Process. . . Page 20
Media War at UN: Netizen Journalism Matters . Page 22
BKM's Idea of Leadership vs Candlelight Model . . . Page 34
Introduction
Needed: A Secretary-General
Who Will Support Forces
Working for the Peaceful
Resolution of Conflicts
Volume 28 No. 1 of the Amateur Computerist
documents how the last Secretary-General, Ban Ki-
moon failed to fulfill on his promise to “encourage
and facilitate the continued work for peace, security
and reunification in the Korean Peninsula.” Volume
28 No. 2, this issue, endeavored to demonstrate how
other forces worked to contribute to this goal.
This issue includes articles published either in
OhmyNews International (OMNI) or on the netizen
blog at http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/. These articles
describe activities by netizens like blogger Loman,
activists from organizations like PSPD or Spark,
Security Council members like Mexico, the Russian
Federation, China and Nigeria, NGO rights organiza-
tions like Asian Forum for Human Rights, the Asian
Human Rights Commission, UN Officials like the UN
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right of Opinion and Expression, Diplomats
advocating Out of the Box Diplomacy like Governor
Bill Richardson and Ambassador Donald Gregg,
Women Peace Activists, who are from South Korea,
North Korea, Japan, U.S., the Russian Federation and
China trying to have enforcement of UN Resolution
1325, newspapers like Hankyoreh and OhmyNews
International, researchers like Michael Hauben and
many unnamed netizen journalists working to uncover
and spread knowledge of an accurate account of the
forces at work in conflict situations. These are but
some of the efforts documented in the pages of this
issue.
Also demonstrated is the fact that there are
processes within the UN system and procedures
which could help to bring a broader view of the nature
of a conflict into the heart of the UN and UNSC
procedures.
One such procedure is mandated in the UN
Charter. This is Chapter V Article 32. This article
provides for the discussion of a conflict situation by
the members of the Security Council inside the
Council itself and with the parties to the conflict as
part of the discussion. This is what the Mexican
presidency of the Security Council in June 2010
provided for in line with the obligation of the UN
Charter.
A second useful procedure is provided for in the
Appendix to the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the
Security Council. This procedure referred to by the
notation S/NC provides a means for private individu-
als and non-governmental entities to send communi-
cation to the Security Council. This procedure has
been in force since 1946. It provides a means for
those wanting to send correspondence to the Security
Council to have a channel to do so, and has provided
a means for a monthly or periodic list published by
the UN Secretariat. Security Council members could
review this list and ask for copies of correspondence
which would be provided to them by the Secretariat.
Recently, however, these procedures have been
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/
Page 1
weakened. For example, the address where to send
correspondence to the Security Council to has not
been published, and only a partial list of what has
been received would be published only one time a
year. Similarly Chapter V, Article 32 is often ignored
by the Security Council which makes its decisions to
punish one party in a conflict without hearing from all
sides. Thus the procedures that were created within
the UN itself to provide for the peaceful resolution of
conflicts are often ignored by member nations,
especially the most powerful member nations. Simi-
larly, at least two examples of open letters to the
Secretary General are referred to in this issue but in
such cases the last Secretary General did not provide
any response to these letters.
The articles in this issue of the Amateur
Computerist can help to demonstrate that there are
forces working within conflict situations which are
making important contributions to the peaceful
resolution of the conflict. A Secretary-General work-
ing for the peaceful resolution of conflicts would do
well to pay attention to such forces and find the
means to give them much needed support.
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in
OhmyNews International on June 8, 2010, at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_vi
ew.asp?no=386108&rel_no=1]
Netizens Question Cause of
Cheonan Tragedy
Online media challenge claims that
North Korea is responsible for sink-
ing the Cheonan
by Ronda Hauben
The South Korean government headed by Lee
Myung-bak is trying to dispel criticism that its accu-
sation that North Korea is responsible for the sinking
on March 26 of the Cheonan warship is politically
motivated and a cover-up or possible false flag
operation.
On May 20, the South Korean government
presented as incontestable fact its conclusion that the
warship Cheonan split in two and sank because of
hostile action by North Korea. Online discussion
seriously challenged that presentation. Perhaps not
coincidentally, May 20, the day of the presentation
coincided with the date when campaigning for the
June 2 provincial and local elections was to officially
begin.
The military communication logs show that the
first message from the Cheonan of trouble said
“aground on rocks.” The ship was in shallow waters.
Similarly, numerous early statements by both South
Korean and U.S. officials assured the public that
North Korea was not involved with the incident.
The rescue operation saved 58 of the crew
members. Forty-six of the 104 members of the ship’s
crew died as a result of the ship’s breaking in two and
sinking. Relatives of the sailors who died complained
that the rescue effort was inadequate and too late.
Public criticism of the Lee government grew regard-
ing how it was handling the ship disaster. A so called
international group was charged with the task of
assessing blame for the disaster. That Joint Investiga-
tion Group (JIG) was under the Korean military.
The Investigation
When the five page investigation statement
1
was
presented on May 20, however, North Korea was
accused of being the cause of the disaster. The accu-
sation was based on a part of a torpedo allegedly
dredged up from the sea which bore a supposed pen
marked number on a rusted surface.
The sinking of the Cheonan occurred during a
period when the U.S. military and the South Korean
military were conducting joint military exercises
named Key Resolve/Foal Eagle. The joint South
Korean-U.S. naval action involved several Aegis class
warships which have the most advanced computer
and radar systems to track and guide weapons to find
and destroy enemy targets. The Cheonan was a patrol
combat corvette (PCC) specializing in anti-submarine
warfare.
The investigation statement claims that some-
how an undetected North Korean submarine pierced
a highly protected arena of U.S.-South Korean mili-
tary maneuvers and released a torpedo in shallow
waters, and then escaped totally undetected.
An article in the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh
2
points out the unlikely scenario that “a North Korean
submarine [would be able] to infiltrate the maritime
cordon at a time when security reached its tightest
level and without detection by the Cheonan.”
No evidence was presented as to the actual
Page 2
firing of the torpedo or the actual presence of a North
Korean submarine in the vicinity of the Cheonan.
There is no actual observation of a North Korean
submarine in the area of the Cheonan, despite the fact
that there was sophisticated surveillance equipment
used for the military exercises. Also, the shallowness
of the sea where the Cheonan sunk, about 40 to 50 m.
and the rocky bottom would make submarine travel
near there almost impossible
The statement of the investigation is unsigned.
The parties who allegedly conducted the investigation
are unnamed. Instead of facts to document a basis for
the accusations which might lead to war, a number of
allegations are followed by the statement that “There
is no other plausible explanation.”
Blogs and other online media
The accusations made by the conservative
media in South Korea about North Korea have taken
on a James Bond quality given the mismatch between
the reality of North Korean capability and the claims
being made of how it has been able to perform amaz-
ing deeds. Blogs and other online media in both the
U.S. and South Korea have presented facts and
discussion challenging the claims in the investigation
statement, and proposing other alternative explana-
tions of the cause of the sinking of the Cheonan.
These online discussions and questions have begun
not only to supplement newspaper accounts but also
to become the subject of newspaper articles in South
Korea.
Questions discussed on blogs included whether
there was a North Korean or German made torpedo
involved in the sinking of the Cheonan, or whether
there was any involvement of a torpedo at all.
3
An
online letter
,,4
addressed to Hillary Clinton by one of
the members of the investigation, questions whether
the marks on the ship came from being run aground or
a collision with some other vessel or both.
The whole story as a false account?
The nature of the pen mark on the torpedo part
offered by South Korea as its main evidence that the
torpedo was fired by North Korea was challenged
5
as
not being a reliable piece of evidence of North Ko-
rean involvement because there was rust under the
pen mark. Also, the blades of the offered evidence
show a degree of corrosion that would usually require
far more time than the two months in the water as
claimed.
Another blog
6
challenges the whole story of the
South Korean government as a false account like the
Gulf of Tonkin incident. Some of the Korean netizens
and political activists who challenged the South
Korean government about the cause of the Cheonan
sinking have been referred to the prosecutor for
charges.
7
The South Korean government has been cited
8
by both Frank La Rue, UN Special Rapporteur for the
Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Opinion and
Expression and Amnesty International for interfering
with the rights of South Korean citizens and netizens.
They need teeth
Given the growing set of questions about the
South Korean government account of the sinking of
the Cheonan, the government has invited
9
some
chosen bloggers and twitter users to a session “to
dispel any doubts among the young that North Korea
was behind the deadly attack,”
A Yonhap News Agency press release explains
that it will select 20 twitter users, 10 defense bloggers
and 30 college reporters “to take a trip to Pyeongtaek
naval port south of Seoul where the salvaged parts of
Cheonan are being kept.” The article explains that
“The event is aimed at removing skepticism among
young Internet users who have raised doubts in online
communities about the results of a multinational
investigation that concluded North Korea downed the
ship in a torpedo attack.”
Like in the case of 9/11, careful fact checking
and examination of the evidence by netizens has
shown the South Korean government’s case for the
involvement of North Korea in the sinking of the
Cheonan to be unsustainable. Netizens are more and
more able to act as watchdogs. But they need teeth.
Notes
1.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10
jigreport.pdf
2. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/
421856.html
3. See the comments at the end of the Scott Creighton’s blog
entry, “The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to” May
24, 2010,
http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/the-
sinking-of-the-cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. Some selected
comments are in the Appendix just below.
4.
http://cafe419.daum.net/_c21_/bbs_search_read?grpid=
11Ypb&mgrpid=&fldid=JFBW&content=P&contentval=0001
qzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz&page=1&prev_page=&firstbbsd
Page 3
epth=&lastbbsdepth=&datanum=114®dt=&favorRegdate=
&favorMode=&listSortType=&listnum=
5. http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/pcc-772-
cheonan-photographic-evidence-that-no-1-written-on
-top-of-rust/
6. http://gowans.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/the-sinking-of-the-
cheonan-another-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/
7. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid= 2921120
8.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/docs/ ROK-
Pressstatement17052010.pdf
9. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/05/31/3/
0301000000AEN20100531003100315F.HTML
Appendix
Some comments from Scott Creighton’s blog entry, “The
Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to,” May 24, 2010
http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/the-sinking-of-th
e-cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/
6. Tim, on May 24, 2010 at 1:55 p.m. said: ‘The markings in
Hangul, which reads “1?(or No. 1 in English),” found inside the
end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of
a previously obtained North Korean torpedo.’ Now, just hang on
a minute ? a previously obtained NK torpedo? A previously
obtained NK torpedo?? How many do they have? Is it not
beyond the realms of possibility that this ‘evidence’ did not
originate from NK at all. We really ought to demand the same
level of ballistic forensics that apply to crime scenes where
ordinary firearms have been discharged. After all many more
lives could be at stake here.
-------------------------------------------
57. Mika, on May 27, 2010 at 5:34 a.m. said: You may want to
have a look at this:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LE26Dg01.html I’ve not
tried verifying any of the claims made there yet, but the com-
ments about the Korean handwritten writings are damning if true,
and if there was indeed still a large scale exercise going on, that
makes it completely unthinkable a NK sub would have pene-
trated that deep, sank the Cheonan and got away again. OTOH,
it does provide a rather credible alternative scenario: a friendly
fire incident blamed on the North Koreans. Kursk anyone?
----------------------------
145. willyloman, on May 28, 2010 at 3:38 p.m. said: the
following comment was left by a reader and it did not go through
so I am posting it here so that others may read it. Mr. Serandos:
WordPress sometimes has problems with comments… it should
work fine but if posting again presents a problem, just me know.
thank you
scott creighton, willyloman
Tom Serandos left the following comment: I tried to leave the
following message on Mr. Creighton’s site but I don’t think it
went through.
PCC-772 report: I agree with the contents of the report.
Examine the photographs of the PCC-772 props. The deforma-
tion on each fluke is evidence of grounding while making turns.
If there was an explosion it occurred after the ship ran aground
or only the lower flukes would have been damaged when it
settled to the bottom. The damage to the shaft alleys would have
locked up the props.
If there was an explosion perhaps it was an unexploded bomb
from the Korean war or a mine the S. Koreans have not retrieved
(reportedly there are over 100 of those still out there). It could
have been in the vessels path when it grounded.
Also, the degree of corrosion on the torpedo parts indicates they
have been in the sea for a very long time (months). It was long
enough for the active alloy in the props to set up a galvanic cell
with the other parts. I am a degreed metallurgist with 25 years of
experience and seven years of service in the U.S. Nuclear Navy.
Tom Serandos
--------------------------------------------
166. Han Kim, on May 29, 2010 at 7:30 a.m. said: I’m Korean
and many Korean ppl know the govt is making things up.
As you might know, the only reason the govt manipulated the
truth is to get more votes on the upcoming election from the old
generations. :) Keep up the good work! We really appreciate the
voices from outside Korea
----------------------
203. ??, on May 29, 2010 at 2:22 p.m. said:
Dear Scott,
have you seen this article, “Did an American Mine Sink South
Korean Ship?” by one Yoichi Shimatsu:
http://newamericamedia.
org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-south-korean-
ship.php
He makes many good points, what I’d like to highlight is what he
says about the type of torpedo submitted as evidence on May 20:
“Since torpedoes travel between 40-50 knots per hour (which is
faster than collision tests for cars), a drive shaft would crumble
upon impacting the hull and its bearing and struts would be
shattered or bent by the high-powered blast…”
My point is that even more bewildering than the various torpedo
schema we’ve seen is the very implausible situation that such a
relatively intact remnant of the alleged weapon exists as foisted
onto us.
North Korea is also now vigorously bringing forth their defense,
which is comprehensively exposing the various contradictions in
the “JIG” case. See my link of “Military Commentator on Truth
behind ‘Story of Attack by North’ (Part 1)”
http://tinyurl.com/29eh9zj The KCNA site won’t link directly, so
I’m linking to the article on my own blog.
People are going to cry about giving North Korea a hearing but
they are certainly innocent until proven guilty and their exclusion
from the investigation process indicates weakness and fear of
exposure in the South Korean position, which has been relying
so far on a kind of international kangaroo court or media
lynching. I’d very much like to see what evidence they presented
at their own press briefing recently to contrast with the “JIG”
press event of May 20. Again people will virulently impugn and
dismiss them, but you can be sure both Russia and China were
paying close attention to all the details of their nearer neighbor’s
case.
It’s also important for your morale to know that South Korean
citizens groups and progressive media are banding together as
we speak to get to the bottom of this particular Big Lie. Also Mr.
Shin is saying he’ll use the suppressive court proceedings
initiated against him to expose the whole phony deal.
Don’t lose sight of the big picture, you’ve taken some
“below-the-belt” hits? hang in there man!
Page 4
-------------------------------
211. hankyul moon, on May 30, 2010 at 11:16 a.m. said:
The kr.gov will keep trying to paint with dirty mentions in order
to wrap this page.
In addition of that, the kr.gove will keep change their story and
evidence, which is a traditional judgment of suspicion. Many
people focused on the torpedo; however, a single evidence is not
correlated to the explosion. The torpedo that kr.gov presented is
not proven evidence of explosion scientifically. For example,
there are no proofs of thermal effects, mechanical damages by
explosion, corrosion effects by salty water, and corrosion effects
by heat and salty water. Only one evidence is letter “1?”, written
by bright blue permanent marker. Nevertheless, North kr.gov
denied using “1?” on machinery.
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in
OhmyNews International in June 2010 at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_s
angview.asp?menu=c10400&no=386133&rel_no=1]
Questioning Cheonan
Investigation Stirs
Controversy
South Korean Government Threatens
to Penalize NGO for Utilizing UN
Security Council Procedure
by Ronda Hauben
South Korean government officials have de-
nounced an NGO for writing to the Security Council.
The NGO is one of the most prominent civil society
organizations in South Korea, People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD). Such action disre-
gards the long tradition and established procedure at
the United Nations for an NGO or private individual
to send communication to the Security Council on
matters it is considering.
PSPD is a watchdog NGO that was founded in
1994. Since then it has monitored the actions of the
South Korean government, supporting the efforts of
South Korean citizens to participate in political
affairs.
In a letter asking for support, PSPD writes:
1
PSPD believes that diplomacy and secu-
rity policy should be under the citizenry’s
watch and democratic control. National
Security and diplomatic policy should not
be monopolized by military and diplo-
matic authorities.
On June 11, 2010, the Center for Peace and
Disarmament of PSPD sent a letter to UN Security
Council President Claude Heller, the Mexican Am-
bassador to the UN. Mexico holds the rotating presi-
dency of the Security Council for the month of June.
With its letter, PSPD included its report, “The PSPD’s
Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking.”
2
The letter and report were also sent to the other
fourteen member states of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, to the United Nations Secretary General
and to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Korea (South Korea).
The PSPD report raised a number of questions
and problems with the findings presented by the
South Korean government of its investigation of the
Cheonan sinking.
Background
The South Korean government, unable to win
support domestically for its allegations that North
Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan,
turned to the UN Security Council for action against
North Korea.
3
On June 4 the South Korean Ambassa-
dor at the UN submitted a letter to the UN Security
Council requesting it to take up the matter of the
sinking of the Cheonan.
4
On June 8, North Korea submitted a letter to the
Security Council denying any involvement in the
sinking of the Cheonan.
5
The Security Council scheduled an informal
meeting for South Korea to present its case against
North Korea on Monday, June 14. Initially there was
no plan for the Security Council to meet with the
North Korean delegation on the Cheonan issue. On
Sunday evening, however, news reports from South
Korea announced that on June 14, the Security Coun-
cil would also hold an informal meeting with North
Korea.
According to some of the South Korean news
media who cover the UN, the big story in South
Korea on Monday, June 14, was not that South Korea
was making its presentation to the Security Council.
Instead the media described denunciations by South
Korean government officials against PSPD for send-
ing its report to the UN. The reporters claimed the
South Korean government believed that the PSPD
report influenced the North Korean UN delegation to
request a presentation at the UN Security Council on
Page 5
the subject of the Cheonan. There was no proof
presented for such allegations. This did not, however,
stop South Korean government officials from making
accusations against PSPD, nor the South Korean
conservative media from supporting the denunciations
with articles accusing the NGO of unpatriotic behav-
ior.
6
In Seoul, on June 14, the spokesman for the
Blue House, for the President of South Korea, Lee
Myung bak, publicly denounced PSPD.
Also on June 14, during the Question and
Answer time at the National Assembly, the South
Korean Prime Minister, Un-Chan Chung, denouncing
PSPD for sending its letter and report to the UN
Security Council, said, “ Such actions are against
national interest. It (PSPD’s action) dishonored and
shamed our country.”
Back at UN headquarters in New York on
Monday, June 14, two separate informal meetings of
the Security Council were held in the North Lawn
Building. A large number of reporters waited in the
cafe outside the area where the Security Council was
meeting because the meetings were closed to the
press.
After the two informal Security Council meet-
ings, the Mexican Ambassador spoke briefly to the
press. He said, “the Security Council issued a call to
the parties to refrain from any act that could escalate
tensions in the region, and makes an appeal to pre-
serve peace and stability in the region.” He also
indicated that the Security Council would continue its
consultations after the meetings it had with the
delegations of both nations. Heller said that it was
very important to have received the very detailed
presentation by South Korea and also to know and
learn from the arguments of North Korea. He com-
mented that it was “very important that North Korea
has approached the Security Council.” In response to
a question about his view on the issues presented, he
responded, “I am not a judge. I think we will go on
with the consultations to deal in a proper manner on
the issue.”
7
The North Korean UN delegation scheduled a
press conference for the following day, Tuesday, June
15. During the press conference, the North Korean
Ambassador presented North Korea’s refutation of the
allegations made by South Korea. Also he explained
North Korea’s request to be able to send an investiga-
tion team to go to the site where the sinking of the
Cheonan occurred. South Korea had denied the
request. During the press conference, a reporter with
a South Korean newspaper asked the North Korean
Ambassador if he had received a copy of the PSPD
document from PSPD. The Ambassador responded
that not to his knowledge.
8
In a press release, the Asian Human Rights
Commission writes that following the denunciation of
PSPD by South Korean government officials, “the
country’s Prosecutor’s office reportedly leaked to
newspapers that there was a possibility that the staff
of the PSPD might be prosecuted under the National
Security Act, if a case were to be filed….”
9
“In response,” the press release explains,
“conservative groups filed a complaint with the
Prosecutor’s Office.” On June 15, the Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Chun Yeong-U said
that, “A legal examination is currently going on.”
Following the accusatory remarks by South
Korean government officials against PSPD, “people
belonging to conservative groups attempted to raid
the offices of PSPD.” There are reports that members
of PSPD were assaulted verbally and physically, and
threatening phone calls were made to the PSPD
offices.
In one incident, a van containing flammable
material was driven up to the building where PSPD
offices are located. The police did not arrest the
perpetrators of these deeds. The Prosecutor, instead,
opened an investigation of PSPD.
On June 17, according to the Asian Human
Rights Commission, the case against PSPD was
allocated to the Public Security Bureau 1, which
announced its intention to summon PSPD officials.
The Asian Human Rights Commission also
reported that the Prosecutor’s office “approached one
of the experts who worked on the government-led
report in order for this expert to submit a complaint
concerning alleged criminal defamation by the NGO.”
South Korean government officials, supported
by some of the South Korean media, allege that it is
an unusual practice for an NGO to send a letter or
report to the UN Security Council. Recently, a re-
porter asked a government official, “Are there any
cases that a NGO sends a contrast position paper
against a government on the security issue.” Chun,
Yung-woo, the 2
nd
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Trade responded, “I have never heard that there
are such NGOs, and document sent by a NGO cannot
be a UNSC document.”
Page 6
NGO Communication to Security Council
Such an interchange demonstrates a serious lack
of knowledge of UN and particularly Security Coun-
cil procedures. There is a long established practice at
the UN of NGO’s or private individuals sending
letters and documents to the Security Council on
questions before the Security Council. Most if not all
of the matters before the Security Council have to do
with security issues.
Records at the UN show that the practice of
sending such correspondence to the Security Council
dates back to 1946. This is the date when the symbol
S/NC/ was introduced as the symbol for “Communi-
cations received from private individuals and non-
governmental bodies relating to matters of which the
Security Council is seized.”
10
The Security Council
has the practice of periodically publishing a list of the
documents it receives, the name and organization of
the sender, and the date they are received. The Provi-
sional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council
states that the list is to be circulated to all representa-
tives on the Security Council. A copy of any commu-
nication on the list is to be given to any nation on the
Security Council that requests it.
There are over 450 such lists indicated in the
UN records. As each list can contain several or a large
number of documents the Security Council has
received, the number of such documents is likely to
be in the thousands.
Under Rule 39 of the Council procedures, the
Security Council may invite any person it deems
competent for the purpose to supply it with informa-
tion on a given subject. Thus the two procedures in
the Security Council’s provisional rules give it the
basis to find assistance on issues it is considering
from others outside the Council and to consider the
contribution as part of its deliberation.
Appeals to End Witch Hunt Against PSPD
Initiating a criminal investigation against a
South Korean NGO or citizen for what is a long
existing practice and tradition with respect to the UN
Security Council, is a South Korean government
action that is being compared to the kind of
“witch-hunts” that occurred during the period of the
1950s in the U.S. which has come to be known as
McCarthyism.
In contrast to the attack on PSPD by the South
Korean government and the conservative media,
many NGOs and citizens in South Korea have ex-
pressed their support for PSPD.
A group of 200 professors and other intellectu-
als in South Korea has issued a statement calling for
the end of the “witch hunt” against PSPD. The state-
ment explains that “PSPD had performed its innate
duty and right as a civic group.” The group calls for
conservative groups to end their irrational backward
attacks on PSPD.
11
Also, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and
Development, an organization of 46 groups in Asia
which includes PSPD, sent a petition to Frank La
Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right of Opinion and Expres-
sion.
12
It asked the UN to “advise the South Korean
government to end the prosecutorial investigation of
PSPD.”
La Rue had visited South Korea on May 6-17,
2010. He issued a press statement on May 17 docu-
menting other examples of the abuse by the South
Korean government of the human rights of its citi-
zens. He referred to the obligation of South Korea to
adhere to the provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights protecting the right to
freedom of expression.
13
While La Rue’s comments were made prior to
the current South Korean government attack on
PSPD, Amnesty International has issued a statement
regarding the current situation.
14
It writes:
Amnesty International is deeply con-
cerned about the Seoul Central Prosecu-
tor’s Office’s decision on Wednesday to
investigate the People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) for
sending a letter to the UN Security Coun-
cil questioning the results of the interna-
tional investigation into the sinking of the
South Korean navy vessel the Cheonan.
The civic group is accused of ‘benefitting’
North Korea, in violation of the National
Security Law, interfering with state’s acts
and defamation.
The statement concludes, “Amnesty Interna-
tional is also concerned that the National Security
Law continues to be used to arbitrarily target individ-
uals or groups peacefully exercising their basic rights
to freedom of expression and association. Simply put,
this law is used as a tool to silence dissent.”
On Friday, June 18, the UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon was asked for his view of the current
Page 7
action by the prosecutor in South Korea against an
NGO for sending a letter to the Security Council. He
responded, “I will have to check. I’m not aware of
that.... I don’t have a comment at this time, but I may
have to check and will get back to you later.”
15
He did
not get back to the journalist as of the publication date
of this article.
Open Letter to Ban Ki-moon
The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)
appealed to Ban Ki-moon. On June 24, it sent an
Open Letter to Sec-Gen Ban Ki-moon about the
situation. In the letter it asks him:
16
…to take all necessary steps to ensure that
the reprisals, directly or indirectly attribut-
able to the Republic of Korea, are imme-
diately halted against civil society groups
that have communicated with the UN. The
AHRC appreciates the work of the Secre-
tary-General concerning reprisals and
urges his offices to include this case as
part of efforts to protect civil society
members from facing attacks based on
their participation in the UN’s work.
The AHRC has also asked the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights to intervene to “ensure that
these reprisals are halted” and that the recommenda-
tions of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expres-
sion be implemented in full and without delay. It also
calls upon South Korea as a member of the Human
Rights Council to act to “uphold the highest stan-
dards.”
PSPD as Political Watchdog
PSPD reports that the organization has increased
its membership by 15% with 1600 new members
joining since the attack by the South Korean govern-
ment. Also, numerous individuals and organizations
in Korea and outside have sent letters and made
statements in support of PSPD.
As a member of the international society, PSPD
explains, “PSPD will continuously make every effort
to advance the universal goals of democracy and
peace through its activities as a political watchdog.”
17
Notes
1. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation on PSPD,”
6/21/2010 http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195
2. PSPD, “The PSPD’s Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan
Sinking,” June 1, 2010.
http://www.peoplepower21.org/?
module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=40158
&sid=7ab45eab894bb107361ef5447c30048b&module_srl=37
681&usg=AFQjCNFTU9vP98NdyzvCupVWG0HqgMhLlw
3. “What’s Behind South Korea Bringing the Cheonan Issue to
the UN Security Council,” 6/7/2010 http://blogs.taz.de/netizen
blog/2010/06/07/whats_behind_south_korea_bringing_the_ch
eonan_issue_to_the_un_security_council/
4. “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of
Korea to the UN with regard to the armed attack by North Korea
on 26 May, 2010 against the Republic of Korea’s navy ship the
Cheonan, S/2010/281”
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
DPRK%20S%202010%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20and
%20Cheonan%20Report.pdf
5. “Letter dated 8 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,”
S/2010/294
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/29
4&Lang=E6. See description in: Gwak Byeong-chan, “Which
Country Do You Belong To?,” Hankyoreh, June 16, 2010
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_opinion/425906.h
tml
7. “Informal comments to the Media by the President of the
Security Council and the Permanent Representative of Mexico,
H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking of
the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.” June
14, 2010, [Webcast: Archived Video - 5 minutes ]
http://webcast.
un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2010/so100614pm3.rm
8. “Press Conference: H.E. Mr. Sin Son Ho, Permanent Repre-
sentative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the
United Nations, on the current situation in the Korean Penin-
sula.” June 15, 2010,[Webcast: Archived Video - 58 minutes]
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/pressconference/2010
/pc100615am.rm
9. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon by the Asian Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-g
eneral-ban-ki-moon
10. See “United Nations Series Symbols: 1946-1996,” Dag
Hammarskjold Library, United Nations, New York, 1998, p. 234.
11. “Scholars Call for End to PSPD Witch Hunt,” Hankyoreh,
June 22, 2010.
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/426832.
htm
12. Forum-Asia Submits the Urgent Appeal on Threats of
Prosecution against PSPD to UN Rapporteur 6/21/2010.
http://www.peoplepower21.org/?module=file&act=procFileDo
wnload&file_srl=40191&sid=4db9d3a9ce23eab695e13dec947
e1842&module_srl=37681
13. Frank La Rue, Rapporteur, “UN, Full Text of ROK Press
Statement,” May 17, 2010
http://www.peoplepower21.org/
?module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=40191&sid=4
db9d3a9ce23eab695e13dec947e1842&module_srl=37681
14. “Amnesty International expresses its concern about the
investigation on the PSPD,” 6/18/2010
http://gaia-lovedream.blogspot.com/2010/06/amnesty-internati
onal-expresses-its.html
15. “2010-06-18, New York: Secretary-General’s remarks to the
Page 8
media,” https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/
2010-06-18/secretary-generals-remarks-media
16. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon by the Asian Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-g
eneral-ban-ki-moon
17. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation of PSPD,”
http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on May 9, 2010 at: http://blogs.taz.de/
netizenblog/2010/09/05/in_cheonan_dispute_un_se
curity_council_discovers_un_charter/]
In Cheonan Dispute UN
Security Council Acts in
Accord with UN Charter
by Ronda Hauben
The challenge of Security Council reform has
been on the agenda at the United Nations for decades
with little obvious effect on the workings of the
Security Council itself.
1
But what happens when an action of the Secu-
rity Council is an improvement over past Security
Council practices and presents an important model for
conflict resolution in line with the obligations of the
Charter? Will there be recognition of the peaceful
direction that the action points in or will it be ignored
and members of the Security Council revert back to
the practice of the past?
The situation I am referring to is the consider-
ation by the Security Council of the sinking of the
South Korean naval warship, the Cheonan. The
dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan was brought
to the Security Council in June and a Presidential
Statement was agreed to in July.
An account of some of what happened in the
Security Council during an important part of this
process is described in an article in Spanish that has
appeared in several different Spanish language
publications. The article, “Heller mediacion de
Mexico en conflict de Peninsula de Corea” by
Maurizio Guerrero, the UN Correspondent for
Notimex (the Mexican News Agency), was published
on July 5.
2
The article describes the experience of the
Mexican Ambassador to the UN, Claude Heller in his
position as president of the Security Council for the
month of June.
In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4,
the Republic of Korea (ROK) more commonly known
as South Korea, asked the Council to take up the
Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, the South Korean
Ambassador to the UN requested that the Security
Council consider the matter of the Cheonan and
respond in an appropriate manner.
3
The letter de-
scribed an investigation into the sinking of the
Cheonan carried out by South Korean government
and military officials. The conclusion was to accuse
North Korea of sinking the South Korean ship.
Sin Son Ho is the UN Ambassador from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),
which is more commonly known as North Korea. He
sent a letter dated June 8 to the Security Council,
which denied the allegation that his country was to
blame.
4
His letter urged the Security Council not to be
the victim of deceptive claims, as had happened with
Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support
its call to be able to examine the evidence and to be
involved in a new and more independent investigation
on the sinking of the Cheonan.
How would the Mexican Ambassador as Presi-
dent of the Security Council during the month of June
handle this dispute? (The presidency rotates each
month to a different Security Council member.) This
was a serious issue facing Heller as he began his
presidency in June 2010.
Heller adopted what he refers to as a “balanced”
approach to treat both governments on the Korean
peninsula in a fair and objective manner. He held
bilateral meetings with each member of the Security
Council which led to support for a process of informal
presentations by both of the Koreas to the members of
the Security Council.
What Heller calls “interactive informal meet-
ings” were held on June 14 with the South Koreans
and the North Koreans in separate sessions attended
by the Security Council members, along with a time
to ask questions and then to discuss the presentations.
At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s
presentations ended, Heller said that it was important
to have received the detailed presentation by South
Korea and also to know and learn the arguments of
North Korea. He commented that “it was very impor-
tant that North Korea approached the Security Coun-
cil.” In response to a question about his view on the
Page 9
issues presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I think
we will go on with the consultations to deal in a
proper manner on the issue.”
5
During June, Heller held meetings with the UN
Ambassadors from each of the two Koreas and then
with Security Council members about the Cheonan
issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30,
he was asked by the media what was happening about
the Cheonan dispute. He responded that the issue of
contention was over the evaluation of the South
Korean government’s investigation.
Heller describes how he introduced what he
refers to as “an innovation” into the Security Council
process. As the month of June ended, the issue was
not yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a basis to
build on the progress that was achieved during the
month of his presidency.
The “innovation” Heller refers to, is a summary
of the positions of each of the two Koreas on the
issue, taking care to present each objectively. Heller
explains that this summary was not an official docu-
ment, so it did not have to be approved by the other
members of the Council. This summary provided the
basis for further negotiations. He believed that it had
a positive impact on the process of consideration in
the Council, making possible the agreement that was
later to be expressed in the Presidential statement on
the Cheonan that was issued by the Security Council
on July 9.
Heller’s goal, he explains, was to “at all times
be as objective as possible” so as to avoid increasing
the conflict on the Korean peninsula. Such a goal is
the Security Council’s obligation under the UN
charter.
In the Security Council’s Presidential Statement
on the Cheonan, what stands out is that the statement
follows the pattern that Heller described of presenting
the views of each of the Koreas and urging that the
dispute be settled in a peaceful manner.
6
In the statement, the members of the Security
Council do not blame North Korea. Instead they refer
to the South Korean investigation and its conclusion,
expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings”
of the investigation.
Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the
Korean newspaper Hankyoreh noted that the state-
ment “allows for a double interpretation and does not
blame or place consequences on North Korea.”
7
Such
a possibility of a “double interpretation” allows
different interpretations.
Some of the articles that have appeared in the
English language media about the Cheonan, however,
appear to be oblivious to the effort to accommodate
the different viewpoints in the Presidential Statement.
For example, an editorial in the New York Times
about the Presidential Statement complained that the
statement contained “weasel wording about blame.”
8
An AP article reported that the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the UN, Susan Rice, and the South Korean
Ambassador, Park Im-kook said the Presidential
Statement “made clear who to blame” for the attack
on the Cheonan.
9
Instead of directly pointing out this
is contrary to the wording of the statement, however,
the AP article notes that in private some diplomats
and analysts expressed concern that the statement
didn’t blame Pyongyang.
Another article in the New York Times, however,
referred to a statement of Li Baodong, China’s Am-
bassador to the UN, that the Presidential statement
moved matters in “the right direction” because it
urged “the parties concerned” to avoid escalating
tensions.
10
Russia had sent a team of experts to South
Korea to do its own evaluation on the South Korean
findings. Though the Russian evaluation has not been
released publicly, a leaked copy was the subject of
articles in Hankyoreh. These describe how the Rus-
sian team of experts disagreed with the South Korean
government’s conclusions about the sinking of the
Cheonan. The Russian experts observed the ship’s
propeller had become entangled in a fishing net and
subsequently a possible cause of the sinking could
have been that the ship had hit the antennae of a mine
which then exploded.
11
The Presidential Statement explains that “The
Security Council takes note of the responses from
other relevant parties, including the DPRK, which has
stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”
12
With the exception of the DPRK, it is not
indicated who “the other relevant parties” are. It does
suggest, however, that it is likely some Security
Council members, not just Russia and China, did not
agree with the conclusions of the South Korean
investigation.
The Security Council action on the Cheonan
took place in a situation where there has been a wide
ranging international critique, especially in the online
media, about the problems of the South Korean
investigation, and of the ROK government’s failure to
make public any substantial documentation of its
Page 10
investigation, along with its practice of harassing
critics of the ROK claims.
The U.S. media, however, for the most part has
chosen to ignore the many critiques which have
appeared. These critiques of the South Korean govern-
ment’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have
appeared not only in Korean, but also in English, in
Japanese, and in other languages. They present a wide
ranging challenge of the veracity and integrity of the
South Korean investigation and its conclusions.
An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28
noted the fact that the media in the U.S. has ignored
the critique of the South Korean government investi-
gation that is being discussed and spread around the
world.
13
More recently, on August 31, an Op Ed by
Donald Gregg, a former U.S. Ambassador to South
Korea, appeared in the New York Times, titled “Test-
ing North Korean Waters.” The article noted that “not
everyone agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North
Korea. Pyongyang has consistently denied responsi-
bility, and both China and Russia opposed a UN
Security Council resolution laying blame on North
Korea.”
14
In a subsequent interview with the Washington
correspondent for Hankyoreh, Gregg adds that the
Russian team’s conclusions could only be tentative
because they were not given access to all the materi-
als they needed for their investigation. The Russian
team recommended that the Chinese not make an
effort to review the South Korean investigation. They
would likely not have access to all the materials
needed to be able to do an adequate review.
In his Op Ed in the New York Times, Gregg
maintains that, “The disputed interpretations of the
sinking of the Cheonan remain central to any effort to
reverse course and to get on track toward dealing
effectively with North Korea on critical issues such as
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” There-
fore, he urges the South Korean government to make
public the study it has done.
Gregg’s public statements are just one example
of the disagreement around the world, along with the
Chinese and Russian governments, with the South
Korean government’s conclusions about the sinking
of the Cheonan and about the process of the investiga-
tion itself.
North Korea referred to this widespread interna-
tional sentiment in its June 8 letter to the Security
Council. The UN Ambassador from North Korea
wrote:
15
It would be very useful to remind our-
selves of the ever-increasing international
doubts and criticisms, going beyond the
internal boundary of south Korea, over the
‘investigation result’ from the very mo-
ment of its release….
The situation that the North Korean Ambassador
is referring to is one marked by actions on the part of
the South Korean netizens and civil society who
challenged the process and results of the South
Korean government’s investigation. There is support
for the South Korean critics by bloggers, scientists
and journalists around the world, writing in a multi-
tude of languages and from many perspectives. A
number of the non-governmental organizations and
scientists in South Korea sent the results of their
investigations and research to members of the Secu-
rity Council to provide them with the background and
facts needed to make an informed decision.
16
The result of such efforts is something that is
unusual in the process of recent Security Council
activity. Most often decisions are made according to
the degree of power and self interest in the issue being
considered, rather than according to an impartial
analysis of the problem and an effort to hear from all
those with an interest in the issue. But an impartial
analysis is what is required by the obligations of the
UN Charter.
In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North
Korea referred to the earlier experience of the Secu-
rity Council, to the February 5, 2003 Security Council
meeting when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
made his presentation of his “evidence” that weapons
of mass destruction existed in Iraq. The U.S. then
used these claims as the pretext for its invasion of
Iraq in March 2003.
17
The June 8 letter from North Korea urges:
It is imperative for the Security Council
not to step into the same situation in
which it was once misused as a tool of
high-handedness and hegemony of the
United States by giving legitimacy to its
armed invasion into Iraq, based on a sin-
gle word of lies of Powell, United States
Secretary of State, in February 2003.
The Security Council is duty bound to
adhere strictly to the principles of respect
for the sovereignty and impartiality of
United Nations Member States, as en-
shrined in the Charter of the United Na-
Page 11
tions.
The process of how the Security Council took
up and determined its response to the dispute on the
Cheonan is an important example of a different
process than that which occurred in the Iraq situation.
The effort in the Security Council described by the
Mexican Ambassador, to uphold the principles of
impartiality and respectful treatment of all members
involved in a problem.
The process instituted by the Mexican presi-
dency of the Security Council in June with respect to
the Cheonan dispute has the potential of providing for
a significant precedent in the process of Security
Council reform. It represents an important example of
the Security Council acting in conformity with its
obligations as set out in the UN charter.
In the July 9 Presidential Statement, the Security
Council urges that the parties to the dispute over the
sinking of the Cheonan find a means to peacefully
settle the dispute. The statement says:
The Security Council calls for full adher-
ence to the Korean Armistice Agreement
and encourages the settlement of outstand-
ing issues on the Korean peninsula by
peaceful means to resume direct dialogue
and negotiation through appropriate chan-
nels as early as possible, with a view to
avoiding conflicts and averting escalation.
Ambassador Gregg is only one of many around
the world who have expressed their concern with the
course of action of the U.S. and South Korea which is
contrary to the direction of the UN Security Council
Presidential Statement. Gregg explained his fear that
the truth of the Cheonan sinking “may elude us, as it
did after the infamous Tonkin Bay incident of 1964,
that was used to drag us (the U.S.) into the abyss of
the Vietnam War.”
18
The Security Council Action on the Cheonan
dispute, if it is recognized and supported, has set the
basis instead for a peaceful resolution of the
conflict.
19
Notes
1. Ronda Hauben, “UN Security Council Reform in Focus,”
OhmyNews International, September 15, 2008.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no
=383668&rel_no=1
2. Maurizio Guerrero, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict
de Peninsula de Corea,” Notimex, July 5, 2010 (published in en
la Economia). http://enlaeconomia.com/news/2010/07/05/69561
3. Security Council, S/2010/281, “Letter dated 4 June 2010”
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6
D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%202010
%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20and%20Cheonan%20Repo
rt.pdf
4. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010 Letter,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6
D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%20201
0%20294.pdf
5. Ambassador Claude Heller at the June 14 stakeout. “Media
Stakeout: Informal comments to the Media by the President of
the Security Council and the Permanent Representative of
Mexico, H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the
sinking of the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on
Kyrgyzstan.” [Webcast: Archived Video – 5 minutes]
h t t p : / / w e b c a s t . u n . o r g / r a m g e n / o n d e m a n d /
stakeout/2010/so100614pm3.rm
6. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13 http://www.un.org/en/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2010/13
7. Lee Jae-hoon,“Presidential Statement allows for a ‘double
interpretation, and does not blame or place consequences upon
N. Korea,” Hankyoreh, July 10, 2010.
www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/429768.html
8. “Security Council Blinks,” Editorial, New York Times, July 10,
2010.
9. Edith Lederer, “UN Condemns S Korea ship sinking,” AP,
July 10, 2010.
10. Neil MacFaquahar, “Condemnation of Ship’s Sinking is a
‘Victory’ North Korea Says,” New York Times, July 9, 2010, a
version of online article appeared in print edition on July 10,
2010, p.6.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/world/asia/
10briefs-KOREA.html
11. “Russian Navy Team’s Analysis of the Cheonan Incident,”
Posted on July 27, Hankyoreh, modified on July 29.
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/43223
0.html The Russian Experts document is titled “Data from the
Russian Naval Expert Group’s Investigation into the Cause of the
South Korean Naval Vessel Cheonan’s Sinking”
See also “Russia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that Sinking
Cheonan Ship was Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27, 2010,
Hankyoreh, modified on July 28, 2010.
http://www.hani.co.kr/
arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html
12. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13. Presidential
view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PRST/2010/13
13. Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubts Surface on
North Korean Role in Ship Sinking,” Los Angeles Times, July
23, 2010.
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/23/world/la-fg-
korea-torpedo-20100724/2
14. Donald P. Gregg, “Testing North Korean Waters,” New York
Times, August 31, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/opinion/01iht-edgregg.html
15. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6
D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%20201
0%20294.pdf Letter, DPKR June 8 2010
16. See for example: Ronda Hauben, “Netizens Question Cause
of Cheonan Tragedy,” OhmyNews International, June 8, 2010.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no
=386108&rel_no=1
Page 12
Ronda Hauben, “Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs
Controversy,” OhmyNews International, June 29, 2010.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_sangview.asp
?no=386133&rel_no=1
17. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6
D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%20201
0%20294.pdf
See also “[FULL] Colin Powell’s Presentation to the UN
Security Council On Iraq’s WMD Program,” Feb 5, 2003
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErlDSJHRVMA
18. Tae-ho Kwon, “South Korean Government Impeded Russian
Team’s Cheonan Investigation: Donald Gregg,” Hankyoreh,
September 4, 2010.
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/
e_northkorea/438299.html
19. See for example “PSPD’s Stance on the Presidential
Statement of the UNSC Regarding the Sinking of the ROK
N a v a l V e s s e l C h e o n a n ”
http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40247
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on April 4, 2013 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/03/04/two-prec
edents-unsc-korean-peninsula/]
Two Precedents for UN
Security Council Action to
Calm Tension in the Korean
Peninsula
by Ronda Hauben
I – Introduction
In his opening presentation to a hearing on U.S.
policy toward North Korea in March 2011, then U.S.
Senator John Kerry, referring to the events of the past
year observed that the year 2010 “was the most
dangerous on the Korean Peninsula since the end of
the Korean War in 1953.”
1
He was referring to several serious crises in the
region in 2010. What was surprising, but yet attracted
little media attention, was the role played by the
United Nations Security Council in calming tension
in two of these crises. In these two situations, there
were members of the Security Council who
demonstrated a commitment to serious consideration
and an impartial exploration of the problem leading to
the crises. This is a role notably different from how
the Security Council has approached most situations
involving the Korean Peninsula. For example, this
role was remarkably different from the historic
example of the Security Council supporting the U.S.
intervention in the Korean War, and more recently, in
imposing sanctions on North Korea for launching a
satellite, or for its effort to build a defensive capacity
against what it deemed U.S. aggressive actions
toward it.
In this article I consider the Security Council
emergency meeting held on December 19, 2010 to
discuss the escalating tension over live fire military
exercises held from Yeongpyeong Island into the
surrounding waters claimed by both South Korea and
North Korea. Then I refer back to how the Cheonan
situation was taken up at the Security Council a few
months earlier, in June and July 2010.
In the concluding section of this article I explore
the significance of these examples toward developing
an analysis of the potential of the Security Council to
provide a counterveiling force to the actions by those
who appear to be trying to provoke a new Cold War
in the Northeast Asian region.
II – Yeonpyeong Island
One of the most perilous times in the recent past
was in December 2010 when North and South Korea
almost went to war. The conflict was brought to the
UN Security Council in what was the last week of its
2010 session.
2
The role played by the Security Council in this
situation is worthy of attention. Through the more
than 60 years of UN involvement in the Korean
Peninsula, the role of the UN, particularly the
Security Council, has often been to increase tension
rather than seeking peaceful diplomatic and political
solutions to conflict situations. This situation in
December 2010 was different.
On November 23, 2010, the ROK (Republic of
Korea commonly known as South Korea) and the
DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
commonly known as North Korea) exchanged
artillery fire after South Korea began live fire military
drills from Yeonpyeong Island 8 miles off the coast of
North Korea. This military encounter ended with the
death of four South Koreans, and perhaps an unknown
number of North Koreans. Shortly afterwards, South
Korea announced it planned a next round of similar
artillery firing for some time between December 17
and December 21. North Korea responded it would
consider such fire a grave provocation and would
Page 13
respond appropriately.
On Saturday, December 18, Vitaly Churkin, the
Ambassador to the UN for the Russian Federation,
requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security
Council to be held that day. In what Ambassador
Churkin later called “a departure from the practice of
the Council,” the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan
Rice, as President of the Security Council for the
month of December, declined to hold a meeting until
the following day.
3
Instead of a Saturday meeting as
requested, she scheduled consultations to start at
11:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 19, with a view to
the possibility of holding a formal meeting later in the
day.
On that Sunday, 50 or more journalists gathered
at the press stakeout area outside the UN Security
Council. Ambassadors and other representatives of
the 15 nations on the council gradually filtered into
the Security Council chambers. Also arriving were
representatives of the DPRK, of the ROK, and B.
Lynn Pasco, then the Under Secretary General for
Political Affairs, who also had been invited to attend
the emergency session. U.S. Ambassador Rice, acting
as the President of the Council for December, arrived
at around 11:20 a.m.
It is reported that the Security Council members
held bilateral meetings and closed consultations. They
took a short lunch break. A closed meeting of the
Security Council was held toward the end of the
emergency session. During the emergency meeting,
the representatives of the ROK and DPRK each
presented their view of the conflict.
Little actual information was provided to
journalists waiting in the press stakeout area about
what was happening. The emergency meeting came to
a close, approximately eight hours after it had begun.
Then Ambassador Churkin came to the press stakeout
to report to journalists. He said the draft press
statement the Russian Federation had proposed had
been revised at least twice, but still did not achieve
the unanimous agreement needed to issue it as a
document from the Council.
In its proposed draft press statement, the
Russian Federation urged the two Koreas to show
restraint in their actions. Also the draft proposed that
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appoint an envoy to
help the two Koreas peacefully resolve the problems
causing the current crisis. The blog “Turtle Bay”
reported obtaining a copy of the original Russian
Federation draft statement. The following is a quote
from the posted statement which urged the parties to
deescalate the tension:
4
The Members of the Security Council
called upon all parties concerned to
exercise maximum restraint and to avoid
any steps which could cause a further
escalation of tension in the Korean
peninsula and the entire region.
The Members of the Security Council
stressed the need to undertake efforts to
ensure a de-escalation of tension in the
relations between the Republic of Korea
and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, resumption of dialogue and
resolution of all problems dividing them
exclusively through peaceful diplomatic
means.
In response to objections raised by some of the
Council members to his draft press statement,
Ambassador Churkin told journalists he had revised
the statement. The Inner City Press blog reported that
in one of the revised drafts, Ambassador Churkin, the
Chinese representative, and others on the Security
Council had agreed to wording that said that the
members of the Security Council “condemned the
shelling” of November 23, 2010.
5
The draft did not
attribute blame for the shelling, reflecting the fact that
both sides had done shelling.
The Council, however, was not able to come to
an agreement on the text. Ambassador Churkin
expressed his regret that the emergency meeting had
not been called on Saturday afternoon as he had
requested. He felt that would have provided more
time for Council members to work out wording they
could all agree on.
In response to a question to him from a
journalist about the danger of what was happening on
the Korean Peninsula, Ambassador Churkin
responded:
6
As you know, I don’t even want to go into
the general subject…. I know it’s very
complicated. This area has very
complicated geography, very complicated
geopolitical history if you will.
Page 14
Stressing the particular assessment of the
situation, Ambassador Churkin told journalists:
I don’t even want to go into the general
issue of whether or not it is prudent to
conduct military exercises in a disputed
area, but we know it is better to refrain
from doing this exercise at this time. That
is why we asked the Republic of Korea to
refrain from conducting this exercise at
this particular time.
Also Ambassador Churkin explained that there
appeared to have been general agreement among
council members for his proposal that the Secretary
General appoint an envoy to work with the two
Koreas and other concerned countries to negotiate a
means to settle the disputes causing the crisis
situation. He stressed the importance of appointing an
envoy, especially since some of the parties were not
willing to go back to the six party talks. There was, he
felt, no other means for a diplomatic process to be
implemented, “no game plan.”
Despite the fact that the Council had not been
able to agree on a press statement, which also would
have made it possible to support the appointment of
an envoy, Ambassador Churkin expressed his hope
that the Secretary General would go ahead and
appoint such an envoy.
Also he expressed his hope that the effect of the
Security Council consultations and meeting, even
though they hadn’t made it possible to reach an
agreement on a press statement, would help to lessen
the tension in the region.
A little while later, Ambassador Rice came to
the stakeout. Though she held the rotating presidency
of the Security Council for December 2010, she spoke
only in her national capacity presenting the views of
the U.S. on the issue. She supported South Korea’s
planned military exercise firing into the contested
waters off Yeonpyeong Island as “South Korea’s
legal right to self-defense.”
7
She said that the U.S.
insisted on a “clear-cut condemnation of the
November 23 attack by DPRK on the ROK,” but she
acknowledged that there was no “unanimity on that
point” among members of the Security Council.
When Ambassador Rice was asked about the
proposal to ask the Secretary General to appoint an
envoy, she responded:
I think there would have been probably
room for agreement in some form of
recommendation that the Secretary
General consider what he might be able to
do in his good offices capacity.
8
The next day, Monday, December 20, Wang
Min, the Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative
spoke to the press at a stakeout. He said, “Yesterday,
China supported Russia’s proposal to call for an
urgent meeting of the Security Council (on) the
situation in the Korean Peninsula.”
He characterized the meeting as, “positive and
of great importance.”
9
Also on Monday, South Korea held a short
military exercise near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).
Though the Russian Ambassador had requested that
South Korea refrain from holding this exercise at this
tense time, South Korea went ahead and again fired
shells into the contested waters off of Yeonpyeong
Island. But it appeared that South Korean shelling
was more moderate than had been expected. They
only fired for 90 minutes.
North Korea refrained from responding mili-
tarily.
10
On Tuesday, December 21 at an informal
meeting of the Security Council, Deputy Permanent
Representative Wang expressed his assessment of the
dangerous nature of the situation that had developed
on the Korean Peninsula. He said that the tension on
the Korean Peninsula between the North and South
had been very high one “especially in the past two
days, it came close to fighting a war.”
11
Despite the fact that the Security Council did
not issue a press statement, or a request that the
Secretary General appoint an envoy, the actions by
Ambassador Churkin on behalf of the Russian
Federation and of the Security Council succeeded in
bringing international public attention to the nature of
the dispute and the need for a peaceful resolution of
the crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula.
Ambassador Churkin had taken the initiative to
request an emergency meeting of the Security Council
and to ask South Korea to refrain from its planned
firing drill in the contested waters surrounding
Yeonpyeong Island, and to ask North Korea to refrain
from responding militarily.
Both the Chinese and Russian foreign ministries
Page 15
had sent representatives to both North Korea and
South Korea to urge them to settle their disputes
peacefully via dialogue. Also some of the Chinese
news media commentary on the crisis situation, even
some which appeared in English language
publications, were critical of the provocative actions
taken by South Korea. They also criticized the U.S.
government for undertaking and encouraging military
exercises in that tense area.
12
As Ambassador Churkin told journalists after
the December 19 Security Council meeting, “I would
like to think that this meeting of the Council will have
an impact on the situation.”
Looking at the subsequent events, it appears that
the December 19 Security Council emergency session
helped to calm the escalating tension on the Korean
Peninsula, at least temporarily.
What is significant in the treatment of the
Yeonpyeong situation by the Security Council, is that
an emergency meeting was held which both North
Korea and South Korea were invited to participate in
and to present their views. Also they were able to hear
the views of the members of the Security Council on
the situation.
Also, after the session, the Russian Ambassador
made a statement to the press condemning the actions
in contested waters at a time of great tension. His
remarks to the press helped to bring international
attention to the inappropriate nature of the planned
drills by South Korea at a time marked by great
tension.
III – Cheonan Incident Brought to the
Security Council
In order to be able to put the December 19, 2010
meeting of the Security Council into a broader
perspective, it is helpful to look back at how the
Security Council handled the Cheonan incident, when
it was brought to the Security Council in June 2010.
On March 26, 2010, the ROK warship Cheonan
broke in two and sank with the loss of 46 sailors in
the West Sea off the coast of North Korea. In early
June, South Korea brought its claim that North Korea
was responsible for the sinking to the UN Security
Council.
Though unusual for the Security Council, a
process was used that made it possible for Council
member states to consider the claim of South Korea,
but also to hear North Korea’s response.
13
Mexico’s
Ambassador to the UN, Claude Heller, as the
President of the Security Council for the month of
June in 2010, invited both North Korea and South
Korea to present their positions in two separate
informal sessions held with the 15 members on the
Security Council. These sessions, called “interactive
sessions,” were off the record, but provided a means
for Security Council members to hear two different
sets of views on the issue.
After the two interactive sessions, a journalist
asked Ambassador Heller for his view on which of
the two presentations appeared more convincing.
14
Ambassador Heller responded, “I’m not a judge. I
think we will go on with the consultations to deal in
a proper manner on the issue.” What was surprising
was that the Ambassador did not rush to make a
judgment, but instead saw himself as responsible for
providing a fair and impartial process for each of the
two parties to be heard and for their views to be
considered. In his treatment of the Cheonan issue,
Ambassador Heller continued with what he called a
“balanced process.” By the end of the month,
however, no decision had been reached by council
members on the wording for a presidential statement
on the issue.
The stumbling block, Ambassador Heller told
reporters at a stakeout at the end of his month-long
presidency, was the disagreement over how Council
members viewed the findings of the investigation of
the Cheonan incident by the Joint Civilian-Military
Investigation Group (JIG) established by the South
Korean government. Also the Russian Federation had
sent a team of experts to South Korea to examine the
evidence cited in the JIG’s report. The team did not
accept the JIG’s conclusions.
15
The Security Council was faced with different
views among the permanent members of the Security
Council. The U.S. backed the findings of the JIG’s
investigation, in which it participated. The Russian
Federation and China did not accept the findings.
How was this disagreement to be handled? An article
by the Mexican news service (Notimex) explains that
at the end of his month long Security Council
presidency, Ambassador Heller prepared a summary
of the two sets of views in an unofficial document.
16
Page 16
This document set the basis for a presidential
statement to be issued in July after the rotating
Security Council presidency passed from the Mexican
Ambassador to the Nigerian Ambassador.
The Security Council Presidential statement on
the Cheonan issued on July 9, 2010 was different
from other recent Security Council statements.
17
It
presented both sides of the controversy, South
Korea’s accusation and North Korea’s denial of the
accusation. Then it urged the two Koreas to settle
their disputes peacefully by negotiation. That is in
sharp contrast with the almost universal
condemnation of North Korea in several previous and
subsequent Security Council actions.
IV – Security Council as a Counterveiling
Force
The Security Council’s treatment of the
Cheonan incident and the December 19 Security
Council Emergency meeting on the increased tension
over the Yeonpyeong situation demonstrate that
nations other than the two Koreas, were able to play
a constructive role in determining how the situation
would be handled.
In the Yeonpyeong situation, the Russian
Federation played a prominent role acting to intervene
by calling for an emergency Security Council meeting
to help to calm the tension. Much of the mainstream
western media, however, focused on other framings
of the situation despite the effectiveness of the
Security Council activity. The narrative in the media
was not that Russia and China were seeking to
diminish the tension in the conflict, but instead that
they were protecting their ‘ally’ or ‘client.’
In the Cheonan situation, Mexico which held the
rotating presidency of the Security Council for the
month of June 2010, played a prominent role in
encouraging the Security Council to create an
inclusive process to hear the different views on the
conflict and act on the dispute. Much of the western
media, however, framed its coverage as a dispute
between the U.S. and China.
18
The actions of the UN Security Council in these
two situations provided a countervailing force to the
escalating tension resulting from the increase in
military exercises by the U.S., and South Korea in the
region. But if one reads almost all western media
coverage of the Security Council actions on the
Korean Peninsula incidents in 2010, the impression
given is that the U.S. succeeded in reigniting another
Cold War.
Sixty years earlier, in June 1950, the U.S. was
able to use the Security Council, and later the General
Assembly to legitimate its military intervention in the
Korean War. In June 2010 and several months later in
December 2010, the UN Security Council
demonstrated that it was possible to play a moderating
role to defuse tension on the Korean Peninsula. Even
when the U.S. held the presidency of the Security
Council in December 2010, the Russian Ambassador
and others in the Security Council were able to urge
North Korea and South Korea to defuse the tension.
Even though the Dec 19 meeting did not issue
an official press statement, Ambassador Churkin’s
statement to the press at the stakeout at the end of the
daylong emergency session made clear there were
legitimate reasons for North Korean’s concern over
South Korea’s planned live firing into disputed
waters. The result of both the emergency meeting and
the draft press statement Churkin had proposed earlier
was to draw international attention to the dispute over
the Northern Limit Line (NLL) which was imposed
unilaterally by the U.S. in August 1953.
Though the U.S. and South Korea had increased
their military collaboration in 2010 and held an
increasing number of military exercises in the region
around the Korean Peninsula – the Security Council
was able to act in a way that helped to challenge the
escalation of tension and encourage negotiation and
the peaceful settlement of disputes.
This is in stark contrast to how the UN was used
by the U.S. to help it to foster military action against
North Korea and subsequently China, 60 years earlier.
In his book “The Hidden History of the Korean
War,” I.F. Stone condemns the hasty Security Council
actions in June 1950 siding with Sigmund Rhee in
condemning North Korea. Stone writes:
19
But there was also a vital interest in the
maintenance of fair procedure within the
United Nations. It was neither honorable
nor wise for the United Nations, under
pressure from an interested great power,
to condemn a country for aggression
without investigation and without hearing
Page 17
its side of the case. This was especially
true when the ambassador of that power
on the scene itself, and the United
Nations’ own Commission, were not yet
prepared to declare which side was guilty
of aggression.
All too often, the absence of a fair procedure
within the UN Security Council appears to be the
norm. Similarly, yielding to the pressure from an
interested great power to condemn another nation,
without hearing its side of the case, was the norm for
resolutions condemning North Korea’s rocket and
nuclear developments. Considering this pattern, it is
all the more important to recognize when attention is
paid to hearing from the opposing sides of a conflict
and providing a means for the Security Council to
resist the pressure to support the demands of an
interested great power.
Can the UN Security Council be a political body
that helps to calm tension in the Korean Peninsula in
fulfillment of its charter obligation? We can consider
the Security Council’s actions in the Yeongpyeong
Island and the Cheonan incident as evidence that
under current world conditions this is possible, though
an all too rare outcome of Security Council action.
Notes
1. “Senator John Kerry Opening Statement for ‘Breaking the
Cycle of North Korean Provocations,’” March 1, 2011
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kerry_Stateme
nt.pdf
2. Ronda Hauben, “Can the Security Council Act to Calm Rising
Tension on Korean Peninsula?,” December 19, 2010, netizenblog
at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/12/19/security
council_korean_tension/
3. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin refers to Rule 2 of the Provisional
Rules of Procedure for the Security Council as the basis for
expecting the Security Council to be called to meet on Saturday
in response to his request. Rule 2 reads: “The President shall call
a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member
of the Security Council.”
https://www.scribd.com/document/
47878301/UNSC-Provisional-Rules-of-Procedure
4. Turtle Bay blog, December 18, 2010.
http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/18/russia_pus
hes_deeper_un_role_in_mediating_crisis_in_the_koreas
5. Inner City Press, December 20, 2011.
http://www.innercitypress.com/usun5ruskor122010.ht ml
6. Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to the United Nations, at a Media Stakeout on the
Situation on the Korean Peninsula, December 19, 2010, (start
06:14).
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/
russian-federation-representative-vitaly-churkin-security-
council-media-stakeout.html
7. “Remarks by President of the Security Council, Ambassador
Susan E. Rice, United States Permanent Representative, at a
Media Stakeout on the Situation on the Korean Peninsula,
December 19, 2010.”
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/
2010/12/united-states-representative-susan-rice-security-counc
il-media-stakeout.html
8. On the concept of Good Offices of the UN Secretary General,
see for example:
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_
organs/representatives.shtml
9. Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of
the People’s Republic of China, at a Media Stakeout on the
Situation on the Korean Peninsula, December 20, 2010.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/wang-min-r
epresentative-of-the-democratic-republic-of-china-security-co
uncil-media-stakeout.html
10. “Commentary: Applause for North Korea’s restraint,” Global
Times, December 22, 2010.
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7238754.html
11. “Korea Tensions came close to ‘war’,” said China Diplomat,
December 22, 2010.
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/
afp_asiapacific/view/1100526/1/.html
12. See for example: “S. Korea playing by dangerous cliff,”
Editorial, Global Times, December 23, 2010.
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/603638. shtml
“Korean brothers advised not to go to war game,” People’s Daily
Online, December 21, 2010.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
90001/90780/91343/7238108.html
L. Hongmei, “U.S., insidious harm to Korean Peninsula,”
People’s Daily Online, December 21, 2010.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/7238362.html
“New ROK drills add to tension on peninsula,” People’s Daily
Online, December 27, 2010.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
90001/90777/90851/7242721.html
13. Ronda Hauben, “In Cheonan Dispute Security Council Acts
in Accord with UN Charter,” taz.de, September 5, 2011.
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/09/05/in_cheonan_dispute
_un_security_council_discovers_un_charter/
14. Ambassador Claude Heller on June 14. 2010 “Media
Stakeout: Informal comments to the Media by the President of
the Security Council and the Permanent Representative of
Mexico, H. E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the
sinking of the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on
Kyrgyzstan.” [Webcast: Archived Video – 5 minutes.]
ht t p:/ / we b c ast . un. o r g / r a mg e n / o n d e ma nd/s t ake o u t/
2010/so100614pm3.rm
15. “Russian Navy Team’s Analysis of the Cheonan Incident,”
Posted on July 27, Hankyoreh, modified on July 29. http://www.
hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432230.html
The Russian Experts document is titled “Data from the Russian
Naval Expert Group’s Investigation into the Cause of the South
Korean Naval Vessel Cheonan’s Sinking.”
See also “Russia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that Sinking
Cheonan Ship was Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27, 2010,
Hankyoreh, modified on July 28, 2010.
http://www.hani.
Page 18
co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html
16. Maurizio Guerrero,”Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict
de Peninsula de Corea,” Notimex, July 5, 2010 (published in en
la Economia).
http://enlaeconomia.com/news/2010/07/05/69561
17. Presidential Statement on Cheonan, July 9, 2010,
S/PRST/2010/13. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/
%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%
7D/NKorea%20SPRST%202010%2013.pdf
18. Ronda Hauben, “In Cheonan Dispute Security Council Acts
in Accord with UN Charter,” taz.de, September 5, 2011.
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/09/05/in_cheonan_dispute
_un_security_council_discovers_un_charter/
19. I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, Monthly
Review Press, 1952, p. 50.
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on July 15, 2013 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/07/15/out-of-the-
box-diplomacy-tobuild-a-dialogue-with-north-korea/]
Out of the Box Diplomacy to
Build a Dialogue with North
Korea
by Ronda Hauben
It was an unusual event. On Thursday, July 11,
the Asia Society presented a program about the
Search for Peace with North Korea. The official title
of the program was “Avoiding Apocalypse: Searching
for Peace with North Korea.”
1
Such a title is in itself
an unusual event for a program about North Korea as
it stresses the desire for peace with North Korea,
instead of focusing on the all too often claims of the
impossibility of progress in improving the U.S.-North
Korean relationship.
Former Governor of New Mexico, Bill
Richardson and Ambassador Donald Gregg, former
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, were the
speakers with ABC’s Jon Williams in the role of
moderator. The program did indeed stand out in the
sense that the speakers made a serious effort to
propose both the reasons and the possible means to
build a dialogue between North Korea and the U.S.
Governor Richardson opened the program by
asking the question, “How do we improve the
relationship?” He argued that, “Isolating North Korea
doesn’t work.” Instead, he proposed the need for what
he called “out of the box diplomacy.”
One such proposal he made was the need for a
special UN envoy to help find a peaceful resolution to
the Korean peninsula conflicts. He recalled that the
UN used to have an envoy, a Canadian, Maurice
Strong. Richardson suggested that the current
Secretary General, Ban Ki moon appoint an envoy.
Richardson also considered the potential of a sports
diplomacy, or something along the lines of the N.Y.
Philharmonic that had been so successful a few years
ago.
Richardson gave as an example of the need for
serious attention to the problem of the poor
relationship with North Korea, the recent experience
of shutting down Kaesong, the joint Korean program
which provides 50,000 jobs for North Koreans in
factories owned by South Koreans. This is the first
time in the history of that program that the bad
relations led to the shut down of this program, he
noted.
“Some creative thinking is needed,” Governor
Richardson argued. Whether that be the appointment
of a special envoy, or something else to be done by
the UN, or something by the media, some kind of
thinking has to evolve, Richardson explained. What’s
happening now is not good, he concluded.
Ambassador Donald Gregg’s contributions to
the program reflected a similar sense that the U.S.
needed to do more to engage with the North Koreans.
Gregg spoke about how Syracuse University had set
up a program more than 10 years ago providing
information technology training for North Koreans.
Gregg was critical of the U.S. failure to recognize that
the U.S. had the potential to influence the situation,
instead of handcuffing “themselves” with policies like
“strategic patience.”
Ambassador Gregg related how when Kim Jung
Un first came on the scene, Gregg had encouraged the
U.S. government to invite him to visit the U.S. This
proposal, however, like others Gregg made to the U.S.
government, were not accepted by U.S. officials.
Another example described by Gregg recalled
an incident in the early 1990s. Recognizing the
antagonism of the North Koreans to the U.S.–South
Korean military exercises each year, Ambassador
Page 19
Gregg had gotten the Pentagon to cancel the exercises
one year. This was welcomed by the North Koreans
and provided an opening for talks. Instead, however,
without consulting Ambassador Gregg, the then U.S.
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney got the military
exercises put back. The result was that North Korea
threw out the IAEA inspectors and a crisis developed.
Describing this experience, the U.S. State Department
country director for Korea at the time, Charles
Kartman commented, “People were looking for clubs
not solutions.”
In response to a question about the nuclear
umbrella that the U.S. provides to protect South
Korea and Japan, Gregg related an incident where
North Koreans suggested that they be included under
the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a means for them not to
feel the need to have their own nuclear program.
Ambassador Gregg proposed that there is a need for
an understanding to develop between the U.S. and
North Korea and that such an understanding can only
come as a result of contact.
Governor Richardson proposed that new players
were needed who could help develop a relationship
between the U.S. and North Korea. He answered
positively to a question from the audience about
whether ASEAN might be able to play a bigger role.
In general, Richardson advocated that the those from
the region be a source of help in opening up the
relationship with North Korea.
A video of the July 11 program has been put
online at the Asia Society. The title is “Searching for
Peace with North Korea.”
2
Notes
1.
http://asiasociety.org/new-york/events/avoiding-apocalypse-
searching-peace-north-korea-0
2. http://asiasociety.org/video/policy/searching-peace-north-
korea-complete
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on Oct 5, 2016 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2016/10/05/women_
seeking_to_participate_in_peace_treaty_process/]
Women Peace Activists Ask
Ban Ki-moon to Initiate a
Process for a Peace Treaty
to End Korean War
by Ronda Hauben
On Tuesday, September 27, 2016, women peace
activists held a press conference at the Interchurch
Center across from the United Nations Headquarters
building in N.Y.C. They announced that they had
delivered a letter signed by more than 100 women
asking UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to initiate
a peace process which will lead to a peace treaty
between the U.S. and the DPRK by 2020.
They explained that with 100 days left before
the Secretary General completes his second five year
term at the head of the UN Secretariat, he has an
obligation to fulfill on a promise he made in a speech
in 2007 where he stated:
Beyond a peaceful resolution of the
nuclear issue with North Korea, we should
aim to establish a peace mechanism,
through transition from armistice to a
permanent peace regimen.
In their letter the peace activists reminded the
UN Secretary General, “We look to you to leave
behind a legacy of diplomacy for peace in Korea,
Northeast Asia and the World.”
In the past few weeks, journalists who are part
of the UN press corps have asked the Secretary
General if he has any intention of using his little time
left as Secretary General to do something to work
toward a peaceful resolution of the tension on the
Korean Peninsula. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s
last term in office will expire on December 31, 2016.
In response to the questions posed by these
reporters, the Secretary General replied that he has no
Page 20
special plans.
It is to the credit of these women peace activists
that they continue to call on the Secretary General to
fulfill on the obligation of his office to work to lessen
the tension on the Korean Peninsula. But whether
their efforts will lead to any action on the part of the
Secretary General or not does not detract from the
importance of such efforts on the part of journalists
and peace activists.
The peace activists holding the press conference
pointed out that currently tensions are especially high
on the Korean Peninsula. The combination of military
exercises by U.S. and South Korea, the U.S. bringing
B1 bombers to South Korea, and the North Korean
nuclear tests leave the situation on the Korean
Peninsula as one with no obvious means of lessening
the tension.
During the press conference, one of the
speakers, Suzy Kim, described a meeting held by the
peace activists in February 2016 in Bali, Indonesia.
The International peace activists group Women
Cross the DMZ (WCDMZ) had invited a South
Korean women peace delegation and a North Korean
women peace delegation to meet with them to discuss
how to work toward the signing of a peace treaty
between the U.S. government and the North Korean
government that would end the Korean War. In order
to make the arrangements for their meeting, there was
a need to get permissions from the South Korean
government and the North Korean government for the
women from their respective countries to meet with
each other. While the delegation of WCDMZ peace
activists got the needed permission from the North
Korean government for the proposed meeting, the
South Korean government would not approve such a
meeting. Therefore, the international peace activists
decided to hold separate meetings with the North
Korean women and the South Korean women.
The WOMENCROSSDMZ.org web site
includes a summary which describes the Bali
meetings and includes a statement of principles
created by the North Korean women and the
international peace activists. Following is the
statement:
MEETING AGREEMENT
Bali Indonesia, February 10, 2016
(Between WCDMZ International
Delegation and DPRK Delegation)
1. We will make active efforts for public
education and awareness raising regarding
the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and
the need for an end to military action that
further aggravates the situation.
2. We will work together as Korean and
international women, in efforts to improve
inter-Korean relations and achieve
peaceful reunification of Korea, in the
spirit of prior inter – Korean agreements
such as the June 15 North and South Joint
Declaration, 2000.
3. We will carry out work toward the
achievement of lasting peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula. This includes
the removal of various political and
physical hindrances to peace and
reunification, replacement of the
Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty,
and the eventual denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and the entire world.
4. We will promote women’s leadership at
all levels of peacebuilding, including
preventing armed conflict and
participating in peace negotiations.
International women will actively work to
urge each government to support women’s
involvement in the Korean peace process,
as provided for in UN Security Council
Resolution 1325.
Such a statement provides a guide for a
transnational peace building campaign. The statement
is an expression of the need for peace negotiations
toward replacing the Korean War Armistice
Agreement with a peace treaty and the eventual
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the rest
of the world.
The summary of the February Bali meeting
offers a demonstration of the value of including
women in line with UN Security Council Resolution
1325 in peace negotiations for the Korean Peninsula.
The importance of implementing UN Resolution
1325 in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula was also
raised at an October 3, 2016 press conference at the
UN marking the Russian Federation assuming the
Page 21
October 2016 rotating presidency of the UN Security
Council. On the agenda for the October 2016
schedule is a UN Security Council meeting on
October 25 which will be an open debate on UNSC
Resolution 1325.
A question raised by a journalist and the
response from Ambassador Vitaly Churkin at the
October 3 press conference helps to support the need
for women peace activists to be part of the peace
process in difficult conflict situations like the Korean
conflict.
Following is the slightly edited transcript of this
question and Ambassador Churkin’s response:
(Journalist): “Yes, I have a question about
(Security Council Resolution-ed) 1325. There are
women, international women peace activists who
went from North Korea and South Korea, and met
with women in both countries. And now they sent a
letter to Ban Ki-moon asking him for a process
towards a peace treaty (between the U.S. and North
Korea-ed) and also to involve women in the process.
And here we have the situation with North Korea
where the Security Council has not made any
progress. And they (the international peace
activists-ed) are saying we need women involved in
doing this, women working for peace.
Is there any way you see of doing this, any way
you see to have 1325 actually implemented so you get
some help toward having a peace development?”
Response from Ambassador Churkin:
(Ambassador Churkin): “Well, You know what we
believe is that, this is an extremely difficult situation.
And the cycle of action and counter action which we
have seen in the past few years, actually since 2005
when this deal of September 19 fell through, it is not
working.
So we do believe we need to try some creative
thinking. We don’t have some specific immediate
proposals, but certainly, DPRK testing and then U.S.
and others conducting some higher level military
maneuvers there, you know, beefing up their military
presence, that does not help at all.
In that creative thinking, it may well be the
greater involvement of women could be one of the
elements that might move the situation forward.”
1
By recognizing the need for and importance of
contributions for the peace process mandated by
UNSC Resolution 1325, Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon would do well to favorably respond to the letter
from the international women peace activists.
Note
1. See webcast for Oct 3, 2016 press conference with
A m b a s s a d o r C h u r k i n :
http://webtv.un.org/media/watch/ambassador-vitaly-churkin-of-
t h e - r u s s i a n - f e d e r a t i o n - p r e s i d e n t - o f - t h e -
security-council-of-october-2016-press-conference/515389874
7001 (at 33:08-33:58, and 33:59-34:42)
The Media War at the UN and
the DPRK Why Netizen
Journalism Matters
Notes for a Talk*
by Ronda Hauben
[Author’s note: The following are slightly edited
Notes prepared for a talk presented at Stony Brook
University on December 4, 2013. The talk was part of
a series of talks in fall 2013 sponsored by the Center
for Korean Studies at Stony Brook focusing on North
Korea. The talk was presented with slides which are
available at the website given at the end of these
Notes. Comments are welcome.]
I – Preface
I am honored to be here today and to give this
talk as part of the series of talks on North Korea.
In October of 2006, I began covering the United
Nations first as a journalist for the English edition of
the South Korean online newspaper OhmyNews
International. When OhmyNews ended its English
edition in 2010, I became a correspondent covering
the UN for an English language blog
German newspaper Die Tageszeitung. Both
OhmyNews International and my blog at the taz.de
website are online publications.
With Michael Hauben, I am a coauthor of the
book Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet
Page 22
and the Internet. The book was first published online
in January 1994. On May 1, 1997, the print edition of
the book Netizens was published in English. Later that
year, in October, a Japanese translation was
published. Netizens was the first book to recognize
that along with the development of the internet, a new
form of citizenship, called netizenship had emerged.
This is a form of citizenship that has developed based
on the broader forms of political participation made
possible by the Net (i.e., the internet).
I want to share some of the background about
the origin, use and impact of the netizen concept and
its relation to what I call netizen journalism before
presenting two case studies of how netizen journalism
has affected the media war at the UN.
II – Introduction
While now many people are interested in the
impact of the internet on society, pioneering research
was done by my coauthor Michael Hauben in the
early 1990s when the internet was first beginning to
spread and to connect people around the world.
In his research, Hauben recognized that there
were people who appreciated the communication the
internet made possible and that these people worked
to spread the Net and to do what they felt needed for
it to help to create a better world. Taking the common
network term, “net.citizen” used online at the time,
Hauben proposed that these people who worked to
contribute to the Net and the bigger world it was part
of were “netizens.”
In an article he wrote on the impact of the Net
on journalism, Hauben recognized that many people
online were frustrated with the mainstream media and
that the netizens would be creating a broader and
more widespread media.
Hauben recognized in the early 1990s that “the
collective body of people assisted by (the Net)…has
grown larger than any individual newspaper….” I
want to look at two news events about North Korea
and the UN in the context of this prediction. Then I
will consider the implication of these case studies for
the kind of journalism about North Korea that I
propose netizens and the internet are making possible.
III – Korea
In February of 2003 I was glancing at the front
page summaries of the articles in an issue of the
Financial Times. I saw a surprising headline for an
article continued later in the issue. The article said
that in 2002 netizens in South Korea had elected the
president of the country, Roh Moo-hyun. He had just
taken office on February 25, 2003. The new president
had even promised that the internet would be
influential in the form of government he established.
Also I learned that an online Korean newspaper called
OhmyNews had been important making these
developments possible. Colleagues encouraged me to
get in contact with OhmyNews and to learn more
about the netizens activities in South Korea and about
OhmyNews.
I was able to get in contact with OhmyNews. I
began to submit articles to it. They would be printed
along with a few other English language articles
others were submitting. By 2004 OhmyNews began an
English language online edition called OhmyNews
International. I began to write for it. I soon became
the first woman columnist for the English edition.
I subsequently learned that both South Korea
and China are places where the role of netizens is
important in building more democratic structures for
society. I began to pay attention to both of these
netizen developments. South Korea, for example, has
been an advanced model of grassroots efforts to create
examples of netizen forms for a more participatory
decision making processes. I wrote several research
papers documenting the achievements and activities
of Korean netizens.
IV – Reporting on the UN
By October 2006, the second five-year term for
Kofi Annan as the Secretary General of the United
Nations was soon to end. One of the main contenders
to become the 8
th
Secretary General of the UN was the
Foreign Minister of South Korea, Ban Ki-moon.
I had covered one previous United Nations
event which I had found of great interest. That event
was the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) which encouraged access to the internet for
everyone. The event took place in Tunis, Tunisia in
November 2005. Also I had watched with interest
some of the press reports of the speeches made by
heads of state at the 2006 opening of the General
Assembly session. These events gave me the sense
Page 23
that it probably would be interesting to go to the UN
and cover the activities for OhmyNews if the new
Secretary General would be Ban Ki-moon, the Korean
candidate.
On October 9, 2006, Ban Ki-moon won the
Security Council nomination. This nomination was to
be approved by the General Assembly on October 13.
I thought this would be a historic event for
South Korea.
By 2006, I was writing regularly as a featured
columnist for OhmyNews International (OMNI).
I asked the Editor of OhmyNews International
if I could get a letter for a press credential to cover the
UN for OMNI. He agreed and I was able to get my
credential in time to go to the General Assembly
meeting when the General Assembly voted to accept
the Security Council’s nomination of Ban Ki-moon.
I was surprised that some of the speeches
welcoming Ban Ki-moon as the Secretary General
elect were meaningful speeches referring to actual
problems at the UN such as the need for reform of the
Security Council. Conversely, the U.S. Ambassador
to the UN, John Bolton, made no pretense to hide
both his welcoming of Ban and his dissatisfaction
with Kofi Annan, the outgoing Secretary General who
had condemned the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A
significant focus of the comments to the new
Secretary General from member states emphasized
the importance of communication at the UN, that it
was critical for the incoming Secretary General to
listen to all states and to hear their views.
It was a thrill to be at the UN witnessing the
vote for a new Secretary General who was from South
Korea. I wondered if the internet would be able to
have any impact on the new Secretary General and on
what happened at the United Nations, since the
internet had been able to make it possible for netizens
in South Korea to impact politics.
The very next day after Ban Ki-moon’s
nomination was approved by the General Assembly,
the Security Council took up to condemn the recent
nuclear test by North Korea. This had been North
Korea’s first nuclear test. The Security Council
imposed sanctions on North Korea, not giving the
North Korean Ambassador to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, a
chance to respond until after the sanctions had been
voted on. When the North Korean Ambassador
responded, he referred among other issues, to
financial sanctions that the U.S. had imposed on
North Korea. No one in the Security Council asked
him what he was referring to or how this affected the
issues the Security Council had acted on with respect
to North Korea.
It impressed me that just as a diplomat from
South Korea was being chosen as the new Secretary
General of the UN, at the same time sanctions were
being imposed on North Korea. The Security Council
acted against North Korea before hearing its views on
the issue they were considering. This was in sharp
contrast to the emphasis member nations had put on
the importance of hearing the views of all members
when member nations welcomed Ban Ki-moon to the
United Nations in the meeting just one day earlier in
the General Assembly.
The article I wrote for OhmyNews International
described this situation. It explained:
The urgent problem facing the UN at this
juncture in history is not whether North
Korea has developed and tested a nuclear
device. It is the breakdown reflected by
the lack of participation and investigation
by the international community into how
a crisis will be handled once it develops,
and whether the concerns and problems of
those involved in the crisis will be
considered as part of the process of
seeking a solution. It is how the UN
functions when tensions reach a point
where serious attention is needed to help
to understand and solve a problem.
(Quoted from “The Problem Facing the
UN,” OhmyNews International, October
17, 2006).
1
In general when at the UN, I paid attention to
Security Council developments, particularly with
regard to the meetings imposing sanctions on North
Korea and also on Iran. Also, I particularly followed
the meetings of the Security Council and the General
Assembly when Security Council reform was being
discussed.
V – Some Mainstream Media Created a
Story
Soon after Ban Ki-moon took office as
Page 24
Secretary General at the beginning of January 2007,
a story appeared in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ)
accusing North Korea of using UN funds from the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for its
nuclear program. An editorial in the January 19 issue
of the WSJ by Melanie Kirkpatrick had the headline:
“United Nations Dictators.”
No evidence was presented in the WSJ, just
accusations. This situation was reminiscent of how
the WSJ and some other mainstream media had
accused the former Secretary General, Kofi Annan, of
misusing UN funds in Iraq, and how this had
mushroomed into what had come to be known as the
“Food for Oil” scandal.
The significance of this story for me, was to see
that some of the mainstream media were active
creating stories and accusations with no real evidence,
while only very few media appeared to be
investigating the actual underlying issues that had led
the North Korean government to carry out its first
nuclear test.
VI – The Six-Party Talks and the Banco
Delta Asia Story
In January 2007 there were reports in the press
about a meeting that had taken place in Berlin
between Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary of
State for the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan, the Deputy
Foreign Minister of North Korea.
Around this time I learned some of the
background behind what had led to North Korea
carrying out its first nuclear test. An agreement had
been reached on September 19, 2005 between the six
parties to talks about the denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula. The six parties were North Korea,
South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Russia and China.
Shortly after the agreement was signed in Sept. 2005,
the U.S. Treasury Department announced that it was
freezing the assets of the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) a
bank in Macao, China, which held $25 million of
North Korean funds.
The result of this action was that North Korea
lost access to $25 million of its bank funds, and also
to the use of the international banking system. North
Korea’s response was to leave the six-party talks to
protest this action which it considered hostile and
politically motivated.
North Korea was encouraged by some parties to
the six-party talks to have bilateral negotiations with
the U.S. over the financial sanctions. The U.S.,
however, refused to negotiate. Unable to find a way to
negotiate with the U.S. over this situation, North
Korea, in July 2006, tested a missile. The response of
the UN Security Council was to condemn North
Korea by passing UN Resolution 1695 but not to
investigate what the problem was that led North
Korea to carry out a missile test.
Then on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried
out its first nuclear test. Once again the Security
Council failed to investigate what was behind this
action. Instead the Security Council passed
Resolution 1718 imposing more sanctions on North
Korea.
Only after this nuclear test did the U.S.
demonstrate a willingness to negotiate with the DPRK
over the financial sanctions imposed on Banco Delta
Asia.
On January 16 and 17, 2007, Christopher Hill
and Kim Kye-gwan held talks in Berlin and came to
an agreement. Though not officially announced, it
was believed that they agreed that the $25 million
being held in the Macau BDA, along with access to
the international banking system would be restored to
North Korea. In exchange North Korea would return
to the six-party talks. The Berlin meeting appeared to
break the deadlock and the six-party talks were held
again starting on February 8, 2007. Another
agreement was announced five days later on February
13, 2007.
Then on March 5 and 6, Hill and Kim held
bilateral talks in New York City. Despite the
agreement reached in Berlin, however, the U.S.
Treasury Department issued a finding on March 19
against the BDA under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot
Act. This move again deadlocked the six-party talks,
even as the delegates arrived for the talks in Beijing.
The deadlock continued for the next few
months, with much of the mainstream U.S. press
blaming North Korea for continuing to insist that its
$25 million be returned via a banking transaction,
before it would agree to any further steps in the six-
party talks. The North Korean delegate said he
understood that the agreement in Berlin with
Christopher Hill had provided for the return of the
Page 25
$25 million from the BDA as a money transfer via the
international banking system.
The U.S. Treasury Department officials claimed
that their decision against the BDA left it up to the
bank to return the funds. The decision against the
bank, however, meant that it had no means to return
the funds as a money transfer as the Section 311
finding against the bank meant that it lost access to
the international banking system.
During this period, there were rumors that a
bank in China had been asked by the U.S. State
Department to make the transfer. The bank allegedly
considered the request. Eventually, however, the bank
refused based on its fear that it too would be frozen
out of the international banking system by the U.S.
Treasury Department, as the BDA had been, if it
offered to help make the transfer of funds back to
North Korea.
The McClatchy Newspaper Company, in a way
that is different from much of the rest of the
mainstream U.S. media, carried articles which helped
to investigate the issues underlying this dispute
between the U.S. and North Korea. Other banks in
Macau, an article in the McClatchy Newspapers
explained, had played a similar role with regard to
North Korea, helping North Korea to sell its gold, but
only the BDA had been singled out for sanctions. The
article suggested that the U.S. Treasury Department’s
actions were not based on actual criminal activity by
the bank or by North Korea, but instead were
motivated by a political objective.
One of the McClatchy newspaper articles
described some documents that the newspaper had
acquired including the BDA’s complaint challenging
the U.S. Treasury Department decision against the
bank. Also, the McClatchy newspaper article referred
to a statement filed by the owner of the BDA to
protest the Treasury Department action.
I tried to find a way to get copies of the
documents. I tried to contact the law firm and even
wrote to the McClatchy reporter, but none of these
efforts succeeded.
I did, however, find on the internet a copy of the
Patriot Act and read Section 311, the section being
used against the bank. I was able to see that the
section of the law was such that the U.S. government
did not have to present any proof for its actions.
In March 2007, I did a story titled “North
Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia,”
documenting how the use of Section 311 of the
Patriot Act against the bank was a political act, rather
than a criminal determination. The U.S. Treasury
Department did not have to provide any evidence and
acted as the accuser and judge in the case. Even
though there had been an agreement between the U.S.
and North Korea to return the $25 million to North
Korea, nothing happened.
The stalemate continued.
In May 2007, I covered the 50
th
Anniversary
dinner celebration of the New York City based Korea
Society. Chris Hill gave a short talk as part of the
program. He indicated that he would persevere until
a means was found to break the impasse over the $25
million so as to make it possible for the six-party talks
to continue.
Several journalists covered the event for other
South Korean publications. They were particularly
interested in what Hill said, but Hill’s talk in itself did
not seem to represent a newsworthy event.
In the next few days, however, it appeared that
an important story was developing. An article by
Kevin Hall titled, “Bank Owner Disputes Money-
Laudering Allegations,” published by the McClatchy
Newspaper Company said that the blog “China
Matters” had published links to some documents
refuting the Treasury Department’s charges against
the bank.
“China Matters” is a blog about U.S.-China
policy. The links that the blog made available
included to an appeal submitted by the lawyer for
Banco Delta Asia to an administrative hearing at the
Treasury Department and to a statement by the owner
of the Bank in Macao, Stanley Au.
I now had the documents in the case. The U.S.
government’s findings were general statements pro-
viding no specific evidence of wrongdoing on the part
of the bank. The bank’s statements and refutation
gave significant documentation refuting charges of
illegal activity on the part of the bank. The refutation
also made the case that there was political motive for
the U.S. government’s allegations rather than actual
illegal activity on the part of the bank.
Also the blogger at China Matters who uses the
pseudonym China Hand or Peter Lee posted some of
Page 26
the Congressional testimony by David Asher, a
former U.S. government official who had helped to
plan and enforce the U.S. Treasury Department
sanctions against the Banco Delta Asia.
Asher explained that the U.S. government had
targeted a small Macau bank in order to scare the
banks in China. “To kill the chicken to scare the
monkeys,” the ex-government official explained,
quoting an old Chinese proverb in his testimony in a
U.S. Congressional hearing.
I wanted to verify the testimony of Asher and
understand its implications, so I searched online and
found an earlier government document from
November 2006. Asher had testified in a similar vein
at a Congressional hearing titled “China’s
Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and Its Role in
Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Situations in
Both Countries,” on September 14, 2006. The
document I found was the transcript of that hearing.
The hearing was held by a special Congressional
Commission about the U.S. China relationship which
held hearings semi annually.
What was most surprising in this document,
however, was the explanation that the Banco Delta
Asia sanctions were an issue that was only
secondarily aimed at North Korea. The primary issue
that was of interest to the U.S. government officials
involved in the Commission Hearing was what was
China’s foreign policy and how closely did China’s
behavior match the foreign policy goals set out by the
U.S.
In the discussion at the September 2006 hearing
about the Banco Delta Asia, David Asher described
the political objectives of the action. Speaking about
China, Asher said:
They get the message on the financial
angle…there’s an old saying in Chinese,
‘You kill the chicken to scare the mon-
keys.’ We didn’t go out and cite a
multitude of Chinese financial institutions
that have been publicly identified as
working with North Korea over the
years…. We did need to designate one
small one though, and that one small one
sent a message to all the others, that they
had to get in line, and it was timed to
coincide with other information that we
were making public…. I think they got the
message…. We need to try to align our
financial and economic interests. I do
think, though the use of some pressure,
including veiled pressure is effective.
(Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 2006,
p. 115-116.)
2
The Commission hearing clarified that the
purpose of freezing North Korean funds in the Banco
Delta Asia was not about stopping criminal activity
by that bank or by North Korea, as there was never
any evidence presented of any such activity. Instead
it was an act with a political objective which was to
pressure China to act in conformity with U.S. policy
goals in general and in its actions toward North Korea
in particular.
At last I had the news peg for an important
story. I wrote the article, “Behind the Blacklisting of
Banco Delta Asia: Is the Policy Aimed at Targeting
China as Well as North Korea?” submitting it around
5:00 a.m. my time to OhmyNews International. By
noon the next day, my story appeared. That was on
May 18.
Also on May 18, the Wall Street Journal carried
an Op Ed by the former U.S. Ambassador to the UN,
John Bolton. The article scolded the U.S. government
for negotiating to return the $25 million to North
Korea
In late May I was an invited speaker at the
International Communications Association (ICA
2007) conference in San Francisco. I summed up my
experience writing for OhmyNews International,
particularly describing the BDA story and the helpful
role of online media in making it possible to present
an alternative narrative as opposed to that of the
mainstream U.S. media about the situation.
VII – Voice of America News Service
Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San
Francisco, however, that my experience with this
story was not ending, but actually a new episode was
beginning.
A short time later, on June 11, I received a
surprising e-mail message. The message was from a
reporter who said she worked for Voice of America
News Korea (VOA News Korean Service). VOA is an
Page 27
official U.S. government news broadcasting service.
3
She began:
“Hello Ms. Hauben.”
She introduced herself as a reporter with the
Korean Service of the Voice of America News in
Washington, D.C.
Her e-mail continued:
While I was working on a story about
BDA issue, I read your report, ‘Behind the
Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia.’ I
thought you made some valuable points
about the BDA issue in this report, I was
wondering if I could have a conversation
with you in this matter. Since I am on a
deadline, I’m trying very hard to get a
hold of you. So I would really appreciate
it if you call or e-mail me back ASAP.
She gave her phone number.
I wondered if it was advisable to speak with her
as VOA News has a reputation of being a promoter of
U.S. government policy, rather than a news service
seeking the facts. I asked my editors at OhmyNews
International and I also spoke with a Korean
journalist I know who covers stories at the UN for
another Korean newspaper. They all encouraged me
to speak with her.
I called her as she had asked. She said she
wanted to interview me by phone. I asked her to let
me know what she would want to speak with me
about. She sent me an e-mail message elaborating.
Her message explained:
The purpose of this interview is to let our
listeners know what is going on regarding
the BDA issue and how the BDA issue is
developing.
When I read your article, I thought you
made valuable and critical points about
the BDA issue, and I thought it might be
very important to let your idea about the
BDA issue be heard by our listeners.
She listed questions she would ask me in the
interview. They were:
1. How you came up with the idea of
writing this article. How you prepared it.
About your sources.
2. Briefly summarize your findings or
main points of the article.
3. What you are trying to accomplish by
writing this article? What needs to be
done to resolve the BDA issue?
“Finally,” she wrote, “I wanted to ask you if we
could do this interview sometime between 9:00 a.m.
and 9:30 a.m.… Thanks again,” she ended the e-mail
message.
She called at the arranged time.
She told me her listeners were in North Korea.
I was surprised that a reporter for a U.S. government
media would offer to do a story about the hidden
political objectives of U.S. policy against North
Korea which were being camouflaged by false
criminal accusations against North Korea.
We had a half hour telephone conversation
discussing my stories, the sources I had used and the
problem represented by the American government
freezing the BDA funds. She also asked for the URLs
to follow up on the sources I had cited. These were
basically material I had found on the internet,
including several government documents, and copies
of the legal documents submitted by the bank owner
to appeal the U.S. Treasury Department ruling against
the bank.
The VOA News reporter said she was interested
in contacting former U.S. government officials like
David Asher who was responsible for crafting the
plan to freeze North Korea’s bank account assets. She
wanted to ask them to respond to my article.
Just as this contact with the VOA News
journalist was happening, there were news stories
describing the ongoing efforts to find a solution to the
roadblock that the frozen North Korean funds
represented.
Soon there were reports that the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York had agreed to transfer the funds
from the BDA to an account held by a Russian bank
for North Korea. In the following weeks, the funds
transfer was done.
The VOA News reporter wrote me saying she
had other stories to do and was not for now going to
pursue this story any longer.
Whether the contact had any impact on the
resolution of the stalemate, I can only speculate.
Regardless of her motivation, however, the VOA
News reporter had contacted me before the situation
was resolved. At the very least, an article I had done
Page 28
had caught the attention of someone connected to the
Voice of America News. I was given the chance to
explain what I had learned about the BDA story and
to explain how I understood the controversy
surrounding it. So my story did indeed have more of
an impact than I had understood when I gave my talk
at the ICA 2007 in San Francisco.
The experience I had with my BDA story and
the encounter with the Korean News Service of the
VOA News demonstrates that the internet makes it
possible not only to spread an accurate narrative
among the public, but also to reach officials with an
interest in the issues being critiqued.
The reason I have taken the time to tell this
story is that it represents for me a taste of the impact
that such online journalism makes possible.
VIII – The Phenomenon of Netizen
Journalism
In the research I have been doing and the
experiences I have had exploring the potential of what
I call netizen journalism, the question has been raised:
What is this new form of news and what are its
characteristics?
Is there something different from traditional
journalism?
Is there some significant new aspect represented
by netizen journalism?
Essentially I have found that there is an
important research component of what I call netizen
journalism. Netizen journalism, is a socially oriented
journalism. As such, at times there is a need to do
serious research into the background, context and
political significance of conflicts. By revealing the
actual forces at work, netizen journalism provides a
more accurate grasp of whose interests are being
served, and what is at stake in the events that make up
the news.
Traditionally, the press can function as a
watchdog for society by exposing the use and abuse
of power. Or, the press can act to support the abuse of
political power.
Netizens, whether journalists or citizens who
turn to journalism to challenge problems in their
society, have demonstrated in a number of instances
that they are able to bring public attention to
situations needing change, and exert the needed
pressure for the change so that the change gets made.
If netizen journalism can provide a more
accurate understanding of conflicts, it can help make
more likely the peaceful resolution of these conflicts.
Also as an aside, my stories about the U.S.-
BDA-North Korea-UN conflict led to my being short-
listed for one of the journalism awards presented each
year by the United Nations Correspondence
Association (UNCA) for the best journalism articles
about the UN for 2007. While I did not get the award
in 2007, I did get it the following year, in 2008.
IX – The Cheonan – Some Background
The Cheonan conflict, which was brought to the
UN in 2010, provides another interesting example
how netizen journalism affected the media war and
helped to make a significant contribution to a peaceful
resolution of the conflict by the Security Council.
The Cheonan incident concerns a South Korean
war ship which broke in two and sank on March 26,
2010. Forty-six of the crew died. At the time, the ship
was involved in naval exercises with the U.S. military
in an area in the West Sea/Yellow Sea between North
Korea and China. This is a situation that had been the
subject of much discussion on the internet.
Initially the South Korean government and the
U.S. government said there was no indication that
North Korea was involved. Then at a press conference
on May 20, 2010, the South Korean government
claimed that a torpedo fired by a North Korean
submarine exploded in the water near the Cheonan,
causing a pressure wave that was responsible for the
sinking. Many criticisms of this scenario have been
raised.
There was no direct evidence of any North
Korean submarine in the vicinity of the Cheonan. Nor
was there any evidence that a torpedo was actually
fired causing a pressure wave phenomenon. Hence the
South Korean government had no actual case that
could be presented in a court of law to support its
claims.
In fact, if this claim of a pressure wave were
true even those involved in the investigation of the
incident acknowledge that North Korea would be the
first to have succeeded at using this kind of a bubble
jet torpedo action in actual fighting.
4
Page 29
X – The Cheonan Press Conference and
the Local Election
The press conference held by the South Korean
government on May 20, 2010, to announce that North
Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan
came, it turns out, at the start of the local election
period. Many South Koreans were suspicious that the
accusation was a ploy to help the ruling party
candidates win in the local elections. The widespread
suspicions about the government’s motives led to the
ruling party losing many of the local election contests.
These election results demonstrated the deep distrust
among the South Korean population of the motives
behind the South Korean government’s accusations
about North Korea’s responsibility for the sinking of
the Cheonan.
XI – The Cheonan and Netizen
Journalism
Netizens who live in different countries and
speak different languages took up to critique the
claims of the South Korean government about the
cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. This netizen
activity had an important effect. It appears to have
acted as a catalyst affecting the actions of the UN
Security Council in its treatment of the Cheonan
dispute.
There were substantial analyses by non
governmental organizations like Spark, PSPD,
Peaceboat, and others posted on the internet in
English or in Korean or in both languages. Some of
these online posts were in the form of letters that were
also sent to the members of the UN Security Council.
At the time, I saw discussions and critiques of the
Korean government’s claims at American, Japanese
and Chinese websites, in addition to conversation and
postings about the Cheonan on South Korean web-
sites.
One such critique included a three-part analysis
by the South Korean NGO People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD). This analysis raised
a number of questions and problems with the South
Korean government’s case. The PSPD document was
posted widely on the internet and also sent to the
President of the United Nations Security Council for
distribution to those Security Council members
interested and to the South Korean Mission to the UN.
While there were many blog comments about
the Cheonan issue in Korean, there were also some
bloggers writing in English who became active in
critiquing the South Korean investigation and the role
of the U.S. in the conflict.
One blogger, Scott Creighton who uses the pen
name Willy Loman, or American Everyman, wrote a
post titled “The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are
being lied to.”
The South Korean government had claimed that
the diagram it displayed above the glass case
containing the alleged torpedo shaft was from a North
Korean weapons sales brochure which offered the
torpedo. The torpedo was identified as the CHT-02D.
In a post he titled “A Perfect Match?,”
Creighton showed how there was a discrepancy
between the diagram displayed by the South Korean
government in the press conference, and the part of
the torpedo it had on display in the glass case below
the diagram. He demonstrated that the diagram did
not match the part of the torpedo on display because
one of the components of the torpedo shown was in
the propeller section, but in the diagram, the
component appeared in the shaft section. There were
many comments in response to this post, including
some from netizens in South Korea. Also the
mainstream conservative media in South Korea
carried accounts of this blogger’s critique. Three
weeks later, at a news conference, a South Korean
government official acknowledged that the diagram
presented by the South Korean government was not of
the same torpedo as the part displayed in the glass
case. Instead the diagram displayed was of the
PT97W torpedo, not the CHT-02D torpedo as
claimed.
In a post titled “Thanks to Valuable Input”
describing the significance of having documented one
of the fallacies in the South Korean government’s
case, Creighton writes:
(I)n the end, thanks to valuable input from
dozens of concerned people all across the
world…. Over 100,000 viewers read that
article and it was republished on dozens of
sites all across the world (even translated).
A South Korean MSM outlet even posted
our diagram depicting the glaring
Page 30
discrepancies between the evidence and
the drawing of the CHT-O2D torpedo,
which a high-ranking military official
could only refute by stating he had 40
years military experience and to his
knowledge, I had none. But what I had,
what we had, was literally thousands of
people all across the world, scientists,
military members, and just concerned
investigative bloggers who were
committed to the truth and who took the
time to contribute to what we were doing
here. ‘40 years military experience’ took
a beating from ‘we the people World-
Wide’ and that is the way it is supposed to
be.
This is just one of a number of serious questions
and challenges that were raised about the South
Korean government’s scenario of the sinking of the
Cheonan.
Other influential events which helped to
challenge the South Korean government’s claims
were a press conference in Japan held on July 9 by
two academic scientists. The two scientists presented
results of experiments they had done which
challenged the results of experiments the South
Korean government used to support its case. These
scientists also wrote to the Security Council with their
findings.
Also a significant challenge to the South Korean
government report was the finding of a Russian team
of four sent to South Korea to look at the data from
the investigation and to do an independent evaluation
of it. The team of Russian navy experts visited South
Korea from May 30 to June 7. The Russian team did
not accept the South Korean government’s claim that
a pressure wave from a torpedo caused the Cheonan
to sink. Getting a leaked copy of the Russian team’s
report, the Hankyoreh newspaper in South Korea
reported that the Russian investigators determined
that the ship had come in contact with the ocean floor
and a propeller and shaft became entangled in a
fishing net. Also the investigators thought it likely
that an old underwater mine had exploded near the
Cheonan adding to the factors that led to it sinking.
Such efforts along with online posts and
discussions by many netizens provided a catalyst for
the actions of the UN Security Council concerning the
Cheonan incident.
When the UN Security Council took up the
Cheonan issue in June 2010, I was surprised to learn
that some of the members of the Council knew of the
criticism of the South Korean government
investigation blaming North Korea for sinking the
ship.
XII – The Cheonan and the UN Security
Council
South Korea brought the dispute over the
sinking of the Cheonan to the United Nations Security
Council. The Mexican Ambassador to the UN, Claude
Heller, was President of the Security Council for the
month of June 2010. (The presidency rotates each
month to a different Security Council member
nation.) In a letter to the Security Council dated June
4, South Korea asked the Council to take up the
Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, then the South
Korean Ambassador to the UN, requested that the
Security Council consider the matter of the Cheonan
and respond in an appropriate manner. The letter
described the investigation into the sinking of the
Cheonan carried out by South Korean government
and military officials. The conclusion of the South
Korean investigation was to accuse North Korea of
sinking the South Korean ship.
How would the Mexican Ambassador as
President of the Security Council during the month of
June handle this dispute? This was a serious issue
facing Ambassador Heller as he began his presidency.
Ambassador Heller adopted what he referred to
as a “balanced” approach to treat both governments
on the Korean peninsula in a fair and objective
manner. He held bilateral meetings with each member
of the Security Council which led to support for a
process of informal presentations by both of the
Koreas to the members of the Security Council. He
arranged for the South Korean Ambassador to make
an informal presentation to the members of the
Security Council. Ambassador Heller also invited the
North Korean Ambassador to make a separate
informal presentation to the members of the Security
Council. Sin Son Ho was the UN Ambassador from
North Korea.
In response to the invitation from the President
Page 31
of the Security Council, the North Korean
Ambassador to the UN sent a letter dated June 8 to
the Security Council which denied the allegation that
his country was to blame. His letter urged the Security
Council not to be the victim of deceptive claims, as
had happened with the U.S. presentation by Colin
Powell on Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council
to support his government’s call to be able to examine
the evidence and to be involved in a new and more
independent investigation on the sinking of the
Cheonan.
In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North
Korea referred to the widespread international
sentiment questioning the conclusions of the South
Korean government’s investigation. The North
Korean Ambassador wrote:
It would be very useful to remind
ourselves of the ever-increasing
international doubts and criticisms, going
beyond the internal boundary of south
Korea, over the ‘investigation result’ from
the very moment of its release….
What Ambassador Heller called “interactive
informal meetings” were held on June 14 with the
South Koreans and the North Koreans in separate
sessions attended by the Security Council members,
who had time to ask questions and then to discuss the
presentations.
At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s
presentations ended, Ambassador Heller said that it
was important to have received the detailed
presentation by South Korea and also to know and
learn the arguments of North Korea. He commented
that “it was very important that North Korea
approached the Security Council.”
In response to a question about his view on the
issues presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I think
we will go on with the consultations to deal in a
proper manner on the issue.”
Ambassador Heller also explained that, “the
Security Council issued a call to the parties to refrain
from any act that could escalate tensions in the region,
and makes an appeal to preserve peace and stability in
the region.”
Though the North Korean Ambassador to the
UN rarely speaks to the media, the North Korean UN
delegation scheduled a press conference for Tuesday,
June 15, the day following the interactive informal
meeting. During the press conference, the North
Korean Ambassador presented his government’s
refutation of the allegations made by South Korea.
Also he explained North Korea’s request to be able to
send an investigation team to the site where the
sinking of the Cheonan occurred. South Korea had
denied the request. During its press conference, the
North Korean Ambassador noted that there was
widespread condemnation of the investigation in both
South Korea and around the world.
The press conference held on June 15 was a
lively event. Many of the journalists who attended
were impressed and requested that there be future
press conferences with the North Korean
Ambassador.
During his presidency of the Security Council in
the month of June, Ambassador Heller held meetings
with the UN ambassadors from each of the two
Koreas and then with Security Council members
about the Cheonan issue. On the last day of his
presidency, on June 30, he was asked by a reporter
what was happening about the Cheonan dispute. He
responded that the issue of contention was over the
evaluation of the South Korean government’s
investigation.
Ambassador Heller described how he introduced
what he refers to as “an innovation” into the Security
Council process. As the month of June ended, the
issue was not yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a
basis to build on the progress that was achieved
during the month of his presidency.
The “innovation” Ambassador Heller referred
to, was a summary he made of the positions of each of
the two Koreas on the issue, taking care to present
each objectively. Heller explained that this summary
was not an official document, so it did not have to be
approved by the other members of the Council. This
summary provided the basis for further negotiations.
He believed that it had a positive impact on the
process of consideration in the Council, making
possible the agreement that was later to be expressed
in the Presidential Statement on the Cheonan that was
issued by the Security Council on July 9, 2010.
Ambassador Heller’s goal, he explained, was to
“at all times be as objective as possible” so as to
avoid increasing the conflict on the Korean peninsula.
Page 32
Such a goal is the Security Council’s obligation under
the UN Charter.
In the Security Council’s July 9 Presidential
Statement (PRST) on the Cheonan, what stands out is
that the statement follows the pattern of presenting
the views of each of the two Koreas and urging that
the dispute be settled in a peaceful manner.
In the PRST, the members of the Security
Council did not blame North Korea. Instead they refer
to the South Korean investigation and its conclusion,
expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings”
of the investigation.
The PRST explains that “The Security Council
takes note of the responses from other relevant
parties, including the DPRK, which has stated that it
had nothing to do with the incident.”
With the exception of North Korea, it is not
indicated who “the other relevant parties” are. It does
suggest, however, that it is likely there were some
Security Council members, not just Russia and China,
which did not agree with the conclusions of the South
Korean investigation.
Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the
Korean newspaper Hankyoreh noted that the
statement “allows for a double interpretation and does
not blame or place consequences on North Korea.”
Such a possibility of a “double interpretation” allows
for different interpretations.
The Security Council action on the Cheonan
took place in a situation where there had been a wide-
ranging international critique, especially in the online
media, about the problems of the South Korean
investigation, and of the South Korean government’s
failure to make public any substantial documentation
of its investigation, along with its practice of
harassing critics of the South Korean government
claims. The Security Council action included hearing
the positions of the different parties to the conflict.
The result of such efforts was something that is
unusual in the process of recent Security Council
activity. The Security Council process in the Cheonan
issue provided for an impartial analysis of the
problem and an effort to hear from those with an
interest in the issue.
The effort in the Security Council was described
by the Mexican Ambassador, as upholding the
principles of impartiality and respectful treatment of
all members toward resolving a conflict between
nations in a peaceful manner. It represents an
important example of the Security Council acting in
conformity with its obligations as set out in the UN
charter.
In the July 9, 2010 Presidential Statement, the
Security Council urged that the parties to the dispute
over the sinking of the Cheonan find a means to
peacefully settle the dispute. The statement says:
The Security Council calls for full
adherence to the Korean Armistice
Agreement and encourages the settlement
of outstanding issues on the Korean
peninsula by peaceful means to resume
direct dialogue and negotiation through
appropriate channels as early as possible,
with a view to avoiding conflicts and
averting escalation.
5
The mainstream U.S. media for the most part,
chose to ignore the many critiques which have
appeared. These critiques of the South Korean
government’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking
have appeared mainly on the internet, not only in
Korean, but also in English, in Japanese, and in other
languages. They present a wide-ranging challenge of
the veracity and integrity of the South Korean
investigation and its conclusions.
An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28,
2010 noted the fact, however, that the media in the
U.S. had ignored the critique of the South Korean
government investigation that was being discussed
online and spread around the world.
In this example, the netizen community in South
Korea and internationally were able to provide an
effective challenge to the misrepresentations by the
South Korean government on the Cheonan.
In conclusion, I want to propose that the
response of netizens to the problems raised by the
investigation of the Cheonan incident is but a prelude
to the potential of netizens in different countries to
work together across national borders to solve the
problems of our times.
XIII – Conclusion
Describing the frustration of many netizens with
the traditional media that they had to rely on before
the internet, Hauben wrote:
Page 33
Today, similarly, the need for a broader
and more cooperative gathering and
reporting of the News has helped create
the new online media that is gradually
supplementing traditional forms of
journalism.
In an article about the power of the internet,
Hauben recognized that the Net gives the power of
the reporter to the netizen. This represents a diffusion
of a power formerly held by the few, placing it in
hands that are different from its former masters.
Speaking about the potential for such a
journalism Hauben predicted, “As people continue to
connect to Usenet and other discussion forums, the
collective population will contribute back to the
human community this new form of news.” He
recognized that, “The Net has opened a channel for
talking to the whole world to an even wider set of
people than did the printed books.”
In one of the press conferences at the UN when
Li Baodong was the Chinese Ambassador to the UN,
he told the media, “You are the 16
th
member of the
Security Council.” He was in general speaking to the
traditional media. However, the case studies I have
described, demonstrate the potential for the new
media, the netizen media, to assume that membership.
Notes
1.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?
no=323351&rel_no=1
2. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/
9.14.06HearingTranscript.pdf
3. Voice of America (VOA) has been a part of several U.S.
government agencies. From its founding in 1942 to 1945, it was
part of the Office of War Information, and then from 1945 to
1953 as a function of the State Department. VOA was placed
under the U.S. Information Agency in 1953. When the USIA was
abolished in 1999, VOA was placed under the Broadcasting
Board of Governors, or BBG, which is an autonomous U.S.
government agency, with bipartisan membership. The Secretary
of State has a seat on the BBG. The BBG replaced the Board for
International Broadcasting (BIB) that oversaw the funding and
operation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a branch of VOA.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_of_America
4. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/
429769.html
5. http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9975.doc.htm
c o l u m b i a . e d u/ ~ h a u b e n/ st o n y - b r o o k / S t o n y-B r o o k -
Slides-12-04-2013.pdf. The URL for the online version of
Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet
is: “Netizens: An Anthology” at:
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120. A version of these Notes
appeared on December 17, 2013 on the Netizenblog at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/12/17/why-netizen-
journalism-matters/
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on Dec. 12, 2016 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2016/12/21/lead
ership-or-candlelight-democracy/]
Ban Ki-moon’s Idea of
Leadership or the
Candlelight Model for More
Democracy?
by Ronda Hauben
South Korea had reached a critical juncture on
December 9, 2016. The National Assembly voted to
impeach the President, Park Geun-hye and the
impeachment has gone to the Constitutional Court.
Six of the nine judges must support the impeachment
for Park to be removed from the presidency
permanently.
In the midst of this turning point, Ban
Ki-moon’s 10 years as Secretary General of the
United Nations (UN) will come to an end on
December 31, 2016. He has indicated he will consider
what to do about becoming a candidate for the
presidency of South Korea after he leaves his office
Page 34
at the UN. He appears to be seriously considering
running for the top political office in South Korea
despite the provisions of a General Assembly
Resolution passed on January 24, 1946, [GA
Resolution 11(1)] which state that a Secretary General
on leaving office should refrain from accepting such
a political position and member nations of the UN
should refrain from offering a recently retired
Secretary General such a position, because of the
privileged sources of information and social
connections he has gathered during his period in the
UN position.
1
For a time, Ban Ki-moon was seen as leading
the South Korean presidential polls as a potential
candidate. He was being courted by the Saenuri Party,
the party of President Park Geun-hye.
But in the past few months there has been a
significant change. What had seemed a promising
new opportunity for Ban is now tied in with the
corruption scandal that has engulfed the
administration of Park Geun-hye. There were
allegations that her administration was plagued by
corruption over the past few years, and by October,
2016 various news media were revealing evidence of
that corruption.
Interviews published in the South Korean
newspaper Hankyoreh began to show how the Korean
government practices were being directly influenced
or even decided by forces outside of the government.
Hankyoreh interviews described meetings with other
people carried out by Choi Soon-sil, a long time
friend of President Park, discussing the president’s
upcoming schedule and national policy issues. This
was substantiated when a computer tablet was found
by reporters connected with the JTBC cable media.
The tablet’s memory contained many files that have
been alleged to prove that President Park
subordinated her presidency to Choi Soon-sil, who
had no official role in the South Korean government.
The allegation is that Park turned to Choi for advice
and decisions concerning government matters.
The involvement of Choi Soon-sil in
government matters was linked to her role in creating
foundations and using the President’s name and
influence to raise funds from the chaebols, the big
corporations dominating the South Korean economy.
It is alleged that some chaebol executives then
expected and received favorable decisions in
government matters relating to their businesses.
Other examples of government corruption have
emerged in areas like culture and sports. There is
evidence that government contracts were given to
those recommended by Choi Soon-sil or officials who
had been appointed based on her recommendation.
The news of these activities spread and the public
came to understand what appeared to be serious
systemic corruption involving the head of the South
Korean government.
By the end of October, large weekly public
demonstrations began to be held by South Korean
citizens calling on President Park to resign. The
demonstrations grew in size so that by December,
2016, over one million people of all ages and from
many walks of life rallied in Seoul with almost two
million people protesting nationwide. President Park
made some attempts at what she claimed to be public
apologies, but the public was dismayed by what
appeared more as attempts at justifying her behavior.
Ban Ki-moon was no longer leading in the polls.
Other potential candidates swung ahead of him or tied
with him.
By December 9, a vote was taken in the
National Assembly to impeach the President. The
result was 234 to support the impeachment resolution
and 56 against. The number voting to impeach Park
exceeded the 200 votes needed for the impeachment
resolution to pass. As required by the Constitution,
the impeachment resolution was taken to the
Constitutional Court, which has up to 180 days to
review the merits of the resolution.
When asked by journalists about his intentions
with respect to a potential candidacy for the
presidency, Ban has responded that he would return to
South Korea only after his term as UN Secretary
General ends on December 31, 2016. He plans to
return in mid-January and then assess the situation
after consulting with others. His spokesperson at the
UN acknowledged that Ban knows about the UNGA
Resolution asking him to refrain from taking a
political position or his country from offering him a
position. But Ban has not so far given any indication
that this resolution would play any role in his
decision.
Meanwhile commentary in the media by
Page 35
scholars, journalists and citizens seeks to analyze
what is happening in South Korea. The article “A
Historic Juncture” in the South Korean newspaper
JoongAng Ilbo by Political Science Professor Jaung
Hoon of Chung-An University proposed that South
Korea was at a critical crossroads.
2
Describing this
juncture, he wrote that this was “a decisive moment at
which the god of history differentiates the fraying
established power from the new force of the future.”
He proposed that ending Park Geun-hye’s
presidency and finding a way to amend the
constitution so no such corruption could be repeated
was important, but that this was not what he called
“the ultimate issues.” What the people truly want, he
explained, is a new form of civic politics and political
platform that go beyond the representative democracy
of the 20
th
century in order to allow continuous
exchange and communication between the
representative system and the general will of the
people. Professor Hoon proposes the need to
strengthen communication between the political
system and the people.
Several other articles in the Korean media
express a similar urgency, but they propose the need
to change the political structures, not merely make
them more responsive. For example, the editorial
“Impeachment Means a New Dawn for South Korean
Democracy” in the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh
proposed the need for changing the political
framework that allowed such corruption to take place.
The Hankyoreh editorial argues:
3
If representative democracy is unable to
adequately express the demands of direct
democracy, there is no reason for it to
continue. Politics has been distorted by
political interests that reject the will of the
people, and it’s time for that to stop. We
hope that the politicians will stop testing
the protesters’ patience.
This Hankyoreh editorial notes, “This is an
opportunity not merely to remove the people who
appropriated state resources for themselves but to
replace the obsolete systems, conditions and
structures that made such appropriation possible.”
The impeachment motion is viewed as but “the first
step on the long journey toward completing the civic
revolution in the truest sense of that phrase.”
The editorial “Candlelight Revolution Mandates
Rebuilding of Nation” in the newspaper The Korea
Times, in a similar vein, explained that what was
happening in South Korea was a “candlelight
revolution” which mandates, “the rebuilding of the
nation.”
4
The editorial reports that people involved in
the protests “commonly pledged to support the
fundamental reformation of society and continuously
participate in decision making.”
The editorial explained that, “The incompetence
of the political parties encouraged people to
participate directly.” It quoted as an example, one
demonstrator who said “We don’t have a clear plan
yet, but we all share in the belief that we need more
action for changes.”
The article “Three Points of the Constitutional
Court ‘Impeachment Trial’,” in the Korean newspaper
OhmyNews explained that what had happened in
South Korea is that citizens took the lead and led
political circles and the media. Although only 40 days
earlier it was expected that the impeachment vote
would be difficult, this writer observed how public
anger skyrocketed in the Park Geun-hye-Choi
Soon-sil gate scandal, endlessly revealing more, like
the pealing of an onion. Citizens came out in the
square and declared “we are the sovereigns.” The
article argues that if it were not for these
“sovereigns,” it would not have been possible to pass
the impeachment resolution in the National Assembly
on December 9, 2016.
5
The author of this article argues that there is a
need for citizens to remain strong. If the amazing
power of candles does not remain as memories of
winter, but continues, this author predicts, “Korea
should become a country of strong citizens…. The
role of the parliamentary elite is important, but I
dream of a society…in which ordinary people can
discuss constitutional principles.” The article argues
for the need for reflection and the involvement of the
ordinary people to determine the vision for the
constitutional change needed so as to lay the
foundation for change. The article proposes favoring
the presidential candidate who advocates many
citizens discussing the constitutional principles to be
proposed, rather than prematurely formulated
constitutional amendments.
Other articles in the media and online caution
Page 36
against allowing politicians to quickly formulate and
pass constitutional amendments that they claim deal
with the problems, but which have excluded citizens
from the formulation process.
The editorial “To Go Beyond June of 1987” in
the Korean newspaper Kyunghyang Shinmun explains
how such a process happened in 1987 excluding those
who had been the protesters from being part of
formulating the mechanisms that would provide a
continuing democratic process for them. Instead, a
small group of politicians formulated the
constitutional language to provide for direct election
of the President, a process that did not provide for
democracy for the people.
6
Instead, the author explained now there is the
“need to introduce and expand direct democracy and
the participation of the citizens. What the National
Assembly should be doing is not to discuss
constitutional amendments but to enact a bill that will
establish the constitutional procedures for citizen
participation in (the process of) amending the
constitution.”
The people protesting are concerned about the
structural weakness of the South Korean political
system where there are such weak safe guards against
high level corruption. Therefore, there is a demand
among the protesters for a structural means for their
ongoing participation in the affairs of government.
Such concerns, however, are different from the
views presented by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
about what is needed to resolve the crisis in South
Korea. At his good-bye press conference for
journalists held at the UN on Friday, December 16,
the Secretary General was asked about his intentions
with respect to becoming a candidate for the
presidency of South Korea.
7
Ban characterized the problem in South Korea
as the need for better leadership. In his response to a
question about whether he would run for the
presidency of South Korea, Ban explained his view of
the situation:
As you know, the situation is very, very
difficult, in a sense, in turmoil. I can
understand and share the anxiety of people
about the future of their country, as this is
one of the biggest challenges the Korean
people are encountering. I know that they
don’t want to lose the hard-earned
democracy and the economic development
which, in fact, transformed [the Republic
of] Korea from a recipient country to a
global donor. That is one pride that the
Korean people have. Koreans have been
known as [an] example to other nations in
that regard. And I also understand the
aspiration of people for a new type of
inclusive leadership that can help them
overcome the challenges ahead.
And there are many issues of how to
reconcile the differences between their
thinking, and differences of their income,
and some regionalism. There are many,
many issues which we have to think
about. That means social integration,
reconciliation and much more mature
democratic institutions. At the same time,
while all these seem to present great
challenges for Koreans and the Korean
Government, I’m confident that the
Korean people, with their resilience and
very mature democratic institutions, I’m
sure that they will be able to overcome
these difficulties soon. Thank you.
Essentially what Ban is proposing is different
from the proposals that come from people involved in
the protests. The contrast is significant. People are
expressing their recognition that the so called
“democratic institutions” have demonstrated their
weakness, and that there is a need for what they refer
to as a 21
st
century politics. The “new type of
leadership” that Ban is referring to is what they call
20
th
century government. While he refers to “social
integration, reconciliation and much more mature
democratic institutions,” among the Korean people,
there is a recognition of the need to create new forms
of democratic institutions which deal with the
deficiencies of the current institutions and provide for
a form of ongoing citizen participation in government
processes and decision making.
South Korea has an important legacy that can
help it to meet this challenge. It is a country that is
first in the world in the spread of the Internet and the
use of the Internet by people online. Many South
Koreans are netizens, those seeking to utilize the
Page 37
empowerment made possible by the Net for a more
democratic and participatory society. During the past
two decades, netizens in South Korea have explored
various forms of online participation so they have a
rich experience to draw from towards creating the
forms and structures needed for the civic revolution
they realize is needed. Their mass participation in the
candlelight activities to expose the corruption and
failures of the current government demonstrates that
they have been mastering the need for the civic
participation of netizens and citizens in the affairs of
the society. Hence they are not looking for better
leadership, but for the participation of the citizens
themselves as leadership. There is a discrepancy
between what politicians like Ban Ki-moon have in
mind and what citizens of South Korea who are acting
to change the governmental model envision. How will
this discrepancy play out when Ban returns to South
Korea? The result of the struggle over such
contending forces will be a sign of the future political
direction for South Korea.
Ban Ki-moon’s 10 years at the UN appear not to
have sensitized him to the demands from the much
more informed public that public opinion is not just
looking for a next ‘great leader’ but for a much
enhanced participation of citizens in the
determination and functioning of their political
system.
Notes
1. See Ronda Hauben, “Debate in South Korean Media Over Ban
Ki-moon’s Intentions to Run for ROK Presidency,” taz netizen-
blog, May 31, 2016.
debate-in-media-over-ban-ki-moon/
2. Jaung Hoon, “A Historic Juncture,” Joong-Ang Ilbo,
November 18, 2016, p. 31.
http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aid=3026380
3. [Editorial] “Impeachment Means A New Dawn for South
Korean Democracy,” Hankyoreh, December 9, 2016.
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_editorial/e_editorial/7739
72.html
4. Cho Jae-hyon, Choi Ha-young, “Candlelight Revolution
Mandates Rebuilding of Nation,” The Korea Times, December
12, 2016.
http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/view.jsp?req_newsidx=
219894
5. agent89, “Three Points of the Constitutional Court
‘Impeachment Trial’,” 16:12:12 09:51, OhmyNews, (Google
Translator translation of Korean).
http://m.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/Mobile/at_pg.aspx?CNT
N_CD=A0002268821
See also Article 1 of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Constitution.
“The sovereignty of the Republic of Korea shall reside in the
people, and all state authority shall emanate from the people.”
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---prot
rav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_117333.pdf
6. Ha Seung-soo, “To Go Beyond June of 1987.” Kyunghyang
Shinmun, December 12, 2016.
http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=20161212
1659497&code=710100
7. Press Conference Ban Ki-moon, Friday, December 16 2016 at
UN Headquarters, SG/SM/18377
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm18377.doc.htm
EDITORIAL STAFF
Ronda Hauben
William Rohler
Norman O. Thompson
Michael Hauben (1973-2001)
Jay Hauben
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