The Amateur
Computerist
Fall 2016 Forces Working for Peaceful Conflict Resolution Volume 28 No. 2
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 1
Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan Tragedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Security Council Acts in Accord with UN Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
UN Acts to Calm Tension on Korean Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 27
Diplomacy to Build Dialogue with North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 39
BKM Asked to Initiate Korea Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 42
Media War at UN: Netizen Journalism Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 47
BKM’s Idea of Leadership vs Candlelight Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 72
Introduction
The previous issue of the Amateur Computerist, Volume 28 No. 1,
documented how the last Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon failed to fulfill
on his promise to “encourage and facilitate the continued work for peace,
security and reunification in the Korean Peninsula.” This issue, Volume
28 No. 2, explores how forces other than the Secretary-General worked to
contribute to this goal.
This issue includes articles published either in OhmyNews Interna-
tional (OMNI) or on the netizen blog at
These articles are part of an effort to create a more accurate form of
journalism, a journalism which can be called netizen journalism. Such a
journalism when it covers the developments related to the Korean
Peninsula strives to encourage the peaceful resolution of conflict rather
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/
Page 1
than engaging in demonizing any party. An objective of netizen journalism
is to lessen the tension and seek to uncover the actual forces at play. This
is in contrast to the objective of much of the mainstream U.S. and Western
media to heighten the tension and distort the actual forces involved.
Several articles which appear in this issue describe those forces other
than Ban Ki-moon whose activities were focused on lessening the tension
on the Korean Peninsula. Articles such as “Netizens Question Cause of
Cheonan Tragedy” explore the role of netizens and bloggers in distin-
guishing the falsifications from the accurate details leading to the Cheonan
sinking. The articles “Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Contro-
versy” and “In Cheonan Dispute UN Security Council Acts in Accord with
UN Charter” demonstrate how peace activists in South Korea, UN
Security Council members like Ambassador Claude Heller acting in a
neutral way in the Mexican presidency of the Security Council in June
2010, along with some other UN member nations and UN officials helped
to support the means to encourage a peaceful resolution of the conflict
over the Cheonan tragedy. The articles “Two Precedents for UN Security
Council Action to Calm Tension in the Korean Peninsula,” “Out of the
Box Diplomacy to Build a Dialogue with North Korea” and “Women
Peace Activists Ask Ban Ki-moon to Initiate a Process for a Peace Treaty
to End Korean War” demonstrate other examples of UN member nations,
peace activists and diplomats supporting “out-of-the-box” forms of
diplomacy to encourage peaceful ways to lessen conflict. The article about
why netizen journalism matters puts some of these events into the broader
context of netizen journalism being part of a media war that is going on at
the UN. The final article contrasting Ban Ki-moon’s view of leadership
with that of citizens and netizens in South Korea who are trying to root out
corruption and provide for a more participatory democracy in South Korea
demonstrates how the struggle for a peaceful resolution of the problems
in South Korea continues even as Ban Ki-moon is replaced as UN
Secretary-General.
Also demonstrated in this issue is the fact that there are processes
within the UN procedures which could help to bring a broader view of the
nature of a conflict into the heart of the UN and UNSC deliberations.
One such procedure is mandated in the UN Charter. This is Chapter
V, Article 32. This article provides for the discussion of a conflict
Page 2
situation by the members of the Security Council inside the Council itself
and with the parties to the conflict as part of the discussion. What the
Mexican presidency of the Security Council provided for in June 2010,
was a variation on this obligation of the UN Charter. It did give the parties
to the conflict an equal chance to present their view of the conflict.
A second useful procedure is provided for in the Appendix to the
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, referred to by the
notation S/NC. This procedure provides a means for individuals and non-
governmental entities to send communication to the Security Council, a
procedure which has been in force since 1946. It provides a means for
those wanting to send correspondence to the Security Council to have a
channel to do so, and at one time provided a means for a monthly or
periodic list of the communications to the Security Council from
individuals or NGOs to be published by the UN Secretariat. Security
Council members could review this list and ask for copies of correspon-
dence which would be provided to them by the Secretariat.
Recently, however, these two procedures have been weakened. For
example, the address where to send correspondence to the Security
Council has not been clearly provided, and only a partial list of what has
been received is published and only one time a year. Similarly the UN
Charter provision in Chapter V, Article 32 is often ignored by the Security
Council which makes its decisions to punish one party in a conflict
without hearing from all sides. Thus the procedures that were created
within the UN itself to provide for the peaceful resolution of conflicts are
often ignored by member nations, especially the most powerful member
nations. Similarly, at least two examples of open letters to the Secretary-
General are referred to in this issue but in both cases Ban Ki-moon did not
provide any response to these letters. And there has been no indication that
the new Secretary-General will assume that obligation.
The articles in this issue of the Amateur Computerist can help to
demonstrate that there are forces working within conflict situations which
are making important contributions toward the peaceful resolution of
conflicts. A Secretary-General working for the peaceful resolution of
conflicts would do well to pay attention to such forces and find the means
to give them the much needed support.
Page 3
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews
International on June 8, 2010, at: http://english.ohmynews.com/article
view/article_view.asp?no=386108&rel_no=1]
Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan
Tragedy
Online Media Challenge Claims that North Korea is
Responsible for Sinking the Cheonan
by Ronda Hauben
The South Korean government headed by Lee Myung-bak is trying
to dispel criticism that its accusation that North Korea is responsible for
the sinking on March 26 of the Cheonan warship is politically motivated
and a cover-up or possible false flag operation.
On May 20, the South Korean government presented as incontestable
fact its conclusion that the warship Cheonan split in two and sank because
of hostile action by North Korea. Online discussion seriously challenged
that presentation. Perhaps not coincidentally, May 20, the day of the
presentation coincided with the date when campaigning for the June 2
provincial and local elections was to officially begin.
The military communication logs show that the first message from the
Cheonan of trouble said “aground on rocks.” The ship was in shallow
waters. Similarly, numerous early statements by both South Korean and
U.S. officials assured the public that North Korea was not involved with
the incident.
The rescue operation saved 58 of the crew members. Forty-six of the
104 members of the ship’s crew died as a result of the ship’s breaking in
two and sinking. Relatives of the sailors who died complained that the
rescue effort was inadequate and too late. Public criticism of the Lee
government grew regarding how it was handling the ship disaster. A so
called international group was charged with the task of assessing blame for
the disaster. That Joint Investigation Group (JIG) was under the Korean
Page 4
military.
The Investigation
When the five page investigation statement
1
was presented on May
20, however, North Korea was accused of being the cause of the disaster.
The accusation was based on a part of a torpedo allegedly dredged up from
the sea which bore a supposed pen marked number on a rusted surface.
The sinking of the Cheonan occurred during a period when the U.S.
military and the South Korean military were conducting joint military
exercises named Key Resolve/Foal Eagle. The joint South Korean-U.S.
naval action involved several Aegis class warships which have the most
advanced computer and radar systems to track and guide weapons to find
and destroy enemy targets. The Cheonan was a patrol combat corvette
(PCC) specializing in anti-submarine warfare.
The investigation statement claims that somehow an undetected North
Korean submarine pierced a highly protected arena of U.S.-South Korean
military maneuvers and released a torpedo in shallow waters, and then
escaped totally undetected.
An article in the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh
2
points out the
unlikely scenario that “a North Korean submarine [would be able] to
infiltrate the maritime cordon at a time when security reached its tightest
level and without detection by the Cheonan.”
No evidence was presented as to the actual firing of the torpedo or the
actual presence of a North Korean submarine in the vicinity of the
Cheonan. There is no actual observation of a North Korean submarine in
the area of the Cheonan, despite the fact that there was sophisticated
surveillance equipment used for the military exercises. Also, the shallow-
ness of the sea where the Cheonan sunk, about 40 to 50 m. and the rocky
bottom would make submarine travel near there almost impossible
The statement of the investigation is unsigned. The parties who
allegedly conducted the investigation are unnamed. Instead of facts to
document a basis for the accusations which might lead to war, a number
of allegations are followed by the statement that “There is no other
plausible explanation.”
Page 5
Blogs and Other Online Media
The accusations made by the conservative media in South Korea
about North Korea have taken on a James Bond quality given the
mismatch between the reality of North Korean capability and the claims
being made of how it has been able to perform amazing deeds. Blogs and
other online media in both the U.S. and South Korea have presented facts
and discussion challenging the claims in the investigation statement, and
proposing other alternative explanations of the cause of the sinking of the
Cheonan. These online discussions and questions have begun not only to
supplement newspaper accounts but also to become the subject of
newspaper articles in South Korea.
Questions discussed on blogs included whether there was a North
Korean or German made torpedo involved in the sinking of the Cheonan,
or whether there was any involvement of a torpedo at all.
3
An online
letter
,,4
addressed to Hillary Clinton by one of the members of the
investigation, questions whether the marks on the ship came from being
run aground or a collision with some other vessel or both.
The Whole Story as a False Account?
The nature of the pen mark on the torpedo part offered by South
Korea as its main evidence that the torpedo was fired by North Korea was
challenged
5
as not being a reliable piece of evidence of North Korean
involvement because there was rust under the pen mark. Also, the blades
of the offered evidence show a degree of corrosion that would usually
require far more time than the two months in the water as claimed.
Another blog
6
challenges the whole story of the South Korean
government as a false account like the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Some of
the Korean netizens and political activists who challenged the South
Korean government about the cause of the Cheonan sinking have been
referred to the prosecutor for charges.
7
The South Korean government has been cited
8
by both Frank La Rue,
UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of
Opinion and Expression and Amnesty International for interfering with the
rights of South Korean citizens and netizens.
Page 6
They Need Teeth
Given the growing set of questions about the South Korean govern-
ment account of the sinking of the Cheonan, the government has invited
9
some chosen bloggers and twitter users to a session “to dispel any doubts
among the young that North Korea was behind the deadly attack,”
A Yonhap News Agency press release explains that it will select 20
twitter users, 10 defense bloggers and 30 college reporters “to take a trip
to Pyeongtaek naval port south of Seoul where the salvaged parts of
Cheonan are being kept.” The article explains that “The event is aimed at
removing skepticism among young Internet users who have raised doubts
in online communities about the results of a multinational investigation
that concluded North Korea downed the ship in a torpedo attack.”
Like in the case of 9/11, careful fact checking and examination of the
evidence by netizens has shown the South Korean government’s case for
the involvement of North Korea in the sinking of the Cheonan to be
unsustainable. Netizens are more and more able to act as watchdogs. But
they need teeth.
Notes
1.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10 jigreport.pdf
2. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/ 421856.html
3. See the comments at the end of the Scott Creighton’s blog entry, “The Sinking of the
Cheonan: We are being lied to” May 24, 2010,
http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/
05/24/the-sinking-of-the-cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. Some selected comments are in
the Appendix just below.
4.
http://cafe419.daum.net/_c21_/bbs_search_read?grpid=11Ypb&mgrpid=&fldid=JFB
W&content=P&contentval=0001qzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz&page=1&prev_page=
&firstbbsdepth=&lastbbsdepth=&datanum=114®dt=&favorRegdate=&favorMode
=&listSortType=&listnum=
5. http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/pcc-772-cheonan-photographic-evidence-
that-no-1-written-on -top-of-rust/
6. http://gowans.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/the-sinking-of-the-cheonan-another-gulf-of-
tonkin-incident/
7. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid= 2921120
8.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/docs/ ROK-Pressstatement17052010.pdf
9. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/05/31/3/0301000000AEN2010053100
3100315F.HTML
Page 7
Appendix
Some comments from Scott Creighton’s blog entry, “The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are
being lied to,” May 24, 2010
http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/the-sinking-
of-the-cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/
6. Tim, on May 24, 2010 at 1:55 p.m. said: ‘The markings in Hangul, which reads “1?(or
No. 1 in English),” found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the
marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo.’ Now, just hang on a minute ?
a previously obtained NK torpedo? A previously obtained NK torpedo?? How many do
they have? Is it not beyond the realms of possibility that this ‘evidence’ did not originate
from NK at all. We really ought to demand the same level of ballistic forensics that apply
to crime scenes where ordinary firearms have been discharged. After all many more lives
could be at stake here.
-------------------------------------------
57. Mika, on May 27, 2010 at 5:34 a.m. said: You may want to have a look at this:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LE26Dg01.html I’ve not tried verifying any of the
claims made there yet, but the comments about the Korean handwritten writings are
damning if true, and if there was indeed still a large scale exercise going on, that makes
it completely unthinkable a NK sub would have penetrated that deep, sank the Cheonan
and got away again. OTOH, it does provide a rather credible alternative scenario: a
friendly fire incident blamed on the North Koreans. Kursk anyone?
----------------------------
145. willyloman, on May 28, 2010 at 3:38 p.m. said: the following comment was left by
a reader and it did not go through so I am posting it here so that others may read it. Mr.
Serandos: WordPress sometimes has problems with comments… it should work fine but
if posting again presents a problem, just me know. thank you
scott creighton, willyloman
Tom Serandos left the following comment: I tried to leave the following message on Mr.
Creighton’s site but I don’t think it went through.
PCC-772 report: I agree with the contents of the report.
Examine the photographs of the PCC-772 props. The deformation on each fluke is
evidence of grounding while making turns. If there was an explosion it occurred after the
ship ran aground or only the lower flukes would have been damaged when it settled to the
bottom. The damage to the shaft alleys would have locked up the props.
If there was an explosion perhaps it was an unexploded bomb from the Korean war or a
mine the S. Koreans have not retrieved (reportedly there are over 100 of those still out
there). It could have been in the vessels path when it grounded.
Also, the degree of corrosion on the torpedo parts indicates they have been in the sea for
a very long time (months). It was long enough for the active alloy in the props to set up
a galvanic cell with the other parts. I am a degreed metallurgist with 25 years of
Page 8
experience and seven years of service in the U.S. Nuclear Navy.
Tom Serandos
--------------------------------------------
166. Han Kim, on May 29, 2010 at 7:30 a.m. said: I’m Korean and many Korean ppl
know the govt is making things up.
As you might know, the only reason the govt manipulated the truth is to get more votes
on the upcoming election from the old generations. :) Keep up the good work! We really
appreciate the voices from outside Korea
----------------------
203. ??, on May 29, 2010 at 2:22 p.m. said:
Dear Scott,
have you seen this article, “Did an American Mine Sink South Korean Ship?” by one
Yoichi Shimatsu:
http://newamericamedia. org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-
south-korean-ship.php
He makes many good points, what I’d like to highlight is what he says about the type of
torpedo submitted as evidence on May 20:
“Since torpedoes travel between 40-50 knots per hour (which is faster than collision tests
for cars), a drive shaft would crumble upon impacting the hull and its bearing and struts
would be shattered or bent by the high-powered blast…”
My point is that even more bewildering than the various torpedo schema we’ve seen is
the very implausible situation that such a relatively intact remnant of the alleged weapon
exists as foisted onto us.
North Korea is also now vigorously bringing forth their defense, which is comprehen-
sively exposing the various contradictions in the “JIG” case. See my link of “Military
Commentator on Truth behind ‘Story of Attack by North’ (Part 1)”
http://tinyurl.com/29eh9zj The KCNA site won’t link directly, so I’m linking to the article
on my own blog.
People are going to cry about giving North Korea a hearing but they are certainly innocent
until proven guilty and their exclusion from the investigation process indicates weakness
and fear of exposure in the South Korean position, which has been relying so far on a kind
of international kangaroo court or media lynching. I’d very much like to see what
evidence they presented at their own press briefing recently to contrast with the “JIG”
press event of May 20. Again people will virulently impugn and dismiss them, but you
can be sure both Russia and China were paying close attention to all the details of their
nearer neighbor’s case.
It’s also important for your morale to know that South Korean citizens groups and
progressive media are banding together as we speak to get to the bottom of this particular
Big Lie. Also Mr. Shin is saying he’ll use the suppressive court proceedings initiated
against him to expose the whole phony deal.
Don’t lose sight of the big picture, you’ve taken some “below-the-belt” hits? hang in there
man!
-------------------------------
211. hankyul moon, on May 30, 2010 at 11:16 a.m. said:
Page 9
The kr.gov will keep trying to paint with dirty mentions in order to wrap this page.
In addition of that, the kr.gove will keep change their story and evidence, which is a
traditional judgment of suspicion. Many people focused on the torpedo; however, a single
evidence is not correlated to the explosion. The torpedo that kr.gov presented is not
proven evidence of explosion scientifically. For example, there are no proofs of thermal
effects, mechanical damages by explosion, corrosion effects by salty water, and corrosion
effects by heat and salty water. Only one evidence is letter “1?”, written by bright blue
permanent marker. Nevertheless, North kr.gov denied using “1?” on machinery.
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews
International in June 2010 at:
http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/
article_sangview.asp?menu=c10400&no=386133&rel_no=1]
Questioning Cheonan
Investigation Stirs Controversy
South Korean Government Threatens to Penalize
NGO for Utilizing UN Security Council Procedure
by Ronda Hauben
South Korean government officials have denounced an NGO for
writing to the Security Council. The NGO is one of the most prominent
civil society organizations in South Korea, People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD). Such action disregards the long tradition
and established procedure at the United Nations for an NGO or private
individual to send communication to the Security Council on matters it is
considering.
PSPD is a watchdog NGO that was founded in 1994. Since then it has
monitored the actions of the South Korean government, supporting the
efforts of South Korean citizens to participate in political affairs.
In a letter asking for support, PSPD writes:
1
PSPD believes that diplomacy and security policy should be
under the citizenry’s watch and democratic control. National
Security and diplomatic policy should not be monopolized by
Page 10
military and diplomatic authorities.
On June 11, 2010, the Center for Peace and Disarmament of PSPD
sent a letter to UN Security Council President Claude Heller, the Mexican
Ambassador to the UN. Mexico holds the rotating presidency of the
Security Council for the month of June. With its letter, PSPD included its
report, “The PSPD’s Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking.”
2
The letter and report were also sent to the other fourteen member
states of the United Nations Security Council, to the United Nations
Secretary-General and to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea
(South Korea).
The PSPD report raised a number of questions and problems with the
findings presented by the South Korean government of its investigation of
the Cheonan sinking.
Background
The South Korean government, unable to win support domestically
for its allegations that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the
Cheonan, turned to the UN Security Council for action against North
Korea.
3
On June 4 the South Korean Ambassador at the UN submitted a
letter to the UN Security Council requesting it to take up the matter of the
sinking of the Cheonan.
4
On June 8, North Korea submitted a letter to the Security Council
denying any involvement in the sinking of the Cheonan.
5
The Security Council scheduled an informal meeting for South Korea
to present its case against North Korea on Monday, June 14. Initially there
was no plan for the Security Council to meet with the North Korean
delegation on the Cheonan issue. On Sunday evening, however, news
reports from South Korea announced that on June 14, the Security Council
would also hold an informal meeting with North Korea.
According to some of the South Korean news media who cover the
UN, the big story in South Korea on Monday, June 14, was not that South
Korea was making its presentation to the Security Council. Instead the
media described denunciations by South Korean government officials
against PSPD for sending its report to the UN. The reporters claimed the
South Korean government believed that the PSPD report influenced the
North Korean UN delegation to request a presentation at the UN Security
Page 11
Council on the subject of the Cheonan. There was no proof presented for
such allegations. This did not, however, stop South Korean government
officials from making accusations against PSPD, nor the South Korean
conservative media from supporting the denunciations with articles
accusing the NGO of unpatriotic behavior.
6
In Seoul, on June 14, the spokesman for the Blue House, for the
President of South Korea, Lee Myung bak, publicly denounced PSPD.
Also on June 14, during the Question and Answer time at the National
Assembly, the South Korean Prime Minister, Un-Chan Chung, denouncing
PSPD for sending its letter and report to the UN Security Council, said, “
Such actions are against national interest. It (PSPD’s action) dishonored
and shamed our country.”
Back at UN headquarters in New York on Monday, June 14, two
separate informal meetings of the Security Council were held in the North
Lawn Building. A large number of reporters waited in the cafe outside the
area where the Security Council was meeting because the meetings were
closed to the press.
After the two informal Security Council meetings, the Mexican
Ambassador spoke briefly to the press. He said, “the Security Council
issued a call to the parties to refrain from any act that could escalate
tensions in the region, and makes an appeal to preserve peace and stability
in the region.” He also indicated that the Security Council would continue
its consultations after the meetings it had with the delegations of both
nations. Heller said that it was very important to have received the very
detailed presentation by South Korea and also to know and learn from the
arguments of North Korea. He commented that it was “very important that
North Korea has approached the Security Council.” In response to a
question about his view on the issues presented, he responded, “I am not
a judge. I think we will go on with the consultations to deal in a proper
manner on the issue.”
7
The North Korean UN delegation scheduled a press conference for the
following day, Tuesday, June 15. During the press conference, the North
Korean Ambassador presented North Korea’s refutation of the allegations
made by South Korea. Also he explained North Korea’s request to be able
to send an investigation team to go to the site where the sinking of the
Cheonan occurred. South Korea had denied the request. During the press
Page 12
conference, a reporter with a South Korean newspaper asked the North
Korean Ambassador if he had received a copy of the PSPD document from
PSPD. The Ambassador responded that not to his knowledge.
8
In a press release, the Asian Human Rights Commission writes that
following the denunciation of PSPD by South Korean government
officials, “the country’s Prosecutor’s office reportedly leaked to newspa-
pers that there was a possibility that the staff of the PSPD might be
prosecuted under the National Security Act, if a case were to be filed….”
9
“In response,” the press release explains, “conservative groups filed
a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office.” On June 15, the Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Chun Yeong-U said that, “A legal
examination is currently going on.”
Following the accusatory remarks by South Korean government
officials against PSPD, “people belonging to conservative groups
attempted to raid the offices of PSPD.” There are reports that members of
PSPD were assaulted verbally and physically, and threatening phone calls
were made to the PSPD offices.
In one incident, a van containing flammable material was driven up
to the building where PSPD offices are located. The police did not arrest
the perpetrators of these deeds. The Prosecutor, instead, opened an
investigation of PSPD.
On June 17, according to the Asian Human Rights Commission, the
case against PSPD was allocated to the Public Security Bureau 1, which
announced its intention to summon PSPD officials.
The Asian Human Rights Commission also reported that the Prosecu-
tor’s office “approached one of the experts who worked on the govern-
ment-led report in order for this expert to submit a complaint concerning
alleged criminal defamation by the NGO.”
South Korean government officials, supported by some of the South
Korean media, allege that it is an unusual practice for an NGO to send a
letter or report to the UN Security Council. Recently, a reporter asked a
government official, “Are there any cases that a NGO sends a contrast
position paper against a government on the security issue.” Chun,
Yung-woo, the 2
nd
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade responded,
“I have never heard that there are such NGOs, and document sent by a
NGO cannot be a UNSC document.”
Page 13
NGO Communication to Security Council
Such an interchange demonstrates a serious lack of knowledge of UN
and particularly Security Council procedures. There is a long established
practice at the UN of NGO’s or private individuals sending letters and
documents to the Security Council on questions before the Security
Council. Most if not all of the matters before the Security Council have to
do with security issues.
Records at the UN show that the practice of sending such correspon-
dence to the Security Council dates back to 1946. This is the date when the
symbol S/NC/ was introduced as the symbol for “Communications
received from private individuals and non-governmental bodies relating
to matters of which the Security Council is seized.”
10
The Security Council
has the practice of periodically publishing a list of the documents it
receives, the name and organization of the sender, and the date they are
received. The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council
states that the list is to be circulated to all representatives on the Security
Council. A copy of any communication on the list is to be given to any
nation on the Security Council that requests it.
There are over 450 such lists indicated in the UN records. As each list
can contain several or a large number of documents the Security Council
has received, the number of such documents is likely to be in the
thousands.
Under Rule 39 of the Council procedures, the Security Council may
invite any person it deems competent for the purpose to supply it with
information on a given subject. Thus the two procedures in the Security
Council’s provisional rules give it the basis to find assistance on issues it
is considering from others outside the Council and to consider the
contribution as part of its deliberation.
Appeals to End Witch Hunt Against PSPD
Initiating a criminal investigation against a South Korean NGO or
citizen for what is a long existing practice and tradition with respect to the
UN Security Council, is a South Korean government action that is being
compared to the kind of “witch-hunts” that occurred during the period of
the 1950s in the U.S. which has come to be known as McCarthyism.
Page 14
In contrast to the attack on PSPD by the South Korean government
and the conservative media, many NGOs and citizens in South Korea have
expressed their support for PSPD.
A group of 200 professors and other intellectuals in South Korea has
issued a statement calling for the end of the “witch hunt” against PSPD.
The statement explains that “PSPD had performed its innate duty and right
as a civic group.” The group calls for conservative groups to end their
irrational backward attacks on PSPD.
11
Also, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, an
organization of 46 groups in Asia which includes PSPD, sent a petition to
Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of the Right of Opinion and Expression.
12
It asked the UN to “advise
the South Korean government to end the prosecutorial investigation of
PSPD.”
La Rue had visited South Korea on May 6-17, 2010. He issued a press
statement on May 17 documenting other examples of the abuse by the
South Korean government of the human rights of its citizens. He referred
to the obligation of South Korea to adhere to the provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protecting the right
to freedom of expression.
13
While La Rue’s comments were made prior to the current South
Korean government attack on PSPD, Amnesty International has issued a
statement regarding the current situation.
14
It writes:
Amnesty International is deeply concerned about the Seoul
Central Prosecutor’s Office’s decision on Wednesday to investi-
gate the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
for sending a letter to the UN Security Council questioning the
results of the international investigation into the sinking of the
South Korean navy vessel the Cheonan. The civic group is
accused of ‘benefitting’ North Korea, in violation of the National
Security Law, interfering with state’s acts and defamation.
The statement concludes, “Amnesty International is also concerned
that the National Security Law continues to be used to arbitrarily target
individuals or groups peacefully exercising their basic rights to freedom
of expression and association. Simply put, this law is used as a tool to
silence dissent.”
Page 15
On Friday, June 18, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was
asked for his view of the current action by the prosecutor in South Korea
against an NGO for sending a letter to the Security Council. He responded,
“I will have to check. I’m not aware of that.... I don’t have a comment at
this time, but I may have to check and will get back to you later.”
15
He did
not get back to the journalist as of the publication date of this article.
Open Letter to Ban Ki-moon
The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) appealed to Ban
Ki-moon. On June 24, it sent an Open Letter to Sec-Gen Ban Ki-moon
about the situation. In the letter it asks him:
16
…to take all necessary steps to ensure that the reprisals, directly
or indirectly attributable to the Republic of Korea, are immedi-
ately halted against civil society groups that have communicated
with the UN. The AHRC appreciates the work of the Secretary-
General concerning reprisals and urges his offices to include this
case as part of efforts to protect civil society members from
facing attacks based on their participation in the UN’s work.
The AHRC has also asked the High Commissioner for Human Rights
to intervene to “ensure that these reprisals are halted” and that the
recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression be
implemented in full and without delay. It also calls upon South Korea as
a member of the Human Rights Council to act to “uphold the highest
standards.”
PSPD as Political Watchdog
PSPD reports that the organization has increased its membership by
15% with 1600 new members joining since the attack by the South Korean
government. Also, numerous individuals and organizations in Korea and
outside have sent letters and made statements in support of PSPD.
As a member of the international society, PSPD explains, “PSPD will
continuously make every effort to advance the universal goals of
democracy and peace through its activities as a political watchdog.”
17
Page 16
Notes
1. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation on PSPD,” 6/21/2010
http://www.people ower21.org/English/40195
2. PSPD, “The PSPD’s Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking,” June 1, 2010.
http://www.peoplepower21.org/? module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=40158
&sid=7ab45eab894bb107361ef5447c30048b&module_srl=37681&usg=AFQjCNFTU
9vP98NdyzvCupVWG0HqgMhLlw
3. “What’s Behind South Korea Bringing the Cheonan Issue to the UN Security Council,”
6/7/2010 http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/06/07/whats_behind_south_korea_bring
ing_the_cheonan_issue_to_the_un_security_council/
4. “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN with
regard to the armed attack by North Korea on 26 May, 2010 against the Republic of
Korea’s navy ship the Cheonan, S/2010/281”
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%202010%
20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20and%20Cheonan%20Report.pdf
5. “Letter dated 8 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the PresidentSecurity
Council,” S/2010/294
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/294
6. See description in: Gwak Byeong-chan, “Which Country Do You Belong To?,”
Hankyoreh, June 16, 2010 http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/
e_opinion/425906.html
7. “Informal comments to the Media by the President of the Security Council and the
Permanent Representative of Mexico, H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident
(the sinking of the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.” June 14, 2010,
[Webcast: Archived Video - 5 minutes ]
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stake
out/2010/so100614pm3.rm
8. “Press Conference: H.E. Mr. Sin Son Ho, Permanent Representative of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations, on the current situation in the Korean
Peninsula.” June 15, 2010,[Webcast: Archived Video - 58 minutes]
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/pressconference/2010/pc100615am.rm
9. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon by the Asian
Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-general-ban-ki-moon
10. See “United Nations Series Symbols: 1946-1996,” Dag Hammarskjold Library,
United Nations, New York, 1998, p. 234.
11. “Scholars Call for End to PSPD Witch Hunt,” Hankyoreh, June 22, 2010.
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/426832.htm
12. Forum-Asia Submits the Urgent Appeal on Threats of Prosecution against PSPD to
UN Rapporteur 6/21/2010.
http://www.peoplepower21.org/?module=file&act=procFile
Download&file_srl=40191&sid=4db9d3a9ce23eab695e13dec947e1842&module_srl=
37681
13. Frank La Rue, Rapporteur, “UN, Full Text of ROK Press Statement,” May 17, 2010
Page 17
http://www.peoplepower21.org/?module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=40191
&sid=4db9d3a9ce23eab695e13dec947e1842&module_srl=37681
14. “Amnesty International expresses its concern about the investigation on the PSPD,”
6/18/2010
http://gaia-lovedream.blogspot.com/2010/06/amnesty-international-expresses-
its.html
15. “2010-06-18, New York: Secretary-General’s remarks to the media,” https://www.un
.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/ 2010-06-18/secretary-generals-remarks-media
16. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon by the Asian
letter-secretary-general-ban-ki-moon
17. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation of PSPD,”
http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on the netizenblog on
_dispute_un_security_council_discovers_un_charter/]
In Cheonan Dispute UN Security
Council Acts in Accord with UN Charter
by Ronda Hauben
The challenge of Security Council reform has been on the agenda at
the United Nations for decades with little obvious effect on the workings
of the Security Council itself.
1
But what happens when an action of the Security Council is an
improvement over past Security Council practices and presents an
important model for conflict resolution in line with the obligations of the
Charter? Will there be recognition of the peaceful direction that the action
points in or will it be ignored and members of the Security Council revert
back to the practice of the past?
The situation I am referring to is the consideration by the Security
Council of the sinking of the South Korean naval warship, the Cheonan.
The dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan was brought to the Security
Council in June and a Presidential Statement was agreed to in July.
Page 18
An account of some of what happened in the Security Council during
an important part of this process is described in an article in Spanish that
has appeared in several different Spanish language publications. The
article, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de Peninsula de Corea”
by Maurizio Guerrero, the UN Correspondent for Notimex (the Mexican
News Agency), was published on July 5.
2
The article describes the
experience of the Mexican Ambassador to the UN, Claude Heller in his
position as president of the Security Council for the month of June.
In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4, the Republic of Korea
(ROK) more commonly known as South Korea, asked the Council to take
up the Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, the South Korean Ambassador to
the UN requested that the Security Council consider the matter of the
Cheonan and respond in an appropriate manner.
3
The letter described an
investigation into the sinking of the Cheonan carried out by South Korean
government and military officials. The conclusion was to accuse North
Korea of sinking the South Korean ship.
Sin Son Ho is the UN Ambassador from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK), which is more commonly known as North
Korea. He sent a letter dated June 8 to the Security Council, which denied
the allegation that his country was to blame.
4
His letter urged the Security
Council not to be the victim of deceptive claims, as had happened with
Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support its call to be able to
examine the evidence and to be involved in a new and more independent
investigation on the sinking of the Cheonan.
How would the Mexican Ambassador as President of the Security
Council during the month of June handle this dispute? (The presidency
rotates each month to a different Security Council member.) This was a
serious issue facing Heller as he began his presidency in June 2010.
Heller adopted what he refers to as a “balanced” approach to treat
both governments on the Korean peninsula in a fair and objective manner.
He held bilateral meetings with each member of the Security Council
which led to support for a process of informal presentations by both of the
Koreas to the members of the Security Council.
What Heller calls “interactive informal meetings” were held on June
14 with the South Koreans and the North Koreans in separate sessions
attended by the Security Council members, along with a time to ask
Page 19
questions and then to discuss the presentations.
At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s presentations ended,
Heller said that it was important to have received the detailed presentation
by South Korea and also to know and learn the arguments of North Korea.
He commented that “it was very important that North Korea approached
the Security Council.” In response to a question about his view on the
issues presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I think we will go on with
the consultations to deal in a proper manner on the issue.”
5
During June, Heller held meetings with the UN Ambassadors from
each of the two Koreas and then with Security Council members about the
Cheonan issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he was asked
by the media what was happening about the Cheonan dispute. He
responded that the issue of contention was over the evaluation of the South
Korean government’s investigation.
Heller describes how he introduced what he refers to as “an innova-
tion” into the Security Council process. As the month of June ended, the
issue was not yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a basis to build on the
progress that was achieved during the month of his presidency.
The “innovation” Heller refers to, is a summary of the positions of
each of the two Koreas on the issue, taking care to present each objec-
tively. Heller explains that this summary was not an official document, so
it did not have to be approved by the other members of the Council. This
summary provided the basis for further negotiations. He believed that it
had a positive impact on the process of consideration in the Council,
making possible the agreement that was later to be expressed in the
Presidential statement on the Cheonan that was issued by the Security
Council on July 9.
Heller’s goal, he explains, was to “at all times be as objective as
possible” so as to avoid increasing the conflict on the Korean peninsula.
Such a goal is the Security Council’s obligation under the UN charter.
In the Security Council’s Presidential Statement on the Cheonan, what
stands out is that the statement follows the pattern that Heller described of
presenting the views of each of the Koreas and urging that the dispute be
settled in a peaceful manner.
6
In the statement, the members of the Security Council do not blame
North Korea. Instead they refer to the South Korean investigation and its
Page 20
conclusion, expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings” of the
investigation.
Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Korean newspaper
Hankyoreh noted that the statement “allows for a double interpretation and
does not blame or place consequences on North Korea.”
7
Such a possibil-
ity of a “double interpretation” allows different interpretations.
Some of the articles that have appeared in the English language media
about the Cheonan, however, appear to be oblivious to the effort to
accommodate the different viewpoints in the Presidential Statement. For
example, an editorial in the New York Times about the Presidential
Statement complained that the statement contained “weasel wording about
blame.”
8
An AP article reported that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan
Rice, and the South Korean Ambassador, Park Im-kook said the Presiden-
tial Statement “made clear who to blame” for the attack on the Cheonan.
9
Instead of directly pointing out this is contrary to the wording of the
statement, however, the AP article notes that in private some diplomats
and analysts expressed concern that the statement didn’t blame Pyong-
yang.
Another article in the New York Times, however, referred to a
statement of Li Baodong, China’s Ambassador to the UN, that the
Presidential statement moved matters in “the right direction” because it
urged “the parties concerned” to avoid escalating tensions.
10
Russia had sent a team of experts to South Korea to do its own
evaluation on the South Korean findings. Though the Russian evaluation
has not been released publicly, a leaked copy was the subject of articles in
Hankyoreh. These describe how the Russian team of experts disagreed
with the South Korean government’s conclusions about the sinking of the
Cheonan. The Russian experts observed the ship’s propeller had become
entangled in a fishing net and subsequently a possible cause of the sinking
could have been that the ship had hit the antennae of a mine which then
exploded.
11
The Presidential Statement explains that “The Security Council takes
note of the responses from other relevant parties, including the DPRK,
which has stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”
12
With the exception of the DPRK, it is not indicated who “the other
Page 21
relevant parties” are. It does suggest, however, that it is likely some
Security Council members, not just Russia and China, did not agree with
the conclusions of the South Korean investigation.
The Security Council action on the Cheonan took place in a situation
where there has been a wide ranging international critique, especially in
the online media, about the problems of the South Korean investigation,
and of the ROK government’s failure to make public any substantial
documentation of its investigation, along with its practice of harassing
critics of the ROK claims.
The U.S. media, however, for the most part has chosen to ignore the
many critiques which have appeared. These critiques of the South Korean
government’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have appeared not only
in Korean, but also in English, in Japanese, and in other languages. They
present a wide ranging challenge of the veracity and integrity of the South
Korean investigation and its conclusions.
An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28 noted the fact that the
media in the U.S. has ignored the critique of the South Korean government
investigation that is being discussed and spread around the world.
13
More
recently, on August 31, an Op Ed by Donald Gregg, a former U.S.
Ambassador to South Korea, appeared in the New York Times, titled
“Testing North Korean Waters.” The article noted that “not everyone
agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea. Pyongyang has
consistently denied responsibility, and both China and Russia opposed a
UN Security Council resolution laying blame on North Korea.”
14
In a subsequent interview with the Washington correspondent for
Hankyoreh, Gregg adds that the Russian team’s conclusions could only be
tentative because they were not given access to all the materials they
needed for their investigation. The Russian team recommended that the
Chinese not make an effort to review the South Korean investigation.
They would likely not have access to all the materials needed to be able
to do an adequate review.
In his Op Ed in the New York Times, Gregg maintains that, “The
disputed interpretations of the sinking of the Cheonan remain central to
any effort to reverse course and to get on track toward dealing effectively
with North Korea on critical issues such as the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.” Therefore, he urges the South Korean government to
Page 22
make public the study it has done.
Gregg’s public statements are just one example of the disagreement
around the world, along with the Chinese and Russian governments, with
the South Korean government’s conclusions about the sinking of the
Cheonan and about the process of the investigation itself.
North Korea referred to this widespread international sentiment in its
June 8 letter to the Security Council. The UN Ambassador from North
Korea wrote:
15
It would be very useful to remind ourselves of the
ever-increasing international doubts and criticisms, going beyond
the internal boundary of south Korea, over the ‘investigation
result’ from the very moment of its release….
The situation that the North Korean Ambassador is referring to is one
marked by actions on the part of the South Korean netizens and civil
society who challenged the process and results of the South Korean
government’s investigation. There is support for the South Korean critics
by bloggers, scientists and journalists around the world, writing in a
multitude of languages and from many perspectives. A number of the
non-governmental organizations and scientists in South Korea sent the
results of their investigations and research to members of the Security
Council to provide them with the background and facts needed to make an
informed decision.
16
The result of such efforts is something that is unusual in the process
of recent Security Council activity. Most often decisions are made
according to the degree of power and self interest in the issue being
considered, rather than according to an impartial analysis of the problem
and an effort to hear from all those with an interest in the issue. But an
impartial analysis is what is required by the obligations of the UN Charter.
In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North Korea referred to the
earlier experience of the Security Council, to the February 5, 2003
Security Council meeting when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made
his presentation of his “evidence” that weapons of mass destruction
existed in Iraq. The U.S. then used these claims as the pretext for its
Page 23
invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
17
The June 8 letter from North Korea urges:
It is imperative for the Security Council not to step into the same
situation in which it was once misused as a tool of high-handed-
ness and hegemony of the United States by giving legitimacy to
its armed invasion into Iraq, based on a single word of lies of
Powell, United States Secretary of State, in February 2003.
The Security Council is duty bound to adhere strictly to the
principles of respect for the sovereignty and impartiality of
United Nations Member States, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations.
The process of how the Security Council took up and determined its
response to the dispute on the Cheonan is an important example of a
different process than that which occurred in the Iraq situation. The effort
in the Security Council described by the Mexican Ambassador, to uphold
the principles of impartiality and respectful treatment of all members
involved in a problem.
The process instituted by the Mexican presidency of the Security
Council in June with respect to the Cheonan dispute has the potential of
providing for a significant precedent in the process of Security Council
reform. It represents an important example of the Security Council acting
in conformity with its obligations as set out in the UN charter.
In the July 9 Presidential Statement, the Security Council urges that
the parties to the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan find a means to
peacefully settle the dispute. The statement says:
The Security Council calls for full adherence to the Korean
Armistice Agreement and encourages the settlement of outstand-
ing issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means to resume
direct dialogue and negotiation through appropriate channels as
early as possible, with a view to avoiding conflicts and averting
escalation.
Ambassador Gregg is only one of many around the world who have
expressed their concern with the course of action of the U.S. and South
Page 24
Korea which is contrary to the direction of the UN Security Council
Presidential Statement. Gregg explained his fear that the truth of the
Cheonan sinking “may elude us, as it did after the infamous Tonkin Bay
incident of 1964, that was used to drag us (the U.S.) into the abyss of the
Vietnam War.”
18
The Security Council Action on the Cheonan dispute, if it is recog-
nized and supported, has set the basis instead for a peaceful resolution of
the conflict.
19
Notes
1. Ronda Hauben, “UN Security Council Reform in Focus,” OhmyNews International,
September 15, 2008.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no
=383668&rel_no=1
2. Maurizio Guerrero, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de Peninsula de Corea,”
news/2010/07/05/69561
3. Security Council, S/2010/281, “Letter dated 4 June 2010”
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E
4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%202010%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20and%20Che
onan%20Report.pdf
4. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010 Letter,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E
4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%202010%20294.pdf
5. Ambassador Claude Heller at the June 14 stakeout. “Media Stakeout: Informal
comments to the Media by the President of the Security Council and the Permanent
Representative of Mexico, H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking
of the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.” [Webcast: Archived Video
– 5 minutes]
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/ stakeout/2010/so100614pm3.rm
.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2010/13
7. Lee Jae-hoon,“Presidential Statement allows for a ‘double interpretation,’ and does not
blame or place consequences upon N. Korea,” Hankyoreh, July 10, 2010.
www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/429768.html
8. “Security Council Blinks,” Editorial, New York Times, July 10, 2010.
9. Edith Lederer, “UN Condemns S Korea ship sinking,” AP, July 10, 2010.
10. Neil MacFaquahar, “Condemnation of Ship’s Sinking is a ‘Victory’ North Korea
Says,” New York Times, July 9, 2010, a version of online article appeared in print edition
Page 25
KOREA.html
11. “Russian Navy Team’s Analysis of the Cheonan Incident,” Posted on July 27,
Hankyoreh, modified on July 29.
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/
e_northkorea/432230.html The Russian Experts document is titled “Data from the
Russian Naval Expert Group’s Investigation into the Cause of the South Korean Naval
Vessel Cheonan’s Sinking”
See also “Russia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that Sinking Cheonan Ship was
Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27, 2010, Hankyoreh, modified on July 28, 2010.
http://www.hani.co.kr/ arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html
12. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13. Presidential Statement of July 9, 2010,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp? symbol=S/PRST/2010/13
13. Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubts Surface on North Korean Role in
Ship Sinking,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2010.
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/
23/world/la-fg-korea-torpedo-20100724/2
14. Donald P. Gregg, “Testing North Korean Waters,” New York Times, August 31, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/opinion/01iht-edgregg.html
15. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%2020
10%20294.pdf Letter, DPKR June 8 2010
16. See for example: Ronda Hauben, “Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan Tragedy,”
OhmyNews International, June 8, 2010.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/
article_view.asp?no=386108&rel_no=1
Ronda Hauben, “Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Controversy,” OhmyNews
International, June 29, 2010. http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_sangview.
asp?no=386133&rel_no=1
17. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%2020
10%20294.pdf
See also “[FULL] Colin Powell’s Presentation to the UN Security Council On Iraq’s
WMD Program,” Feb 5, 2003 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErlDSJHRVMA
18. Tae-ho Kwon, “South Korean Government Impeded Russian Team’s Cheonan
Investigation: Donald Gregg,” Hankyoreh, September 4, 2010. http://english.hani.co.kr/
arti/english_edition/ e_northkorea/438299.html
19. See for example “PSPD’s Stance on the Presidential Statement of the UNSC
Regarding the Sinking of the ROK Naval Vessel Cheonan”
http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40247
Page 26
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on the netizenblog on
precedents-unsc-korean-peninsula/]
Two Precedents for UN Security Council
Action to Calm Tension in the Korean
Peninsula
by Ronda Hauben
I – Introduction
In his opening presentation to a hearing on U.S. policy toward North
Korea in March 2011, then U.S. Senator John Kerry, referring to the
events of the past year observed that the year 2010 “was the most
dangerous on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Korean War in
1953.”
1
He was referring to several serious crises in the region in 2010. What
was surprising, but yet attracted little media attention, was the role played
by the United Nations Security Council in calming tension in two of these
crises. In these two situations, there were members of the Security Council
who demonstrated a commitment to serious consideration and an impartial
exploration of the problem leading to the crises. This is a role notably
different from how the Security Council has approached most situations
involving the Korean Peninsula. For example, this role was remarkably
different from the historic example of the Security Council supporting the
U.S. intervention in the Korean War, and more recently, in imposing
sanctions on North Korea for launching a satellite, or for its effort to build
a defensive capacity against what it deemed U.S. aggressive actions
toward it.
In this article I consider the Security Council emergency meeting held
on December 19, 2010 to discuss the escalating tension over live fire
Page 27
military exercises held from Yeongpyeong Island into the surrounding
waters claimed by both South Korea and North Korea. Then I refer back
to how the Cheonan situation was taken up at the Security Council a few
months earlier, in June and July 2010.
In the concluding section of this article I explore the significance of
these examples toward developing an analysis of the potential of the
Security Council to provide a counterveiling force to the actions by those
who appear to be trying to provoke a new Cold War in the Northeast Asian
region.
II – Yeonpyeong Island
One of the most perilous times in the recent past was in December
2010 when North and South Korea almost went to war. The conflict was
brought to the UN Security Council in what was the last week of its 2010
session.
2
The role played by the Security Council in this situation is worthy of
attention. Through the more than 60 years of UN involvement in the
Korean Peninsula, the role of the UN, particularly the Security Council,
has often been to increase tension rather than seeking peaceful diplomatic
and political solutions to conflict situations. This situation in December
2010 was different.
On November 23, 2010, the ROK (Republic of Korea commonly
known as South Korea) and the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea commonly known as North Korea) exchanged artillery fire after
South Korea began live fire military drills from Yeonpyeong Island 8
miles off the coast of North Korea. This military encounter ended with the
death of four South Koreans, and perhaps an unknown number of North
Koreans. Shortly afterwards, South Korea announced it planned a next
round of similar artillery firing for some time between December 17 and
December 21. North Korea responded it would consider such fire a grave
provocation and would respond appropriately.
On Saturday, December 18, Vitaly Churkin, the Ambassador to the
UN for the Russian Federation, requested an emergency meeting of the
Page 28
UN Security Council to be held that day. In what Ambassador Churkin
later called “a departure from the practice of the Council,” the U.S.
Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, as President of the Security Council
for the month of December, declined to hold a meeting until the following
day.
3
Instead of a Saturday meeting as requested, she scheduled consulta-
tions to start at 11:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 19, with a view to the
possibility of holding a formal meeting later in the day.
On that Sunday, 50 or more journalists gathered at the press stakeout
area outside the UN Security Council. Ambassadors and other representa-
tives of the 15 nations on the council gradually filtered into the Security
Council chambers. Also arriving were representatives of the DPRK, of the
ROK, and B. Lynn Pasco, then the Under Secretary-General for Political
Affairs, who also had been invited to attend the emergency session. U.S.
Ambassador Rice, acting as the President of the Council for December,
arrived at around 11:20 a.m.
It is reported that the Security Council members held bilateral
meetings and closed consultations. They took a short lunch break. A
closed meeting of the Security Council was held toward the end of the
emergency session. During the emergency meeting, the representatives of
the ROK and DPRK each presented their view of the conflict.
Little actual information was provided to journalists waiting in the
press stakeout area about what was happening. The emergency meeting
came to a close, approximately eight hours after it had begun. Then
Ambassador Churkin came to the press stakeout to report to journalists.
He said the draft press statement the Russian Federation had proposed had
been revised at least twice, but still did not achieve the unanimous
agreement needed to issue it as a document from the Council.
In its proposed draft press statement, the Russian Federation urged the
two Koreas to show restraint in their actions. Also the draft proposed that
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appoint an envoy to help the two Koreas
peacefully resolve the problems causing the current crisis. The blog
“Turtle Bay” reported obtaining a copy of the original Russian Federation
draft statement. The following is a quote from the posted statement which
Page 29
urged the parties to deescalate the tension:
4
The Members of the Security Council called upon all parties
concerned to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid any steps
which could cause a further escalation of tension in the Korean
peninsula and the entire region.
The Members of the Security Council stressed the need to
undertake efforts to ensure a de-escalation of tension in the
relations between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, resumption of dialogue and resolu-
tion of all problems dividing them exclusively through peaceful
diplomatic means.
In response to objections raised by some of the Council members to
his draft press statement, Ambassador Churkin told journalists he had
revised the statement. The Inner City Press blog reported that in one of the
revised drafts, Ambassador Churkin, the Chinese representative, and
others on the Security Council had agreed to wording that said that the
members of the Security Council “condemned the shelling” of November
23, 2010.
5
The draft did not attribute blame for the shelling, reflecting the
fact that both sides had done shelling.
The Council, however, was not able to come to an agreement on the
text. Ambassador Churkin expressed his regret that the emergency
meeting had not been called on Saturday afternoon as he had requested.
He felt that would have provided more time for Council members to work
out wording they could all agree on.
In response to a question to him from a journalist about the danger of
what was happening on the Korean Peninsula, Ambassador Churkin
responded:
6
As you know, I don’t even want to go into the general subject….
I know it’s very complicated. This area has very complicated
geography, very complicated geopolitical history if you will.
Stressing the particular assessment of the situation, Ambassador
Churkin told journalists:
I don’t even want to go into the general issue of whether or not
Page 30
it is prudent to conduct military exercises in a disputed area, but
we know it is better to refrain from doing this exercise at this
time. That is why we asked the Republic of Korea to refrain from
conducting this exercise at this particular time.
Also Ambassador Churkin explained that there appeared to have been
general agreement among council members for his proposal that the
Secretary-General appoint an envoy to work with the two Koreas and
other concerned countries to negotiate a means to settle the disputes
causing the crisis situation. He stressed the importance of appointing an
envoy, especially since some of the parties were not willing to go back to
the six party talks. There was, he felt, no other means for a diplomatic
process to be implemented, “no game plan.”
Despite the fact that the Council had not been able to agree on a press
statement, which also would have made it possible to support the
appointment of an envoy, Ambassador Churkin expressed his hope that the
Secretary-General would go ahead and appoint such an envoy.
Also he expressed his hope that the effect of the Security Council
consultations and meeting, even though they hadn’t made it possible to
reach an agreement on a press statement, would help to lessen the tension
in the region.
A little while later, Ambassador Rice came to the stakeout. Though
she held the rotating presidency of the Security Council for December
2010, she spoke only in her national capacity presenting the views of the
U.S. on the issue. She supported South Korea’s planned military exercise
firing into the contested waters off Yeonpyeong Island as “South Korea’s
legal right to self-defense.”
7
She said that the U.S. insisted on a “clear-cut
condemnation of the November 23 attack by DPRK on the ROK,” but she
acknowledged that there was no “unanimity on that point” among
members of the Security Council.
When Ambassador Rice was asked about the proposal to ask the
Secretary-General to appoint an envoy, she responded:
I think there would have been probably room for agreement in
some form of recommendation that the Secretary-General
Page 31
consider what he might be able to do in his good offices
capacity.
8
The next day, Monday, December 20, Wang Min, the Chinese Deputy
Permanent Representative spoke to the press at a stakeout. He said,
“Yesterday, China supported Russia’s proposal to call for an urgent
meeting of the Security Council (on) the situation in the Korean Penin-
sula.”
He characterized the meeting as, “positive and of great importance.”
9
Also on Monday, South Korea held a short military exercise near the
Northern Limit Line (NLL). Though the Russian Ambassador had
requested that South Korea refrain from holding this exercise at this tense
time, South Korea went ahead and again fired shells into the contested
waters off of Yeonpyeong Island. But it appeared that South Korean
shelling was more moderate than had been expected. They only fired for
90 minutes.
North Korea refrained from responding militarily.
10
On Tuesday, December 21 at an informal meeting of the Security
Council, Deputy Permanent Representative Wang expressed his assess-
ment of the dangerous nature of the situation that had developed on the
Korean Peninsula. He said that the tension on the Korean Peninsula
between the North and South had been very high one “especially in the
past two days, it came close to fighting a war.”
11
Despite the fact that the Security Council did not issue a press
statement, or a request that the Secretary-General appoint an envoy, the
actions by Ambassador Churkin on behalf of the Russian Federation and
of the Security Council succeeded in bringing international public
attention to the nature of the dispute and the need for a peaceful resolution
of the crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula.
Ambassador Churkin had taken the initiative to request an emergency
meeting of the Security Council and to ask South Korea to refrain from its
planned firing drill in the contested waters surrounding Yeonpyeong
Island, and to ask North Korea to refrain from responding militarily.
Both the Chinese and Russian foreign ministries had sent representa-
Page 32
tives to both North Korea and South Korea to urge them to settle their
disputes peacefully via dialogue. Also some of the Chinese news media
commentary on the crisis situation, even some which appeared in English
language publications, were critical of the provocative actions taken by
South Korea. They also criticized the U.S. government for undertaking
and encouraging military exercises in that tense area.
12
As Ambassador Churkin told journalists after the December 19
Security Council meeting, “I would like to think that this meeting of the
Council will have an impact on the situation.”
Looking at the subsequent events, it appears that the December 19
Security Council emergency session helped to calm the escalating tension
on the Korean Peninsula, at least temporarily.
What is significant in the treatment of the Yeonpyeong situation by
the Security Council, is that an emergency meeting was held which both
North Korea and South Korea were invited to participate in and to present
their views. Also they were able to hear the views of the members of the
Security Council on the situation.
Also, after the session, the Russian Ambassador made a statement to
the press condemning the actions in contested waters at a time of great
tension. His remarks to the press helped to bring international attention to
the inappropriate nature of the planned drills by South Korea at a time
marked by great tension.
III – Cheonan Incident Brought to the Security Council
In order to be able to put the December 19, 2010 meeting of the
Security Council into a broader perspective, it is helpful to look back at
how the Security Council handled the Cheonan incident, when it was
brought to the Security Council in June 2010.
On March 26, 2010, the ROK warship Cheonan broke in two and sank
with the loss of 46 sailors in the West Sea off the coast of North Korea. In
early June, South Korea brought its claim that North Korea was responsi-
ble for the sinking to the UN Security Council.
Though unusual for the Security Council, a process was used that
Page 33
made it possible for Council member states to consider the claim of South
Korea, but also to hear North Korea’s response.
13
Mexico’s Ambassador
to the UN, Claude Heller, as the President of the Security Council for the
month of June in 2010, invited both North Korea and South Korea to
present their positions in two separate informal sessions held with the 15
members on the Security Council. These sessions, called “interactive
sessions,” were off the record, but provided a means for Security Council
members to hear two different sets of views on the issue.
After the two interactive sessions, a journalist asked Ambassador
Heller for his view on which of the two presentations appeared more
convincing.
14
Ambassador Heller responded, “I’m not a judge. I think we
will go on with the consultations to deal in a proper manner on the issue.”
What was surprising was that the Ambassador did not rush to make a
judgment, but instead saw himself as responsible for providing a fair and
impartial process for each of the two parties to be heard and for their
views to be considered. In his treatment of the Cheonan issue, Ambassador
Heller continued with what he called a “balanced process.” By the end of
the month, however, no decision had been reached by council members on
the wording for a presidential statement on the issue.
The stumbling block, Ambassador Heller told reporters at a stakeout
at the end of his month-long presidency, was the disagreement over how
Council members viewed the findings of the investigation of the Cheonan
incident by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG)
established by the South Korean government. Also the Russian Federation
had sent a team of experts to South Korea to examine the evidence cited
in the JIG’s report. The team did not accept the JIG’s conclusions.
15
The Security Council was faced with different views among the
permanent members of the Security Council. The U.S. backed the findings
of the JIG’s investigation, in which it participated. The Russian Federation
and China did not accept the findings. How was this disagreement to be
handled? An article by the Mexican news service (Notimex) explains that
at the end of his month long Security Council presidency, Ambassador
Heller prepared a summary of the two sets of views in an unofficial
Page 34
document.
16
This document set the basis for a presidential statement to be issued
in July after the rotating Security Council presidency passed from the
Mexican Ambassador to the Nigerian Ambassador.
The Security Council Presidential statement on the Cheonan issued
on July 9, 2010 was different from other recent Security Council
statements.
17
It presented both sides of the controversy, South Korea’s
accusation and North Korea’s denial of the accusation. Then it urged the
two Koreas to settle their disputes peacefully by negotiation. That is in
sharp contrast with the almost universal condemnation of North Korea in
several previous and subsequent Security Council actions.
IV – Security Council as a Countervailing Force
The Security Council’s treatment of the Cheonan incident and the
December 19 Security Council Emergency meeting on the increased
tension over the Yeonpyeong situation demonstrate that nations other than
the two Koreas, were able to play a constructive role in determining how
the situation would be handled.
In the Yeonpyeong situation, the Russian Federation played a
prominent role acting to intervene by calling for an emergency Security
Council meeting to help to calm the tension. Much of the mainstream
western media, however, focused on other framings of the situation
despite the effectiveness of the Security Council activity. The narrative in
the media was not that Russia and China were seeking to diminish the
tension in the conflict, but instead that they were protecting their ‘ally’ or
‘client.’
In the Cheonan situation, Mexico which held the rotating presidency
of the Security Council for the month of June 2010, played a prominent
role in encouraging the Security Council to create an inclusive process to
hear the different views on the conflict and act on the dispute. Much of the
western media, however, framed its coverage as a dispute between the
U.S. and China.
18
The actions of the UN Security Council in these two situations
Page 35
provided a countervailing force to the escalating tension resulting from the
increase in military exercises by the U.S., and South Korea in the region.
But if one reads almost all western media coverage of the Security Council
actions on the Korean Peninsula incidents in 2010, the impression given
is that the U.S. succeeded in reigniting another Cold War.
Sixty years earlier, in June 1950, the U.S. was able to use the Security
Council, and later the General Assembly to legitimate its military
intervention in the Korean War. In June 2010 and several months later in
December 2010, the UN Security Council demonstrated that it was
possible to play a moderating role to defuse tension on the Korean
Peninsula. Even when the U.S. held the presidency of the Security Council
in December 2010, the Russian Ambassador and others in the Security
Council were able to urge North Korea and South Korea to defuse the
tension.
Even though the Dec 19 meeting did not issue an official press
statement, Ambassador Churkin’s statement to the press at the stakeout at
the end of the daylong emergency session made clear there were legitimate
reasons for North Korean’s concern over South Korea’s planned live firing
into disputed waters. The result of both the emergency meeting and the
draft press statement Churkin had proposed earlier was to draw interna-
tional attention to the dispute over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) which
was imposed unilaterally by the U.S. in August 1953.
Though the U.S. and South Korea had increased their military
collaboration in 2010 and held an increasing number of military exercises
in the region around the Korean Peninsula – the Security Council was able
to act in a way that helped to challenge the escalation of tension and
encourage negotiation and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
This is in stark contrast to how the UN was used by the U.S. to help
it to foster military action against North Korea and subsequently China, 60
years earlier.
In his book “The Hidden History of the Korean War,” I.F. Stone
condemns the hasty Security Council actions in June 1950 siding with
Sigmund Rhee in condemning North Korea. Stone writes:
19
Page 36
But there was also a vital interest in the maintenance of fair
procedure within the United Nations. It was neither honorable
nor wise for the United Nations, under pressure from an inter-
ested great power, to condemn a country for aggression without
investigation and without hearing its side of the case. This was
especially true when the ambassador of that power on the scene
itself, and the United Nations’ own Commission, were not yet
prepared to declare which side was guilty of aggression.
All too often, the absence of a fair procedure within the UN Security
Council appears to be the norm. Similarly, yielding to the pressure from
an interested great power to condemn another nation, without hearing its
side of the case, was the norm for resolutions condemning North Korea’s
rocket and nuclear developments. Considering this pattern, it is all the
more important to recognize when attention is paid to hearing from the
opposing sides of a conflict and providing a means for the Security
Council to resist the pressure to support the demands of an interested great
power.
Can the UN Security Council be a political body that helps to calm
tension in the Korean Peninsula in fulfillment of its charter obligation? We
can consider the Security Council’s actions in the Yeongpyeong Island
and the Cheonan incident as evidence that under current world conditions
this is possible, though an all too rare outcome of Security Council action.
Notes
1. “Senator John Kerry Opening Statement for ‘Breaking the Cycle of North Korean
Provocations,’” March 1, 2011
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kerry_Statement.pdf
2. Ronda Hauben, “Can the Security Council Act to Calm Rising Tension on Korean
Peninsula?,” December 19, 2010, netizenblog at: http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/12/
19/security council_korean_tension/
3. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin refers to Rule 2 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure for
the Security Council as the basis for expecting the Security Council to be called to meet
on Saturday in response to his request. Rule 2 reads: “The President shall call a meeting
of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council.”
Page 37
https://www.scribd.com/document/ 47878301/UNSC-Provisional-Rules-of-Procedure
2010/12/18/russia_pushes_deeper_un_role_in_mediating_crisis_in_the_koreas
122010.ht ml
6. Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations, at a Media Stakeout on the Situation on the Korean Peninsula, December 19,
2010, (start 06:14).
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/ russian-federation-
representative-vitaly-churkin-security-council-media-stakeout.html
7. “Remarks by President of the Security Council, Ambassador Susan E. Rice, United
States Permanent Representative, at a Media Stakeout on the Situation on the Korean
Peninsula, December 19, 2010.”
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/
united-states-representative-susan-rice-security-council-media-stakeout.html
8. On the concept of Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General, see for example:
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_ organs/representatives.shtml
9. Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic
of China, at a Media Stakeout on the Situation on the Korean Peninsula, December 20,
2010.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/wang-min-representative-of-the-
democratic-republic-of-china-security-council-media-stakeout.html
10. “Commentary: Applause for North Korea’s restraint,” Global Times, December 22,
2010. http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7238754.html
11. “Korea Tensions came close to ‘war’,” said China Diplomat, December 22, 2010.
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/ afp_asiapacific/view/1100526/1/.html
12. See for example: “S. Korea playing by dangerous cliff,” Editorial, Global Times,
December 23, 2010. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/603638. shtml
“Korean brothers advised not to go to war game,” People’s Daily Online, December 21,
2010. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 90001/90780/91343/7238108.html
L. Hongmei, “U.S., insidious harm to Korean Peninsula,” People’s Daily Online,
December 21, 2010. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/7238362.html
“New ROK drills add to tension on peninsula,” People’s Daily Online, December 27,
2010. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 90001/90777/90851/7242721.html
13. Ronda Hauben, “In Cheonan Dispute Security Council Acts in Accord with UN
Charter,” taz.de, September 5, 2011. http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/09/05/in_
cheonan_dispute_un_security_council_discovers_un_charter/
14. Ambassador Claude Heller on June 14. 2010 “Media Stakeout: Informal comments
to the Media by the President of the Security Council and the Permanent Representative
of Mexico, H. E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking of the ship from
the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.” [Webcast: Archived Video – 5 minutes.]
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/ 2010/so100614pm3.rm
15. “Russian Navy Team’s Analysis of the Cheonan Incident,” Posted on July 27,
Page 38
Hankyoreh, modified on July 29. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/
e_northkorea/432230.html
The Russian Experts document is titled “Data from the Russian Naval Expert Group’s
Investigation into the Cause of the South Korean Naval Vessel Cheonan’s Sinking.”
See also “Russia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that Sinking Cheonan Ship was
Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27, 2010, Hankyoreh, modified on July 28, 2010.
http://www.hani. co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html
16. Maurizio Guerrero,”Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de Peninsula de Corea,”
news/2010/07/05/69561
17. Presidential Statement on Cheonan, July 9, 2010, S/PRST/2010/13.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9% 7D/NKorea%20SPRST%202010%2013.pdf
18. Ronda Hauben, “In Cheonan Dispute Security Council Acts in Accord with UN
cheonan_dispute_un_security_council_discovers_un_charter/
19. I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, Monthly Review Press, 1952, p.
50.
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on the netizenblog on
July 15, 2013 at:
box-diplomacy-tobuild-a-dialogue-with-north-korea/]
Out of the Box Diplomacy to Build a
Dialogue with North Korea
by Ronda Hauben
It was an unusual event. On Thursday, July 11, the Asia Society
presented a program about the Search for Peace with North Korea. The
official title of the program was “Avoiding Apocalypse: Searching for
Peace with North Korea.”
1
Such a title is in itself an unusual event for a
program about North Korea as it stresses the desire for peace with North
Page 39
Korea, instead of focusing on the all too often claims of the impossibility
of progress in improving the U.S.-North Korean relationship.
Former Governor of New Mexico, Bill Richardson and Ambassador
Donald Gregg, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, were
the speakers with ABC’s Jon Williams in the role of moderator. The
program did indeed stand out in the sense that the speakers made a serious
effort to propose both the reasons and the possible means to build a
dialogue between North Korea and the U.S.
Governor Richardson opened the program by asking the question,
“How do we improve the relationship?” He argued that, “Isolating North
Korea doesn’t work.” Instead, he proposed the need for what he called
“out of the box diplomacy.”
One such proposal he made was the need for a special UN envoy to
help find a peaceful resolution to the Korean peninsula conflicts. He
recalled that the UN used to have an envoy, a Canadian, Maurice Strong.
Richardson suggested that the current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon
appoint an envoy. Richardson also considered the potential of a sports
diplomacy, or something along the lines of the N.Y. Philharmonic that had
been so successful a few years ago.
Richardson gave as an example of the need for serious attention to the
problem of the poor relationship with North Korea, the recent experience
of shutting down Kaesong, the joint Korean program which provides
50,000 jobs for North Koreans in factories owned by South Koreans. This
is the first time in the history of that program that the bad relations led to
the shut down of this program, he noted.
“Some creative thinking is needed,” Governor Richardson argued.
Whether that be the appointment of a special envoy, or something else to
be done by the UN, or something by the media, some kind of thinking has
to evolve, Richardson explained. What’s happening now is not good, he
concluded.
Ambassador Donald Gregg’s contributions to the program reflected
a similar sense that the U.S. needed to do more to engage with the North
Koreans. Gregg spoke about how Syracuse University had set up a
Page 40
program more than 10 years ago providing information technology
training for North Koreans. Gregg was critical of the U.S. failure to
recognize that the U.S. had the potential to influence the situation, instead
of handcuffing “themselves” with policies like “strategic patience.”
Ambassador Gregg related how when Kim Jung Un first came on the
scene, Gregg had encouraged the U.S. government to invite him to visit
the U.S. This proposal, however, like others Gregg made to the U.S.
government, were not accepted by U.S. officials.
Another example described by Gregg recalled an incident in the early
1990s. Recognizing the antagonism of the North Koreans to the
U.S.–South Korean military exercises each year, Ambassador Gregg had
gotten the Pentagon to cancel the exercises one year. This was welcomed
by the North Koreans and provided an opening for talks. Instead, however,
without consulting Ambassador Gregg, the then U.S. Secretary of
Defense, Dick Cheney got the military exercises put back. The result was
that North Korea threw out the IAEA inspectors and a crisis developed.
Describing this experience, the U.S. State Department country director for
Korea at the time, Charles Kartman commented, “People were looking for
clubs not solutions.”
In response to a question about the nuclear umbrella that the U.S.
provides to protect South Korea and Japan, Gregg related an incident
where North Koreans suggested that they be included under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella as a means for them not to feel the need to have their
own nuclear program. Ambassador Gregg proposed that there is a need for
an understanding to develop between the U.S. and North Korea and that
such an understanding can only come as a result of contact.
Governor Richardson proposed that new players were needed who
could help develop a relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. He
answered positively to a question from the audience about whether
ASEAN might be able to play a bigger role. In general, Richardson
advocated that the those from the region be a source of help in opening up
the relationship with North Korea.
A video of the July 11 program has been put online at the Asia
Page 41
Society. The title is “Searching for Peace with North Korea.”
2
Notes
1.
http://asiasociety.org/new-york/events/avoiding-apocalypse-searching-peace-north-
korea-0
2. http://asiasociety.org/video/policy/searching-peace-north-korea-complete
[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on the netizenblog on
_seeking_to_participate_in_peace_treaty_process/]
Women Peace Activists Ask Ban
Ki-moon to Initiate a Process for a
Peace Treaty to End Korean War
by Ronda Hauben
On Tuesday, September 27, 2016, women peace activists held a press
conference at the Interchurch Center across from the United Nations
Headquarters building in N.Y.C. They announced that they had delivered
a letter signed by more than 100 women asking UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon to initiate a peace process which will lead to a peace treaty
between the U.S. and the DPRK by 2020.
They explained that with 100 days left before the Secretary-General
completes his second five year term at the head of the UN Secretariat, he
has an obligation to fulfill on a promise he made in a speech in 2007
where he stated:
Beyond a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue with North
Korea, we should aim to establish a peace mechanism, through
Page 42
transition from armistice to a permanent peace regimen.
In their letter the peace activists reminded the UN Secretary-General,
“We look to you to leave behind a legacy of diplomacy for peace in Korea,
Northeast Asia and the World.”
In the past few weeks, journalists who are part of the UN press corps
have asked the Secretary-General if he has any intention of using his little
time left as Secretary-General to do something to work toward a peaceful
resolution of the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon’s last term in office will expire on December 31, 2016.
In response to the questions posed by these reporters, the Secretary-
General replied that he has no special plans.
It is to the credit of these women peace activists that they continue to
call on the Secretary-General to fulfill on the obligation of his office to
work to lessen the tension on the Korean Peninsula. But whether their
efforts will lead to any action on the part of the Secretary-General or not
does not detract from the importance of such efforts on the part of
journalists and peace activists.
The peace activists holding the press conference pointed out that
currently tensions are especially high on the Korean Peninsula. The
combination of military exercises by U.S. and South Korea, the U.S.
bringing B1 bombers to South Korea, and the North Korean nuclear tests
leave the situation on the Korean Peninsula as one with no obvious means
of lessening the tension.
During the press conference, one of the speakers, Suzy Kim,
described a meeting held by the peace activists in February 2016 in Bali,
Indonesia.
The International peace activists group Women Cross the DMZ
(WCDMZ) had invited a South Korean women peace delegation and a
North Korean women peace delegation to meet with them to discuss how
to work toward the signing of a peace treaty between the U.S. government
and the North Korean government that would end the Korean War. In
order to make the arrangements for their meeting, there was a need to get
permissions from the South Korean government and the North Korean
Page 43
government for the women from their respective countries to meet with
each other. While the delegation of WCDMZ peace activists got the
needed permission from the North Korean government for the proposed
meeting, the South Korean government would not approve such a meeting.
Therefore, the international peace activists decided to hold separate
meetings with the North Korean women and the South Korean women.
The WOMENCROSSDMZ.org web site includes a summary which
describes the Bali meetings and includes a statement of principles created
by the North Korean women and the international peace activists.
Following is the statement:
MEETING AGREEMENT
Bali Indonesia, February 10, 2016
(Between WCDMZ International Delegation and DPRK Delega-
tion)
1. We will make active efforts for public education and aware-
ness raising regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and
the need for an end to military action that further aggravates the
situation.
2. We will work together as Korean and international women, in
efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and achieve peaceful
reunification of Korea, in the spirit of prior inter – Korean
agreements such as the June 15 North and South Joint Declara-
tion, 2000.
3. We will carry out work toward the achievement of lasting
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This includes the
removal of various political and physical hindrances to peace and
reunification, replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a
peace treaty, and the eventual denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and the entire world.
4. We will promote women’s leadership at all levels of
peacebuilding, including preventing armed conflict and partici-
pating in peace negotiations. International women will actively
Page 44
work to urge each government to support women’s involvement
in the Korean peace process, as provided for in UN Security
Council Resolution 1325.
Such a statement provides a guide for a transnational peace building
campaign. The statement is an expression of the need for peace negotia-
tions toward replacing the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace
treaty and the eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the
rest of the world.
The summary of the February Bali meeting offers a demonstration of
the value of including women in line with UN Security Council Resolution
1325 in peace negotiations for the Korean Peninsula.
The importance of implementing UN Resolution 1325 in the conflict
on the Korean Peninsula was also raised at an October 3, 2016 press
conference at the UN marking the Russian Federation assuming the
October 2016 rotating presidency of the UN Security Council. On the
agenda for the October 2016 schedule is a UN Security Council meeting
on October 25 which will be an open debate on UNSC Resolution 1325.
A question raised by a journalist and the response from Ambassador
Vitaly Churkin at the October 3 press conference helps to support the need
for women peace activists to be part of the peace process in difficult
conflict situations like the Korean conflict.
Following is the slightly edited transcript of this question and
Ambassador Churkin’s response:
(Journalist): “Yes, I have a question about (Security Council
Resolution-ed) 1325. There are women, international women peace
activists who went from North Korea and South Korea, and met with
women in both countries. And now they sent a letter to Ban Ki-moon
asking him for a process towards a peace treaty (between the U.S. and
North Korea-ed) and also to involve women in the process. And here we
have the situation with North Korea where the Security Council has not
made any progress. And they (the international peace activists-ed) are
saying we need women involved in doing this, women working for peace.
Is there any way you see of doing this, any way you see to have 1325
Page 45
actually implemented so you get some help toward having a peace
development?”
Response from Ambassador Churkin:
(Ambassador Churkin): “Well, You know what we believe is that, this is
an extremely difficult situation. And the cycle of action and counter action
which we have seen in the past few years, actually since 2005 when this
deal of September 19 fell through, it is not working.
So we do believe we need to try some creative thinking. We don’t
have some specific immediate proposals, but certainly, DPRK testing and
then U.S. and others conducting some higher level military maneuvers
there, you know, beefing up their military presence, that does not help at
all.
In that creative thinking, it may well be the greater involvement of
women could be one of the elements that might move the situation
forward.”
1
By recognizing the need for and importance of contributions for the
peace process mandated by UNSC Resolution 1325, Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon would do well to favorably respond to the letter from the
international women peace activists.
Note
1. See webcast for Oct 3, 2016 press conference with Ambassador Churkin:
http://webtv.un.org/media/watch/ambassador-vitaly-churkin-of-the-russian-federation-
president-of-the-security-council-of-october-2016-press-conference/5153898747001 (at
33:08-33:58, and 33:59-34:42)
Page 46
The Media War at the UN and the DPRK
Why Netizen Journalism Matters
Notes for a Talk*
by Ronda Hauben
[Author’s note: The following are slightly edited Notes prepared for a talk
presented at Stony Brook University on December 4, 2013. The talk was
part of a series of talks in fall 2013 sponsored by the Center for Korean
Studies at Stony Brook focusing on North Korea. The talk was presented
with slides which are available at the website given at the end of these
Notes. Comments are welcome.]
I – Preface
I am honored to be here today and to give this talk as part of the series
of talks on North Korea.
In October of 2006, I began covering the United Nations first as a
journalist for the English edition of the South Korean online newspaper
OhmyNews International. When OhmyNews ended its English edition in
2010, I became a correspondent covering the UN for an English language
blog
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblogat the website of the German newspa-
per Die Tageszeitung. Both OhmyNews International and my blog at the
taz.de website are online publications.
With Michael Hauben, I am a coauthor of the book Netizens: On the
History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet. The book was first
published online in January 1994. On May 1, 1997, the print edition of the
book Netizens was published in English. Later that year, in October, a
Japanese translation was published. Netizens was the first book to
recognize that along with the development of the internet, a new form of
citizenship, called netizenship had emerged. This is a form of citizenship
that has developed based on the broader forms of political participation
made possible by the Net (i.e., the internet).
Page 47
I want to share some of the background about the origin, use and
impact of the netizen concept and its relation to what I call netizen
journalism before presenting two case studies of how netizen journalism
has affected the media war at the UN.
II – Introduction
While now many people are interested in the impact of the internet on
society, pioneering research was done by my coauthor Michael Hauben in
the early 1990s when the internet was first beginning to spread and to
connect people around the world.
In his research, Hauben recognized that there were people who
appreciated the communication the internet made possible and that these
people worked to spread the Net and to do what they felt needed for it to
help to create a better world. Taking the common network term,
“net.citizen” used online at the time, Hauben proposed that these people
who worked to contribute to the Net and the bigger world it was part of
were “netizens.”
In an article he wrote on the impact of the Net on journalism, Hauben
recognized that many people online were frustrated with the mainstream
media and that the netizens would be creating a broader and more
widespread media.
Hauben recognized in the early 1990s that “the collective body of
people assisted by (the Net)…has grown larger than any individual
newspaper….” I want to look at two news events about North Korea and
the UN in the context of this prediction. Then I will consider the implica-
tion of these case studies for the kind of journalism about North Korea that
I propose netizens and the internet are making possible.
III – Korea
In February of 2003 I was glancing at the front page summaries of the
articles in an issue of the Financial Times. I saw a surprising headline for
an article continued later in the issue. The article said that in 2002 netizens
in South Korea had elected the president of the country, Roh Moo-hyun.
Page 48
He had just taken office on February 25, 2003. The new president had
even promised that the internet would be influential in the form of
government he established. Also I learned that an online Korean newspa-
per called OhmyNews had been important making these developments
possible. Colleagues encouraged me to get in contact with OhmyNews and
to learn more about the netizens activities in South Korea and about
OhmyNews.
I was able to get in contact with OhmyNews. I began to submit articles
to it. They would be printed along with a few other English language
articles others were submitting. By 2004 OhmyNews began an English
language online edition called OhmyNews International. I began to write
for it. I soon became the first woman columnist for the English edition.
I subsequently learned that both South Korea and China are places
where the role of netizens is important in building more democratic
structures for society. I began to pay attention to both of these netizen
developments. South Korea, for example, has been an advanced model of
grassroots efforts to create examples of netizen forms for a more
participatory decision making processes. I wrote several research papers
documenting the achievements and activities of Korean netizens.
IV – Reporting on the UN
By October 2006, the second five-year term for Kofi Annan as the
Secretary-General of the United Nations was soon to end. One of the main
contenders to become the 8
th
Secretary-General of the UN was the Foreign
Minister of South Korea, Ban Ki-moon.
I had covered one previous United Nations event which I had found
of great interest. That event was the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) which encouraged access to the internet for everyone. The
event took place in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2005. Also I had watched
with interest some of the press reports of the speeches made by heads of
state at the 2006 opening of the General Assembly session. These events
gave me the sense that it probably would be interesting to go to the UN
and cover the activities for OhmyNews if the new Secretary-General would
Page 49
be Ban Ki-moon, the Korean candidate.
On October 9, 2006, Ban Ki-moon won the Security Council
nomination. This nomination was to be approved by the General Assembly
on October 13.
I thought this would be a historic event for South Korea.
By 2006, I was writing regularly as a featured columnist for
OhmyNews International (OMNI).
I asked the Editor of OhmyNews International if I could get a letter
for a press credential to cover the UN for OMNI. He agreed and I was able
to get my credential in time to go to the General Assembly meeting when
the General Assembly voted to accept the Security Council’s nomination
of Ban Ki-moon.
I was surprised that some of the speeches welcoming Ban Ki-moon
as the Secretary-General elect were meaningful speeches referring to
actual problems at the UN such as the need for reform of the Security
Council. Conversely, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, made
no pretense to hide both his welcoming of Ban and his dissatisfaction with
Kofi Annan, the outgoing Secretary-General who had condemned the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. A significant focus of the comments to the new
Secretary-General from member states emphasized the importance of
communication at the UN, that it was critical for the incoming Secretary-
General to listen to all states and to hear their views.
It was a thrill to be at the UN witnessing the vote for a new Secretary-
General who was from South Korea. I wondered if the internet would be
able to have any impact on the new Secretary-General and on what
happened at the United Nations, since the internet had been able to make
it possible for netizens in South Korea to impact politics.
The very next day after Ban Ki-moon’s nomination was approved by
the General Assembly, the Security Council took up to condemn the recent
nuclear test by North Korea. This had been North Korea’s first nuclear
test. The Security Council imposed sanctions on North Korea, not giving
the North Korean Ambassador to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, a chance to
respond until after the sanctions had been voted on. When the North
Page 50
Korean Ambassador responded, he referred among other issues, to
financial sanctions that the U.S. had imposed on North Korea. No one in
the Security Council asked him what he was referring to or how this
affected the issues the Security Council had acted on with respect to North
Korea.
It impressed me that just as a diplomat from South Korea was being
chosen as the new Secretary-General of the UN, at the same time sanctions
were being imposed on North Korea. The Security Council acted against
North Korea before hearing its views on the issue they were considering.
This was in sharp contrast to the emphasis member nations had put on the
importance of hearing the views of all members when member nations
welcomed Ban Ki-moon to the United Nations in the meeting just one day
earlier in the General Assembly.
The article I wrote for OhmyNews International described this
situation. It explained:
The urgent problem facing the UN at this juncture in history is
not whether North Korea has developed and tested a nuclear
device. It is the breakdown reflected by the lack of participation
and investigation by the international community into how a
crisis will be handled once it develops, and whether the concerns
and problems of those involved in the crisis will be considered as
part of the process of seeking a solution. It is how the UN
functions when tensions reach a point where serious attention is
needed to help to understand and solve a problem. (Quoted from
“The Problem Facing the UN,” OhmyNews International,
October 17, 2006).
1
In general when at the UN, I paid attention to Security Council
developments, particularly with regard to the meetings imposing sanctions
on North Korea and also on Iran. Also, I particularly followed the
meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly when Security
Council reform was being discussed.
Page 51
V – Some Mainstream Media Created a Story
Soon after Ban Ki-moon took office as Secretary-General at the
beginning of January 2007, a story appeared in the Wall Street Journal
(WSJ) accusing North Korea of using UN funds from the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) for its nuclear program. An editorial in the
January 19 issue of the WSJ by Melanie Kirkpatrick had the headline:
“United Nations Dictators.”
No evidence was presented in the WSJ, just accusations. This situation
was reminiscent of how the WSJ and some other mainstream media had
accused the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, of misusing UN funds
in Iraq, and how this had mushroomed into what had come to be known
as the “Food for Oil” scandal.
The significance of this story for me, was to see that some of the
mainstream media were active creating stories and accusations with no
real evidence, while only very few media appeared to be investigating the
actual underlying issues that had led the North Korean government to
carry out its first nuclear test.
VI – The Six-Party Talks and the Banco Delta Asia Story
In January 2007 there were reports in the press about a meeting that
had taken place in Berlin between Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary
of State for the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan, the Deputy Foreign Minister of
North Korea.
Around this time I learned some of the background behind what had
led to North Korea carrying out its first nuclear test. An agreement had
been reached on September 19, 2005 between the six parties to talks about
the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The six parties were North
Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Russia and China. Shortly after the
agreement was signed in Sept. 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department
announced that it was freezing the assets of the Banco Delta Asia (BDA)
a bank in Macao, China, which held $25 million of North Korean funds.
The result of this action was that North Korea lost access to $25
million of its bank funds, and also to the use of the international banking
Page 52
system. North Korea’s response was to leave the six-party talks to protest
this action which it considered hostile and politically motivated.
North Korea was encouraged by some parties to the six-party talks to
have bilateral negotiations with the U.S. over the financial sanctions. The
U.S., however, refused to negotiate. Unable to find a way to negotiate with
the U.S. over this situation, North Korea, in July 2006, tested a missile.
The response of the UN Security Council was to condemn North Korea by
passing UN Resolution 1695 but not to investigate what the problem was
that led North Korea to carry out a missile test.
Then on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test.
Once again the Security Council failed to investigate what was behind this
action. Instead the Security Council passed Resolution 1718 imposing
more sanctions on North Korea.
Only after this nuclear test did the U.S. demonstrate a willingness to
negotiate with the DPRK over the financial sanctions imposed on Banco
Delta Asia.
On January 16 and 17, 2007, Christopher Hill and Kim Kye-gwan
held talks in Berlin and came to an agreement. Though not officially
announced, it was believed that they agreed that the $25 million being held
in the Macau BDA, along with access to the international banking system
would be restored to North Korea. In exchange North Korea would return
to the six-party talks. The Berlin meeting appeared to break the deadlock
and the six-party talks were held again starting on February 8, 2007.
Another agreement was announced five days later on February 13, 2007.
Then on March 5 and 6, Hill and Kim held bilateral talks in New York
City. Despite the agreement reached in Berlin, however, the U.S. Treasury
Department issued a finding on March 19 against the BDA under Section
311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. This move again deadlocked the six-party
talks, even as the delegates arrived for the talks in Beijing.
The deadlock continued for the next few months, with much of the
mainstream U.S. press blaming North Korea for continuing to insist that
its $25 million be returned via a banking transaction, before it would agree
to any further steps in the six-party talks. The North Korean delegate said
Page 53
he understood that the agreement in Berlin with Christopher Hill had
provided for the return of the $25 million from the BDA as a money
transfer via the international banking system.
The U.S. Treasury Department officials claimed that their decision
against the BDA left it up to the bank to return the funds. The decision
against the bank, however, meant that it had no means to return the funds
as a money transfer as the Section 311 finding against the bank meant that
it lost access to the international banking system.
During this period, there were rumors that a bank in China had been
asked by the U.S. State Department to make the transfer. The bank
allegedly considered the request. Eventually, however, the bank refused
based on its fear that it too would be frozen out of the international
banking system by the U.S. Treasury Department, as the BDA had been,
if it offered to help make the transfer of funds back to North Korea.
The McClatchy Newspaper Company, in a way that is different from
much of the rest of the mainstream U.S. media, carried articles which
helped to investigate the issues underlying this dispute between the U.S.
and North Korea. Other banks in Macau, an article in the McClatchy
Newspapers explained, had played a similar role with regard to North
Korea, helping North Korea to sell its gold, but only the BDA had been
singled out for sanctions. The article suggested that the U.S. Treasury
Department’s actions were not based on actual criminal activity by the
bank or by North Korea, but instead were motivated by a political
objective.
One of the McClatchy newspaper articles described some documents
that the newspaper had acquired including the BDA’s complaint challeng-
ing the U.S. Treasury Department decision against the bank. Also, the
McClatchy newspaper article referred to a statement filed by the owner of
the BDA to protest the Treasury Department action.
I tried to find a way to get copies of the documents. I tried to contact
the law firm and even wrote to the McClatchy reporter, but none of these
efforts succeeded.
I did, however, find on the internet a copy of the Patriot Act and read
Page 54
Section 311, the section being used against the bank. I was able to see that
the section of the law was such that the U.S. government did not have to
present any proof for its actions.
In March 2007, I did a story titled “North Korea’s $25 Million and
Banco Delta Asia,” documenting how the use of Section 311 of the Patriot
Act against the bank was a political act, rather than a criminal determina-
tion. The U.S. Treasury Department did not have to provide any evidence
and acted as the accuser and judge in the case. Even though there had been
an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea to return the $25 million
to North Korea, nothing happened.
The stalemate continued.
In May 2007, I covered the 50
th
Anniversary dinner celebration of the
New York City based Korea Society. Chris Hill gave a short talk as part
of the program. He indicated that he would persevere until a means was
found to break the impasse over the $25 million so as to make it possible
for the six-party talks to continue.
Several journalists covered the event for other South Korean
publications. They were particularly interested in what Hill said, but Hill’s
talk in itself did not seem to represent a newsworthy event.
In the next few days, however, it appeared that an important story was
developing. An article by Kevin Hall titled, “Bank Owner Disputes
Money-Laudering Allegations,” published by the McClatchy Newspaper
Company said that the blog “China Matters” had published links to some
documents refuting the Treasury Department’s charges against the bank.
“China Matters” is a blog about U.S.-China policy. The links that the
blog made available included to an appeal submitted by the lawyer for
Banco Delta Asia to an administrative hearing at the Treasury Department
and to a statement by the owner of the Bank in Macao, Stanley Au.
I now had the documents in the case. The U.S. government’s findings
were general statements providing no specific evidence of wrongdoing on
the part of the bank. The bank’s statements and refutation gave significant
documentation refuting charges of illegal activity on the part of the bank.
The refutation also made the case that there was political motive for the
Page 55
U.S. government’s allegations rather than actual illegal activity on the part
of the bank.
Also the blogger at China Matters who uses the pseudonym China
Hand or Peter Lee posted some of the Congressional testimony by David
Asher, a former U.S. government official who had helped to plan and
enforce the U.S. Treasury Department sanctions against the Banco Delta
Asia.
Asher explained that the U.S. government had targeted a small Macau
bank in order to scare the banks in China. “To kill the chicken to scare the
monkeys,” the ex-government official explained, quoting an old Chinese
proverb in his testimony in a U.S. Congressional hearing.
I wanted to verify the testimony of Asher and understand its
implications, so I searched online and found an earlier government
document from November 2006. Asher had testified in a similar vein at a
Congressional hearing titled “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and
Iran, and Its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Situations in Both
Countries,” on September 14, 2006. The document I found was the
transcript of that hearing.
The hearing was held by a special Congressional Commission about
the U.S. China relationship which held hearings semi annually.
What was most surprising in this document, however, was the
explanation that the Banco Delta Asia sanctions were an issue that was
only secondarily aimed at North Korea. The primary issue that was of
interest to the U.S. government officials involved in the Commission
Hearing was what was China’s foreign policy and how closely did China’s
behavior match the foreign policy goals set out by the U.S.
In the discussion at the September 2006 hearing about the Banco
Delta Asia, David Asher described the political objectives of the action.
Speaking about China, Asher said:
They get the message on the financial angle…there’s an old
saying in Chinese, ‘You kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.’
We didn’t go out and cite a multitude of Chinese financial
institutions that have been publicly identified as working with
Page 56
North Korea over the years…. We did need to designate one
small one though, and that one small one sent a message to all
the others, that they had to get in line, and it was timed to
coincide with other information that we were making public….
I think they got the message…. We need to try to align our
financial and economic interests. I do think, though the use of
some pressure, including veiled pressure is effective. (Hearing
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commis-
sion, 2006, p. 115-116.)
2
The Commission hearing clarified that the purpose of freezing North
Korean funds in the Banco Delta Asia was not about stopping criminal
activity by that bank or by North Korea, as there was never any evidence
presented of any such activity. Instead it was an act with a political
objective which was to pressure China to act in conformity with U.S.
policy goals in general and in its actions toward North Korea in particular.
At last I had the news peg for an important story. I wrote the article,
“Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the Policy Aimed at
Targeting China as Well as North Korea?” submitting it around 5:00 a.m.
my time to OhmyNews International. By noon the next day, my story
appeared. That was on May 18.
Also on May 18, the Wall Street Journal carried an Op Ed by the
former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton. The article scolded the
U.S. government for negotiating to return the $25 million to North Korea
In late May I was an invited speaker at the International Communica-
tions Association (ICA 2007) conference in San Francisco. I summed up
my experience writing for OhmyNews International, particularly
describing the BDA story and the helpful role of online media in making
it possible to present an alternative narrative as opposed to that of the
mainstream U.S. media about the situation.
VII – Voice of America News Service
Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San Francisco, however,
that my experience with this story was not ending, but actually a new
Page 57
episode was beginning.
A short time later, on June 11, I received a surprising e-mail message.
The message was from a reporter who said she worked for Voice of
America News Korea (VOA News Korean Service). VOA is an official
U.S. government news broadcasting service.
3
She began:
“Hello Ms. Hauben.”
She introduced herself as a reporter with the Korean Service of the
Voice of America News in Washington, D.C.
Her e-mail continued:
While I was working on a story about BDA issue, I read your
report, ‘Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia.’ I thought
you made some valuable points about the BDA issue in this
report, I was wondering if I could have a conversation with you
in this matter. Since I am on a deadline, I’m trying very hard to
get a hold of you. So I would really appreciate it if you call or e-
mail me back ASAP.
She gave her phone number.
I wondered if it was advisable to speak with her as VOA News has a
reputation of being a promoter of U.S. government policy, rather than a
news service seeking the facts. I asked my editors at OhmyNews Interna-
tional and I also spoke with a Korean journalist I know who covers stories
at the UN for another Korean newspaper. They all encouraged me to speak
with her.
I called her as she had asked. She said she wanted to interview me by
phone. I asked her to let me know what she would want to speak with me
about. She sent me an e-mail message elaborating.
Her message explained:
The purpose of this interview is to let our listeners know what is
going on regarding the BDA issue and how the BDA issue is
developing.
When I read your article, I thought you made valuable and
critical points about the BDA issue, and I thought it might be
Page 58
very important to let your idea about the BDA issue be heard by
our listeners.
She listed questions she would ask me in the interview. They were:
1. How you came up with the idea of writing this article. How
you prepared it. About your sources.
2. Briefly summarize your findings or main points of the article.
3. What you are trying to accomplish by writing this article?
What needs to be done to resolve the BDA issue?
“Finally,” she wrote, “I wanted to ask you if we could do this
interview sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.… Thanks again,”
she ended the e-mail message.
She called at the arranged time.
She told me her listeners were in North Korea. I was surprised that a
reporter for a U.S. government media would offer to do a story about the
hidden political objectives of U.S. policy against North Korea which were
being camouflaged by false criminal accusations against North Korea.
We had a half hour telephone conversation discussing my stories, the
sources I had used and the problem represented by the American
government freezing the BDA funds. She also asked for the URLs to
follow up on the sources I had cited. These were basically material I had
found on the internet, including several government documents, and
copies of the legal documents submitted by the bank owner to appeal the
U.S. Treasury Department ruling against the bank.
The VOA News reporter said she was interested in contacting former
U.S. government officials like David Asher who was responsible for
crafting the plan to freeze North Korea’s bank account assets. She wanted
to ask them to respond to my article.
Just as this contact with the VOA News journalist was happening,
there were news stories describing the ongoing efforts to find a solution
to the roadblock that the frozen North Korean funds represented.
Soon there were reports that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
had agreed to transfer the funds from the BDA to an account held by a
Russian bank for North Korea. In the following weeks, the funds transfer
Page 59
was done.
The VOA News reporter wrote me saying she had other stories to do
and was not for now going to pursue this story any longer.
Whether the contact had any impact on the resolution of the stalemate,
I can only speculate. Regardless of her motivation, however, the VOA
News reporter had contacted me before the situation was resolved. At the
very least, an article I had done had caught the attention of someone
connected to the Voice of America News. I was given the chance to
explain what I had learned about the BDA story and to explain how I
understood the controversy surrounding it. So my story did indeed have
more of an impact than I had understood when I gave my talk at the ICA
2007 in San Francisco.
The experience I had with my BDA story and the encounter with the
Korean News Service of the VOA News demonstrates that the internet
makes it possible not only to spread an accurate narrative among the
public, but also to reach officials with an interest in the issues being
critiqued.
The reason I have taken the time to tell this story is that it represents
for me a taste of the impact that such online journalism makes possible.
VIII – The Phenomenon of Netizen Journalism
In the research I have been doing and the experiences I have had
exploring the potential of what I call netizen journalism, the question has
been raised:
What is this new form of news and what are its characteristics?
Is there something different from traditional journalism?
Is there some significant new aspect represented by netizen journal-
ism?
Essentially I have found that there is an important research component
of what I call netizen journalism. Netizen journalism, is a socially oriented
journalism. As such, at times there is a need to do serious research into the
background, context and political significance of conflicts. By revealing
the actual forces at work, netizen journalism provides a more accurate
Page 60
grasp of whose interests are being served, and what is at stake in the
events that make up the news.
Traditionally, the press can function as a watchdog for society by
exposing the use and abuse of power. Or, the press can act to support the
abuse of political power.
Netizens, whether journalists or citizens who turn to journalism to
challenge problems in their society, have demonstrated in a number of
instances that they are able to bring public attention to situations needing
change, and exert the needed pressure for the change so that the change
gets made.
If netizen journalism can provide a more accurate understanding of
conflicts, it can help make more likely the peaceful resolution of these
conflicts.
Also as an aside, my stories about the U.S.-BDA-North Korea-UN
conflict led to my being short-listed for one of the journalism awards
presented each year by the United Nations Correspondence Association
(UNCA) for the best journalism articles about the UN for 2007. While I
did not get the award in 2007, I did get it the following year, in 2008.
IX – The Cheonan – Some Background
The Cheonan conflict, which was brought to the UN in 2010, provides
another interesting example how netizen journalism affected the media
war and helped to make a significant contribution to a peaceful resolution
of the conflict by the Security Council.
The Cheonan incident concerns a South Korean war ship which broke
in two and sank on March 26, 2010. Forty-six of the crew died. At the
time, the ship was involved in naval exercises with the U.S. military in an
area in the West Sea/Yellow Sea between North Korea and China. This is
a situation that had been the subject of much discussion on the internet.
Initially the South Korean government and the U.S. government said
there was no indication that North Korea was involved. Then at a press
conference on May 20, 2010, the South Korean government claimed that
a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine exploded in the water near
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the Cheonan, causing a pressure wave that was responsible for the sinking.
Many criticisms of this scenario have been raised.
There was no direct evidence of any North Korean submarine in the
vicinity of the Cheonan. Nor was there any evidence that a torpedo was
actually fired causing a pressure wave phenomenon. Hence the South
Korean government had no actual case that could be presented in a court
of law to support its claims.
In fact, if this claim of a pressure wave were true even those involved
in the investigation of the incident acknowledge that North Korea would
be the first to have succeeded at using this kind of a bubble jet torpedo
action in actual fighting.
4
X – The Cheonan Press Conference and the Local
Election
The press conference held by the South Korean government on May
20, 2010, to announce that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of
the Cheonan came, it turns out, at the start of the local election period.
Many South Koreans were suspicious that the accusation was a ploy to
help the ruling party candidates win in the local elections. The widespread
suspicions about the government’s motives led to the ruling party losing
many of the local election contests. These election results demonstrated
the deep distrust among the South Korean population of the motives
behind the South Korean government’s accusations about North Korea’s
responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan.
XI – The Cheonan and Netizen Journalism
Netizens who live in different countries and speak different languages
took up to critique the claims of the South Korean government about the
cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. This netizen activity had an important
effect. It appears to have acted as a catalyst affecting the actions of the UN
Security Council in its treatment of the Cheonan dispute.
There were substantial analyses by non governmental organizations
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like Spark, PSPD, Peaceboat, and others posted on the internet in English
or in Korean or in both languages. Some of these online posts were in the
form of letters that were also sent to the members of the UN Security
Council. At the time, I saw discussions and critiques of the Korean
government’s claims at American, Japanese and Chinese websites, in
addition to conversation and postings about the Cheonan on South Korean
websites.
One such critique included a three-part analysis by the South Korean
NGO People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). This
analysis raised a number of questions and problems with the South Korean
government’s case. The PSPD document was posted widely on the internet
and also sent to the President of the United Nations Security Council for
distribution to those Security Council members interested and to the South
Korean Mission to the UN.
While there were many blog comments about the Cheonan issue in
Korean, there were also some bloggers writing in English who became
active in critiquing the South Korean investigation and the role of the U.S.
in the conflict.
One blogger, Scott Creighton who uses the pen name Willy Loman,
or American Everyman, wrote a post titled “The Sinking of the Cheonan:
We are being lied to.”
The South Korean government had claimed that the diagram it
displayed above the glass case containing the alleged torpedo shaft was
from a North Korean weapons sales brochure which offered the torpedo.
The torpedo was identified as the CHT-02D.
In a post he titled “A Perfect Match?,” Creighton showed how there
was a discrepancy between the diagram displayed by the South Korean
government in the press conference, and the part of the torpedo it had on
display in the glass case below the diagram. He demonstrated that the
diagram did not match the part of the torpedo on display because one of
the components of the torpedo shown was in the propeller section, but in
the diagram, the component appeared in the shaft section. There were
many comments in response to this post, including some from netizens in
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South Korea. Also the mainstream conservative media in South Korea
carried accounts of this blogger’s critique. Three weeks later, at a news
conference, a South Korean government official acknowledged that the
diagram presented by the South Korean government was not of the same
torpedo as the part displayed in the glass case. Instead the diagram
displayed was of the PT97W torpedo, not the CHT-02D torpedo as
claimed.
In a post titled “Thanks to Valuable Input” describing the significance
of having documented one of the fallacies in the South Korean govern-
ment’s case, Creighton writes:
(I)n the end, thanks to valuable input from dozens of concerned
people all across the world…. Over 100,000 viewers read that
article and it was republished on dozens of sites all across the
world (even translated). A South Korean MSM outlet even
posted our diagram depicting the glaring discrepancies between
the evidence and the drawing of the CHT-O2D torpedo, which a
high-ranking military official could only refute by stating he had
40 years military experience and to his knowledge, I had none.
But what I had, what we had, was literally thousands of people
all across the world, scientists, military members, and just
concerned investigative bloggers who were committed to the
truth and who took the time to contribute to what we were doing
here. ‘40 years military experience’ took a beating from ‘we the
people WorldWide’ and that is the way it is supposed to be.
This is just one of a number of serious questions and challenges that
were raised about the South Korean government’s scenario of the sinking
of the Cheonan.
Other influential events which helped to challenge the South Korean
government’s claims were a press conference in Japan held on July 9 by
two academic scientists. The two scientists presented results of experi-
ments they had done which challenged the results of experiments the
South Korean government used to support its case. These scientists also
wrote to the Security Council with their findings.
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Also a significant challenge to the South Korean government report
was the finding of a Russian team of four sent to South Korea to look at
the data from the investigation and to do an independent evaluation of it.
The team of Russian navy experts visited South Korea from May 30 to
June 7. The Russian team did not accept the South Korean government’s
claim that a pressure wave from a torpedo caused the Cheonan to sink.
Getting a leaked copy of the Russian team’s report, the Hankyoreh
newspaper in South Korea reported that the Russian investigators
determined that the ship had come in contact with the ocean floor and a
propeller and shaft became entangled in a fishing net. Also the investiga-
tors thought it likely that an old underwater mine had exploded near the
Cheonan adding to the factors that led to it sinking.
Such efforts along with online posts and discussions by many netizens
provided a catalyst for the actions of the UN Security Council concerning
the Cheonan incident.
When the UN Security Council took up the Cheonan issue in June
2010, I was surprised to learn that some of the members of the Council
knew of the criticism of the South Korean government investigation
blaming North Korea for sinking the ship.
XII – The Cheonan and the UN Security Council
South Korea brought the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan to
the United Nations Security Council. The Mexican Ambassador to the UN,
Claude Heller, was President of the Security Council for the month of June
2010. (The presidency rotates each month to a different Security Council
member nation.) In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4, South
Korea asked the Council to take up the Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook,
then the South Korean Ambassador to the UN, requested that the Security
Council consider the matter of the Cheonan and respond in an appropriate
manner. The letter described the investigation into the sinking of the
Cheonan carried out by South Korean government and military officials.
The conclusion of the South Korean investigation was to accuse North
Korea of sinking the South Korean ship.
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How would the Mexican Ambassador as President of the Security
Council during the month of June handle this dispute? This was a serious
issue facing Ambassador Heller as he began his presidency.
Ambassador Heller adopted what he referred to as a “balanced”
approach to treat both governments on the Korean peninsula in a fair and
objective manner. He held bilateral meetings with each member of the
Security Council which led to support for a process of informal presenta-
tions by both of the Koreas to the members of the Security Council. He
arranged for the South Korean Ambassador to make an informal presenta-
tion to the members of the Security Council. Ambassador Heller also
invited the North Korean Ambassador to make a separate informal
presentation to the members of the Security Council. Sin Son Ho was the
UN Ambassador from North Korea.
In response to the invitation from the President of the Security
Council, the North Korean Ambassador to the UN sent a letter dated June
8 to the Security Council which denied the allegation that his country was
to blame. His letter urged the Security Council not to be the victim of
deceptive claims, as had happened with the U.S. presentation by Colin
Powell on Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support his
government’s call to be able to examine the evidence and to be involved
in a new and more independent investigation on the sinking of the
Cheonan.
In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North Korea referred to the
widespread international sentiment questioning the conclusions of the
South Korean government’s investigation. The North Korean Ambassador
wrote:
It would be very useful to remind ourselves of the ever-increas-
ing international doubts and criticisms, going beyond the internal
boundary of south Korea, over the ‘investigation result’ from the
very moment of its release….
What Ambassador Heller called “interactive informal meetings” were
held on June 14 with the South Koreans and the North Koreans in separate
sessions attended by the Security Council members, who had time to ask
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questions and then to discuss the presentations.
At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s presentations ended,
Ambassador Heller said that it was important to have received the detailed
presentation by South Korea and also to know and learn the arguments of
North Korea. He commented that “it was very important that North Korea
approached the Security Council.”
In response to a question about his view on the issues presented, he
replied, “I am not a judge. I think we will go on with the consultations to
deal in a proper manner on the issue.”
Ambassador Heller also explained that, “the Security Council issued
a call to the parties to refrain from any act that could escalate tensions in
the region, and makes an appeal to preserve peace and stability in the
region.”
Though the North Korean Ambassador to the UN rarely speaks to the
media, the North Korean UN delegation scheduled a press conference for
Tuesday, June 15, the day following the interactive informal meeting.
During the press conference, the North Korean Ambassador presented his
government’s refutation of the allegations made by South Korea. Also he
explained North Korea’s request to be able to send an investigation team
to the site where the sinking of the Cheonan occurred. South Korea had
denied the request. During its press conference, the North Korean
Ambassador noted that there was widespread condemnation of the
investigation in both South Korea and around the world.
The press conference held on June 15 was a lively event. Many of the
journalists who attended were impressed and requested that there be future
press conferences with the North Korean Ambassador.
During his presidency of the Security Council in the month of June,
Ambassador Heller held meetings with the UN ambassadors from each of
the two Koreas and then with Security Council members about the
Cheonan issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he was asked
by a reporter what was happening about the Cheonan dispute. He
responded that the issue of contention was over the evaluation of the South
Korean government’s investigation.
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Ambassador Heller described how he introduced what he refers to as
“an innovation” into the Security Council process. As the month of June
ended, the issue was not yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a basis to
build on the progress that was achieved during the month of his presi-
dency.
The “innovation” Ambassador Heller referred to, was a summary he
made of the positions of each of the two Koreas on the issue, taking care
to present each objectively. Heller explained that this summary was not an
official document, so it did not have to be approved by the other members
of the Council. This summary provided the basis for further negotiations.
He believed that it had a positive impact on the process of consideration
in the Council, making possible the agreement that was later to be
expressed in the Presidential Statement on the Cheonan that was issued by
the Security Council on July 9, 2010.
Ambassador Heller’s goal, he explained, was to “at all times be as
objective as possible” so as to avoid increasing the conflict on the Korean
peninsula. Such a goal is the Security Council’s obligation under the UN
Charter.
In the Security Council’s July 9 Presidential Statement (PRST) on the
Cheonan, what stands out is that the statement follows the pattern of
presenting the views of each of the two Koreas and urging that the dispute
be settled in a peaceful manner.
In the PRST, the members of the Security Council did not blame
North Korea. Instead they refer to the South Korean investigation and its
conclusion, expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings” of the
investigation.
The PRST explains that “The Security Council takes note of the
responses from other relevant parties, including the DPRK, which has
stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”
With the exception of North Korea, it is not indicated who “the other
relevant parties” are. It does suggest, however, that it is likely there were
some Security Council members, not just Russia and China, which did not
agree with the conclusions of the South Korean investigation.
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Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Korean newspaper
Hankyoreh noted that the statement “allows for a double interpretation and
does not blame or place consequences on North Korea.” Such a possibility
of a “double interpretation” allows for different interpretations.
The Security Council action on the Cheonan took place in a situation
where there had been a wide-ranging international critique, especially in
the online media, about the problems of the South Korean investigation,
and of the South Korean government’s failure to make public any
substantial documentation of its investigation, along with its practice of
harassing critics of the South Korean government claims. The Security
Council action included hearing the positions of the different parties to the
conflict.
The result of such efforts was something that is unusual in the process
of recent Security Council activity. The Security Council process in the
Cheonan issue provided for an impartial analysis of the problem and an
effort to hear from those with an interest in the issue.
The effort in the Security Council was described by the Mexican
Ambassador, as upholding the principles of impartiality and respectful
treatment of all members toward resolving a conflict between nations in
a peaceful manner. It represents an important example of the Security
Council acting in conformity with its obligations as set out in the UN
charter.
In the July 9, 2010 Presidential Statement, the Security Council urged
that the parties to the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan find a means
to peacefully settle the dispute. The statement says:
The Security Council calls for full adherence to the Korean
Armistice Agreement and encourages the settlement of outstand-
ing issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means to resume
direct dialogue and negotiation through appropriate channels as
early as possible, with a view to avoiding conflicts and averting
escalation.
5
The mainstream U.S. media for the most part, chose to ignore the
many critiques which have appeared. These critiques of the South Korean
Page 69
government’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have appeared mainly
on the internet, not only in Korean, but also in English, in Japanese, and
in other languages. They present a wide-ranging challenge of the veracity
and integrity of the South Korean investigation and its conclusions.
An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28, 2010 noted the fact,
however, that the media in the U.S. had ignored the critique of the South
Korean government investigation that was being discussed online and
spread around the world.
In this example, the netizen community in South Korea and interna-
tionally were able to provide an effective challenge to the misrepresenta-
tions by the South Korean government on the Cheonan.
In conclusion, I want to propose that the response of netizens to the
problems raised by the investigation of the Cheonan incident is but a
prelude to the potential of netizens in different countries to work together
across national borders to solve the problems of our times.
XIII – Conclusion
Describing the frustration of many netizens with the traditional media
that they had to rely on before the internet, Hauben wrote:
Today, similarly, the need for a broader and more cooperative
gathering and reporting of the News has helped create the new
online media that is gradually supplementing traditional forms of
journalism.
In an article about the power of the internet, Hauben recognized that
the Net gives the power of the reporter to the netizen. This represents a
diffusion of a power formerly held by the few, placing it in hands that are
different from its former masters.
Speaking about the potential for such a journalism Hauben predicted,
“As people continue to connect to Usenet and other discussion forums, the
collective population will contribute back to the human community this
new form of news.” He recognized that, “The Net has opened a channel
for talking to the whole world to an even wider set of people than did the
printed books.”
Page 70
In one of the press conferences at the UN when Li Baodong was the
Chinese Ambassador to the UN, he told the media, “You are the 16
th
member of the Security Council.” He was in general speaking to the
traditional media. However, the case studies I have described, demonstrate
the potential for the new media, the netizen media, to assume that
membership.
Notes
1.
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp? no=323351&rel_no=1
2. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/ 9.14.06HearingTranscript.pdf
3. Voice of America (VOA) has been a part of several U.S. government agencies. From
its founding in 1942 to 1945, it was part of the Office of War Information, and then from
1945 to 1953 as a function of the State Department. VOA was placed under the U.S.
Information Agency in 1953. When the USIA was abolished in 1999, VOA was placed
under the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or BBG, which is an autonomous U.S.
government agency, with bipartisan membership. The Secretary of State has a seat on the
BBG. The BBG replaced the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) that oversaw the
funding and operation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a branch of VOA.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_of_America
4. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/ 429769.html
5. http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9975.doc.htm
stony-brook/Stony-Brook-Slides-12-04-2013.pdf. The URL for the online version of
Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet is: “Netizens: An
Anthology” at:
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120. A version of these Notes appeared on
December 17, 2013 on the Netizenblog at:
12/17/why-netizen-journalism-matters/
Page 71
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on the netizenblog on
Dec. 12, 2016 at: http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2016/12/21/leadership-
or-candlelight-democracy/]
Ban Ki-moon’s Idea of Leadership or the
Candlelight Model for More Democracy?
by Ronda Hauben
South Korea had reached a critical juncture on December 9, 2016. The
National Assembly voted to impeach the President, Park Geun-hye and the
impeachment has gone to the Constitutional Court. Six of the nine judges
must support the impeachment for Park to be removed from the presidency
permanently.
In the midst of this turning point, Ban Ki-moon’s 10 years as
Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) will come to an end on
December 31, 2016. He has indicated he will consider what to do about
becoming a candidate for the presidency of South Korea after he leaves his
office at the UN. He appears to be seriously considering running for the
top political office in South Korea despite the provisions of a General
Assembly Resolution passed on January 24, 1946, [GA Resolution 11(1)]
which state that a Secretary-General on leaving office should refrain from
accepting such a political position and member nations of the UN should
refrain from offering a recently retired Secretary-General such a position,
because of the privileged sources of information and social connections he
has gathered during his period in the UN position.
1
For a time, Ban Ki-moon was seen as leading the South Korean
presidential polls as a potential candidate. He was being courted by the
Saenuri Party, the party of President Park Geun-hye.
But in the past few months there has been a significant change. What
had seemed a promising new opportunity for Ban is now tied in with the
corruption scandal that has engulfed the administration of Park Geun-hye.
Page 72
There were allegations that her administration was plagued by corruption
over the past few years, and by October, 2016 various news media were
revealing evidence of that corruption.
Interviews published in the South Korean newspaper Hankyoreh
began to show how the Korean government practices were being directly
influenced or even decided by forces outside of the government.
Hankyoreh interviews described meetings with other people carried out by
Choi Soon-sil, a long time friend of President Park, discussing the
president’s upcoming schedule and national policy issues. This was
substantiated when a computer tablet was found by reporters connected
with the JTBC cable media. The tablet’s memory contained many files
that have been alleged to prove that President Park subordinated her
presidency to Choi Soon-sil, who had no official role in the South Korean
government. The allegation is that Park turned to Choi for advice and
decisions concerning government matters.
The involvement of Choi Soon-sil in government matters was linked
to her role in creating foundations and using the President’s name and
influence to raise funds from the chaebols, the big corporations dominat-
ing the South Korean economy. It is alleged that some chaebol executives
then expected and received favorable decisions in government matters
relating to their businesses.
Other examples of government corruption have emerged in areas like
culture and sports. There is evidence that government contracts were given
to those recommended by Choi Soon-sil or officials who had been
appointed based on her recommendation. The news of these activities
spread and the public came to understand what appeared to be serious
systemic corruption involving the head of the South Korean government.
By the end of October, large weekly public demonstrations began to
be held by South Korean citizens calling on President Park to resign. The
demonstrations grew in size so that by December, 2016, over one million
people of all ages and from many walks of life rallied in Seoul with almost
two million people protesting nationwide. President Park made some
attempts at what she claimed to be public apologies, but the public was
Page 73
dismayed by what appeared more as attempts at justifying her behavior.
Ban Ki-moon was no longer leading in the polls. Other potential
candidates swung ahead of him or tied with him.
By December 9, a vote was taken in the National Assembly to
impeach the President. The result was 234 to support the impeachment
resolution and 56 against. The number voting to impeach Park exceeded
the 200 votes needed for the impeachment resolution to pass. As required
by the Constitution, the impeachment resolution was taken to the
Constitutional Court, which has up to 180 days to review the merits of the
resolution.
When asked by journalists about his intentions with respect to a
potential candidacy for the presidency, Ban has responded that he would
return to South Korea only after his term as UN Secretary-General ends
on December 31, 2016. He plans to return in mid-January and then assess
the situation after consulting with others. His spokesperson at the UN
acknowledged that Ban knows about the UNGA Resolution asking him to
refrain from taking a political position or his country from offering him a
position. But Ban has not so far given any indication that this resolution
would play any role in his decision.
Meanwhile commentary in the media by scholars, journalists and
citizens seeks to analyze what is happening in South Korea. The article “A
Historic Juncture” in the South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo by
Political Science Professor Jaung Hoon of Chung-An University proposed
that South Korea was at a critical crossroads.
2
Describing this juncture, he
wrote that this was “a decisive moment at which the god of history
differentiates the fraying established power from the new force of the
future.”
He proposed that ending Park Geun-hye’s presidency and finding a
way to amend the constitution so no such corruption could be repeated
was important, but that this was not what he called “the ultimate issues.”
What the people truly want, he explained, is a new form of civic politics
and political platform that go beyond the representative democracy of the
20
th
century in order to allow continuous exchange and communication
Page 74
between the representative system and the general will of the people.
Professor Hoon proposes the need to strengthen communication between
the political system and the people.
Several other articles in the Korean media express a similar urgency,
but they propose the need to change the political structures, not merely
make them more responsive. For example, the editorial “Impeachment
Means a New Dawn for South Korean Democracy” in the Korean
newspaper Hankyoreh proposed the need for changing the political
framework that allowed such corruption to take place.
The Hankyoreh editorial argues:
3
If representative democracy is unable to adequately express the
demands of direct democracy, there is no reason for it to con-
tinue. Politics has been distorted by political interests that reject
the will of the people, and it’s time for that to stop. We hope that
the politicians will stop testing the protesters’ patience.
This Hankyoreh editorial notes, “This is an opportunity not merely to
remove the people who appropriated state resources for themselves but to
replace the obsolete systems, conditions and structures that made such
appropriation possible.” The impeachment motion is viewed as but “the
first step on the long journey toward completing the civic revolution in the
truest sense of that phrase.”
The editorial “Candlelight Revolution Mandates Rebuilding of
Nation” in the newspaper The Korea Times, in a similar vein, explained
that what was happening in South Korea was a “candlelight revolution”
which mandates, “the rebuilding of the nation.”
4
The editorial reports that
people involved in the protests “commonly pledged to support the
fundamental reformation of society and continuously participate in
decision making.”
The editorial explained that, “The incompetence of the political
parties encouraged people to participate directly.” It quoted as an example,
one demonstrator who said “We don’t have a clear plan yet, but we all
share in the belief that we need more action for changes.”
The article “Three Points of the Constitutional Court ‘Impeachment
Page 75
Trial’,” in the Korean newspaper OhmyNews explained that what had
happened in South Korea is that citizens took the lead and led political
circles and the media. Although only 40 days earlier it was expected that
the impeachment vote would be difficult, this writer observed how public
anger skyrocketed in the Park Geun-hye-Choi Soon-sil gate scandal,
endlessly revealing more, like the pealing of an onion. Citizens came out
in the square and declared “we are the sovereigns.” The article argues that
if it were not for these “sovereigns,” it would not have been possible to
pass the impeachment resolution in the National Assembly on December
9, 2016.
5
The author of this article argues that there is a need for citizens to
remain strong. If the amazing power of candles does not remain as
memories of winter, but continues, this author predicts, “Korea should
become a country of strong citizens…. The role of the parliamentary elite
is important, but I dream of a society…in which ordinary people can
discuss constitutional principles.” The article argues for the need for
reflection and the involvement of the ordinary people to determine the
vision for the constitutional change needed so as to lay the foundation for
change. The article proposes favoring the presidential candidate who
advocates many citizens discussing the constitutional principles to be
proposed, rather than prematurely formulated constitutional amendments.
Other articles in the media and online caution against allowing
politicians to quickly formulate and pass constitutional amendments that
they claim deal with the problems, but which have excluded citizens from
the formulation process.
The editorial “To Go Beyond June of 1987” in the Korean newspaper
Kyunghyang Shinmun explains how such a process happened in 1987
excluding those who had been the protesters from being part of formulat-
ing the mechanisms that would provide a continuing democratic process
for them. Instead, a small group of politicians formulated the constitu-
tional language to provide for direct election of the President, a process
that did not provide for democracy for the people.
6
Instead, the author explained now there is the “need to introduce and
Page 76
expand direct democracy and the participation of the citizens. What the
National Assembly should be doing is not to discuss constitutional
amendments but to enact a bill that will establish the constitutional
procedures for citizen participation in (the process of) amending the
constitution.”
The people protesting are concerned about the structural weakness of
the South Korean political system where there are such weak safe guards
against high level corruption. Therefore, there is a demand among the
protesters for a structural means for their ongoing participation in the
affairs of government.
Such concerns, however, are different from the views presented by
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon about what is needed to resolve the crisis
in South Korea. At his good-bye press conference for journalists held at
the UN on Friday, December 16, the Secretary-General was asked about
his intentions with respect to becoming a candidate for the presidency of
South Korea.
7
Ban characterized the problem in South Korea as the need for better
leadership. In his response to a question about whether he would run for
the presidency of South Korea, Ban explained his view of the situation:
As you know, the situation is very, very difficult, in a sense, in
turmoil. I can understand and share the anxiety of people about
the future of their country, as this is one of the biggest challenges
the Korean people are encountering. I know that they don’t want
to lose the hard-earned democracy and the economic develop-
ment which, in fact, transformed [the Republic of] Korea from a
recipient country to a global donor. That is one pride that the
Korean people have. Koreans have been known as [an] example
to other nations in that regard. And I also understand the aspira-
tion of people for a new type of inclusive leadership that can help
them overcome the challenges ahead.
And there are many issues of how to reconcile the differences
between their thinking, and differences of their income, and some
regionalism. There are many, many issues which we have to
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think about. That means social integration, reconciliation and
much more mature democratic institutions. At the same time,
while all these seem to present great challenges for Koreans and
the Korean Government, I’m confident that the Korean people,
with their resilience and very mature democratic institutions, I’m
sure that they will be able to overcome these difficulties soon.
Thank you.
Essentially what Ban is proposing is different from the proposals that
come from people involved in the protests. The contrast is significant.
People are expressing their recognition that the so called “democratic
institutions” have demonstrated their weakness, and that there is a need for
what they refer to as a 21
st
century politics. The “new type of leadership”
that Ban is referring to is what they call 20
th
century government. While
he refers to “social integration, reconciliation and much more mature
democratic institutions,” among the Korean people, there is a recognition
of the need to create new forms of democratic institutions which deal with
the deficiencies of the current institutions and provide for a form of
ongoing citizen participation in government processes and decision
making.
South Korea has an important legacy that can help it to meet this
challenge. It is a country that is first in the world in the spread of the
Internet and the use of the Internet by people online. Many South Koreans
are netizens, those seeking to utilize the empowerment made possible by
the Net for a more democratic and participatory society. During the past
two decades, netizens in South Korea have explored various forms of
online participation so they have a rich experience to draw from towards
creating the forms and structures needed for the civic revolution they
realize is needed. Their mass participation in the candlelight activities to
expose the corruption and failures of the current government demonstrates
that they have been mastering the need for the civic participation of
netizens and citizens in the affairs of the society. Hence they are not
looking for better leadership, but for the participation of the citizens
themselves as leadership. There is a discrepancy between what politicians
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like Ban Ki-moon have in mind and what citizens of South Korea who are
acting to change the governmental model envision. How will this
discrepancy play out when Ban returns to South Korea? The result of the
struggle over such contending forces will be a sign of the future political
direction for South Korea.
Ban Ki-moon’s 10 years at the UN appear not to have sensitized him
to the demands from the much more informed public that public opinion
is not just looking for a next ‘great leader’ but for a much enhanced
participation of citizens in the determination and functioning of their
political system.
Notes
1. See Ronda Hauben, “Debate in South Korean Media Over Ban Ki-moon’s Intentions
to Run for ROK Presidency,” taz netizenblog, May 31, 2016.
blog/2016/05/31/ debate-in-media-over-ban-ki-moon/
2. Jaung Hoon, “A Historic Juncture,” Joong-Ang Ilbo, November 18, 2016, p. 31.
http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aid=3026380
3. [Editorial] “Impeachment Means A New Dawn for South Korean Democracy,”
Hankyoreh, December 9, 2016. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_editorial/e_editorial/
773972.html
4. Cho Jae-hyon, Choi Ha-young, “Candlelight Revolution Mandates Rebuilding of
Nation,” The Korea Times, December 12, 2016.
http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/
view.jsp?req_newsidx=219894
5. agent89, “Three Points of the Constitutional Court ‘Impeachment Trial’,” 16:12:12
09:51, OhmyNews, (Google Translator translation of Korean).
http://m.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/Mobile/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002268821
See also Article 1 of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Constitution.
“The sovereignty of the Republic of Korea shall reside in the people, and all state
authority shall emanate from the people.”
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed
_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_117333.pdf
6. Ha Seung-soo, “To Go Beyond June of 1987.” Kyunghyang Shinmun, December 12,
2016.
http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201612121659497&code
=710100
7. Press Conference Ban Ki-moon, Friday, December 16 2016 at UN Headquarters,
SG/SM/18377 https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm18377.doc.htm
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EDITORIAL STAFF
Ronda Hauben
William Rohler
Norman O. Thompson
Michael Hauben (1973-2001)
Jay Hauben
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