The Amateur

Computerist

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Fall 2018 The Candlelight Revolution Continues Volume 31 No. 2

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Gwanghwamun Song. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4

Panmunjom Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9

Joint Statement at the Singapore Summit . . . . . Page 11

Welcoming the Singapore Summit . . . . . . . . . . Page 12

Kim Jong-un’s Pass & Trump’s Reverse Dunk . Page 13

Peace with Pyongyang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14

Role of Civil Society on the Korean Peninsula. . Page 19

Era of Great Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 29

Introduction

The 2016-2017 Candlelight Revolution

and the Support for More Peaceful

North-South Relations on the Korean

Peninsula

by Ronda Hauben

[email protected]

I. Background

In May 2018, I returned from a one month visit

to South Korea. The visit was remarkable in a number

of ways that I want to document and discuss. In order

to understand the current developments, however,

some background is needed. That background is what

I refer to as the netizen developments.

My attention was first drawn to South Korea

early in 2003 when mainstream Western newspapers

carried accounts of how in December 2002, Roh

Moo-hyun had been elected President by the

netizens.

This was a reference to the Internet users

who were committed to exploring their civic responsi-

bility having been empowered by their newly ac-

quired Internet access.

Roh’s election was propelled by demonstrations

called Candlelight demonstrations, in response to

netizen anger after two South Korean middle school

students had been killed by a vehicle driven by U.S.

Military Personnel. Roh was a human rights lawyer

whose election was the product of a broad ranging

campaign by netizens challenging the conservative

practices that have been common during South

Korean elections.

By 2008, Roh’s term was up. He was followed

as president by Lee Myung-bak, a conservative

business man who was elected to the presidency in

part because the online campaigning that enabled Roh

to win his election was now called illegal and forbid-

den and punished by big fines or even a potential jail

term. Such restrictions took several more years to be

overturned by the South Korean Constitutional Court.

Lee Myung-bak served as the President of South

Korea from 2008-2012.

Just a few weeks after he took office, President

Lee introduced a number of programs that drew

vehement opposition, particularly from netizens. This

led to a 106-day Candlelight demonstration in Seoul

along with other demonstrations around the country.

Among the studies of the 2008 Candlelight demon-

strations is one by Min Kyung-bae titled “Analog

Government Digital Citizens.”

In his article, Min describes the growing gap

between the netizens who have mastered digital

technology and new ways of focusing on communica-

tion as opposed to the government officials who are

stuck in the old patterns of analog technology. Min’s

article describes how government officials had closed

off some of the offline open areas where students and

others could discuss and debate issues. In response

netizens set up online forums where they could have

discussion and debate. Then netizens took the frame-

works they had created online and recreated them

offline.

One example of this process was a debate held

outdoors around midnight on June 10, 2008 which

continued into the early morning hours on June 11.

The issue of the debate was whether or not the dem-

onstrators should climb over the shipping containers

Page 1

that the police had used to erect a barricade in front of

the Blue House where the President lived and worked.

During the offline debate many people online

also participated by being in online contact with those

who were out at the plaza participating in the debate.

The result of the debate is that a decision was made

for several protesters to climb onto the top of the

shipping container barricade with their organization

flags to demonstrate that they could have gone over

the barricade but that they had publicly come to the

conclusion they should not do that.

Their action demonstrated that such a debate/

discussion which could be carried out online, now

could also occur offline. In this situation demonstra-

tors learned that their online practice could be used to

create such actions offline.

Such experience and lessons learned during the

2008 Candlelight demonstrations served the citizens

and netizens of South Korea well when in 2016 they

began six months of Saturday nonviolent demonstra-

tions in their fight to impeach Park Geun-hye who

had become the President of South Korea in the 2012

election.

II. The Inter-Korean Summit

When I arrived in Seoul late in April 2018,

everyone’s attention was focused on the upcoming

Inter-Korean Summit which was to take place on

April 27.

Once the Summit began, the attention of all the

South Koreans I observed in stores nearby or else-

where was focused on the streaming TV programs

broadcasting the Summit.

The details of the unfolding event were impres-

sive as the commitment of both President Moon Jae-

in of South Korea and Chairman Kim Jong-un of

North Korea demonstrated a determination to work

toward a peaceful future. A warm and friendly rela-

tionship showed signs of developing between the two

and between their wives.

Several days later when I was having dinner

with a Korean friend, the friend observed, “Who

would have expected any of this to happen even just

two years ago?”

III. The 2016-2017 Candlelight Demon-

strations

My decision to take a trip to South Korea was in

part motivated by the desire to hear the discussion and

debates among activists and researchers about how

they understood the 2016-2017 Candlelight demon-

strations.

When I arrived in Seoul, I learned that there

were several conferences planned to analyze the

2016-2017 Candlelight demonstrations. One of the

conferences was to be held toward the end of my

visit, but it would all be in the Korean language

without translation.

Fortunately, I was able to arrange interviews in

English with a few of the researchers at that confer-

ence to hear about their work. One professor did a

brief translation for me of the keynote presentation on

the first day of the conference. He also arranged for a

student to translate some presentations the second day

of the conference. This conference was on the recent

Candlelight demonstrations and their impact.

I found the keynote especially interesting but

since there was no written version available and the

translation I was given was informal, I will share

some of the notes I made with the proviso that these

are my notes and not the result of any official or

formal translation.

The title of the conference as rendered in the

informal translation was: “Symposium on Candlelight

Protest.” It was held in a National Assembly building

in Seoul on May 18-19, 2018. The title of the keynote

presented on May 18 by Kim Jung-bae was “Histori-

cal Significance and Challenges of Candlelight.”

In the keynote, Kim pointed to a book written a

few years earlier about how around the world, democ-

racy has been in retreat, for example in India and

Turkey. Kim Jung-bae wondered, if democracy was

in retreat everywhere, then how was it that the Can-

dlelight protest was possible in South Korea? He said

he was still seeking answers to this puzzle. He pro-

posed that the drama of the Candlelight and its

ramifications needed to be studied.

He also described how he had attended a dem-

onstration called by middle school students. He was

surprised that they had come from across South Korea

and that they put forward the need for a revolution.

Kim Jung-bae made a number of other observa-

tions and raised issues to be explored. Then he re-

turned to his concern that even after the Candlelight

demonstrations, there was still a danger of South

Korea retreating from democracy. He proposed there

was a need to identify the fundamental motivation

driving the Candlelight so as to keep it alive.

Other papers at the conference explored various

Page 2

aspects of the Candlelight phenomenon. In general,

the issues in contention revolved around two different

views. One was that the candlelight was part of a

revolutionary development. The other was that it was

perhaps a form of popularism.

One of the reasons I have offered this back-

ground is that I felt it would be helpful to understand

the kind of analysis and discussion that characterize

the papers presented at another conference that took

place on May 23. That conference was titled: “Inter-

national Forum: The Role of Civil Society for the

Improvement of Inter-Korean Relations and the

Process of Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula.”

I want to point to some observations and recom-

mendations in one particular paper presented at this

conference, the paper by Lee Taeho titled, “The Role

of Civil Society for Building Inter-Korean Trust and

Peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

(The paper is

reprinted in this issue starting on page 19.) There are

other similarly interesting observations and recom-

mendations in other papers presented at the same

conference, but for my summary Lee Taeho’s paper

makes some particularly useful observations and

recommendations.

IV. Observations and Recommendations

One significant observation made in Lee’s paper

was that the relationship between the two Koreas had

to be different after the 2016-2017 Candlelight

Revolution from what it had been before. Some of the

reasoning behind this observation was that the Can-

dlelight Revolution provided for the democratic

legitimacy of the Moon Jae-in government. The

election that Moon Jae-in won shortly after the

victory of the Candlelight was a direct result of the

Candlelight Revolution’ winning the impeachment of

Park Geun-hye. The Candlelight demonstrations

provided support for the political authority of what

would shortly afterwards become the Moon govern-

ment. The success of the Candlelight Revolution

resulted in part from the important role played by

South Korean Civil Society. With this support, one

can argue that Korean Civil Society has won the right

to work together with the government to find solu-

tions to difficult problems. But for that partnership to

continue the government will have to work for better

relations with the North since reconciliation and

eventual reunification are crucial goals of many who

are part of South Korean Civil Society.

Another basis for a different relationship be-

tween the government and the citizens, Lee’s paper

proposes, is based on the experience demonstrating

that the safety and well being of the people who live

on the Korean Peninsula is dependent on decisions

made by them, not by outside experts.

Drawing its conclusions from the success of the

Candlelight demonstrations, the paper proposes

“broad and open discussions” by the ordinary people

“without limitation” on debate.

Lee’s paper calls for the government to form a

discussion forum to make it possible for citizens to

participate in the reviews and discussion of the

direction the government should take to improve the

relationship between the two Koreas so as to be able

to resolve controversial issues. It proposes that civil

society in South Korea work to “open a space where

citizens as sovereign can have a discussion altogether

and participate to build a peaceful consensus for

coexistence.”

Lee’s paper argues that the legacy of the years

of the division of Korea has created a challenging

situation. In order not to be harmed by this legacy,

civil society has to work to create a process which

will require not just finding the middle ground be-

tween different views but a space to encourage free

discussion of various visions and methods so as to

arrive at processes to unify those with diverse experi-

ences.

The paper concludes that, with the “dramatic

change … unfolding on the Korean Peninsula and in

Northeast Asia,” the role for civil society, is to “freely

imagine, share, and boldly embody practices to

overcome the division of the Korean Peninsula and to

further the coexistence in East Asia while confronting

old stereotypes, prejudice, and taboos that the division

system emphasized to us, armed with a strong belief

in changes that the participation and solidarity of the

citizens of the Korean Peninsula and the entire world

will help us draw out.”

V. Summary

A question is raised by the review of the Can-

dlelight Revolution that has been going on in South

Korea over the past 15 years. Is there a new political

process unfolding in South Korea which can help

forge a new relationship between the two Koreas?

The experience of the Candlelights has helped to

create a digital form of citizenship which is also a

more participatory form of citizenship. Min Kyung-

bae’s article about the 2008 Candlelight helped to

Page 3

document the nature of this new form of citizenship.

Lee Taeho’s article documents some of the new

processes that South Korean netizens and citizens

have learned from the Candlelight experience which

can be applied to the inter-Korean processes.

Another article, “Ushering in an Era of Great

Transformation on the Korean Peninsula through

Citizen Participation” by Lee Hyeuk-hee, demon-

strates that there are other activists and researchers in

South Korea trying to define this new political pro-

cess and determine how it can help to forge a new

relationship between the two Koreas. “A different era

requires different thinking” writes the author, who is

Chairperson of the Operation Committee of the NGO

One Korea Action. Lee Hyeuk-hee describes what is

happening on the Korean Peninsula as “this great

transformation.” At its core, he writes, was the

“Candlelight Revolution.”

While Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye

sought to pursue a policy of confrontation with the

DPRK, leading to a military crisis, earlier South

Korean Presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun

had begun the process of working toward a more long

range and peace-supporting inter-Korean policy. They

instituted an engagement policy.

With a new government in the South put in

place due to the success of the Candlelight Revolu-

tion, it became possible for the new president, Moon

Jae-in, to return to an engagement policy. This in-

volves economic, social and cultural interaction rather

than Lee Myung-bak’s and Park Guen-hye’s policy of

reunification through absorption.

Moon and Kim Jung-un have put in place a top

down approach toward rapidly normalizing relations

through “negotiation and dialogue between high

ranking officials” which then is to be “expanded

downward.”

The goal of this process is to institutionalize

inter-Korean relations via the creation of a confedera-

tion of the North and South. A confederation means

the North and the South can exist as two sovereign

states for a period of time as they prepare for reunifi-

cation, by first forming an economic community, then

a socio-cultural community and finally a political

community.

Lee Hyeuk-hee argues that the previous failure

of inter-Korean exchanges was the failure to “attract

the masses” to be part of the process. He explains,

their participation was needed in order to succeed in

building a solidarity between the peoples of the two

Koreas. The Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office opened

in Summer 2018 could provide a means to create the

structures to make possible the needed exchanges and

cooperation.

Lee Hyeuk-hee proposes the need for many

contributions to forge the solidarity between the two

cultures of the North and the South. Such contribu-

tions, he suggests, could be made by those who had

been part of the Candlelight Revolution and by ‘regu-

lar’ citizens. Lee Hyeuk-hee argues, such wide

ranging contributions and involvement is needed in

order to finally end the cold war system still dividing

the Korean people.

Min Kyung-bae, Lee Taeho, and Lee Hyeuk-hee

all see the Candlelight Revolution as setting the basis

for the new political processes that will make possible

the new relationship to be built between the two

Koreas.

The papers by Lee Taeho, and Lee Hyeuk-hee

provide a set of proposals for how the two Koreas

learning from the candlelight experience, can ap-

proach each other. This is a start. But also needed is

continued study of the candlelight experience so as to

broaden the insights and lessons that civil society and

government can learn so as to build a mass based

solidarity among the peoples of the two Koreas. There

is some experience that the Korean people have had,

in both the North and the South to help with this.

What is needed is discussion among the citizens and

netizens of Korea and research efforts to meet the

demands of such challenges.

Notes:

1. See e.g., Michael Hauben, “The Net and Netizens: The Impact

the Net has on People’s Lives.” Online at:

http://www.colum

bia.edu/~rh120/ch106.x01.

2. Barbara Demick, “‘Netizens’ Crusade Buoys New South

Korean Leader: An unofficial online fan club is credited with

helping Roh Moo Hyun into office by attracting young voters. It

may continue to play a role.” LA Times, Feb 10, 2003. Online at:

http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/10/world/fg-cyber10

3. Yun Young Min, “An Analysis of Cyber-Electioneering:

Focusing on the 2002 Presidential Election in Korea,” Korea

Journal, Vol. 43. No. 3 Autumn, 2003 pp.141-164. Online at:

https://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3258

4. Min Kyung Bae, “Analog Government Digital Citizens,”

Global Asia Vol. 3 No. 3, 2008.9, pp. 94-103. Online at:

https://www.globalasia.org/v3no3/feature/analog-government-

digital-citizens_kyung-bae-min

5. Lee Taeho, “The Role of Civil Society for Building Inter-

Korean Trust and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” presented at

“The International Forum: The Role of Civil Society for the

Page 4

Improvement of Inter-Korean Relations and the Process of

Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula” on May 23, 2018 in

Seoul. Reprinted in this issue.

[Editor’s Note: Jennifer Lee, a New York City stu-

dent, spent a semester between high school and

college in Seoul, South Korea. She was in Seoul

during the 2016-2017 Candlelight Revolution which

succeeded in impeaching then President Park Geun-

hye. This essay was published on the Entropy website

on January 16, 2018 at: https://entropymag.org/

gwanghwamun-song-by-jennifer-lee/.]

Gwanghwamun Song

by Jennifer Lee

My aunt calls to tell me: let’s meet at Jongno-

3ga [subway station]. My eyes linger on the faces of

those boarding the 1-train with me at Si-Chung

Station, wondering if we share a common destination.

The late-autumn air bites with the tang of anticipa-

tion, and I recall the expected numbers scrolling

across the television this morning as I lay in the

jjimjilbang [public bath] with my grandmother, eyes

squinting to see without my glasses.

As I sat together with halmoni [grandma],

splitting a tangerine and strawberry yogurt, she

sighed. “It’s so dangerous to gather in such large

groups,” she said, eyes fixed on the news anchor

telling us that as many as a million people are ex-

pected to show. “I can’t believe people are putting

their lives at risk.”

I brushed from my mind thoughts of the incrimi-

natory texts in my locker by the baths as I peeled two

slices of the tangerine apart, giving one to halmoni,

straining to hear the muted voice of the news anchor.

A historical moment.

My grandmother shakes her head again. “Her

father, Park Chung Hee – he did great things for our

nation.” She folds the foil yogurt cover into a spoon,

scooping strawberry yogurt into her mouth. “It’s so

unfortunate about his daughter. But going into the

streets….”

The fear reminds me of my history teacher on

Friday as she told us about the [May 1980] Gwangju

Uprising, adding, “I sat at home last weekend, worry-

ing these protests will become violent, as they did

thirty years ago,” and I feel my throat catch, because

I know my grandmother remembers Gwangju and she

remembers the [1987] June Struggle and she remem-

bers farther back, too, to the 6.25 [Korean] War.

But the past weeks had been nonviolent, and so

I texted my aunt, asking to go with her to

Gwanghwamun.* She’d told me to text her back when

I left the jjimjilbang with my grandmother, and then

had called to tell me where to meet. All these mo-

ments are churning through me, and I cling to the

warmth of the jjimjilbang with my grandmother in the

pit of my stomach as I sway with the lurching train

towards the candlelight.

These past few weeks, in evaluating the actions

of the president, people have been returning to two

lines from the Constitution: Article 1.2, which states

that “The sovereignty of the Republic of Korea shall

reside in the people, and all state authority shall

emanate from the people,” and Article 7.1, which

states that “All public officials shall be servants of the

entire people and shall be responsible to the people.”

The word for the Constitution comes from

the Sino-Korean roots meaning “law” and also

meaning “law” – a contrast to the American word

“Constitution,” which suggests more something that

is drawn up intentionally of several parts, composed

by human hands, rather than an absolute, fundamental

law.

The irony of the idea of a “law” “law” is per-

haps best exemplified by Korea’s Second Consti-

tutional Amendment, also known as the “Sasaoib”

(Integer-Rounding) Amendment. In 1954, there was

a National Assembly vote to remove the term restric-

tion on the first president. In order for a constitutional

amendment to pass, a two-thirds majority of the 203

Assemblymen in office needed to vote in the affirma-

tive. Two-thirds of 203 is 135.3)3)3) (repeated),

which makes 136 votes necessary for a two-thirds

majority. But only able to secure 135 affirmative

votes, the ruling party decided with the support of the

Korean Mathematical Society’s head that one should

use integer math to round down, making 135 votes

count as a two-thirds majority, thus enabling

Syngman Rhee to legally cling to his office in perpe-

tuity.

This was the original functioning of Korea’s

Constitution.

As I hurtle towards Jongno-3ga, signs of the

gathering begin making their way onboard. Students

wearing headbands with plastic tealight candles fixed

atop their heads. Parents guarding children who clutch

Page 5

signs and candles nestled in cups, trying to impart

early lessons about democracy. My phone buzzes as

I connect to subway station Wi-fi, and I pull up

KakaoTalk to find that my classmate has messaged

me. there r so many ppl! I’ve been here since 1 and I

just followed th crowd until I cld get into paris ba-

guette but now I don’t kno wht street im on and my

phone is at 1% and im going 2 miss night hagwon too.

where r u?

going 2 meet my aunt but if u know where u r

maybe we can meet u? can u charge ur phone? find ur

way to the nearest train station?

I step onto the platform of Jongno-3ga, taking

the stairs up – and then there are people all around

me, those heading for the subway and those heading

for the outside, and the walls are lined by people

waiting for the bathroom – mothers and grandmothers

and children and high schoolers in school uniform.

I follow the signs to exit 7, but as I approach, a

subway worker wielding a flashlight shouts at me and

those around me: “Exit through these stairs is not

permitted! You can go out exit 5, or go back towards

the subway.”

Exit 5 is where I had just come from, is the exit

nearest where I had gotten out from the train level,

but I head back, phone pressed to my mouth, telling

my aunt, “Exist seven is blocked. I’m going out exit

five.”

“Find your way to exit seven,” she says, hang-

ing up.

I follow the feet in front of me up the stairs,

onto street level – and it is then, looking around, that

I find myself caught in a current and realize that This

is what a crowd looks like.

My decade as a New Yorker has not prepared

me for the people packing the streets. We are the

street, sidewalk to sidewalk, hands cupping candles

and calling out in unison: “Park Geun-Hye ha-ya ha-

ra! Dang-jang toe-jin ha-ra!” My eyes roam hungrily

across the crowd, seeking a subway entrance with a

“7” emblazoned on it, and I find it, on the far side of

the sea, just as everybody around me begins to sit.

see u soon! I text back, sitting cross-legged with

the crowd around me. I cannot figure out how to

make my way through the street without stepping on

feet or hands or pushing those around me, so I decide

to lose myself to this crowd, if only for a moment. We

are not shouting, or pushing, or speaking. Just sitting

in this silence, in this stillness, and I feel the power

between me and my neighbors, in the lights they are

holding, as I am one among a million, and I wish for

my own candlelight to cup my hands around. And

then there is a woman shouting, “The procession is

continuing towards the Blue House,” and people are

standing, and in the rush, I push my way towards my

aunt – on the other end of the sea, waiting for me.

Finally I see her, and she reaches for me – arms

open in a hug, the niece she sees not often enough, as

she whispers, “Your mom would kill me if she knew

you were here.”

The impeachment of a president through popu-

lar protest in Korea does not lack precedence. In

1960, in what we now remember as the April 19

[4.19] Revolution, a hundred thousand protesters

marched to the Blue House demanding the resignation

of Korea’s first president – U.S.-backed dictator

Syngman Rhee. The police opened fire on civilians,

killing hundreds. When Syngman Rhee finally

stepped down, the U.S. flew him to Hawaii, where he

lived unremarkably until he passed away.

It wasn’t until this past winter, when I went in

search of the 4.19 [April 19, 1960 student uprising

against Syngman Rhee] National Memorial, that I

realized it was the same park in Suyu-ri I had gone to

play in with my grandmother when I was a child.

Seeing the flowers and Korean flags marking each

tombstone, I had thought at the time that the rows and

rows of headstones at the edge of the park belonged

to military veterans or soldiers, like my grandfather –

it was only now that, returning, I read them for the

first time. They were college students, barely older

than I was, unexceptional other than in that they had

hoped for a better country and died at the hands of

their government.

As we walk together towards Gwanghwamun,

my aunt buys us each a candle for two thousand won,

from one of the dozens of sellers lining the streets.

“Be careful not to tip it – the paper cup might burn,”

the man who hands me mine warns. As my aunt and

I link arms, each holding a light, I cannot help the

smile breaking across my face. I am angry; I am sad;

both are reasons why I am here – but being here,

among fellow Koreans, hands cupping my candle-

light, I imagine our years of shared history behind us

as a bond tying us together to this one place.

The crowd grows thicker as we approach the

square, and amidst the plummeting temperatures a

girl passes me a stack of hand warmers, telling me to

take one and pass it.

We pass screen after screen – massive

Page 6

Samsungs and LGs set up in the street, with people

clustered before each. Vans, too – from JTBC, from

OhmynewsTV, from KBS and SBS and every station

under our sun. Major opposition political parties have

bought out blocks of bus and plane tickets for people

to come up from the countryside or fly in from as far

as Jeju Island. Groups pass, waving flags and shout-

ing. There are no signs of the disunity and national

disagreement that will become the next presidential

election, as the same people who fought alongside

each other for the impeachment fight for the right to

become the face of a new era. My aunt steers me from

those headed for the Blue House, murmuring, “If

anything violent happens, it’ll probably be there.”

And then, suddenly, we can go no further.

Ahead of us is a wall of people, and I realize that the

people I saw before were only the outskirts of the

crowd: now I have reached the edge of the center,

from which I can see only bodies ahead of me, spill-

ing out in all directions, further than the furthest

reaches of my eye. I understand now my friend when

she said she did not know where she was, that she

could not see any street signs, that all she saw were

people and people and people until she ducked into a

bakery. As I realize why my aunt had told me to meet

a fifteen-minute walk away from the Gwanghwamun

station, voices rise around me in song.

You call this a country? You call this a country?

Den of treacherous thieves Geun-hye, Soon-sil,

Myung-bak

Heaven for criminals; hell for everyday men;

We can stand it no longer.

Ha-ya ha-ya ha-ya ha-ya hayuh-ra.

Park Geun-Hye reul dang-jang ha-ya hayuh-ra

Ha-ok ha-ok ha-ok ha-ok hayuh-ra.

Park Geun-Hye reul ha-ok shikyuh-ra.

I do not yet know these lyrics – although as the

months of protests continue this song is one of many

I will come to know as muscle memory, songs that

make my throat catch and my eyes water as I remem-

ber what it was like to stand in Gwanghwamun

Square that winter. These are songs I will only ever

remember as protest songs, because I heard them first

at Gwanghwamun:

As we walk back to the subway, my aunt gives

her candle to a person on their way to

Gwanghwamun, and they thank her, and she thanks them.

In the weeks to come, my feet will lead me

further into the crowd, shoulder-to-shoulder with

those around me, energy pulsating between us, fumes

from vendors selling bbundaegi heavy in the air as I

wave the reusable LED candle my aunt has ordered

for me online.

Half a dozen songs take shape in my mouth as

I think of my high school teachers who have de-

nounced Park Chung-hee for his authoritarian rule,

Park Geun-hye on her government-created history

textbook policy, which would erase the memory of

the Jeju Massacre, and the bribing of university

officials for Choi Soon-sil’s daughter’s education.

Every week there is more news of the corruption

spiraling out from Park Geun-hye’s administration,

despite her having been the only president to have

won the nation’s democratic elections with an abso-

lute majority of the vote. Of course, months later,

evidence surfaces also of the previous president task-

ing the national intelligence agency with the role of

ensuring that Park Geun-hye would win the next

election, ensuring the party’s maintenance of power.

I buy gloves from the subway station on my way

home from Gwanghwamun, as I realize an LED will

not keep my fingers from the chill.

December 3, 2016 – the Saturday before the

verdict of the 9

. The day of the two million. My aunt

and I eat spicy mushroom kalguksu near the National

Assembly building before we head over to the sub-

way. There had been protests in front of the Assembly

all morning, but we are headed again to

Gwanghwamun. My mother has given me her bless-

ing today, told my aunt to take care of me, said, “Be

there for me! It isn’t about you, but it’s about your

body, on the street, making one of two million.”

All together, let us sing:

We dreamt without regret;

Page 7

Things that have passed have meaning,

As things that have passed.

That day, we walk from Eljiro-3ga station, and

people are passing out flyers with the contact infor-

mation for members of the National Assembly, telling

us to please contact our representatives, to pressure

them into bowing before the will of the nation.

My fingers clench as I pass a Caucasian man in

the street waving a Korean flag and shouting “Korea

man-sae!” This battle is neither his to mock nor his to

claim. I sit among rows and rows of people,

candlelights cupped in our palms, and those without

pull up images of candles on their phones, holding

before them the light. We join in the Korean history

of democratic uprising, stretching back to before

Rhee’s ousting from office, to the independence

fighters of March 1

[1919], and we are crying, and I

am crying, because people have been coming out

every Saturday for the past several months, and those

unable to make it to Gwanghwamun have been

making it out to the centers of their own towns. My

Korean teacher who is pregnant told us she walked

through her neighborhood with her baby with her

candle held high knowing that her daughter will be

born into this country, and that if the National Assem-

bly turns on us on the ninth and does not impeach, we

will be left in the throes of a crumbling nation.

In the days between the third and the ninth,

whenever I pass people on the street or meet eyes

with passing strangers on the subway, I find myself

wondering, Were you there with me this Saturday?

Last Saturday? Is it so tiring for you to wake up each

day with your head held high and move forward

towards an unknown? Did your grandparents go out

in anti-protest, demanding that President Park be

kept in office? Can you imagine us as a hopeful

nation?

“President” in Korea was not originally meant

to mean “democratically elected.” Even after

Syngman Rhee’s impeachment, his legacy of election

fraud and constitutional amendment with the purpose

of securing his next term in office remained the norm.

Changes in ruling party were violent – most notable

being the 1961 Coup d’etat by which Park Geun-

hye’s father Park Chung-hee seized power and the

1979 Coup d’etat by which Chun Doo-hwan took

over following Park Chung-hee’s assassination.

Both periods of rule were marked by the pres-

idents’ violent quashing of dissent – as well as con-

versely, the ongoing uprisings led by labor organizers

and college students. The 1979 Bu-Ma Democratic

Protests, demanding the end of Park Chung-hee’s

dictatorial Yushin regime. The May 18

Gwangju

Uprising, which many call “Korea’s Tiananmen

Square” – when in response to the declaration of

martial law and the shutting down of universities

nationwide, college students in Gwangju took to the

streets to demand that Chun Doo-hwan step down,

and paratroopers and military forces stationed at the

Parallel were sent to quash what the government

labeled a Communist uprising.

It wasn’t until 1987 that Korea’s democratic

constitution was put in place, the year before my

parents entered college. In the months leading up to it,

two students at two of Korea’s top universities – Park

Jong-chul and Yi Han-yeol – became rallying points

for the public: Park Jong-chul had been a student at

Seoul National University who, despite never having

himself participated in protests, was arrested and

interrogated by the police regarding the whereabouts

of an upperclassman friend and protest leader who

had vanished to evade arrest. The police returned

Park’s body to his family, claiming that they had hit

a desk and the boy had keeled over of a heart attack.

It soon became clear the student had been water-

tortured. Yi Han-yeol was a Yonsei University

student who had been protesting in the streets when

he was hit in the face by a tear gas canister, and a

month later, he passed away.

I visited the Yi Han-yeol memorial that winter,

a small two-floor display tucked into a side-street in

Sinchon, where video footage of that winter’s Candle-

light vigils played beside glass cases showing the

materiality of the boy when he was hit: the white

sneakers; the Yonsei jersey; the tattered pants. On

audio loop was a song that had filled the streets that

winter, a song that had become popularized during the

protests in response to the Sewol Ferry sinking of

2014: “The Truth Does Not Sink.”

Darkness cannot overcome the light;

Lies cannot overcome the truth;

The truth does not sink;

We do not give up.

There is a 1983 Korean short story called

“Sapyeong Station” by Lim Chul-woo, describing the

people waiting for a train in the midst of snowfall.

The cranky old man; the middle-aged ex-convict who

Page 8

is on his way to see whether the mother of the friend

he met in prison is still alive; the former college

student who was going to fulfill his parents’ every

dream, until he was expelled for participating in

democratic uprisings.

The student went home to see his parents, but

could not bear to tell them what had happened, and so

now is headed back away from home, waiting for the

train in the middle of a snowfall. This past winter,

high school seniors were out on the streets in the

weeks leading up to the Suneung (college entrance

exam), proclaiming that as youth invested in their

futures, they could only invest also in this voice

calling for a different future.

When the National Assembly votes to impeach,

it is as if the world has finally let out the breath it had

been holding, even though it can still only be the

beginning. We must continue fighting for the Consti-

tutional Court’s confirmation, and even after, know

that change is contingent upon the results of the new

election and the new candidates’ ability to uphold

campaign promises and the nation’s ability to keep

moving forward.

My history teacher reminds us to be grateful for

those students from 4.19 to Gwangju to the June

Struggle who fought for us to have this democracy.

My father reminds me that protest in his college years

was violent – that he most definitely remembers

throwing rocks at and running from the police; that

that was simply “what college students did.” Espe-

cially at a place like Seoul National University, where

students imagined the future of the country was in

their hands, and that as responsible, upstanding

citizens, they would have to go out onto the streets for

the fight.

The afternoon of the day the Constitutional

Court confirms Park’s impeachment, I am in

Namdaemun Market with my aunt, who buys pink

hair curlers to match the judge who had delivered the

verdict confirming the former president’s guilt. The

acting chief justice Lee Jung-mi, swamped by the

hectic mess of the morning, had been caught by the

paparazzi leaving the house with two pink hair rollers

left in. After the impeachment, images of the woman

that every mother wanted to raise her daughter to be

had gone viral, hair curlers and all.

Today, I think back to the Gwanghwamun

winter and of how far our nation has left to build. Of

how every fifth spring, come the presidential election,

I will be reminded of this year that permanently

changed the season of our election from fall to spring.

Did it really happen? Was I really there? I find

myself wondering, an ocean away now in my Ivy

League classroom, watching the stoic day-to-day of

the nation in the face of Trump’s aggression towards

North Korea. As I watch the implementation of

THAAD and Trump’s rhetoric grow increasingly

violent, I think of the Kim Kwang-kyu poem “Faint

Shadows of Old Love,” in which old friends who

marched together in the [1960] 4.19 Revolution meet

again eighteen years later with neckties and jobs –

now part of the old generation, now afraid of revolu-

tion. They are no longer singing. As they exchange

their new phone numbers and gossip; as they split to

play poker and dance, the wind asks:

Aren’t you ashamed?/Aren’t you ashamed?

Jennifer Lee studies computer science at Columbia University

and tweets @robotslikemars

*Gwanghwamun Square is a public open space located in the

Jongno district in the heart of Seoul. From Oct 2016 to April

2017 there were 23 weekly nonviolent Saturday evening

Candlelight demonstrations against then president Park Geun-

hye and her corrupt government. The demonstrations there and

throughout South Korea were attended in total by an estimated

17 million Koreans.

[Editor’s Note: Following is the Panmunjom Declara-

tion adopted between the DPRK’s Kim Jong-un and

the ROK‘s Moon Jae-in on April 27, 2018, during the

first 2018 Inter-Korean Summit.]

Panmunjom Declaration for

Peace, Prosperity and

Unification of the Korean

Peninsula

During this momentous period of historical

transformation on the Korean Peninsula, reflecting the

enduring aspiration of the Korean people for peace,

prosperity and unification, President Moon Jae-in of

the Republic of Korea and Chairman Kim Jong-un of

the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea held an Inter-Korean

Page 9

Summit Meeting at the ‘Peace House’ at Panmunjom

on April 27, 2018.

The two leaders solemnly declared before the

80 million Korean people and the whole world that

there will be no more war on the Korean Peninsula

and thus a new era of peace has begun.

The two leaders, sharing the firm commitment

to bring a swift end to the Cold War relic of long-

standing division and confrontation, to boldly ap-

proach a new era of national reconciliation, peace and

prosperity, and to improve and cultivate inter-Korean

relations in a more active manner, declared at this

historic site of Panmunjom as follows:

South and North Korea will reconnect

the blood relations of the people and

bring forward the future of co-pros-

perity and unification led by Koreans

by facilitating comprehensive and

groundbreaking advancement in inter-

Korean relations.

Improving and cultivating inter-Korean

relations is the prevalent desire of the whole nation

and the urgent calling of the times that cannot be held

back any further.

South and North Korea affirmed the principle

of determining the destiny of the Korean nation on

their own accord and agreed to bring forth the water-

shed moment for the improvement of inter-Korean

relations by fully implementing all existing agree-

ments and declarations adopted between the two sides

thus far.

South and North Korea agreed to hold dia-

logue and negotiations in various fields including at

high level, and to take active measures for the imple-

mentations of the agreements reached at the Summit.

South and North Korea agreed to establish a

joint liaison office with resident representatives of

both sides in the Kaesong region in order to facilitate

close consultation between the authorities as well as

smooth exchanges and cooperation between the

peoples.

South and North Korea agreed to encourage

more active cooperation, exchanges, visits and con-

tacts at all levels in order to rejuvenate the sense of

national reconciliation and unity. Between South and

North, two sides will encourage the atmosphere of

amity and cooperation by actively staging various

joint events on the dates that hold special meaning for

both South and North Korea, such as June 15, in

which participants from all levels, including central

and local governments, parliaments, political parties

and civil organizations, will be involved. On the

international front, two sides agreed to demonstrate

their collective wisdom, talents and solidarity by

jointly participating in international sports events

such as the 2018 Asian Games.

South and North Korea agreed to endeavor to

swiftly resolve the humanitarian issues that resulted

from the division of the nation, and to convene the

Inter-Korean Red Cross Meeting to discuss and solve

various issues including the reunion of separated

families. In this vein, South and North Korea agreed

to proceed with reunion programs for the separated

families on the occasion of the National Liberation

Day of August 15 this year.

South and North Korea agreed to actively

implement the projects previously agreed in the 2007

October 4 Declaration, in order to promote balanced

economic growth and co-prosperity of the nation. As

a first step, the two sides agreed to adopt practical

steps towards the connection and modernization of

the railways and roads on the eastern transportation

corridor as well as between Seoul and Sinuiju for

their utilization.

South and North Korea will make joint efforts

to alleviate the acute military tension and practically

eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula.

South and North Korea agreed to completely

cease all hostile acts against each other in every

domain, including land, air and sea, that are the

source of military tension and conflict. In this vein,

the two sides agreed to transform the demilitarized

zone into a peace zone in a genuine sense by ceasing

as of May 1 this year all hostile acts and eliminating

their means, including broadcasting through loud-

speakers and distribution of leaflets, in the areas along

the Military Demarcation Line.

South and North Korea agreed to devise a

practical scheme to turn the areas around the Northern

Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace

zone in order to prevent accidental military clashes

and guarantee safe fishing activities.

South and North Korea agreed to take various

military measures to ensure mutual cooperation,

exchanges, visits and contacts. The two sides agreed

to hold frequent meetings between military authori-

ties, including the Defense Ministers Meeting, in

order to immediately discuss and solve military issues

that arise between them. In this regard, the two sides

agreed to first convene military talks at the rank of

Page 10

general in May.

South and North Korea will actively cooperate

to establish a permanent and solid peace regime on

the Korean Peninsula. Bringing an end to the current

unnatural state of armistice and establishing a robust

peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is a historical

mission that must not be delayed any further.

South and North Korea reaffirmed the Non-

Aggression Agreement that precludes the use of force

in any form against each other, and agreed to strictly

adhere to this Agreement.

South and North Korea agreed to carry out

disarmament in a phased manner, as military tension

is alleviated and substantial progress is made in

military confidence-building.

During this year that marks the 65

anniver-

sary of the Armistice, South and North Korea agreed

to actively pursue trilateral meetings involving the

two Koreas and the United States, or quadrilateral

meetings involving the two Koreas, the United States

and China with a view to declaring an end to the War

and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.

South and North Korea confirmed the com-

mon goal of realizing, through complete denu-

clearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, South

and North Korea shared the view that the measures

being initiated by North Korea are very meaningful

and crucial for the denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula and agreed to carry out their respective

roles and responsibilities in this regard. South and

North Korea agreed to actively seek the support and

cooperation of the international community for the

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The two leaders agreed, through regular meet-

ings and direct telephone conversations, to hold

frequent and candid discussions on issues vital to the

nation, to strengthen mutual trust and to jointly

endeavor to strengthen the positive momentum

towards continuous advancement of inter-Korean

relations as well as peace, prosperity and unification

of the Korean Peninsula.

In this context, President Moon Jae-in agreed

to visit Pyongyang this fall.

April 27, 2018

Done in Panmunjom

(signed) Moon Jae-in, President, The Republic of

Korea

(signed) Kim Jong-un, Chairman, State Affairs

Commission, The Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea

[Editor’s Note: Following is the Joint Statement that

U.S. President Trump and DPRK Chairman Kim

signed on June 12, 2018 in Singapore after their one

day summit.]

Joint Statement of President

Donald J. Trump and Chair-

man Kim Jong Un at the

Singapore Summit

President Donald J. Trump of the United

States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the

State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) held a first, historic

summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018.

President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un

conducted a comprehensive, in-depth, and sincere

exchange of opinions on the issues related to the

establishment of new U.S.-DPRK relations and the

building of a lasting and robust peace regime on the

Korean Peninsula. President Trump committed to

provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chair-

man Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwaver-

ing commitment to complete denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.

Convinced that the establishment of new U.S.-

DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and

prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world,

and recognizing that mutual confidence building can

promote the denuclearization of the Korean Penin-

sula, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un

state the following:

1. The United States and the DPRK commit to estab-

lish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the

desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace

and prosperity.

2. The United States and the DPRK will join their

efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on

the Korean Peninsula.

3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Decla-

ration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recov-

ering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate

repatriation of those already identified.

Page 11

Having acknowledged that the U.S.-DPRK

summit – the first in history – was an epochal event of

great significance and overcoming decades of ten-

sions and hostilities between the two countries and for

the opening of a new future, President Trump and

Chairman Kim Jong Un commit to implement the

stipulations in this joint statement fully and expedi-

tiously. The United States and the DPRK commit to

hold follow-on negotiations led by the U.S. Secretary

of State, Mike Pompeo, and a relevant high-level

DPRK official, at the earliest possible date, to imple-

ment the outcomes of the U.S.-DPRK summit.

President Donald J. Trump of the United

States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the

State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea have committed to cooperate for

the development of new U.S.-DPRK relations and for

the promotion of peace, prosperity, and security of the

Korean Peninsula and of the world.

June 12, 2018

Sentosa Island, Singapore

[Editor’s Note: The following is a Statement by the

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Con-

flict (GPPAC) issued on June 12, 2018. It can be

accessed at:

https://www.gppac.net/news/-/asset_

publisher/fHv91YcOz0CI/content/welcoming-the-si

ngapore-summit-a-step-towards-a-peaceful-nuclear-

free-korean-peninsula/]

Welcoming the Singapore

Summit:

A Step Toward a Peaceful, Nuclear-

Free Korean Peninsula

As a global network of civil society peace

building organizations, the Global Partnership for the

Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) welcomes

today’s historic summit and subsequent agreement in

Singapore by President Donald Trump of the United

States and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The points laid

out in the agreement, relating to the establishment of

new U.S.-DPRK relations, the building of a lasting

peace regime, and the complete denuclearization of

the Korean Peninsula are important, positive steps

forward to achieving a peaceful, nuclear-free North-

east Asia.

The lack of a peace treaty to formally end the

Korean War, and the ongoing nuclear threats on the

Korean Peninsula, continue to endanger the lives and

human security of not only the Korean people, but

also the entire Northeast Asian region and indeed the

world. It is for this very reason that GPPAC and its

member organizations in Northeast Asia, including in

Korea, have continued for decades to undertake

multilayered initiatives to promote dialogue, ex-

change and trust building for peace on the Korean

Peninsula, including the GPPAC Northeast Asia-led

Ulaanbaatar Process.

We applaud the diplomatic efforts which made

today’s summit possible, including the leadership

demonstrated by South Korean President Moon Jae-

in, supported by the civil society which brought him

into power through the Candlelight Revolution. This

is indeed an example of the prevention of armed

conflict, with the support of civil society – vitally

needed in light of the long-running tensions on the

Korean Peninsula, involving even the risk of a cata-

strophic nuclear war.

At the same time, we recognize that today’s

meeting is but a first step, and that a long process

must follow. Concrete steps must now be made to

implement both the June 12 Kim-Trump Joint State-

ment and the April 27 Inter-Korean Panmunjeom

Declaration. To this end, we welcome both Chairman

Kim’s expressing his strong will to achieve

denuclearization, and President Trump’s announce-

ment to end war games on the Korean Peninsula. We

encourage all parties to cease any potential acts of

provocation. Further trust must be built in order to

ensure that this agreement will be upheld, and the

peace process will be lasting, and we urge the interna-

tional community to extend their full support to this

end.

GPPAC also emphasizes the importance of

civil society involvement in the ongoing Korean

peace process. We encourage the involved parties to

develop mechanisms to ensure such meaningful

engagement, and to heed the various recommenda-

tions being presented from civil society already. This

includes those regarding concrete steps to create a

nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the importance of

women’s meaningful inclusion in the talks, private

sector participation in regional and international

Page 12

economic cooperation, and the easing of restrictions

regarding humanitarian work and civil exchange.

The “promotion of peace, prosperity, and the

security of the Korean Peninsula” is indeed vital for

peace globally. We call on the entire international

community to join efforts to support the implementa-

tion of today’s agreement and past agreements.

Furthermore, this should be taken a step further,

toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapons free

zone in Northeast Asia, a regional mechanism for

peace and security, and the comprehensive resolution

of lingering Cold War structures in the region. To-

day’s positive momentum must be sustained into the

future. Based on the historic efforts of civil society,

we pledge to do our utmost to work together with all

relevant parties to promote further dialogue and

confidence building, and to take active steps toward

the creation of a peaceful, nuclear-free Korean Penin-

sula, Northeast Asia and world.

[Editor’s Note: This article was written by Wooksik

Cheong (director of PeaceNetwork) and Chaewon

Moon (research assistant of PeaceNetwork). The

PeaceNetwork website is

http://peacekorea.org/

zbxe/?mid=Eng_main.]

Kim Jong-un’s Pass and

Trump’s Reverse Dunk

by Wooksik Cheong and Chaewon Moon

[Publisher’s Note: This article is an analysis of the

2018 United States-North Korea Summit. The author

explains that the hostile U.S.-N.K. relation is a main

cause for the failure so far in dealing with the N.K.

nuclear issue. Based on the U.S.-N.K. June 12, 2018

joint statement, he evaluates the event as a milestone

that would turn around U.S.-N.K. relations and

change nuclear dynamics in Korean Peninsula.]

Peace on the Korean Peninsula can be com-

pleted only when three pillars are properly erected.

The first pillar is a normalization of South Korea-

North Korea (N.K.) and U.S.-N.K. relations. Second

is to substitute a peace regime for the 65-year lasting

armistice regime and the last one is a “complete

denuclearization of Korean Peninsula.” These pur-

poses are reflected in the Panmunjum Declaration.

Surprisingly, the provisions in U.S.-N.K. joint state-

ment are structured and ordered in the exact same

manner. The accordance suggests a tremendously

significant implication.

However, when the U.S.-N.K. joint statement

in Singapore went public, the majority of the Western

and conservative South Korean press and experts

sharply criticized the result of the meeting. Mainly

because the statement stays at the level of “Complete

Denuclearization,” not including an expression of

CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible

Denuclearization ), some experts argue that a resolu-

tion of N.K. nuclear issue is now off the table and

some even claim N.K. virtually is now a nuclear state.

First of all, these claims are self-contradictory.

When Chairman Kim Jong-un suggested the Summit

and President Donald Trump accepted on the fly in

March 2018, people who supported the claims cred-

ited Trump for his ‘maximum pressure’ strategy. To

those people, the result of the U.S.-N.K. joint state-

ment could be extremely shocking. As much as they

argued Trump’s pressure brought Kim to the negotiat-

ing table humbled, the statement should have been

written in favor of U.S. In fact, it comprehensively

contains what N.K. has long been demanding.

More importantly, these claims are originated

from people’s blindness to the nature of the Korean

Peninsula nuclear issue. I firmly believe that the U.S.-

N.K. joint statement is the paramount agreement for

N.K. nuclear issue resolution. It is not only because

this statement is the first agreement between U.S.-

N.K. at a summit. This short length statement pene-

trates the essence of the N.K. nuclear issue, contain-

ing a direction of comprehensive resolution. Previous

agreements prioritized the denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula to build a peace regime and U.S.-

N.K. normalization. However, for this time, agreed

provisions are structured in order of a new establish-

ment of a U.S.-N.K. relationship, building a peace

regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the complete

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Borrowed

from a basketball analogy, Kim passed the ball and

Trump finished with a reverse dunk. Yet, most of the

media and experts missed this great spectacular.

This historic event carries a significant impli-

cation. It shows the U.S.-N.K. summit’s decision and

willingness to change the condition of the U.S.-N.K.

relations that has bred a poisonous mushroom, namely

a nuclear N.K. For the past 25 years, a fundamental

reason of failure in N.K. nuclear resolution lays upon

Page 13

the toxic environment. In other words, an effort to

uproot a toxic N.K. nuclear issue without dealing with

the agenda of the hostile U.S.-N.K. relationship and

an armistice agreement on the Korean Peninsula has

been meaningless. As this is the case, often the toxic

mushroom is not perfectly removed or repeatedly

spread out to somewhere else. However, this time the

U.S.-N.K. summit finally decided to get rid of the old

virulent soil and start with a new fresh nutritious soil.

By doing so, they chose a method so that the poison-

ous mushroom eventually disappears.

In the statement, the U.S.-N.K. summit “rec-

ognize that mutual confidence building can promote

the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and at

the same time “establish new U.S.-DPRK relations”

and “joint efforts to build a lasting and stable peace

regime on the Korean Peninsula.” These parts of the

statement imply that the U.S. both recognizes and

admits that the N.K. nuclear issue fundamentally lies

upon the hostile U.S.-DPRK relationship and the

armistice regime. Thus, only normalization of the

currently abnormal diplomatic environment can

accomplish “complete denuclearization.” As many as

25 years were needed for an old paradigm to be

turned around. This transition implies a new open

door for Kim Jong-un that leads to an ‘honorable

denuclearization.’

One more thing, since the statement does not

contain CVID, a possibility of “complete denucle-

arization” greatly increases. Understanding this self-

contradiction is very important. First, let me clarify

one thing; the press evaluates the Summit as a failure

or a half-success, pointing out ‘Verifiable and Irrevers-

ible’ is excluded from a dialogue of denuclearization.

In fact, no non-bilateral or multilateral agreement

involving N.K. has contained a notion of CVID and

also N.K. has never agreed to the expression included

in agreements. Resultantly, the Trump administration

has agreed to “Complete Denuclearization,” not

enforcing CVID to the end. Why? There are two

reasons. One is that sticking to CVID could raise the

chance of Summit cancellation.

A more fundamental reason exists. What the

Trump administration desires most is a ‘Fast

Denuclearization.’ Speaking of arms control agree-

ments, ‘Completeness’ is basically a concept that

involves verification. Therefore, the expression

“Complete Denuclearization” incorporates ‘Verifi-

able’ from CVID. This is a point that Trump and

Pompeo have been stressing. Moreover, Kim Jong-un

and Trump will “commit to implement the stipula-

tions in this joint agreement fully and expeditiously.”

A keyword here is “expeditiously.” If I were asked to

choose the most crucial word from the statement, I

would relentlessly pick this one. Trump using the

word “quickly” numerous times in the press confer-

ence can be understood in this context. Under the

circumstance, importuning ‘VI’ is suicidal for the

Trump administration. If Trump had been determined

to incorporate the expression ‘CVID’ in the statement,

the summit might have been canceled. Or even if it

had proceeded as planned, a controversy over the

definition and the expectation that expression carries

would have worked as an obstacle for the following

negotiation. This option conflicts with the Trump

administration’s most prioritized goal, the fast

denuclearization. At the end, Trump chose what he

thought was practical.

This article was written by Wooksik Cheong (director of Peace-

Network) and Chaewon Moon (research assistant of Peace-

Network.) Any individuals or organizations are free to study,

cite, publish and distribute the article with a reference of Peace

Network website (

http://peacekorea.org/zbxe/?mid =Eng_main)

If you have any questions regarding to the article please contact

Chaewon Moon (

moonchaewon07@gmail. com.)

[Editor’s Note: This article first appeared on the 38

North website on June 17, 2018 at: https://www.38

north.org/2018/06/hferon061118/]

Peace with Pyongyang:

Legal Implications for the United

States and South Korea

by Henri Féron

Introduction

Reaching a peace treaty to end the Korean

War is frequently interpreted as a North Korean

“trap” rather than as the key to resolving the nuclear

crisis and the decades-old Korean Question in gen-

eral.

Many fear that it could legitimize the DPRK

(North Korea) as a nuclear weapons state, split the

alliance between the United States and the ROK

(South Korea), or even trigger a reunification under

North Korean leadership. In fact, these are merely

hypothetical political consequences that cannot come

Page 14

to pass against the joint will of Seoul and Wash-

ington. A peace treaty can raise the legal bar on using

force on the Korean Peninsula, without legally imply-

ing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea, the

dissolution of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the start of a

reunification process, the legalization of North

Korean nuclear weapons or the lifting of United

Nations nonproliferation sanctions. In short, a peace

treaty is a versatile instrument that can be tailored to

further U.S. and South Korean interests in addressing

the security challenges posed by North Korea.

Distinguishing Peace and Armistice

Peace would raise the legal bar for using force

on the Korean Peninsula. The legal effect of a peace

treaty is to end a state of war between its parties,

meaning they may not refer to matters settled by the

treaty to justify any further use of force against each

other.

By contrast, an armistice is traditionally

understood as a temporary cease-fire agreement that

does not end the state of war.

An armistice is only a

weak safeguard, because the main consequence of

serious violations is to give the other side a right to

denounce it and to resume hostilities in due course.

The Korean War Armistice Agreement (KWAA) fits

the traditional definition of armistices better than

modern theories interpreting them as final settle-

ments, as it was clearly not intended as conclusive.

The KWAA’s own provisions call for its replacement

with a political settlement for peace;

in addition, it

was never formally ratified,

was continuously vio-

lated by both sides

and was repeatedly denounced by

Pyongyang.

Moreover, several UN organs have

called for the KWAA’s replacement, including the

General Assembly, the President of the Security

Council, the Secretary-General and even the Commis-

sion of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK.

That

said, peace would not leave the ROK defenseless, as

it does not prejudice the right of parties to resort to

force again if legally justified by new instances of

self-defense or Security Council authorization.

Peace would nevertheless imply the dissolu-

tion of the so-called “United Nations Command”

(UNC), as its sole remaining duty is the enforcement

of the KWAA.

The UNC arguably fulfilled its

original Security Council mandate by September

1950, when forces under the “unified command” of

the United States repelled North Korean troops

beyond the 38th parallel.

The UNC lingered on

because its subsequent “rollback” invasion of the

North ultimately implicated it in signing and monitor-

ing the KWAA.

Nearly all UN Member troops left

over the years, and the General Assembly already

suggested the UNC’s dissolution as early as the

1970s.

Dissolution would not significantly affect

combat capabilities of the U.S.-ROK alliance, be-

cause the UNC’s operational control (OPCON) over

U.S. Forces Korea and ROK troops was overtaken in

1978 by the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command

(CFC).

Parties to Peace

All belligerents to the Korean War are capable

of concluding a peace treaty, but a treaty need not

include all belligerents: it can end the state of war as

between only some of them.

There is, therefore, a

political element in determining which parties are the

most relevant for meaningfully reducing tensions and

helping resolve the Korean Question. The states that

were most clearly belligerents are the DPRK, the

ROK and the United States as the commanding

authority of the UNC forces.

The other UN members

that contributed troops were also belligerents,

but

not the UN itself since it “did not at any time have

any role in the command of the forces that operated in

Korea under the Unified Command between 1950 and

1953.”

China is generally considered a belligerent,

despite the artifice of a “volunteer army,” but has

already normalized relations with the United States

and ROK, suggesting an implicit end to the war as

between these parties.

It is also important to note

that an armistice and a peace treaty are legally distinct

instruments: participation in the former is not a

precondition to participation in the latter. It is irrele-

vant here that former ROK president Syngman Rhee

refused to sign the KWAA, and neither the DPRK’s

refusal to recognize the ROK as party nor the

DPRK’s own denunciation of the KWAA precludes

an ROK-DPRK peace agreement.

It is, therefore,

possible to end the Korean War in substance by

concluding in parallel a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty and

a ROK-DPRK peace agreement.

The Koreas can conclude a binding peace

agreement even while mutually denying their sover-

eignty. Although a “treaty” can strictly speaking only

be concluded between states, international law can

also recognize as binding agreements concluded

between subjects other than states, especially peace

agreements.

While the Koreas can be characterized

as two states – they are recognized as such at the

Page 15

United Nations – their insistence on seeing each other

as one state with two authorities competing for

legitimacy could detract from the full application of

the law of treaties.

The Koreas have nevertheless

already concluded several inter-Korean agreements

which have been ratified following the constitutional

procedure for treaties, formally expressing intent to

be bound.

Note that the Panmunjom Declaration of

April 27, 2018 would fall short of a peace agreement

even if it were ratified, as it calls itself for follow-up

meetings “with a view to declaring an end to the War

and establishing a permanent and solid peace

regime.”

Note also that a peace agreement cannot

force the Koreas into a reunification model against

their will; Seoul and Pyongyang only have a constitu-

tional mandate to seek a particular type of reunifica-

tion and thus can block any project that doesn’t fit this

mandate.

Distinguishing Peace and the U.S.-ROK

Alliance

Peace does not legally imply the dissolution of

the U.S.-ROK alliance or force Seoul to withdraw its

invitation of U.S. troops, as these are bilateral matters

to be decided between Seoul and Washington.

States

may as a sovereign prerogative invite foreign troops

on their territory, within the limits of the principle of

non-intervention, and the widespread state practice of

maintaining foreign military bases in peacetime

indicates that consent may be given independently of

the existence of an active military threat.

Peace

would have diminished Seoul’s original justification

for the presence of the United States and other UN

Members, namely the 1950 invitation to repel the

DPRK invasion.

The conclusion of the U.S.-ROK

Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 nevertheless provided

an alternate basis to justify the continued invitation of

U.S. troops, one that was not tied to the existence of

an active military threat from the DPRK.

Peace

would not legally undermine the alliance treaty as it

is drafted to remain in force indefinitely until either

side decides to terminate it with one year notice.

Peace could nevertheless legally affect the

maintenance of the U.S.-ROK CFC’s “wartime

OPCON” over ROK troops, given the reduction of

military needs that justify this arrangement. OPCON

stands for the delegated authority to direct the opera-

tion, training and organization of forces.

Seoul

delegated OPCON over its armed forces to the UNC

from 1954 to 1978, and to the CFC since 1978.

From 1994 onward, Seoul has reduced the delegation

to the point where it now retains OPCON over its

armed forces by default and only delegates it to the

CFC in “wartime,” i.e. if hostilities break out.

Peace

would at least partially fulfill the stated conditions for

ending the delegation: “the ROK will assume wartime

OPCON when critical ROK and Alliance military

capabilities are secured and the security environment

on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is condu-

cive to a stable OPCON transition.”

Distinguishing Peace and Denucleariza-

tion

Peace does not legalize North Korean nuclear

weapons. Short of a threat or use of force violating

article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the DPRK’s mere

development or possession of nuclear weapons does

not violate customary international law, as the law

does not include any rules “whereby the level of

armaments of a sovereign state can be limited,” or

“any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the

threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.”

Develop-

ment and possession of nuclear weapons would

violate the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but the

DPRK declared withdrawal in 2003 by invoking the

art. X right of each party “to withdraw if it decides

that extraordinary events…have jeopardized the

supreme interests of its country.”

Even if it were still

a party, the DPRK could not be recognized as an

authorized “nuclear weapons state” under the NPT

because it has not “manufactured and exploded a

nuclear weapon…prior to 1 January 1967.”

Peace does not legally imply lifting UNSC

sanctions: they are not legally based on a violation of

the NPT, but on the violation in particular of UNSC

resolution 1718, which singles out DPRK nuclear

weapons as a particular threat to international peace

and security.

While the DPRK has argued that these

resolutions illegally infringe on its inherent right of

self-defense, peace would not affect the debate on

whether the UNSC had or had not abused its authority

under the Charter when it adopted the sanctions.

this sense, it appears possible to conclude a peace

treaty before denuclearization, as a security guarantee,

without prejudice to the maintenance of nonprolifera-

tion sanctions as leverage to then enforce full denu-

clearization.

Page 16

Conclusion

A peace treaty may not be the only way to

achieve progress in the resolution of the Korean

Question, but it is hard to think of a more straightfor-

ward, flexible and impactful instrument in this con-

text. At the same time, it is important to note that

purposefully delaying or obstructing peace for lever-

age on legally distinct matters could violate the UN

Charter obligations to settle disputes peacefully and

in good faith.

States are also bound by the principle

of non-intervention in internal and external affairs,

which prohibits “coercion” – including but not limited

to the threat or use of force – with regard to the

sovereign matters of other states, such as “the choice

of a political, economic, social and cultural system,

and the formulation of foreign policy.”

Ultimately,

the Korean people, just like all other peoples impli-

cated in this crisis, have a right to peace.

Notes:

1. See e.g. Andrei Lankov, “The Problem With a Korean Peace

Treaty,” N.K. News, October 9, 2013,

https://www.nknews.org/

2013/10/the-problem-with-a-korean-peace-treaty/; Ahn Miyeong,

“Pyeonghwa Hyeopjeong-eun Cheokhwa Tongil-eui Jirumgil”

(A Peace Agreement Is a Shortcut to Hostile Reunification),

Korea Times, July 29, 2014,

http://www.koreatimes.com/

article/20140729/866571; Bruce W. Bennett, “Kim Jong-Un Is

Trolling America Again,” The National Interest, May 17, 2016,

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/kim-jong-un-trolling-amer-

ica-again-16238; Donald Kirk, “Korean Peace Treaty is a Bad

Idea,” Inside Sources, June 29, 2017, http://www.insidesour

ces.com/korean-peace-treaty-bad-idea/; Evans J.R. Revere, “A

U.S.-North Korea Summit: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?,”

Brookings, March 9, 2018,

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/

order-from-chaos/2018/03/09/a-u-s-north-korea-summit-what-

could-possibly-go-wrong/; Michael Rubin, “Trump Must Not

Fall for the North Korea Peace Treaty Trap,” The Washington

Examiner, March 12, 2018,

https://www.washingtonexaminer.

com/opinion/contributors/trump-must-not-fall-for-the-north-ko

rea-peace-treaty-trap; Kim Seongmin, “Kim Jong-un-yi

Malhaneun Pyeonghwa Hyeopjeong-eun ‘Juhan Migun

Cheolsu’-Da” (Kim Jong-un’s Peace Agreement Amounts to the

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea), Chosun Ilbo, April 24, 2018,

http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/04/23/

2018042302764.html; Eli Lake, “Beware the Korean Peace

Trap,” Bloomberg, April 27, 2018,

https://www.bloomberg.com/

view/articles/2018-04-27/north-korean-peace-pledge-is-a-trap.

2. Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 2, 7

ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), para. 272, p. 611

(“[Parties to a peace treaty]are legally bound not to go to war

over matters settled by a previous treaty of peace.”). See,

generally, Marina Mancini, “The Effects of a State of War or

Armed Conflict,” Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in

International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), Marc Weller

ed., p. 988-1013 (on general differences between war and peace

in contemporary international law); Jann K. Kleffner, “Peace

Treaties,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International

Law, last updated March 2011, para. 7-9 (on the evolution of the

state of war doctrine in contemporary international law).

3. Oppenheim, supra n. 2, at para. 231, p. 546.

4. Ibid., at para. 239, p. 555-6.

5. Patrick M. Norton, “Ending the Korean War Armistice: The

Legal Issues,” The Nautilus Institute, March 29, 1997, at II.B,

https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/napsnet-poli

cy-forum-online-2-norton-ending-the-korean-armistice/.

6. Korean War Armistice Agreement (Jul. 27, 1953), art. IV,

para. 60.

7. Oppenheim, supra n.2, para. 235(2), p. 550 (“[S]ince general

armistices are of vital political importance, only the belligerent

Governments themselves or their commanders-in-chief are

competent to conclude them, and ratification, whether specially

stipulated or not, is usually considered necessary” (citations

omitted).

8. Steven Lee, “The Korean Armistice and the End of Peace: The

U.S.-UN Coalition and the Dynamics of War-Making in Korea,

1953-1976,” Journal of Korean Studies, Vol.18, No. 2 (Fall

2013), pp. 183-224 (on the violation of the Armistice provisions

concerning the prohibition of reinforcements and the responsibil-

ities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission),

http://www.jstor.org/stable/44080503; Congressional Research

Service, “North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007,” April

20, 2007 (detailing a U.S. view on DPRK armistice violations),

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf; Ho Hak Rim, “The

Conclusion of a Korean Peace Treaty and the U.S. Strategy in

the Asia Pacific Region,” Institute for Security & Development

Policy, December 2011 (detailing a DPRK view on U.S.

armistice violations),

http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/images/

stories/isdp-main-pdf/2011_ho_korean-peace-treaty.pdf.

9. Yonhap News Agency, “Chronology of Major North Korean

Statements on the Korean War Armistice,” May 28, 2009,

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/05/28/46/04

01000000AEN20090528004200315F.HTML (on DPRK denun-

ciation of the Armistice); Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Declares

1953 War Truce Nullified,” New York Times, March 11, 2013,

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/world/asia/ north-korea-

says-it-has-nullified-1953-korean-war-armistice.html.

10. G.A. Res. 3390 (XXX) A-B, Question of Korea (November

18, 1975); S.C. Pres. Statement 1996/42 (October 15, 1996); UN

Secretary-General, Statement on 50

Anniversary of Armistice

Agreement SG/SM/8792 (July 25, 2003); UN Human Rights

Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights

in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea A/HRC/25/63

(Feb. 7, 2014), para. 94(j).

11. UN Charter arts. 2.3, 2.4, 42, 51; Martin Waehlisch, “Peace

Settlements and Prohibition of the Use of Force,” Oxford

Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford

University Press, 2015), Marc Weller ed., p.976.

12. Burwell B. Bell, “The Evolution of Combined Forces

Command,” Presentation at the Korea Foundation Global

Seminar, June 8-11, 2012,

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-

c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 2 / 0 9 / 6 9 - B e l l - E v o l u t i o n - o f -

Combined-Forces-Command.pdf; Hwee Rhak Park, “The

Transfer of Wartime Operational Control in Korea: History,

Risks and Tasks from a Military Perspective,” Korean Journal

of International Studies, Vol. 8, Issue 2 (December 2010) p. 339,

Page 17

http://www.kaisnet .or.kr/resource/down/8_2_06.pdf; see, Ronda

Hauben, “The Role of the UN in the Unending Korean War:

‘United Nations Command’ as Camouflage,” Global Research,

September 21, 2013,

https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-role-of-

the-un-i n- the -u ne nd ing-ko rea n-war-unit ed-na tions-

command-as-camouflage/5350876 .

13. S.C. Res. 82 (Jun. 25, 1950); S.C. Res. 83 (Jun. 27, 1950);

S.C. Res. 84 (Jul. 7, 1950).

14. Korean War Armistice Agreement (Jul. 27, 1953), art. II. On

the rollback decision, see: National Security Council Report NSC

81/1 to the President, “United States Courses of Action with

Respect to Korea” (Sep. 9, 1950), Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1950, Vol. 2, p. 712, https://history.state.

gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/pg_712; Foreign Relations

of the United States, 1950, Vol. VII, Doc. 543,

https://

history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d543; Yufan

Hao and Zhihai Zhai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean

War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly, Vol. 121, pp. 94-115

(1990) (on the link between the rollback policy and China’s

intervention in the War),

https://doi.org/10.1017/

S0305741000013527; see also G.A. Res. 376 (V), The Problem

of the Independence of Korea (Oct. 7, 1950), para. 1.

15. G.A. Res. 3333 (XXIX), Question of Korea (Dec. 17, 1974),

para. 2; G.A. Res. 3390 (XXX) A, Question of Korea (Nov. 18,

1975), para. 4; G.A. Res. 3390 (XXX) B, Question of Korea

(Nov. 18, 1975), para. 2.

16. Yonhap News Agency, “Chronology of Wartime Operational

Control in South Korea,” October 24, 2014,

http://english.

yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2014/10/23/24/0200000000AEN2014

1023004800315F.html. But see Park, supra n. 12, at p. 339

(alleging that “the two countries did not produce any document

for the transfer of OPCON authority from the Commander of

UNC to the ROK government and re-delegation of it to the

Commander of CFC.”).

17. For examples of treaties that did not include all belligerents

to a war, see e.g. San Francisco Peace Treaty (Sep. 8, 1951);

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Mar. 3, 1918); Treaty of Versailles (Jun.

28, 1919); U.S.-German Peace Treaty (Aug. 25, 1921).

18. Norton, supra n. 5, at I.C. and II.C. See also S.C. Res. 84

(Jul. 7, 1950), para. 3; Letter from ROK President Syngman

Rhee to Commander-in-Chief of UN Command Douglas

MacArthur (“Pusan Letter”), July 15, 1950.

19. Norton, supra n. 5, at II.C. See also G.A. Res. 711 (VII), The

Korean Question (Aug. 28, 1953), para. 5(a).

20. UN Secretary-General Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing,

June 21, 2013,

https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/db130621.

doc.htm (as quoted by Hauben, supra n. 12). See also Norton,

supra n. 5, at I.C.1.

21. Norton, supra n. 5, at II.C.; Joint Communique on the

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States

of America and the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 1, 1979);

Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

between the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of

China (Aug. 24, 1992).

22. See n. 9.

23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 3. See

notably Christine Bell, “Peace Agreements: Their Nature and

Legal Status,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol.

100, No. 2, pp. 373, 380 (Apr. 2006).

24. See generally Jeong-ho Roh, “The Legal and Institutional

Approach to Inter-Korean Relations,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed.,

Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects (Palgrave

Macmillan, 2004), pp. 159-174.

25. Seong-Ho Jhe, “Four Major Agreements on Inter-Korean

Economic Cooperation and Legal Measures for their Imple-

mentation,” Journal of Korean Law, Vol.5, No. 1, p. 129 (2006);

see also Hyo-Won Lee, “The Current State and Required

Modifications of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

Act,” Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 11, pp. 55-76 (Dec. 2011).

26. Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unifica-

tion of the Korean Peninsula (Apr. 27, 2018), para. 3.3; Yonhap

News Agency, “Moon Urges Parliamentary Ratification of

Panmunjom Declaration,” April 30, 2018, http://english.

yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2018/04/30/0301000000AEN2018

0430007652315.html.

27. ROK Constitution, art 4; DPRK Constitution, art 9. See,

generally, Henri Féron, “Proposing a Model of Reunification to

Solve the Korean Nuclear Crisis,” in Kyung-ok Do, Jeong-ho

Roh and Henri Féron, eds., Pathways to a Peaceful Korean

Peninsula: Denuclearization, Reconciliation and Cooperation

(Korean Institute for National Unification, 2016), pp. 263-301.

28. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-

gua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.133, para. 265

(“there is no rule of customary international law to prevent a

State from choosing and conducting a foreign policy in

co-ordination with that of another State”). See also Agence

France Presse, “S. Korea: U.S. Troop Withdrawal Not Linked to

Possible Peace Treaty,” May 2, 2018,

https://www.yahoo.

com/news/korea-confirms-arrival-f-22-stealth-fighters-

drill-022205896.html.

29. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-

gua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 126, para. 246

(“[intervention is] allowable at the request of the government of

a State”); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo

(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 2005, p. 196-199, paras. 42-54.

30. S.C. Res. 82 (Jun. 25, 1950); S.C. Res. 83 (Jun. 27, 1950);

S.C. Res. 84 (Jul. 7, 1950).

31. U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (Oct.1, 1953). See also

Status of Forces Agreement between the United States of

America and the Republic of Korea (Jul. 9, 1966).

32. U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (Oct.1, 1953), art. VI.

33. See, generally, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed

Forces of the United States, March 25, 2013, at V-6,

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_c

h1.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160207-587.

34. See n. 16. Letter from ROK President Syngman Rhee to

Commander-in-Chief of UN Command Douglas MacArthur

(“Pusan Letter”), July 15, 1950; Agreed Minutes and Amend-

ments between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the

United States of America (Nov. 17, 1954), art. 2. See also:

Won-je Son, “The ‘most remarkable concession of sovereignty

in the entire world’,” Hankyoreh, November 4, 2014,

http://

english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/662856.

html.

35. Bell, supra n. 12; Walter Sharp, OPCON Transition in Korea,

Korea Chair Platform, December 2, 2013 (according to which

transition to wartime OPCON is to be made at “DEFCON III”),

h tt p s : / /c s i s -p r o d . s 3 . a ma z o na ws. c o m / s 3 f s - p u b l i c /

legacy_files/files/publication/131216_OPCON_Transition_in_

Page 18

Korea.pdf.

36. 46

ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting, Joint Com-

muniqué (Oct. 23, 2014), para. 13,

https://www.defense.

g o v / P o r t a l s / 1 / D o c u m e n t s / p u b s / 4 6

t h

_ S C M _

Joint_Communique.pdf

37. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-

gua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 135, para. 269;

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory

Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 266, para. 105(2)(B) and ©.

38. NPT Arts. II, X; Korean Central News Agency, “KCNA

‘Detailed Report’ Explains NPT Withdrawal,” January 22, 2003,

https://fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/dprk012203.html. Despite

initial dispute about whether the withdrawal was legally effec-

tive, the UN Treaty Collection Website does not list the DPRK

as NPT signatory anymore: United Nations Treaty Collection

(website), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

last accessed May 3rd, 2018,

https://treaties.un.org/pages/

showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801d56c5.

39. NPT Art. IX(3). See also S.C. Res. 1718 (Oct. 14, 2006),

Preamble §4.

40. S.C. Res. 1718 §1, 2 (Oct. 14, 2006); S.C. Res. 1874 §1 (Jun.

12, 2009); S.C. Res. 2094 §1 (Mar. 7, 2013); S.C. Res. 2270 §1

(Mar. 2, 2016); S.C. Res. 2321 §1 (Nov. 30, 2016); S.C. Res.

2375 §1 (Sep. 11, 2017).

41. UN Charter art. 24.2, 25; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobey-

ing the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful

Sanctions (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 54-84. For the

DPRK arguments, see e.g. Statement by the DPRK Foreign

Minister at the 72

Session of the UN General Assembly,

September 23, 2017,

https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/

gastatements/72/kp_en.pdf; Korean Central News Agency,

“KLC’s White Paper on UN” Resolutions on Sanctions “against

the DPRK,” March 16, 2017,

http://www.songunbg.org/

politika/White%20Paper%20on% 20sanctions.pdf.

42. See e.g. James Clapper, “Ending the Dead End in North

Korea,” New York Times, May 19, 2018,

https://www.nytimes.

com/2018/05/19/opinion/sunday/clapper-north-korea.html.

43. UN Charter arts. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4.

44. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of Interna-

tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation

among States (Oct. 24, 1970); Military and Paramilitary Activi-

ties In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), I.C.J. Reports

1986, p. 107-8, para. 205.

45. G.A. Res. 39/11, Declaration on the Right of Peoples to

Peace (Nov. 12, 1984); G.A. Res. 71/189, Declaration on the

Right to Peace (Dec. 19, 2016).

Henri Féron is a postdoctoral research associate at Columbia

Law School’s Center for Korean Legal Studies. He holds a PhD

in law from Tsinghua University, LLMs from Columbia and

Tsinghua University, and a double LLB from King’s College

London and the University of Paris 1. He is the co-editor of the

book Pathways to a Peaceful Korean Peninsula, published in

partnership with the Korean Institute for National Unification.

[Editor’s Note: The following is a presentation given

at “The International Forum: The Role of Civil

Society for Improvement of the Inter-Korean Rela-

tions and the Process of Peacebuilding on the Korean

Peninsula” on May 23, 2018 in Seoul, South Korea at

the Korea Press Center. It appears on pages 71-87 of

the proceedings of that conference.]

The Role of Civil Society for

Building Inter-Korean Trust

and Peace on the Korean

Peninsula

by Taeho Lee,

Chair of the Policy Committee, PSPD

1. Introduction

Following the April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean

Summit at Panmunjeom and successfully making the

Panmunjeom Statement, the DPRK-U.S. Summit as

planned was held on June 12. This essay is aimed at

diagnosing the meaning of the summit meeting

between the two Koreas. The analysis is from the

viewpoint of the principles and positions that civil

society has presented to peacefully resolve Korean

Peninsular issues. It aims to identify the role of civil

society to build confidence between Seoul and Pyong-

yang and bring permanent peace to the Korean

Peninsula.

2. The Positions of Civil Society on

Peacefully Resolving the Issues of the

Korean Peninsula

On April 16, prior to the summit meeting

between the North and South Korean leaders, a total

of 16 civil and religious groups, including the Peo-

ple’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy sug-

gested “the Four Principles for the Spring of Peace

On the Korean Peninsula.”

The suggestions for

which I was in charge of writing emphasize that

“What is desperately needed are new imaginations

and fearless approaches to turn a pair of summit

meetings into a true starting point to move beyond the

armistice system and remove nuclear threats from the

Korean Peninsula, make progress in the North and

South Korean relationship, and kick start meaningful

peacebuilding efforts in East Asian.”

The suggestions say, “While the basic frame-

Page 19

work for a comprehensive agreement related to the

armistice system and nuclear issues on the Korean

Peninsula and the reinforcement of peace and cooper-

ation in the East Asian region was developed through

a six-party talks Joint Statement issued on September

19, 2005,

a more positive and comprehensive ap-

proach should be introduced on which every party can

rely, considering mistrust and conflict which sur-

rounded the previous joint statement which was

accentuated further through conflict regarding nuclear

weapons and missile programs.”

Under such a premise, the civil groups pro-

posed that the Moon Jae-in administration should

stick to the following four principles or basic posi-

tions during the summit meeting between the two

Koreas and other diplomatic activities on the Korean

Peninsula:

First, the South Korean government should

find a comprehensive solution to turn the

armistice system into a peace regime on the

Korean Peninsula and connect the normaliza-

tion of the relationship between North Korea

and the U.S. and Japan to the dismantling of

North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

All the parties can make a fundamental

approach to working out various issues only

when the nuclear conflict on the Korean

Peninsula is seen as part of the unstable armi-

stice system. As is well known, the nuclear

conflict on the Korean Peninsula is a product

of the standoff of the two governments and

the arms race, which has dragged on for

decades, and accelerated due to North Korea’s

“strategy to build up asymmetry deterrence”

to compensate for the inferiority of its con-

ventional military power. As a result, it is

extremely crucial to approach these issues

with an accurate understanding of the fact that

the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

is closely connected with building mutual

military confidence, removing the armistice

system, establishing a peace system, and

normalizing relations among the parties.

Instead of taking the denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula as a precondition for a

peace treaty, it should be simultaneously

pushed forward with a peace treaty. In this

context, the negotiations among the countries

concerned aimed at concluding a peace treaty

and normalizing the relationship between

North Korea and the U.S. and Japan should

simultaneously progress with bilateral or

multilateral negotiations aimed at resolving

the North Korea nuclear issues.

Second, the denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula should be discussed within the

paradigm of creating a nuclear-free zone on

the Korean Peninsula or in Northeastern Asia.

A fundamental solution to the Korean

peninsula’s nuclear crisis cannot be found if

only the denuclearization of North Korea is

engaged. The nuclear missile conflict on the

Korean Peninsula is part of the nuclear missile

conflict in the East Asian region and heavily

interlinked with the global issues of

nonproliferation and disarmament. As a result,

a more fundamental and comprehensive

solution should be sought, one which not only

dismantles North Korea’s nuclear missile

programs but also eliminates any nuclear

threat to the Korean Peninsula. The most

effective way to mutually remove nuclear

threats is to construct a nuclear-free zone in

Northeast Asia by first beginning to construct

such a zone on the Korean Peninsula whilst

concurrently promoting a global nuclear

disarmament negotiation aimed at a nuclear-

free world. Therefore, the negotiations regard-

ing the ultimate solution to nuclear issue on

the Korean Peninsula should include the

nuclear umbrella issue of South Korea and

Japan as part of the agenda. Furthermore, it

should be actively explored how North and

South Korea, the U.S., China, and Japan can

join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons altogether.

Third, the dialogue and cooperation between

the authorities of North and South Korea

should be institutionalized and extended,

along with an effort to hold a summit meeting

between the two Koreas on a regular basis,

and a variety of nongovernmental exchanges

and cooperation should be guaranteed by

establishing a continuously operational con-

sultation body at a nongovernmental level.

Peace on the Korean Peninsula can be

realized by ruling out absorption unification

by one party, by respecting each other’s

system of government, by promoting military

confidence-building and mutual non-aggres-

Page 20

sion, and by reconciliation and cooperation.

Holding summit meetings between North and

South Korea on a regular basis to resolve

issues on the Korean Peninsula and to institu-

tionalize the cooperation between the two

Koreas in the fields of the military, economy,

and nongovernmental exchange is the basis of

resolving the problems of the Korean penin-

sula. The nongovernmental role in this pro-

cess is as significant as that of the govern-

ment. In addition to revitalizing

nongovernmental exchanges and cooperation,

the South Korean government must allow

civil society to actively take part in the pro-

cess as a party directly concerned with which

policies related to peace on the Korean Penin-

sula are adopted and executed. The govern-

ment has to lift the May 24 economic sanc-

tions and resume multidimensional exchange

and cooperation projects such as humanitarian

aid to North Korea, the reunion of separated

families, operation of the Gaeseong Industrial

Complex, and the Mt. Geumgang tour pro-

gram.

The government needs to form “the

Committee on the Social and Cultural Cooper-

ation between North and South Korea,” as

quickly as possible as agreed through both the

October 4 Declaration in 2007 and the First

Prime Ministerial talks between the two sides

and prepare for regular consultation channels

designed to boost nongovernmental exchanges

between the two Koreas by establishing a

joint secretariat. In addition, the government

must prepare a stable environment at the

earliest possible time that allows civil society

to participate in the process by which the

government decides its policies toward North

Korea, as well as diplomatic policies, and

allows a social agreement to be formed.

Fourth, a fundamental principle that any

military activities in which the North, South,

or the U.S. target one another must be halted

for as long as the talks continue.

North Korea “pledged not to use con-

ventional weapons against South Korea, not to

speak of nuclear weapons,” saying “it will

never resume strategic provocations like

additional nuclear tests and the test launching

of ballistic missiles as long as the dialogue

continues.” Nevertheless, South Korea and the

U.S. were still conducting the Key Resolve

Eagle Joint Military Exercises. North Korea

expressed its decision not to raise any objec-

tions regarding this military drill, however an

offensive military exercise conducted with the

premise of occupying North Korea will serve

as a catalyst to touch off military tension and

conflict at any time. To maintain momentum

for dialogue and negotiations in the future in

addition to the June 12, 2018 summit meeting,

North and South Korea and the U.S. must

respect one another and work to facilitate

growing mutual confidence. Any military

actions in which the three nations target one

another must cease for as long as the talks go

on. With that in mind, the South Korean

government and the American government

should consider also a forward looking policy

which pledges not to engage the Eulji Free-

dom Guardian military exercise, which is

planned be conducted in the latter half of

2018.

3. The Assessment of the Inter-Korean

Summit and Remaining Tasks

1) The Inter-Korean Summit and the Panmunjeom

Declaration

“The Panmunjeom Declaration for the Peace

and Prosperity of the Korean Peninsula” adopted by

Moon Jae-in, the South Korean President, and Kim

Jong-un, the North Korean Chairman of the State

Affairs Commission, on April 27 emphasizes in its

preamble the parties “firm resolution to more posi-

tively improve and develop the relationship between

North and South Korea while bringing to an end long-

standing division and confrontation, a byproduct of

the Cold War, as quickly as possible and fearlessly

opening a new era of national reconciliation and

peaceful prosperity,” it goes on to “solemnly reiter-

ates to the 80 million Koreans and the entire world

that there will not be anymore war on the Korean

Peninsula, and a new peace era will be opened.”

The Declaration consists of three parts. They

are, firstly, the overall and ground-breaking improve-

ment and development of the relationship between the

two Koreas. Secondly, joint efforts to mitigate mili-

tary tension and substantially eliminate the risk of a

war. Thirdly, cooperation to build an ever-lasting and

Page 21

stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The two

leaders “confirmed the common goal to realize a

nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through a complete

denuclearization” as part of an ever-lasting and stable

peace regime and “decided to have serious discussion

about the vital matters of the Koreans through regular

talks and a hotline.”

2) Characteristics and Meaning

Sitting in the Driver’s Seat in Resolving the

Korean Peninsular Issues – A Negotiation Phase

Led by North and South Korea

The Panmunjeom Declaration consists of the

development of the North and South Korea relation-

ship, the building of military confidence, and the

development of a peace regime in that order. It can be

understood that the declaration clarifies that the

improved relationship between the two Koreas in

various areas and military confidence building are not

subordinate factors for resolving nuclear issues or

improving the relationship between Washington and

Pyongyang but a starting point and a center for them.

In addition, the declaration explicitly sets forth a

concrete plan to implement steps between North and

South first and foremost while carefully setting aside

the challenges in improving relations by connecting

them to the summit meeting between North Korea and

the U.S. on June 12, 2018 or to agreements by the

global community. The Panmunjeom Declaration

clarifies that the leaders of North and South Korea

will play leading roles in resolving the Korean

Peninsula-related issues, and it can be interpreted as

the result of a carefully drawn out step-by-step

process which considers both conditions at home and

abroad. Predicting such a dramatic development even

at the end of 2017 was not easy. President Moon Jae-

in created room for negotiations by reiterating time

and again, including at South Korea’s August 15,

2017 Liberation Day celebrations, that there would be

“no war on the Korean Peninsula,” saying “no one

can make a decision on military actions on the Korean

Peninsula without previous consent from South

Korea.” Kim Jong-un, the Chairman of the State

Affairs Commission suggested in his 2018 New

Year’s Address that “North and South Korea make

2018 a history-making year that could be recognized

as noteworthy in Korean history where the two Korea

are not tied down to the past and can improve their

icy relationship.” These comments from Korean

leaders laid the foundations for the two Koreans to

spearhead the negotiation phase on the Peninsula.

Resumption of Cooperation in Numerous Fields

and Hosting of Talks between the Two Koreas

on a Daily and Regular Basis

North and South agreed to promote coopera-

tion and exchanges between the two Koreas at various

levels, including the civil society. Both leaders agreed

to facilitate projects agreed to in the October 4, 2007

Declaration including “the reunion of separated

families and relatives in the celebration of August 15

Liberation Day,” “joint participation in international

sports events like the 2018 Asian Games,” “the

promotion of joint national events in which people

from all walks of life take part, such as the authori-

ties, the National Assembly, political parties, regional

governments, and civil groups, in the celebration of

days like June 15, which is meaningful to both sides.”

and “the connection of the East Sea railway, the

Seoul-Shinuiju railway and relevant roads.” President

Moon Jae-in also separately delivered a file contain-

ing his ideas for economic cooperation to the North

Korean leader. Moreover, the two authorities decided

to set up a joint North and South liaison office in

Gaeseong, which is designed to guarantee

“nongovernmental exchanges and cooperation,” as

well as “negotiations between the two authorities.”

What is most meaningful is the promise to hold

summit meetings between the two leaders on a regular

basis and open a direct hotline. As a result, a safety

valve was installed through which misunderstandings

and crises can be prevented from worsening, and a

route was established in which the leaders can com-

municate with each other frequently to discuss the

mountain of challenges that await them. As a result,

in spite of the fact that steps caused by international

sanctions arising from the North Korea nuclear issue

are still in effect, the May 2010 economic sanctions

imposed by South Korea in the aftermath of the sink-

ing of the Cheonan R.O.K Navy Ship, were effec-

tively lifted. What really stands out as a focal point

for attention here is that rather than merely restarting

conversation, the two Koreas agreed to systematic and

regular dialogue.

An Attempt to Initiate a Comprehensive Solution

This summit declaration expresses “the

realization of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through

complete denuclearization” as one of the goals that

must be achieved in building “an everlasting and

Page 22

stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” It also

implies that the negotiations aimed at replacing the

armistice system and normalizing the relationship

among the parties concerned could be simultaneously

or proactively conducted, along with those exclu-

sively aimed at resolving nuclear issues at a bilateral

or multilateral level. The Korean leaders have decided

to “positively push forward with a three-party confer-

ence, in which North and South Korea and the U.S.

will take part, or a four-party conference, in which

North and South Korea, the U.S., and China will take

part, to declare a permanent cease-fire and build an

everlasting and stable peace regime by which the

armistice treaty will be turned into a peace treaty in

2018 during the 65

anniversary year of the armistice

treaty.” The declaration speaks of the necessity of

“step-by-step disarmament in line with a military

confidence-building process,” as well as “a complete

denuclearization.” The summit declaration also

enumerates details necessary to military confidence

building by dividing “joint efforts to ease military

tension situations and substantially remove the risk of

a war” into a separate chapter as a precondition for

constructing a peace system and reaching

denuclearization. It is particularly noticeable that

North and South Korea agreed to “totally cease all

hostile activities against the other party, which serve

as a root cause of military tension and confrontation

in every space such as land, sea, and air.” It goes on

that they “take substantial steps to prevent accidental

military confrontation and guarantee safe fishing

activities by making the areas along the Northern

Limit Line in the west sea designated peace waters.”

A comprehensive approach to act as the backbone of

such agreements, such as the agreed upon four princi-

ples has been repeatedly suggested by civil and social

organizations, proving that suggestions arising from

civil society are plausible and practical, rather than

merely idealistic.

Enhancing Confidence through Proactive Mea-

sures

While this summit declaration does not

contain any concrete agreement on the way to

denuclearize the Korean Peninsula or a joint security

system in the northeast Asia, it could be understood

that the two leaders agreed to observe the outcomes of

the summit meeting between North Korea and the

U.S. before proceeding with negotiations among the

concerned parties. In spite of such uncertainties, the

two leaders attached more emphasis to, in particular,

implementing their promises and pro-actively taking

measures necessary to building confidence, a stark

contrast to previous negotiations. South Korea and the

U.S. decided to put off the Key Resolve Military Drill

and the Eagle Training by one month, which had been

perceived as hurdles to initiating dialogue during the

Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games. U.S. strategic

assets, such as a nuclear carrier and a long-range

strategic bomber, would not be deployed in accor-

dance with what North Korea had requested, thereby

indirectly expressing the US’s will for negotiations.

On the other side, North Korea decided at the third

plenary meeting of the 7

Worker’s Party Central

Committee to “halt conducting nuclear tests and test-

firing intercontinental ballistic missiles” and disman-

tle “the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site” shortly before

the summit meeting, North Korea is now implement-

ing its decision. Moreover, North and South Korea

have already put tangible follow-up projects into

practice such as dismantling loudspeakers, refraining

from sending propaganda leaflets into one another’s

territory, opening a hotline between authorities, and

pushing forward with plans for a high-level meeting

immediately after the summit meeting. North Korea

also set free three American citizens, who were held

in North Korea before the planned DPRK-U.S. Sum-

mit. Those initiatives undertaken by the two Koreas

are positive steps that will be welcome news to

authorities in charge of negotiations but also draw the

attention and raise expectation of citizens in each

country. Such proactive measures make a significant

contribution to forming a public opinion to look more

optimistically at the future of negotiations which

currently lack transparency.

3) Challenges

The success or failure of follow-up negotia-

tions as well as the two authorities’ determination to

carry out what should be done will decide whether the

measures agreed to in the Panmunjeom Declaration

will be smoothly implemented. Numerous rounds of

negotiation have been set, including the summit

meeting between North Korean and American leaders

held on June 12, 2018. Hurdles lie in wait at each

negotiation table. An analysis of some of the basic

challenges facing the South Korean government and

civil society in ensuring that the following bilateral

and multilateral talks can lead to the construction of

a peace system, a complete denuclearization of the

Page 23

Korean Peninsula, and the sustainable development of

the relationship among North and South Korea and

adjacent nations follows below.

The Continuation of a Comprehensive

Approach and the Exclusion of Unilateralism

All adjacent, concerned and relevant coun-

tries, including the two Koreas, should consistently

push forward with a comprehensive solution con-

nected with the realization of a nuclear-free Korean

Peninsula through complete denuclearization to turn

the armistice system into a peace system on the

Korean Peninsula and normalize the relationship

between North Korea and the U.S. and Japan. In this

process, it is crucial that South Korea, the U.S., and

Japan do not remain inactive or retain one sided

attitudes in their approach toward Pyongyang as they

did in the past.

The previous functionalist inertia refers to the

approach whereby it was believed that the issue of

North Korea’s nuclear missile development could be

settled solely with economic assistance to North

Korea instead of regarding it as connected to the

armistice and system of confrontation on the Korean

Peninsula. It is a solution which proved to be unsuc-

cessful because the parties concerned passed through

numerous rounds of negotiations for almost three

decades. A clear example of the unilateral approach

utilized was the attitude by which those negotiating

with North Korea put significant emphasis on North

Korea’s nuclear missile threats alone, whilst avoiding

discussing any military threats to North Korea’s

system that they might pose.

This militarism-based unilateralism is charac-

teristic of a discourse which stressed North Korea’s

denuclearization or military surrender, while South

Korea was vehemently opposed to discussing our own

offensive weapons, overwhelming military power and

military drills.

The solution is easy and simple. The only

thing all the parties should do is to show sincerity in

resolving every critical issue while fully understand-

ing that North and South Korea could pose a serious

threat to each other. In particular, in the 30 years since

the end of the Cold War, the South Korean army has

annually spent a military budget larger than North

Korea’s entire GDP, even excluding military spend-

ing related to the U.S. Army stationed in South Korea.

It is important to acknowledge that South Korea’s

conventional military strength has, in a sense, served

as part of the momentum for North Korea to aggres-

sively push forward with developing nuclear weap-

ons.

Disarmament and the Reorganization of Military

Plans

Considering this point and moving beyond the

North Korean regime’s guaranteeing its own security,

South Korea and America should have a sincere

discussion about drastically revising offensive mili-

tary plans and their astronomical military spending

which both sides have pushed forward recently. In

particular, South Korea’s military reform plan focus-

ing on a full scale increase of military spending,

including extended military power against North

Korea, should be sharply revised to the extent that it

constitutes enough only for South Korea’s self-

defense.

On the other hand, if concrete steps to reduce

the threat and to increase military confidence building

are not taken such threats will become a major hin-

drance to denuclearization negotiations. A good

example is North Korea’s putting off a high-level

meeting between North and South Korea due to Max

Thunder 2018, a large-scale military exercise by

South Korean and U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps

in which America’s strategic assets such as B-52

bombers and F-22 fighters took part. North Korea

also implied that the joint military drill could have a

negative effect on the meeting between North Korea

and the U.S.

It is irrational to explain that such a large-

scale air-to-air and air-to-ground exercise in which

strategic assets play a leading role does not violate the

Panmunjeom Declaration that clarifies that “North

and South Korea agreed to totally cease all hostile

activities against the other party in every space

including land, sea, and air which serve as the root

cause of military tension and confrontation.”

Social Consensus on a Nuclear-Free Korean

Peninsula

Civil society should follow up with discus-

sions and an action plan regarding “the denucleariza-

tion of the Korean Peninsula” points which were

presented by the two leaders. A complete

denuclearization equates to a condition whereby

nuclear threats to the Korean Peninsula are elimi-

nated. This goal cannot be achieved only by North

Page 24

Korea’s verifiable and irreversible dismantling of its

past, present, and future nuclear capabilities. The goal

can be achieved only when all military strategies

reliant on nuclear deterrence disappear from both the

Korean Peninsula and the area surrounding the

Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, the nuclear umbrella (extended

deterrence) strategy on which South Korea and

America or South Korea, America, and Japan rely

should also be dealt with as part of the agenda along

with North Korea’s denuclearization. For the Korean

Peninsula’s solution to nuclear issues to develop into

a stepping stone toward a nuclear threat-free northeast

Asia and a nuclear-free world, it would be meaningful

if “a truly nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” was real-

ized.

Civil society has long insisted that denucle-

arization on the Korean Peninsula be discussed in the

context of constructing a nuclear-free zone on the

Korean Peninsula or in Northeastern Asia. North

Korea insisted in 2016 that “the U.S. Army, which

has full control of the authority to use nuclear weap-

ons in South Korea, be withdrawn.” This has been

paradoxically interpreted as North Korea’s willing-

ness to flexibly discuss the role of the U.S. Army if it

gave up “its authority to use nuclear weapons.”

On the other hand, it is also worthy of explor-

ing the possibility that North and South Korea would

as one entity pro-actively seek to join the Treaty for

the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This would be a

step in the promotion of a complete denuclearization

on the Korean Peninsula and in accord with the

universal desire of the human race for a nuclear-free

world. It would also help Japan, Korea’s neighboring

country, and the nuclear powers around the Korean

Peninsula to gradually follow suit.

The Democratization of Diplomatic, Security, and

Unification Policy Decisions

This summit meeting can be regarded in some

way as a result of the Candlelight Revolution, some-

thing which the South Korean government itself

acknowledges. South Korean citizens displayed their

capacity to the entire world in resolving pressing

social issues peacefully and democratically through

their own agency in the Candlelight Revolution. The

revolution acted as a foundation for the South Korean

government to demonstrate its diplomatic capacity as

the Revolution improved the Moon Jae-in administra-

tion’s democratic legitimacy.

In other words, the Candlelight Revolution

acts as a driving force by which the South Korean

government and civil society could jointly steer in

trying to find solutions to thorny issues on the Korean

Peninsula. This demonstrates why the contents and

procedures, priorities, and methods in dealing with

the improvement of the relationship between the two

Koreas, diplomatic issues around the Korean Penin-

sula, and other foreign affairs and security-related

issues should be democratically decided and imple-

mented.

In particular, the relationship between North

and South Korea is such a critical issue that it is

directly associated with a safe and happy life of every

resident living on the Korean Peninsula. Ultimately,

the relationship cannot be advanced without the

understanding and agreement of the majority of

citizens. Nevertheless, the foreign policies that deal

with issues on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere

have been unilaterally decided and executed based on

threats that so-called experts judged and interpreted

without citizen or civil society intervention and the

remedy and priorities that they presented were with-

out any social agreement.

Now is the time when relevant information

should be made public to the maximum level without

being embellished by ideologies or political interests

and policy priorities. The speed of policy imple-

mentation should be democratically decided and

controlled through ordinary people’s participation and

broad open discussions without limitation on debate.

Bipartisan Social Consensus and Civilian and

Governmental Cooperation for Social,

Economic, and Cultural Exchanges

As the previous agreements between North

and South Korean leaders failed to be fully connected

with social consensus, the South Korean government

faced numerous difficulties in implementing them.

Fortunately, the summit meeting and the Panmunjeom

Declaration are overwhelmingly supported by citizens

who have higher expectations for them.

It is desirable that the government should do

everything in its power to get an agreement or a

resolution from the National Assembly in support of

the significant agreements between the two Koreas in

the future, including the Panmunjeom Declaration, so

that such public opinion can be institutionalized to

demonstrate social consensus. While attempting this,

Page 25

the government could also seek to get the existing

agreements between the two Koreas, along with the

declaration, if possible, ratified by the National

Assembly.

Furthermore, the government should make

concerted efforts to form a discussion forum in which

citizens are allowed to participate to review and

discuss the direction which the government should

push for in improving the relationship between Seoul

and Pyongyang and resolving controversial issues.

Such a forum will be the starting point to review what

would be a reasonable and realistic method as a

means of forming social consensus. That consensus is

needed in dealing with the relationship between the

two Koreas and institutionalizing that in relation to

various solutions such as “The Unification People

Agreement” and the ratification of “the North and

South Korea Basic Agreement” that President Moon

Jae-in promised during his presidential candidacy.

Through such open and democratic means,

government-civil society cooperation can take root in

South Korea to resolve numerous issues on the

Korean Peninsula, and at the same time, various

players including the government, political parties,

and social groups should be allowed to join in the

process as stakeholders and participants at the Korean

Peninsula level for reconciliation, cooperation, and

unification.

4. Roles and Action Challenges of the

Civil Society Groups

In the light of these basic challenges, the roles

and action challenges the civil society movements

should deal with are as follows:

1) “Give Peace A Chance” – The Pursuit of Peace

and Unification through Peaceful Means

The most significant role and challenge for

civil society is to facilitate and prepare a foothold for

a structure that can peacefully and in a consistent

manner resolve fundamental issues. It may be safely

said that the most important and primary issue is

confidence building on the Korean Peninsula and a

reduction of mutual threats as a means to make that

possible. The long-term challenges can also be

summarized as follows: the prevention of military

conflict while helping peace take root, the exclusion

of a forceful absorption unification dominated by one

side, and the achievement of a step-by-step unifica-

tion to which both sides can agree.

The cooperation of the governments and civil

societies of adjacent countries, as well as North and

South Korea, are desperately needed in this process.

There is nothing that can be resolved under any

circumstances through such a militarism-based frame

as that which has continued thus far. The militarism

that has been so far presented as so-called realism has

not succeeded in finding a solution to pending issues.

In particular, the ideas of the Cold War era, which

were heavily dependent on superior military power

and alliances, are likely to worsen issues instead of

resolving them.

The problem is that, while the need and the

possibility for North Korea to change has been

actively discussed internally by civil society regard-

ing topics such as relationship development or eco-

nomic cooperation between North and South Korea,

or how to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile

issues, the discussions about the manner in which

changes should be enacted and what changes it is that

we have to lead have been insufficient and neglected

as topics for discussion. The problem is that, among

other things, an environment where imaginative

solutions can be put forward and an atmosphere

encouraging free discussion where the issues on the

Korean Peninsula can be calmly and objectively

understood has not been formed yet. An atmosphere

exists where issues of “disarmament,” “military

alliance,” and “a nuclear-free world” are not handled

as issues with any possibility and therefore not subject

to expert discussion.

The Agendicization of Peace, Disarmament and

Balanced Diplomacy

The roles of civil society and researchers are

to fully recover the discussion platform in which half-

balanced military security has been chiefly discussed

so far, to pursue peace through particular peaceful

means, and to put realistic and feasible coexistence

and joint security, which are not dependent on mili-

tary spending or military alliance, firmly on the

agenda.

Pacifism and disarmament are crucial choices

for the solution of public welfare issues in South

Korean society where ordinary people cannot find a

reliable solution while suffering from social polariza-

tion and demographic problems. Balanced diplomacy

and joint security are essential to mutual prosperity in

a peaceful Northeastern Asia.

Page 26

Increasing Peace Education and Anti-division

Education

It is extremely important to imagine, without

limitations, what we can obtain through peaceful

resolutions. Peace education, coexistence and tolerant

education, and anti-division education should be

encouraged and extended so that the scope of under-

standing and imagination that we have not reached yet

can be expanded.

2) Preparations for civil participation, social consen-

sus, and coexistence

Direct participation by citizens and social

consensus should be treated as both the most impor-

tant means and the goal for the peace and unification

of the Korean Peninsula. The relationship between the

two Koreas after the Candlelight Revolution should

be different from that before the Revolution, and it

has no choice but to be different. The civil society

movement has to exert efforts to open a space where

citizens as sovereign can have a discussion all to-

gether and take part and play a role so that citizens

themselves can lead in building peace and drawing

social consensus for coexistence.

The Alleviation of Monopoly on Diplomatic and

Security Information and the Improvement of

Participation Structure

To begin with, the civil society movement

should take the initiative in improving various institu-

tions and practices by which the relationship between

the two Koreas and diplomacy and security can be

democratized and citizen participation increased. The

civil society movement should seek to redress the

internal ideological conflict and ingrained confronta-

tion in the South Korean society, which have been

artificially consolidated since the Korean Peninsula

was divided, and exert efforts to create a social

environment where policies are decided and imple-

mented by citizens’ voluntary participation and social

consensus. Then citizens can work together with a

sense of responsibility to address a great number of

issues taking place in that process. To do so, the civil

society movement should exert essential efforts to

improve institutions and practices so that information

on the relationship between the two Koreas and

diplomacy and security can be made public to the

maximum level, and the monopoly of interpretation of

such issues can be removed.

The Creation of a Citizen Participation-type Con-

templation Space and the Promotion of Biparti-

san Agreement

In addition, the civil society movement should

also take the initiative in attempting to draw biparti-

san social consensus about major issues relating to

diplomacy with neighboring countries to improve the

relationship between the two Koreas and resolve

issues on the Korean Peninsula. In this case, social

consensus does not mean just finding the middle

ground between alternatives that have already been

developed.

A contemplation space in which anybody can

take part could make an important contribution to

forming social consensus under the premise that

various visions and methods that we can choose can

be introduced without restrictions and be freely

discussed, along with the sharing of and access to

information regarding the relationship between the

two Koreas and diplomacy and security. However,

civil society should be careful given that an attempt at

social consensus or a social pact on the relationship

between the two Koreas if inadequately pushed

forward with only the previous limited imagination,

agenda, and choice of alternatives as bases could

actually deepen the South-South conflict. Under this

premise, civil society groups can work together in

pushing forward with the agreement of unifying

people and others promised by President Moon Jae-in

his presidential candidacy.

The Elimination of Cultural and Institutional

Violence such as Hatred and Discrimination

Lastly, the South Korean civil society move-

ments should enhance agreements for integration and

coexistence in the South Korean society so that

discrimination, hatred, violence, and exclusion

against North Korea and North Korean residents

(living in South Korea) cannot be ignited or existing

problems worsen during the process to improve the

relationship between the two Koreas. In fact, the issue

of hatred and discrimination against North Korea and

North Korean residents, which are closely connected

with that of hatred and discrimination against mi-

grants, disabled people, women, and sexual minorities

is one aspect of the distorted division system that has

justified survival of the fittest in society.

This is closely connected with “a war politics”

that sees the other party as something that should be

excluded and exterminated. Civil society needs to

Page 27

examine and improve, among other things, institu-

tional and cultural discrimination and violence against

North Korea defectors. Moreover, it should take a

close look at institutions, such as the National Secu-

rity Law, which have justified anti-human rights

regulations under the pretext of a hostile relationship

with the North.

3) Exchanges and cooperation in various fields

Civil society movements should play an active

part in exchanges and cooperation in various fields

agreed by the North and South Korean authorities and

push them on to a new stage.

Humanitarian Aid and the Extension and Rear-

rangement of Nongovernmental Development

and Cooperation

The fundamental aspects in nongovernmental

exchanges between the two Koreas are humanitarian

aid and cooperation. These areas must not be subject

to political conditions and should be sustainable. The

nongovernmental emergency relief activities that have

been perceived as part of the humanitarian aid so far

should be normalized and extended to a variety of

areas equipped with the universality of development

cooperation at civil society level. They are likely to be

actually increased at an explosive rate in accordance

with the improvement of the relationship between the

two Koreas.

While the issue of transparency related to

humanitarian aid and development cooperation has

always been treated as important and should be

improved in the future, we have to keep in mind that

the local ownership and sustainability and the creation

of an enabling environment are a crucial principle and

standard to be respected.

The Extension of Dialogue for Social and Cul-

tural Exchanges and Preventing Armed Conflict

While social and cultural exchanges that focus

on group-oriented coordinated exchanges and cooper-

ation have been subject to repeatedly being started

and then discontinued, civil society should exert

efforts to normalize them and extend the participation

in exchanges and cooperation to include ordinary

citizens. However, the civil society should keep in

mind that social and cultural exchanges and coopera-

tion should make progress while working with a

unique counterpart in North Korea.

In this case, it is important to try to strike a

balance with preparations in the North Korean soci-

ety. While for the time being such activities are

limited to those coordinated by the North and South

Korean authorities, the civil society should under-

stand that they are part of the nongovernmental

cooperation activities aimed at preventing armed

conflict in the Korean Peninsula. Although these

activities should be guaranteed as an independent area

because they are a natural right and a duty of the

people of the Korean Peninsula, the civil society

should extend their agenda and scope by displaying a

high level of sense of purpose while keenly recogniz-

ing that they are part of cooperation for resolving the

issues on the Korean Peninsula as a whole.

While the social exchanges and cooperation

between the two Koreas and the solidarity of the

citizens for world peace have been ongoing even

while being disconnected or separated, the civil

society should pay attention to extending multilateral

international exchanges and cooperation including but

also beyond North and South Korea. A good example

can be found in the Ulan Bator Process organized by

the Northeastern Committee of GPPAC, which has

been ongoing since 2015.

It is quite difficult to deal with the issue of

economic cooperation in this presentation. However,

we cannot overstress how important it is to exert

efforts to do research on what effects coexistence and

economic cooperation between the two Koreas will

have on the peace and prosperity on the Korean

Peninsula and, more concretely, on the public welfare

of South Korea, as well as to spread them and develop

them into social consensus. Civil society should also

play a vital role in providing guidelines and action

principles so that exchanges and cooperation in

various fields including economic cooperation can be

carried out according to universal principles such as

economic justice, ecological and cultural diversity

and sustainability, gender equality, and female em-

powerment.

5. Conclusion

Dramatic change is unfolding on the Korean

Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The role that the

South Korean society, in particular the civil society,

and the civil society movements are urgently asked to

play, along with challenges they have to resolve, can

be briefly summarized as follows: they should freely

imagine, share, and boldly embody practices to

overcome the division of the Korean Peninsula and to

Page 28

further coexistence in East Asia while confronting old

stereotypes, prejudice, and taboos that the division

system emphasized to us. We should be armed with a

strong belief in changes that the participation and

solidarity of the citizens of the Korean Peninsula and

the entire world will help us draw out.

Notes:

1. The organizations that took part in this announcement are:

Goyang Tongil Tree, Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation

Forum, Green Korea, Korean NGO Council for Cooperation with

North Korea, Professors for Democracy, Peace 3000, Eco

Horizon Institute, Civil Peace Forum, Won-Buddhism Pyong-

yang Chapter, PSPD, One Corea Action, Peace Network,

Women Making Peace, Daegu Peace Together, NCCK Reconcil-

iation & Reunification Committee, Korean Women’s Association

United, Korea YMCA, The Headquarters of National Unification

Movement of Young Korean Academy.

2. See full text of the joint statement adopted Sept. 19, 2005 at

the fourth round of six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear

programs. It can be accessed at: http://www.chinadaily.com.

cn/english/doc/2005-09/19/content_479150.htm

3. Refer to the following link for the whole text in English

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/731_2480

77.html. Also see text on page 9 in this issue.

[Editor’s Note: The following article is the second

essay written for the 2018 Peace Report Project of the

Civil Peace Forum, under the sponsorship of

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Korea Office. It is dated July

22, 2018 and can be seen online at:

http://www.

peoplepower21.org/index.php?mid=English&docu

ment_srl=1575942.]

Ushering in an Era of Great

Transformation on the

Korean Peninsula through

Citizen Participation

by Lee Hyeuk-hee

Chairperson of Operation Committee

One Korea Action

1. A Different Era Requires Different

Thinking

At this very moment, the Korean Peninsula is

entering a new era of great transformation. After the

North Korea-United States summit following the

Inter-Korean Summit in 2018, this great transforma-

tion is now the current of the times that no one can

swim against. I refer to this development of events as

a great transformation because this is an extraordinary

time that is now unfolding: something none of us has

ever experienced.

This great transformation can be specifically

defined as “the end of the Cold War,” “deconstruction

of a divided Korea,” and “the emergence of a new

order on the Korean Peninsula” filling in the political

vacuum left after the Cold War system has ceased or

been aborted. The biggest shock and concern would

be to witness the paradigm shift of “peace through

national security” to “security through cooperation.”

We have never experienced living in a world in which

not guns but a collective security system and armies

without a main enemy maintain peace. To adapt to

this new situation will take quite some time. Decons-

truction of a divided Korea will be even more shock-

ing. If this division actually refers to a “hostility”

derived from “regional division” and “different

lifestyles” (See Lee Jong-suk, 1998), North Korea

will gradually go through a transition into market

socialism following its policy of accelerating

marketization and focusing on economic develop-

ment. This means expiration of the “different life-

styles,” and the hostility which arose from the hate for

being different from one another will also very likely

disappear. The only thing left then is the regional

division. If Korea can maintain its de facto unification

even though regional division is still in place, the

national division, which has grown on its own and

persisted for a long time only on the Korean Penin-

sula, can be deconstructed.

More importantly, however, is the matter of

“recreation.” Paik Nak-chung pointed out that in

terms of a reunification theory applicable to the

Korean Peninsula, people must take the initiative and

be creative in deconstructing the existing division.

The key to this argument that reunification must be

part of a recreation process is that an entirely new

Korean Peninsula has to be created by overcoming the

contradictions which exist in both South and North

Korean society through comprehensive inner reflec-

tion, not by unifying the two societies without rectify-

ing their own inconsistencies.

In May 27, 2018, at a press conference report-

ing on the second round of the Inter-Korea Summit,

President Moon Jae-in remarked, “This is only a start.

However, it is not anything that has been witnessed in

Page 29

the past. It will be a whole new beginning.” I assume

that his emphasis is along the same line as what I’ve

mentioned above. It is also worth noting Chairman

Kim Jong Un’s words during the 2018 North Korea-

United States Summit: “It was not easy to get here.

The past worked as fetters on our limbs, and the old

prejudices and practices worked as obstacles on our

way forward. But we overcame all of them, and we

are here today,” adding that “the world will see major

changes.” Chairman Kim’s remarks were originally

made with the intent of ending North Korea’s hostile

relationship with the United States, but they can be

viewed as an indicator of the upcoming major

changes within his country. As such, a tremendous

opportunity for a great transformation of the Korean

Peninsula through citizen participation has presented

itself, at a time when the leaders of the two Koreas are

willing to create a new Korea and are pushing for-

ward with great effort.

What we must focus on now is determining

how we can help this great transformation to happen

with citizen participation and not political decisions

made by our leaders. More precisely, the question is

“How can we become creative in the process of

recreation as a people, and go beyond the boundaries

of grand decisions and visions put forward by the

governments of South and North Korea?”

2. The Candlelight Revolution:

A Starting Point for Great Transformation

To understand the trends within this great

transformation and respond to them, we need to look

at the fundamental factors that facilitated it. While

there are many opinions and views on this issue, the

undeniable fact is that Korea’s “Candlelight Revolu-

tion” was at its core. The previous administrations,

run by Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, pursued

a strong confrontational policy toward North Korea

which led to military crisis, instead of managing inter-

Korean relations. This is a distinctive feature of the

system of a divided Korea in which South Korean

leaders attempt to strengthen their political hold

through a confrontational footing toward North Korea

to gain and unite their supporters, supported by

advisors who intend to prompt an economic collapse

of the North and reunify through absorption. When

peaceful everyday life was no longer possible in the

two Koreas due to this fierce confrontation, Paik Nak-

chung anticipated that a “citizen participation move-

ment does not merely mean participation by citizens,

but the inevitability of an ultimate change in the status

quo, which is a call to change the anti-peace regime.”

Indeed, this occurred in the Candlelight Revolution.

As he reviewed these revolutionary processes, Paik

remarked that “the Candlelight Revolution, which

overthrew a regime that was against progress in inter-

Korean relations was the best example of citizen

participation I have ever witnessed.” Only afterwards,

it became clear that “citizen participation” meant

“voluntary participation of citizens” attempting to

resolve a situation that disrupted everyday life,

overthrowing a regime that fundamentally supported

the system of peninsular division.

The current approval rating for President

Moon shows that support for his administration

comes from its success in bringing about peace on the

Korean Peninsula by improving inter-Korean rela-

tions rather than removing deep-rooted irregularities

or improving the economy. Civil society has played

an especially important role in shaping favorable

conditions for rapidly improving relations in 2018, at

least according to the words of Chairman Kim Jong

Un. During his opening remarks at the April 27 Inter-

Korean Summit, Kim used the phrase “lost 11 years”

and expressed hope that these lost years would not be

repeated. Paradoxically, his remarks can be inter-

preted as North Korea being willing to dialogue with

South Korea to improve inter-Korean relations, as the

new regime in the South was put in place due to the

success of the Candlelight Revolution.

3. The Starting Point for Great Transfor-

mation is to Institutionalize South-North

Relations

Looking back at the June 15

(2000) North-

South Joint Declaration, the administration headed by

Kim Dae-jung adopted an “engagement policy” after

abandoning one of confrontation toward North Korea,

pushed by the previous administration of Kim Young-

sam. This new approach was to rebuild trust between

the two Koreas by promoting social and cultural

exchanges and vitalizing economic cooperation

mainly in the non-governmental sector rather than

through direct government intervention. Engagement

policy was shaped and influenced by the negative

legacy effects of the worsening inter-Korean relations

left behind by the Kim Young-sam administration.

However, all the connections made between South

Page 30

and North Korea gradually disintegrated with the Lee

Myung-bak administration and the closure of the

Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in February 2016

by the Park Geun-hye administration. This brought

the efforts by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun

administrations to improve inter-Korean relations

back to square one. Certainly, it is difficult to under-

stand how inter-Korean relations, which had seen one

million South Koreans allowed to visit Mount

Kumgang and 10,000 more every year to visit Pyong-

yang, had totally collapsed due to policy under the

Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations.

This collapse shows the limits of functionalist ap-

proaches that focus on exchange and cooperation in a

non-political arena, rather than those of engagement

policy.

As for the Kim Dae-jung administration

before him, the Moon Jae-in government was handed

the legacy of negative inter-Korean relations. An anti-

North Korean mentality was widespread among

Korean citizens and theories of reunification through

absorption or even of the uselessness of reunification

were dominant in the related discourse. However, the

Moon administration broke away from the past when

the opportunity came and adopted a totally different

approach. Its top-down approach is to rapidly normal-

ize relations between South and North and build trust

through negotiation and dialogue between high-

ranking government officials and then expand down-

ward into exchanges in the non-governmental sector

and economic cooperation.

This approach has many advantages. First, it

promotes stability and sustainability of inter-Korean

relations. It is unrealistic to expect Mount Kumgang

tourism or the KIC to resume operations without first

constructing mutual trust in a political and military

sense, as the two Koreas were once at the brink of

war. There will be no South Koreans, whether private

citizens or business people, who would return to

tourism or business with North Korea in the face of

such instability. Second, the Inter-Korean Summit

revealed that President Moon is focusing more on

peace while Chairman Kim on reunification. Such a

difference seems like déjà vu of the situation after the

June 15

North-South Joint Declaration in which the

South focused on implementing Article 4 of the

Declaration, which promoted economic cooperation

and social and cultural exchange, while the North

focused on Article 1, which emphasized the reunifica-

tion to be achieved by the two Koreas.

Unfortunately, there failed to be any further

progress on implementing Article 2 of the June 15

North-South Joint Declaration, implementation plans

for reunification, which was virtually the Declara-

tion’s final aim, and here we are now. During the

fourth Inter-Korean Summit held in May 26, 2018,

the two leaders sought to persuade the world that the

two Koreas will not repeat the mistakes of the past.

Or, they at least succeeded in convincing the world

that they would institutionalize inter-Korean relations

– in other words, a confederation of South and North

would be achieved. This development was no less

than a message that the two Koreas are acting at least

toward the same purposes and goals. It is also clear

that military tensions and adventurism between the

South and the North will not be restrained without

such institutionalization: a whole new approach.

4. The Citizen Participation Movement in

a Special Era

In this era of great transformation, the mem-

bers of the citizen participation movement have to

find consensus on the details of reunification theory

and then take the initiative to promote it widely, to

ensure that people from all walks of life are the focus

during this transformation.

When the limitations of the functionalist

approach appeared, the argument that it was simply

“pouring money into North Korea” gained promi-

nence. This argument was an emotional, rather than

scientific or rational, line of thinking as well as some

kind of distorted “frame,” and defined humanitarian

assistance and non-governmental exchanges as

“forces against reunification,” assuming that any

assistance to the North would help sustain the regime

there. However, this is simply based on the strategy of

demonizing North Korea and promoting its collapse.

But it held great sway among the population and

some even became supporters of “reunification

through absorption.”

To point out the flaws in this argument, we

have to clarify the term “reunification.” In terms of

overcoming the system of division, reunification is

defined as “the process by which the vast majority of

the people on the Korean Peninsula live under a better

system than the current one.” According to this

definition, it is “a gradual process that takes place

over a long period of time” as opposed to what

happened in Germany or Vietnam, where reunifica-

Page 31

tion occurred once, suddenly, after a preparation

process. If reunification is viewed as a process and

not a dramatic moment, it will be recognized as

having a progressive form which is the sum total of

different processes at several stages toward reunifica-

tion, and not a finished form. In this case, reunifica-

tion will be defined as a process in which the people

seek the type of state that best suits their interests, and

not instantly becoming a single-race nation.

Based on this, reunification will be further

defined as a state in which the two Koreas help each

other, visit one another, and coexist in peace – in

other words, a state of being virtually reunified, not

simply known as a single nation state. We define

reunification as a “confederation” of the South and

North, an institutionalized form of inter-Korean

relations. Such a confederation will be reunification,

and the need for reunification will now become more

than just a reunion of one nation divided by foreign

countries. The understanding of the word will be

extended into a process in which the two Koreas, in

recent history developing along two different routes,

create a unified community in the interest of eco-

nomic and security needs. A confederation means the

South and North exist as two sovereign states for a

certain period of time.

According to the principles upheld by the

Basic Agreement of 1991, inter-Korean relations are

distinct in that they exist inside one nationality and

aim for reunification. While they are not relations

between two different countries, it is also clear at the

same time that a certain form of institutionalization

comparable to international relations is needed for a

certain period during which the two Koreas build a

community and learn to coexist in peace. As the

South and North have already accepted the idea of a

confederation of two Koreas as the provisional form

for reunification stated in Article 2 of the June 15

North-South Joint Declaration, they have to expand

their scope of thinking through deep reflection.

However, a confederation of two Koreas is

certainly different from the establishment of “a peace

state,” an idea advocated by some in the peace move-

ment that aims for peaceful coexistence. Under

confederation, the Korean War will be declared over,

which will mark the end of the Armistice regime, and

a “peace agreement” discussed to regulate the state of

peace on the Korean Peninsula as denuclearization

proceeds. The agents responsible for observing such

a peace agreement should be none other than the two

Koreas. Although a series of events, including declar-

ing the end of war and signing of a peace agreement

will not be possible without guarantees from the U.S.

and China, the major foreign participants in the

Korean War, the central responsibility for maintaining

the regime of peace on the Peninsula will lie with the

North and South themselves. The North-South Con-

federation will be a very inter-Korean organization to

uphold the peace agreement proposed in the National

Community Unification Formula, and agreed in the

June 15

Joint Declaration. This confederation should

not posit a permanent state of peaceful coexistence as

its end goal; it needs to be situated as a tool of a peace

regime aimed at reunification. The peace state and the

North-South Confederation have fundamentally

different purposes: the former the maintenance of

peace, the latter reunification. Of course, the two

Koreas are not the only actors in the peace regime on

the Peninsula. It goes without saying that a system of

cooperation and security must be built that encom-

passes not just Northeast Asia but the entire continent.

But even this is only meaningful to the extent that the

two Koreas participate as responsible parties and

garner international support for reunification, and

should not serve as grounds to perpetuate the state of

partition.

The North-South Confederation will serve to

accelerate the integration of the two communities

with the goal of establishing a regime of peace aimed

at reunification. The natural sequence of integration

under such a Confederation would be to start with the

establishment of an economic community, moving on

to a socio-cultural community, and then culminating

in a political community. The Korean people have

witnessed the Panmunjeom Declaration and the fourth

Inter-Korean Summit meeting. If the fifth summit

meeting, scheduled for the Fall of 2018, also material-

izes, this would enable a new discourse that conceptu-

alizes reunification as “de facto reunification in the

form of a North-South Confederation” to firmly take

root as part of the discourse on reunification. Once

reunification undergoes such a concept transformation

among the population, it should be possible to open a

new era with a major transition through the participa-

tion of the people, free from the shackles of the old

idea of reunification through absorption. For the

moment, there is also dire need for a national cam-

paign to explain the meaning and content of the

Panmunjeom Declaration and the Singapore Declara-

tion. Informing the people of the content of these

Page 32

declarations alone can go a long way toward spread-

ing the new conversation on reunification and accom-

plishing civic participation in an era of major transi-

tion. There is an urgent need to organize speaking

events nationwide at the city, district, and town level

to inform people of the coming of this era, with the

aim of securing the participation of at least 10% of

the population.

Next, the campaign to build civic participation

must work toward involving the people who took part

in the Candlelight Revolution in inter-Korean ex-

changes and realizing solidarity with the North

Korean people.

The late Reverend “Late Spring” Moon Ik-

hwan was the first to advocate solidarity between the

people of the two Koreas after partition of the Penin-

sula. The 1994 initiative known as the “70 Million

Compatriots in Preparation for Reunification” embod-

ied this idea. Solidarity between the people of North

and South Korea will not be an impossible dream

once a North-South Confederation is institutionalized

and de facto reunification becomes reality. Achieving

solidarity between the people of the two Koreas, in

particular, is a challenge that the South Korean civic

movement must tackle. Rather than blaming past

governments for “the lost 11 years,” the civic move-

ment must come to terms with the failure of inter-

Korean exchanges and peace movements to attract

mass participation. In particular, the direction and aim

of inter-Korean exchanges were not informed by the

concept of civic participation. Exchange programs,

although numerous and frequent, have mainly in-

volved organizations and prominent figures, failing to

draw general participation and taking root in people’s

everyday lives. Now that the Candlelight Revolution

has given rise to a new opportunity, the participants in

that Revolution must take part in the new era of

peace, prosperity, and reunification on the Korean

Peninsula. However, those who got out for the Can-

dlelight Revolution are for the most part people who

had not been born or become interested in such things

before the “lost 11 years.” Should we try to explain

past inter-Korean exchanges, they will not under-

stand, and neither would they be won over to that

same framework of inter-Korean exchanges. It is

apparent that we need a new way of relating to them,

a way which befits a new era. For civic participation

to become a grassroots movement, such a new way of

relating to people in North Korea is sorely needed.

People living in the North are not the same as before,

either. The new generation since the “March of Or-

deal” are known to have a completely different

outlook than those before them. Snacks and other

food products recently manufactured there apparently

have the phone numbers of manufacturers printed on

them, sometimes even bar codes and QR codes. This

suggests North Korean people are on the cusp of

exercising their “consumer rights,” often deemed the

most basic of all human rights. News reports even

have it that the most popular food manufacturer in

North Korea, Gold Cup Athlete General Food Fac-

tory, boasts that average people test all its products

prior to launch. These are signs that confirm, while

not the immediate arrival, at least the potential for the

Fourth Sector, or civil society, to emerge in North

Korea.

What will the citizen participation movement

for reunification do, if things change so dramatically,

if, for example, railways and roads are connected and

Mount Kumgang tourism resumes in earnest through

an Inter-Korean Summit? The answer is that it must

focus on building solidarity between the people of the

two Koreas. The idea of creating a new relationship

has to be reexamined in earnest if a desire exists to

keep up with the changes in both South and North

Korea.

The present donation campaign for the people

of North Korea is the most telling example of efforts

to overcome the system dividing Korea – in other

words, a reunification movement pursued in everyday

life. The campaign was lauded as the most significant

self-help movement of the Korean people since the

Dangun era. Every organization took part as it un-

folded at every municipal level (cities, districts, and

towns) as the first donation campaign for the North.

Finding success in forming new relations will

depend on whether the existing exchanges in different

fields expand and create a new movement of popular

exchange with a wide range of participants. Such

efforts will only bring about real change as opportuni-

ties arise out of the Candlelight Revolution. Certainly,

what is important here is that these efforts should not

be one-sided. The new movement of exchange has to

take the distinctive features of North Korean society

and the position of its regime into consideration and

establish a scope that is within what North Korean

society can accept. In this regard, the “Inter-Korean

Joint Liaison Office” to be established in Kaesong is

the most crucial route. Civil society must assume the

responsibility for preparing to establish solidarity

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between the people of the two Koreas in everyday life

through this Office. To this end, a network for inter-

Korean exchange and cooperation is needed. Such an

intermediate support organization would include a

variety of Candlelight Revolution participants and

“regular” citizens hoping to form new relations and

grassroots organizations. The network would first

need to introduce to the public assistance projects for

North Korea. Second, it would coordinate and rear-

range overlapping projects. Third, it would offer

educational programs on peace and reunification to

alleviate possible culture shock that can arise from

contact with North Korean society. Fourth, it will

need to come up with strategic projects to build

solidarity between the two cultures.

A special era calls for a special method of

movement-building. The only mission civil society

needs to accomplish is to exacerbate the current

trends ending the Cold War system – something made

possible by the Candlelight Revolution and its citizen

participants – and to finally end the system dividing

our peninsula.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben (1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

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and not necessarily the opinions of the Amateur Computerist

newsletter. We welcome submissions from a spectrum of

viewpoints.

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