The Amateur

Computerist

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Summer 2019 Upholding the Singapore Kim-Trump Statement Volume 32 No. 1

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Towards Nuclear-Weapon-Free Northeast Asia . Page 2

Open Letter to the UN Security Council . . . . . . . . Page 5

Joint Statement at the Singapore Summit . . . . . . Page 7

Send Communication to the UN SC . . . . . . . . . . Page 8

Support for Peaceful North-South Relations . . . Page 10

Korean Peninsula: Unusual Signs of Hope . . . . Page 14

Olympic Truce as a Support for Peace . . . . . . . Page 17

Korean Peninsula Provides A Ray of Hope . . . . Page 18

Security Council Members Support Dialogue . . Page 19

Opera Performance for UN Delegates. . . . . . . . Page 21

Glyn Ford on Talking with North Korea . . . . . . . Page 22

Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year’s Speech . . . . . Page 23

How Did UN SG Treat the Korean Peninsula . . Page 24

In Memory of Dumisani Kumalo. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 26

Michael Lynk Questions Israeli Occupation . . . . Page 28

On Israel’s Annexation of Palestinian Territory . Page 29

Tackling the Problem of Frozen Dialogue . . . . . Page 31

Introduction

Something very special began to develop on

the Korean Peninsula. From January 1, 2018

through January 2019, a different spirit and practice

dominated the activities on the Korean Peninsula.

This issue of the Amateur Computerist is an effort

to document this important development in order to

see if there are lessons that can be identified. We

want to strengthen and continue the important pre-

cedent of successfully working for peace that the

DPRK, the ROK and the U.S. succeeded in estab-

lishing.

The Singapore U.S.-DPRK Summit held on

June 12, 2018 demonstrated this spirit and practice

when it ended with the agreement by the U.S. and

the DPRK to the following main principles:

1. To establish new U.S.-DPRK relations.

2. To build a lasting and stable peace regime

on the Korean Peninsula.

3. To work toward the complete denuclear-

ization of the Korean Peninsula.

In a letter sent to the UN Security Council

by 55 NGOs concerned with building a peace re-

gime on the Korean Peninsula, the civic organiza-

tions pointed to the important insight revealed by

the recent peace activities:

In Korea, we have recently witness-

ed that peace can be built through

peaceful means and problems can be

solved through dialogue and negotia-

tion.

Their conclusion is that, “‘Denuclearization

as a peace process’ must be observed as a prin-

ciple.”

But then, an ill wind was introduced by U.S.

negotiators at the Hanoi U.S.-DPRK Summit held

on February 27-28, 2019.

In place of the three principles the U.S. had

formerly agreed to, the U.S. insisted on a Libyan-

style denuclearization putting the third principle of

the Singapore Summit in the primary position and

requiring the DPRK to subordinate the other two

principles to the principle of denuclearization. This

action by the U.S. represented a near abrogation of

the agreement the two nations had reached at the

Singapore summit.

The letter from the 55 civic groups sent to

the UN Security Council explained the problem

with this change:

For the countries who have been en-

emies to each other for almost 70

years, it is not easy at all to trust and

begin to have open talks with each

other. This is why it is neither realis-

tic nor appropriate for the U.S. to de-

mand that the DPRK completely

denuclearize at once. The DPRK

Page 1

needs to consider the fact that deep-

rooted mistrust is also alive despite

her stated willingness to denuc-

learize.

This issue of the Amateur Computerist pres-

ents a collection including the documents quoted

above and articles that appeared on the netizenblog

at taz.de during this period of peaceful negotiations.

The articles document several of the different steps

taken by the various parties which contributed to

the peace process during this brief period from Jan-

uary 1, 2018 through January 2019. It is hoped that

a review of these articles and the situation they doc-

ument, will contribute to a strengthened determina-

tion and set of insights to provide a foundation for

further peace-generating actions.

This issue begins with the presentation made

to the 2019 PrepCom for the 2020 NPT Review

Conference meeting at the UN in New York on

May 1, 2019 by two NGOs, Peoples Solidarity for

Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and International

Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR). Sooyoung

Hwang of PSPD presented the statement on behalf

of the two NGOs.

Also in the issue is the letter sent by 55 Civil

Society groups to the UN Security Council in April

2019, shortly after the failure of the Hanoi U.S.-

DPRK Summit which took place February 27-28,

2019.

The presentation by the two NGOs which is

included in this issue represents an effort to draw

the lessons that they propose are needed to be able

to contribute to a continuation of the “the most

peaceful time ever since the signing of the Korean

War Armistice Agreement in 1953.”

Expressing their disappointment “that the

second U.S.-DPRK Summit ended without any

agreement in Hanoi this February,” the two NGOs

propose that “the two parties recall and recommit to

the original goals and general approach they had

agreed to in the Singapore Summit.”

They argue that the “big deal” denuclear-

ization that the U.S. was requiring at the Hanoi

Summit, “would be like building a shining castle on

sands,” as it would have failed to build the further

confidences and security guarantees needed given

the long history of distrust and threats that make up

the past 70 years of conflict between the two par-

ties. As such the NGOs claim such a “quick deal

will not last long.”

Discussion of such issues is needed at the

UN. The UN Security Council would do well to

consider both the Letter from the 55 NGOs and the

Statement by PSPD and IFOR to the UN 2019

PrepCom for the 2020 NPT Review Conference as

important input to how they determine what actions

on their part can help to restore and maintain peace

on the Korean Peninsula.

Notes

1. Open Letter to the UN Security Council Members, p. 5 this

issue.

2. Sooyoung Hwang on behalf of People’s Solidarity for Par-

ticipatory Democracy (PSPD) and John Kim NGO Represen-

tative, UN Headquarters, International Fellowship of Recon-

ciliation (IFOR). See below.

[Editor’s Note: The following statement by Peo-

ple’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

(PSPD) and International Fellowship of Reconcilia-

tion (IFOR) was delivered at the UN Headquarters

in NYC on May 1, 2019 to the 2019 PrepCom for

the 2020 NPT Review Conference. It is online at:

https://www.peoplepower21.org/English/1628437.]

End the Korean War

and Move Towards

Nuclear-Weapon-Free

Northeast Asia

by Sooyoung Hwang, PSPD

Mr. Chair, delegates and civil society colleagues!

Thank you for this opportunity to speak at this con-

ference.

1. Our key message here is that the Korean people,

whether they live in the South or North, want to end

the long, costly Korean War, the last remaining ves-

tige of the Cold War, and to move toward a nuclear-

weapon-free Northeast Asia. We sincerely believe

that the Korean Peninsula represents the best hope

and opportunity at this time, in terms of promoting

the international community’s desire to create a

world without nuclear weapons. Thus, we appeal to

the UN community to help the Korean people to

Page 2

establish a permanent peace on the Korean Penin-

sula. Securing peace first will be also the best way

to bring about a peaceful denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.

2. In 2018, there were significant, positive changes

in the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

The leaders of the United States and the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) held their his-

toric summit in Singapore last June. They issued an

important Joint Statement, which outlined their

joint goals to be achieved in the future talks, includ-

ing “establishing new U.S.-DPRK relations,”

“building a lasting and stable peace regime on the

Korean Peninsula,” and “to work toward complete

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” In the

same Statement, President Trump and Chairman

Kim also recognized the general approach to realiz-

ing a nuclear-weapon-free Korea by stating that

“mutual confidence-building can promote the

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” More-

over, the two countries are now observing an infor-

mal “freeze for freeze” deal in which the DPRK

stopped its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile

tests, while the U.S. ended its large-scale joint war

drills with ROK.

3. Likewise, there was also a remarkable reduction

in military tensions between the Republic of Korea

(ROK) and the DPRK. Through the three inter-Ko-

rean Summits last year, the two governments of Ko-

rea have ceased all hostile activities against each

other and shared the view that the Korean Peninsula

must be turned into “a land of peace free from nu-

clear weapons and nuclear threats.” Thus, the Ko-

rean people are enjoying at present the most peace-

ful time ever since the signing of the Korean War

Armistice Agreement in 1953. We have witnessed

that “peace can be achieved through peaceful

means” and that problems can be solved through

dialogue and negotiation. Under no circumstances

can we return to the past, which was riddled with

heightened military tension and repeated threats of

nuclear war.

4. However, it is certainly disappointing that the

second U.S.-DPRK Summit ended without any

agreement in Hanoi this February. We urge both

governments to continue their talks to find a new

path forward. In this regard, we believe it is critical

that the two parties recall and recommit to the origi-

nal goals and general approach they had agreed in

the Singapore Summit. The general approach al-

ready agreed requires building “mutual confidence”

between the U.S. and DPRK first. To aim for a “big

deal” on denuclearization of the DPRK at this time,

without building further confidences and security

guarantees between the two long running adversar-

ies, would be like building a shining castle on

sands. Such a quick deal will not last long.

5. The nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula is

inherent in the long-standing, unstable armistice

regime on the Korean Peninsula. In order to induce

the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons, it is es-

sential for the U.S. and the international community

to understand that the DPRK’s missile and nuclear

development program stems from the decades-long

military conflict and arms race on the Korean Pen-

insula. Moreover, the nuclear issue in Korea is

deeply related to the fact that the neighboring coun-

tries of Korea have continued to strengthen their

military reliance on nuclear weapons ever since the

horrendous fighting in Korea was halted with a

ceasefire agreement. This is why the process of

denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula must go

hand-in-hand with the building of a permanent

peace in Korea, including the establishment of

diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the

U.S., along with efforts to fundamentally eradicate

any source of nuclear threats surrounding the Penin-

sula.

6. Indeed, it will be very difficult to address the nu-

clear issue in Korea by solely focusing on the

“denuclearization of the DPRK” as the starting

point for negotiations in any future talks between

the U.S. and the DPRK or between the two Koreas.

We urge all the concerned countries in Korea to

adjust their demands and expectations, aim for

smaller deals, and build the momentum by imple-

menting such deals in a phased and simultaneous

manner. Once mutual trust is built, more difficult

issues can be resolved and bigger deals can be

agreed to.

7. Furthermore, it is also critical to recognize that

the nuclear issue of the DPRK cannot be resolved

by sanctions and pressure only. It is about time for

the U.S. and the UN to take active steps to lift some

Page 3

of their harsh sanctions imposed on the DPRK, not

only as an incentive for the DPRK to take further

steps for giving up its nuclear weapon program, but

also to stop a growing danger that the draconian

U.S. and UN economic sanctions may have under-

mined the general health and welfare of the DPRK

people in general. The UN agencies have already

reported that about 40% of the DPRK population is

“undernourished” (see Paragraph 24, SCR 2397). In

fact, some of the tough UN sanctions, such as pro-

hibiting any export of the DPRK’s seafood, agricul-

tural products, textiles or minerals may well violate

the UN Charter, as well as the international human

rights and humanitarian law.

8. In addition, these draconian economic sanctions

are creating huge obstacles to the implementation of

the inter-Korean agreements as well as inter-Korean

exchanges and cooperation in general. A good ex-

ample of this problem is seen in the inability of the

ROK government to connect its transportation sys-

tem with the DPRK. In this regard, it is to be noted

that the latest resolutions of the UN Security Coun-

cil emphasized the concerned parties’ commitment

to “a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to

the situation” and that economic sanctions were

“not intended to have adverse humanitarian conse-

quences for the civilian population of the DPRK or

to affect negatively or restrict those activities, in-

cluding economic activities and cooperation, food

aid and humanitarian assistance…”. (e.g. SCR 2375

and 2397)

9. Finally, we would like to discuss our understand-

ing of the meaning of the “denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.” The kind of complete denu-

clearization that the Korean people want to achieve

in Korea is a state where all nuclear threats sur-

rounding the Korean Peninsula are removed. This

cannot be achieved by a “CVID of the DPRK”

alone. It is also necessary for the U.S., ROK, and

Japan to drop their “extended nuclear deterrence”

policy on which they base their military strategy in

Northeast Asia. This is the only way for a nuclear-

weapon-free Korean Peninsula can also serve as a

stepping stone toward the creation of a Northeast

Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

10. In this regard, it is very disturbing that the U.S.

administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review has

reaffirmed its commitment “to maintain a credible

nuclear umbrella extended to over thirty allies and

partners” as well as to modernize its nuclear weap-

ons and their infrastructure. Moreover, the U.S. is

continuing its rejection of the “no first use” policy,

as well as its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These regretful

measures show that the U.S. is not in compliance

with its legal obligations under the NPT’s Article 6

to “pursue negotiations in good faith” for nuclear

disarmament in the world. And these negative poli-

cies will also hinder the process of denuclearization

of the Korean Peninsula.

11. Ladies and gentlemen, the time has come to end

the Korean War fully with a peace agreement and

thereby take a step closer to a nuclear-weapon-free

Northeast Asia. We would like to urge all the par-

ticipants in this conference to support our sincere

appeal for ending officially the costly war on the

Korean Peninsula now. Such a development will be

a big step forward for the two States of Korea to

join the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty (TPNW) in

the near future.

Thank you.

Endorsed by the following civil society groups:

Abolition 2000 working group on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

American Friends Service Committee

Article 9 Canada

Atisha Dipankar Peace Trust Bangladesh

Basel Peace Office

Campaign for Peace Disarmament and Common Security

Channing and Popai Liem Education Foundation

Church of What’s Happenin’ Now

Environmentalists Against War

Hawaii Peace and Justice

Human Survival Project

International Peace Bureau

Kaua`i Alliance for Peace and Social Justice

Korea Peace & Unification Action of Boston

Korea Peace Network

Korean Quarterly

MA Korea Peace Campaign

Mâlama Mâkua

Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

Massachusetts Peace Action

Maui Peace Action

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Oceania Rising

One Corea Now

Pacific Earth Institute

Pax Christi International

Page 4

Peace Action

Peace Boat

Peace Depot

Peace Philosophy Centre

Peaceworkers

People for Nuclear Disarmament

RootsAction

Veterans For Peace

War Prevention Initiative

Western States Legal Foundation

Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

World BEYOND War

World Can’t Wait Hawaii

World Future Council

[Editor’s Note: On March 21, 2019 55 South Ko-

rean civil society organizations sent the following

letter to the UN Security Council. They sent this

open letter to raise their concerns on the deadlock

between the DPRK and the U.S. after the last sum-

mit in Vietnam. They appealed to the Members of

the UN Security Council, the Security Council

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718,

and the international community to ensure that the

peace process on the Korean Peninsula is firmly

sustained. The letter can be accessed online at:

http://www.peoplepower21.org /English/1619256.]

Open Letter to the UN

Security Council Members

The Peace Process on the Korean

Peninsula must Go on

We are 55 civil society organizations that

act for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Since the

last summit in Vietnam between the DPRK and the

U.S. ended without result, concerns have been

raised that the deadlock between the two countries

will be prolonged. We wish to make it clear that

there must be no further action to aggravate the sit-

uation. We appeal to the Members of the UN Secu-

rity Council, the Security Council Committee estab-

lished pursuant to resolution 1718, and the interna-

tional community to ensure that the peace process

on the Korean Peninsula is firmly sustained.

We request the Members of the UN Security

Council to publicly announce in support of the fol-

lowing: the reopening of the DPRK-U.S. dialogue;

the lifting all the sanctions related to humanitarian

assistance; and the starting of negotiations to build a

peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

We also request the 1718 Committee to lift

all the sanctions against humanitarian support to the

DPRK.

The dialogue between the DPRK and

the U.S. must continue

The second DPRK-U.S. summit clearly

showed that removing tensions from the Korean

Peninsula, where the Cold War still runs, is not an

easy task. For the countries who have been enemies

of each other for almost 70 years, it is not easy at all

to trust and begin to have open talks with each

other. This is why it is neither realistic nor appropri-

ate for the U.S. to demand that the DPRK com-

pletely denuclearize at once. The DPRK needs to

consider the fact that deep-rooted mistrust is also

alive despite her stated willingness to denuclearize.

We would like to highlight that the DPRK

and the U.S. committed in Singapore “to establish

new relations, to build a lasting and stable peace

regime on the Korean Peninsula and to work toward

complete denuclearization of the Korean Penin-

sula.” We expect the two countries will adjust their

demands and expectations to start phased and si-

multaneous implementation of their promises at the

smallest level they feel comfortable with. Once they

start building trust in the process, they will be able

to agree on larger issues. The DPRK and the U.S.

must earnestly listen to each other and continue

their dialogue.

At least, the sanctions against the

DPRK that are related to humanitarian

assistance must be lifted

The UN says that the sanctions against the

DPRK are not the end, but the means. In the same

light, all resolutions of the UN Security Council on

the sanctions emphasize the commitment to “a

peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the

situation.” The true purposes of such resolutions are

to urge “the DPRK and the U.S. to respect each

other’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together”

and also “the council members as well as other stat-

es to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solu-

tion through dialogue.” Humanitarian assistance is a

universal and non-derogable value and spirit in the

work of the UN. As the UN Security Council reso-

Page 5

lutions clarify that these resolutions “are not in-

tended to have adverse humanitarian consequences

for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect

negatively or restrict those activities, …the work of

international and non-governmental organizations

carrying out assistance and relief activities in the

DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of

the DPRK.” However, the sanctions against the

DPRK by the UN and the stronger ones imposed by

the U.S. after the first DPRK-U.S. summit have ag-

gravated the conditions for humanitarian assistance

to the DPRK. We urge the 1718 Committee to lift

all the sanctions that prevent humanitarian assis-

tance to the DPRK.

These sanctions hamper implementation of

inter-Korean agreements for exchange and coopera-

tion. They even made it difficult to resume opera-

tion of Mount Geumgang tours and Gaeseong In-

dustrial Complex, which are stopped activities unre-

lated to the UN sanctions. As initial steps for peace,

the two Koreas need to expand meetings and coop-

eration in order to end military tension and confron-

tation, thus paving the way for peace on the Korean

Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The sanctions

against the DPRK which impede the conduct of hu-

manitarian assistance and the building of coopera-

tive relationships between the two Koreas must be

relieved as soon as possible.

‘Denuclearization as Peacemaking Pro-

cess’ must be observed as a principle

The nuclear conflict on the Korean Penin-

sula is a product of the instability inherent to an ar-

mistice regime, grown out of the decades-long mili-

tary confrontation and arms race. Denuclearization

of the Korean Peninsula is closely connected to

building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula

with normalizing relations between the DPRK and

the U.S. The denuclearization of the DPRK alone

cannot be the entry point for negotiations to begin.

Peace on the Peninsula cannot be achieved only

through denuclearization. It can only be achieved,

instead, when it becomes part of a peace-building

process. Efforts to build a permanent peace regime,

such as signing a peace treaty or a non-aggression

agreement, and normalizing relations between the

DPRK and the U.S. must be paralleled.

The kind of complete denuclearization that

people in the two Koreas sincerely wish to achieve

is a state where all nuclear threats surrounding the

Peninsula are removed. This cannot be achieved

only by ‘Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denu-

clearization’ of the DPRK alone. Abolishment of

the extended deterrence strategy on which the ROK,

the U.S., and Japan rely is one of the associated and

necessary tasks. Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula can

become a stepping stone for Northeast Asia Nu-

clear-Weapon-Free Zone and Nuclear-Free world.

There is no other way to achieve peace

but through peaceful means

Achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula

will serve as a test case for whether humanity will

be able to peacefully resolve the accumulated con-

flicts of today’s world, or not. In Korea, we have

recently witnessed that peace can be achieved

through peaceful means and problems can be solved

through dialogue and negotiation. Since the inter-

Korean summit last year, the two Koreas have

ceased all hostile activities, cherishing the most

peaceful time ever since the armistice began. We

should never return to the repeated threats of nu-

clear war and heightened military tension under any

circumstances.

Once again, we urge the UN Security Coun-

cil and the international community to support the

painstaking efforts to bring peace to the Korean

Peninsula. Cooperation from the international com-

munity is absolutely crucial. We plead that you do

your utmost to ensure the continuity of the peace

process on the Korean Peninsula. For its part, Ko-

rean civil society will spare no effort.

55 Civil Society Organizations in ROK:

80 Million Koreans Community Preparing for Reunification

(K.P.R.)

Asia Peace & History Education Network

Chuncheon Womenlink

Citizens’ Coalition for Democratic Media

Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice

Civil Peace Forum

Civil Society Organizations Network in Korea

Civilian Military Watch

Conference for Peace in East Asia

Daejeon Differently Abled Women Solidarity

Daejeon Women' Association for Better Aging Society

Daejeon Women's Association United

Daejeon Women’s Association for Democracy

Daejeon Women’s Association for Peace-Making

Dongbuk Womenlink

Eco Horizon Institute

Page 6

Green Korea

Gunpo Womenlink

Gwangju Womenlink

Incheon Womenlink

Jeju Peace Human Rights Center

Jeju Peace Human Rights Institute WHAT

Korea Federation for Environmental Movements

Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea

Korea Veterans for Peace

Korea Women's Associations United

Korea Women's Hot Line

Korean Sharing Movement

MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society

Movement for One Korea

Namseo Womenlink

National YWCA of Korea

NCYK (National Council of YMCA'S of Korea)

Networks for Greentransport

Ok Tree

Peace Network

Peace Sharing Association

PEACEMOMO

People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)

Professors for Democracy

Pyeongtaek Peace Center

Reconciliation and Reunification Committee, NCCK (The Na-

tional Council of Churches in Korea)

Research Institute for Peace and Reunification of Korea

Sejong Women's Corporation

Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK)

The Corea Peace 3000

The Headquarters of National Unification Movement of

Young Korean Academy

The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Is-

sues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan

The Research Institute of the Differently Abled Person’s Right

in Korea

The Righteous People for Korean Unification

Women in Action for Life PAN

Women Making Peace

Womenlink

Won-Buddhism Diocese of Pyongyang

World Without War

[Editor’s Note: The following is the text of the Joint

Statement signed in Singapore on June 12, 2018 by

the U.S. President and the DPRK Chairman after

the first ever summit between the leaders of the two

countries.]

Joint Statement of President

Donald J. Trump of the

United States of America and

Chairman Kim Jong Un of

the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea at the

Singapore Summit

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of

America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State

Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) held a first, historic

summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018.

President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un con-

ducted a comprehensive, in-depth, and sincere

exchange of opinions on the issues related to the

establishment of new U.S.–DPRK relations and the

building of a lasting and robust peace regime on the

Korean Peninsula. President Trump committed to

provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and

Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and

unwavering commitment to complete denuclearizat-

ion of the Korean Peninsula.

Convinced that the establishment of new U.S.-

DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and

prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the

world, and recognizing that mutual confidence

building can promote the denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula, President Trump and Chairman

Kim Jong Un state the following:

1. The United States and the DPRK commit

to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in

accordance with the desire of the peoples of

the two countries for peace and prosperity.

2. The United States and the DPRK will join

their efforts to build a lasting and stable

peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Page 7

3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018

Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK com-

mits to work toward complete denuclearizat-

ion of the Korean Peninsula.

4. The United States and the DPRK commit

to recovering POW/MIA remains, including

the immediate repatriation of those already

identified.

Having acknowledged that the U.S.-DPRK summit

– the first in history – was an epochal event of great

significance in overcoming decades of tensions and

hostilities between the two countries and for the

opening up of a new future, President Trump and

Chairman Kim Jong Un commit to implement the

stipulations in this joint statement fully and expedi-

tiously. The United States and the DPRK commit to

hold follow-on negotiations, led by the U.S. Secre-

tary of State, Mike Pompeo, and a relevant high-

level DPRK official, at the earliest possible date, to

implement the outcomes of the U.S.–DPRK sum-

mit.

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of

America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State

Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea have committed to cooperate for

the development of new U.S.–DPRK relations and

for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and security

of the Korean Peninsula and of the world.

DONALD J. TRUMP

President of the United States of America

KIM JONG UN

Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

June 12, 2018

Sentosa Island

Singapore

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 29, 2017 on the netizenblog at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2017/01/29/channel-

for-communication-to-unsc/.]

Channel for Individuals

or NGOs to Send

Communication to the

UN Security Council

by Ronda Hauben

Since the early days of the UN Security

Council there has been a procedure for private indi-

viduals and non-governmental organizations to be

able to send communications to the Security Coun-

cil on matters of which it is seized.

The procedure

has been referred to by its library classification

symbol which is S/NC.

I first came across this procedure when an

NGO in South Korea had been accused of being

unpatriotic to the South Korean government be-

cause that NGO (and others as well) sent a critique

to the Security Council about something the South

Korean government was presenting to the Security

Council.

It seemed particularly inappropriate for the

South Korean government to accuse an NGO of

disloyalty because of a letter sent to members of the

Security Council as there is a long tradition from

1946 to the present for private individuals or

NGO’s to write to the Security Council. Security

Council documents show that there are lists of prob-

ably thousands of such communications.

In doing some research at the UN into the

background of this procedure of the UN, I came to

realize that in the early days of the Security Coun-

cil, lists of such communications were issued by the

Secretariat on a frequent basis. The procedure is de-

scribed in the Appendix of the Provisional Rules of

Procedure of the Security Council. It states:

Provisional Procedure for Dealing

with Communications from Pri-

vate Individuals and Non-Govern-

mental Bodies

A. A list of all communications from

private individuals and non-govern-

mental bodies relating to matters of

which the Security Council is seized

Page 8

shall be circulated to all representa-

tives on the Security Council.

B. A copy of any communication on

the list shall be given by the Secre-

tariat to any representative on the

Security Council at his request.

The lists published by the UN Secretariat of

the communications received by the Security Coun-

cil from individuals or non-governmental entities

included the name and organization of the sender,

the date of the communication, the city or town and

country of the sender, and originally whether the

communication was a telegram, letter, petition etc.

The communications were grouped according to the

Security Council agenda item that the communica-

tion referred to.

If a Security Council member saw some

communication on a list that was of interest, the

Security Council member could request a copy of

the communication from the Secretariat.

From 1946 and for several years afterwards,

lists were issued on a frequent basis. By the mid

1990’s the lists would be issued on a quarterly basis

by the UN Secretariat. Then for some reason not yet

understood, starting from the 2000 list, lists by the

Secretariat would only be issued once a year,

around April.

Along with the less frequent issuing of the

lists of communications sent to the Security Coun-

cil, there appears to be no publicly available infor-

mation indicating how or where an individual or

non-governmental entity can send a communication

to the Security Council.

Recently when asking some Security Coun-

cil members if they were aware of this procedure,

only one indicated he remembered seeing some cor-

respondence from individuals or NGO’s sent to the

Security Council. Others appeared to have no

knowledge of this process. While this brief survey

was only based on a small sample, it demonstrated a

breakdown in one of the few publicly available

channels of communication between members of

the public and members of the Security Council.

In 2010 some NGOs and some academic

scientists attempted to send communication to the

Security Council about a matter being considered

by the Security Council. They sent email to all the

member states then on the Security Council. None

of these communications, however, appeared on the

annual S/NC list published by the UN Secretariat

for 2010.

More recently, during the press conference

marking the beginning of the Russian Federation’s

Presidency of the Security Council for the month of

October 2016, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin re-

sponded to a question raised by a journalist. He said

that he would support, “the greater involvement of

women” in line with Security Council Resolution

1325 to help address the high level of tension on the

Korean Peninsula.

In response to his statement, Christine Ahn,

the International Coordinator for the NGO “Women

Cross DMZ” wrote to the Security Council asking

that several recommendations the group proposed

be raised at the Security Council Debate on Resolu-

tion 1325 planned for October 25, 2016. When she

tried to find where to send her letter to have it con-

sidered as a communication to the Security Council,

however, there was no clear information publicly

available about where an individual or NGO should

send their communication. A press inquiry demon-

strated that such information was not easy to locate.

Similarly, a press inquiry to some Security

Council members yielded little help with how to

find such information. It was only a month later, at

the press conference held by the Spanish Ambassa-

dor on the occasion of assuming the Presidency of

the Security Council for the month of December

2016, that there was an offer of help to find the an-

swer to the mystery.

Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi, the

Spanish Ambassador to the UN, welcomed the

question on how to send communication to the Se-

curity Council saying that his delegation “really

believed in the participation of civil society.” He

promised that if information was sent to him docu-

menting the problem, “I’ll do my best…I’ll see

what I can do.”

An inquiry by his press secretary led to a

response from the Secretariat. The email from the

Office of the President of the Security Council in

the UN Department of Political Affairs in the Secre-

tariat stated that if an email or surface mail on a

topic being considered by the Security Council is

sent to the email address given in the UN Journal

for communications for UN member nations to send

their communication to the Security Council, or to

the postal address provided, it will usually be infor-

mally circulated by the Security Council President

Page 9

via their “political coordinators’ network.” If the

document “falls under one of the agenda items

seized by the Security Council, it gets listed and

published as a Security Council document under

S/NC[year]/1.” Then it will appear on the list that is

published for that year by the Secretariat.

Looking at the earliest S/NC lists, one is

impressed by the fact that there are communications

from individuals and groups around the world. For

example some of the earliest lists present communi-

cation received “Concerning Franco Regime in

Spain.”

Looking at the names of those who are listed

as sending communication to the UN Security

Council from 1946 to the present, one gets a sense

of the UN existing in the bigger world in a way that

is different from what is conveyed when one just

watches the workings of, for example, the Security

Council. It would appear that more serious attention

should be paid to making the address for sending

communication to the Security Council publicly

available. Also more frequent publication of the

lists would make it possible for Security Council

members to make timely requests for copies of the

communications that interested them. That could

help broaden the perspectives of Security Council

members to enable them to be better able to find

peaceful ways to resolve difficult conflicts.

Notes:

1. The term “seized” as used at the UN indicates, “that, while

the Security Council is seized of a matter, no other organ of

the United Nations may legally take it up, as under Article 12

of the UN Charter.” See:

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/be_

seized_of

2. Ronda Hauben, “S. Korean Gov’t Urged to End Criminal

Investigation of NGO for Questions on Cheonan Sent to UN”

Netizenblog, June 26, 2010.

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/

2010/06/26/s_korean_govt_urged_to_end_criminal_investigati

on_of_ngo/

3. Román Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain), President of the Security

Council for the month of December 2016 – Press Conference.

See “1 Dec 2016 – Press Conference by H.E. Mr. Román

Oyarzun Marchesi, Permanent Representative of Spain to the

United Nations and President of the Security Council for the

month of December 2016, on the Security Council Programme

of work for the month”:

http://webtv.un.org/watch/rom%C3%

A1n-oyarzun-marchesi-spain-president-of-the-security-

council-for-the-month-of-december-2016-press-conference/

5232207921001

4. Communication from private individuals, NGO’s or other

entities which relate to the work of the Security Council can be

sent to the email address listed in the UN Journal,

dppa-

[email protected]* or mailed to:

United Nations Security Council

405 East 42

Street

New York, NY 10017

*Please note the email to the Security Council has changed

from when this article was originally written. The current

email address is as listed above. It is

[email protected]

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on October 16, 2018 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2018/10/16/peace-a

nd-the-korean-peninsula/.]

The 2016-2017 Candlelight

Revolution and the Support

for Peaceful North-South

Relations on the

Korean Peninsula

by Ronda Hauben

[Author’s Note: The following article is my intro-

duction to a collection of articles which explores the

role of the 2016-2017 Candlelight Revolution in

giving birth to the advance made in inter-Korean

negotiations and joint work on the Korean Penin-

sula in 2018. Contrary to the view put forward by

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),

UNSC sanctions are not the source of the DPRK

commitment to work toward denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula. This article explains how it is the

candlelight demonstrations in the ROK that have set

the foundation for the changed environment and

actions of the ROK and DPRK on the Korean Pen-

insula. The collection of articles titled, “The Can-

dlelight Revolution Continues” is online at:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn31-2.pdf.]

I. Background

In May 2018, I returned from a one month

visit to South Korea. The visit was remarkable in a

number of ways that I want to document and dis-

cuss. In order to understand the current develop-

ments, however, some background is needed. That

Page 10

background is what I refer to as the netizen devel-

opments.

My attention was first drawn to South Korea

early in 2003 when mainstream Western newspa-

pers carried accounts of how in December 2002,

Roh Moo-hyun had been elected President by the

netizens.

This was a reference to the Internet users

who were committed to exploring their civic re-

sponsibility having been empowered by their newly

acquired Internet access.

Roh’s election was propelled by demonstra-

tions called Candlelight demonstrations, in response

to netizen anger after two South Korean middle

school students had been killed by a vehicle driven

by U.S. Military Personnel. Roh was a human rights

lawyer whose election was the product of a broad

ranging campaign by netizens challenging the con-

servative practices that have been common during

South Korean elections.

By 2008, Roh’s term was up. He was fol-

lowed as president by Lee Myung-bak, a conserva-

tive business man who was elected to the presi-

dency in part because the online campaigning that

enabled Roh to win his election was now called ille-

gal and forbidden and punished by big fines or even

a potential jail term. Such restrictions took several

more years to be overturned by the South Korean

Constitutional Court. Lee Myung-bak served as the

President of South Korea from 2008-2012.

Just a few weeks after he took office, Presi-

dent Lee introduced a number of programs that

drew vehement opposition, particularly from

netizens. This led to a 106-day Candlelight demon-

stration in Seoul along with other demonstrations

around the country. Among the studies of the 2008

Candlelight demonstrations is one by Min Kyung-

bae titled “Analog Government Digital Citizens.”

In his article, Min describes the growing gap

between the netizens who have mastered digital

technology and new ways of focusing on communi-

cation as opposed to the government officials who

are stuck in the old patterns of analog technology.

Min’s article describes how government officials

had closed off some of the offline open areas where

students and others could discuss and debate issues.

In response, netizens set up online forums where

they could have discussion and debate. Then

netizens took the frameworks they had created on-

line and recreated them offline.

One example of this process was a debate

held outdoors around midnight on June 10, 2008

which continued into the early morning hours on

June 11. The issue of the debate was whether or not

the demonstrators should climb over the shipping

containers that the police had used to erect a barri-

cade in front of the Blue House where the President

lived and worked. During the offline debate that

night many people online also participated by being

in online contact with those who were out at the

plaza participating in the debate. The result of the

debate is that a decision was made for several pro-

testers to climb onto the top of the shipping con-

tainer barricade with their organization flags to

demonstrate that they could have gone over the bar-

ricade but that they had publicly come to the con-

clusion they should not do that.

Their action demonstrated that such a de-

bate/discussion which could be carried out online,

now could also occur offline. In this situation dem-

onstrators learned that their online practice could be

used to create such actions offline.

Such experience and lessons learned during

the 2008 Candlelight demonstrations served the citi-

zens and netizens of South Korea well when in

2016 they began six months of non violent Saturday

demonstrations in their fight to impeach Park Geun-

hye who had become the President of South Korea

in the 2012 election.

II. The Inter-Korean Summit

When I arrived in Seoul late in April 2018,

everyone’s attention was focused on the upcoming

Inter-Korean Summit which was to take place on

April 27.

Once the Summit began, the attention of all

the South Koreans I observed in stores nearby or

elsewhere was focused on the streaming TV pro-

grams broadcasting the Summit. The details of the

unfolding event were impressive as the commitment

of both President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and

Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea demon-

strated a determination to work toward a peaceful

future. A warm and friendly relationship showed

signs of developing between the two and between

their wives.

Several days later when I was having dinner

with a Korean friend, the friend observed, “Who

would have expected any of this to happen even just

two years ago?”

Page 11

III. The 2016-2017 Candlelight Demon-

strations

My decision to take a trip to South Korea

was in part motivated by the desire to hear the dis-

cussion and debates among activists and researchers

about how they understood the 2016-2017 Candle-

light demonstrations. When I arrived in Seoul, I

learned that there were several conferences planned

to analyze the 2016-2017 Candlelight demonstra-

tions. One of the conferences was to be held toward

the end of my visit, but it would all be in the Ko-

rean language without translation.

Fortunately, I was able to arrange interviews

in English with a few of the researchers at that con-

ference to hear about their work. One professor did

a brief translation for me of the keynote presenta-

tion on the first day of the conference. He also ar-

ranged for a student to translate some presentations

the second day of the conference. This conference

was on the recent Candlelight demonstrations and

their impact. I found the keynote especially interest-

ing but since there was no written version available

and the translation I was given was informal, I will

share some of the notes I made with the proviso that

these are my notes and not the result of any official

or formal translation.

The title of the conference as rendered in the

informal translation was: “Symposium on Candle-

light Protest.” It was held in a National Assembly

building in Seoul on May 18-19, 2018. The title of

the keynote presented on May 18 by Kim Jung-bae

was “Historical Significance and Challenges of Can-

dlelight.”

In the keynote, Kim pointed to a book writ-

ten a few years earlier about how around the world,

democracy has been in retreat, for example in India

and Turkey. Kim Jung-bae wondered, if democracy

was in retreat everywhere, then how was it that the

Candlelight protest was possible in South Korea?

He said he was still seeking answers to this puzzle.

He proposed that the drama of the Candlelight and

its ramifications needed to be studied. He also de-

scribed how he had attended a demonstration called

by middle school students. He was surprised that

they had come from across South Korea and that

they put forward the need for a revolution. Kim

Jung-bae made a number of other observations and

raised issues to be explored. Then he returned to his

concern that even after the Candlelight demonstra-

tions, there was still a danger of South Korea re-

treating from democracy. He proposed there was a

need to identify the fundamental motivation driving

the Candlelight so as to keep it alive. Other papers

at the conference explored various aspects of the

Candlelight phenomenon. In general, the issues in

contention revolved around two different views.

One was that the candlelight was part of a revolu-

tionary development. The other was that it was per-

haps a form of popularism.

One of the reasons I have offered this back-

ground is that I felt it would be helpful to under-

stand the kind of analysis and discussion that char-

acterize the papers presented at another conference

that took place on May 23, 2018. That conference

was titled “International Forum: The Role of Civil

Society for the Improvement of Inter-Korean Rela-

tions and the Process of Peacebuilding on the Ko-

rean Peninsula.”

I want to point to some observations and

recommendations in one particular paper presented

at this conference, the paper by Lee Taeho titled

“The Role of Civil Society for Building Inter-Ko-

rean Trust and Peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

There are other similarly interesting observations

and recommendations in other papers presented at

the same conference, but for my summary Lee

Taeho’s paper makes some particularly useful ob-

servations and recommendations.

IV. Observations and Recommendations

One significant observation made in Lee’s

paper was that the relationship between the two

Koreas had to be different after the 2016-2017 Can-

dlelight Revolution from what it had been before.

Some of the reasoning behind this observation was

that the Candlelight Revolution provided for the

democratic legitimacy of the Moon Jae-in govern-

ment. The election that Moon Jae-in won shortly

after the victory of the Candlelight was a direct re-

sult of the Candlelight Revolution’s winning the

impeachment of Park Geun-hye. The Candlelight

demonstrations provided support for the political

authority of what would shortly afterwards become

the Moon government. The success of the Candle-

light Revolution resulted in part from the important

role played by South Korean Civil Society. With

this support, one can argue that Korean Civil Soci-

ety has won the right to work together with the gov-

ernment to find solutions to difficult problems. But

Page 12

for that partnership to continue the government will

have to work for better relations with the North

since reconciliation and eventual reunification are

crucial goals of many who are part of South Korean

Civil Society.

Another basis for a different relationship

between the government and the citizens, Lee’s pa-

per proposes, is based on the experience demon-

strating that the safety and well being of the people

who live on the Korean Peninsula is dependent on

decisions made by them, not by outside experts.

Drawing its conclusions from the success of

the Candlelight demonstrations, the paper proposes

“broad and open discussions” by the ordinary peo-

ple “without limitation” on debate.

Lee’s paper calls for the government to form

a discussion forum to make it possible for citizens

to participate in the reviews and discussion of the

direction the government should take to improve

the relationship between the two Koreas so as to be

able to resolve controversial issues. It proposes that

civil society in South Korea work to “open a space

where citizens as sovereign can have a discussion

altogether and participate to build a peaceful con-

sensus for coexistence.”

Lee’s paper argues that the legacy of the

years of the division of Korea has created a chal-

lenging situation. In order not to continue the harm

of this legacy, civil society has to work to create a

process which will require not just finding the mid-

dle ground between different views but a space to

encourage free discussion of various visions and

methods so as to arrive at processes to unify those

with diverse experiences.

The paper concludes that, with the “dramatic

change…unfolding on the Korean Peninsula and in

Northeast Asia,” the role for civil society, is to

“freely imagine, share, and boldly embody practices

to overcome the division of the Korean Peninsula

and to further the coexistence in East Asia while

confronting old stereotypes, prejudice, and taboos

that the division system emphasized to us, armed

with a strong belief in changes that the participation

and solidarity of the citizens of the Korean Penin-

sula and the entire world will help us draw out.”

V. Summary

A question is raised by the review of the

Candlelight Revolution that has been going on in

South Korea over the past 15 years. Is there a new

political process unfolding in South Korea which

can help forge a new relationship between the two

Koreas. The experience of the Candlelights has

helped to create a digital form of citizenship which

is also a more participatory form of citizenship. Min

Kyung-bae’s article about the 2008 Candlelight

helped to document the nature of this new form of

citizenship. Lee Taeho’s article documents some of

the new processes that South Korean netizens and

citizens have learned from the Candlelight experi-

ence which can be applied to the inter-Korean pro-

cesses.

Another article, “Ushering in an Era of

Great Transformation on the Korean Peninsula

through Citizen Participation” by Lee Hyeuk-hee,

demonstrates that there are other activists and re-

searchers in South Korea trying to define this new

political process and determine how it can help to

forge a new relationship between the two Koreas.

“A different era requires different thinking” writes

the author, who is Chairperson of the Operation

Committee of the NGO One Korea Action. Lee

Hyeuk-hee describes what is happening on the Ko-

rean Peninsula as “this great transformation.” At its

core, he writes, was the “Candlelight Revolution.”

While Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye

sought to pursue a policy of confrontation with the

DPRK, leading to a military crisis, earlier South

Korean Presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-

hyun had begun the process of working toward a

more long range and peace supporting inter-Korean

policy. They instituted an engagement policy.

With a new government in the South put in

place due to the success of the Candlelight Revolu-

tion, it became possible for the new president,

Moon Jae-in, to return to an engagement policy.

This involves economic, social and cultural interac-

tion rather than Lee Myung-bak’s and Park Guen-

hye’s policy of reunification through absorption.

In 2018 Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un put

in place a top down approach toward rapidly nor-

malizing relations through “negotiation and dia-

logue between high ranking officials” which then is

to be “expanded downward.” The goal of this pro-

cess is to institutionalize inter-Korean relations via

the creation of a confederation of the North and

South. A confederation means the North and the

South can exist as two sovereign states for a period

of time as they prepare for reunification, by first

forming an economic community, then to a socio-

Page 13

cultural community and then finally to a political

community.

Lee Hyeuk-hee argues that the previous fail-

ure of inter-Korean exchanges was the failure to

“attract the masses” to be part of the process. He

explains, their participation was needed in order to

succeed in building a solidarity between the peoples

of the two Koreas. The Inter-Korean Joint Liaison

Office which opened in September 2018 could pro-

vide a means to create the structures to make possi-

ble the needed exchanges and cooperation. Lee

Hyeuk-hee proposes the need for many contribu-

tions to forge the solidarity between the two cul-

tures of the North and the South. Such contribu-

tions, he suggests, could be made by those who had

been part of the Candlelight Revolution and by ‘regu-

lar’ citizens. Lee Hyeuk-hee argues, such wide

ranging contributions and involvement is needed in

order to finally end the cold war system still divid-

ing the Korean people.

Min Kyung-bae, Lee Taeho, and Lee

Hyeuk-hee all see the Candlelight Revolution as

setting the basis for the new political processes that

will make possible the new relationship to be built

between the two Koreas.

The papers by Lee Taeho, and Lee Hyeuk-

hee provide a set of proposals for how the two

Koreas learning from the candlelight experience,

can approach each other. This is a start. But also

needed is continued study of the candlelight experi-

ence so as to broaden the insights and lessons that

civil society and government can learn from so as to

build a mass based solidarity among the peoples of

the two Koreas. There is some experience that the

Korean people have had, in both the North and the

South to help with this. What is needed is discus-

sion among the citizens and netizens of Korea and

research efforts to meet the demands of such chal-

lenges.

Notes:

1. See e.g., Michael Hauben, “The Net and Netizens: The Im-

pact the Net has on People’s Lives.” Online at

http://www.colu

mbia.edu/~rh120/ch106.x01

2. See e.g., Barbara Demick, “‘Netizens’ Crusade Buoys New

South Korean Leader: An unofficial online fan club is credited

with helping Roh Moo Hyun into office by attracting young

voters. It may continue to play a role.” L.A. Times, Feb 10,

2003. Online at:

http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/10/world

/fg-cyber10

3. Yun Young Min, “An Analysis of Cyber-Electioneering:

Focusing on the 2002 Presidential Election in Korea,” Korea

Journal, Vol. 43. No. 3 Autumn, 2003 pp.141-164. Online at:

https://www.ekoreajournal.net/issue/view_pop.htm?Idx=3258

4. Min Kyung Bae, “Analog Government Digital Citizens,”

Global Asia Vol. 3 No. 3, Fall 2008, pp. 94-103. Online at:

http://www.globalasia.org/v3no3/feature/analog-government-d

igital-citizens_kyung-bae-min

5. Lee Taeho, “The Role of Civil Society for Building Inter-

Korean Trust and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” at “The

International Forum: The Role of Civil Society for the

Improvement of Inter-Korean Relations and the Process of

Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula” on May 23, 2018 in

Seoul.

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 14, 2018 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2018/01/14/toward-

2018-winter-olympics/.]

On the Korean Peninsula

Unusual Signs of Hope:

Toward Joint Participation in

2018 Winter Olympics

by Ronda Hauben

Part I.

A set of important developments in the con-

flict on the Korean Peninsula was initiated by the

DPRK’s Kim Jong-un using his New Year’s Ad-

dress on January 1, 2018.

In his address, he said:

This year is significant for the north

and the south…in the south the Win-

ter Olympic Games will take place.

In order to not only celebrate great

national events in a splendid manner

but also demonstrate the dignity and

spirit of the nation at home and

abroad, we should improve the fro-

zen inter-Korean relations and glo-

rify this meaningful year as an event-

ful one noteworthy in the history of

the nation.

He proposed that: “A climate favorable for

national reconciliation and reunification should be

established.” To create such a climate, he urged:

Page 14

The improvement of inter-Korean

relations is a pressing matter of con-

cern not only to authorities but to all

other Koreans, and it is a crucial task

to be carried out through a concerted

effort by the entire nation. The north

and south should promote bilateral

contact, travel, cooperation and ex-

change on a broad scale to remove

mutual misunderstanding and dis-

trust, and fulfil their responsibility

and role as the motive force of na-

tional reunification.

As a means to accomplish this, he offered:

We will open our doors to anyone

from south Korea, including the rul-

ing party and opposition parties, or-

ganizations and individual person-

ages of all backgrounds, for dia-

logue, contact, travel, if they sin-

cerely wish national concord and

unity.

Such action however, he explained would

need to be the work solely of the two Koreas:

Inter-Korean relations are, to all in-

tents and purposes an internal matter

of our nation, which the north and

the south should resolve on their

own responsibility. Therefore they

should acquire a steadfast stand and

viewpoint that they will resolve all

the issues arising in bilateral rela-

tions on the principle of By Our Na-

tion Itself.

Hence, he cautioned:

(…) Now it is not time for the north

and the south to turn their backs on

each other and merely express their

respective standpoints; it is time that

they sit face to face with a view to

holding sincere discussions over the

issue of improving inter-Korean rela-

tions by our nation itself and seek a

way out for its settlement in a bold

manner.

As a practical measure to accomplish such

ends, he noted that:

As for the Winter Olympic Games to

be held soon in south Korea, it will

serve as a good occasion for demon-

strating our nation’s prestige and we

earnestly wish the Olympic Games a

success. From this point of view we

are willing to dispatch our delegation

and adopt other necessary measures:

with regard to this matter, the

authorities of the north and the south

may meet together soon. Since we

are compatriots of the same blood as

south Koreans, it is natural for us to

share their pleasure over the auspi-

cious event and help them.

Such actions would not be limited to this

example. He explained:

We will in the future, too, resolve all

issues by the efforts of our nation

itself under the unfurled banner of

national independence and frustrate

the schemes by anti-reunification

forces within and without on the

strength of national unity, thereby

opening up a new history of national

reunification.

Part II.

ROK President Moon Jae-in greeted the

possibility of the DPRK participating in the Olym-

pics with an eager response.

Very soon after the New Year’s Speech, the

two Koreas reestablished a hot line communication

system to make it possible for there to be communi-

cations between them.

Similarly, Moon soon announced that he had

had a phone conversation with the U.S. President

Donald Trump who agreed to postpone the military

maneuver that had been planned to take place dur-

ing the Olympic period, until after the Olympics.

There is a tradition to declare the period

seven days before the Games start until seven days

after they end as a time of an Olympic truce where

hostilities between nations are temporarily stopped

as a way to protect the security of both the athletes

and the spectators so they can participate and or

watch the games. This tradition goes back to the

Greek notion of an Olympic truce (ekecheiria)

which some maintain “was a legendary oracle of

Delphi, to replace the cycle of conflict with a

friendly athletic competition every four years.

In November, 2017 the UN General Assem-

bly had passed a resolution, GA Res A/72/L.5 (3

Page 15

November 2017), urging the member nations of the

UN to honor this tradition.

Almost immediately after Kim Jong-un’s

New Year’s Address, the ROK welcomed the pro-

posal and suggested Tuesday, January 9, 2018 as

the first date for Inter-Korean negotiations. The

DPRK accepted this date.

A momentum appeared to be building up to

support negotiations between the two Koreas. Both

Koreas appointed negotiating teams.

The sports representative of the DPRK flew

to Lausanne, Switzerland to meet with Olympic

officials who promised to do what they could to

make it possible for the DPRK to participate in the

Olympics.

Moon announced that he would make his

New Year’s Speech on Wednesday, January 10 and

then hold a press conference.

Given the concern around the world over the

growing tension on the Korean Peninsula, these

events have been greeted hopefully by many who

expressed their support for the negotiations to con-

tinue. There is support for a breakthrough in the

situation toward the development of a peaceful pro-

cess to overcome the impasse that had only recently

seemed insurmountable.

Part III.

There were a few developments toward the

end of 2017 that may have contributed to bring this

situation about. One was the invitation by the

DPRK to the UN to send a team to the DPRK for a

visit and discussion. The acceptance of the invita-

tion by the UN with the visit of Under Secretary

General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman and

his two colleagues, Sam Martell and Katrin Hett to

Pyongyang from December 5 to 8, 2017, was one

small sign that perhaps some change was possible

to replace the tense situation previously prevailing

in the region.

Around the same period, Choi Moon-soon,

the governor of Gangwon, the province which in-

cludes the major site of the 2018 Winter Olympics,

at Pyeongchang, where a number of Winter Olym-

pic Games will be held, met on the sidelines of an

international sports event with the DPRK Sport

Club president Mun Ung and encouraged the DPRK

to attend the Games.

An article in Hankyoreh de-

scribes such efforts:

Choi has previously made several

efforts to encourage North Korea’s

participation in the Pyeongchang

Olympics, including a meeting with

North Korea’s April 25 Sports Club

president Mun Ung during the Ari

Sports Cup 15-and-under interna-

tional youth football championship

in Kunming on Dec. 19–22.

The article also describes the efforts of rep-

resentatives of the International Olympic Commit-

tee (IOC) to welcome DPRK participation in the

2018 Winter Olympics.

Then, Japan as president of the Security

Council for the month of December, invited the

DPRK and the ROK to attend the December 15,

2017 Security Council meeting discussing non-pro-

liferation and the DPRK. The invitation made it

possible for the DPRK Ambassador to UN to pres-

ent his nation’s view of the dispute, and of the secu-

rity problem facing his nation. The ROK Ambassa-

dor, as part of his presentation, urged the DPRK to

participate in the upcoming Winter Olympics.

These were but some of the signs that some-

thing might happen to support interaction among

the various parties to the tension on the Korean

Peninsula so that they would find a way to begin to

interact, especially with respect to the desire of the

ROK to have the DPRK participate in the upcoming

Olympic events.

Part IV.

The UN Secretary General and the President

of the General Assembly greeted these develop-

ments with welcoming messages for the inter-Ko-

rean efforts to make it possible to have a joint

DPRK-ROK contribution to the upcoming Winter

Olympics in February and March 2018.

The UN Secretary General’s response was

to welcome the reopening of the inter-Korean com-

munication channel. On January 3, 2018, the Dep-

uty Spokesman for Secretary General Guterres said

it was always a positive development to have dia-

logue between the DPRK and the Republic of Ko-

rea. The statement said it was “In that context, the

Secretary-General welcomes the reopening of the

inter-Korean communication channel.”

Also, on January 3, the President of the

General Assembly met with the DPRK Ambassador

to the UN. He issued the following statement:

Page 16

The President of the 72

session of

the General Assembly, H.E. Mr.

Miroslav Lajèák, met today with

H.E. Mr. Ja Song Nam, Permanent

Representative of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

to the United Nations, at the request

of the Permanent Representative.

The President of the General Assem-

bly said he was pleased with the

readiness of DPRK to constructively

engage in a dialogue with the Repub-

lic of Korea, including a possible

participation of a delegation from

DPRK in the Winter Olympic Games

in PyeongChang, Republic of Korea,

as well as with the reopening of the

communication channels. New York.

Given the dangerous hostile environment

that has existed regarding this dispute, these recent

events appear remarkable. Whether they can be

continued or whether they just end in a return to the

previous more hostile environment one cannot

know at this juncture. But it is important that peace

loving people carefully watch what is happening on

the Korean Peninsula and find a way to give what-

ever support they can to the forces for peace who

are trying to make an impact on the current situa-

tion.

Notes:

1. From Kim Jong-un’s New Year Address, Jan. 1, 2018

2. See General Assembly Resolution A/72/L.5 (3 November

2017), “Sport for development and peace: building a peaceful

and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal,” p. 1.

3. Kim Chang-keum, and Park Soo-hyun, “Gangwon governor

raises possibility of joint South-North skating team,” January

3, 2018, Hankyoreh.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_

edition /e_northkorea/826186.html See also http://english.hani

.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_north korea/827349.html

4. See transcript of the Press Briefing January 3, 2018 by the

Spokesperson for the UN Secretary General at UN Headquar-

ters in New York.

http://www.un.org/press/en/2018/db180103

.doc .htm

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 30, 2018 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2018/01/30/olympic

-truce-as-support-for-peace/.]

UN Appeal for Olympic Truce

as a Support for Peace

by Ronda Hauben

On Friday, January 26, 2018, the President

of the UN General Assembly opened the meeting of

the GA with a “solemn appeal” for the observance

of the Olympic Truce.

While the event at the UN was only sparsely

attended, it carried an importance that should be

noted and celebrated.

In his remarks, GA President Miroslav

Lajèák appealed to all UN Member States to ob-

serve the historic ‘Olympic Truce’ during the pe-

riod of the Olympic Games. The GA President was

referring to the ancient Greek tradition of the

ekecheira, or ‘Olympic Truce,’ which began in the

Eighth Century B.C., and is a cherished tradition of

the Olympic Games. In 1992 the International

Olympic Committee (IOC) honored this tradition by

calling all nations to observe the Truce.

In a resolution passed by the UN General

Assembly on November 13, 2017, the GA called on

all UN member states to observe the UN truce indi-

vidually or collectively, from a period from the 7th

day before the start of the Winter Olympic Games

until the seventh day following the end of the

Paralympic Winter Games which were to be held in

Pyeongchang, Republic of Korea.

The truce has a special meaning in the con-

text of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games.

The truce that has been called for on the Ko-

rean Peninsula will mean that the two Koreas will

have some unified inter-Korean activities in this

upcoming Olympics. For this Olympics the “first

unified inter-Korean women’s hockey team” is al-

ready in training. When the North Korean athletes

and coaches arrived at the training center in the Re-

public of Korea (ROK), they were given a warm

welcome by the South Korean team. The South Ko-

rean women’s ice hockey coach Sarah Murray be-

came the coach of the unified team. Newspaper ac-

counts report that coach Pak Chul-ho who accompa-

nied the players from the Democratic Republic of

Page 17

Korea (DPRK) is working together with Coach

Murray helping the players from the North with

their training under her.

Such experiences carried out by Koreans

from both parts of the peninsula help to demonstrate

why the tradition of the Olympic truce is so impor-

tant.

The truce has provided a reprieve of a pe-

riod with less tension between the two Koreas. It is

a gift to the world from the tradition of the Olym-

pics. Also the pause in tension it provided makes it

possible for the parties to the conflict to consider

alternatives that may make it possible to find a

peaceful resolution for the conflict.

An article in the English language edition of

the South Korean newspaper Hankyoreh reported

about a recent Congressional hearing in the U.S.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

proposed that the U.S. support reinstating the six-

party talks to seek a means of resolving the conflict

with the DPRK. Could this be an example of how

alternative perspectives may be explored during the

period when the Olympic Truce provides for a

pause in the hostile rhetoric among the belligerent

parties?

UN actions which help to support concrete

efforts toward peace provide an example for the

role the UN should play in the world.

Note:

1. “Henry Kissinger suggests a return to the Six Party Talks,”

Hankyoreh, January 28, 2018.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/en

glish_edition/e_northkorea/829736.html

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 23, 2018 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2018/01/23/korean-

peninsula-a-ray-of-hope/.]

Korean Peninsula Provides

A Ray of Hope

by Ronda Hauben

In some newspaper accounts of a meeting

held on January 20, 2018 by Thomas Bach, the

President of the International Olympics Committee

(IOC), Bach is quoted congratulating the North and

South Korea for the inter Korean achievements that

he recognizes “would have seemed impossible just

a few weeks ago.”

Thomas Bach was describing a meeting at

IOC headquarters that he held with North Korean

Sports Minister Kim Il-Guk and his South Korean

counterpart, Do Jong-hwan South Korea’s Minister

of Culture, Sports and Tourism on January 20,

2018.

He was responding to recent events which

were working to make a peace Olympics a reality.

What are some of these achievements?

A resolution, GA Res (A/72/L.5) approving

a peace Olympics, was passed by the UN General

Assembly on November 3, 2017. The resolution

encouraged the cessation of any military activities

during the period from 10 days before the beginning

of the Olympic Games to 10 days after the Games

end. The Olympic Games begin Friday February 9,

2018 and last until Sunday, February 25, 2018.

Then the Paralympic games are scheduled

starting on Thursday, March 8 and ending on

Sunday, March 18. This makes the peace period

from 10 days before the Winter Olympics starting

on Wednesday, January 31, 2018 until 10 days after

the Paralympics ending on Wednesday, March 28.

Republic of Korea President Moon Jae-in

asked the U.S. to postpone the joint military maneu-

vers it was planning for the Korean Peninsula dur-

ing the time of the Olympics. The U.S. agreed.

Also, the Chosun Ilbo conservative newspaper re-

ported that a U.S. nuclear powered submarine was

trying to dock at Buson at the southern end of the

Korean Peninsula. Instead it was sent to Jinhae to

be out of international view. In the end it did not

call at that Korean port either.

At face-to-face talks between representa-

tives of the two Koreas, and also at the January 20

meeting with the IOC, some of the arrangements

agreed upon included: Three inter Korean routes

that have been closed are being opened for travel by

North Koreans coming to the games.

An Olympic Korean Declaration stated the

agreement that for 22 athletes, 24 government offi-

cials and 21 media representatives from the DPRK

will attend the games.

At the opening ceremony on February 9,

both Koreas will march under the Unification flag,

Page 18

white with a blue silhouette of the peninsula in the

middle of the flag.

Athletes from both Koreas will wear special

uniforms similar to the Unification flag.

The acronym for team will be COR.

The original team of 23 South Koreans on

the Women’s ice hockey team will have 12 North

Korean members added to make it a joint team.

Their anthem will be the folk song Arirang.

The DPRK figure skater pair Ryom Tae-ok

and Kim Ju-Sil will be permitted to compete.

There will be performances of cultural

events. The 140 member Samjiyon Orchestra from

the DPRK will perform once in Seoul and once in

Gangneung.

These are but some of the important devel-

opments that have been achieved in a relatively

short period of time.

On January 19, the First Vice Foreign Min-

ister from the ROK Lim Sung-nam met with the

U.N Secretary General in New York. He asked for

the Secretary General’s support and attention to

these important developments between the Koreas.

Secretary General Guterres promised the UN would

do all in its power to help to produce progress in the

inter-Korean talks.

Referring to the planned joint entrance by

the Korean athletes, IOC President Bach is quoted

as saying:

“I am sure this will be a very emotional mo-

ment not only for all Koreans but also for the entire

world.” Bach added, “Coming myself from a for-

merly divided country (Germany), it is a moment

that I am also personally looking forward to with

great anticipation and great emotion.”

All Koreans and all peace loving people de-

serve this ray of hope.

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 31, 2018 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2018/01/31/unsc-m

embers-support-inter-korean-dialogue-under-kazak

hstan-presidency/.]

Security Council Members

Support Dialogue

by Ronda Hauben

At the press conference at the beginning of

the Kazakhstan presidency of the Security Council

for the month of January 2018, Kairat Umarov, the

Kazakhstan Ambassador to the UN, said that the

Security Council meeting on non-proliferation

would provide a helpful alternative on how to deal

with the problem on the Korean Peninsula. He was

proposing that “trust and confidence building”

would provide a basis to resolve such conflicts.

Presiding at the January 18 Security Council

meeting on non-proliferation, the President of

Kazakhstan, Abdrakhmanov Nazarbayev presented

a statement about his proposal for an alternative

process to deal with nuclear and other weapons of

mass destruction. He gave the example of his coun-

try which had owned what he said was the world’s

fourth largest nuclear arsenal transitioning his coun-

try to a nuclear-free status voluntarily. President

Nazarbayev called on other nations with nuclear

weapons to follow his country’s example. In the

process he proposed that “the way to counter the

threat of nuclear weapons throughout the world is

through trust.” He called for a “revival of political

trust and systematic dialogue.” He described meet-

ing with U.S. President Donald Trump and discuss-

ing the issue, and offering “to engage in mediation

and provide a platform for negotiations should the

need arise among stakeholders.”

A part of his proposal was the call for the

participation of the U.S., Russia and China in seek-

ing a solution to the North Korean issues. He pro-

posed that “We advocate that the five nuclear-

weapon states grant security assurances to the Dem-

ocratic People’s Republic of Korea as a key prereq-

uisite for establishing an atmosphere of trust for

Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table.”

This was different from just calling for

“trust” as a means for a solution. Considering that

the U.S. provides a nuclear umbrella to the Repub-

Page 19

lic of Korea and Japan as part of its alliance with

them in opposition to the DPRK, it is significant

that the President of Kazakhstan recognized the

need for guarantees to the DPRK that nuclear weap-

ons will not be used against it.

The Kazakhstan president also recognized

the need for the “great nuclear Powers” to lead by

example in WMD reduction. However, he recog-

nized the contradiction that will occur “if the great

nuclear Powers state that they intend to maintain

and strengthen their nuclear capacities and prevent

others from acquiring the same.” He said, “I believe

that that will backfire.”

It is rare but helpful that the need to reduce

not increase or upgrade the capabilities of the nu-

clear powers was recognized.

These issues are important to understand as

a basis for “trust.” But “trust” cannot replace actual

efforts to downgrade the nuclear threat posed by the

five nuclear-weapon states which are the permanent

members of the UN Security Council.

This concern was also recognized in the pre-

sentation by Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of

the Russian Federation. He referred to a problem

that he said occurred at the 2015 Non-Proliferation

Treaty Review Conference, which he characterized

as “the misguided and dangerous trend prevailing at

the time involving attempts to compel nuclear Pow-

ers to abandon their nuclear arsenals without ac-

counting for their security interests or strategic reali-

ties.”

Lavrov explained that “the total eradication

of nuclear weapons is possible only in a context of

comprehensive, full disarmament, with equitable,

equal and indivisible security for all, including

those possessing nuclear weapons….” He referred

to Russia and China’s proposals for a “road map

aimed at reaching an exclusively peaceful settle-

ment” of the nuclear problem on the Korean penin-

sula.

Other proposals from the Security Council

meeting included from Bolivia’s Ambassador

Llorentty Soliz who pointed to “political dialogue”

as the only way to achieve the denuclearization of

the region.” Llorentty Soliz proposed the need for

“the development of mutual confidence building

measures.” And he complimented “the willingness

shown by the Governments of the Republic of Ko-

rea and of the Democratic People’s Republic of Ko-

rea to begin negotiations in order to facilitate the

attendance of a North Korean delegation in the up-

coming Winter Olympics and the participation of

both countries in the inaugural ceremony under the

same flag.”

Among other comments was one from Swe-

den’s Ambassador Skoog who maintained:

“… (S)anctions alone will not solve the cur-

rent crisis on the Korean peninsula.” The Swedish

Ambassador noted that, “We welcome the develop-

ments on the peninsula, including the steps taken to

reopen channels of communication, such as military

to military dialogue. That is an important means to

avoid misunderstanding and reduce tensions. We

also welcome the decision of the Democratic Peo-

ple’s Republic of Korea to participate in the Olym-

pic Games. Those are positive developments. It is

important to seize that window of opportunity and

support all efforts that can lead to denuclearization

and peaceful relations on the Korean peninsula.”

Cote d’Ivoire also welcomed the “thaw in

the relations between the two Koreas….” Ambassa-

dor Tanoh-Boutchoue of Cote d’Ivoire proposed

that “That thaw augurs well for the Olympic Winter

Games in South Korea. It should be welcomed and

encouraged in order to achieve the denuclearization

of the Korean peninsula.”

Ambassador Alemu of Ethiopia noted that

“It is increasingly apparent that there is no other

option but a peaceful and diplomatic path to resolv-

ing the crisis in the Korean peninsula…. In that re-

gard, we welcome the recent high-level intra-Ko-

rean talks and the agreement reached to ease mili-

tary tensions, hold military-to-military talks and

reopen the inter-Korean military hotline, which we

hope will help to reduce tensions on the Korean

peninsula. We also welcome the agreement reached

between the United States and the Republic of Ko-

rea to postpone their joint military exercises.”

China’s contribution to the meeting from

Ambassador Wu Haitao was to encourage the reso-

lution of “non-proliferation hotspot issues by politi-

cal and diplomatic means.” He applauded the very

recent positive changes that have emerged on the

Korean Peninsula. “All parties should make a con-

certed effort to maintain the hard-won momentum

of reduced tensions, create the conditions for re-

launching dialogue and negotiations and return the

nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula to dialogue

and negotiations,” he said.

Page 20

China’s Representative also referred to the

“suspension-for-suspension initiative and two-track

approach as well as the road map jointly proposed

by Russia and China” as “realistic and feasible” for

“resolving the nuclear issue of the Korean

Peninsula.”

While other issues were also raised at the

meeting, it is significant to see how much support

there was for the current inter-Korean dialogue that

has taken place between the DPRK and the ROK.

Sometimes the UN serves as a venue where

ideas and proposals for a more peaceful resolution

of difficult tensions are proposed and discussed

with some seriousness. If only it happened more

often and mechanisms for implementation were de-

veloped.

Note:

1. The quotes used in this article are from the transcript of the

January 18, 2018 Security Council meeting S/PV.8160 at the

UNSC website. The url is:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/vi

ew_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.8160

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 21, 2019 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/01/21/hungari

an-ambassador-to-un-sponsors-opera/.]

Hungarian Ambassador to

UN Sponsors Opera Perfor-

mance for UN Delegates

by Ronda Hauben

Several years ago I had the privilege of vis-

iting Budapest, Hungary and attending both an op-

era and a ballet. The prices for the tickets were low

compared to U.S. prices and the performances were

top notch. When I returned home I vowed to attend

the opera in Lincoln Center when I could, which

was not so often given the higher prices for the tick-

ets.

One of the cultural highlights of 2018 was a

special event sponsored in part by the Hungarian

Mission to the UN. At the end of October through

the beginning of November, 2018, the amazing

event was that the Hungarian State Opera and the

Hungarian National Ballet came to New York mak-

ing top notch performances available to New York-

ers. The U.S. tour by the Hungarian artists was initi-

ated on the occasion of the renovation of the Hun-

garian State Opera House

On October 30, the Hungarian State Opera

opened their visit to New York with a performance

of Ferenc Erkel’s Bank Ban (The Viceroy Bank).

The evening represented a splendid continuation of

the many cultural salons held at the Hungarian Mis-

sion to the UN to celebrate the music and other cul-

tural achievements of Hungary. It was therefore

fitting that Katalin Annamaria Bogyay, the Hungar-

ian Ambassador to the UN opened the program on

October 30 at the Koch Theater in New York’s Lin-

coln Center.

Ambassador Bogyay told the audience that

this performance in New York was part of the 2018

celebration of Hungary’s National Day. She ex-

plained that the performance provided her with the

opportunity to invite ambassadors and other leaders

of the United Nations to be part of the evening so as

to celebrate Hungary’s national day together with

drama and music.

The Ambassador described the role music

and culture has played in the Hungarian struggle

against oppression. She also recalled how the

liberetto for the opera which was written in Hungar-

ian had been censored in Hungary for a long time.

The opera is based on a 13

Century histori-

cal event when the Hungarian people fought against

foreign oppression. The opera presented the abuse

of the people of Hungary by Queen Gertrud of

Merania who came to Hungary via her marriage to

King Endre. Accompanying Queen Gertrud in the

Hungarian Court were many of her Meranian re-

tainers. They came with her to Hungary and she

entertained them instead of attending to the obliga-

tion to alleviate the hardships in the lives of her

Hungarian subjects. The result was widespread pop-

ular discontent with the activities of the Court.

The opera recounts the tragic story of how

the Queen and her brother schemed against the wife

of Viceroy Bank who was a popular leader oppos-

ing the suffering of the Hungarian People. The op-

era documents how such treachery can take its toll

on those trying to challenge ruthless leaders, but it

also demonstrates the resistance of those who op-

pose the cruelty and praises their efforts.

Page 21

The cast, the performance and its staging

were outstanding. The music was lovely. Also there

were subtitles written in English and Hungarian for

those who couldn’t understand the Hungarian

performance. This opening program was the begin-

ning of a series of several other performances by

the Hungarian State Opera in Lincoln Center along

with some performances by the Hungarian National

Ballet. Also a Gala Concert performed on Novem-

ber 4, 2018 featured selections from different op-

eras and from different ballets providing a broad

panorama of Hungarian culture for the New York

audience. Several of the selections presented were

greeted with enthusiast ‘bravos’ by members of the

audience. The tour by the Hungarian artists was a

demonstration of how music and art can help the

UN encourage the struggle for peace and against

tyranny.

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 27, 2019 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/01/27/korea-s

ociety-with-glyn-ford/.]

Korea Society Sponsors

Conversation with Glyn Ford

on his Recent Book Talking

with North Korea

by Ronda Hauben

On Friday, January 25 the Korea Society in

New York had a program featuring Glyn Ford, for-

mer U.K. Labour Party member of the European

Parliament (1984–2009), discussing his new book

Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Stand-

off published in 2018 by Pluto Press.

The format for the program was a conversa-

tion with Korea Society senior director Stephen

Noerper.

Ford said he had visited North Korea almost

50 times in the past 20 years. As such he has a

broad perspective of both the changes he has ob-

served over that period and how to view the current

developments on the Korean Peninsula.

Responding to a series of questions from

Noerper, Ford pointed to the substantial change in

North Korea he has seen since 2017 just after the

second ICBM launch. That was a time of great hos-

tility and high tension. There was a real prospect of

slipping accidentally into a war. That was quite a

dangerous period, he noted. Viewing the develop-

ments from that perspective, he pointed out that “it

is amazing how quickly we have moved” to the cur-

rent situation.

Ford also noted that before 2011, North Ko-

rea had been encouraged to follow the model of

Libya, giving up its nuclear weapons. But one

month before Kim Jong Un came to power in North

Korea he saw the head of Libya killed in a very

cruel way.

Ford made several references to what he felt

were helpful considerations that were highlighted

by being included in Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New

Year’s speech. One such highlight was the empha-

sis put on the need for a multilateral process as a

way to resolve the conflict on the peninsula. He re-

lated how the North Koreans he knows speak about

when the U.S. withdrew from the 1990s Agreed

Framework, that was the end of the agreement. But

when the U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehen-

sive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated with Iran,

it did not end there because the JCPOA had been

negotiated with other countries which still backed it

even after the U.S. withdrew.

Also, Ford pointed to the references in

Kim’s New Year’s speech to North Korea’s need to

solve its energy problem and how Kim refers to

tidal, wind and atomic power as possible ways,

along with coal, that North Korea can provide part

of a solution to its need for more energy.

Ford explained the advantage he had as a

member of the British Labor Party. That gave him

access to the Workers Party of Korea in North Ko-

rea.

During the question period, there was a

question about what security guarantees would be

needed to satisfy North Korea to make a deal about

denuclearization. Once again Kim Jong Un’s 2019

New Year’s speech was helpful. It proposed that

guarantees that were broader than the bilateral

model of the U.S. negotiations with North Korea or

with South Korea were needed. Instead a multilat-

eral model was more appropriate. Ford pointed to

the Iran deal which had a Security Council resolu-

tion, and various countries to provide security guar-

Page 22

antees. In the case of North Korea that could

include China, Russia, and South Korea.

Ford’s discussion offered a way of looking

at what is happening on the Korean Peninsula with

optimism. In the past such optimism has been in

short supply among many of those who are the

usual advisers and commentators in the West about

the Korean situation.

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 29, 2019 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/01/29/reviewi

ng-kim-jong-uns-2019-new-years-speech/.]

Reviewing Kim Jong Un’s

2019 New Year’s Speech

by Ronda Hauben

Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year’s Speech

provides a valuable resource through which to un-

derstand the events of the past year and what we

can expect in the coming year.

Kim opened his speech referring to “The

year 2018” as “a historic year, in which remarkable

changes took place in internal and external sit-

uations.”

“Last year,” he recalled referring to the his-

tory of the division of Korea “was a stirring year

which witnessed a dramatic change unprecedented

in the history of national division spanning over 70

years.”

Explaining what made the year so remark-

able, he writes:

With a determination to usher in an

era of national reconciliation, peace

and prosperity by putting an end to

the abnormal state on the Korean

Peninsula which had suffered a con-

stant war crisis, we took proactive

and bold measures to effect a great

turn in north-south relations from the

outset of last year.

He points to “eye-opening achievements

which were unimaginable in the past,” and were

made in a “short time.”

The events of last year, he proposes were

“unprecedented events,” which can be expanded by

“thoroughly implementing the historic north-south

declarations.”

It is our steadfast will to eradicate

military hostility between north and

south and make the Korean Penin-

sula a durable and lasting peace

zone.

Among the means to accomplish this goal,

he maintains is “to actively promote multi-party

negotiations for replacing the current cease fire on

the Korean Peninsula with a peace mechanism in

close contact with the signatures to the armistice

agreement so as to lay a lasting and substantial

peace-keeping foundation.”

In particular, Kim Jong Un points to the

“historic, first-ever DPRK-U.S. summit meeting

and talks” that he believes “brought a dramatic turn

in the bilateral relationship” between the U.S. and

the DPRK, a relationship that he characterizes as

“the most hostile on the earth.” The summit meet-

ing and talks “made a great contribution to ensuring

peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the

region,” Kim notes.

Based on that achievement, he proposes “to

establish a new bilateral relationship that meets the

demand of the new era as clarified in the June 12

DPRK-U.S. Joint Statement” to “build a lasting and

durable peace regime and advance toward complete

denuclearization.”

Referring to the “reality of north-south rela-

tions that made rapid progress last year,” Kim ex-

plains that he “wants to believe that our relations

with the United States will bear good fruit this year,

as inter-Korean relations have greeted a great turn,

by the efforts of the two sides.”

He points to the “meeting and holding talks

beneficial to both sides with the U.S. president in

June last year,” where “we exchanged constructive

views and reached a consensus of understanding for

a shortcut to removing each other’s apprehensions

and resolving the entangled problems.”

Kim Jong Un emphasizes, “I am ready to

meet the U.S. president again anytime, and will

make efforts to obtain without fail results which can

be welcomed by the international community.”

He provides, however, one important quali-

fication to his offer. Kim noted:

But if the United States does not

keep the promise it made in the eyes

of the world, and out of miscalcula-

Page 23

tion of our people’s patience, it at-

tempts to unilaterally enforce some-

thing upon us and persists in impos-

ing sanctions and pressure against

our Republic, we may be compelled

to find a new way for defending the

sovereignty of the country and the

supreme interests of the state and for

achieving peace and stability of the

Korean Peninsula.

One analyst points to this statement as being

probably deliberately vague, but yet offering the

U.S. a precaution in how it acts with respect to the

attitude the “dialogue partners” bring to the negotia-

tions.

As Kim argues earlier in his New Year’s ad-

dress, “nothing is impossible to a willing heart, and

dialogue partners will reach the destinations that are

beneficial to each other without fail if they put for-

ward fair proposals on the principle of recognizing

and respecting each other by abandoning their dog-

ged insistence broad mindedly and conduct negotia-

tions with a proper stand and the will to settle

issues.”

Kim Jong Un demonstrates that he doesn’t

underestimate the challenges and difficulties that lie

ahead. But by recognizing the important progress

made in 2018, it becomes clear that further progress

has a strong foundation to build on, and thus can be

an achievable goal.

Notes:

1. “DPRK Leader Kim Jong-Un’s 2019 New Year Address,”

January 3, 2019 at:

http://www.zoominkorea.org/dprk-chair

man-kim-jong-uns-2019-new-year-address/

2. Robert Carlin, “Hints for 2019: Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s

Address” at:

https://www.38north.org/2019/01/rcarlin010319/

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 31, 2019 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/01/31/on-kore

a-in-press-conference-at-un/.]

UN Secretary General Treats

the Question of the Korean

Peninsula in his New Year’s

Press Conference

by Ronda Hauben

UN Secretary General, António Guterres

held his first press conference of the New Year on

January 18, 2019 in the press briefing room at UN

Headquarters in New York City.

The press conference covered a number of

issues. In his introductory remarks, Secretary Gen-

eral Guterres described how in the 1990s he had an

unrealistic expectation that the problems of the

world would be solved by “globalization and the

new technology.”

But this was “a naïve sense.”

Now he sees that the result of the last 20 years of

globalization was a disappointment especially for

those “left behind.” This reality needs attention and

action.

The trouble with Secretary General

Gutterres’ emphasis, however, is that it stressed the

negative. Events like the Candlelight Revolution in

South Korea in 2016-2017, the inter-Korean sum-

mits in 2018 between South Korea and North Ko-

rea, and the June 12, 2018 Summit between the U.S.

and the DPRK, are significant events of our times.

These are hopeful events which provide a basis for

the coming year to be one where long standing

problems and conflicts that for many years the UN

has not succeeded in solving, are within reach of

some resolution.

While what Guterres described is one possi-

ble phenomena of our current times, it would be

more all sided to include some description of more

positive developments like those that occurred on

the Korean Peninsula. This would have provided a

way of including some review of the role the UN

played in making these possible, including for ex-

ample the UN Olympic Truce

during the winter

games at Pyeongchang, South Korea, in 2018.

A few questions raised by journalists during

the press conference also called the Secretary Gen-

Page 24

eral’s attention to the situation on the Korean Penin-

sula. One question was about the current sanctions

and whether some relief from them was possible to

help encourage some steps toward denuclearization

by North Korea.

The journalist also pointed to the fact that

humanitarian aid had been cut by the sanctions. The

journalist asked the Secretary General for his view

of Japan’s statement that it was too early in the dia-

logue process to grant humanitarian exemptions to

North Korea.

The Secretary General responded explaining

that there is a clear distinction between humanitar-

ian aid and other areas of negotiations in a conflict.

That humanitarian aid should be provided whenever

it is possible and it must be exempt from political

considerations.

But then the Secretary General Gutteres

called for a roadmap for the activities in resolving

the conflict and contradicting himself, said the two

aspects of the resolution should be linked as part of

the roadmap.

Another question on the conflict was

whether the Secretary General would consider send-

ing an envoy to North Korea as he did in 2017 when

he sent Jeffery Feltman to persuade North Korea to

give up their nuclear weapons. Or would the Secre-

tary General consider making a trip himself?

His

response was that since the U.S. and the DPRK

were both willing to negotiate, it was to encourage

that to happen not to have any other initiatives just

to get into news articles. Such initiatives are not

needed. And he again called for a roadmap to help

establish a sense of predictability about the process

of the negotiations.

But Jeffrey Feltman’s trip showed that the

UN can contribute to peace efforts, while the do-

nothing mode during some periods of UN activity

just contributed to letting the peace efforts deterio-

rate.

Lately, however, when I have gone to pro-

grams outside of the UN where there were efforts to

analyze what is needed to promote peace on the Ko-

rean Peninsula, I have seen members of the UN

staff or officials attending the programs. It seems

there is an effort by the UN Secretariat to under-

stand what is happening and hopefully to be able to

contribute constructively. Perhaps if the Secretary

General held more frequent press conferences at

UN headquarters as was the situation in the past,

that could help to clarify what contributions the

Secretariat could make to the efforts toward peace

on the Korean Peninsula.

When I first came to the UN in October

2006, it was common practice for the Secretary

General to hold monthly press conferences in the

press briefing room. Over the years, however, the

practice has changed. Lately, press conferences

with the Secretary General are not only less

frequent, but they have also diminished in length

and breadth. The New Year’s press conference with

the Secretary General in the press briefing room

where a number of journalists were called on to ask

their questions was indeed a relatively unusual oc-

casion. Will the Secretary General have more like

this? Or will he slip back to his more common prac-

tice of coming to the podium of the stakeout area of

the Security Council where he introduces a subject

and then takes questions from a few journalists.

To start off the New Year with a substantial

press event as this, was a welcomed event and one

which hopefully signals a desire on the part of the

Secretary General for an improved interaction be-

tween the Secretary General and the UN press

corps.

Notes:

1. Full transcript Press Conference:

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2019-01-

18/secretary-generals-press-conference The Secretary General

said: “When I served in government in Portugal in the 1990s,

there was a sense – a naïve sense as it turned out – that global-

ization and technological progress would solve all our prob-

lems in the world and the benefits would ultimately reach all.”

2. Olympic Truce

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olympic_Tru

3. Question: “Thank you, Secretary General. I’m Motokura

Kazushige, Japan. My question is about DPRK (Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea). So, what will happen next will

have much to do with the ongoing meeting between DPRK,

U.S. high ranking officials today in Washington. But I’d like

to ask you, if…do you think it’s a good time to start…from the

point of view of the United Nations, it’s good time to start

discussing easing sanctions of Security Council against DPRK

to push this process of denuclearization forward? And, also,

what would be your opinion about restarting humanitarian aid

for DPRK? So, last years, there have been lot of effort to re-

start the humanitarian…addressing humanitarian necessity in

DPRK, but, for example, Japan is strongly…well, Japan is still

saying that it’s too early to apply humanitarian exemption for

DPRK. What would be your opinion? Thank you.”

4. Secretary-General: “I like to separate things. Humanitarian

aid is based on humanitarian principles, and the basic humani-

Page 25

tarian principle is that humanitarian aid doesn’t follow politi-

cal objectives. So, in our opinion, we should never refuse hu-

manitarian aid to any country in the world in any circumstance

for the people of that country, if the humanitarian aid can be

distributed to the people of that country. This is clear for us in

all circumstances. So, it’s not a matter applied to each country

in each moment according to political observations.”

5. Secretary General: “Having said so, we believe it’s high

time to make sure that the negotiations between the United

States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea start

again seriously and that a roadmap is clearly defined for the

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. So, we wouldn’t

advocate for any anticipation of other measures before a clear

negotiation is put in place, aiming at the denuclearization of

the Korean Peninsula with a roadmap, and then, of course, the

two things will be inevitably interlinked.”

6. Question: “Mr. Secretary General, I wanted to get back to

North Korea. Many important discussions (are) going on in

Washington today. Basically, do you think that in 2019, it will

be possible to persuade North Korea to give up their weapons

programs? You’ve come up with a suggestion a while ago to

send an envoy to Pyongyang to try to open the door. Is this

something that you’d be willing to do again, or would you,

yourself, be willing to travel to Pyongyang to advance that dos-

sier?”

7. Secretary-General: “I am not a supporter of having initia-

tives just to be in the newspapers. I think initiatives need to be

taken when they are useful. At the present moment, I don’t

think that it makes sense to try to push both the DPRK and the

United States for a negotiation, because I believe both sides

are willing to do so. And I believe that the DPRK has already

accepted that the objective of the negotiation, a central objec-

tive of the negotiation would be the denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula. So, we encourage both countries to move

on with the negotiations. I think we need a clear roadmap, as I

said, to clarify things and to allow to know exactly what the

next steps will be and to have predictability in the way negoti-

ations take place. But I don’t think the UN at the present mo-

ment can have much added value. I think it’s important for the

two parties to come together in an effective way…”

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 23, 2019 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/01/23/in-mem

ory-of-dumisani-kumalo/.]

In Memory of Dumisani

Kumalo, South African

Ambassador to the UN

by Ronda Hauben

My delegation believes that silence

on the situation in the Middle East is

more dangerous than even meetings

where there might be a raising of

temperatures or heat.

Dumisani Kumalo

It was with great sadness that I learned the

news of the passing of Dumisani Kumalo on

Sunday, January 20, 2019. Ambassador Kumalo

had been appointed by Nelson Mandela in 1999 to

serve as South Africa’s UN Ambassador, which he

did until February 2009.

For me it was the end of an era when, ten

years ago, Dumisani Kumalo left the UN. At that

time, a farewell party held on the 4

floor in the

Delegates Lounge, demonstrated why he was so

special a figure at the UN. A number of delegates

attended, some with their wives or husbands as

well.

In the brief speech he gave to his friends and

colleagues who had come to say how much he

would be missed, Kumalo described how as a child

growing up in apartheid South Africa his father told

him that help for the people of South Africa in their

fight against apartheid would come from the UN –

from the United Nations. Little did his father know,

Kumalo said, that the young boy would become the

Ambassador from South Africa at the United Na-

tions.

The significance of this memory, Kumalo

explained, was that it was an example of the hope

that many people around the world have in the UN.

This is why it is so important, he said, that people at

the UN strive to live up to that hope.

What Ambassador Kumalo represented at

the UN is something I have found rare among UN

officials. He was someone with a vision of the UN

Page 26

being the champion of the people. Moreover, he

was willing to struggle against those for whom the

UN only meant power politics rather than the fight

for a better world.

One of my most memorable experiences at

the UN was in early January 2007 when Kumalo

stepped down as the head of the G77 and China. He

was practically in tears as he recounted how during

the South African presidency of the G77 and China,

there had been a series of struggles against the U.S.

Ambassador John Bolton’s view of how to restruc-

ture the UN. The G77 fought for a multilateral UN

and won some important battles.

Kumalo was then leaving but one scene of

struggle, the G77, to enter another, a new set of bat-

tles. As the Ambassador for South Africa, he was

beginning a two year term (January 2007-December

2008) when South Africa became one of the ten

elected members of the UN Security Council. I

watched the first meeting of the newly constituted

Security Council of 2007. I was surprised and de-

lighted to see how several of the elected members

(as opposed to the five permanent members) took

up to outline the problems they saw with the Secu-

rity Council and the need for change.

When South Africa took over the rotating

presidency of the Security Council for the month of

March 2007, Kumalo made it clear he was there to

answer questions from journalists, which he did

diligently through the course of the month long

presidency. Often during his term on the Security

Council he shared his frustration when the Council

failed to issue a needed statement or resolution. One

such example, was when in January 2008, the

Council failed to express its support for Palestinians

suffering because of Israel’s closure of the crossing

points into Gaza.

Another striking memory is of the South

African and Indonesian Ambassadors’ speaking out

in response to the British Ambassador’s proposal

that the Security Council only have consultations

which are closed meetings, rather than having open

meetings on the issue of Palestine. The British Am-

bassador argued the differences among the Ambas-

sadors led to sharp exchanges. Kumalo disagreed,

stating unequivocally that the disagreements made

it ever more important to have open meetings as

this was a subject of vital interest and importance to

the public.

There is a body of international law and de-

cisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

This forms a framework of law to determine issues

the Security Council is considering. During South

Africa’s 2007-2008 term on the Security Council,

several of the P-5 Ambassadors, especially the U.S.

Ambassador, demonstrated little regard for this

framework in determining the U.S. position on the

issues before the Security Council. Kumalo’s posi-

tion would in general be consistent with the tenets

of international law and the ICJ legal decisions.

For example, when Israel closed the cross-

ing points to Gaza, the U.S. supported Israel in ef-

forts at the Security Council, claiming that Israel’s

action was acceptable given its right to defend itself

in retaliation for rockets being fired into Southern

Israel from Gaza. Kumalo and others on the Secu-

rity Council condemned Israel’s actions as a form

of collective punishment, forbidden under interna-

tional law. Kumalo also argued that Israel as the

occupying state had obligations to support and pro-

vide for the well being of the Palestinians under the

provisions of international law.

Kumalo supported the principles he argued

were in line with international law. Often he would

be criticized in South African newspapers for his

actions. An example was his opposition to interfer-

ence in the internal affairs of a sovereign country.

When there was pressure in the Security Council to

become involved with the vote for President in

Zimbabwe, Kumalo argued this was not a proper

issue for the Security Council to become involved

with. He maintained that there were other UN or-

gans that could be involved, not the Security Coun-

cil.

When Miriam McKeba died, the South Afri-

can Mission to the UN held a program to honor her

life and contributions. A number of delegates spoke

describing the important role McKeba had played in

the struggle for South African independence.

Kumalo’s talk encouraged people to carry on her

struggle and to dance to her music.

At his farewell gathering at the UN in 2009,

Ambassador Kumalo danced with his guests. His

farewell presented the challenge to others to carry

on the struggle that he had been such an important

part of in his ten years of service as the Ambassador

to the UN from South Africa.

Page 27

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 30, 2018 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2018/01/30/rapporte

ur-questions-legality/]

UN Rapporteur Michael Lynk

Questions Legality of Israeli

Occupation

by Ronda Hauben

In 2016, the UN Human Rights Council ap-

pointed S. Michael Lynk, a law professor at West-

ern University in London, Ontario, Canada, as the

Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human

Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since

1967.

In October 2017, Lynk issued his first Re-

port to the UN. This report raises a fundamental

question about the nature of the Israeli occupation

of Palestine. That question is:

Whether Israel’s role as occupiant of

Palestinian territory has now reached

the point of illegality under interna-

tional law?

The Report establishes the criteria for the

legality of an occupation under international law.

Then it uses as precedent the International Court of

Justice case regarding South Africa’s occupation of

Namibia. In that case, the International Court of

Justice decided that South Africa did not satisfy the

requirements for the occupation to be a legal occu-

pation. As a result of that judgment, the inter-

national community was obligated to pressure

South Africa to cease its occupation.

Lynk’s criteria for a legal occupation are the

satisfaction of four requirements. They are:

1. There is an absolute prohibition against annex-

ation of any of the occupied territory.

2. The length of the occupation must be finite,

meaning it must be ended in a reasonable period of

time.

3. It must be carried out in good faith.

4. It must be carried out in a way that meets the best

interests of the occupied.

Stated more formally, these principles are:

1. The Belligerent Occupier Cannot Annex Any of

the Occupied Territory.

2. The Belligerent Occupation Must Be Temporary,

and Cannot Be Either Permanent or Indefinite.

3. The Belligerent Occupation Must Be Carried Out

in a Way to satisfy that it serves the best interests of

the Occupied.

4. The Belligerent Occupier must administer the

occupied territory in good faith including acting in

full compliance with its duties and obligations un-

der international law and as a member of the United

Nations.

In his second Report, the Rapporteur takes

up to demonstrate that Israel fails to satisfy all four

of these requirements.

For example, Lynk proposes that the “ex-

traordinary duration” of Israel’s occupation of Pal-

estine would be enough to place Israel in violation

of this critical element for legality of occupation,

especially as no persuasive justification has been

provided for the excessive longevity of the occupa-

tion.

In his Report the Rapporteur makes the case

documenting how the role of Israel as Occupier in

the Palestinian territories “had crossed a red line”

and that there is a need to free the Palestinian peo-

ple from this illegal occupation.

In his conclusion, Lynk makes recommen-

dations including:*

…that the Government of Israel

bring a complete end to the 50 years

of occupation of the Palestinian terri-

tories in as expeditious a time period

as possible, under international su-

pervision.

…that the United Nations General

Assembly:

a. Commission a United Nations

study on the legality of Israel’s con-

tinued occupation of the Palestinian

territory;

b. Consider the advantages of seek-

ing an advisory opinion from the

International Court of Justice on the

question of the legality of the occu-

pation;

c. Consider commissioning a legal

study on the ways and means that

UN Member States can and must

fulfill their obligations and duties to

ensure respect for international law,

including the duty of non-recogni-

Page 28

tion, the duty to cooperate to bring to

an end a wrongful situation and the

duty to investigate and prosecute

grave breaches of the Geneva Con-

ventions;

d. Consider the adoption of a Uniting

for Peace resolution with respect to

the Question of Palestine, in the

event that there is a determination

that Israel’s role as occupier is no

longer lawful.

Lynk explained several reasons why the de-

termination would play a helpful role in this situa-

tion:

First, it would encourage member

states to take all reasonable steps to

prevent or discourage national insti-

tutions, organizations and corpora-

tions within their jurisdiction from

engaging in activities that would in-

vest in, or sustain, the occupation.

Second, it would encourage national

and international courts to apply the

appropriate laws within their juris-

diction that would prevent or dis-

courage cooperation with entities

that invest in, or sustain, the occupa-

tion. Third, it would invite the inter-

national community to review its

various forms of cooperation with

the occupying power as long as it

continues to administer the occupa-

tion unlawfully. Fourth, it would

provide a solid precedent for the in-

ternational community when judging

other occupations of long duration.

Most of all, such a determination

would confirm the moral importance

of upholding the international rule of

law when aiding the besieged and

the vulnerable.

While Rapporteur reports only document,

analyze and recommend, they can carry a moral

force and they can alert the governments and peo-

ples of the world to injustices and situations that

need attention and action toward their resolution.

Prof Lynk in his second Report helps direct atten-

tion to the possibility that the Israeli-Palestine dis-

pute and conflict lacks a solution because it is not

properly understood. There are many calls for a

peaceful resolution and for talks between the Israeli

and Palestinian leaders, but maybe those are not

possible as long as Israel is mistakedly seen as a

legitimate occupier of the Palestinian Territories.

Note:

*Quotes in this article are from the Report “Situation of Hu-

man Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since

1967.” The Report is available online. The URL is:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/02/01/on-israels-annexati

on-of-palestinian-territory-michael-lynks-report/

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on February 1, 2019 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/02/01/on-israe

ls-annexation-of-palestinian-territory-michael-lynks

-report/.]

On Israel’s Annexation of

Palestinian Territory:

Michael Lynk’s Report

by Ronda Hauben

In 2017 Michael Lynk presented his first

Report to the United Nations General Assembly.

Lynk’s official title is the Special Rapporteur on the

Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Terri-

tories Occupied Since 1967. The 2017 report ana-

lyzed the obligations of an occupying nation and

what happens when the occupier fails to fulfill the

requirements of a legitimate occupier.

Lynk’s report specified criteria for a legal

occupation. They are the satisfaction of four re-

quirements:

1. There is an absolute prohibition against annex-

ation of any of the occupied territory.

2. The length of the occupation must be finite,

meaning it must be ended in a reasonable period of

time.

3. It must be carried out in good faith.

4. It must be carried out in a way that meets the best

interests of the occupied.

Lynk demonstrated that Israel has failed to

meet the requirements of a legal occupation, and he

called for several actions by the UN. Among these

actions was that the General Assembly commission

Page 29

a UN study on the legality of Israel’s continued oc-

cupation of the Palestinian territory.

He proposed that one of the reasons that it

has not been possible to resolve the Palestinian –

Israeli conflict is because Israel is mistakenly seen

as the legitimate occupier of the Palestinian Territo-

ries.

Lynk proposes that a more accurate under-

standing of the facts and how they apply given the

principles of international law could help member

states to act in accord with their obligations under

International law, and it could help to clarify what

actions are possible at the UN and the International

Court of Justice.

Lynk reported at a UN press briefing on Oct

24, 2018 that there has been considerable interest in

his 2017 Report and that he had been invited to

present the keynote at conferences discussing the

issues it raises.

Recently, Lynk presented a related report.

Even though Israel will not allow him to visit the

area he is to investigate, in this 2018 Report he doc-

umented conditions based on information he gath-

ered by various means including correspondence,

video conferences, and meetings held in Amman,

Jordan. Among his conclusions is that Israel “has

twice formally annexed occupied territory under its

control: East Jerusalem (1967, 1980) and the Golan

Heights (1981).”

Also, his 2018 report documents the deterio-

ration of the Human Rights situation since his last

report. And he described some of the gross ways

that Israel has treated the Palestinians during the

period since 2017.

In the process of documenting some of the

most urgent concerns he identified, he observed the

continuing expansion and development of the settle-

ments, and the proposal of legislation and actions

by various officials which are aimed at formally

annexing parts of the West Bank and other Palestin-

ian Territory.

Beyond his 2017 report, the 2018 report

partly focused on an analysis of the issue of “the

question of annexation, examining both the applica-

ble legal framework as well as the current situation

in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).”

In modern international law, Lynk points out

there is a general prohibition against annexation.

Also Lynk documents several different ways that

Israel has “entrenched its de facto annexation of the

West Bank” toward “imposing intentionally-irre-

versible changes to occupied territory proscribed by

international humanitarian law.” He refers specifi-

cally to the 230 settlements, to the 400,000 Israeli

settlers, to the extension of Israeli laws to the West

Bank to the unequal access to resources, to a dis-

criminatory legal regime, and to “explicit state-

ments by a wide circle of senior Israeli political

leaders calling for the formal annexation of parts or

all of the West Bank.”

Lynk describes some of how the UN has

helped stop some of the acts of annexation around

the world since its founding. Particularly pointing to

the principles of international law relating to occu-

pation, Lynk writes, “Annexation is utterly incom-

patible with the foundational principles of the laws

of occupation, which stipulates that the occupying

power’s tenure is inherently temporary, not perma-

nent or even indefinite, and that it must rule the ter-

ritory as a trustee for the benefit of the protected

population under occupation, and not for its own

aggrandizement. Annexation is also profoundly in

breach of the fundamental right to self-determina-

tion, an ‘erga omnes’ obligation under international

law.”

In his 2018 report, Lynk documents a num-

ber of specific ways that Israel’s actions in the Oc-

cupied Palestinian Territories are effectively carry-

ing out or have carried out an annexation of “a sig-

nificant part of the West Bank and is treating this

territory as its own.”

On pages 18 and 19 of his 2018 report, Lynk

lists a series of recommendations for Israel and for

the International Community. To Israel he recom-

mends compliance with international standards and

laws, and to the international community he recom-

mends holding Israel to international standards, ac-

countability and to the obligations of international

humanitarian law.

And Lynk recommends the international

community “commission a United Nations study on

the legality of Israel’s annexation and continued

occupation of the Palestinian territory.”

For two years in a row, Michael Lynk has

issued reports that give a better understanding of the

Israel-Palestine question which may help in the ef-

fort to find a just and lasting solution to this major

outstanding question.

Page 30

Notes:

1. “UN Rapporteur Michael Lynk Questions Legality of Israeli

Occupation,” Ronda Hauben, January 30, 2018.

2. See p. 7

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/NY/G

A73/A_73_45717.docx

3. See pp. 7-8 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/N

Y/GA73/A_73_45717.docx

4. See p. 8 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/NY/G

A73/A_73_45717.docx

5. See p. 18 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/NY/

GA73/A_73_45717.docx

[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared

on January 21, 2019 on the netizenblog at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2019/01/21/un-sc-pr

esidency-on-frozen-dialogue/]

Tackling the Problem of

Frozen Dialogue

by Ronda Hauben

To start off the new year of Security Council

meetings, the Dominican Republic as President of

the Security Council for the month of January 2019

held a press conference for UN correspondents on

January 2.

The Dominican Republic is one of the five

new members of the Council elected for the two

year term of 2019 to 2020. The other four elected

members are Germany, Indonesia, South Africa and

Belgium.

Its position in the monthly Security Council

rotation put the Dominican Republic in line for the

January 2019 presidency. Mr José Singer Weisinger

had been appointed as a special representative by

the President of the Dominican Republic to be the

nation’s representative on the Security Council. Mr

Singer welcomed journalists to the press conference

explaining that though the Dominican Republic is a

founding member of the United Nations, this is the

first time the nation has had a term on the Security

Council.

He also explained that the practice of his

country on the Council will be guided by the princi-

ples of its foreign policy and by the principles of the

UN Charter.

After reviewing the planned schedule for the

activities of the Council during the month of Janu-

ary, he opened the floor for questions.

Several of the questions referred to North

Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(DPRK)) and Palestine even though there were no

specific references to them in the schedule of the

month’s planned topics.

Referring to the special representative’s in-

troduction, a question was asked about the fact that

the UN Charter requires certain due process proce-

dures on the part of the Security Council but the

Security Council does not act in accord with these

charter obligations.

Specifically in Article 32 of Chapter 5 of the

UN Charter, the Security Council is directed to in-

vite any Member of the United Nations, if it is a

party to a dispute under consideration by the Secu-

rity Council, to the meeting where the dispute is

being discussed so that the member can participate,

without vote in the discussion relating to the dis-

pute.

In practice this would mean that the Security

Council should invite to a meeting a country that is

subjected to sanctions and would direct the Council

to include that country in the discussion in the

Council about the dispute. Such a process would

make it possible for the Council to hear the views of

all countries that are involved in the dispute the Se-

curity Council is considering.

In response to such questions raised by jour-

nalists at the press conference, the special represen-

tative of the Dominican Republic emphasized that

“we have to listen to the affected party. I totally

agree.”

Among the other conflicts referred to in

questions from journalists were conflicts in Yemen,

Venezuela and the Palestinian situation. The Secu-

rity Council’s lack of attention to North Korea in its

proposed schedule for the month of January was a

source of concern among several journalists who

raised questions. One journalist asked the special

representative for the Dominican Republic for his

nation’s response to Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s

Speech promising a new form of response if the

international community continues to impose sanc-

tions on the DPRK. In response, the special repre-

sentative emphasized that dialogue should be the

only path toward solutions to conflicts and if dia-

logue has been frozen for any reason, that problem

has to be dealt with and addressed. “There is no so-

lution other than dialogue, at least we as a country

don’t see any other solution,” explained Mr Singer.

Page 31

Such statements suggest that there is the po-

tential for more dialogue in the practice of the Secu-

rity Council if new members to the Council act in

line with the principles of the UN Charter as Mr

Singer indicated was the goal of the Dominican Re-

public.

Notes:

1. “Any Member of the United Nations which is not a Member

of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of

the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consider-

ation by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate,

without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute….” From

Chapter V Art. 32 of the UN Charter.

2. Article 32 also applies to inviting to the Security Council

states who are not Members of the UN. It says, “The Security

Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the

participation of a state which is not a Member of the United

Nations.”

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben (1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

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