The Amateur

Computerist

Spring 2017

Tribute to Vitaly Churkin: Ten Years at the UN Volume 29 No. 1

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Georgia: Resolutions Spark Controversy. . . . . . . Page 2

Can the Security Council Calm Tension in Korea? . . . Page 4

UNSC Helped Calm Tension in Korea . . . . . . . . Page 5

Lessons from UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya. Page 10

Defending UN Charter by Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13

UNSC Approves 90 Day Syria Observer Mission . . . Page 17

UN Fails to Condemn Ukraine Attack on RF Embassy Page 20

Amb. Churkin’s 2015 SC Presidency Press Briefing Page 21

Women Ask BKM to Initiate Korea Peace Process. . Page 23

UNSC Tribute to Memory of Vitaly Churkin . . . . Page 25

Introduction

We dedicate this issue of the Amateur

Computerist as a tribute to the life and work of the

Russian Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin who

for over 10 years provided a bulwark against the

efforts of certain powerful nations at the UN to use

the Security Council as part of their toolbox to bring

forcible regime change to various governments that

did not acquiesce to their demands.

Ambassador Churkin’s sudden passing on

February 20, 2017 took many of us with such surprise

that even weeks later it was hard to believe this

terrible news. Ambassador Churkin was the Perma-

nent Representative at the UN for the Russian Federa-

tion from April 2006 until his passing in February

2017. As such he provided an important presence for

more than 10 years on the UN Security Council. This

issue of the Amateur Computerist is published as a

tribute to the special contribution he made, in particu-

lar to the activities of the Security Council, and in

general to the United Nations over this period.

The issue has two parts. The first part is a

selection of articles that appeared first in OhmyNews

International until 2010 and then on the netizenblog,

blogs.taz.de/netizenblog. These articles provide a

small sample of the day-to-day activities in the

Security Council and the role of Ambassador Churkin

in such day-to-day activities.

It was in observing such daily happenings that

one could only but admire Ambassador Churkin’s

skill as a diplomat presenting the principles that

guided his actions rather than, as some of the other

members of the Security Council, stooping to vitriol

and personal attacks in response to disagreements

among the diplomats.

The second part of the issue presents comments

from some of the Ambassador’s colleagues presented

as a part of the Security Council meeting held on

February 21, 2017 in response to the passing of their

colleague.

While a number of the Ambassadors who

attended this Security Council meeting offered some

comment, we have only included in this issue those

comments which expressed something in addition to

condolences to the family or colleagues in the mis-

sion. The comments presented at this meeting demon-

strated the high regard with which Ambassador

Churkin was held by many of his colleagues.

Our editor, Ronda Hauben has a special reason

to express gratitude for the presence of Ambassador

Churkin at the UN. Her accreditation to cover the UN

began approximately six months after Ambassador

Churkin began his presence at the UN. Thus she had

the privilege of learning from him that diplomacy is

both a skill and an art. He was a master of both. While

others may have had the ability to garner more votes

for a resolution when there was disagreement among

the five permanent representatives, Ambassador

Churkin had the ability to explain the rationale of his

vote and thus to defend the fact it was within the

scope of the charter to exercise a veto on the particu-

lar issue. On the other hand, those forcing a vote

when they were aware there was not yet agreement on

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Page 1

the text they were promoting, demonstrated their own

failure to work toward a text all permanent members

could support.

Ambassador Churkin will be missed by many of

those who were privileged to be at the UN during the

10 years he enriched the scope of the discussion and

debate. He demonstrated by his deeds the importance

of respecting the different viewpoints represented on

the Security Council while representing your own

national position.

It is with a heavy heart that we say we will miss

Ambassador Churkin. We can only hope that some of

Ambassador Churkin’s skill and art of diplomacy will

somehow be passed on and mastered by others. This

has the potential to set the basis for a more peaceful

world.

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Aug. 23, 2008 at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.as

p?no=383465&rel_no=1]

Georgia: Resolutions Spark

Controversy

Online Discussion Reflects Vigilance

Over Georgian, Russian, NATO

Actions

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

The Russian ambassador to the United Nations

told journalists that the resolution he proposed to the

Security Council has been put in blue so that it could

be voted on. This resolution is one of two contending

draft resolutions put before the Security Council in

the controversy in the council over Georgia and South

Ossetia. Once a Security Council resolution has been

put into this form, it can be put to a vote of the Secu-

rity Council after 24 hours.

While the controversy that exists inside the

council is being reflected in some degree in the

international mainstream media, the manifestation of

it is even more remarkably demonstrated in the

netizen media of online discussions and commentary,

blogs and online media of many varieties. (See for

example, the blog vineyardsaker [

http://thesaker.is/]

or the commentary on [http://www.digitaljournal.

com/]. These were just two examples of many

thoughtful blogs where analyses and substantial

online discussion filled the Internet on this issue.)

The public presentation of competing resolu-

tions is relatively unusual with respect to Security

Council activity. While there are often differences

among the delegates, such differences are less often

presented in public proceeding. Instead, a form of

scripted activity agreed to in advance more regularly

takes place, especially when public action is taken on

resolutions.

Also, it is not so common that Security Council

activity is the subject of netizen discussion and

commentary. To have public scrutiny of Security

Council controversy sets a basis for the delegates to

treat their actions with more consideration of the

public concerns than is often obvious.

The Russian resolution presented to the Security

Council on Tuesday refers to the six points of the

cease-fire agreement that was signed between Georgia

and of Russia.

Following is the text of the resolution

the Russian delegation submitted to the Security

Council on Tuesday and announced to be put in blue

on Wednesday:

The Russian Federation Draft Resolu-

tion

The Security Council, Recalling all its previous

relevant resolutions,

1. Endorses the following plan agreed in Moscow on

August 12, 2008:

President of the Russian Federation Dmitry

Medvedev and President of the Republic of France

Nicolas Sarkozy support the following principles of

resolving the conflicts and call on the parties con-

cerned to adhere to these principles:

a) do not resort to the use of force;

b) definitive cessation of hostilities;

c) free access to humanitarian aid;

d) withdrawal of the Georgian forces to their perma-

nent bases;

e) withdrawal of the Russian Federation forces to the

line prior to the beginning of hostilities; pending the

establishment of international mechanisms the Rus-

sian peacekeeping forces take additional security

measures;

f) opening of international discussion of lasting

security and stability arrangements for South Ossetia

and Abkhazia.

Page 2

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to implement the

abovementioned plan in good faith.

The French Draft Resolution

A French draft resolution, which had been presented

to the council on Monday, relates to two of the items

from the six principles, rephrased, and adds the issue

of support for the territorial integrity of Georgia as the

essential focus.

The resolution states:

The Security Council, Recalling all its previous

resolutions on Georgia, including resolution 1808 of

15 April 2008 (S/RES/1808); and reaffirming in this

context the commitment of all Member States to the

sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of

Georgia within its internationally recognized borders;

1. Demands full and immediate compliance with the

cease-fire agreement to which the parties have sub-

scribed;

2. Demands the immediate withdrawal of Russian

forces to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostili-

ties, and the return of Georgian forces to their usual

bases;

3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

(“TEXT-Draft U.N. Security Council resolution on Georgia,”

Reuters, Aug. 19, 2008)

Some Security Council Delegates Ex-

plain Their Positions

Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the

UN, talking to journalists about the draft resolution

submitted by Russia, explained that it is important to

have the UN Security Council play a constructive role

in the process of implementing the peace framework

signed by Georgia and Russia. He said that he had

presented the draft resolution to the French Ambassa-

dor several days earlier and had not heard any vehe-

ment objections to it (Vitaly Churkin on the situation

in Georgia, Stakeout, Aug. 20).

Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the deputy representative

from France to the UN, said that the draft resolution

submitted to the council by France limited itself to

two elements from the six principles of the agreement

because the Security Council will have a number of

issues to deal with and should be looking at the

priorities, the first of which is the withdrawal of

Russian forces from Georgia (Jean-Pierre Lacroix,

Stakeout, Aug. 20).

The deputy representative to the Security

Council from the U.S., Alejandro Wolff, describing

his support for the French resolution and objection to

the Russian, focused on asking what the Russian

intentions are with regard to Georgia (Alejandro

Wolff, Stakeout, Aug. 20).

At the public meeting of the council held on

Tuesday to consider what to do about the Georgia

situation, the council members who are also members

of NATO spoke in favor of the proposed French draft

resolution. The Russian ambassador explained his

problems with the proposed resolution.

The only other council member to speak was the

ambassador from Costa Rica, Jorge Urbina. He said

that the situation should not be viewed as a European

issue or as one that concerns “only the great economic

and military powers.” Although he said that the

smallest states of the UN also were concerned about

what was happening, he didn’t express any viewpoint

toward the French draft resolution or the six-point

agreement between Russia and Georgia (see meeting

notes from Security Council Aug. 19 meeting,

S/PV.5961).

Georgia’s actions

on Aug. 7 in first calling a

truce and then sending its troops to attack Tskhinvali,

the capital of South Ossetia, would seem difficult to

understand outside of the context of its aspirations to

join NATO. The existence of its regions that have

declared their autonomy was, according to some news

reports, given as one reason for the objections to its

request for membership.

Some analyses argue that Georgia gambled that

if it was able to defeat the South Ossetians by a

military attack on Tskhinvali, that would have re-

moved one of the objections to Georgia’s admission

to NATO. A problem with such reasoning, however,

is that the history of the Ossetian struggle for inde-

pendence from Georgia demonstrates that military

means cannot be a way to solve the controversy over

the autonomy issue for South Ossetia.

Such analyses propose that the Georgian assault

was based on a strategy that even if the military attack

failed, it would provoke Russia to respond militarily

and that would solicit support for Georgia’s bid to be

part of NATO.

While the struggle goes on at the Security

Council, an even more fierce battle is raging between

the mainstream Western media and the online netizen

journalism. This issue has solicited many responses

from people around the world. Some of the responses

refer to the media campaign the U.S. government

waged to create a pretext to invade Iraq as the reason

Page 3

netizens must be vigilant with respect to the coverage

by the mainstream Western media of the conflict.

One such comment advised Russia to support

online discussion and commentary in response to

Western mainstream media views and misrepresenta-

tions. This is proposed to be as important as any other

new military defense.

Notes

1. The Six Principles in the Agreement Signed by Russia and

Georgia are as follows, with additions Sarkozy made after the

signing:

1. No recourse to use violence between the protagonists.

Sarkozy: This applies to everyone: Ossetians,

Abkhazians, Georgia in its entirety and Russians.

2. The cessation of hostilities.

3. The granting of access to humanitarian aid.

4. The return of Georgian armed forces to their usual

quarters.

5. Russian armed forces to withdraw to the positions held

before hostilities began in South Ossetia. Russian peace-

keepers to implement additional security measures until

an international monitoring mechanism is in place.

Sarkozy: These measures affect only the immediate

vicinity of South Ossetia and in no instance the entire

territory of Georgia.

6. The opening of international discussions on the modali-

ties of security and stability of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia. (

Deutsche Presse Agentur [DPA])

2. See the blog by an R T journalist sent to report on Tskhinvali

on Aug. 8: Mikehalid Lebedev Blog

http://www.russiatoday.

com/features/news/29163 See also the meeting of the Security

Council early on Aug. 8 about Georgia’s military action against

South Ossetia

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/

article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=383370&rel_no=1

3. One such analysis is contained in an Opinion article in the

Moscow Times on Aug. 13. A similar analysis is offered by

Mikhail Gorbachev in an op-ed “Russia Never Wanted a War”

published in the New York Times on Aug. 20, 2008

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/opinion/20gorbachev.html.

An earlier version of this article appears on my blog, netizenblog

a t :

h t t p : / / b l o g s . t a z . d e / ne t iz en b lo g/ 2 0 0 8 / 0 8 / 2 1 /

contending_draft_resolutions_on_georgia_before_the_un_secu

rity_council/

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Dec. 19, 2010 at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/12/19/securityc

ouncil_korean_tension/]

Can the Security Council Act

to Calm Rising Tension on

Korean Peninsula?

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

In a statement to the press issued early Saturday

evening, December 18, Vitaly Churkin, the Russian

Ambassador explains that “This morning (Saturday

morning) I sent a letter to the current President of the

Security Council – the delegation of the United States

requesting an emergency meeting of the Council be

called on the situation in the Korean peninsula.”

He explains that he took this action because,

“We believe that the Security Council must send a

restraining signal to the Republic of Korea (South

Korea) and the DPRK (North Korea) and help launch

diplomatic activity with a view to resolving all issues

of dispute between the two Korean sides by political

and diplomatic means.”

Rule 2 of the Security Council’s Provisional

Rules of Procedure, states that:

“The President shall call a meeting of the Security

Council at the request of any member of the Security

Council.”

No meeting of the Security Council took place

on Saturday in response to Churkin’s request.

Churkin’s statement explains that, “the President of

the Security Council declined to convene such a

meeting today (Saturday). We regret that.”

He maintains that “such a step by the President is a

departure from the practice existing in the Council.”

In his statement, Churkin indicates that the U.S.

delegation had promised that there would be a meet-

ing of the Council convened on Sunday, December 19

at 11 a.m. (N.Y. time), and that information about the

Security Council meeting would be circulated to

members of the Council, the UN Secretariat and the

media.

“We assume that nothing will happen in the

interim that would bring about a further aggravation

on the Korean peninsula,” said Churkin in his state-

ment to the press.

Page 4

The notice from the Secretariat to journalists

about a Sunday meeting of the Security Council,

however, indicated only that closed “consultations

would be held at 11 a.m. on Sunday December 18,

with a view to a formal meeting.”

The U.S. government has been encouraging

South Korea to carry out a live fire drill in the con-

tested waters of the West Sea. This is an area that the

two Koreas have previously recognized needs to be

treated as a peace zone because it is a particularly

dangerous site where hostilities between the two

Koreas can easily break out.

Calling for live fire drills in these waters is

creating what Bill Richardson, the Governor of New

Mexico and a long time envoy to North Korea calls a

“tinderbox.”

In a statement released by his office late Satur-

day night, Richardson said:

“I hope that the U.N. Security Council will pass a

strong resolution calling for self-restraint from all

sides in order to seek peaceful means to resolve this

dispute.”

Supporting the need for Security Council action

to help lessen the tension, Richardson said:

“A U.N. resolution could provide cover for all sides

that prevents aggressive military action.”

A draft press statement that is being proposed

by the Russian Ambassador to the Security Council,

which was made available to a UN correspondent

would “stress the need” to “de-escalate” tension in the

relations between North Korea and South Korea.

would call for “a resumption of dialogue and the

resolution of all problems….”

Also the press draft requests that the Secretary-

General dispatch a special representative to North

Korea and South Korea “to consult on urgent matters

and to settle peacefully the crisis….” In February

2010 the Secretary-General had sent a four person

delegation from his office to consult with North

Korea. Reporting back to the press from that trip, one

of the envoys explained that among the issues raised

were how to phrase the disagreements in a way that it

recognized the interests of the different parties to the

controversy and what sequence was acceptable to take

up the problems.

In a situation where there is a danger of a new

Korean war, can the Security Council act to make a

difference?

Notes:

1. Statement by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent

Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, Saturday,

Dec. 18, 2010 at 6:21 p.m. E-mail to press.

2. Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council.

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/scrules.htm

3. Ronda Hauben, “Escalating Tension on the Korean Peninsula

and the Role of the UN,” taz.de, November 29, 2010.

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/11/29/escalating_tension_

korea/

4. Colum Lynch, “Russia Presses for UN Role in Mediating

Crisis in the Koreas,” Saturday, December 18, 2010.

http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/blog/16159

5. “Security Council to Meet as S. Korea set on Exercise,” The

Boston Globe, Sunday, December 19, 2010

http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/12/19/s

ecurity_council_to_meet_as_skorea_set_on_exercise/?rss_id=

Boston.com+%2F+Boston+Globe+–+World+News

6. Ronda Hauben, “UN-North Korean Talks Hint at a Peace

Treaty on the Korean Peninsula,” Global Times, February 21,

2010.

http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2010-02/506799.html

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Jan. 17, 2011 at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/01/17/un_sc_m

tg_dec_19_korea/]

UN Security Council Helped

Calm Tension on Korean

Peninsula

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

One of the most perilous situations of the past

year was the conflict on the Korean Peninsula that

was brought to the UN Security Council in what was

the last week of its 2010 session.

On Saturday December 18, Vitaly Churkin, the

Russian Federation Ambassador to the UN, requested

an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to

be held on Saturday.

In what Ambassador Churkin called “a depar-

ture from the practice of the Council,” the U.S.

ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, as President of the

Security Council for the month of December, declined

to hold a meeting until the following day.

Instead she

scheduled consultations to start at 11 a.m. on Sunday,

December 19, with a view to the possibility of hold-

ing a formal meeting later in the day.

Page 5

On Sunday, 50 or more journalists gathered at

the stakeout outside the UN Security Council. Ambas-

sadors and other representatives of the 15 nations on

the council gradually filtered into the Security Coun-

cil chambers. Also arriving were representatives of

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North

Korea), of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and

B. Lynn Pasco, Under-Secretary-General for Political

Affairs.

U.S. Ambassador Rice, acting as the President

of the Council for December, arrived at around 11:20

a.m.

The Security Council members held bi-laterals,

closed consultations, took a short lunch break, and

had a closed meeting as part of its emergency session.

Little actual information was provided to

journalists waiting in the press stakeout area about

what was happening. The emergency session came to

a close, approximately eight hours after it had begun.

When the emergency session was over, Ambassador

Churkin came to the press stakeout to report to

journalists. He said that council members had failed

to reach the unanimous agreement needed to issue a

press statement. The draft press statement the Russian

Federation had proposed had been revised at least

twice, but still did not achieve the unanimous agree-

ment needed to issue it as a document from the

Council.

In the draft press statement, the Russian Federa-

tion urged the two Koreas to show restraint in their

actions. Also the draft proposed that Secretary-Gen-

eral Ban Ki-moon appoint an envoy to help the two

Koreas to peacefully resolve the problems causing the

current crisis situation. The blog “Turtle Bay” re-

ported obtaining a copy of the original Russian

Federation draft statement.

Here is the reported draft

posted on the blog:

The Members of the Security Council

have considered in an emergency meeting

of the Council on 18 December 2010 a

dangerous aggravation of the situation in

the Korean peninsula. They heard a brief-

ing by _____________________.

The Members of the Security Council

called upon all parties concerned to exer-

cise maximum restraint and to avoid any

steps which could cause a further escala-

tion of tension in the Korean peninsula

and the entire region.

The Members of the Security Council

stressed the need to undertake efforts to

ensure a de-escalation of tension in the

relations between the Republic of Korea

and the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea, resumption of dialogue and resolu-

tion of all problems dividing them exclu-

sively through peaceful diplomatic means.

The Members of the Security Council

requested the Secretary-General of the

United Nations to dispatch without delay

his special representative to the Republic

of Korea and the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea to consult on urgent

measures to settle peacefully the current

crisis situation in the Korean peninsula.

The Members of the Security Council also

requested the Secretary-General of the

United Nations to stay in close coordina-

tion with other countries concerned in this

regard.

In response to objections raised by some of the

other Council members, Ambassador Churkin told

journalists he had revised the statement. The blog

Inner City Press reported that in one of the revised

drafts, Ambassador Churkin, the Chinese representa-

tive, and others on the Security Council had agreed to

wording that said that the members of the Security

Council “condemned the shelling” of 23 November

2010.

The draft did not attribute blame for the

shelling, reflecting the fact that both sides had done

shelling.

The Council, however, was not able to come to

an agreement on the text. Ambassador Churkin

expressed his regret that the emergency meeting had

not been called on Saturday afternoon as he had

requested. He felt that would have provided more

time for Council members to work out wording they

could all agree on.

In response to a question to him from a journal-

ist about the danger of what was happening on the

Korean Peninsula, Ambassador Churkin responded

As you know, I don’t even want to go into

the general subject…. I know its very

complicated. This area has very compli-

cated geography, very complicated geo-

political history if you will.

I don’t even want to go into the general

issue of whether or not it is prudent to

conduct military exercises in a disputed

area, but we know it is better to refrain

Page 6

from doing this exercise at this time. That

is why we asked the Republic of Korea to

refrain from conducting this exercise at

this particular time.

Ambassador Churkin stressed the seriousness of

the situation. Also he explained that there appeared to

have been general agreement among council members

for his proposal that the Secretary-General appoint an

envoy to work with the two Koreas and other in-

volved countries to negotiate a means to settle the

disputes causing the crisis situation. Ambassador

Churkin stressed the importance of the Secretary-

General appointing an envoy, especially since some

of the parties were not willing to go back to the six

party talks. Thus there was no other means for a

diplomatic process to be implemented, “no game

plan.”

Despite the fact that the Council had not come

to agree on a press statement which also would have

supported the appointment of an envoy, Ambassador

Churkin expressed his hope that the Secretary-Gen-

eral would go ahead and appoint an envoy. Also he

expressed his hope that the Security Council consulta-

tions and meeting, even though it hadn’t reached an

agreement on a press statement, would have an

impact to lower the tension in the region.

A little while later, Ambassador Rice came to

the stakeout. Though she held the rotating presidency

of the Security Council for December, she only spoke

in her national capacity presenting the views of the

U.S. on the issue. She indicated that the U.S. insisted

on a “clear-cut condemnation of the November 23

attack by DPRK on the ROK,” but that there was no

“unanimity on that point” among members of the

Security Council.

When Ambassador Rice was asked about the

proposal to ask the Secretary-General to appoint an

envoy, she responded

I think there would have been probably

room for agreement in some form of

recommendation that the Secretary-Gen-

eral consider what he might be able to do

in his good offices capacity.

The next day, Monday, December 20, Wang

Min, the Chinese deputy Permanent Representative

spoke to the press at a stakeout. He said, “Yesterday,

China supported Russia’s proposal to call for an

urgent meeting of the Security Council (on) the

situation in the Korean Peninsula…. The meeting was

positive and of great importance.”

Also on this Monday, South Korea held its

military exercise firing into the contested waters.

North Korea refrained from responding militarily.

On Tuesday December 21, at an informal

meeting of the Security Council, Ambassador Wang,

expressed his view of the seriousness of the situation

that had developed on the Korean Peninsula. He said

that the tension on the Korean Peninsula between the

North and South had been very high “especially in the

past two days it came close to fighting a war.”

At the noon briefing held on Monday, Decem-

ber 20, the day following the emergency Security

Council meeting, journalists asked Farhan Haq, the

Acting Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-

General, about the possibility of an envoy being sent

to the Korean Peninsula by the Secretary-General.

Despite the unanimity expressed at the emergency

Security Council session about the Secretary-General

appointing an envoy, the idea met with reluctance on

the part of the spokesperson for the Secretary-Gen-

eral. Following is an excerpt from the press confer-

ence on December 20 with the deputy spokesperson

for the Secretary-General

Question: (Y)esterday in this all-day

Security Council meeting about DPRK

[Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]

or the Korean peninsula, both Ambassador

[Vitaly] Churkin, Ambassador [Susan]

Rice and they both seemed to say that all

15 members were supportive of the idea

of the Secretary-General naming a Special

Envoy to the Korean peninsula. They

didn’t end up adopting a statement be-

cause of disputes about who to blame or

who to condemn. But is it something that,

I guess…what does the Secretary-General

think of that idea and is he actually going

to name an envoy?

Acting Deputy Spokesperson: Well, first

of all, the Secretary-General did send Mr.

[B. Lynn] Pascoe earlier this year to the

Korean peninsula, and so he has already

taken some initiative regarding efforts to

deal with the question of good offices in

the Korean peninsula itself. However, in

terms of appointing an envoy, what we are

doing at this stage is waiting to see what

kind of unified decision, if any, the Secu-

rity Council can take on the question of

the Korean peninsula. As you yourself

Page 7

pointed out just now, they didn’t come to

any decision yesterday, and I don’t know

whether there will be a statement by the

Security Council. But if there is one, we

would respond to that.

Question: But there is…I guess the ques-

tion was asked of Ambassador Churkin

whether he thought that the Secretary-

General should go forward. In the sense

of, are you saying that you can only go

forward if you have some kind of press

statement or do the statements of the

President of the Council saying….

Acting Deputy Spokesperson: No, no, as

I pointed out, Mr. Pascoe went, I believe

in February of this year, as it was. So, it’s

not dependent on action by the Security

Council. However, in this case, the Secu-

rity Council had been working out differ-

ent types of language, and we would wait

to see what it is that they have to say

before responding to it.

Question: So has Secretary-General com-

pletely ruled out appointing a Special

Envoy for DPRK?

Acting Deputy Spokesperson: No, it’s

just fitting at this stage for a matter that’s

under consideration by the Security Coun-

cil for us to wait to see what it is, what

decision that they come to. Yes, Khaled?

Question: What we’re saying is that what

is under consideration by the Council and

the statement, and concerning, as you

know, Matthew said, who is to blame and

who is to condemn, but both Mr. Churkin

and Mrs. Rice said yesterday there was

agreement on the need for an envoy, dif-

ferent from the task taken by Mr. Pascoe

in February. So, what does the Secretary-

General feel about that?

Acting Deputy Spokesperson: Well, if

there is an agreement among Council

members, we are sure that that can mani-

fest itself in a unified position taken by

the Security Council and we’d await that.

Question: But he said he (the Security

Council -ed) had a unified position on the

envoy, but not on the condemnation issue.

That’s what he said.

Acting Deputy Spokesperson: Well, like

I said, if they can agree on any particular

point, we would await that particular

agreement and respond in kind.

This reluctance to appoint an envoy for the

Korean Peninsula expressed by the Secretary-Gen-

eral’s Deputy Spokesman could be considered all the

more surprising when taking into account an inter-

view with Ban Ki-moon in November 2006 after Ban

Ki-moon was chosen to be the UN Secretary-General

(for the 2007-2011 term). In the interview published

in the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh, Ban said that

once he was Secretary-General, he would appoint an

envoy to help to resolve the tension on the Korean

Peninsula. The Deputy Spokesman for the Secretary-

General, however, now responding to questions from

journalists, said that Ban would wait for the Security

Council to take action on the issue of the envoy.

Following is an excerpt from the November 2006

interview with Ban Ki moon. Professor Moon Chung-

in of Yonsei University is asking the questions for

Hankyoreh

Q: It is unfortunate that the North Korean

nuclear situation has worsened, despite

your will to resolve it as the Foreign Min-

ister. The North Korean nuclear issue is

not one limited to the Korean Peninsula or

North Korea, but rather is a global issue

and one of importance to the UN. Are you

stressing this resolution of this issue as

Secretary-General only because you could

not resolve it as Foreign Minister?

A: Secretary-General Kofi Annan also

carried a large interest in [resolving] the

North Korean issue and appointed a spe-

cial envoy to North Korea, but he could

not set foot in the country during his 10-

year tenure. As for Special Envoy to

North Korea Maurice Strong, he was

implicated in an unsavory affair and re-

signed midway through his term. I will

appoint a politician or diplomat with the

confidence of the international commu-

nity, someone who has the trust of both

North and South Korea to actively push

the issue forward. The envoy must be one

to impel the six-party talks to action when

they stagnate, and must be prepared to

play a direct role when necessary. I am

even ready to intervene directly when

intervention is called for.

Page 8

Q: The UN created the North South

cease-fire agreement. Although both

Koreas, the U.S.’s and China’s roles are

important in transforming the cease-fire

regime into a peaceful order, the UN must

participate to reach a legal and systematic

conclusion. What plans do you have to

spur the creation of a peaceful order?

A: Fundamentally, this issue must be

discussed between the U.S. and North

Korea, but the UN must decide how to

help as it is inextricably linked with the

problem, and UN specialists must come to

an agreement.

Under Article 99 of the UN Charter, the

Secretary-General has the ability to act in situations

where there is a danger to international peace and

security

. He can ask the Security Council to act in a

situation. Hence it is all the more surprising that

Secretary-General Ban would insist on waiting for the

Security Council to act, when it is his prerogative

under the UN Charter to ask the Security Council to

act. Similarly, he has the ability in what is referred to

as “his good offices” to send an envoy to help to

resolve tension in a volatile situation, an action Ban

has taken with other situations, but which he has not

taken with regard to the escalating tension on the

Korean Peninsula. As the Deputy Spokesman noted,

Ban did send some of his staff to Pyongyang in

February 2010, so he recognizes he is not dependent

on the Security Council to undertake a peace initia-

tive.

Yet in the four years of his tenure thus far as

UN Secretary-General, he has not yet acted on the

commitment he made in November 2006 to appoint

an envoy to engage in efforts to resolve the tension on

the Korean Peninsula.

Despite the fact that the Security Council did

not issue a press statement, and the fact the Secretary-

General has not appointed an envoy, the actions by

Ambassador Churkin on behalf of the Russian Feder-

ation and others on the Security Council did succeed

in bringing international public attention to the crisis

situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Ambassador Churkin took the initiative to

request an emergency meeting of the Security Council

to ask South Korea to refrain from its planned firing

drill on the contested waters surrounding Yeonpyeong

Island, and to ask North Korea to refrain from re-

sponding.

Both the Chinese and Russian foreign ministries

sent representatives to both North and South Korea to

urge them to settle their disputes via dialogue.

Also a number of articles appeared in the

English language Chinese press on the crisis situation,

some of which were critical of the provocative actions

taken by South Korea and of the U.S. government for

encouraging such actions.

As Ambassador Churkin told journalists after

the December 19 Security Council meeting, “I would

like to think that this meeting of the Council will have

an impact on the situation.”

Looking at the subsequent events, it appears that

indeed the fact that the Security Council held an

emergency session on December 19 did help to

support a process to calm the escalating tension on the

Korean Peninsula, at least temporarily.

Notes

1.Ronda Hauben, “Can the Security Council Act to Calm Rising

Tension on Korean Peninsula?,” Dec 19, 2010, blog at taz.de

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/12/19/securitycouncil_kor

ean_tension/

2. Churkin refers to Rule 2 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure

for the Security Council as the basis for expecting the Security

Council to be called to meet on Saturday in response to his

request. Rule 2 reads: “The President shall call a meeting of the

Security Council at the request of any member of the Security

Council.”

http://www.un.org/doc/sc/scrules.htm

3. Turtle Bay blog, December 18, 2010

http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/18/russia_pus

hes_deeper_un_role_in_mediating_crisis_in_the_koreas

4. Inner City Press, December 20, 2011.

http://www.innercitypress.com/usun5ruskor122010.html

5. Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian

Federation to the United Nations, at a Media Stakeout on the

Situation on the Korean Peninsula, 19 December 2010, (start

06:14)

http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/russian-

federation-representative-vitaly-churkin-security-council-media-

stakeout.html

6. Remarks by President of the Security Council, Ambassador

Susan E. Rice, United States Permanent Representative, at a

Media Stakeout on the Situation on the Korean Peninsula, 19

December 2010

http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/united-states-

representative-susan-rice-security-council-media-stakeout.html

7. Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of

the People’s Republic of China, at a Media Stakeout on the

Situation on the Korean Peninsula, 20 December 2010

http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/12/wang-min-

representative-of-the-democratic-republic-of-china-security-

council-media-stakeout.html

8. “Commentary: Applause for North Korea’s restraint,” Global

Times, December 22, 2010

Page 9

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7238754.html

9. “Korea Tensions came close to ‘war’,” said China Diplomat,

December 22, 2010,

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/

1100526/1/.html

10.“Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for

the Secretary-General,” Farhan Haq, Acting Deputy Spokesper-

son for the Secretary-General, UN, December 20, 2010.

http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/db101220.doc.htm

11. ”[Interview] Next UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon,”

Interviewer Moon Chung-in, Hankyoreh, November 3, 2006,

translated into English by Daniel Rakov.

http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=169339

12. “The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the

Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten

the maintenance of international peace and security,” Article 99,

UN Charter

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter15.shtml

13. Ronda Hauben, “UN-North Korea talks hint at a peace treaty

on the Korean Peninsula,” Global Times, February 21, 2010

http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2010-02/506799.html

14. See for example: “S. Korea playing by dangerous cliff,”

Editorial, Global Times, December 23, 2010.

http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-12/603638.html

“Korean brothers advised not to go to war game,” People’s Daily

Online, December 21, 2010.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/723810

8.html

L. Hongmei, “U.S., insidious harm to Korean Peninsula,”

People’s Daily Online, December 21, 2010.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/7238362.html

“New ROK drills add to tension on peninsula,” People’s Daily

Online, December 27, 2010

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/724272

1.html

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Dec. 14, 2011 at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/12/14/lessons-f

rom-unscr-1973-on-libya/]

Lessons from UN Security

Council Implementation of

Resolution 1973 on Libya

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

I – Introduction

As is customary, a press conference was held by

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin to mark the beginning of

the Russian Federation’s Presidency of the Security

Council for the month of December 2011. Ambassa-

dor Churkin’s comments in this press conference

provide insight into an important problem in the

structure of the Security Council that became evident

in the course of the implementation of the Security

Council resolutions against Libya.

The press conference was held on December 2.

There is video of the press conference for those who

are interested in viewing the conference itself.

Though other issues were brought up, many of

the questions asked by journalists related to the

Russian Federation’s views concerning Security

Council action on Libya and Syria.

II – Critique of Implementation of SCR

1973 on Libya

During the press conference Ambassador

Churkin revealed that NATO had been asked for a

“final report…summing up their view of their com-

plying or not complying, of performing or not per-

forming under the resolutions of the Security Coun-

cil.” But no summary had been received from NATO.

Ambassador Churkin said it was his understanding

that NATO was not planning to send the Security

Council any summary.

The importance of this revelation is that during

its military action against Libya, NATO claimed it

was acting under the authorization of UNSC Resolu-

tion 1973 (SCR 1973). Yet when asked to provide the

Security Council with an evaluation of how its Libyan

campaign complied with the actual resolution, appar-

ently NATO did not see itself as being held account-

able to the Security Council.

This situation reinforces the observation made

by some inside and others outside the Council.

The

Council passed SCR 1973, but it had no means of

monitoring or controlling how this resolution was

implemented. Thus the implementation of this Secu-

rity Council resolution on Libya reveals a serious flaw

in the structure of the Council itself.

Some members maintained that the resolution

called for a cease fire and political settlement of the

conflict in Libya.

Other Security Council members began bomb-

ing Libyan targets, and brought NATO in to carry out

a bombing campaign against military, civilian and

infrastructure targets in Libya. Ironically, NATO

claimed such bombing was about the protection of

civilians.

Similarly a self appointed “Contact Group”

on Libya set as its goal, regime change in Libya.

Page 10

Members of the Security Council who expressed

opposition to these activities, arguing they were

contrary to SCR 1973, had no means to stop such

usurpation of Security Council control over the

implementation of the resolution.

The December 2 press conference with Ambas-

sador Churkin helped to illustrate and examine this

problem.

In an earlier Security Council meeting, Brazil

had indicated it was planning to do a concept paper on

the “responsibility while protecting” under the Re-

sponsibility to Protect (R2P) concept.

Brazil’s two

year term on the Security Council will be over at the

end of December, but no such concept paper has yet

been presented. When Churkin was asked what he

could tell journalists about the progress on this paper,

he said, “My understanding is that it is going to be a

serious process, a fundamental process of revisiting

those things.”

On the issue of the Security Council’s summary

of what had happened in the course of implementing

Resolution 1973 against Libya, Ambassador Churkin

explained the dilemma this posed for the Council.“As

to lessons learned, this is a much broader issue which

unfortunately I think we cannot put together as

council members. It is something for round tables,

academics, politicians to discuss in various flora. We

discussed that. We have had a number of discussions

of the various lessons we have learned, and the things

we need to do or not to do.”

He recommended looking back at the Security

Council meetings held in open chambers, particularly

at the statements he had made in his capacity as the

Russian Federation Permanent Representative. “I

minced no words about some of the conclusions that

need to be drawn from our Libyan experience,” he

said, “But I am sure the Libyan experience is some-

thing that will have an impact of such importance that

this will be a subject of attention for years to come.”

Asked whether the Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) concept had been misused by the Security

Council, Ambassador Churkin responded, “This is a

very dangerous thing.” This was not only the view of

his delegation, but also of others both on the council

and outside of the council, he explained.

“That is something that makes the life and work

on the Security Council very difficult because words

are no longer what they used to be. They have differ-

ent meanings,” he said, offering as an example the

implementation of the No Fly Zone on Libya con-

tained in SCR 1973.

He described how, “No Fly Zone in the good old

world, used to mean that nobody’s flying. That you

prevent aircraft from being used against civilians.”

“In the brave new world,” though, said Churkin,

“No Fly Zone means freewheeling bombing of the

targets you choose to bomb in whatever modality and

mode you want to bomb. Close air support ok. Bomb-

ing a television station, OK. And that is a matter of

grave concern.”

The significance of there being such a big

difference in how words are being used, Churkin

explained, was that, “Now we have to think not only

about the words and concepts, but about the enormous

ability of some of our colleagues to interpret the

world out of them. And this is a very serious issue.”

“We need to return to the Council, to our inter-

action and cooperation with our colleagues, a clear

understanding of what we mean,” maintained

Churkin.

Demonstrating the significance of this discrep-

ancy between how different members of the Council

interpreted the words of resolutions, Churkin pointed

out that in the case of Libya, there had been reports

that the Gaddafi regime was using airplanes to bomb

civilians. (But no evidence was ever presented to

support these claims, at the time, or since.-ed)

There were, however, no such reports about

Syria. How then could there be “such uncritical

enthusiasm” for setting up a No Fly Zone for Syria,

Churkin wondered. Where was this enthusiasm

coming from?

“Is it,” he asked, “an indication that in fact when

they are saying that they don’t plan any military

action (against Syria-ed), they don’t really mean it?

When they talk about a no fly zone, they are already

planning targets to bomb in Syria?”

Referring to the implication of this problem,

Churkin noted, “On various issues which can have

dramatic repercussions for regions and countries, and

unfortunately this is clearly the case about Syria and

about Iran and about some other issues, so it is not a

perfect day for diplomacy, a perfect day to work in

the Security Council.”

III – Security Council Action Against Syria

In response to several questions from journalists

asking about the Russian Federation’s view of what

action was appropriate with respect to Syria, Churkin

explained the principles that should guide such action.

Page 11

“We think it’s the role of the international

community to try to help resolve internal crises by

promoting dialogue,” Churkin told journalists, “This

is what we have been doing with our contacts with the

Syrian authorities, opposition, and the Arab League.”

Referring to the proposal of the Arab League to

conduct a monitoring mission in Syria, he explained,

“We think that the Arab League has a unique opportu-

nity to play a constructive role in Syria.”

This required, however, that the Arab League be

willing to consider Syria’s proposed amendments to

the Arab League proposal, rather than just offering

Syria an ultimatum that it had to accept the Arab

League proposal with no negotiations over it, said

Churkin.

“We think the Syrian government’s proposed

amendments to that plan could have been consid-

ered,” he explained. “Personally I looked at the two

texts. I haven’t seen in the texts anything which

couldn’t have been bridged there with some negotia-

tions on the modalities of the deployment of that

mission.”

Concerned that, “this opportunity to really

mediate between the government and the opposition

is not lost,” Churkin proposed that the Arab League

economic sanctions imposed on Syria were “counter-

productive.”

Comparing Security Council action on Syria

with its action on Yemen, Churkin said that Russia

was able to “exercise our position of principle” in

Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011) about

Yemen, “by encouraging dialogue and political

accommodation on the basis of the Gulf States initia-

tive.”

In the case of Yemen, Churkin noted, the

Security Council and the international community had

rallied in support of the action that Russia proposed.

But when it came to Syria, he described how

Russia and China had proposed a resolution that “had

many of the same elements which were contained in

the resolution which was adopted on…Yemen.” In the

case of Syria, however, the Russian-Chinese spon-

sored Resolution, was not supported by several other

members of the Council.

“So I think in Yemen the international commu-

nity can be proud that even in a situation with blood-

shed and very serious conflict in a country we were

giving a strong signal in favor of dialogue and of

political accommodation and this is what we

achieved,” said Churkin.

“What we don’t understand,” he noted, “is why

if that can be done in Yemen, why that can’t apply to

Syria.”

Furthermore, in the case of Syria, he said, the

Security Council met with opposition from some of

the capitals, to any form of dialogue to resolve the

Syrian conflict. The governments opposed to dia-

logue, he reported, took the position that there was,

“no way dialogue can help. That those who go into

dialogue they should stop it immediately,” and that

“there is no future in the Arab League initiative.”

Such action is, he proposed “something very

counterproductive. And this is something that has

acerbated the situation in Syria.”

While maintaining that there is “no prescription

for different countries” since they are all structured

differently with regard to their traditions and political

set up, Churkin proposed that there is a general

attitude and principles that can be applied in a general

way. This is that “the international community is not

there to smell blood and to fan confrontation. But the

international community is there to prevent further

bloodshed and to encourage dialogue.”

Reflecting on the importance of such an interna-

tional effort in favor of domestic dialogue, Churkin

said, “This is what the United Nations is all about.

This is what the Security Council is about.”

IV – Concerns about Libya

With respect to Gaddafi, Churkin said members

of the council, including Russia, thought that what

happened to Gaddafi is something that shouldn’t have

happened.”

Ambassador Churkin was asked whether the

Security Council was concerned about the conditions

in Libya for those who had supported the Gaddafi

government and particularly, about the situation of

Saif al Islam Gaddafi and whether it was conceivable

he could get a fair trial in Libya when there was no

functioning legal system in the country.

Churkin responded that these concerns about the

situation in Libya had been discussed very often and

the delegation of the Russian Federation and of a

number of other countries had raised these concerns.

Also he spoke to concern over the plight of migrant

workers in Libya. “We directed the UN mission in

Libya to pay proper attention to these issues,” he said.

He indicated that they would continue to follow

these issues closely.

Page 12

V – Conclusion

Ambassador Churkin’s press conference was an

important and all too rare example of a press confer-

ence held by a member of the Security Council which

helps to shed light on the workings of the Council. All

too often the problems that develop in the course of

Security Council activity are shrouded in shadows

and kept from public view. This is contrary to the

obligations of the Council, which is obliged to report

on its actions to the General Assembly in annual and

special reports under the UN Charter, Article 15(1).

Members of the General Assembly responding to the

annual report from the Security Council ask for more

analytical reports, rather than just summaries of the

activities that have gone on over the year.

In his December 2 press conference, Ambassa-

dor Churkin shared some of the problems that devel-

oped in the Security Council over the course of the

implementation of the resolutions on Libya. In the

process he has helped clarify what future difficulties

in the Security Council will be given a failure to

understand and resolve the problems he has outlined.

By helping to reveal the difficulties in the functioning

of the Security Council, Ambassador Churkin has

provided important details that need further attention

and consideration.

Notes

1. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the

Russian Federation and President of the Security Council for the

month of December 2011 on the Programme of Work of the

Security Council for the month.

http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/12/press-

conference-ambassador-vitaly-churkin-president-of-the-security-

council.html

2. See for example the critique of Resolution 1973 by the

Concerned Africans, “An Open Letter to the Peoples of Africa

and the World from Concerned Africans,” July 2011.

http://www.concernedafricans.co.za/

See also Mahmood Mamdani, “A Ugandan’s Perspective: What

Does Gaddafi’s Fall Mean for Africa.”

http://www.unaatimes.com/2011/10/

3. For some of the examples of NATO’s bombing of civilians

that went on during its military campaign against Libya see:

Global Civilians for Peace in Libya

http://globalciviliansforpeace.com/tag/bombing/

“Libya: War Without End” by Stephen Lendmain,

ThePeoplesVoice.org, October 30, 2011.

http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/10/30

/libya-war-without-end

4. See Nov. 9, 2011 meeting of the Security Council on Protect-

ing Civilians in the Situation of Armed Struggle, S/PV.6650, pg.

16. Ambassador Viotti said: “The Brazilian delegation will

shortly circulate a concept paper. It elaborates on the idea that

the international community, as it exercises its responsibility to

protect, must demonstrate a high level of responsibility while

protecting.”

h t t p : / / d a c c e s s - d d s - n y . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C /

PRO/N11/585/43/PDF/N1158543.pdf?OpenElement

5. Actually no evidence was ever presented that airplanes were

ever used to bomb civilians under the Gaddafi government. It

was only under NATO that there is evidence that airplanes were

used resulting in the bombing of civilians. See for example:

http://globalciviliansforpeace.com/reports

“Despite detailed investigation we could not find any evidence

that the three regions of Tripoli cited in UN resolution 1973 had

been subjected to government forces bombardment nor that their

had been fighting between government troops and the people, we

received many testimonies to the contrary.”

6. See SCR 2014 (passed October 21, 2011)

h t t p : / / d a c c e s s - o d s . u n . o r g / a c c e s s . n s f /

Get?Open&DS=S/RES/2016(2011)&Lang=E

7. See for example Ronda Hauben, “UN Security Council

Challenges Hidden Agenda on Syria,” taz.de

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/10/27/security_council_ve

to_on_syria/

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Feb. 11, 2011 at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/02/11/defendin

g-the-un-charter/]

Defending the UN Charter by

Use of the Veto: The SC

Resolution on Syria

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

Up until the Arab League Observer Mission had

been sent to Syria on December 24, 2011, there had

been two main narratives describing what was hap-

pening in Syria. One was that the violence in Syria

was by the government against its people. The other

was that the violence was also perpetrated by armed

groups attempting to destabilize Syria. There had

been no independent way to judge between these two

narratives. The Observer Mission Report of January

22 provided such an independent judgment.

The Observer Mission determined that there

were armed opposition elements in Syria. (Paragraph

71) The original protocol setting up the Observer

Mission did not take into account this aspect of the

situation. By detailed observations in the Report, the

Page 13

Observer Mission documented that there were armed

opposition elements attacking civilians and govern-

ment officials, blowing up trains and pipelines,

civilian buses and killing not only Syrian civilians but

also a French journalist.

(Paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 44,

75)

The Observer Mission Report noted that as a

result of the Mission’s insistence on a complete end

to violence, the problem of violence by the Govern-

ment forces and exchange of gunfire with armed

elements in Homs and Hama had receded. “The most

recent reports of the Mission,” the Report stated,

“point to a considerable calming of the situation and

restraint on the part of those forces.”

The Report documented that the Observer

Mission witnessed peaceful demonstrations by both

the opposition and the supporters of the government

while the Mission was on the ground. (Paragraph 30)

Also, the Report said that, “The most important

point in this regard is the commitment by ‘all sides’ to

cease all aspects of violence thereby allowing the

Mission to complete its tasks and ultimately lay the

groundwork for the political process.” (Paragraph 79)

The Report warned that discontinuing the Mission

“could lead to chaos on the ground”. (Paragraph 81)

To seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict in

Syria, the continuation of something like the Observer

Mission would be needed. The Report concluded that

there needed to be an ”expansion of and a change in

the Mission’s mandate.“ (paragraph 79) Also the

Mission needed political, media and technical support

to fulfill its mandate. (Paragraphs 80, and 82)

The dominant states in the Arab League, how-

ever did not support changing the protocol to include

the problem represented by the armed groups in Syria,

as recommended by the Report. Instead, the Arab

League introduced a plan to require President Assad

of Syria to step down and to turn over power to the

Vice President to fulfill a plan drafted without the

Syrian government’s agreement.

This ignored the

recommendations of the Report of the Observer

Mission, and substituted the imposition of an Arab

League political plan for Syria in place of the recom-

mended modification and continuation of the Ob-

server Mission. The Arab League political plan had as

its aim the removal of the Syrian president, as op-

posed to creating a peaceful solution so that the

Syrian people could make the political changes they

desired in a Syrian determined process.

The Arab League brought their regime change

political plan to the UN Secretary-General asking him

to submit it to the Security Council. The Arab League

was seeking the UN’s endorsement for its plan.

The Arab League submitted a letter to the UN

Secretary-General requesting a meeting of the Secu-

rity Council. The letter listed several enclosures.

Though the Report of the Observer’s Mission

(Report) to the UN was listed as one of the enclo-

sures, this document was not included in the material

originally sent to the UN.

The Russian Ambassador, however, insisted that

the Report be submitted to the UN Security Council.

No Security Council discussion of the Arab League

plan was to be held until the Report was submitted to

the Security Council. Also it was to be treated as an

official document of the UN and translated into the

six official languages as is customary of official

documents.

Russia had requested that the Security Council

hold a session to discuss the Report. Russia also

requested that the head of the Observer Mission,

General Mohammed Al-Dabi, be invited to the

Security Council to discuss the Report. Russia’s

request to the Security Council to discuss the Report

was not accepted, even though there were other

Security Council members who agreed about the

importance of the report. Instead some members of

the Council wanted to schedule the Security Council

to discuss the Arab League plan on Monday, January

30. Other members wanted the meeting on Tuesday,

January 31 to give Security Council members time to

read the Report.

On January 31, as part of the Security Council

meeting, the Report was officially circulated in

English and Arabic along with the letter from the

Arab League to the Secretary-General. The Arab

League, represented by its Secretary-General Nabil

Elaraby and the current rotating chairman of the

League, Prime Minister Al-Thani of Qatar, presented

its plan to the Security Council. They discouraged the

Security Council from asking to meet with Al Dabi.

Though some members of the Security Council

recognized the importance of the Report, the discus-

sion in the Council was diverted to the Arab League

plan for Syria.

Subsequently, a draft Security Council resolu-

tion was submitted by Morocco. Though Russia also

had submitted a revised version of the Resolution it

had submitted weeks before, the discussion turned to

the Moroccan draft.

The issue in contention over this

Page 14

draft was whether the Council would agree to “fully

support” the Arab League plan for regime change in

Syria.

The recommendations of the Observer Report

presented the need to expand the protocol agreed to

by the Syrian government and the Arab League to

include a provision related to the presence of armed

groups and the violence perpetuated by them. The

Arab League proposal for regime change in Syria

ignored this issue. The Security Council members

differed on the need to make an independent judg-

ment about whether the Arab League plan fit the

criteria of Chapter VIII in the UN Charter. This

provision of the Charter requires that regional actions

supported by the Security Council be consistent with

the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

(Article 52(1))

On Saturday, February 4, the Russian Federa-

tion submitted several amendments to the draft

resolution, amendments it said would enable Russia

to support a resolution on Syria.

It asked that these

amendments be discussed before taking a vote on the

draft resolution.

To deal with the problem of armed groups and

violence perpetuated by them, Russia proposed that a

line be added to the Security Council Resolution that

would not only demand the withdrawal of the govern-

ment’s military forces from conflict areas, but in

conjunction would require that armed groups be

prevented from taking advantage of the vacuum to

occupy those areas.

Also the Russian Federation identified another

important loophole in the draft Security Council

resolution. The Arab League plan required that

President Assad step down and turn over negotiations

for a political transition to his vice president. This is

essentially a call for Assad to agree to a forced regime

change for Syria. If Assad were to resist, which one

would expect of the head of State of a nation being

attacked by armed insurgents who are killing civilians

and destroying infrastructure. Then what? The arbi-

trary and mandatory time deadlines would provide a

pretext for the advocates of foreign intervention to

claim that the UN supports intervention into the

internal affairs of Syria. This is what had been done

with Libya. The Russian amendments proposed the

need to change the mandatory time deadlines in the

Arab League timetable to make the deadlines advi-

sory, instead of mandatory. Mandatory time deadlines

could be used as a pretext to violate the UN Charter

which prohibits foreign interference in the internal

affair of a member state. (UN Charter, Article 2(7))

The request for time to discuss the amendments

was denied, leading to a vote on the draft resolution

at a public meeting of the Council on February 4.

Russia and China as expected by all, vetoed the

resolution. Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong sup-

ported Russia’s request for continued consultations as

“reasonable.”

He said that it was “regrettable” that

Russia’s request for a few days of discussion on its

proposed amendments had not been honored.

Referring to the Charter to explain why China

vetoed the resolution, Li Baodong said:

“(T)he sovereignty, independence and territorial

integrity of Syria should be fully respected. The

actions of the Security Council on the Syrian issue

should comply with the purposes and principles of the

UN Charter….”

“Under these principles,” he said, “China has

taken an active part in the consultations on the draft

resolution, and supported the efforts made by the

Arab League to facilitate a political settlement of the

Syria issue and maintain stability in the region. Like

many Council members, China maintains that, under

the current circumstances, to put undue emphasis on

pressuring the Syrian government, prejudge the result

of the dialogue or impose any solution will not help

resolve the Syrian issue, but instead may further

complicate the situation.”

Talking to journalists at a media stakeout at the

UN, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin described

some of what led to his nation’s veto of the proposed

Security Council resolution.

“As Syrian forces were

pulling out, armed groups were moving in. We were

trying to address that situation,” he explained. To

support a peaceful political solution to the crisis in

Syria as required by the UN Charter, both sides

capable of substantial violence had to be observed and

called on to be restrained and to cease all acts of

violence, thereby allowing the Mission to complete its

tasks and, ultimately lay the groundwork for a politi-

cal solution.

Commenting on the impact on Russia of the

Security Council action on Libya, a columnist for

Russia Today (RT), Fyodor Lukyanov, explains that,

“Russia has drawn lessons in Libya last year after

Moscow refrained from using its veto in the UNSC,

paving the way for ‘humanitarian intervention’ by

NATO. The ‘no-fly’ mandate was almost immedi-

ately shifted into a regime change operation led by

Page 15

France and Britain. Russia felt its cooperation had

been abused.”

The result of this experience, Lukyanov argues,

is that, “Russia opposes any call for Bashar al-Assad

to resign because ultimatums of this kind will mean

entering onto a path whose final destination is inva-

sion. This is because the UNSC will not allow its

demand to be ignored, while it is unlikely that Assad

will be in any hurry to fulfill it.”

At a media stakeout after he spoke with the

Security Council on Wednesday, February 8, Ban Ki-

moon said that he had told the Security Council that

the Arab League Secretary-General had spoken with

him on the phone and asked the UN Secretary Gen-

eral about setting up some sort of Observer Mission

in Syria in conjunction with the UN. The question this

raises is whether such a possible joint Observer

Mission would take into account the recommenda-

tions of the January 22 Observer Mission Report. The

obligations of the UN Charter require that the UN

Security Council act in line with the UN Charter,

rather than just endorsing the actions of regional

organizations even if such actions are in violation of

the UN Charter.

The struggle continues at the UN Security

Council to find a way to support a peaceful resolution

to the conflict in Syria without violating the Purposes

and Principles of the UN Charter. The February 4

veto was in the words of the Foreign Minister of the

Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, “the (United

Nations) Charter at work.”

Notes

1. “League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria: Report of

the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria

for the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012”

http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/Report_of_Arab_League_

Observer_Mission.pdf

The official UN document distributed January 31 2012 at the UN

contained the Observer Report as Enclosure 4 of S/2012/71

2. See for example, Ronda Hauben, Al Observer Report Corrects

Media Narratives about Syria, taz.de January 31, 2012

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/01/31/observer-mission-

report-syria/

3. Security Council S/2012/71, Enclosure 1“Elements of Arab

Plan to Resolve the Syrian Crisis,” January 30, 2012

Enclosure 1 listed the following steps to be taken in Syria:

1.Govt of national unity formed within 2 months. The

President should grant his Vice-President full powers to

fulfill transition phase

2.Within 3 months of its formation free and fair elections

should be held for a constituent assembly

3.This should prepare a new draft constitution for ap-

proval by popular referendum and an electoral based on

that draft constitution

4. I was told that Security Council members received a copy of

the Observer Mission Report sometime on Friday, January 27.

5. Draft resolution S/2012/77

h t t p : / / d a c c e s s - d d s - n y . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C /

GEN/N12/223/75/PDF/N1222375.pdf?OpenElement

vetoed on February 4, 2012.

6. Mathew Lee, “Russian Amendments Condemn Armed

Groups, Only ‘Take Into Account’ AL,” Inner City Press,

February 4, 2012.

http://www.innercitypress.com/syria1rusam020412.html

7. Change proposed by Russia from the text of the Resolution on

Syria.

Resolution said: 5d) withdraw all Syrian military and armed

forces from cities and towns, and return them to their original

home barrack;

Russia’s requested change:

Requested change said: 5d) withdraw all Syrian military and

armed forces from cities and towns, and return them to their

original home barrack; in conjunction with the end of attacks by

armed groups against State institutions and quarters and towns.

8. UN Transcript, Security Council Meeting on Middle East

Situation (February 4, 2012) – Syria, S/PV.6711 , p. 9-10

h t t p : / / d a c c e s s - d d s - n y . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C /

PRO/N12/223/56/PDF/N1222356.pdf?OpenElement

9. Stakeout, Vitaly L. Churkin (Russian Federation) on Syria,

Security Council Media Stakeout, February 4, 2012

http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/02/h-e-mr-vitaly-

i-churkin-russian-federation-on-the-situation-in-syria-security-

council-media-stakeout-2.html

10. Fyodor Lukyanov,“Why is Russia so Resolute on Syria?,”

RT, February 3, 2012

http://rt.com/politics/columns/unpredictable-world-foreign-

lukyanov/russia-syria-assad-un/

11. Ban Ki Moon at stakeout at Security Council on February 8,

2012.

http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/02/un-secretary-

general-ban-ki-moon-on-the-middle-east-security-council-media-

stakeout.html

Page 16

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on April 23, 2012. It can be seen at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/04/23/unsc-app

roves-90-day-observer-mission-to-syria/]

Second Track Challenged as

UNSC Approves 90 Day

Observer Mission to Syria

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

I – Security Council Authorizes UN

Observer Mission

At a stakeout for journalists on Saturday after

the vote on Security Council Resolution 2043, Rus-

sia’s UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin explained that

the text was carefully worded to signal all, including

the opposition, to refrain from violence and to support

the implementation of Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s 6

point plan. This resolution (S/2012/2043) provides the

authorization for up to 300 UN observers to be sent to

Syria for a period of up to 90 days.

The resolution

states that the “mandate of the Mission shall be to

monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms

by all parties and support the full implementation of

the Envoy’s six-point proposal.”

Differences about some of the provisions of the

resolution had been resolved by changes made to the

draft resolution in a 3-1/2 hour consultation held by

Security Council members on Friday evening. Am-

bassador Churkin expressed satisfaction that the

Security Council resolution he had initiated provided

the basis for the resolution approved by the Security

Council on Saturday in a unanimous vote of all 15

members.

II – Statements After the Vote

Statements made by several of the members of

the Security Council after the vote help to shed light

on the situation the UN observer mission can expect

to encounter in Syria. In his statement, South African

Ambassador Baso Sangqu referred to a letter to the

Security Council members received earlier in the

week. In that letter, the UN Secretary General re-

ported that the Syrian government had welcomed the

Advance Team of the observer mission, and that

“despite some challenges, the Advance Team has

enjoyed freedom of movement and has not observed

major military concentrations or conflict.”

“We welcome the news,” Ambassador Sangqu

said, “that the advance team has been able to visit

hotspots of the conflict, including Homs and that they

have observed calm and an end to major hostilities.”

He noted that, “The deployment of the advance team

has already proven to be a calming influence as

violence has decreased during its presence. This

marked decrease in violence should now be sus-

tained.”

In his statement after the vote, Indian Ambassa-

dor Hardeep Singh Puri thanked the Russian delega-

tion for introducing the resolution. “This is a signifi-

cant step in the Council’s collective support for the

efforts of the joint Special Envoy, Mr. Kofi Annan,”

said Ambassador Puri.

The Indian Ambassador observed, “it is a matter

of satisfaction that Mr. Annan’s efforts over the last

seven weeks have resulted in an improvement in the

situation in Syria. Even though there have been

reports of violations, the cease-fire that came into

force on 12 April has been observed by all parties in

a large part of Syria.“ Ambassador Puri called for an

expeditious deployment of the United Nations Super-

vision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) which the Security

Council had just authorized.

China’s Ambassador Li Baodong expressed the

hope that, “the Supervision Mission will fully respect

Syria’s sovereignty and dignity, act in strict accor-

dance with the authorization of the Security Council,

adhere to the principles of neutrality, objectivity and

impartiality, and play an active and constructive role

in pushing for a sustained cessation of violence in

Syria.”

In his comments after the vote, Ambassador

Churkin, expressed his view that, “The resolution

establishes a clear framework of responsibilities for

all parties to end the Syrian violence and for the need

for cooperation with the UN observer mission and the

Special Envoy.” He called upon the “external players

involved in the Syrian question” to behave “responsi-

bly” and to act in accordance with the provisions of

resolutions adopted by the Security Council. In that

regard, he pointed to the fact that the UN Security

Council is the body which holds primary responsibil-

ity for matters of international peace and security.

Other formats like the “groups of friends” that met in

Tunis, Istanbul or Paris, should follow the resolutions

of the Security Council and not undermine its work,

he said. Similarly, he expressed the sentiment that

Page 17

“the Libyan model of action should remain forever in

the past.”

While other delegations on the Security Council

like those of Portugal, Pakistan, and Morocco pointed

to the obligations of all in the Syrian conflict to honor

the cease fire and cease violent acts, the US Ambassa-

dor Susan Rice focused her criticism solely on what

she referred to as the “Assad regime.” And she

threatened that if the Syrian government did not

provide for “full freedom of movement for UN

personnel” and other demands that she enumerated,

the U.S. would “pursue measures against the Syrian

government.”

The text of the resolution, however, contains no

provision for “full freedom of movement for UN

personnel” to be provided, as Ambassador Rice

demanded. To the contrary, the resolution calls on the

Syrian government to ensure the effective operation

of UNSMIS by ensuring that unimpeded and immedi-

ate freedom of movement and access as necessary “to

fulfill its mandate.” The mandate is not open ended

but is specifically written. The mandate is “to monitor

a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all

parties and support the full implementation of the

Envoy’s six-point proposal.”

After all Council members who had asked to

speak had been called on, the Syrian Ambassador

Bashar al-Jaafari made a statement to the Council. He

noted that there were statements made in the Security

Council session in support of the resolution and

statements contrary to it. He pointed to the fact that

there was no reference in the resolution to the “Assad

regime” as the US Ambassador had mischaracterized

the Syrian government. Similarly, he noted the

mischaracterizations of the violence in Syria. He

pointed out that such mischaracterization had been

critiqued in the Arab League Observer Report. (para

30, Arab League Observer Report)

Examples presented in the Report provided

convincing evidence that there were armed militants

carrying out violent acts in Syria. Also the Arab

League Observers noted in their Report that while

they were in Syria, peaceful opposition protests that

they observed had not been disrupted by the Syrian

government. (para 71, Arab League Observer Report)

Ambassador Jaafari characterized as topsy

turvey blaming crimes by armed insurgents on the

Syrian government. He hoped that the UN Observer

Mission would help to dispel the media misinforma-

tion about the situation on the ground in Syria, as the

Arab League Observer Mission Report had done.

III – Safety Issues and Lessons from Arab

League Observer Mission

During the stakeout held by the Russian Ambas-

sador after the Security Council meeting, one journal-

ist asked a question referring to the danger of sabo-

tage of the UN Observer Mission as had happened

with the Arab League Observer Mission. This earlier

mission was discontinued just as it documented the

actual existence of an armed insurgency that was

responsible for substantial violence in the Syrian

conflict.

The Russian Ambassador acknowledged that the

UN observers going to Syria would be facing a

“daunting task.” He was concerned for their safety

and noted that Russian observers would be part of the

UN Mission. It would be their duty to report objec-

tively, he explained, and he hoped that the interna-

tional community would support their objective

reporting.

In the Security Council process of planning for

this Second Observer Mission to be sent to Syria,

there appears to have been little attention paid to

building on the lessons described in the Arab League

Observers Report. The Report of the Arab League

Observers was included as Enclosure Number 4 in the

document S/2012/71 (p. 11-46) distributed at the

January 31, 2012 meeting of the Security Council. In

the Report, problems of the insufficiency of transpor-

tation and communication equipment were particu-

larly noted, as was the need to make available ade-

quate “administrative and logistic support” and

“media and political support to create an appropriate

environment that will enable it to fulfill its mandate in

the required manner.” (Para 83) (See Also Para 64,

65,68 and 69, VIII)

The Report describes the experience of the Arab

League Observers, both their successes and the

problems they faced. In so doing it provides a basis to

predict what problems will need to be solved and

what difficulties can be expected for the UN Observer

Mission to Syria. Ambassador Churkin and several

other members of the Security Council recognized the

challenges that the UN Observer Mission will face,

but the frequent distractions presented by those

governments that are hopeful they can bring about

regime change in Syria appear to hinder the needed

consideration in the Security Council of how to build

Page 18

on the lessons of the Arab League Observer Mission.

IV – Netizen Comments

In an online discussion of a report on RT (Rus-

sia Today TV and streaming video) about the most

recent Security Council Resolution authorizing the

UN to provide for the observer mission in Syria, one

netizen pointed to the problem of foreign support for

the armed insurgency in Syria.

As part of a longer

comment, this netizen criticized the UN saying:

The UN has failed in its duties to protect

Syria from outside interference by remain-

ing silent on the continued arming/funding

of the ‘opposition’ by the U.S./U.K./

Israel/Turkey and their Arab allies. (Anon,

April 22. 00:08)

Another netizen commenting on the need for

accurate reporting about the role of the armed insur-

gents wrote:

Let’s hope the monitors have the guts to

tell the UN the role that the terrorist oppo-

sition plays in the mayhem. Unlike Ban-

Ki-Moon, who blames it all on the govt.

forces. ( CON, April 21. 2012. 19:49)

A netizen comment on the irony represented by

media reports which are in sharp contrast to the

reality on the ground:

Despite the UN’s ‘peace plan’ being fully

rejected by both the Syrian rebels and

their Western and Arab League backers

who have openly pledged cash, weapons,

and support for them to continue fighting

in full violation of the proposed cease-fire,

the Western media has instead accused the

Syrian government of failing to meet its

obligations…. (Tony Cartalucci, April 21,

2012. 23:12)

Yet another netizen pointed to the lack of logic

of much of Western reporting about the armed insur-

gents in Syria:

It is absurd to try to enforce a cease fire,

when only (the) Government has signed

the accord. The militants did not bother.

And in the meantime, all Western govern-

ments are concerned about is the “right of

Syrians to protest.” Fantastic. Let them

just get in the streets, so that the bombers

can blow them up and blame the Govern-

ment. Militants are giving interviews in

(the) Western press – Der Spiegel – about

their executions of civilians suspected of

supporting (the) regime!… If anywhere on

(the) planet such armed extremists try to

take over neighborhoods, the entire force

of that country will be brought to bear on

them, and nobody would shed a tear if

they all get blasted into oblivious. But in

Syria, we glorify them? And why? I am

not sure, but it seems to me that Saudi

Arabia and the Gulf do not like the fact

that in Syria EVERYBODY can practice

openly any religion – and is safe….

(Bianca, April 22, 2012. 06:54)

Responding to such comments, another netizen wrote,

….I salute the discerning readers of this

thread. (Igor, April 22, 2012. 13:38)

Such extracts from comments of netizens

discussing the UN Security Council activities demon-

strate that the situation in Syria is of concern to

people around the world.

Security Council Resolution 2043, some of the

statements made in the Security Council after the

vote, and the Arab League Observer Mission Report

paint a more accurate than usual picture of the crisis

in Syria. Considered in light of sample netizen com-

ments and other articles

on the Internet critiquing

mainstream media coverage of this crisis, a more

accurate view of the crisis emerges which will be

needed if the means is to be found to resolve the

conflict.

Notes

1. S/RES/2043 (2012) “The situation in the Middle East”

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions12.htm

The draft resolution was S/2012/245

h t t p : / / d o c u m e n t s - d d s - n y . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C /

GEN/N12/306/08/pdf/N1230608.pdf?OpenElement

2. The Arab League Observer Report

h t t p : / / d o c u m e n t s - d d s - n y . u n . o r g / d o c / U N D O C /

GEN/N12/219/03/doc/N1221903.DOC?OpenElement

“Letter dated 24 January 2012 from the Secretary-General

addressed to the President of the Security Council, Enclosure 4.

League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria “Report of

Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for

the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012,p. 11-22.”

Another copy of the Arab League Observer Report is online. The

url is:

h t t p : / / w w w . c o l u m b i a . e d u / ~ h a u b e n / s 2 0 1 2 -

71ArabLeagueObserverMission.pdf

3. http://rt.com/news/un-security-council-monitors-syria-

635/comments/

4. “Ulrike Putz, “An Executioner for Syria’s Rebels Tells his

Page 19

Story,” Der Spiegel, March 29, 2012

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,824603,00.h

tml

5. A couple of other recent articles documenting media misrepre-

sentations of what is happening in Syria include:

http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/sandbox/surprise-video-

changes-syria-timeline

http://www.syrianews.cc/syria-security-council-unsc-increases-

observers-607.html

http://tunisianquestfortruth.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/samples-

of-media-distortion-of-facts-about-syria-1-fake-pictures/

(contains some disturbing images)

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on June 25, 2014 at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2014/06/25/failure-at

-un-to-condemn-ukraine-attack-on-embassy/]

Failure at the UN to

Condemn Ukraine Attack on

Embassy of the Russian

Federation

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

On Saturday June 14, there was a violent attack

on the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kiev,

Ukraine. A crowd gathered which included Right

Sector members and the Ukrainian acting Foreign

Minister who had been appointed after the February

21-22 unconstitutional change of government that had

taken place in Ukraine.

The building was pelted with stones, firecrack-

ers and paint. Windows were broken. Cars belonging

to Embassy staff were overturned and vandalized.

Fireman put out a fire that had been started, but

through the mayhem Ukrainian law enforcement

officials did nothing. The failure of law enforcement

officials to protect the Embassy is in violation of the

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963)

which describes the actions and standards of behavior

expected of host countries with respect to such an

attack on another nation’s Embassy.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention includes

the obligation:

The receiving State is under a special duty

to take all appropriate steps to protect the

consular premises against any intrusion or

damage and to prevent any disturbance of

the peace of the consular post or impair-

ment of its dignity

Not only did the Ukrainian officials fail in their

diplomatic obligations, but a similar failure to support

the fulfillment of this provision of the Vienna Con-

vention marked the actions of the UN Security Coun-

cil and initially, the spokesperson’s office of the UN

Secretary-General.

It is a usual and expected procedure at the UN

Security Council that when an embassy is attacked to

issue a press statement condemning the attack.

The Ambassador to the UN for the Russian

Federation, Vitaly Churkin, speaking to reporters at

the UN Security Council stakeout on June 16, the

Monday following the attack, explained that he had

sent out a press statement for the approval of mem-

bers of the Security Council. A press statement

requires the approval of all members of the Council,

which was what he expected to happen. No statement

was issued, however, because the Lithuanian Repre-

sentative failed to approve it.

During the consultations held at the Council on

Monday, Ambassador Churkin explained that several

other members of the Security Council expressed

their regrets that the Council had failed to issue a

statement condemning the Saturday attack on the

Russian Federation Embassy. Later some journalists

speaking with members of the Lithuanian delegation

reported that the Lithuanian delegation had not

approved the statement asking that the Council also

issue a condemnation of the downing of a Ukrainian

military plane in Eastern Ukraine.

Asking that a statement condemning an assault

on an Embassy be issued contingent on the issuing of

a condemnation of some other situation can always be

used as a means of disguising one’s failure to support

the diplomatic obligations of the Vienna Convention.

But the diplomatic obligations of the Vienna Conven-

tion are not conditional on other circumstances. They

are specified obligations.

The failure to adhere to the obligations of the

Vienna Convention was not merely a disease infect-

ing the UN Security Council in this situation.

It is also the usual practice in such a situation

for the UN Secretary-General’s Office to issue a

condemnation of any attack on an Embassy. Over the

June 14-15 weekend, however, no such condemnation

of the attack was issued by Ban Ki-moon’s office. On

Monday, June 16, when the Deputy Spokesperson for

Page 20

the Secretary-General was asked about this breach in

obligation, he responded that the Secretary-General

did not want to take any action that would inflame the

situation.

To call a condemnation of an attack on an

Embassy something that will inflame a situation, is

akin to calling the Vienna Convention requiring that

the host country protect an Embassy, an inflammatory

act.

But the Vienna Convention is an agreement to

protect against inflammatory acts, not the cause of an

inflammatory action.

At a stakeout on Monday, June 16, Ambassador

Churkin was asked about the failure of the Secretary-

General’s Office to issue a statement condemning the

attack. He responded that he was surprised but he

would look into the situation.

While the Secretary-General’s Office did not

issue any condemnation of the attack on the Embassy

during the weekend of June 14-15, on June 14, it

issued a condemnation of the downing of a Ukrainian

military plane in Eastern Ukraine.

The failure to condemn the attack on the Em-

bassy of the Russian Federation was a breach in

obligation by the UN Secretary-General’s Office.

On Tuesday, June 17, the Deputy Spokesman

for the Secretary-General announced a second con-

demnation of the downing of the Ukrainian military

plane. This time, however, the announcement in-

cluded a statement about the need to protect an

Embassy.

The Deputy Spokesman announced:

The Secretary-General condemned the

growing violence in Ukraine, including

the downing of a Ukrainian military air-

plane. The Secretary-General also decried

acts such as the attack on the Russian

embassy in Kyiv, which only increase

tension. I would like to add that he con-

demns that attack and urges the Ukrainian

authorities to abide by their international

commitments to ensure the inviolability of

all diplomatic missions and personnel.

Though the UN Security Council and the UN

Secretary-General’s office both initially exhibited

serious failures with regard to their obligations in the

situation with the Embassy of the Russian Federation

that occurred on Saturday June 14 in Kiev, the Deputy

Spokesperson for the Secretary-General later stated a

condemnation at a press briefing.

There were netizens discussing the situation on

blogs on June 14-15, however, who were expressing

their concern, not only at the attack on the Russian

Federation’s Embassy, but also at the failure of the

UN Security Council and of the UN to meet its

obligations to be a force for peace in such a situation.

By the UN Security Council’s failing to condemn the

attack, one comment on the MoonofAlabama blog

noted, the UN was “tacitly giving their official

blessing to it.”

Another post in a thread on the Vineyard Saker

blog commented about UN Security Council members

blocking a criticism of the attack on the Russian

Embassy. “This effectively kills the Vienna Conven-

tion. In fact, this pretty much kills the U.N. And

makes all embassies of all nations fair targets. Wel-

come to the new Dark Ages, ladies and gentlemen.

BOPOH, 15 June, 2014 01:20”

And another comment on the same thread

maintained that the failure of the Security Council to

condemn the attack on the Embassy of the Russian

Federation meant that, “The UN is now a totally

defunct organization that is going the same way as the

organization before it, the league of nations….”

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Sept 22, 2015 at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2015/09/22/amb-chu

rkins-2015-sc-presidency-press-briefing/]

Ambassador Churkin’s

September 2015 Security

Council Presidency’s Press

Briefing

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

On September 2, 2015 the UN press briefing

room was filled with journalists.

Vitaly Churkin, the

Russian Federation’s Ambassador to the UN arrived

in a cheerful mood for his press conference for UN

accredited media. The Russian Federation holds the

rotating presidency of the Security Council for the

month of September 2015. This is a significant month

for the UN as it is the month that traditionally brings

heads of state and government from around the world

Page 21

to the New York headquarters for the opening of the

United Nations General Assembly. This year is

somewhat special, however, as the UN is also cele-

brating its 70

birthday. A larger than usual number

of heads of state and government will travel to New

York to contribute to this special occasion.

Ambassador Churkin’s conduct of what is the

traditional press conference held by the new president

set a notable example of how a Security Council

member holding the rotating monthly presidency

should interact with the press.

While the recent tendency among several of the

current Security Council members has been to shorten

the time of the press conference where they take

questions, Ambassador Churkin welcomed questions

and the press conference continued for almost an

hour.

His responses to questions were in general

forthright and helped to clarify some of the spectrum

of views of those on the Security Council. Similarly

he explained how progress had been made on a recent

resolution, thereby giving a sense of how the previous

frequent stalemates that have occurred on the Council

could be averted.

Perhaps one of the most controversial issues

relating to the Security Council procedures is the fact

that the UN Charter provides the right of veto over

Security Council decisions to the five Permanent

Members of the Council. Recently conflicting views

among members of the Security Council on the Syrian

conflict have resulted in some vetoes of resolutions

that were tabled for a vote by the Council before there

was adequate negotiation over the points in conten-

tion.

Some members of the Security Council and

other UN members are campaigning to weaken the

right of the Permanent Members of the Council to use

the veto. Also there are calls for increasing the num-

ber of members on the Security Council, with some

UN member nations maintaining the need to give

some of the new members the veto, while there are

other UN member nations trying to limit any further

nations that would be granted the veto.

One question to Ambassador Churkin was about

his views on the proposals for Security Council

Reform.

Ambassador Churkin responded that there were

two basic issues in the reform controversy. One had

to do with the expansion of the Security Council. This

issue is: Should the expansion include new permanent

member seats or just a lengthening of some of the

terms of elected members? This might involve a new

category of members, called “Intermedia Members.”

Ambassador Churkin observed that he didn’t see any

consensus on this issue. Until there is such a consen-

sus it was unlikely, therefore, that there be any change

decided by UN members about this issue.

A second issue in Security Council reform

efforts, he explained, is a proposal to limit the veto of

permanent members in the case of “mass atrocities.”

Ambassador Churkin explained why he felt such a

proposal was unworkable. The proposal is that a

decision by a yet undetermined number of members

of the UN, whether it be 50 or 100, or by the

Secretary-General or the High Commissioner for

Human Rights, that war crimes were happening,

would trigger a prohibition against a permanent

member using the veto.

The problem with such a proposal, he explained,

was that this is a political world. It is not so difficult

to put together 50 members of the General Assembly

or 100 to deprive a permanent member of the Security

Council of his or her veto. The number is not impor-

tant, Ambassador Churkin argued, as it could be 150.

That would mean, however, members of the General

Assembly infringing on the prerogatives of the

Security Council. Churkin also noted that “you cannot

say that every resolution in a dire situation is a good

resolution and not going to be used for political

purposes….”

It is the veto, he maintained, which allows

members of the Security Council to produce balanced

decisions which make it possible for the minority

opinion to be reflected in the work of the Security

Council.

And he pointed to what happened in the Secu-

rity Council in 2011 with the resolution against Libya.

There were those hoping the veto would have been

used to stop the passage of Security Council Resolu-

tion 1973.

Sometimes as in a case like that of Libya, the

absence of the veto can produce a disaster, he noted.

Ambassador Churkin was asked whether the

U.S. and the Russian Federation could work together

in the Security Council on the situation in Syria.

In response to this question, he offered a recent

example of how they had worked together. Ambassa-

dor Churkin described how he was first given a draft

resolution by the U.S. on the use of chemical weapons

in Syria. The U.S. is the pen holder in drafting resolu-

Page 22

tions on Syria. He recognized that he would have to

veto the draft resolution unless there were needed

changes.

But in this case, the U.S. was willing to negoti-

ate with the Russian Federation to create a resolution

that both the U.S. and the Russian Federation could

agree to. Through contacts at the level of national

Ambassadors between the U.S. and the Russian

Federation, and then through negotiation between the

Russian Federation’s Foreign Minister, Sergey

Lavrov, and the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry,

a new draft resolution was prepared which the Rus-

sian Federation was able to support. Churkin ex-

plained that this was a tedious process and that Kerry

and Lavrov even had a meeting with the Saudi For-

eign Minister on the resolution. There were also

meetings with the Syrian opposition and the Syrian

government. The result was S/RES/2235 (2015) and

support for the work of the UN Secretary-General.

There were a number of other questions raised

during Ambassador Churkin’s press conference. One

of the questions was whether there was anything the

Security Council could do to stop the attack on

Yemen.

Ambassador Churkin explained that what was

happening in Yemen was a very dramatic situation.

That it was well known that the U.S. and the U.K. are

providing all kinds of support for the operation

against Yemen. These two nations, who are Security

Council members, share the responsibility for what is

going on in Yemen. Such a military campaign pro-

duces a lot of civilian casualties. The way it looks

now is that the mood to continue fighting is prevailing

over the need to produce a political program, he said.

Another question concerned the lack of action

by the Middle East Quartet in helping to resolve the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Ambassador Churkin

pointed out that the Quartet was important as it

provided an international framework to resolve the

Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

Going through the calendar of the Security

Council for the month of September, Ambassador

Churkin especially pointed to a Security Council

meeting planned for September 30, 2015. It would be

held at the Foreign Minister level of representation.

During the meeting, with Foreign Minister Lavrov as

Chair, the Russian Federation would present a pro-

posal for a United Front against terrorist groups.

The Security Council press conference lasted 50

minutes, in sharp contrast with the ever shorter press

conferences held by some other members of the

Security Council when they held the rotating presi-

dency. Such a period of time gave Ambassador

Churkin a chance to hear questions and to present

responses that helped to shed light on the workings of

the Council and the obstacles and successes of the

efforts of different member nations in helping the

Council to make progress or to be stymied in its

efforts.

This press conference provided an example of

the kind of press conference that can help the press to

provide better coverage of the work of the Council.

Note:

http://webtv.un.org/media/watch/sc-president-vitaly-i-

churkin-russian-federation-on-the-security-council-programme

-of-work-in-september-2015-press-conference/4459405043001

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Oct. 5, 2016. It can be seen at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2016/10/05/women_

seeking_to_participate_in_peace_treaty_process/]

Women Peace Activists Ask

Ban Ki-moon to Initiate a

Process for a Peace Treaty

to End Korean War

by Ronda Hauben

ronda.netizen@gmail.com

On Tuesday, September 27, 2016, women peace

activists held a press conference at the Interchurch

Center across from the United Nations Headquarters

building in N.Y.C. They announced that they had

delivered a letter signed by more than 100 women

asking UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to initiate

a peace process which will lead to a peace treaty

between the U.S. and the DPRK by 2020.

They explained that with 100 days left before

the Secretary-General completes his second five year

term at the head of the UN Secretariat, he has an

obligation to fulfill on a promise he made in a speech

in 2007 where he stated:

Beyond a peaceful resolution of the nu-

clear issue with North Korea, we should

Page 23

aim to establish a peace mechanism,

through transition from armistice to a

permanent peace regimen.

In their letter the peace activists reminded the

UN Secretary-General, “We look to you to leave

behind a legacy of diplomacy for peace in Korea,

Northeast Asia and the World.”

In the past few weeks, journalists who are part

of the UN press corps have asked the Secretary-

General if he has any intention of using his little time

left as Secretary-General to do something to work

toward a peaceful resolution of the tension on the

Korean Peninsula. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s

last term in office will expire on December 31, 2016.

In response to the questions posed by these

reporters, the Secretary-General replied that he has no

special plans.

It is to the credit of these women peace activists

that they continue to call on the Secretary-General to

fulfill on the obligation of his office to work to lessen

the tension on the Korean Peninsula. But whether

their efforts will lead to any action on the part of the

Secretary-General or not does not detract from the

importance of such efforts on the part of journalists

and peace activists.

The peace activists holding the press conference

pointed out that currently tensions are especially high

on the Korean Peninsula. The combination of military

exercises by U.S. and South Korea, the U.S. bringing

B1 bombers to South Korea, and the North Korean

nuclear tests leave the situation on the Korean Penin-

sula as one with no obvious means of lessening the

tension.

During the press conference, one of the speak-

ers, Suzy Kim, described a meeting held by the peace

activists in February 2016 in Bali, Indonesia.

The International peace activists group Women

Cross the DMZ (WCDMZ) had invited a South

Korean women peace delegation and a North Korean

women peace delegation to meet with them to discuss

how to work toward the signing of a peace treaty

between the U.S. government and the North Korean

government that would end the Korean War. In order

to make the arrangements for their meeting, there was

a need to get permissions from the South Korean

government and the North Korean government for the

women from their respective countries to meet with

each other. While the delegation of WCDMZ peace

activists got the needed permission from the North

Korean government for the proposed meeting, the

South Korean government would not approve such a

meeting. Therefore, the international peace activists

decided to hold separate meetings with the North

Korean women and the South Korean women.

The WOMENCROSSDMZ.org web site in-

cludes a summary which describes the Bali meetings

and includes a statement of principles created by the

North Korean women and the international peace

activists. Following is the statement:

MEETING AGREEMENT

Bali Indonesia, February 10, 2016

(Between WCDMZ International Delega-

tion and DPRK Delegation)

1. We will make active efforts for public

education and awareness raising regarding

the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and

the need for an end to military action that

further aggravates the situation.

2. We will work together as Korean and

international women, in efforts to improve

inter-Korean relations and achieve peace-

ful reunification of Korea, in the spirit of

prior inter – Korean agreements such as

the June 15 North and South Joint Decla-

ration, 2000.

3. We will carry out work toward the

achievement of lasting peace and stability

on the Korean Peninsula. This includes

the removal of various political and physi-

cal hindrances to peace and reunification,

replacement of the Armistice Agreement

with a peace treaty, and the eventual

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

and the entire world.

4. We will promote women’s leadership at

all levels of peace-building, including

preventing armed conflict and participat-

ing in peace negotiations. International

women will actively work to urge each

government to support women’s involve-

ment in the Korean peace process, as

provided for in UN Security Council

Resolution 1325.

Such a statement provides a guide for a transna-

tional peace building campaign. The statement is an

expression of the need for peace negotiations toward

replacing the Korean War Armistice Agreement with

a peace treaty and the eventual denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula and the rest of the world.

Page 24

The summary of the February Bali meeting

offers a demonstration of the value of including

women in line with UN Security Council Resolution

1325 in peace negotiations for the Korean Peninsula.

The importance of implementing UN Resolution

1325 in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula was also

raised at an October 3, 2016 press conference at the

UN marking the Russian Federation assuming the

October 2016 rotating presidency of the UN Security

Council. On the agenda for the October 2016 sched-

ule is a UN Security Council meeting on October 25

which will be an open debate on UNSC Resolution

1325.

A question raised by a journalist and the re-

sponse from Ambassador Vitaly Churkin at the

October 3 press conference helps to support the need

for women peace activists to be part of the peace

process in difficult conflict situations like the Korean

conflict.

Following is the slightly edited transcript of this

question and Ambassador Churkin’s response:

(Journalist): “Yes, I have a question about

(Security Council Resolution-ed) 1325. There are

women, international women peace activists who

went from North Korea and South Korea, and met

with women in both countries. And now they sent a

letter to Ban Ki-moon asking him for a process

towards a peace treaty (between the U.S. and North

Korea-ed) and also to involve women in the process.

And here we have the situation with North Korea

where the Security Council has not made any prog-

ress. And they (the international peace activists-ed)

are saying we need women involved in doing this,

women working for peace.

Is there any way you see of doing this, any way

you see to have 1325 actually implemented so you get

some help toward having a peace development?”

Response from Ambassador Churkin:

(Ambassador Churkin): “Well, You know what we

believe is that, this is an extremely difficult situation.

And the cycle of action and counter action which we

have seen in the past few years, actually since 2005

when this deal of September 19 fell through, it is not

working.

So we do believe we need to try some creative

thinking. We don’t have some specific immediate

proposals, but certainly, DPRK testing and then U.S.

and others conducting some higher level military

maneuvers there, you know, beefing up their military

presence, that does not help at all.

In that creative thinking, it may well be the

greater involvement of women could be one of the

elements that might move the situation forward.”

By recognizing the need for and importance of

contributions for the peace process mandated by

UNSC Resolution 1325, Secretary-General Ban Ki-

moon would do well to favorably respond to the letter

from the international women peace activists.

Note

1. See webcast for Oct 3, 2016 press conference with Ambassa-

dor Churkin:

http://webtv.un.org/media/watch/ambassador-

vitaly-churkin-of-the-russian-federation-president-of-the-

security-council-of-october-2016-press-conference/515389874

7001 (at 33:08-33:58, and 33:59-34:42)

[Editor’s Note: On Feb 20, 2017 Vitaly Churkin died

suddenly in his office in NYC. Churkin had been the

Permanent Representative the Russian Federation to

the United Nations for over ten years. At the Feb. 21

meeting of the Security Council, the Security Council

Members and other Member States paid tribute to

Ambassador Churkin. Most of those tributes follow.]

UN Security Council Tribute

to the Memory of His

Excellency Ambassador

Vitaly Churkin

The meeting was called to order Feb. 21, 2017 at

10:10 a.m.

The President: As members know, yesterday

the Council adopted a press statement on the passing

of the Permanent Representative of the Russian

Federation to the United Nations (SC/12724). As

President of the Security Council, I propose that the

Council observe a minute of silence in connection

with the death of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin. The

members of the Security Council observed a minute

of silence.

Mr. Iliichev (Russian Federation) (spoke in

Russian): The Russian delegation is grateful for the

Page 25

warm words and expressions of condolence on Rus-

sia’s irreparable loss of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin.

We have lost an outstanding diplomat, a great profes-

sional, a talented orator and polemicist, and a soulful

and kind-hearted person. He had encyclopedic knowl-

edge that he often applied in practice, delving into the

finer points of all issues discussed. Working at the

forefront of international diplomacy and occupying

the most critical posts, Vitaly Ivanovich defended the

positions of his country for more than 40 years.

Thanks to his talent and brilliant mind, he often

found solutions to what seemed to be impossible

situations. He always sought ways to unify efforts and

strike a balance of interests, while carefully listening

to the views of his partners in debates. That is why he

was respected by all who worked with him, even

those who may not have agreed with his approach.

The hundreds of calls and letters of condolence that

continue to flow into the Russian Mission bear

witness to that.

Vitaly Ivanovich will always remain in our

memory as a principled diplomat of the highest

calibre, a leader who demanded much but also upheld

the highest standards. I again thank everyone for their

kind words.

Mr. Rosselli (Uruguay) (spoke in Spanish): In

a press communiqué issued yesterday, the Govern-

ment of Uruguay expressed its deepest sorrow over

the passing of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Perma-

nent Representative of the Russian Federation to the

United Nations, noting that he was a highly seasoned

diplomat who represented his country responsibly and

earnestly and whose talent, professionalism and

dedication were recognized by all his colleagues.

The Government of Uruguay offers its sincere

condolences to the family of Mr. Churkin and to the

Russian Government its sincere condolences for their

terrible loss. We should have wished to express to

Vitaly personally our great admiration of his profes-

sionalism and our pleasure in sharing his experience,

knowledge and honest work.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (spoke in Chinese):

China is deeply shocked at and regrets the untimely

passing of Ambassador Churkin following a brief

illness. We express our deep sorrow at his passing and

offer our heartfelt condolences to the bereaved family

and the Government and the Permanent Mission of

the Russian Federation.

As the Permanent Representative of the Russian

Federation for over 10 years, Ambassador Churkin

was an able, experienced and senior diplomat. He

made enormous contributions to the United Nations

and multilateralism. He worked right up to the last

minute of his life as an exemplar of dedication and

professionalism, and was thus an outstanding repre-

sentative of diplomats. We are deeply saddened by his

passing, which is a loss for the entire United Nations

diplomatic corps. Ambassador Churkin was a good

friend to many of us present here. He was sincere and

kind. Although we mourn his passing, his memory

will remain with us forever. He will be deeply missed.

May he rest in peace.

China joins with the Russian Federation and

other Council members in playing an active role in

upholding multilateralism and the principles and

purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, the

maintenance of world peace and the promotion of

common development.

Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): Let me say from the

bottom of my heart that the passing of Ambassador

Vitaly Churkin is a great tragedy, not just for his

family and Russia but for the Organization and

multilateral diplomacy, at a time when the United

Nations is needed more than ever. One need not delve

into this at length. These are not normal times. This is

a period when we need a person like Vitaly — a

patriot for his country, no doubt, but also a diplomat

whom we could trust at a time when that quality is not

found in abundance. He would never mislead you and

was a person who allowed space for mutual accom-

modation. One thing is very clear — he left us a time

when people like him are needed the most. On behalf

of my Government, I want to express condolences to

his family, his colleagues, the United Nations family

and the Government of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Arancibia Fernández (Plurinational State

of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I should like at the

outset, on behalf of the Plurinational State of Bolivia,

to offer our most sincere condolences to the bereaved

family, the Mission of the Russian Federation, the

Government and the people of Russia on the passing

of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, who was a great

exponent of global diplomacy.

The Bolivian Mission to the United Nations

regrets the loss of one of the most brilliant Ambassa-

dors in our forum — a fervent defender of

multilateralism who always managed to build bridges

for dialogue and agreement between diverging posi-

tions, thereby resolving the most difficult issues, as

with the cease-fire agreement in Syria, which was a

Page 26

milestone that would not have been possible without

Ambassador Churkin’s work and commitment to

peace. His principled position was also apparent in

other situations, such as that in Palestine and his

opposition to neocolonialism.

Lastly, on behalf of Ambassador Llorentty

Solíz, who is traveling and therefore not able to attend

today’s meeting, I extend our most sincere condo-

lences to the family of Ambassador Churkin. Ambas-

sador Llorentty Solíz considered him a brilliant

colleague and a close, beloved friend. We appreciated

his eloquent speeches, which contributed greatly to

the debates held in this Chamber. May his soul rest in

peace.

Mr. Vassilenko (Kazakhstan) (spoke in Rus-

sian): We were saddened to learn yesterday of the

untimely passing of Vitaly Ivanovich Churkin, Per-

manent Representative of the Russian Federation to

the United Nations. On behalf of Minister Kairat

Abdrakhmanov and the entire Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Kazakhstan, we convey to him our deepest

condolences to the bereaved family and to the Russian

delegation on the passing of such a brilliant diplomat.

Vitaly Ivanovich Churkin was an outstanding

individual who defended the interests of his country

and made a significant contribution to strengthening

the principles of multilateral diplomacy. Saddened by

the news, our Minister, who used to be the Permanent

Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations,

said:

“The passing of Vitaly Ivanovich, with whom I

worked for the past three years in the United Nations,

is for me a personal tragedy. It is an intolerable loss

for the whole diplomatic corps. He was an outstand-

ing person, a good friend, a reliable ally and a true

professional. We shall always remember him. May he

rest in peace.”

Mr. Bessho (Japan): I was deeply shocked and

saddened by the news of the passing of Ambassador

Vitaly Churkin. I happened to meet him on Sunday at

lunchtime; coincidentally, we were seated next to

each other at a restaurant. He was with his wife, I was

with my wife, and we were all very happy at the time.

In fact, he had arrived a bit after I did, so I did not

realize that he was there. I suddenly heard a voice

saying, Koro, what do you recommend? I looked back

and there was Vitaly, looking happy, looking very

well and with his usual big smile.

We happened to be of the same age, so while a

lot of heated discussions took place in the Chamber

and in the consultation room, I always had something

that I felt for him. He was certainly a great, true,

outstanding diplomat. He worked hard for his coun-

try, but at the same time we all loved him for his

humour and his willingness to try to resolve issues.

May he rest in peace.

Ms. Haley (United States of America): I should

like to express the deepest condolences of the United

States on the passing of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin.

I did not have the honour of working with Vitaly for

very long, but his diplomacy will be long remem-

bered. He was a fierce advocate for his country. He

was a consummate diplomat. He was brilliant, wise,

gracious and funny. He could spot even the narrowest

opportunities to find a compromise. Having spent the

early part of his career in the United States, Vitaly

also recognized the value of closer ties between our

two countries.

Vitaly’s passing is a shock to all of us and a

great loss. Let me once again, on behalf of the United

States, offer our thoughts and prayers to Vitaly’s

family, to our colleagues at the Russian Mission and

to the people of Russia. God bless.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): Like others, I

should like to express my deepest personal condo-

lences to the delegation of the Russian Federation and

to the family and friends of Vitaly Churkin. Vitaly

was an exceptional diplomat and a truly remarkable

man. We disagreed on many issues, but I always

found him to be an honest and decent colleague, no

matter the issues, no matter the positions. It has not

really sunk in yet that he has died. I will remember

him every day. My thoughts go out to Irina, to their

children, to their family, to Petr, to all the members of

the Russian delegation, to all Russian diplomats

everywhere.

I will always remember the lessons that I

learned from Vitaly. He was a diplomatic giant, a

maestro of the Security Council. May he rest in peace.

Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): On

behalf of France and on my own behalf, I should like

to pay special tribute to our colleague and friend

Vitaly Churkin. I should like to convey to his wife,

Irina, and to his family our most sincere condolences

and our deepest sadness, which I would also convey

to all of the Russian Mission.

Vitaly Churkin was an exceptional representa-

tive of the Russian Federation to the United Nations.

Beyond our differences, we always worked in a spirit

of mutual respect and personal friendship. Vitaly

Page 27

Churkin was more than an exceptional diplomat, more

than a fearsome negotiator; he was a master of diplo-

macy. He was one of the most talented diplomats I

ever met. We will miss him greatly, and his spirit will

remain here in the Security Council with us. I will

never forget him.

Mr. Seck (Senegal) (spoke in French): Among

the many, many expressions of sympathy we have

heard since yesterday in memory of our illustrious

colleague Vitaly Churkin, whose affection and friend-

ship we shall sorely miss, one in particular struck me,

and I should like to reiterate it here:

(spoke in English)

“With Ambassador Churkin’s passing, the

United Nations has lost a highly intelligent, frank,

wise and dynamic presence and a diplomat committed

to the dignity of the Security Council.”

(spoke in French)

As was already done by the Foreign Minister of

Senegal yesterday in a letter to his counterpart, the

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federa-

tion, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, I would like personally and

on behalf of my entire delegation to convey to Am-

bassador Iliichev our most heartfelt condolences on

the passing of a person whom many of us so rightly

considered to embody the spirit of the Security

Council.

The Secretary-General, as has been said here,

has contributed to a surge in diplomacy. Once again

I would quote Mr. Churkin himself, in 2011, who, in

this very Chamber, said the following:

(spoke in English)

“We also understand the concern that the

Council may too often resort to Chapter VII of the

Charter, including the application of sanctions. In that

regard, we stress that the Russian Federation has

consistently called on the Council to make more

active use of the toolkit of preventive diplomacy and

to invest in the development of mechanisms for the

peaceful settlement of disputes. The provisions of

Chapters VI and VIII should be fully exploited.

Sanctions and the use of force to settle conflict are

appropriate when all possibilities for peaceful settle-

ment have been exhausted, the threat to international

peace and security is clear, and the decision to resort

to Chapter VII enjoys the broadest possible support of

Council members.” (S/PV.6672, pp. 3-4)

(spoke in French)

I would ask Mr. Iliichev to convey to the mem-

bers of his delegation and to the bereaved family and

the Government and the people of the Russian Feder-

ation our most heartfelt condolences. May Vitaly’s

soul rest in peace.

Mr. Cardi (Italy): I also wish to express my

personal sorrow and that of my authorities for the loss

of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin. He was an outstand-

ing diplomat. Above all, he was a loyal colleague,

someone who was always transparent and able to

serve the best interests of his country. He was also a

friend. I admired him — we admired him — and we

will miss his professional abilities and his warm,

personal human touch. Our condolences go to his

wife and children and the rest of his family, his

friends, Mr. Iliichev and his other colleagues at the

Russian Mission, and the Russian authorities.

Mr. Aboulatta (Egypt) (spoke in Arabic): My

country’s delegation would like to express its most

sincere condolences to the Mission of the Russian

Federation to the United Nations as well to the Gov-

ernment and the people of Russia for the passing of

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin. In our view, Ambassa-

dor Churkin was an exceptional diplomat when it

came to the United Nations and the Security Council.

He deserved the respect of all the delegations. Thanks

to his professionalism and credibility, his sudden

passing is a great loss not only for Russian diplomacy

but also for the Security Council, the United Nations

and multilateral diplomacy.

Ms. Söder (Sweden): When I arrived in New

York last night to take part in today’s debate on

European security, I was met by the news that Am-

bassador Vitaly Churkin had passed away. The

Swedish Government, our Permanent Representative

Olof Skoog, who is traveling, and I are deeply sad-

dened by this news. I would like to express our

sincere condolences to the family of Vitaly Churkin,

to our colleagues in the Mission, here represented by

Mr. Iliichev, to the Russian Government and to the

people of the Russian Federation.

On a personal note, let me say that I will cer-

tainly miss the lively and fruitful conversations I had

during almost all of my visits here in New York in the

last few years. Vitaly Churkin will certainly be

greatly missed.

The President: I now give the floor to the

Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General: I was flying yesterday

evening from Lisbon to New York when, during the

flight, one of the flight attendants came to me with a

small note saying that it was coming from the Cap-

Page 28

tain. The note said that Vitaly Churkin had passed

away. I must confess that my first reaction was not to

believe it. I had not had the opportunity to work with

him for a long time, as has happened with many other

members of the Security Council, but I always felt

that he was one of those persons who represent life

itself.

Unfortunately, it was not a joke in bad taste, nor

was it misinformation; it was the truth. I believe that

Vitaly Churkin was not only an outstanding diplomat,

but an extraordinary human being who possessed a

unique combination of intelligence, knowledge, and

firmness in the expression of his beliefs. He was also

a man with a remarkable sense of humour and an

enormous warmth that would make us all feel a

natural tendency to become friends.

I want to express my deepest condolences to

Mrs. Irina Churkina, to Vitaly’s family, to the Gov-

ernment and the people of the Russian Federation,

and most especially to Vitaly Churkin’s colleagues in

the Russian Mission and in the Ministry for Foreign

Affairs.

I think Vitaly’s passing represents a deep loss

for all of us at the United Nations, including for the

members of the Security Council, where his distinc-

tive voice was ever present over the past decade and

where that voice will indeed be missed in the sessions

to come.

The President: I thank the Secretary-General

for his statement….

Mr. Dapkiunas (Belarus) (spoke in Russian):

Vitaly Ivanovich Churkin died yesterday. He was a

leading Russian diplomat and a key figure in the

Security Council, representing his country in a mature

manner for more than a decade. We mourn the loss of

our colleague and friend. We extend our condolences

to his family and friends. We are grateful to the

members of the Security Council for the words of

condolences that they expressed on what is a loss to

us all. At the same time, it must be recognized that the

President of the Security Council did not use this

opportunity to pay tribute to the doyen of the Security

Council with a statement from the President, as would

have been appropriate.

Mr. Radomski (Poland): At the outset, let me

express our sincere condolences to the Russian

delegation on the sudden passing away of Russia’s

Permanent Representative, Ambassador Vitaly

Churkin. At this hour of sadness and disbelief, our

deepest sympathies go to his family and the Mission

of the Russian Federation in New York.

Mr. Pedersen (Norway): I would first like to

express my heartfelt condolences to his family,

friends and colleagues at the Russian Mission on the

passing of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin. Ambassador

Churkin was a highly respected colleague who sought

to find solutions through compromise and great

diplomatic skill. I always appreciated our conversa-

tions. We have lost an extraordinary diplomat and

friend. May he rest in peace.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela) (spoke in Spanish): With the permission

of the Security Council, I would like to begin my

statement by echoing the many heartfelt condolences

expressed today over the passing of our friend,

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin. His sudden departure is

an irreparable loss not only for his family, to whom

we extend our sympathy and solidarity, but also to the

Russian Federation, which Ambassador Churkin

served with dedication and patriotism, and to the

United Nations, which lost an exceptional figure

committed to inclusive multilateralism, the respect for

international law and the peaceful settlement of

disputes. We convey our affection and admiration to

Ambassador Ilichev and his delegation for the work

carried out by Ambassador Churkin at the United

Nations and the mark he left on us all as a remarkable

diplomat, teacher and human being. We regret that the

Council has not been able to issue a declaration in

memory of Ambassador Churkin. It is a matter of

humanity, all the more so given his distinguished

career as a diplomat.

Mr. Mnatsakanyan (Armenia): Like others, we

were deeply shocked, saddened and grieved by the

news of the passing of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, a

great man, a great friend and a great professional.

(spoke in Russian) We express our sincere condo-

lences to Vitaly’s family, his wife, Irina, and his

children, and to our colleagues and friends at the

Russian Mission. This is a great loss for us all. (spoke

in English) Vitaly was a man of wisdom; his wit and

his professionalism will be greatly missed. But his

memory will remain with us.

Ms. Wilson (Australia): Let me begin by

offering our heartfelt condolences to the colleagues,

family and friends of Ambassador Churkin following

his sad and untimely passing. As many have noted,

Ambassador Churkin was an accomplished diplomat

and representative. We will greatly miss his presence

at the United Nations and particularly in the Security

Page 29

Council, where he played such a strong and formative

role over many years.

Mr. Blanchard (Canada): Following the death

of our colleague, Ambassador Churkin, I would like

to begin by expressing my most sincere condolences

to his wife, Irina, his family, the entire Russian

mission and the Russian people for their great loss. In

addition to his exceptional legacy here at the United

Nations, Vitaly Churkin left many good memories

during his time as ambassador to Canada between

1998 and 2003. A few weeks ago I was having a

discussion with Prime Minister Chrétien who was the

Prime Minister during that period. Prime Minister

Chrétien told me that he had fond memories of his

relationship with Ambassador Churkin.

Mr. Mavros (Cyprus): At the outset, I would

like to express our deep sadness about the death of

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, a prominent and highly

experienced diplomat who skillfully represented

Russia at the United Nations for more than a decade

and contributed to the promotion of the United

Nations agenda.

Mr. Taula (New Zealand): I thank Ukraine for

convening today’s open debate. With great sadness I,

too, wish to acknowledge the passing of Ambassador

Vitaly Churkin. New Zealand had the honour of

working side-by-side with that outstanding diplomat

over the last two years. I would like to convey the

deep condolences of the New Zealand Permanent

Mission to the Russian Federation, and particularly to

the members of the Russian delegation here in New

York. Ambassador Churkin served his country with

distinction and was deeply respected by all who

worked with him. He will be greatly missed.

Mr. Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium) (spoke

in French): Allow me, first of all, to express my

deepest condolences to the Russian Mission for the

loss of Ambassador Churkin, who was also well-

known in Belgium where he had also been stationed

and where tribute was paid to him this morning.

Mrs. Abdul Hamid (Malaysia): At the outset,

I wish, on behalf of the Government of Malaysia, to

extend our deepest condolences to the Government

and the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation,

as well as to the family of Ambassador Vitaly

Churkin, on his sudden passing. Our Mission had the

opportunity to work closely with him, especially

during the past two years during Malaysia’s member-

ship in the Council, and we will miss his presence and

friendship tremendously.

Mr. Milanovic (Serbia): Before I proceed to

make my statement, I would like to take this opportu-

nity to pay my respects to one of our own. Yesterday,

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representa-

tive of the Russian Federation to the United Nations,

passed away in his office, hard at work representing

his country and promoting the great causes of the

United Nations. A stalwart of our Organization and a

friend, he will be missed by all of us and we all owe

him our utmost respect and gratitude. Our condo-

lences also go to his family and colleagues from the

Russian Mission.

Mr. Perovic (Montenegro): Let me begin by

offering my sincere and deepest condolences to the

Government of the Russian Federation, the family and

the friends on the passing of our respected colleague,

His Excellency Mr. Vitaly Churkin, Permanent

Representative of the Russian Federation to the

United Nations.

Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): In honour of

your presidency, Sir, let me try to say this in Ukrai-

nian: “I thank you very much, Mr. President”. I also

thank you for being here at this late hour in our

proceedings. I should like to begin by offering our

deepest condolences on the sad demise of Ambassa-

dor Churkin yesterday and through you, Sir, espe-

cially to his wife and children. He was an important

interlocutor for the Kingdom of the Netherlands

during his mandate on the Security Council, and he

will be sorely missed.

Mr. Madrakhimov (Uzbekistan) (spoke in

Russian): At the outset, I want to express our sincere

condolences in connection with the sudden death of

the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federa-

tion, Vitaly Ivanovich Churkin. We were stunned and

deeply saddened by this news. The memory of this

wonderful and bright person will always remain with

us. We offer our support and condolences to the

family of Vitaly Churkin and all our colleagues in the

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation. (spoke

in English)

Mr. Panayotov (Bulgaria) (spoke in Russian):

At the outset, I should like to express the sincere

condolences of the Government of Bulgaria in con-

nection with the passing of an outstanding diplomat

and human being, the Permanent Representative of

the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Ambas-

sador Vitaly Ivanovich Churkin. (spoke in English)

Mr. Iliichev (Russian Federation) (spoke in

Russian): We would once again like to thank the

Page 30

delegations that have expressed their condolences on

the death of the Permanent Representative of the

Russian Federation, Mr. Vitaly Ivanovich Churkin.

Their support at this difficult time is very important to

us.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben (1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

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