The Amateur

Computerist

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Spring 2020 Obstacles to Peace on the Korean Peninsula Volume 33 No. 1

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Letter to UN SG about ‘UN Command’s’ Use of UN Flag . . . . . . Page 2

‘Peace–Forwarding Actions’ with DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4

Chinese and Russian Draft DPRK Resolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5

U.S. Misrepresents its Role in Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6

‘United Nations Command’ As Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8

Article 32: Right to Due Process in UN Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14

The Problem Facing the U.N.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19

UN SC Controversy over North Korean Satellite Launch . . . . . Page 22

Position of the UN SG on the Use of the UN Flag . . . . . . . . . . Page 24

Open Letter to the UN Security Council Members. . . . . . . . . . . Page 26

Letter to UN SC Regarding Sanctions on North Korea . . . . . . . Page 27

Call to Ease or Suspend the Sanctions Against the DPRK. . . . Page 29

Resolution Proposes Easing Some UN Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . Page 31

Dissolution of the ‘United Nations Command’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 34

Introduction

What is happening about Korea? The question

of how to encourage the resumption of U.S.–DPRK

negotiations has seemed to fade from public discus-

sion and attention. It becomes ever more urgent to

review recent developments and consider what is

needed for forward developments.

This issue of the Amateur Computerist con-

tains a collection of articles that helps to review some

of the events and actions that have helped to lead to

the current impasse. In February 2020 a significant

article appeared in the South Korean newspaper

Hankyoreh. The article titled “The ‘UNC’s’ time is

up” was contributed by Professor Lee Jang–hue, who

is an emeritus professor of civil law at the Hangul

University of Foreign Studies in South Korea.

Professor Lee’s article reviews developments

in the efforts to support inter–Korean cooperation on

the Korean Peninsula and comes to the conclusion

that the U.S. and the role it plays under the cover of

being the United Nations Command (UNC) is a force

functioning in opposition to the obligation it has to be

moving toward a peace agreement between the two

Koreas. Professor Lee writes:

As the only signatory from the South

Korean side to the Korean Armistice

Agreement on July 27, 1953, the UN

Command’s duties involve managing

the agreement, preventing military

clashes and acts of hostility, and

spearheading a peace agreement.

This is why, the ‘UNC’ holds author-

ity to approve passage over the Mili-

tary Demarcation Line (MDL) and

entry to the DMZ. But now these du-

ties of the ‘UNC’ are posing a major

obstacle to the effort of linking inter–

Korean railways and roads. Rather

than cooperating toward a peace

agreement — which should be its

biggest responsibility following the

April 27 Panmunjom Declaration in

2018 — it is instead finding faults

with and hamstringing inter–Korean

exchange and cooperation efforts. The

same is true about its overzealous

micro–management of the DMZ.

In his article Professor Lee proposes that in

order to stop the introduction of obstacles to peace on

the Korean Peninsula, the ‘UN Command’ should be

replaced by the Republic of Korea as a signatory to

the Armistice Agreement.

Several of the articles in this issue of the

Amateur Computerist explore various aspects of how

the ‘UN Command’ was created and the problems

that accompanied that process. Also there are critical

articles written by some NGO’s as letters either to the

UN Secretary–General or the Security Council

protesting the continued violation of UN processes

and procedures by the role played by the U.S. under

the guise of being the ‘UN Command’.

Also articles in this issue discuss the obliga-

tion of the Security Council to invite those parties to

Page 1

a conflict to the discussion in the Council on the

conflict so the Council can hear the nature of the

problem at the root of the conflict.

In the conflict regarding the U.S. and the

DPRK the Security Council failed to fulfill this ob-

ligation established by the UN Charter. Therefore it is

important that there be public attention to and ac-

knowledgment of the DPRK side of the conflict. A

conflict can only be resolved when there is an effort

at impartial deliberation.

This issue is organized into four parts. The four parts

are:

Part 1 is about activist and Security Council

Members criticism of UN activity on the so–called

‘United Nations Command’ (‘UN Command’) as the

chief obstacle to peace on the Korean Peninsula or of

the Security Council sanctions imposed on the DPRK.

Part 1

Letter to the Secretary General about ‘UN Com-

mand’s’ Use of UN Flag

NGOs’ Letter to UN Security Council Proposes

Peace–Forwarding Actions’ with DPRK

Chinese Russian Draft DPRK Resolution

Part 2 includes reprints of previous articles

about the problem represented by the ‘UN Command’

and related problems.

Part 2

U.S. Misrepresents it’s Role in Korean War and in

Armistice Agreement as ‘UN Command’

‘United Nations Command’ As Camouflage: On the

Role of the UN in the Unending Korean War

Article 32: Right to Due Process Enshrined in UN

Charter, Violated by Security Council

The Problem Facing the UN

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the

Policy Aimed at Targeting China as Well as North

Korea

UN Security Council Controversy over North Korean

Satellite Launch: Reconvening Six–party Talks or

Penalizing Pyongyang

Part 3 includes the original letters sent to UN

by NGO’s or published as Open Letters by NGOs.

Part 3

Letter from Jeanne Mirer to UN Secretary–General on

behalf of itself and civil society actions on North

Korean Groups about improper use of the UN flag by

‘UN Command’

Open Letter to UN Security Council Members: We

Cannot Possibly Go Back to Times of Competition

and Hostility

Letter to UN Security Council Regarding Sanctions

on North Korea

Call to Ease or Suspend the Sanctions Against the

DPRK that Impede the Response to COVID–19

Part 4 includes other relevant documents.

Part 4

Security Council Resolution Submitted by China and

Russia Proposes Easing Some United Nations Sanc-

tions Against DPRK

Dissolution of the ‘United Nations Command’ is the

Essential Requirement in Defending Peace and Sta-

bility on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia–

Pacific Region by the DPRK

Part 1

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Jan 29, 2020. It can be seen online at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2020/01/29/letter-to-un-

secretary-general-on-un-command-use-of-un-flag/]

Letter to UN Secretary–

General about ‘UN

Command’s’ Use of UN Flag

by Ronda Hauben

In September 2019, several Korean peace and

international activists visited New York City to raise

concerns during the period of the opening of the

2019–2020 session of the UN General Assembly

(GA).

One of the issues they raised related to the

growing concern in South Korea with the activities of

an entity calling itself the ‘United Nations Com-

mand’, despite the fact that the UN has no role in

determining or overseeing its activities.

It has been reported that the so called ‘United

Nations Command’ prevented inter–Korean joint

activity to inspect railroad compatibility in the two

Koreas. The activists pointed out that there was

increasing attention in the Republic of Korea by

various government officials and others to such

activity of the ‘United Nations Command’ question-

ing the legitimacy of the so–called ‘United Nations

Command’.

One action taken by activists concerned with

Page 2

these issues was to transmit a letter to UN Secretary-

General Anthonio Guterres from the International

Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) on behalf

of itself and 46 other Korean and international peace

organizations dated September 30, 2019.

Also the

activists held a press conference across from the UN

on October 1, 2019 about this letter.

The activists pointed out that over the years

there have been various complaints and concerns

raised about the inappropriate activity of the U.S.

using the name ‘United Nations Command’.

For example, the letter points to the 1947 GA

Resolution A/RES/92(I) which refers to the need for

the UN to protect the name of the organization and its

official emblem and seal from any use not authorized

by the UN Secretary–General.

The letter also cites provisions of the United

Nation Flag Code providing for how the UN flag can

be used.

And the letter refers to action taken in the

General Assembly by 28 member states in 1972 seek-

ing to encourage the peaceful reunification of Korea.

At that time among other proposals was that the “right

to use the United Nations flag … in South Korea,

should be annulled.”

The letter also cites a UN

document from June 1975 (S/11737) in which the

U.S. agrees to work toward the termination of the

‘UN Command’ including restricting the use of the

UN flag

In this 1975 document, the U.S. said it

would be part of negotiations to replace the ‘UN

Command’.

Citing other references to actions taken by the

General Assembly or members of the Security Coun-

cil, the letter raised four questions for the Secretary–

General and requested that the Secretary–General act

to stop such use.

The letter also referred to some of the con-

cerns raised by legal scholar Hans Kelsen in the

Supplement to his book The Law of the United Na-

tions: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Prob-

lems.

In response to their letter to the UN Secretary–

General, the IADL received a reply from Stephen

Mathias, Assistant Secretary–General for Legal

Affairs (ASG). ASG Mathias wrote “regarding the

use of the United Nations flag by the ‘United Nations

Command’ … . I regret to inform you that the ques-

tions that you have asked concern matters that do not

fall within the competence of the Secretary–General.”

There was no further explanation from the ASG for

Legal Affairs about why he gave the response he did

or what authority he was referring to in stating that

the UN Secretary–General was unable to act in a way

that would fulfill on the obligations that the GA had

assigned to the Secretary–General.

Commenting on the reply received from the

UN Secretariat, activists of the “International Cam-

paign to Abolish the Fake ‘United Nations Com-

mand’” write:

Due to the irresponsible neglect of the

UN in the last 70 years, an abnormal

state of affairs persists for the United

Nations because the so–called ‘United

Nations Command’ which is not a UN

entity, has been continuing its activi-

ties — undermining the dignity and

order of the United Nations … . A

first step is to prohibit the abuse of the

UN flag in the name of the ‘UNC’.

This is an exchange between the activists

questioning the legitimacy of the U.S. use of the

United Nations name and flag and the statement by

the UN legal office top official without explanation.

Presented are two different views as to whether there

is activity contrary to the obligations of the UN Char-

ter in the U.S. government’s actions calling some of

its military and control activities on the Korean

Peninsula, the ‘United Nations Command’, and of its

use of the UN flag by this so called ‘United Nations

Command’.

The activists propose that the Secretary–

General has the authority under the Charter to deter-

mine what is appropriate and not appropriate use. The

UN Legal Office claims that the Secretary–General

does not have such “competence.”

If in fact, the ‘United Nations Command’ is an

entity functioning without any connection with the

UN Charter, then by what authority does the

so–called ‘United Nations Command’ act to restrict

interaction by the two Koreas? This is indeed a

serious question for the UN to consider.

Notes

1. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Misrepresents its Role in Korean War

and in Armistice Agreement as ‘UN Command’.”:

https://blogs

.taz. de/netizenblog/2013/06/26/us-misrepresents-its-role-as-un-

command, June 6, 2013. See also, Ronda Hauben, “‘United Na-

tions Command’ As Camouflage: On the Role of the UN in the

Unending Korean War,”:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/

08/31/united-nations-command-as-camouflage/, August 31, 2013.

2. Letter to Secretary–General, September 30, 2019,: https://

Page 3

www.veteransforpeace.org/files/8015/7065/0224/IADL_letter-

Final_1.doc

3. A/RES/92(I), Official Seal and Emblem of the UN, 7 Decem-

ber, 1946; A/RES/167(II), United Nations Flag, 20 October 1947.

4. ST/AFS/SGB/89. The United Nations Flag Code (as amend-

ed), 28 July, 1950.

5. A/8752/Add. 9. “Creation of Favourable Conditions to Accel-

erate The Independent and Peaceful Reunification of Korea.”

6. S/11737, 27 June, 1975 “Letter Dated 27 June, 1975 from the

Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the

United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security

Council.”

7. Hans Kelsen, “The Law of the United Nations: A Critical

Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems With Supplement,” 1951,

pp. 938–940.

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Jan 31, 2020. It can be seen online at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2020/01/31/ngos-let

ter-for-peace-with-dprk/.]

NGOs’ Letter to UN Security

Council Proposes

‘Peace–Forwarding Actions’

with DPRK

by Ronda Hauben

There has often been criticism of how the

Security Council conducts its deliberations. One

recent civil society effort to contribute to improve-

ment of the negotiation process in the UN Security

Council was sent to the Security Council in January

2020.

It was an open letter to members of the Secu-

rity Council, dated January 7, 2020.

The letter is titled “We cannot possibly go

back to times of competition and hostility.” In their

letter, four civil society organizations present both an

analysis of the current situation and propose what

they see as needed steps toward transforming the

roadblocks to fruitful progress in the negotiations

with the DPRK.

Pointing out that this year 2020 marks the 70

year since the beginning of the Korean War, the letter

proposes that Korean civil society is an important

agent to contribute to peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The letter proposes that not only the DPRK and the

U.S., but also the whole international community is

needed to contribute to “peace–forwarding actions.”

The letter notes that there were no meaningful

negotiations either after “last year’s Trump–Kim Ha-

noi Summit nor after the meeting at Panmunjom in

June 2019.” Though the U.S. and DPRK at their Sing-

apore meeting declared that “mutual trust building”

would “expedite denuclearization of the Korean Pe-

ninsula,” this agreement was not implemented. In par-

ticular the letter notes “that the U.S. has not taken any

measures to show their trust compared to DPRK’s set

of actions including a freeze of nuclear and missile

experiments.” That is why, the letter proposes, there

have been “no points of contact” between the two

parties.

“We are strongly against a practical muddling

through of the U.S. by insisting ‘denuclearization

first’” the letter explains, critiquing the U.S. position,

and critiquing the DPRK, for the “North’s missile

tests conduct that creates militaristic tensions.”

The letter proposes that the United Nations

and the U.S. “lift the sanctions against the DPRK that

are related to humanitarian aid at least.”

The letter points out that the original claimed

purpose of the sanctions was to act as “a medium of

problem–solving.” Instead, however, the sanctions

have developed to a point of “aggravating the situa-

tion” for the people of the DPRK. Also the sanctions

have been used to stymie inter–peninsula cooperation.

The letter asks that the UN Security Council

have constructive discussions about partially lifting

economic sanctions “which could lead to the negotia-

tion table.” And it urges Seoul and Washington to

pause the joint exercises they have planned for March

2020. It also calls for resolute action by the ROK

government to “proactively ask for broad sanction

lifting and to exercise some autonomy in solving the

problem.”

The letter points out that the efforts toward

inter–Korean exchange and cooperation projects were

prevented from happening by the economic sanction

of the UN and U.S. Among these were Mount Geum-

gang tours, humanitarian cooperation for separated

families, road and rail connect projects, and the

formation of a Joint South–North Military Com-

mittee.

The groups writing the letter propose that “We

will strive to mark 2020 a year to be one that will halt

the war and open the way to a new age of peace.”

The groups signing the letter include, Civil

Society Organization Network in Korea — Civil

Peace Forum, Korean Confederation of Religions for

Page 4

Peace, Korean Council for Reconciliation and Coop-

eration, Korean NGO Council for Cooperation with

North Korea, and the Southern Committee on June 15

Joint Declaration.

Notes

1. See Ronda Hauben, “Channel for Individuals or NGO’s to

Send Communication to UN Security Council,” netizenblog, Jan

29, 2017:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2017/01/29/channel-

for-communication-to-unsc/

2. “Open Letter to Security Council, ‘We cannot possibly go

back to times of competition and hostility’.”: http:// www.people

power21.org/index.php?mid=English&document_srl=1679682

&listStyle=list

[Editor’s Note: The following article was written in

January 2020. The resolution had not been acted on as

of March 2020.]

Chinese and Russian Draft

DPRK Resolution

by Ronda Hauben

The UN Security Council has on the whole

appeared content that two years of efforts to explore

the possibility of dialogue between the U.S. and the

DPRK and between the DPRK and ROK appears to

have broken down. On December 7, 2019, however,

China and the Russian Federation made an effort to

propose a draft Security Council resolution which

could lead to a more constructive direction for negoti-

ations between the DPRK and the Security Council.

The proposed resolution has yet to receive

enough support from other Security Council members

to have it pass through the stages needed for Security

Council adoption. It is however useful to look at some

of the elements contained in the resolution in order to

consider how such a resolution could provide a

needed change in the Security Council direction with

respect to the DPRK.

The proposed resolution provides for the

UNSC to “adjust the sanction measures” as needed to

correspond with the DPRK’s compliance with rele-

vant UN Security Council resolutions.

One criticism of the actions of the U.S. in

negotiations with the DPRK is that there is not any

flexibility in the U.S. stance but only that the DPRK

must make all the concessions while the U.S. offers

nothing in return. Such a behavior is contrary to the

normal process for settlement of a dispute by negotia-

tion. Instead it is directed toward inflicting punish-

ment on one party to the dispute, making negotiations

toward resolving the dispute impossible.

Another provision in the proposed resolution

welcomes “close dialogue and communication be-

tween the authorities of the two sides.” This refers to

civilian cooperation and exchanges in many areas, “in

particular the projects of rail and road connections on

the Korean Peninsula,” as agreed on 27 April, 2018

and 19 September, 2018 by Moon Jae–in and Kim

Jung Un. In particular, the proposed resolution pro-

vides for the 1718 Sanctions Committee to respond

favorably to “requests for exemption from existing

UN sanctions against the DPRK for humanitarian and

livelihood purposes.” It also provides for the exemp-

tion from existing sanctions for inter–Korean rail and

road cooperation projects.

The proposed inter–Korean projects provide a

means for cooperation between the two Koreas, and

in this way, creating a basis for the DPRK to have a

more secure and positive environment. This begins to

provide a means of meeting the DPRK demand that

the U.S. cease its hostile actions and attitude toward

the DPRK.

Also Security Council sanctions are illegiti-

mate when they impede humanitarian aid. Yet the

Security Council in general has ignored the criticisms

of its actions in violation of this obligation.

The proposed resolution provides for lifting at

an early date the sanctions against the DPRK “which

are directly related to the livelihood of the civilian

population.” That a number of the sanctions are

directed at stopping or interfering with activity related

to the livelihood of the people of the DPRK demon-

strates the hostile nature of the sanctions rather than

that their purpose is directed to help resolve the

dispute.

The proposed resolution provides for lifting

the sanctions against the supply, sale, etc. of machin-

ery or vehicles, “which are used for infrastructure

construction and cannot be diverted to the DPRK’s

nuclear and ballistic missile programs.” The proposed

resolution contains a substantial list of such items.

The proposed resolution calls on member

states to step up their efforts to provide humanitarian

assistance needed by the population of the DPRK.

The sanctions against the DPRK have led to the

ending of several humanitarian programs previously

Page 5

functioning in the DPRK. Particularly, by interfering

with banking transactions in the DPRK, the sanctions

not only impeded humanitarian projects and aid

previously functioning in the DPRK, but made other

forms of humanitarian aid difficult to deliver.

Other parts of the proposed resolution encour-

ages building peace related activities.

For example, the proposed resolution wel-

comes the continuing dialogue between the U.S. and

the DPRK toward building a “lasting and stable peace

on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the 12

June, 2018 joint statement” of the President of the

U.S., and the Chairman of the State Affairs Commit-

tee of the DPRK.

Also, the proposed resolution calls on all

parties concerned to find ways to implement steps to

reduce military confrontations including but not

limited to a peace treaty to end the Korean war.

Toward such a goal, the proposed resolution

calls for the resumption of the Six Party Talks or

dialogue in other formats to work to reduce tension

and promote beneficial regional cooperation in North

East Asia.

Considering these various aspects of the

proposed resolution demonstrates that there has been

a serious vacuum within the Security Council toward

fulfilling its obligation toward supporting the dia-

logue and positive cooperation between the two

Koreas and between the U.S. and the DPRK.

Though the proposed resolution does not

appear to have gotten support in the Security Council

for a discussion of its merits, the Republic of Korea

government (ROK) has indicated that it is pursuing

efforts to restore work on certain joint projects,

particularly, for example, the inter–Korean railway

project.

It would seem appropriate that the 15 mem-

bers of the Security Council recognize the need for an

active means of encouraging inter–Korean activity

and negotiation. Also the Security Council has basi-

cally left negotiations between the U.S. and the

DPRK up to the U.S., rather than investigating the

nature of the dispute by hearing the views of both

parties toward finding a resolution. Why this is true

and how to end this state of affairs deserves a serious

investigation and analysis of why the Security Coun-

cil has been so lax in its obligation to work toward a

peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula conflict.

This is the process that Article 32 of the UN Charter

requires and it is the obligation of the members of the

Security Council to act according to the procedures

and principles outlined in the Charter.

Part 2

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on June 6, 2013. It can be seen online at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/06/26/us-misrep

resents-its-role-as-un-command/.]

U.S. Misrepresents its Role

in Korean War and in

Armistice Agreement as

‘UN Command’

by Ronda Hauben

July 27, 2013 was an important anniversary. It

was the 60

anniversary of the Armistice Agreement

which provided the means to end the hostilities of the

Korean War.

The armistice was recognized as a temporary

means to stop the military action. It included a provi-

sion that it be followed by a political conference three

months later to hammer out a political agreement

which would serve as a peace treaty ending the

Korean war.

The political conference has never been held.

And no means has yet been created to settle the un-

resolved issues of the Korean War.

At the UN on Friday, June 21, 2013, the per-

manent mission of the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North

Korea, held a press conference.

Sin Son Ho, DPRK’s

Ambassador to the United Nations, presented journal-

ists with a statement outlining the background of a

serious problem remaining from the Korean War, a

problem that needs to be resolved if the tension on the

Korean Peninsula is not to escalate.

He documented how the United States, with-

out any authority from the United Nations, changed

the name of the Unified Command it was to direct, to

the name ‘UN Command’. This change falsifies the

nature of the U.S. role in the Korean War and in the

Armistice, making it appear that the U.S. is acting

under the authority of the United Nations. The deci-

sions made by what is called the ‘UN Command’ are

Page 6

made by the U.S. The U.S. is not acting as a subsid-

iary or representative of the UN when it acts under the

name of the ‘UN Command’. Yet the false appear-

ance given is that the U.S. is acting under the author-

ity of the UN.

The DPRK Ambassador explained how this

misrepresentation was accomplished by the U.S. in

July 1950. On July 7, a Security Council Resolution

(SC 84, 1950) was passed putting the U.S. as the head

of what was called in the resolution the Unified

Command, but with no oversight obligations by the

UN for the actions of the U.S. On July 25, 1950 the

U.S. submitted a report to the Security Council in

which it replaced the name Unified Command with

the name ‘UN Command’.

Subsequently, the U.S. uses the designation

‘UN Command’ despite the fact that this creates a

false impression that there is a role played by the UN

in Korean Armistice activities. The U.S. even uses

‘UN Command’ as its designation in the actual

Armistice Agreement.

The DPRK has at various times tried to get the

U.S. to drop its misleading use of the title ‘UN Com-

mand’. In November 1975, Resolution 3390 (XXX)

B was passed by the UN General Assembly calling

for negotiations between the relevant parties so that

the U.S. would no longer use the misleading designa-

tion ‘UN Command’ to represent the U.S. military

role. The U.S. has not fulfilled on the obligation to

carry out these negotiations. Instead the U.S. at the

time argued that changing its designation as the ‘UN

Command’ would affect the oversight provisions

provided for in the Armistice Agreement.

Subsequently, the DPRK points out that in the

60 years since the Armistice Agreement was signed,

any oversight provisions it may have included no

longer exist and the actual decisions regarding the

agreement currently are made through negotiations

between the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the

U.S. military authority.

In view of the facts, Ambassador Sin said, the

existence of the ‘UN Command’ is an “anachronism.”

Instead of agreeing to dissolve it, however, he ex-

plained, the U.S. is projecting that it can serve as a

“multinational force command” which would consti-

tute the “matrix of an Asian version of NATO.”

Two former UN Secretary–Generals have spo-

ken out against the continuing use by the U.S. mili-

tary of the name ‘UN Command’. Ambassador Sin

noted that both Boutros Boutros–Ghali and Kofi

Annan have gone on record confirming that there is

no UN military activity related to the U.S. claim that

it is the ‘UN Command’.

At the June 21, 2013 noon press briefing by

the Deputy Spokesman for UN Secretary–General

Ban Ki–moon, a question was raised asking for Ban

Ki–moon’s views on the issue. The journalist asked:

As I am sure you know, just now, Sin

Son Ho, the Permanent Representative

of the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea, held a press conference in

which he said he called for the dis-

mantling of the ‘UN Command’ uh, in

South Korea, and he said it is not

really a UN body at all, and quoted

Boutros Boutros–Ghali and Kofi

Annan to that effect. So what I wonder

is as, as, the office of the Secre-

tary–General, Ban Ki–moon, as the

head of the UN system, has, does he,

what is his position on the legal status

in terms of the UN of the ‘UN Com-

mand’? And separately, does he have

any, what … would be, what’s his

response to a call to, to dismantle this

entity?

In apparent agreement with the DPRK, Deputy

Spokesperson for the Secretary–General, Eduardo del

Buey responded:

But the United Nations has never had

any role in the command of any armed

forces deployed in the Korean penin-

sula. In particular, the United Nations

did not at any time have any role in

the command of the forces that oper-

ated in Korea under the Unified Com-

mand between 1950 and 1953.

In response, to the part of the question relating

to Ban Ki–moon’s view on the U.S. representing itself

as the ‘UN Command’, the Deputy Spokesperson

promised a future reply. He noted that:

Well, first of all, as you know, the

Secretary–General is just getting off

the plane from China now, so he is

going to be reading the transcript of

the statement by the Permanent Repre-

sentative of the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea, and we’ll have

something later on to say.

To an email asking for further clarification of

Page 7

the Secretary–General’s view about the DPRK’s call

for the dissolution of the ‘UN Command’, the Deputy

Spokesperson answered by referring to the Secretary–

General’s view that with respect to an issue related to

the Armistice Agreement:

This is a matter for the parties to the

Agreement. The United Nations is not

party to the Armistice Agreement.

Does this mean Ban Ki–moon believes that

the misuse of the UN name by the U.S. is an issue to

be solved by the parties to the Armistice Agreement,

and is not a concern for the UN?

In his press briefing Ambassador Sin said that

if the U.S. did not dissolve the ‘UN Command’, the

DPRK is considering once again pursuing this issue

at the UN General Assembly, which in November

1975 had already urged the U.S. to dissolve the ‘UN

Command’ (See 3390 (XXX)B 1975).

Ambassador Sin explained that “due to the

existence of the ‘UN Command’, the security mecha-

nism on the Korean peninsula has become war–ori-

ented not peace–oriented.”

“In other words,” he elaborated, “the existence

of the ‘UN Command’ is not serving the peace

building efforts on the Korean peninsula. On the

contrary, it is the root of evil or tumor laying a step-

ping stone for the U.S. armed forces of aggression

toward the DPRK and the realization of the America’s

Pivot to Asia strategy.”

Notes

1. Press conference June 21 2013, Ambassador Sin Son Ho at the

UN:

http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/watch/ambas

sador-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-representative-of-the-

democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-the-un-press-confer-

ence/2498682301001 For an earlier version of the statement, see:

KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum,” January

14, 2013.

2. Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the

Secretary–General, June 21, 2013:

https://www.un.org/press/en/

2013/db130621.doc.htm

3. Email from Eduardo del Buey on June 25, 2013. See follow up

article, Ronda Hauben, “‘United Nations Command’ As Camou-

flage: On the Role of the UN in the Unending Korean War,”

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/08/31/united-nations-co

mmand-as-camouflage/, August 31, 2013.

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Aug 31, 2013. It can be seen online at:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/08/31/united-na

tions-command-as-camouflage/.]

‘United Nations Command’

As Camouflage:

On the Role of the UN in the

Unending Korean War

by Ronda Hauben

I – Some Background

The story of the Korean War is a story not

often told. Yet sixty years after the agreement to end

the military hostilities on July 27, 1953, there is not

yet a peace treaty to end the war. This article on the

occasion of the 60

Anniversary of the Armistice

Agreement is intended as a contribution to the body

of research and study needed to find the underlying

cause of the bottleneck impeding the negotiation of a

peace treaty so a breakthrough can be made.

Korea, which had been one nation for over

1000 years, had been forcibly divided at the end of

WWII. By the UN legitimating an election in the

south of Korea in May 1948 which was boycotted by

many Koreans and from which all Koreans north of

the 38

parallel and many Koreans south of the 38

parallel were excluded, a formal structural division

was created which continues until today.

The signif-

icant aspect of the UN supported election was that it

led to an official government structure for only the

southern part of Korea, thus solidifying the division

of Korea. The government structure created in the

South by the election was a repressive government

structure. One view of the military conflict that

became known as the Korean War was that it was a

civil war that was trying to restore Korea as one

country.

The U.S. Government response to the fighting

which broke out in June 1950 in Korea was to per-

petuate support for the repressive government that the

U.S. and UN had put in place as the Republic of

Korea (more commonly known as South Korea). This

is the context in which the United Nations Security

Council resolutions of June and July 1950 authorizing

UN participation in the Korean War took place.

The question that led me to begin this study

Page 8

was: What Was the Role of the UN in the Korean

War and What Should be the Role of the UN in

Bringing an End to the War?

It is important to take into account that before

any action was taken on the part of the UN on June

27, 1950, authorizing intervention in the war that had

begun in Korea, the U.S. had decided and began to

send military support to the South Korean side of the

conflict. The independent journalist, I.F. Stone in his

book, The Hidden History of the Korean War, de-

scribes this U.S. action as forcing the UN Security

Council to support the U.S. Government action in

Korea.

Stone writes:

When Truman ‘ordered the United

States air and sea forces to give the

Korean Government troops cover and

support’ he was in effect imposing

military sanctions before they had

been authorized by the Security Coun-

cil. The Council had to vote sanctions

or put itself in the position of oppos-

ing the action taken by the United

States. For governments dependent on

American bounty and themselves

fearful of Soviet expansion, that was

too much to expect, though again

Yugoslavia had the courage to vote

‘No,’ an act of principle for which it

got no credit from the Soviet bloc

while antagonizing the United States

to which it owed its Council seat.

By acting before the Security Council could

act, the U.S. was in violation of Article 2(7) of the

UN Charter which requires a Security Council action

under Chapter VII before there is any armed interven-

tion into the internal affairs of another nation unless

the arms are used in self–defense. (See Article 51 of

the UN Charter. The U.S. armed intervention in

Korea was clearly not an act of self defense for the

U.S.) Also the actions of the UN have come to be

referred to as the actions of the ‘United Nations Com-

mand’ (UNC), but this designation is not to be found

in the June and July 1950 Security Council resolu-

tions authorizing participation in the Korean War.

What is the significance of the U.S. using the UN in

these ways?

The current U.S. military command in South

Korea claims to wear three hats: Command of U.S.

troops in South Korea, Combined Forces Command

(U.S. and South Korean troops), and “United Nations

Command” with responsibilities with respect to the

Armistice. The United Nations, however, has no role

in the oversight or decision making processes of the

‘United Nations Command’. The U.S. Government is

in control of the ‘United Nations Command’. The use

by the U.S. of the designation ‘United Nations Com-

mand’, however, creates and perpetuates the mis-

conception that the UN is in control of the actions and

decisions taken by the U.S. under the ‘United Nations

Command’.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(more commonly referred to as North Korea) has

called for disbanding the ‘United Nations Command’

(‘UN Command’). At a press conference held at the

United Nations on June 21, 2013, the North Korean

Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Sin Son Ho

argued that the actions of the U.S. Government using

the designation ‘United Nations Command’ are not

under any form of control by the United Nations.

Since the UN has no role in the decision making

process of what the U.S. does under the title of the

‘United Nations Command’, North Korea contends

the U.S. should cease its claim that it is acting as the

‘United Nations Command’.

II – UN Authorized ‘Unified Command’

Looking at the Security Council resolutions

related to Korea that were passed in June and July

1950, it is clear that the content of these resolutions

supports North Korea’s argument. During this period

the UN Security Council passed four resolutions.

They are:

SC 82 (V)–S/1501 on June 25, 1950

SC 83 (V)–S/1511 on June 27, 1950

SC 84 (V)–S/1588 on July 7, 1950

SC 85 (V)–S/1657 on July 31, 1950

None of these resolutions refers to a ‘United

Nations Command’ or gives the United States permis-

sion to call itself the ‘United Nations Command’.

The last two of these resolutions refer to a

“Unified Command.” SC Resolution 84 of July 7,

1950 is the first Security Council resolution to refer to

the creation of a “Unified Command.” The language

of the resolution says that the Security Council,

“Recommends that all members providing forces and

other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security

Council resolution make such forces and other assis-

tance available to a Unified Command under the

United States of America.”

Page 9

The resolution states that the Security Council

requests the United States to designate the com-

mander of such forces, and it authorizes the “Unified

Command” at its discretion to use the United Nations

flag “concurrently with the flags of the various

nations participating.”

SC Resolution 84 also made the request that

“the United States … provide the Security Council

with reports as appropriate on the course of action

taken under the Unified Command.”

In subsequent action by the Security Council

during this period, the members of the Security

Council, were careful to refer to the U.S. command of

the Korean War forces related to the United Nations

as the “Unified Command.”

Therefore, when reviewing the action by the

U.S. to designate itself as the ‘United Nations Com-

mand’, the question is raised as to how, why and by

whom the designation ‘United Nations Command’

was substituted for the Security Council designation

of a “Unified Command.”

SC Resolution 84 was passed on July 7 using

the designation “Unified Command.” The following

day, on July 8, the U.S. President Harry Truman

appointed General Douglas MacArthur to head this

Command. A Memo referring to this appointment,

states that with this appointment, General MacArthur

was designated as the Commander of the “Unified

Command.”

In the period immediately following the

passing of UN Security Council Resolution 84, U.S.

Ambassador Warren Austin refers to the U.S. govern-

ment command as the “Unified Command.”

For example, “A Letter to the UN Secretary–

General from Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the

UN,” on July 12, says:

(…) I have the honor to inform you

that the President of the United States,

in response to the Security Council

resolution of 7 July, 1950, has on 8

July designated General Douglas Mac-

Arthur as the Commanding General of

the military forces which the Members

of the United Nations place under the

Unified Command of the United

States pursuant to the United Nations

effort to assist the Republic of Korea.

Similarly the “Unified Command” was the

designation used in a letter dated 24 July, 1950 trans-

mitting the first Report from General MacArthur to

the Security Council. The Report is titled, “First

Report to the Security Council by the United States

Government on the course of action taken under the

Unified Command (USG).”

III – U.S. Substitutes ‘United Nations Com-

mand’ as Camouflage

It appears that it was in a U.S. Government

communiqué dated July 25 that the designation ‘UN

Command’ was first officially used in a U.S. Govern-

ment communication to the UN. This document was

titled, “Communique Number 135 of the Far East

Command S/1629 25 July, 1950.” It states:

The ‘United Nations Command’ with

Headquarters in Tokyo was officially

established today with General Doug-

las MacArthur as Commander–in–

Chief. The announcement was made

in General Order No. 1, General

Headquarters, ‘United Nations Com-

mand’. The order reads:

1. In response to the resolution of the

Security Council of the United Na-

tions of July 7, 1950, the President of

the United States has designated the

undersigned Commander–in–Chief of

the Military Forces this date the

‘United Nations Command’. Pursuant

thereto, there is established this date

the ‘United Nations Command’, with

General Headquarters in Tokyo, Ja-

pan.

According to this communiqué dated July 25,

1950, it is the President of the United States not the

United Nations that was responsible for creating the

designation ‘United Nations Command’, as a replace-

ment for the UN authorized “Unified Command.” The

communiqué alleges that this was done to fulfill the

obligations of SC Resolution 84 of July 7. It is evi-

dent, however, from reading the resolution of July 7

that there is no reference in that resolution to a ‘Unit-

ed Nations Command’.

Why did the U.S. government substitute the

designation ‘United Nations Command’ for the

Security Council designation “Unified Command”

after initially referring to the designation of “Unified

Command,” language which was actually provided

for in the Security Council resolution of July 7?

There are accounts that are helpful in under-

Page 10

standing what was going on behind the scenes at the

time that can give clues to solve this puzzle. One such

account is provided by an article by James W Houck

titled, “The Command and Control of United Nation

Forces In the Era of Peace Enforcement.”

At the time

he wrote this article in the early 1990s, Houck was

Force Judge Advocate for the Commander of the U.S.

Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain.

Houck writes that UN Secretary–General

Trygve Lie and some of the countries on the Security

Council, namely the U.K., France and Norway were

in favor of creating a structure to provide for a United

Nations role in the Korean operations.

Houck describes how, “During the negotia-

tions preceding authorization of the unified command,

Secretary–General Trygve Lie had proposed a ‘com-

mittee as coordination of assistance for Korea’

consisting of troop contributing states and the Repub-

lic of Korea.”

While the explicit purpose of the committee,

Secretary–General Lie explained, was, “to stimulate

and coordinate offers of assistance, its deeper purpose

was to keep the United Nations ‘in the picture’,” as

Lie himself writes in his recollections of his seven-

year term as UN Secretary–General. He explains that

his purpose was, “to promote continuing United

Nations participation in and supervision of the mili-

tary security action in Korea of a more intimate and

undistracted character than the Security Council could

be expected to provide.”

The U.S., however, was opposed to the idea of

such a supervisory committee and had the power to

turn it down. This effectively left the U.S. in control

of the decisions regarding what was to be done in the

UN authorized operations of the Korean War.

“From the start of the Korean conflict,” Houck

explains, “the United States exercised both political

control and strategic direction over the operation.”

Though the Security Council authorized the U.S.

intervention in the Korean War, the Security Council

failed to fulfill its obligation under the UN Charter to

act as the political authority for military actions taken

under the authority of the UN Security Council.

Implicit in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter is that it is the

Security Council that can exercise force not that it can

cede its authority to others.

Instead of the United Nations fulfilling its

charter obligations, however, as Houck documents,

“The United Nations did not interfere at all in the

purely military aspects of the operation and even in

political matters it confined itself to making recom-

mendations.”

Corroborating Houck’s account, military hist-

orian James Schnabel, in his account of the first year

of the Korean War, describes why the U.S. govern-

ment was opposed to the Committee favored by

Trygve Lie and several Security Council members.

Schnabel explains that the response of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff was to oppose such a project. They

were hostile to the potential of such a committee to

try to control military operations.

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Schnabel writes,

“wanted a command arrangement in which the United

States, as executive agent for the United Nations,

would direct the Korean operation, with no positive

contact between the field commander and the United

Nations.”

Though the U.S. Government had turned

down the political oversight committee proposed by

the Secretary–General, there was, according to

Schnabel, a recognition that the unilateral political

and military control the U.S. Government exercised

over the “Unified Command” was problematic. The

Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur “to avoid any

appearance of unilateral American action in Korea.”

As Schnabel writes,”For worldwide political

reasons,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed that, “it is

important to emphasize repeatedly the fact our opera-

tions are in support of the United Nations Security

Council.”

According to Schnabel, “this led General

MacArthur to identify himself whenever practicable

as Commander–in–Chief, ‘United Nations Command’

(CINCUNC), and whenever justified, would empha-

size in his communiqués the activities of forces of

other member nations.”

Noting that the State Department proposed to

the Secretary of Defense that reports be sent to the

Security Council each week, Schnabel writes, “These

would keep world attention on the fact that the United

States was fighting in Korea for the United Nations,

not itself.” But these reports were not required and

were not a mechanism for UN supervision over the

U.S. activities or decision making processes.

Decisions on the operations of MacArthur’s

command were made by the U.S. Government, writes

Schnabel. The United Nations at no time in the

Korean War sought to interfere in the control of

operations which were the responsibility of the United

States. As MacArthur later testified to a Senate

Page 11

investigating committee, “ … my connections with

the United Nations was largely nominal … everything

I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff … . The

controls over me were exactly the same as though the

forces under me were all Americans. All of my

communications were to the American high command

here.”

IV – ‘United Nations Command’ as

Achilles Heel

UN Secretary–General Trygve Lie, however,

points out that the insistence on unilateral control of

the conduct of the War waged in Korea by the U.S.

had its Achilles heel. Lie wrote, “As the Korean War

developed, Washington complained, and had reason

to complain, that the United States was carrying too

much of a burden; but its unwillingness, in those early

days, when the pattern of the police action was being

set, to accord the United Nations a larger measure of

direction and thereby participation no doubt contrib-

uted to the tendency of the Members to let Washing-

ton assume most of the responsibility for the fight-

ing.”

So an interesting anomaly emerges. The UN

resolution authorizing military action in Korea spoke

about a “Unified Command” and the original resolu-

tion the UN Secretary–General proposed included a

mechanism for the UN to supervise the military

action. This control was rejected by the U.S. govern-

ment, and it appears, the UN never pressed to exert its

supervision over the conduct of the Korean War. This

control was thus ceded to the U.S. government.

While the U.S. government had total control

over the Korean campaign it was waging, it appears

that it also needed a means to camouflage the unilat-

eral nature of this operation. The designation ‘United

Nations Command’, which the U.S. government

assigned to its operation, replaced the designation of

the “Unified Command” described in Security Coun-

cil Resolution 84. This change of name provided the

camouflage to hide the unilateral nature of the U.S.

command and control and of its conduct of the war

against North Korea.

The U.S. Government needed the appearance

that its unilateral actions were on behalf of and under

the United Nations. This was provided by changing

the designation of the Command from the “Unified

Command” to the ‘United Nations Command’. The

change of name helped to create the needed mislead-

ing appearance. Similarly, the reports that the U.S.

Government voluntarily submitted to the UN Security

Council were titled, “Reports of the ‘United Nations

Command’.” This made it appear that the U.S. was

conducting the war on behalf of the UN and under its

supervision.

This misleading designation continues to exist

today over 60 years after it was created, thereby

continuing to give the world the false impression that

the campaign waged by the U.S. in Korea was and

continues to be a United Nations operation and that

even today the UN has a presence on the Korean

Peninsula.

While the UN did not participate in the deci-

sion making process of the military campaign carried

out in its name, it played a role then and continues to

play a role by allowing the U.S. Government to

appropriate the United Nations name as a camouflage

cover for the actions of the U.S. Government. What is

the UN responsibility in such a matter for what was

done, and for what continues to be done in its name?

That is the essence of the question raised by North

Korea’s call that the ‘United Nations Command’ be

dissolved.

V – Conclusion

The research represented in this paper presents

a curious, but significant irony. The UN authorized

Member States to intervene in the Korean War, to

form the “Unified Command,” to use the UN flag

along with the flags of the member states participat-

ing in the “Unified Command,” and it authorized the

U.S. to appoint a Commander in Chief for the “Uni-

fied Command.”

According to the obligation required under the

UN Charter, and to the original efforts of Trygve Lie,

with support from three Security Council members,

namely, the U.K., France, and Norway, there was an

effort to set up a political entity that would oversee

the Korean War operation for the Security Council.

The U.S., however, rejected the proposal and

succeeded in controlling the political and the strategic

direction for the Korean War. After rejecting the UN

proposal for UN supervision over U.S. actions and

decisions, the U.S. put itself forward as the ‘United

Nations Command’. Thus assuming the cloak of the

United Nations, by referring to itself as the United

Nations. This mechanism served as a means to mis-

represent the U.S. Government’s unilateral actions

and decision making processes in the Korean War.

Page 12

Recently several UN Secretary–Generals,

including Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Gali,

Secretary–General Kofi Annan, and Secretary–

General Ban Ki–moon have acknowledged that the

U.S. was in charge of the Command structure of the

Korean War activity taken under the authority of the

“Unified Command,” and that the United Nations had

no role in overseeing the actions undertaken in the

name of the UN. The statement is made that the UN

“never had any role in the command of any armed

forces deployed in the Korean peninsula.”

The difficulty raised by such a claim, how-

ever, is that it evades the salient fact that the Security

Council authorized the U.S. to assume this role in

violation of the obligations implicit in the UN Charter

that the UN exercise supervision over the political,

and strategic decision making processes of an action

approved under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Therefore, there is some truth to the state-

ments of Boutros Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan, and

Ban Ki–moon that the UN had no role in the com-

mand of the military activity carried out under its

name in Korea. Specifically as the Spokesperson for

Ban Ki–moon stated,”The UN did not at any time

have any role in the command of the forces that

operated in Korea in 1950–1953.”

But what this leaves out is that the UN autho-

rized the U.S. to designate the Commander of the

“Unified Command.” Then, however, under pressure

from the U.S., the UN failed to exercise its obligation

to supervise the actions of the “Unified Command.”

Subsequently, the UN continues to evade

fulfilling its obligations by continuing to allow the

U.S. to claim that it is the ‘United Nations Command’

in Korea and in failing to provide its political supervi-

sion over what the U.S. has done and continues to do

in Korea in the name of the UN.

The DPRK proposal is that the U.S. cease to

call itself the ‘United Nations Command’. It is impor-

tant to include a recognition of how the U.S. Govern-

ment activity represents a continuing violation of the

UN Charter.

In 2013, in response to a question, the Spokes-

person for Ban Ki–moon said that the issues of the

Korean Armistice are issues that do not concern the

United Nations as the United Nations is not a party to

the Armistice.

Why then has the United Nations

allowed the U.S. to continue to use the designation,

‘United Nations Command’ to misrepresent itself as

acting under the control of the UN in the Armistice?

Unless the UN takes responsibility for allow-

ing the U.S. to claim the authority of the United

Nations in its continuing actions as part of the Armi-

stice, the UN is continuing to allow actions in viola-

tion of the UN Charter. If there is a ‘United Nations

Command’ that is part of the Korean Armistice

Agreement, such a command must be under the

political and strategic direction of the UN Security

Council. Otherwise, the authority of the UN Charter

is being treated as a charade to justify U.S. Govern-

ment unilateral activity under the camouflage of the

UN name. It is as if the UN is but a set of words to

hide the illegal acts of one of the Great Powers.

VI – Epilogue

There is another significant aspect of the con-

duct of the U.S. government with respect to its initiat-

ing and intervening in the Korean War. This has to do

with the role played by the U.S. Government in by-

passing not only the requirements of the UN Charter,

but also the requirement of the U.S. Constitution.

The UN Charter specifies that all military

action taken to intervene in another country requires

a resolution of the Security Council under Chapter 7.

Yet the U.S. government made the decision and began

to act on that decision to intervene in the Korean

conflict before there was any such action by the UN

Security Council. This represented a violation by the

U.S. Government of the UN Charter.

Similarly, the U.S. Executive Branch violated

the provision of the U.S. Constitution requiring that

no decision to go to war can be made without a

Congressional Declaration of War. There was no such

declaration with respect to the U.S. Government

waging war on the Korean peninsula.

There is a provision in the UN Charter, Article

43(3) which states that member states participating in

military actions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter

are obliged to have such actions “subject to the

signatory states in accordance with their respective

constitutional processes,”

In his article “The Korean War: On what

Legal Basis Did Truman Act?” Louis Fisher who is a

specialist in Constitutional Law, points to the consti-

tutional violation represented by Truman’s sending

U.S. troops to the Korean War.

Truman used as an illegitimate excuse that the

act had been authorized by the UN Security Council.

Fisher’s article describes the extensive debate in the

U.S. Congress before joining the UN to consider if it

Page 13

was appropriate for the U.S. government to claim that

a Security Council resolution justified bypassing U.S.

Constitutional obligations.

In his appearance before the House Committee

on Foreign Relations then Under Secretary of State

Dean Acheson explained that “only after the President

receives the approval of Congress is he ‘bound to

furnish that contingent of troops to the Security

Council’.”

Not only did Truman commit troops and aid to

South Korea before the Security Council called for

military action, but more importantly, no action of the

Security Council authorizes the U.S. government to

violate the U.S. Constitution. For the U.S. govern-

ment to wage war, the U.S. Constitution requires that

the U.S. Congress make the decision that authorizes

that war.

Though other artifices were employed to

evade U.S. Constitutional obligation, such as calling

the Korean War a “police action,” U.S. Courts re-

jected such subterfuges.

Responding to these subterfuges, Vito

Marcantonio, the American Congressman from N.Y.

for the American Labor Party said, “When we agreed

to the United Nations Charter we never agreed to

supplant our Constitution with the United Nations

Charter. The power to declare and make war is vested

in the representations of the people, in the Congress

of the United States.”

Commenting on this same situation, Justice

Felix Frankfurter argued, “Illegality cannot attain

legitimacy through practice. Presidential acts of war,

including Truman’s initiative in Korea can never be

accepted as constitutional or as a legal substitute for

Congressional approval.”

Notes

1. See for example: Jay Hauben, “Is the UN Role in Korea 1947–

1953 the Model Being Repeated Today?”:

http://www.columbia

.edu/~hauben/UN-Role-in-Korea.doc

2. I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New

York, 1952, p. 75. By August 1, 1950, the Soviet Union had

returned to the Security Council ending its six–month boycott

and so there were no further UN resolutions authorized by the

Security Council supporting UN participation in the Korean War.

3. See for example: Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Misrepresents its Role

in Korean War and in Armistice Agreement as ‘UN Command’,”

taz blogs, June 26, 2013:

http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/

06/26/us-misrepresents-its-role-as-un-command

4. Press conference June 21, 2013, Ambassador Sin Son Ho at

the UN: http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/watch/

ambassador-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-representative-of-the-

democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-to-the-un-press-confer-

ence/2498682301001

5. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War

Policy and Direction: The First Year, available at:

http://www

.history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-1/CMH_Pub_20-1.pdf. See

p. 102, f/n 6 “Memo, JCS for Secy. Defense, 9 Jul. 50, sub:

Designation of a United Nations Unified Comdr by the United

States.”

6. James W. Houck, “The Command and Control of United

Nations Forces in the Era of ‘Peace Enforcement’,” Duke

Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 4, No 1,

1993.

7. See Houck, p. 13 f/n 51.

8. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, New York, p. 334.

9. Houck, p. 12. “None of the resolutions (referring to the June

and July SC resolutions -ed),” writes Houck, provided for

Security Council control over the ensuing operation despite the

fact that it would be conducted under Security Council authoriza-

tion.”

10. See Articles 42, 44, 46 and 48 of the UN Charter. These

articles authorize the Security Council to use force. There is no

article in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which authorizes the

Security Council to cede political decision making to a member

state to carry out a Chapter 7 action.

11. Schnabel, p. 103, Rad, WAR 85743, DA to CINCFE, Jul. 12, 50.

12. Schnabel, p. 104, f/n 10. See MacArthur Hearings, p. 10.

13. Lie, p. 334.

14. Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for

the Secretary–General, June 21, 2013: https://www.un.org/press

/en/2013/db130621.doc.htm

15. Email received from Eduardo del Buey on June 25, 2013.

16. See I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New

York, 1952, p. 75.

17. Louis Fisher, “The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did

Truman Act?,” American Journal of International Law, Jan.

1995. (89 Am J. Int’l L. 21), p. 30.

18. Fisher, p. 34.

19. Fisher, p. 35.

20. Fisher, p. 38.

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on the

netizenblog on Dec 13, 2017. It can be seen online at:

https://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2017/12/13/article-

32-right-to-due-process/.]

Article 32: Right to Due

Process Enshrined in UN

Charter, Violated by Security

Council

by Ronda Hauben

There is a provision in the UN Charter which

Page 14

requires the Security Council, when it discusses a

dispute, to invite those countries that are parties to the

dispute to participate in that discussion. This require-

ment of the UN Charter is explained in Chapter V,

Article 32 of the Charter.

The language of Article 32 says:

Any member of the United Nations

which is not a member of the Security

Council … if it is a party to a dis-

pute under consideration by the Secu-

rity Council shall be invited to par-

ticipate, without vote, in the discus-

sion relating to the dispute. (Emphasis

added)

The Security Council, however, does not

comply with this requirement of the UN Charter. The

many resolutions that have been passed by the Secu-

rity Council condemning actions of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were passed

without the members of the Security Council inviting

the DPRK into the discussion as is required by the

UN Charter.

For example, shortly after the first nuclear test

was carried out by the DPRK on October 9, 2006, the

DPRK indicated that there were reasons why it took

this action. In violation of the Charter, however, the

members of the Security Council did not invite the

DPRK to participate in the discussion in the Council

about the dispute. Instead sanctions were imposed by

the Security Council on the DPRK without hearing its

side of the dispute. Only after the sanctions were

voted on as Resolution 1718 was the Representative

of the DPRK allowed to speak.

How can the members of the Security Council

understand the nature of a dispute without hearing

from the parties to the dispute? How can Security

Council members decide how to act to resolve a dispute

unless they hear from those involved in the dispute?

In the many years since UN Security Council

passed in 2006 Resolution 1718 punishing the DPRK

for its first nuclear test, the DPRK has conducted

several additional nuclear or missile tests. The UN

Security Council has passed several additional resolu-

tions against the DPRK, without making any attempt

to hear from the DPRK. The DPRK has written to the

Security Council several letters asking to have the

Security Council consider the dispute that the DPRK

says is why it needs to develop a nuclear weapon. The

DPRK has also offered to freeze further nuclear

development if the U.S. and the Republic of Korea

(ROK) cease large scale military drills against the

DPRK that they hold several times a year. The U.S.

refused to consider this offer and the Security Council

members continue to support the U.S.–created resolu-

tions increasing the Security Council’s sanctions

against the DPRK.

While the Security Council ignores the letters

from the DPRK, and the Charter requirement that it

hear DPRK’s views about the dispute, several Secu-

rity Council members publicly proclaim but inaccu-

rately, that it is the DPRK that refuses to negotiate

about its nuclear program.

The failure of the Security Council to adhere

to the obligation of the UN Charter, has led to an ever

more tense situation over the dispute between the

DPRK and the U.S.

An event, however, which helps to shed light

on this situation took place at UN headquarters on

September 22, 2017 during the week of the General

Debate that began the 72

Session of the General

Assembly. A press conference was held by the For-

eign Minister of the Russian Federation, Sergey

Lavrov. In response to a question raised by a journal-

ist at the press conference, FM Lavrov provided not

only an understanding of the nature of the obligation

that Article 32 bestows on the Security Council, but

also an understanding of the importance of this

obligation.

The journalist asked Foreign Minister

Lavrov:

My question is about the significance

of the Security Council and the world

not hearing, in the process of the sanc-

tions, from the DPRK. Under Article

32, it says that the DPRK should be

invited to the Security Council.

They’ve [the DPRK] also asked to come

about the joint exercises. They’ve sent

numerous letters to the Security Coun-

cil and yet we are told they don’t want

to negotiate. But if the Security Coun-

cil constantly doesn’t even follow the

Charter inviting them, how can they

(the DPRK) have a sense there is any

process going on within the Security

Council? Can you say Russia’s posi-

tion about having an invitation the

way Article 32 provides for a country

who is being discussed and hearing

their side of the story?

Foreign Minister Lavrov responded:

Page 15

I believe that when the UN Security

Council reviews the issues which

regard any country, any member coun-

try, this country has to be invited and

has to have an opportunity to present

their position to the UN Security

Council. For me, this is a given and it

is enshrined in (the) Charter as you

quite rightfully say. But when it goes

for the practical actions not everything

depends on us. There are many oppor-

tunities for other Security Council

members, member states. Well, in any

case, despite this article (in the Char-

ter), the routine practice is the follow-

ing: that we need consensus. Not ev-

erything depends on us.

Lavrov’s response clarified that while the

obligation is “enshrined in the Charter” to provide an

opportunity for any country, involved in a dispute

considered by the Security Council to be invited and

to be able to present its view of the dispute to the

Security Council, he also acknowledges that this

obligation of the Charter is not practiced at present by

Security Council members. Instead Security Council

members determine by consensus what their practice

will be. In addition, Lavrov explains that on its own

the Russian Federation is not able to change this

Security Council violation of the Charter.

But Lavrov is not alone in recognizing the

violation by the Security Council of the right to due

process under the Charter for those being condemned

by the Security Council. This violation of the Charter

by the practice of the Security Council also has been the

subject of criticism by member states demonstrating the

need for Security Council Reform.

For example, at the 62

General Assembly

meeting on the need for Security Council Reform,

Ambassador Hilario Davide of the Philippines told

the Council:

(D)ue process and the rule of law

demand that Member States that are

not members of the Security Council

but are the subjects of the Council’s

scrutiny should have the right to ap-

pear before the Council at all stages of

the proceedings concerning them to

state or defend their positions on the

issues that are the subjects of or are

related to that scrutiny … . A denial of

due process, … is a violation of the

basic principle of the rule of law. Due

process and the rule of law require

that a party must be heard before it is

condemned.

Also this violation of the Charter had been

criticized by civil society groups, as for example, in

a [2017] letter sent to the Secretary–General and

signed by over 300 women and women’s groups from

45 countries. In the letter, the women wrote:

In accordance with UN Charter rules,

we urge you to respond to North Ko-

rea’s security concerns regarding these

war drills, the world’s largest, which

rehearse surgical strikes on North

Korea, ‘decapitation,’ and regime

change. According to Article 32 of the

UN Charter, ‘Any Member of the

United Nations which is not a member

of the Security Council … if it is a

party to a dispute under consideration

by the Security Council, shall be in-

vited to participate, without vote, in

the discussion relating to the dispute.’

Yet the DPRK has never been invited

to participate in UNSC sessions on

sanctions resolutions, and the Perma-

nent Mission of the DPRK to the UN

has not received a response to its Au-

gust 25, 2017 letter where they

“strongly request [ed] the Security

Council of the United Nations to place

the issue of the joint military exercise

as its emergent agenda and discuss in

the meeting with no further delay.”

Criticism of the Security Council’s failure to

provide due process to those they condemn has even

been raised in court proceedings as with SC Resolu-

tion 1267, with the Court requiring the Security

Council to change its procedures.

Also, there is an example of the Security

Council acting differently. In 2010 the Security

Council took up a dispute regarding sinking of a war

ship involving the Republic of Korea and the Demo-

cratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Security

Council invited both parties to present their view of

the dispute. Then it issued a Presidential Statement

documenting the nature of the dispute and urging the

two parties to settle it in a peaceful manner.

It is significant that Lavrov recognized the

Page 16

obligation of the Security Council to hear the views of

nations involved in a dispute being considered by the

Security Council. His acknowledgment that such

problems need others to take them up in order to be

resolved, implies a current challenge for the UN. The

ongoing failure of the Security Council to operate

according to the Charter undermines the legitimacy of

the Security Council and even of the UN.

Notes

1. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 32,:

https://

www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html

2. The U.S. is the pen holder writing the SC Resolutions against

the DPRK and then uses various forms of pressure to get the SC

to pass the resolution. This is the case even though the U.S. is a

party to the dispute with the DPRK.

3. See for example:

http://webtv.un.org/watch/japan-prime-min

ister-addresses-general-debate-72nd-session/558178 6476001/

Japan — Prime Minister Addresses General Debate, 72

Ses-

sion, 20 Sep 2017 — Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan,

addresses the general debate of the 72

Session of the General

Assembly of the UN (New York, 19–25 September, 2017).

4. See:

http://webtv.un.org/media/watch/sergey-lavrov-russian-

federdation-press-conference-22-september-2017/558313657

3001/?term= (Start 30:23; End 32:03) Sergey Lavrov (Russian

Federation) — Press Conference (22 September, 2017) 22 Sept.,

2017 — Sergey V. Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the

Russian Federation, addresses the press on disarmament and

other topics.

5. See:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol

=S/PV.5968 (Resumption 1) Transcript Security Council meet-

ing, August 27, 2008, S/PV.5968, Resumption 1, p. 8.

6. See for example:

https://www.womencrossdmz.org/web/wp-

content/uploads/2017/09/Final_Letter-to-UNSG-ver6.pdf

7. See for example: https://www.heise.de/tp/features/At-Legal-

Crossroads-3419131.html Ronda Hauben, “At Legal Crossroads:

Security Council sanctions imposed without Due Process,”

Telepolis, 29 June, 2008.

8. See for example: UN Security Council Presidential Statement

S/PRST/2010/13:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc

.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2010/13

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on Oct 17, 2006. It can be

seen online at: http://english.ohmynews.com/article

view/article_view.asp?no=323351 &rel_no=1.]

The Problem Facing the U.N.

by Ronda Hauben

Only after an agreement was achieved among

the five permanent members of the Security Council

and supported by the ten temporary members, and

voted on, did the Council agree to hear the party to

the problem that was before them. And only after

hearing the views of all the permanent members of

the Security Council — the U.S., France, Britain,

China and Russia — and some of the temporary

members about why they voted for the sanctions on

North Korea did the Council allow the representative

from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(North Korea), Pak Gil Yon, to have a few minutes to

speak. His talk was followed by a brief statement

from the South Korean ambassador to the U.N., who

spoke in support of the sanctions.

In the brief opportunity he had to speak, Pak

indicated that his country felt it was the victim of

hostile acts by the U.S. and that it had a sovereign

right to defend itself from such hostile acts. Also, he

indicated that the process of the Security Council in

mandating sanctions on his country was more like the

activity of gangsters than an activity representing a

legitimate means of investigating a dispute and

determining how to diffuse a tense situation.

In the General Assembly on Friday, Oct. 13,

2006, there were speeches supporting discussion and

investigation. But the closed decision–making process

that culminated the following day in the issuing of

sanctions against North Korea was in stark contrast.

The statements by several of the five perma-

nent members of the Security Council, the members

who have the power to veto Security Council deci-

sions, emphasized that their resolution imposing

sanctions against North Korea reflected the condem-

nation of the “international community” and that all

the nations of the U.N. now had a legal obligation to

carry out the provisions of the sanctions.

While the Security Council does indeed have

the power to impose such sanctions on a country in

the name of the U.N., the process by which the

sanctions were decided, is a sorry demonstration of

power politics that involves very few of the 192

member countries that make up the U.N.

The chairman of the Latin American and

Caribbean regional group, in his comments at the

General Assembly made to the future secretary–

general, he explained that there are important chal-

lenges for the U.N. in the role it plays in “today’s

world.”

“International public opinion demands that the

Security Council and other bodies of the organization

should perform a much better job. There is a trend at

Page 17

this time for great and infinite opportunities as well as

unprecedented risks,” explained Ecuadorian Ambas-

sador to the U.N. Diego Cordovez.

“The United Nations, it is said, should be a

base, a forum, a mode that would enable the interna-

tional community to take advantage of those transcen-

dental opportunities and foresee and neutralize

potential risks,” Cordovez added. “For those reasons,

it is important to insist on the need to reform thor-

oughly and deeply the organization and undoubtedly,

that would be the main task and responsibility of our

new Secretary–General.” (He was referring to the

failure of the member states to reform the Security

Council.)

“It is inconceivable,” he said, “that we are

discussing the reform of the Security Council for

decades, preparing infinite numbers of formulas,

doing report after report on that item, and yet it

remains immutable and impossible to the critics for

its lack of representation and its parsimonious con-

duct to confront [the] world’s crises.”

The act of bringing sanctions against a mem-

ber state by the Security Council, with no investiga-

tion into the grievances that motivated North Korea’s

actions, stands as an egregious example of the failure

of the obligation of the U.N. to hear from each mem-

ber state and to provide a place where problems can

be heard and discussed to find a solution.

North Korea says its problems are with the

U.S. and that it has developed nuclear devices be-

cause of its need to defend itself from the U.S. That is

a serious statement requiring investigation to see who

has caused the problem and who merits the imposition

of sanctions.

Another aspect of the current process that

ended in sanctions is that the five permanent members

of the Security Council are powerful countries that

possess nuclear weapons. These very countries have

failed to meet their obligations under the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty to carry out their disarma-

ment.

Some scholars and diplomats explain that they

are not surprised that North Korea believes it needs to

develop a nuclear capacity in order to protect itself

from danger. Given the actions of the U.S. govern-

ment in branding North Korea as part of the “axis of

evil” and attacking another, Iraq, which it had simi-

larly branded, is but one of the reasons some scholars

believe the U.S. government provided North Korea

with a legitimate justification to develop nuclear

weapons.

In its brief talk at the Security Council

meeting, North Korea expressed one of its disappoint-

ments:

It was gangster–like for the Security

Council to adopt such a coercive reso-

lution against the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea while neglecting

the nuclear threat posed by the United

States against his country … . The

council was incapable of offering a

single word of concern when the Unit-

ed States threatened to launch nuclear

pre–emptive attacks, reinforced its

armed forces and conducted large–

scale military exercises near the Ko-

rean Peninsula.

It must be remembered that the five permanent

members of the Security Council possess thousands

of nuclear weapons.

Although commentators and scholars who feel

there is justification for North Korea’s actions want to

discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they

explain that punishing North Korea, while ignoring

those countries who are in the club of nations possess-

ing nuclear weapons, can only breed cynicism and

hostility to antinuclear development and enforcement

efforts.

That North Korea can claim that it felt com-

pelled to develop a nuclear device, is a signal that the

current regime of power politics is not working in a

way that provides alternatives for a small nation that

feels threatened by the nations that are nuclear pow-

ers. North Korea’s situation is a demonstration that

there is need for serious discussion by the 192 mem-

ber states of the U.N. to understand the problems that

North Korea claims compel it to develop nuclear

weapons as a means of securing its borders and

protecting its sovereignty.

There is indeed an international community,

and there is indeed a serious challenge facing it. The

five big nuclear powers who wield veto power on the

Security Council can bring to bear punishment upon

a small nation that endeavors to develop nuclear

capability. This, however, will only compound the

problem as it will only increase the hostility and

resentment that the small nation feels from such

unequal treatment at the hands of those who them-

selves possess nuclear weapons and who use the

power this capability bestows on them in such a self-

serving manner.

Page 18

The two Koreas have brought to the world

stage the need for a truly international organization,

one that will consider all its members’ concerns and

needs, and find ways to support serious consideration

of the problems such nations have but are unable to

solve themselves.

The urgent problem facing the U.N. at this

juncture in its history is not whether North Korea has

developed and tested a nuclear device. It is the break-

down reflected by the lack of participation and

investigation by the international community into how

a crisis will be handled once it develops, and whether

the concerns and problems of those who are involved

in the crisis will be considered as part of the process

of seeking a solution. It is how the U.N. functions

when tensions reach a point where serious attention is

needed to help to understand and solve a problem.

Unfortunately for the world, and for North

Korea, there was no such process in the decision to

impose sanctions on North Korea. The decision to

impose sanctions on North Korea was not made by

the international community. It was the decision of a

small set of nuclear countries. Who was responsible

for the crisis was not explored before determining

blame, and thus the proclaimed solution is likely only

to worsen the problem rather than solve it. Yet the

actual problem exists and the fact that people of the

world recognize it is highlighted by a recent poll

taken in South Korea, which showed that 43 percent

of the population blames the U.S. government for

North Korea’s test of a nuclear device, while only

37.2 percent blame the North Koreans.

The actions in the Security Council to punish

North Korea occurred without the needed exploration

of what had motivated North Korea to turn to nuclear

weapons as a means of self–defense. Can the U.N. be

changed in the needed ways so that it will be able to

handle such problems? This is the urgent issue facing

the U.N. This is one of the challenges facing, member

nations and people who are part of the U.N. organiza-

tion of this needed global organization.

Notes

1. See “Pyongyang’s Nuke Test Sparks Fission Over Response.”

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/pyongyang-nuke-test.txt

2. See “What About North Korea’s sovereignty?”

3. See “U.S. Most Responsible for Nuclear Test: Poll.”

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on May 19, 2007. It can be

seen online at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/article

view/article_view.asp?no=362192& rel_no=1.]

Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia

Is the Policy Aimed at Targeting

China as Well as North Korea?

by Ronda Hauben

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher

Hill, speaking at the Korea Society’s 50

Anniversary

dinner in New York City on May 15, 2007, said that

he was determined not to “allow $26 million or $25

million get between us and a deal that will finally do

something about nuclear weapons on the Korean

peninsula.” He promised that Kathleen Stephens at

the Korea desk at the State Department was working

on the problem and that “we are going to keep after

this problem till we solve it.” His statement didn’t

give further details about how this problem was to be

solved, a problem that had interrupted the progress

that seemed at last possible in the Feb. 13 Six–Party

agreement.

Just two days later, on May 17, the U.S.

Wachovia Bank announced that it is exploring a

request from the State Department to transfer the

funds from the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) to North

Korea. Wachovia Bank reported that it would require

the necessary approvals from bank regulators to do

the transfer.

Until this latest announcement, banks have

been unwilling to do the transfer because of the legal

action that the U.S. government took against the

BDA, by ruling that it was involved in criminal

activity under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act.

Banks which deal with a bank that has been found

guilty of such illegal acts risk losing their access to

the international financial system. North Korea has

said that the denuclearization and other aspects of the

Six–Party agreement that it has been part of can only

go forward when the BDA situation is resolved. “To

make the money transfer possible freely just like

before has been our demand … from the beginning,”

a spokesperson from North Korea said.

In his daily press briefing on May 17, Scott

McCormack at the U.S. State Department said, “We

Page 19

all want to see the BDA issue resolved, obviously

resolved within the laws and regulations of the United

States as well as the international financial system,

and we’d like to move on and get back to the business

of the Six–Party Talks, which is really focused on the

issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether this latest development with

Wachovia Bank will provide the needed breakthrough,

it is too soon to tell. But there are other developments

which may provide the needed pressures on the U.S.

government to decriminalize the $25 million it has

frozen of North Korean funds and restore North

Korea’s access to the international banking system.

Their access was severely impeded by the action that

the U.S. Treasury Department took against the BDA.

The developments I am referring to are the

release in the public domain of several documents

related to the U. S. Treasury Department’s actions

against BDA. One of the documents is a sworn

statement by the owner of the BDA, Mr. Stanley Au,

in support of his petition to revoke the rule imposing

the special measures taken by the U.S. Treasury

Department against his bank. Another document is the

petition in support of his case. Also the Treasury

Department finding against the bank has been put

online. These documents have been made available on

the blog “China Matters.”

In his statement, Au explains the history of his

bank’s relations with North Korea and how there was

only one experience, which occurred in June 1994,

when there was a problem with counterfeit U.S.

dollars. At the time, the bank reported this incident to

the U.S. government. Agents from the U.S. govern-

ment came to the bank and questioned Au. He an-

swered their questions and asked if the agents recom-

mended that the bank “desist from doing business

with North Korean entities.” The agents said “they

would like us to continue to deal with them as it was

better that we conducted this business than another

financial entity that may not be so cooperative with

the United States government.”

Au explains that there was no further experi-

ence with counterfeit money showing up in the

transactions of the bank. All “large value deposits of

U.S. dollar bills from North Korean sources” were

sent to the Hong Kong branch of the Republic Na-

tional Bank of New York (which became HSBC) to

be certified that they were authentic via advanced

technology possessed by that bank. Smaller quantities

of bills were examined in accord with common

banking practices by the bank itself.

Au also explains that he had not been ap-

proached by U.S. government agents alerting him to

any problem or illegal activity. The first he learned

that his bank was being charged as a bank engaged in

“illicit activities” came when he saw a report in the

Asian Wall Street Journal in September, 2005 that his

bank was a candidate for a U.S. money–laundering

blacklist. He tells how “this news came as a bolt out

of the blue — the Bank had never been informed by

the United States that its practices were a cause of any

money–laundering concern, and the counterfeiting

event that the media reported as the basis for the

designation had occurred more than ten years earlier

and had been promptly reported to the authorities by

Banco Delta Asia.”

Stanley Au’s statement is in sharp contrast

with the account in the U.S. government’s Federal

Treasury Department.

The Federal Register finding states that the

bank had provided financial services for more than 20

years to multiple North Korean–related individuals

and entities that were engaged in illicit activities. It

provides no specific details of what such illicit activi-

ties were. It claims that the entities paid a fee to

Banco Delta Asia for their access to the bank. The

finding claims that the bank facilitated wire transfers

and helped a front company.

In his statement, Stanley Au maintained that

the BDA did not charge a fee for its services nor did

it conduct illicit services for North Korea or any other

customer. The bank was only one of the banks in

Macau that did business with North Korea. The

business his bank had with North Korea began in the

mid 1970s and was to assist North Korea with its

foreign trade transactions. Also Au described North

Korea as a gold producing country and that in the late

1990s the bank had acted as a “gold bullion trader on

behalf of the North Koreans.” Also the BDA bought

or sold foreign currency notes for North Korea,

including U.S. dollars, because North Korea had a

limited banking system and so it couldn’t do such

transactions itself (see Statement, pp. 3–4).

The petition submitted to the U.S. Dept. of the

Treasury to challenge the finding against BDA pro-

poses that BDA was targeted not because of any

“voluminous” evidence of money–laundering but

“because it was an easy target in the sense that it was

not so large that its failure would bring down the

Page 20

financial system.”

In the substantial and prolific analysis of the

BDA problem that has been developed on the blog

“China Matters,” there is the assessment that North

Korea has legitimate financial activity and that the

BDA was legitimately serving as one of the banks for

that activity. Even with the UN’s sanctions, it was not

appropriate to target for blacklisting the legitimate

financial activities of North Korea. The sanctions that

the UN–imposed against North Korea were to be

aimed at its activity that was related to nuclear

weapon development, not to normal financial transac-

tions.

The author of China Matters blog writes:

The alternative view … is that legiti-

mate North Korean financial activity

does exist, BDA had a right to solicit

North Korean accounts and handle

North Korean transactions, and Stan-

ley Au should be allowed to run his

bank as long as he conforms to the

laws of his jurisdiction — and (the

bank) not be used as a political foot-

ball in Washington’s dealings with

Pyongyang.

To put it more succinctly, the blog China

Matters quotes David Ascher, who had been the

coordinator for the Bush Administration working

group on North Korea and a senior adviser in East

Asian affairs in the State Department, in testimony to

the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on April 18,

2007, explaining why Banco Delta was chosen to be

blacklisted from the international banking system:

Banco Delta was a symbolic target.

We were trying to kill the chicken to

scare the monkeys. And the monkeys

were big Chinese banks doing busi-

ness in North Korea … and we’re not

talking about tens of millions, we’re

talking hundreds of millions.

The purpose of the action against the BDA

appears not only to have been to target North Korea

and its access to the international banking system, but

also to send a message to China.

Therefore it would appear that the action

against BDA is a carefully crafted political action and

that it will be necessary that there be public under-

standing, discussion and debate about what is behind

this action in order to find a way to have the policy

that gave rise to the BDA action changed.

Instead of the U.S. mainstream press carrying

out the needed investigation about why BDA has been

targeted and what is behind this action, there have

been continual condemnations of North Korea.

Fortunately there are journalists like those who work

with the McClatchy News Service who have made an

effort to probe what is happening behind–the–scenes

in the BDA affair and blogs like China Matters which

have taken the time and care to begin uncovering

what the BDA affair is really all about. This is but one

of the stories of what is really going on behind the

scenes within the U.S. government that has been

hidden from the public. This is one of the stories yet

to be unraveled by bloggers, and citizen journalists.

Notes

1. See an earlier article “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco

Delta Asia.”:

http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article

_view.asp?menu=A11100&no=351525&rel_no=1&back_url=

%3Cbr%3E

2. “North Korea says work to transfer bank funds under way,”

AFP, May 15, 2007:

https://www.spacewar.com/reports/North

_Korea_Says_Work_To_Transfer_Bank_Funds_Under_Way_99

9.html

3. Scott McCormack, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, D.C.,

May 17, 2007.

4. “Bank owner disputes money–laundering allegations.”:

http://

chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-case-

for-banco.html

5. Statement of Mr. Stanley Au in Support of Petition to Revoke

Rule Imposing Special Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, p.

7.:

http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Jones _Day_Pet

ition_Rescind_BDA_Rule.pdf See also: Kevin G. Hall, “Bank

owner disputes money–laundering allegations,” McClatchy

Newspapers, May 16, 2007:

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/

news/nation-world/world/article24463246.html

6. Department of the Treasury, 31 CFR Part 103, RIN 1506–

AA83, Federal Register, Vol. 72, No. 52, Monday, March 19,

2007, Rules and Regulations:

https://www.fincen.gov/sites/

default/files/shared/bda_final_rule.pdf

7. Petition of Mr. Stanley Au and Delta Asia Group (Holdings)

Ltd. to Rescind Final Rule, p. 12:

http://www.ncnk.org/resour

ces/publications/Jones_Day_Petition_Rescind_BDA_Rule.pdf

8. “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia,” Tuesday,

May 15, 2007: http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stan

ley-au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html

9. “David Asher’s Dead End,” Saturday, April 28, 2007:

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-

end.html See also “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and

Iran, and its role in addressing the nuclear and missile situations

in both nations,” Hearing, Sept. 14, 2006, Nov. 2006, p. 115–

116:

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts

/sept_14/06_09_14_trans.pdf

10. Ronda Hauben, “Bill Moyers and the Emergence of U.S.

Citizen Journalism: Power of government creates need for in-

Page 21

vestigative news.”: http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/art

icle_view.asp?no=360069&rel_no=1

The above article can be seen at: http://english.ohmynews.com/

articleview/article_view.asp?menu=c10400&no=362192&rel_no=1

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared in

OhmyNews International on Oct 4, 2009. It can be

seen at: http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/

article _view.asp?no=385061&rel_no=1.]

UN Security Council

Controversy over

North Korean Satellite

Launch

Reconvening Six–Party Talks or

Penalizing Pyongyang?

by Ronda Hauben

There has been a controversy among the

members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) over

how to react to the April 5, 2009, launch of a satellite

by North Korea. The Security Council met for emer-

gency consultations on Sunday, April 5, while the P–5

and Japan met in other consultations after the Sunday

meeting.

Japan and the U.S. have encouraged the

UNSC to take strong measures against North Korea to

punish it for launching the satellite. The Russian

Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly I. Churkin warned

against a “knee jerk” reaction and proposed that the

crucial goal was to ensure the continuation of the six–

party talks toward the denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula. These talks broke down during the Bush

administration and have not yet been resumed.

The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Zhang

Yesui said that the reaction of the Security Council

had to be “cautious and proportionate.” He said that

his delegation would be most willing to consider

constructive responses.

U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice, called the

launch by North Korea, “a clear–cut violation of UN

Security Council Resolution 1718.”

She said that it is the view of the U.S. govern-

ment “that this action merits a clear and strong

response from the United Nations Security Council.”

Her position was that SC Resolution 1718

“prohibited missile related activity and called on the

DPRK to halt further missile related activity.”

Vietnam, one of the elected members of the

Security Council, called for a “prudent reaction.” A

spokesperson for the its Foreign Ministry said that

Vietnam “hopes the relevant parties have a prudent

reaction, find a reasonable solution and do not com-

plicate the situation and affect peace and stability in

the Northeast Asia region.”

While Vietnam said that it was opposed to the

proliferation of nuclear weapons, an earlier statement

indicated that Vietnam supports “the rights of coun-

tries to use science and technology for peaceful

purposes.”

The Japanese Ambassador to the UN, Yukio

Takasu requested an emergency consultative session

of the Security Council on Sunday, April 5. His

position was that North Korea’s launch of a satellite

was banned by SC Resolution 1718 which demands

that North Korea suspend all activities “related to its

ballistic missile program.”

While SC Resolution 1718 explicitly demands

that North Korea not conduct any “launch of a ballis-

tic missile,” the members of the Security Council

disagree about whether SC Resolution 1718 forbids

the launch of a communication satellite.

Countries advocating the position that North

Korea violated SC Resolution 1718, point to parts 5

and 8(a)ii of the resolution as the parts violated.

Part 5 reads that the Security Council:

Decides that the DPRK shall suspend

all activities related to its ballistic

missile program and in this context

reestablish its pre–existing commit-

ments to a moratorium on missile

launch. (SC Resolution 1718, p. 2)

Section 8(a)ii is about member states prevent-

ing the sale or transfer to North Korea of “materials,

equipment, goods and technology as set out in the

lists … which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear–

related, ballistic missile–related or other weapons of

mass–destruction related programs.” (SC Resolution

1718, p. 2–3)

North Korea was not invited to participate in

the emergency consultations of the Security Council,

despite the fact that Article 32 of the UN charter

requires that a “party to a dispute under consideration

by the Security Council shall be invited to participate,

without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute

Page 22

… .”

Speaking to reporters at the UN on Tuesday,

April 7, the Deputy Ambassador to the UN from the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North

Korea), Pak Tok Hun said:

Every country has the right, the in-

alienable right to use the outer space

peacefully. Not a few countries, many

countries, they have already launched

satellites several hundred times.

Does it mean it would be OK for them

to launch satellites but we are not

allowed to do that? It’s not fair. It’s

not fair.

This is a satellite. Everyone can distin-

guish (a) satellite with a missile. It’s

not a missile. I know most of the

countries now recognize it’s not a

missile.

A reporter asked, “But you use ballistic

technology. You need ballistic technologies.”

Pak responded:

Those countries who launch satellites

use similar technology and if the Se-

curity Council, they take any kind of

step whatever, this is infringement on

the sovereignty of our country and the

next option will be ours and necessary

and strong steps will follow that.

Along with the dispute in the Security Council

over whether or not the North Korea’s action is an

actual violation of SC Resolution 1718, there is a

controversy over whether the thrust of the Security

Council action should be toward getting the six–party

talks reconvened, or toward penalizing North Korea

in some way.

The resolution of this controversy depends

predominantly upon the U.S. because it can be argued

that the U.S. was responsible for the current break-

down of the six–party talks.

In a talk at the Korea Society in NYC Fall

2008, Leon Sigal of the Social Science Research

Council (SSRC) explained how the six–party talks

broke down over the issue of verification. The U.S.

government had changed the terms of the agreement

unilaterally, imposing a condition on North Korea that

was not part of the original agreement.

The second phase of the six–party February,

2007 agreement required disabling the reactor, and

other processes at Yongbyon and declaring the

nuclear material and equipment which were to be

eliminated in Phase 3 of the agreed actions.

The Bush administration was obligated to

provide ‘action for action’ in response to North

Korea’s disabling the reactor and other steps.

The verification was to occur only later in the

six–party talk process, in Phase 3 “when the disman-

tling of the North’s nuclear facilities and elimination

of any plutonium or weapons it has would be taken

up.” Instead the U.S. continued to press for a verifica-

tion agreement during Phase 2 of the agreement.

Most of the mainstream U.S. media, with the

exception of an important article in the Washington

Post, failed to explain the reason for the breakdown in

the talks.

The Washington Post article which docu-

mented how the hostile U.S. State Department envi-

ronment eroded the process of negotiation between

the U.S. government and North Korea, was only

carried on page 20 of the newspaper. It described how

U.S. government hardliners fashioned a verification

procedure to be imposed on North Korea which was

in the words of an expert in nuclear disarmament akin

to “a license to spy on any military site they (North

Korea) have.”

By launching a satellite rather than a ballistic

missile, North Korea has avoided violation of the

ballistic missile sections of SC Resolution 1718. This

gives the U.S. a chance to respond by returning to the

six–party talks and seeking to finish Phase 2 before

requiring verification in Phase 3 of the process.

The Security Council has this opportunity to

call for all parties to cease any obstruction and to

return to the six–party talks and to intensify their

efforts to complete Phase 2 and enter the next phase

of the agreed path to the denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.

Notes

1. Vietnam calls for ‘prudent’ reaction to DPRK rocket, April 5,

2009, on line at:

http://travel.org.vn/news/politics/2009/04/viet

nam-calls-for-rsquoprudentrsquo-reaction-to-dprk-rocket-

launch.html

2. Pak Tok Hun, Deputy Ambassador from the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to the UN, speaking

to reporters at the UN on Tuesday, April 7, 2009.

3. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the Six–

Party Talks,” OhmyNews International, Sept. 29, 2008, on line

at:

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?

menu=c10400&no=383769&rel_no=1

4. Glenn Kessler, “Far reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea

Deal: Demands Began to Undo Nuclear Accord,” Washington

Page 23

Post, Friday, Sept. 26, 2008; p. A20.

Part 3

[Editor’s Note: The following letter was sent to the

United Nations Secretary–General on September 30,

2019. It can be seen online at:

https://www.veteransforpeace.org/files/8015/7065/0

224/IADL_letter-Final_1.doc]

Letter Seeking Position of

the UN Secretary–General on

the Use of the UN Flag by the

‘United Nations Command’ in

Korea and Japan

September 30, 2019

Hon. Antonio Guterres

Secretary–General

The United Nations

New York, New York

Dear Secretary–General Guterres:

The International Association of Democratic

Lawyers, (IADL) a non–governmental organization

with consultative status with ECOSOC, is writing on

behalf of itself and other civil society groups that are

supporting this letter (the list of these groups is

[below]). We are seeking your opinion on the above

issue because the UN General Assembly adopted a

resolution beginning in its early history to protect the

name of the United Nations and Secretary–General

had been authorized by the General Assembly to

adopt a UN flag code and protect its dignity.

1. The U.S. military is still using the UN flag

at certain military bases in Korea and Japan, in

claiming to be the ‘United Nations Command’, which

was unilaterally created by the U.S. in July 1950. The

U.S. uses Security Council Resolution 84 of 7 July,

1950 to justify its use of the UN flag. However, there

are some serious problems with such use. For in-

stance, the Security Council made a grave mistake in

authorizing the use of the UN flag for a non–UN,

multi–national military command that was only

recommended in SCR 84. Perhaps, some members of

the Security Council at the time may have believed

that the Security Council had such power. However,

according to Prof. Hans Kelsen, the leading legal

scholar on the Charter and Law of the United Nations

at the time, such opinion had “no basis neither in the

Charter nor in the Resolution 167(II) of the General

Assembly.”

Moreover, SCR 84 authorized the

“Unified Command” to use the UN flag in the “course

of operations against North Korean forces,” but the

U.S. military has used the UN flag in the name of the

‘UN Command’ in its military operations in Korea

from the beginning.

2. The first UN Flag Code was issued on 19

December, 1947, and Pt. 8 of the Code stated that

“the flag shall not be used except in accordance with

this Flag Code.” However, the Code did not contain

a provision authorizing the use of the flag in military

operations. On 28 July, 1950, Secretary–General

Trygve Lie added to the Code a new paragraph under

Pt. 6 which stipulated that “the flag may be used in

military operations only upon express authorization to

that effect by a competent organ of the United Na-

tions.”

Prof. Kelsen criticized this new provision as

“an ex post facto justification” of the SCR 84.

3. In a joint letter sent to the Secretary–

General by 28 Member States on 15 September, 1972,

requesting to add to the agenda of the 27

session of

the General Assembly a draft resolution with the title

of “Creation of Favorable Conditions to Accelerate

the Independent and Peaceful Reunification of Ko-

rea,” the second clause of the resolution stated that the

General Assembly “Considers that the right to use the

United Nations flag … in South Korea, should be

annulled.”

Thereafter, the U.S. wrote a letter to the

Security Council which informed the Council that it

will “undertake measures to reduce manifestations of

the ‘United Nations Command,’ including restricted

use of the flag … .”

About three months later, the

U.S. sent another letter to the Security Council,

informing the Council that “from 25 August, 1975,

the United Nations flag” will no longer fly over

military installations in the Republic of Korea “except

at facilities directly associated with the implementa-

tion of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July, 1953.”

The U.S. has taken the step of continually using the

UN Flag unilaterally, in opposition to the growing

demand of Member States that the U.S. stop using the

UN flag in Korea. Such action was also taken in

disregard of the Secretary–General’s authority and

opinion.

4. On 24 December, 1993, while crossing the

Page 24

South–North dividing line in the DMZ, the UN

Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali stated that

he did not authorize flying the UN flag at

Panmunjom.

His remark was true and just since the

Secretary–General was also a scholar of international

law. In June 1994, the Secretary–General further

clarified that SCR 84 “did not establish the unified

command as a subsidiary organ under its control …”.

In other words, the “Unified Command” was not

under the control of the UN Security Council. Thus,

it cannot be called as a ‘United Nations Command’.

5. In regard to this issue, we would like to ask

the Secretary–General the following four questions:

1) Did the SCR 84 violate the UN Charter and

the UN Flag Code when it authorized the

“Unified Command,” which was a non–UN

entity, to use the UN flag in the course of

operations against North Korean forces?

2) Did the U.S. violate the SCR 84 by creating

the so–called the ‘UN Command’ on its own

initiative and then using the UN flag in the

name of the ‘UN Command’?

3) Did the U.S. violate the SCR 84 by contin-

uing the use of the UN flag in the name of the

‘UN Command’ even today, although active

fighting in Korea ended on 27 July, 1953 and

the main goal of the SCR 84 was achieved?

4) If the U.S. violated the UN Charter, the UN

Flag Code, or the SCR 84, then what mea-

sures would the Secretary–General take to

stop the abuse of the UN flag in Korea and

Japan?

We would appreciate your attention to this

matter and kind response as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

Jeanne Mirer, Esq.

President, International Association of Democratic

Lawyers

Endorsed by the following civil society groups:

Confederation of Lawyers of Asia and the Pacific

(COLAP)

Lawyers for a Democratic Society–Research Commit-

tee on USFK Affairs (ROK)

Citizen’s Solidarity for Peace & Unification (ROK)

Peace Mothers of Korea (ROK)

Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (ROK)

Eurasia Peace Way (ROK)

Korea Youth Solidarity (ROK)

The Tomorrow (ROK)

National Federation of Peasant Society (ROK)

Korean Women Peasant Association (ROK)

National Women’s Solidarity (ROK)

Korea International Peace Forum (ROK)

Action One Korea (ROK)

Democratic Workers’ National Conference (ROK)

National Democratic Movement Families Association

(ROK)

National Unification National Unity South Korea

Headquarters (ROK)

Progressive College Student Network (ROK)

Unification Square (ROK)

Support Committee for Prisoners of Conscience for

Justice, Peace and Human Rights (ROK)

Korea Progressive Solidarity (ROK)

National Poverty Alliance (ROK)

Democratization Practice Family Movement Council

(ROK)

Citizen’s Coalition for Resurrection of Chang Jun Ha,

the Patriot of Korea (ROK)

Progress Union of Korea University Students (ROK)

World BEYOND War (U.S.)

Environmentalists Against War (U.S.)

Columban Mission Society

Des Moines Catholic Worker (U.S.)

Peace Action Maine (U.S.)

Peaceworkers (U.S.)

Veterans For Peace (U.S.)

Presbyterian Peace Network for Korea (U.S.)

National Association of Korean Americans (U.S.)

The Olympia, Washington Fellowship of Reconcilia-

tion (U.S.)

Citizens Opposing Active Sonar Threats (U.S.)

Popai Liem Education Foundation (U.S.)

Global Network against Weapons and Nuclear Power

in Space (U.S.)

Australian Anti–Bases Campaign Coalition (Austra-

lia)

6.15 Komitee of South–North–Overseas Korean, Sec-

tion Europe (Germany)

International Network of Engineers and Scientists for

Global Responsibility (Germany)

Peace Philosophy Centre, Vancouver, B.C. (Canada)

Peace Women Partners International

Swedish Peace Council (Sweden)

Trident Ploughshares, XR Peace (U.K.)

SOAS University of London Social Justice Korea

(Student Union Society) (U.K.)

Page 25

Policy Research for Development Alternative (Ban-

gladesh)

Notes

1. A/RES/92(I), Official Seal and Emblem of the UN, 7 Decem-

ber, 1946; A/RES/167(II), United Nations Flag, 20 October,

1947.

2. Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical

Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: Frederick A.

Praeger, 1950), p. 938.

3. ST/AFS/SGB/89, The United Nations Flag Code (as amend-

ed), 28 July, 1950.

4. IBID., Kelsen, p. 939.

5. A/8752/Add. 9.

6. S/11737 (27 June, 1975).

7. S/11830 (22 September, 1975).

8. Shawn P. Creamer (U.S. Army Colonel), “The ‘United

Nations Command’ and the Sending States,” International

Journal of Korean Studies, vol. XXI, n. 2, Fall–Winter 2017, p. 2.

9. UN Secretary–General Boutros Boutros–Ghali letter to the

DPRK’s Foreign Minister, New York, NY, June 24, 1994.

[Editor’s Note: The following open letter to the UN

Security Council members was dated 13 January,

2020. It was signed by five South Korean Civil

Society organizations. A copy appeared on the Peo-

ple’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)

website at:

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English

/1679682.]

Open Letter to the UN

Security Council Members

We Cannot Possibly Go Back to Times

of Competition and Hostility

At the beginning of 2020, the 70

new year

since the outbreak of the Korean War, the situation of

the Korean peninsula stays gloomy. The DPRK–U.S.

negotiations have been stuck at a deadlock for the

past year without a seemingly possible breakthrough.

In the meanwhile, DPRK that has recently announced

“a new path” have resolved a “frontal breakthrough”

in the latest Workers’ Party Central Committee plen-

um and emphasized economic self–help strategies and

development of new strategic weapons.

Two years have barely passed since 2018,

when hope that this age of hostility and contention

would end, was plated. As we all know, the road to

peace establishment in the Korean peninsula should

be a trust–building process through perpetual conver-

sations and patience. We are now facing the uneasy

obstacles along the road, but we cannot possibly

abandon patience for a return for antagonism. Today,

the civil society organizations have gathered here in

a united wish to never go back to the time before the

Panmunjom Inter–Korean Summit in any circum-

stances, when dangers of war were imminent. We

assert that conversations between DPRK–U.S. and

South–North should reconvene as soon as possible,

and agreements which had been difficult to reach

between them should be fulfilled, and we hereby

suggest to governments of ROK, DPRK, and the U.S.

DPRK and the U.S. should both work to form

adequate preconditions to resume dialogue.

DPRK and the U.S. have not been able to

progress meaningful discussions, neither after last

year’s Hanoi Summit nor after the meeting at

Panmunjom in June 2019. During Singapore, the two

parties have declared that a mutual trust–building will

expedite denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,

but such resolutions have not been abided by. Above

all, we pinpoint the fact that the U.S. has not taken

any measures to show their trust compared to DPRK’s

set of actions including a freeze of nuclear and missile

experiment conducts. This is also a reason why there

have been no points of contact — none among pack-

aged, phased, or concurrent settlements — between

the two. We are strongly against a practical mud-

dling–through of the U.S. by insisting “denuclear-

ization first,” and North’s missile tests conduct that

creates militaristic tensions. Both the U.S. and DPRK

should do their best to establish conditions that will

continue the dialogue, and clarify the principles of

denuclearization and peace regime establishment. We

ask for the U.S.’s political, militaristic, economic

trust–building mechanisms that will allow for greater

agreements, and also for DPRK to halt from taking

further militaristic actions.

The UN and the U.S. should lift the sanctions

against the DPRK that are related to humanitarian aid

at least.

The United Nations and the U.S. have con-

stantly maintained or built up the levels of economic

sanctions against DPRK since it was first enacted.

The U.S. is standing firm on the position that without

prior denuclearization of DPRK, Washington cannot

lift the sanctions. It has been testified that the eco-

nomic sanctions have been aggravating the situation

for especially the underprivileged. Now that the sanc-

Page 26

tions are outpacing their original purpose to act as a

medium of problem–solving, the trust–building

process between DPRK and the U.S. is even more

injured. Moreover, these sanctions are keeping inter-

peninsula cooperation. We hope that the unsuccessful

history of insisting ‘nuclearization first, sanction

alleviation next’ kind of solution without any fruit

will not repeat itself. At the minimum, the sanctions

that accelerate the humanitarian crisis should be

lifted. We’d like to appeal to the UN Security Council

for proactive discussions about China and Russia

partially lifting economic sanctions, which could lead

to the negotiation table.

Communication and militaristic actions cannot

coexist.

We remember the fact that the postponement

of ROK–U.S. joint military exercise worked as a

driving force for the peace process on the Korean

peninsula. Raising militaristic threats and confronta-

tions are no good for the negotiation. We hereby urge

Seoul and Washington to pause another joint exercise

planned in March. This decision will ignite the dying

ember of negotiation between the DPRK and the U.S.

We urge for a resolute action for the ROK

government to carry out the agreements.

When DPRK–U.S. negotiations have been

stopped, South–North relations also chilled down.

Including the exchanges and cooperation projects, the

parts the two sides have agreed on has not been able

to take a single step due to maintained economic

sanctions of the UN and the U.S. This is a very

lamentable situation. Operation of Gaeseong Indus-

trial Complex, Mount Geumgang tours, humanitarian

cooperation for solving separated families’ problems,

road and railway connection projects should not be

postponed any longer. This includes the formation of

the Joint South–North Military Committee and other

parts of the agreements that pertain to military issues.

The ROK government should proactively ask for

broad sanctions lift and exercise some autonomy in

solving the problem. Though it will not be easy, the

government should lead to provide room for problem

solving and engine to change the current situation.

We will take up the civic society’s responsi-

bility to cease the war and to make peace.

This is the 70

year since the Korean War. It

is time to put an end to contentions and hatred as

results of the divide and cease–fire that have been

regenerating itself. The Korean civil society is the

agent directly involved that will form the peace on

this peninsula. We hold the responsibility to stimulate

dialogue for permanent peace regime and denuclear-

ization to continue. We will gather desperate voices

for peace and deliver them not only to the DPRK and

the U.S. but to the whole international community.

We will ask the international community to be with us

on our peace–forwarding actions. We will strive to

mark 2020 a year to be one that will halt the war and

open the way to a new age of peace.

7 January, 2020

Civil Society Organization Network in Korea — Civil

Peace Forum

Korean Conference of Religions for Peace

Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation

Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North

Korea

The Southern Committee on June 15 Joint Declara-

tion

[Editor’s Note: The following letter dated Dec 11,

2019 from four women’s peace groups to the Mem-

bers of the UN Security Council was posted on the

Korea Peace Now website on Dec 11, 2019 at:

https://koreapeacenow.org/letter-to-un-security-coun

cil-regarding-sanctions-on-north-korea/.]

Letter to UN Security

Council Regarding Sanctions

on North Korea

Members of the United Nations Security Council

December 11, 2019

Dear Ambassadors,

We are writing to you as members of the

international women–led campaign Korea Peace

Now! Women Mobilizing to End the War.

As you gather today to discuss the security

crisis on the Korean Peninsula, we urge you to take a

holistic approach considering the human costs of

sanctions–based responses. The North Korean civilian

population is caught in the crossfire of a geopolitical

dispute they have little to no control over, perpetuated

by the lack of resolution to the Korean War and made

more acute by the imposition of sanctions so compre-

Page 27

hensive they threaten their very existence. As it is part

of the fundamental principles of the United Nations to

settle disputes peacefully and in conformity with the

principles of justice and international law, we urge

you to call for an end to the Korean War and to

review the conformity of nonproliferation sanctions to

international human rights and humanitarian law.

Recently, our campaign commissioned a panel

of independent experts to produce a report, “The

Human Costs and Gendered Impact of Sanctions on

North Korea,” which highlighted the negative conse-

quences of sanctions on the lives of the North Korean

people. According to the report, the sanctions regime

against North Korea has since 2016 grown from a

“smart sanctions” model essentially targeting the

military and the elite to an almost total embargo on

North Korea–related trade, investments, and financial

transactions. Drawing evidence from UN and non-

governmental organizations on the ground as well as

other relevant data sets, the report found that sanc-

tions are having humanitarian, developmental and

gendered impacts and that existing sanctions exemp-

tion mechanisms are insufficient to prevent adverse

consequences. It raised concerns that the sanctions in

their current form may overstep what is permissible

under international humanitarian and human rights

law, highlighting the rights to life, food, health, an

adequate standard of living, and development, as well

as women’s rights.

While the Security Council has repeatedly

stated that its sanctions are not intended to have

adverse humanitarian consequences, in their current

form, sanctions are interfering with the ability of both

international aid organizations and of the North

Korean government to address the urgent and long-

standing humanitarian needs of the population.

According to the UN Panel of Experts, a wide range

of humanitarian–sensitive items are banned from

entering the country, including agricultural material

and medical equipment, and generally any items

containing metal, such as scalpels or nails.

Sanctions are also impeding the economic

development of the DPRK, reversing the country’s

growing trade and engagement with the world. This

undermines progress that North Korea made in

overcoming the economic crisis and famine of the

1990s, particularly market activity led by grassroots

women, a key engine of social change. Sanctions

undermine women’s economic security and their

livelihoods, perhaps most clearly with UNSC resolu-

tion 2375’s ban on textile exports, an industry in

which 82 percent of workers are female. Increasing

gender inequality is counterproductive to the stated

aims of those advocating sanctions. Furthering a

gender divide and marginalizing women from any

form of economic power and, hence, influence (even

if limited) serves only to institutionalize the dispari-

ties that empirical research in various conflicts has

shown is inimical to peace building.

As the crushing North Korean winter sets in

and as expatriate North Korean workers are forced to

give up their jobs by the end of the year and return to

the DPRK, we urge you to urgently address the

unfolding human tragedy by (1) opening the space for

dialogue on the adverse consequences of sanctions

and the question of their conformity to international

human rights and humanitarian law, (2) establishing

a process to assess the human impact of sanctions and

take expedient action to mitigate and ultimately

eliminate undue harm; and (3) calling on the relevant

parties to the unresolved Korean War to formally end

it by replacing the 1953 Armistice with a peace

agreement.

We look forward to your response and con-

structive engagement.

Sincerely,

Korean Women’s Movement for Peace

Nobel Women’s Initiative

Women Cross DMZ

Women’s International League for Peace and Free-

dom (WILPF)

Page 28

[Editor’s Note: The following is a call issued March

31, 2020 to suspend sanctions against the DPRK.

Endorsed by 87 South Korean Civil Society Organi-

zations (CSOs), it argues that what is needed is to

ease or suspend the sanctions against the DPRK

imposed by the U.S. and UN, because the sanctions

are blocking any possibly effective response to

COVID-19. The call can be accessed online at:

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/1695715.]

Call to Ease or Suspend the

Sanctions Against the DPRK

That Impede the Response to

COVID–19

On March 25, 2020, the U.S. Secretary of

State Mike Pompeo asserted that “the G7, and all

nations, must remain united in calling on North Korea

to return to negotiations, and stay committed to apply

diplomatic and economic pressure over its illegal

nuclear and ballistic missile programs.” This was a

dismissal of remarks made the day before by Michelle

Bachelet, United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights, that “In a context of a global pan-

demic, both for global public health reasons, and to

support the rights and lives of millions of people in

these countries (e.g. the DPRK), sectoral sanctions

should be eased or suspended.” Following this,

Secretary Pompeo had an interview with the media on

March 26 saying that “Venezuela, North Korea, Iran,

in some of these countries, when humanitarian assis-

tance is offered, they’ll often reject it.” However,

maintaining the level of pressure in the DPRK poli-

cies while taking their rejection of humanitarian

assistance does nothing to mitigate the current situa-

tion. If the U.S. is willing to cooperate with the

DPRK in preventing the COVID–19 epidemic as

President Trump wrote in his personal letter to Kim,

what is needed right now is to ease or suspend the

sanctions against the DPRK imposed by the U.S. and

UN, which are blocking any possibly effective re-

sponse to COVID–19.

Calls for easing or suspending sanctions are

continued, as COVID–19 is spreading on a global

scale. Michelle Bachelet said that “Broad sectoral

sanctions should urgently be re–evaluated in countries

facing the coronavirus pandemic” and mentioned

Cuba, the DPRK, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Iran to

emphasize that sanctions may also impede medical

efforts, which heightens the risk for all of us. António

Guterres, UN Secretary–General, also sent a letter to

G20 members and encouraged them to waive sanc-

tions to ensure access to food, essential health sup-

plies, and COVID–19 medical support. Humanitarian

assistance groups of the U.S. also urge that sanctions

against the DPRK should not impede the assistance.

The 1718 Sanctions Committee of the UN

Security Council is approving the requested humani-

tarian exemptions on a case–by–case basis and they

recently shortened the duration of the procedure, but

it is still not enough. Even the necessary medical

supplies such as thermometers, RT PCR machines,

reagents, and ventilators have to go through a com-

plex process. In order to obtain the waiver, a wide-

ranged submission of information that encompasses

the purpose of the aid, the travel position of the items,

the quantity and method of the shipment, travel route

of the package, its value converted into dollars, the

reasons for seeking an exemption, and the financial

institutions that will be used, is required and there

should be no changes in its operation. Besides, even

if an exemption is granted, financial sanctions and the

U.S. secondary boycott complicates the situation

further because they make it difficult to find financial

institutions to pay for the items and provide funds for

resident NGOs or UN agencies in the DPRK. It is

hard to deliver cash in person due to COVID–19

related restrictions, overall, assistance is met with

severe adversity. Sanctions against the DPRK are

blocking urgent and effective responses to a rapidly

spreading epidemic.

The DPRK has reported that there is no case

of COVID–19 up until now, but no one would be able

to possibly predict situations to come. They have shut

down flights since the beginning phase of prolifera-

tion and with other border controls, are said to be

concentrating in the prevention of epidemics. Concur-

rently, they asked for reagent kits to Russia and

medical supplies to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

and UNICEF, etc. Even if there is not a single case of

infection, no country can be called safe unless a tight

quarantine system is in operation. There are no

borders for a virus. Experts accentuate the importance

of multilateral and international cooperation because,

if only one country fails to prevent and the outbreak

goes out of control, it will pose the intensified level of

threat to the whole world. Not just to ‘support’ the

DPRK but also to jointly respond against COVID–19

Page 29

as a whole, it is very urgent that some alteration in

sanctions be made.

On March 26, G20 leaders have hosted an

extraordinary summit regarding responses to

COVID–19 and agreed that ‘global action, solidarity

and international cooperation are more than ever

necessary to address this pandemic.’ A number of

countries have been requesting the international

cooperation with South Korea because the ROK

government’s actions have been acclaimed. Ironi-

cally, one country that the ROK cannot cooperate

with is the DPRK, a country that resides on the same

peninsula. Assistance from the ROK government and

NGOs and inter–Korean cooperation on health care

have been blocked by the sanctions. Effective mecha-

nisms to prevent the outbreak of COVID–19 in the

DPRK would expand supplies for prevention, quaran-

tine, and treatment, which cannot possibly take place

without an extensive easing or suspending sanctions

against the DPRK and international cooperation. In

addition, something that is as important as the elabo-

rated agenda is the active participation of the DPRK

to the proposals of the international society for

cooperation to prevent the epidemic. Cooperation

does not bear fruit by efforts that are one–sided.

The two Koreas, through the Inter–Korean

Sectoral Meeting for Cooperation on Health Care that

took place in November 2018, agreed upon bilateral

sharing of information to prevent the influx and

spread of infectious diseases cooperation on diagno-

sis, prevention and treatment of infectious diseases;

including tuberculosis and malaria; promotion of

extensive mid and long–term cooperation projects for

epidemics; health and medical care regular discus-

sions and resolutions through inter–Korean Joint

Liaison Office. However, in a context of a global

pandemic of COVID–19, these pacts are not carried

out at all. This is a clear case that shows the progress

of a peace process on the Korean peninsula is directly

connected with people’s safety. As António Guterres,

UN Secretary–General had highlighted, “this is the

time for solidarity, not exclusion.” There is no time to

hesitate. The U.S. and the international society must

immediately ease or suspend sanctions that impede

the response to COVID–19 in the DPRK.

Endorsed by the following 87 Civil Society Organiza-

tions in ROK:

80 Millions’ Movement for One Korea, Anti–

THAAD Gimcheon Civil Action Committee,

Childfund Korea, Citizen Solidarity for Participation

& Autonomy of Chungbuk, Citizen Solidarity for

Participation & Autonomy of Sejong, Citizens’

Solidarity for Human Rights, Civil Peace Forum,

Civilian Military Watch, Coal Briquettes for Neigh-

bors in Korea, Committee of Reconciliation and

Reunification in NCC–Korea, Cool–Jam, Cooperation

for Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula,

Corporation Nanum, Education Institutes for Work-

ers, Gimje Justice Peace Act, Green KOREA,

Hananuri, Health and Sharing, Hyungmyung Founda-

tion, Incheon Citizen Culture Art Center, Incheon

Movement for One Korea, Incheon Network for

Making Peace City, Incheon Network for Peace &

Welfare, Incheon Small Library Association, Incheon

Urban Agriculture Network, Incheon Women’s

Association, Incorporated Organization Silcheon

Bulgyo, Inmuyeon Humanities Center, Jeju Peace

Human Rights Institute WHAT, Jeju People out of the

Island, Jeju Solidarity for Participatory Self–govern-

ment, Jeonnam Inter–Korean Exchanges Peace

Center, Kaesong Tourism Resume Movement,

Kimcheon Education Beyond, Korea Alliance For

Progressive Movement(KAPM), Korea Association

for Restorative Justice, Korea Biopolitics Forum,

Korea Vietnam Peace Foundation, Korea Women's

Associations United, Korea Women Alliance, Korean

Catholic Women’s Community for a New World,

Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, Korean

Federation Medical Activist Groups for Health Rights

(Association of Korea Doctors for Health Rights,

Association of Physicians for Humanism, Korean

Dentist’s Association for Healthy Society, Korean

Pharmacists for Democratic Society, Solidarity for

Worker’s Health), Korean House for International

Solidarity, Korean Public Service and Transportation

Worker’s Union (KPTU), Korean Sharing Movement,

Korean Women Peasants Association, Korean

Women's Movement for Peace, Medical Aid for

Children, Naeil Corp. for Youth Human Rights,

National Council of YMCAs of Korea, Networks for

Greentransport, New Bodhisattva Network, Nice

People Foundation, Okedongmu Children in Korea,

One Korea Tree, Pan Korean Association for Recon-

ciliation, Pax Christi Korea, Peace and Human Rights

Center in Jeju, Peace Network, Peace Railway of the

Korea, Peacemomo, People not Profit, People’s

Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD),

Professors for Democracy, SARANGBANG Group

Page 30

For Human Right, Seongju Soseongri Villagers’

Association against THAAD, Solidarity for Another

World, Solidarity for Independent Peaceful Reunifica-

tion of Korea, Solidarity for Peace & Human Rights,

The Center for Historical Truth and Justice, The

Corea Peace 3000, The Headquarters of National

Unification Movement of Young Korean Academy,

The Korean Council for the Justice and Remembrance

for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan,

The Righteous People for Korean Unification, The

Won–Buddhist Emergency Committee to Guard the

Sacred Site at Seongju, Ulsan People’s Solidarity,

Unification Committee of MINBYUN–Lawyers for

Democratic Society, Urinuri Peace Corp., West Sea

Peace Zone Association, Women Making Peace, Won

Buddhism Human Rights Commission, Won–

Buddhists Social Movement Network

Part 4

[Editor’s Note: The following is the resolution pro-

posed in Dec., 2019 by the People’s Republic of

China and the Russian Federation missions to the UN

Security Council for consultations and adoption.]

Security Council Resolution

Submitted by China and

Russia Proposes Easing

Some United Nations

Sanctions Against DPRK

The Security Council,

PPl. Recalling its previous relevant resolu-

tions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution

1695 (2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874

(2009), resolution 1887 (2009), resolution 2321

(2016), resolution 2356 (2017), resolution 2371

(2017), resolution 2375 (2017), resolution 2397

(2017),

PP2. Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons as well as their

means of delivery constitutes a threat to international

peace and security,

PP3. Noting that the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) has refrained from

conducting nuclear tests from September 2017 and

introduced a moratorium on conducting further

nuclear tests and test launches of intermediate–range

and intercontinental missiles from 21 April, 2018,

PP4. Welcoming numerous important state-

ments by the DPRK on firm and unwavering commit-

ment to complete denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula and the decision by the DPRK to demolish

Punggye–ri nuclear test site and Dongchang–ri

missile engine test site and launch platform under the

observation of experts from relevant countries,

PP5. Considering the development of inter-

Korean relations based on the principles of independ-

ence and self–determination of the Korean nation as

the key for a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula,

PP6. Underscoring the necessity to respect the

legitimate security concerns of the DPRK, and ensure

the welfare, inherent dignity, and rights of people in

the DPRK, and reaffirming that the measures previ-

ously introduced by the UN Security Council are not

intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences

for the civilian population of the DPRK,

PP7. Expressing its support for the efforts by

the United States of America and the DPRK to

establish mutual trust and improve bilateral relations

through dialogue and consultations,

PP8. Stressing the importance of further

defusing military tension on the Korean Peninsula and

fostering the atmosphere of cooperation and trust by

preservation of the abovementioned moratorium of

the DPRK and the decision by the United States of

America and the Republic of Korea to indefinitely

postpone their joint large–scale military exercises in

the region,

PP9. Reiterating its commitment to a peaceful,

diplomatic and political solution to the situation on

the Korean Peninsula and beyond and welcoming the

efforts by the Council Members as well as other

States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive

solution through dialogue,

OP1. Reiterates that all parties should commit

to work toward complete denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula;

OP2. Decides that the Security Council shall

adjust the sanction measures towards the DPRK as

may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance

with relevant UN Security Council resolutions;

OP3. Calls upon the nuclear–weapon State

Parties to the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons to facilitate together with the

DPRK the process of practical denuclearization of the

Page 31

Korean Peninsula;

OP4. Welcomes further development of inter-

Korean relations through close dialogue and commu-

nication between the authorities of the two sides,

civilian exchanges and cooperation in many areas, in

particular the projects of rail and road connections on

the Korean Peninsula, in accordance with Panmunjom

Declaration of 27 April, 2018 and Pyongyang Decla-

ration of 19 September, 2018 by the president of the

Republic of Korea Moon Jae–in and the Chairman of

the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK Kim Jong

Un;

OP5. Decides that the 1718 Committee shall

adopt the most favorable approach towards requests

for exemptions from existing UN sanctions against

the DPRK for humanitarian and livelihood purposes;

and decides to exempt the inter–Korean rail and road

cooperation projects from existing UN sanctions

against the DPRK and such activities should be

notified to the 1718 Committee in advance;

OP6. Decides that the measures imposed by

resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013),

2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017),

2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), which are

directly related to the livelihood of the civilian popu-

lation of the DPRK should be lifted at an early date;

OP7. Decides that the provision that all

member states shall prohibit the direct or indirect

supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their

territories or by their nationals, or using their flag

vessels and aircraft, of certain industrial machinery

and transportation vehicles which are used for infra-

structure construction and cannot be diverted to the

DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes,

and certain items in the humanitarian and livelihood

field is not applicable to the specific items and corre-

sponding HS Codes as listed in the Annex;

OP8. Decides with the intent of enhancing the

livelihood of the civilian population of the DPRK to

terminate the provisions set out in paragraph 29 of

resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 9 of resolution

2371 (2017), paragraph 16 and 17 of resolution 2375

(2017), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017);

OP9. Calls upon all Member States to inten-

sify their efforts in providing humanitarian assistance

to the DPRK both bilaterally and through the pro-

grames of the UN and other international organiza-

tions, and non–governmental organizations, given

grave concerns about the current humanitarian situa-

tion in the DPRK; and stresses that all member states

should ensure the unobstructed and timely provision

of humanitarian aid to the DPRK through their

territory;

OP10. Welcomes the continuation of the

dialogue between the United States and the DPRK at

all levels, aimed at establishing new U.S.–DPRK

relations, building mutual confidence and joining

efforts to build a lasting and stable peace on the

Korean Peninsula in a staged and synchronized

manner, in accordance with the joint statement of 12

June, 2018 by the President of the United States of

America Donald J. Trump and the Chairman of the

State Affairs Commission of the DPRK Kim Jong Un;

OP11. Calls upon all parties concerned to

consider implementing further practical steps to

reduce military tension on the Korean Peninsula and

probability of any military confrontation by all

appropriate means, such as, but not limited to, conclu-

sion of agreements between military officials, adop-

tion of formal declaration and/or a peace treaty for the

end of the Korean war; and affirms its intention to

provide needed assistance in this process;

OP12. Reaffirms the importance of maintain-

ing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in

North–East Asia at large; and stresses that it can be

achieved only on the basis of multilateral cooperation

between the countries of the region;

OP13. Calls for prompt resumption of the six–

party talks or re–launch of multilateral consultations

in any other similar format, with the goal of facilitat-

ing a peaceful and comprehensive solution through

dialogue, reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula

and beyond, and promoting peaceful co–existence and

mutually beneficial regional cooperation in North–

East Asia;

OP14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Page 32

Annex

List of the Items to be removed from the

sanctions with HS Codes

1. Materials, machines and vehicles for infrastructure

constructions

HS code Items

1 721041 Iron or non–alloy steel; flat–

rolled, width 600mm or more,

corrugated, plated or coated with

zinc (Color steel tile)

2 7302 Railway or tramway track materi-

als of iron or steel; rails, ties, etc.

3 7308 Structure of iron or steel and parts

thereof for roof, window, etc.

4 7318 Screws, bolts, rivets, washers, and

the like, of iron or steel.

5 8429 Bulldozers, excavators, road roll-

ers, etc.

6 8530 Electric signaling or traffic con-

trol equipment; for railways, port,

airfields, etc.

7 ex870191 Tractors of an engine power not

exceeding 18 kW

8 870421

870422

Vehicles of a gross vehicle weight

not exceeding 20 tonnes

9 870431

ex870432

Vehicles of a gross vehicle weight

not exceeding 8 tonnes

10 8705 Special purpose motor vehicles,

such as breakdown lorries and fire

fighting vehicles

2. Humanitarian and livelihood items

HS code Items

11 7317 Nails, drawing pins and the like,

of iron or steel

12 7319 Sewing needles for use in the

hand, pins and similar articles, of

iron or steel

13 7321

through

7324

Stoves, radiators for central heat-

ing, kitchen articles and parts,

sanitary ware and parts thereof,

etc., of iron or steel

14 7415 Nails, drawing pins and the like,

of copper or steel

15 7418 and

7615

Copper and aluminium; table,

kitchen or other household arti-

cles and parts thereof

16 8211

through

8215

Cutlery such as knives, scissors,

spoons and forks

17 83 Miscellaneous products of base

metal, such as locks, filing cab-

inets, loose–leaf binders and

name plates

18 8403 Central heating boilers

19 ex841510 Air conditioning machines, of a

refrigerating effect not exceeding

4000 Cal per hour

20 841520 Air conditioning machines, of a

kind used for persons, in motor

vehicles

21 ex841821 Refrigerators for household use,

compression–type, of a capacity

exceeding 50 L, not exceeding

150 L

22 ex841919 Solar water heaters

23 842211 Dish washing machines, of the

household type

24 8450 Household or laundry–type wash-

ing machines

Page 33

25 8471 Automatic data processing ma-

chines and units thereof, such as

panel computers and micro–com-

puters

26 850811

Vacuum cleaners, with self con-

tained electric motor, of a power

not exceeding 1500 W and having

a dust bag or other receptacle ca-

pacity not exceeding 20 L

27 8509

through

8510

Electro–mechanical domestic ap-

pliances, such as juice extractors,

food grinders, and electric shavers

28 8516 Electric water heaters, electric

irons, microwave ovens, electro-

magnetic ovens, etc.

29 8712

through

8715

Bicycles, carriages for disabled

persons, baby carriages, parts and

accessories thereof

30 8201 Spades, shovels, axes, sickles and

other tools used in agriculture,

horticulture, and forestry

31 8202

through

8206

Tools, hand; saws, files, spanners

and wrenches, etc., two or more

put up in sets for retail sale

32 8424 Fire extinguishers, spray guns,

etc.

33 8432

through

8438

Machinery and equipments for

agriculture, forestry, poultry–

keeping, etc.

34 8439

through

8443

Machinery for paper making,

binding and printing

35 8472 Office machines, such as copy

machines, staplers, and paper

shredders

36 8475 Lamps, tubes, etc., and machines

for manufacturing glassware

[Editor’s Note: The following is the Annex to the

letter dated 14 January, 2013 from the Permanent

Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the

President of the Security Council. It is posted online

at: https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2013 /20.]

Dissolution of the ‘United

Nations Command’ is the

Essential Requirement in

Defending Peace and

Stability On the Korean

Peninsula and In the

Asia–Pacific Region

Memorandum of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs

of the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea

This year marks the sixtieth year since the

Korean Armistice Agreement was signed.

It is now 60 years since the gunfire of war

stopped roaring, but the war has not been terminated

legally. There remains a fragile ceasefire status of

neither peace nor war on the Korean peninsula, which

has yet to build up a mechanism to ensure peace.

The United States has gone defiant against the

Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea in its consistent stand and effort to replace the

Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and tries to

maintain the ceasefire status. Lurking behind this

background is the ghost of the cold war, i.e., the

‘United Nations Command’.

This ghost, keeping pace with the recent

United States defense strategy, is coming back to life

as a tool for an aggressive war that would bring a

fierce flame to the Asia–Pacific region, the greatest

hotspot of the world.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Demo-

cratic People’s Republic of Korea recognizes that

there is a need to bring the attention of the interna-

tional community to these moves of the United

States, which would result in an extremely dangerous

situation.

Page 34

The United States, according to its new

defence strategy, is trying to transform the ‘United

Nations Command’ into a “multinational force com-

mand” which would serve as a matrix of the Asian

version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO).

The ulterior motive of the new United States

defense strategy, released for the first time in January,

2012, is to encircle and put a military curb on other

big Powers in Asia so that the latter cannot grow to

make a resistance to it. For this purpose, the United

States plans to concentrate 60 percent of its overseas–

deployed forces to the Asia–Pacific region in the next

10 years. At the same time, the United States is

stepping up its preparations to drag its bilateral allies

in the region into a gradual concentration as a multi-

lateral military alliance like NATO that moves under

a unified command system.

It is a well–known fact that the United States

has long kept its eye on forming a tripartite military

alliance by combining the United States–Japan and

United States–South Korea military alliances.

The United States drew its “experience” of

containing and collapsing the former Soviet Union

and East European countries by relying on NATO

during the cold war time. Based on this, it is trying to

set up a larger–scale collective military organization

which would enable it to encircle its potential ene-

mies in the Asia–Pacific region as well.

The United States, in order to get around the

stiff resistance of the countries concerned, is trying to

form a combined force instead of opting for a new

one, by playing tricks to revive the functions of the

‘United Nations Command’, which is nothing more

than just a name.

The ‘United Nations Command’, fundamen-

tally speaking, is a tool of war which was organized

by the United States for the purpose of deploying its

satellite forces and exercising its control over them

during the Korean war. After the ceasefire, the United

States continued to seize and exercise its right to

operational command in South Korea through the

‘United Nations Command’. But, as pressure was

mounting at home and abroad in the 1970s to disman-

tle the ‘United Nations Command’ and withdraw its

forces from South Korea, the United States had no

other alternative but to form the United States–South

Korea “Combined Forces Command” and transfer the

right to operational command to it. Through this, it

tried to legalize and perpetuate its occupation of

South Korea by changing the nature of the United

States troops in South Korea from “United Nations

forces” to that of forces dispatched by the “Republic

of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty.”

Since then, the ‘United Nations Command’

has become a nominal one with nothing more than a

name.

Behind the recent attempts of the United

States to revive the functions of the ‘United Nations

Command’ lie its strategic self interest to make South

Korea a forward base for the domination of the Asia–

Pacific region and hold fast to it as cannon fodder for

an aggressive war under a changed situation.

As sentiment ran high for independence

against the United States and pressure was exerted to

take over the commanding power from the United

States, the United States had no other choice but to

return the right to peacetime operational command to

the South Korean side in 1994. Furthermore, it is to

hand over the right to wartime command by 2015.

Accordingly, the United States–South Korea “Com-

bined Forces Command,” which has served as a tool

for exercising the right to United States operational

command over South Korea, should be dismantled.

This does not mean that the United States is

likely to easily give up its right to military command

over South Korea, the strategic point in its strategy

regarding the Asia–Pacific region.

It is none other than the revival of the ‘United

Nations Command’ that the United States worked out

as an “alternative” to seize and wield its actual

command control over the South Korean armed

forces.

The resolution of the Security Council which

was railroaded for adoption by the United States in

the 1950s stipulates that all the forces provided to

South Korea should be under the control of the ‘Unit-

ed Nations Command’ under the United States.

Together with this, the United States moved further in

depriving South Korean authorities of the right to

operational command in the name of the ‘United

Nations Command’, according to the July 1950

“Taejon Agreement.” Such being the case, if the

‘United Nations Command’ is to revive its function

now, that would be as good as re–establishing the

United States right to control over the South Korean

puppet army.

When the United States began to discuss the

Page 35

issue of returning the right to wartime operational

command to South Korea in March, 2006, the United

States Commander in South Korea, at a hearing

before the United States Senate Armed Services

Committee, made an assertion that the ‘United

Nations Command’ should increase its role and be

turned into a “multinational force command” in such

a way as to allow the member States of the ‘United

Nations Command’ to participate in its detailed

activities, let alone the fact that they are involved in

the mapping of the wartime operational plans.

Following this, the United States made its

gradual move to increase the scale and frequency of

the joint military drills in and around South Korea

and saw to it that the operational players from the

member States of the ‘United Nations Command’

were involved in such drills, adapting them to the

operational skills of the joint military drills led by the

United States.

The United States and South Korea held the

forty–fourth annual security meeting in Washington

in October, 2012, and issued a joint statement “reaf-

firming that the ‘United Nations Command’ is indis-

pensable for maintaining peace and stability on the

Korean peninsula.”

This shows that the United States had already

forced the South Korean authorities to accept its

scheme to revive the ‘United Nations Command’.

It is also on a step–by–step basis that prepara-

tions are under way to expand the operational sphere

of the ‘United Nations Command’ to the whole of the

Asia–Pacific region.

The United States troops in South Korea, the

mainstay of the ‘United Nations Command’, have

already been afforded “strategic flexibility” so that

they could provide support in case of emergencies in

other parts of East Asia. Recently, the plan has been

actively under review to revive the deployment of the

United States marine forces to the Philippines and

South Korea which are due to be present in Australia

on a new basis.

If any move to establish a collective military

bloc in the Asia–Pacific region is allowed, this would

inevitably trigger off a countervailing force from

other countries which are placed under the target of

this bloc. If this is the case, it would be par for the

course that this region, too, would be plunged into a

theater to take sides with as in Europe, with a revival

of the cold war and increased danger of a nuclear war

beyond any measure. Under this worst–case scenario,

it is none other than South Korea that would suffer

most.

The ‘United Nations Command’ is primarily

an unjust tool which only misuses the name of the

United Nations. All this bears no relation to the

consensus of the United Nations Member States.

According to Article 27 of the Charter of the

United Nations, the important decisions of the Secu-

rity Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of

more than seven member States (at that time), includ-

ing the concurring votes of all five permanent mem-

ber States. This means that even if the United States

scraped the bottom of the barrel in collecting seven

satellite States, it was not possible to make any

decisions against the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea when one of the permanent member States

did not agree on it.

The situation was that the former Soviet

Union, which held a seat on the Security Council, was

not attending Council meetings from 13 January,

1950, in protest against the exercise of the representa-

tive right in the United Nations by the Taiwanese

authorities, not by the People’s Republic of China.

The United States took this occasion as

momentum in instigating the traitor Syngman Rhee to

launch a pre–emptive all–out armed invasion against

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On that

same day, the United States did not lose any time in

convening a meeting of the Security Council where it

adopted a resolution branding the Democratic Peo-

ple’s Republic of Korea as an “aggressor” (resolution

82 (1950)).

The Government of the Soviet Union re-

sponded to this by sending telegrams to the Security

Council on 29 June and 6 July, 1950. In those mes-

sages, it emphasized that the resolution could not go

into effect, as it had been adopted by permanent

member States against the United Nations Charter

without the consent of the Soviet Union and the

People’s Republic of China, permanent members of

the Security Council.

Despite this, the United States convened a

meeting on 7 July, again in the absence of the Soviet

Union. At that meeting, it cooked up a resolution

allowing United Nations Member States to dispatch

forces to the Korean war and place those forces under

the control of “‘the unified command’ under the

authority of the United States” and giving free rein to

Page 36

that command to “use the United Nations flag”

(resolution 84 (1950)).

On 25 July, 1950, the United States submitted

a report of this command to the Security Council in

which it had freely changed the name of the “unified

command” to the ‘United Nations Command’.

It was only on 31 January, 1951, after the

former Soviet Union, permanent member of the

Security Council, had returned to its meetings, that

the Council submitted an agenda and adopted resolu-

tion 90 (1951), calling for the removal of the agenda

item “Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of

Korea” from the list of items of which the Council

was seized. This complaint was made by the United

States when the Korean war broke out on 25 June,

1950. In the ensuing time, the Korea question was no

longer discussed.

The Security Council adopted such a resolu-

tion even in the middle of the war. This itself is an

admission of the fact that the United Nations made a

mistake from the beginning by allowing it to be

involved and misused in the Korean war.

Even the successive Secretaries–General of

the United Nations have made an official recogni-

tion of the fact that the ‘United Nations Command’

is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, but

absolutely a tool used by the United States for the

war.

In June, 1994, the then Secretary–General,

Boutros Boutros–Ghali, recognized that “the Secu-

rity Council did not establish the ‘unified com-

mand’ as a subsidiary organ under its control and

that it came to be placed under the authority of the

United States” (24 June, 1994 letter from the Sec-

retary–General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).

In December, 1998, Secretary–General Kofi

A. Annan made it clear that “none of my predecessors

have granted any authorization to any State to make

use of the name of the United Nations” when he

referred to the forces and command dispatched by the

United States into the Korean war (21 December,

1998 letter from the Secretary–General to the Presi-

dent of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s

Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea).

On 27 July, 2004 and 6 March, 2006, the

United Nations Spokesperson confirmed that the

“‘United Nations Command,’ despite its name, is not

the army of the United Nations, but a United States–

led force.”

It is not the United Nations, but the United

States, which has the power to appoint the “United

Nations forces commander.” It is not the United

Nations, but the United States Administration, which

has an absolute power to decide on reduction or

enforcement of the United States forces in south

Korea that are under the helmets of the “United

Nations forces.”

The United Nations has changed its composi-

tion with the passage of time. Given this, the ‘United

Nations Command’ is all the more a subsidiary organ

of the United States, which has no relevance to the

United Nations.

The United Nations today is no longer the

forum of the 1950s, when the United States organized

the ‘United Nations Command’ at its will.

More than 20 years have passed since the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea became a

legitimate member of the United Nations after joining

it. China, together with the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea, sat face to face with the “United

Nations forces” when it gave a joint signature to the

Korean Armistice Agreement. It has been 40 years

since China came to exercise its representative right

as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Despite this prolonged time, the United

Nations flag is still hanging and shows off in

Panmunjom. This, a product of anachronism, is

simply a shame to the United Nations.

The ‘United Nations Command’ should be

dismantled without any further delay if the United

Nations really wants to regain its lost authority and

impartiality.

The ‘United Nations Command’ is the refuse

of the times, the dissolution of which has already

been declared by the General Assembly.

At its thirtieth session, held in November,

1975, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions

on the dissolution of the ‘United Nations Command.’

Resolution 3390 (XXX) B, initiated by the progres-

sive Member States of the United Nations, called for

the immediate and unconditional dissolution of the

‘United Nations Command’. The United States–

sponsored resolution 3390 (XXX) A stated that the

‘United Nations Command’ might be dissolved on 1

January, 1976, if “alternative arrangements” for

maintaining the Armistice Agreement were made.

Page 37

This is how the United States came up with

the conditional theory of dismantling the ‘United

Nations Command’. This is simply a despair counsel

to avoid the voice of the broad international society

calling for an immediate and unconditional dissolu-

tion of the ‘United Nations Command’. All this

shows that even the United States itself could not

deny the illegal and anachronistic substance of the

‘United Nations Command’.

If we look at the composition of the then

‘United Nations Command’, it was no longer the

multinational forces, but the United States command

which had only the United States troops stationed in

South Korea.

As soon as the Armistice Agreement was

signed, Member States of the United Nations which

had participated in the Korean war withdrew their

forces, to the exclusion only of the United States.

Afterwards, Luxembourg and Ethiopia removed their

flags from the ‘United Nations Command’ which

they had left as a symbol. Even those countries that

still have their own flags neither have staff in the

‘United Nations Command’ nor participate in its

activities.

The United States asserted that the dissolution

of the ‘United Nations Command’ would be possible

only when another mechanism to maintain the Armi-

stice was set up. But the current ceasefire status is not

maintained by the ‘United Nations Command’ in

practice. In March, 1991, the United States made an

unannounced decision to replace the chief delegate to

the “United Nations forces” at the Military Armistice

Commission with the South Korean army general, a

post so far occupied by the United States army

general. The United States sought no prior consulta-

tions with the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea side in replacing the chief delegate to the

“United Nations forces” with the army general of

South Korea, which is not a party to the Armistice

Agreement. This was a clear provocation violating

paragraph 61, article V of the Armistice Agreement,

which stipulates that amendments and additions to the

Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by

the commanders of the opposing sides.

As the “United Nations forces” lost their

delegation power, the Military Armistice Commission

was virtually put in a state of paralysis. Eventually,

the delegation of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, a

member of the Korean–Chinese side of the Military

Armistice Commission, withdrew in December, 1994

and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea side

formed the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean Peo-

ple’s Army (KPA) to maintain the ceasefire on behalf

of the former Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea–Chinese side.

As time passed, the members of the Neutral

Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) failed to

maintain the positions of neutrality which they had at

the time of signing the Armistice Agreement. With

this, the NNSC could no longer carry out its func-

tions.

This led to the complete fall of the previous

armistice mechanism, and the ‘United Nations Com-

mand’ was reduced to a scarecrow with no party left

to deal with.

It has been since then that all the issues

related to the running of the ceasefire status have

been discussed and disposed of between the KPA and

United States military authority rather than between

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea–China

and the “United Nations forces.”

Both the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea side and the United States side have main-

tained effective control of the ceasefire status for

decades, and this reality proves that there is no longer

any reason to withhold the dissolution of the ‘United

Nations Command’. Even from the viewpoint of

replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace

treaty, the ‘United Nations Command’ stands in the

way as a legacy of the cold war that would bring no

good but only harm.

According to the Armistice Agreement, the

issue of ensuring a lasting peace is to be negotiated

only at a political conference at a level higher than

that of military commanders. The actual political

superior of the ‘United Nations Command’, a signa-

tory to the Armistice Agreement, is not the United

Nations, but the United States Administration.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Government proposed to establish a new peacemak-

ing mechanism on the Korean peninsula in April,

1994, (28 April, 1994 statement of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea).

After that, the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea also proposed to make a provisional agree-

ment between the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea and the United States that could replace the

Page 38

current Armistice Agreement in order to prevent

armed conflicts, remove the danger of war and

peacefully maintain the ceasefire status until a full

peace treaty was signed on the Korean peninsula (22

February, 1996 statement by the Spokesman of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Peo-

ple’s Republic of Korea).

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

and the United States held several rounds of talks at

the general level in Panmunjom over the issue of

putting in place a new armistice mechanism on the

Korean peninsula.

The issue of establishing a permanent peace

regime on the Korean peninsula was also discussed in

the four–party talks between the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea and the United States, which also

saw the participation of China and South Korea. The

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the

United States held talks in Washington in October,

2000, where both sides confirmed that there were

several ways, including the four–party talks, to put a

formal end to the Korean war by easing tension and

replacing the Armistice Agreement with a durable

peace regime on the Korean peninsula (12 October,

2000 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea–United

States joint communiqué).

An agreement was reached at the North–South

Summit in October, 2007 to proceed with the declara-

tion of the end of the war by the leaders of three or

four parties that are direct parties to the Korean

question (4 October, 2007 Declaration for Develop-

ment of North–South Relations and Peace and Pros-

perity).

As the facts show, there have been many

discussions and agreements between the concerned

parties on changing the ceasefire status to a durable

peace on the Korean peninsula where we can find no

mention of any method which presupposes the

existence of the ‘United Nations Command’.

Despite that, the ‘United Nations Command’

still exists today, and, on top of that, it is trying to be

revived as a tool of war to be used by multinational

forces. This is an issue that can never be overlooked

from the perspective of ensuring security in the Asia–

Pacific region, including the Korean peninsula.

The United States is claiming that the effort of

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to bolster

its national defensive power is causing tension in the

region. This is nothing but an imprudent trick to

cover up the aggressive nature of its Asia–Pacific

strategy.

Whether the United States immediately

dismantles the ‘United Nations Command’ or not will

serve as the acid test in deciding whether the United

States will or will not maintain its anti–Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea hostile policy and

whether it wants peace and stability or a revival of the

cold war in the Asia–Pacific region.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

will continue to strengthen its deterrence against all

kinds of war, thereby actively contributing to peace

and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the rest

of Asia, until the United States makes a right choice.

Pyongyang, 14 January, 2013

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben (1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

The Amateur Computerist invites submissions.

Articles can be submitted via e-mail:

jrh29@columbia.edu

Permission is given to reprint articles from this issue in a non

profit publication provided credit is given, with name of author

and source of article cited.

The opinions expressed in articles are those of their

authors and not necessarily the opinions of the Amateur

Computerist newsletter. We welcome submissions from

a spectrum of viewpoints.

ELECTRONIC EDITION

ACN Webpage:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

All issues from1988 to present of the Amateur Computerist

are on–line at:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/NewIndex.pdf

Page 39