
Flint, MI, Feb. 11, 1960.)
Kermit Johnson and the rest of the strike strat-
egy committee realized that if they could get and hold
Plant 4, they could stop production sufficiently to
mortally wound GM. But 100 feet from Plant 4 was
the company personnel building which was used as an
arsenal for the company police.
“Even the top leadership in the CIO, including
John L. Lewis,” Kermit wrote, “were seriously
worried about the GM situation. When Lewis’ right-
hand man, John Brophy, approved our plan of action,
he did it with great reluctance and a complete lack of
confidence. He couldn’t conceive of a successful
strike in a plant that was less than one-fourth orga-
nized.”
The strike strategy committee developed a
diversionary plan. They held a meeting of carefully
chosen union men, but insuring that included was a
General Motors’ stool pigeon. They convinced the
men at the meeting that they would take Plant 9,
despite the fact that Plant 4 was the vital plant for
Chevrolet production. The stool-pigeon convinced
GM that the strikers planned to seize Plant 9. Thus the
strikers lured the plant guards away from Plant 4.
With the guards gone, the thousands of workers in
Plant 4 were able to fight the necessary battles against
supervision and company goons to gain control of
their plant. And when the police tried to enter Plant 4,
they were stopped at the gate by the Women’s Emer-
gency Brigade, a paramilitary group of women
wearing red tams and red armbands who played a
crucial role in defending the sit-downers.
Writers in Fortune Magazine in Nov. 1937 were
compelled to admit, “Out of all the sensational news
of the auto strike, the seizing of Chevy IV was the
high point.” They saw it as an “illustration of labor’s
growing initiative...it serves as a landmark,” they
acknowledged, “measuring how far labor had traveled
in less than three years and through some 4,000
strikes.”
On February 11, 1937, sit-downers emerged
from their occupied factories and joined a long parade
through the streets of downtown Flint. General
Motors had been forced to sign a one page document
conceding to the UAW the basis to become the sole
bargaining agent for the auto workers.
The sit-downers went back to work by Feb. 18.
They found that GM had not changed. To the con-
trary, the LaFollette Committee hearings document
how GM management singled out union people and
threatened or tried to fire them when they returned to
work after the Feb. 11 victory. In Chevrolet, Arnold
Lenz, the anti-union plant manager, marched 1000
men armed with clubs through the plant. And the
workers fought back, sometimes with slowdowns,
sometimes with sit-down strikes as their way to
resolve grievances or settle injustices. For example,
later there were sit-downs at Plant No. 4 and No. 8 in
Flint on March 6 when 6500 workers sat down, and
on March 8, 500 workers in Plant 4 sat down. (Sidney
Fine, Sit-Down, Ann Arbor, Mi, 1969, p. 322)
Floyd Hoke-Miller, a sit-downer in Plant 4,
sums up the victory of ‘37. “We didn’t win the war,
but we developed the unity to fight the coming bat-
tles.”
The sit-downers of `37 went on to lead the fight
for the contractual rights workers have today: senior-
ity, a grievance procedure, vacation pay, COLA,
pensions, 30 and out retirement, medical insurance,
etc. The story of how they won these gains is even
less known than the little known story of the Great
Flint Sit-Down Strike. But the story is a tremendously
important one.
The Chevy Worker, the newspaper started by the
Chevy workers on Jan. 7, 1937 to name the “dirty
rats...so that they can be shunned by all honest men”
became the precursor of shop papers put out by UAW
locals across the country.
The newspaper put out by the Plant 4 sit-down-
ers, was called The Searchlight. It was subtitled, “The
Voice of the Chevrolet Worker.” In testimony before
the War Labor Board in Washington, GM’s Director
of Labor Relations complained, “We always had a
tough bunch of cookies up at Chevrolet-Flint to deal
with. That was the breeding ground for the sit-down
strikes…. It is this same group of people,” he went
on, “that we thought that through the evolution of
labor relationship...would probably be changed and
improved.” He lamented, “They are now back in the
saddle and one very interesting paper (The Search-
light, official local publication) they got out recently
is directed at ‘Herr Thomas’ [Pres. of the UAW]. So
the worm has turned and they have got their own
union officials, some of whom they dislike, to replace
us in the news.” (The Flint Journal, January 7, 1944)
In response, George Carroll, the first editor of
The Searchlight, explained, “We have criticized (not
attacked) R. J. Thomas [Pres. of UAW] and Phillip
Murray [Pres. of CIO] and shall continue to exercise
the right to criticize as long as they pursue a policy
Page 10