The Amateur
Computerist
Summer 2021 Toward a Second Netizen Book (Part 4a) Volume 34 No. 4a
Table of Contents
Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 1
Interview with Ronda and Jay Hauben. . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Netizen Pressure for a New Journalism. . . . . . . . . Page 8
Netizens and the Republic of Tahrir Square . . . . Page 19
Netizens in Media War at the United Nations . . . Page 21
Significance of the Net and the Netizens . . . . . . . Page 37
Forward
This issue of the Amateur Computerist, Vol. 34
No. 4a, is the fourth issue in a series, each containing
chapters that are the basis for a second netizen book.
The chapters in this issue provide analysis and exam-
ples of an emerging new journalism. Michael Hauben
wrote that the net “brings the power of the reporter to
the Netizen.”
The first article is an interview that asks the
question, what is new about this emerging journalism.
It offers several examples of characteristics that
distinguish netizen journalism from other journalism
forms. The second article, “Netizen Reporting and
Media Criticism Pressure for a New Journalism”
argues that netizen activity in China has served as a
pressure for a reexamination and recasting of journalist
practice. The next article, “Netizens in Egypt and the
Republic of Tahrir Square” describes how bloggers
reported on the 2011 protests and discussed them
online. Their journalism became a significant part of
the protest activities.
The article, “The Role of Netizen Journalism in
the Media War at the United Nations” shows that
journalists with a social purpose and with blogs and
other online forms, can on occasion influence even the
UN. The article documents there are netizens who are
dedicated to doing the research and analysis to deter-
mine the interests and actions that are too often hidden
from public view making it possible to have a more
accurate grasp of whose interests are being served and
what is at stake in the events that make up the news.
The last article, ties this new journalism with the
emergence of new developments, of a new politics, of
a new form of citizenship, and of what Michael Hauben
called the “poor man’s version of the mass media.” It
cites the work of Mark Poster, who wonders if the role
of citizen is being replaced with the role of netizen as
globalization drives society to new forms of democracy.
[Editor’s Note: In September 2007, Ronda and Jay
Hauben were in Germany for a conference celebrating
German-Chinese networking collaboration. On the side-
line to that conference, journalist and journalism
professor Gabriele Hooffacker interviewed them on
September 23, 2007. Dr Hooffacker published the
interview in a book with the German title Wem gehört
das Internet? (Verlag Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker,
Munchen, 2008). The following is the original English
interview, edited by the Haubens in December 2007.]
Interview with Ronda
and Jay Hauben
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: Would you say that
netizen journalism is the same as grassroots journalism?
Ronda Hauben: They are not quite the same. Netizen
journalism includes grassroots journalism, but the
significance I understand is that a netizen has a social
perspective and does something from that perspective.
Some of the origin of the term netizen was when
Michael Hauben, then a college student, did some
research in 1992-1993. He sent out a number of ques-
tions on Usenet which was at the time and still is an
online forum for discussion. Usenet was very active in
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/
Page 1
the early 90s. He also sent his questions out on Internet
mailing lists.
In the responses to his questions people said that
they were interested in the Internet for the different
things they were trying to do but they also wanted to
figure out how to spread the Internet, to help it to grow
and thrive and to help everybody have access. What
Michael found was that there was a social purpose that
people explained to him. People had developed this
social sense from the fact that they could participate
online and find some very interesting valuable possi-
bilities online. Many of the people that responded to
his questions shared with him that they wanted to
contribute to the Internet so that it would grow and
thrive.
In my opinion this set of characteristics is broad-
er than grassroots journalism. Grassroots journalism I
would interpret as people from the grassroots having
the ability to post. But where there is also a social
desire and purpose, that is what I would define as
netizen journalism.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: You also said political
participation?
Ronda Hauben: Yes a political and a social purpose.
By social I mean that people support something
happening for other people, that the net be shared and
be available to a broader set of people. This includes a
political focus as well.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: I just remember one of
my first keynote speeches. I had to speak about em-
powering the information poor in 1994. It was a
meeting of pedagogic teachers and I told them that
they should try to make it possible for many people of
all classes to have access to the Internet. That I think is
some of the sense of being a netizen.
Ronda Hauben: That is being a netizen.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: I’m afraid many people
think participation only means economical and not
political and that especially people in Eastern Europe
mainly wanted to take part economically.
Ronda Hauben: In the U.S. for example, there has
been a lot of pressure supported by the U.S. govern-
ment for seeing the Internet as a way to enrich your-
self. But that is not what grew up with the Internet
community. The pressure for the Internet to be for
economic purposes was in opposition to the netizen
developments in the U.S.
Jay Hauben: At one point it became clear that there
was beginning to be the Internet for economic pur-
poses in contradiction to the original Internet. That is
when Ronda and Michael received a lot of help toward
having appear a print edition of their book, Netizens*.
People said, we must defend the Internet from this new
pressure, which is coming as an economic pressure.
That was a great impetus and support for publishing the
book.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: We just talked about the
Chinese bloggers and you told me that they call them-
selves netizens.
Ronda Hauben: I asked a Chinese blogger, Zola
Zhou, who I had written to if he thought of himself as
a netizen. He said yes he did. Also, I have seen articles
about the Internet in China that actually say that the
netizens are a small set of the Chinese online population
but are those who have political purpose and activities.
That is in line with research that Michael originally did
in the 1990s with regard to the Internet and which
helped his coming to understand that such people online
around the world were netizens.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: You told me that there is
a great blogger community without censorship and also
political?
Ronda Hauben: No, there is censorship in China. But
there is a big blogger community and something that I
found in one of the articles that I read I thought was
very hopeful. It quoted a Chinese Internet user who said
that focusing too closely on Internet censorship over-
looks the expanded freedoms of expression made
possible in China by the Internet. I thought that seemed
correct. All I ever hear from the U.S. press is that in
China the Internet is censored. Such framing of the
Internet in China leads away from trying to look and
understand what is happening in China with the Inter-
net. It turns out that there is something very significant
developing and that has already developed, which
involves a lot of people who are being very active
trying to discuss the problems of China and trying to
see if they can be part of helping to solve those prob-
lems. That is the opposite of the sense you get from the
news media that talks about censorship all the time.
Jay Hauben: The chairwoman of the Internet Society
of China (ISC) Madame Hu Qiheng spoke to me about
this. She said that there are some very high Chinese
government officials who have blogs and they invite
anybody and everybody to comment. They answer as
many comments as they can and they are learning the
importance of blogging. She feels that they will be
supportive to the changes that are needed to make the
Internet even more extensive and more well spread in
China. She was optimistic that at least some in the
Page 2
Chinese government were seeing the importance of the
blogging activity and were learning how to be sup-
portive of it in some way. She wanted that to be known
to the world.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: I’m not sure whether I
understand. Do they hope if the people blog they will
learn to use the Internet?
Jay Hauben: No, she said the government officials
themselves had their own blogs and receive from the
population criticisms and complaints and other things
and they try to answer some. Those officials who have
entered into this back and forth exchange she feels will
learn from it and be supportive in the expanding
support for blogging in China.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: There are some examples
that netizens can sometimes get control over the
government. Could you give us one example?
Ronda Hauben: A question that I have is whether
netizens can have some impact on what government
does. Traditionally people like James Mill, writing in
England in the 1800s argued that if a people do not
have some oversight over government then govern-
ment can only be corrupt. That is why a society needs
processes and ways that people can discuss what
government is doing and watch government. I like to
use the word ‘watch dogging’ government. A piece of
my research is to see if there are ways that by having
the Internet and the ability to participate in the discus-
sion of issues netizens can have an impact on what
government is doing. I have found situations where
there is an impact on government.
One example I give is a blog that is called ‘China
Matters.’ Also there have been articles in ‘OhmyNews
International,’ which is the newspaper for which I
write. It is the English edition of the Korean Ohmy-
News, an online newspaper started in 2000.
The blog China Matters was able to post some
original documents from a case involving ‘The Six-
Party Talks Concerning the Korean Peninsula.’ The six
parties are North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Russia,
China and Japan. There was a breakthrough in the six-
party talks in September of 2005 leading to a signed
agreement toward denuclearizing the Korean penin-
sula.
Immediately after the breakthrough, the U.S.
Treasury Department announced that it was freezing
the assets of a bank called Banco Delta Asia in Macau,
China. Macau is a former Portuguese colony now a
part of China as a special administrative region. Banks
in Macau are under the Chinese banking authority and
supervision. The U.S. government was determining
what would happen with this bank in China. The Banco
Delta China had accounts containing $25 million of
North Korean funds. In response to the U.S. causing
these funds to be frozen, North Korea left the six-party
talks saying it would have nothing to do with the talks
until this matter got resolved.
In late January and the beginning of February
2007 there were negotiations between a U.S. govern-
ment official and a North Korean official in Berlin. An
agreement was reached that there would be an activity
to work out the Banco Delta Asia problem so that the
negotiations could resume in the six party talks.
But often with negotiations with the U.S. when-
ever there is an effort to try to straighten something out,
the implementation is not done in a way that is appro-
priate. In this case what was offered was that North
Korea could send someone to Macau to get the funds
but it could not use the international banking system to
transfer the funds which is the normal procedure.
U.S. Treasury Department officials went to China
for negotiations allegedly to end the financial problems
the U.S. had caused for North Korea. Officials from the
different countries were waiting to have this settled so
the negotiations could go on. Instead the U.S. Treasury
Department officials failed to allow the international
banking system to be used to be able to get the funds
back to North Korea.
On the China Matters blog, the blogger posted the
response of the Banco Delta Asia bank owner to these
activities. If you read the owner’s response you would
realize that the bank owner was never given any proof
of any illegal activity that had gone on with regard to
the funds in his bank, so there was no justification
presented for having frozen the funds of his bank. The
U.S. Treasury Department under the U.S. Patriot Act
was able to be the accuser and then the judge and jury,
to make the judgement and then have banks around the
world go along.
Jay Hauben: By posting these documents on his blog,
the China Matters blogger made it possible for journal-
ists to write about this aspect of the case. In one of his
blog posts he also put links to the U.S. government
hearing documents that helped to expose the rationale
and the intention of the Treasury Department.
Ronda Hauben: Based on what I had learned from
these blogs and then subsequent research that I had
been able to do using the Internet to verify what the
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blogger said, I wrote articles that appeared on Ohmy-
News International. I was subsequently contacted by
somebody from the Korean section of the Voice of
America, the official U.S. State Department world-
wide broadcasting service. She asked me about the
articles I had written. Essentially the Voice of America
reporter said that if this situation went on and the funds
were not returned, the Voice of America was going to
ask questions of the people I had identified who had
come up with this policy. It would ask them to explain
what they had done and to respond to the issues raised
by my articles.
Just at this time, however, a means was found to
get the funds back to North Korea via the international
banking system. All the other prior times, this had
failed.
It was very interesting that this was all happening
at the same time. It provides an example of how a
netizen media of blogs and online newspapers can take
up issues like this one, get under the surface to the
actual story and even have an influence on government
activity.
The China Matters blog is very interesting
because it says that there is U.S. policy about China
being made without the knowledge of the American
people. Therefore the American people do not under-
stand what is going on or what the issues are. They are
not given a chance to discuss and consider the policy.
Somehow these issues have to be opened up, they have
to be
made public so that there will be a good policy
with regard to what happens between the U.S. and
China.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: So the way was from the
netizens and the bloggers directly to the government
and not via mainstream media?
Ronda Hauben: In this situation there was one
mainstream press that was different from all the rest.
It was the McClatchy newspapers. McClatchy actually
had an article about the China Matters blog. It was
helpful for people to know about the blog. Here was
collaboration between the blogger and the mainstream
media but it was not that the rest of the mainstream
media picked up any of that or discussed it. Most of
the English speaking mainstream media just said that
North Korea is being very difficult and that it should
be allowing the six-party talks to go on instead of
making this trouble. McClatchy articles and my
articles on OhmyNews tried to understand why North
Korea was insisting that this money be returned using
the international banking system. In this situation there
was no need to influence what the rest of the main-
stream media said or did. Voice of America Korea and
the U.S. State Department responded to my articles in
OhmyNews directly.
Jay Hauben: In a presentation at a recent symposium,
Ronda spoke of a situation in China of child abduction
and labor abuse with little response by the local govern-
ment. The situation had been casually covered by local
media but was not solved. Only later when the story
appeared prominently in online discussion sites did it
spread. Then it was discussed by a large cross-section
of the population. Finally the government started to act.
In this case, the government had not been influenced by
coverage by the local mainstream media but was pushed
by the coverage of the netizen media.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: Ronda, you are a featured
writer for OhmyNews. I do not know whether there is
a German edition?
Ronda Hauben: No, there is none at this point.
OhmyNews has a Korean, a Japanese and an English
language international edition. There are German
writers who write in English for OhmyNews Inter-
national. There is however a German online magazine
which I am honored to write for in English, Telepolis,
which I would call an example of netizen journalism.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: Why do you think that
OhmyNews is a good thing?
Ronda Hauben: The Korean edition of OhmyNews
pioneered a concept which is very interesting. The
founder of OhmyNews , Mr. Oh Yeon-Ho, had worked
for an alternative monthly magazine, Mal, for almost 10
years. He saw that the mainstream media which is
basically conservative would cover a story and it would
be treated as news. On the other hand, he had uncovered
for Mal a very important story about a cover-up of a
massacre during the Korean War. His story, however,
got very little coverage in the mainstream media and his
coverage had no effect. About three years later, an
American reporter covered the same story and got a
Pulitzer Prize. Then the Korean mainstream media
picked up the story and gave substantial coverage to it.
Mr. Oh realized that it was not the importance of
an issue that determined if it would be news, it was
rather the importance given to the news organization
that determined that. He decided that Korea needed to
have a newspaper that could really challenge the
conservative dominance of the news. So he set out with
a small amount of money and a very small staff to try to
Page 4
influence how the press frames stories, how it deter-
mines what should be the stories that get covered. He
also decided to welcome people to write as citizen
reporters, to support the kinds of stories that were not
being told in the other newspapers. He ended up
welcoming in and opening up the newspaper so that a
broader set of the Korean population could contribute
articles to it and could help set what issues were
covered.
One example is the story of a soldier who had
been drafted into the South Korean army. He devel-
oped stomach cancer. The medical doctors for the
army misdiagnosed his illness as ulcers and hid the
evidence that it could be cancer. He did not find out
until the cancer was too far advanced for successful
treatment. He died shortly after his term in the army
was over. People who knew the soldier wrote the story
and contributed it to OhmyNews. The OhmyNews
staff reporters wrote follow up articles. There were a
number of articles, which led to really looking into
what the situation was.
Jay Hauben: There were 28 articles in 10 days. The
government first said that the incident was not signifi-
cant and that it happened all the time. But as more and
more articles were written and more and more people
were commenting and more and more people were
writing letters and more and more people were blam-
ing the government, the government changed its tune
and acknowledged that there was something seriously
wrong here. The government eventually said it would
put 10 billion won over a 5 year period to have a better
medical system in the armed services. That was the
result of this 10 days of constant articles. Everybody
knew someone in the army that might get sick and they
did not want that to happen. Every mother was upset.
It was a major national phenomenon from these 28
stories in 10 days.
Ronda Hauben: That is the kind of thing that
OhmyNews has done in the Korean edition. The
English language edition does not have regular staff
reporters the way the Korean edition does so is weaker
in what it can do.
A lot of the analysis of OhmyNews in the
journalism literature is only looking at the fact Ohmy-
News uses people as reporters who are not part of a
regular staff. This literature does not look at the whole
context of what ‘OhmyNews’ has attempted and de-
veloped.
But even the practice of the English edition is
worth looking at. There, the Banco Delta North
Korean story was covered in a number of articles. The
OhmyNews staff welcomed these articles. Not only did
it welcome articles on this topic with no similar cover-
age elsewhere, there was on the staff an editor who used
his experience and knowledge of North Korea to help
the journalists with their articles. He was a very good
person to have as an editor in the English language
edition, to be helpful toward covering that important
aspect of the Korean story. Unfortunately he is not an
editor any longer as they had to cut back on their
editors.
Journalism articles written about OhmyNews
rarely describe this aspect of OhmyNews, that reporters
need a supportive editorial staff that is knowledgeable
about the issues and willing to be really helpful to the
people doing the reporting so that they are not just off
on their own but they can have a discussion and a
communication with the people who work with the
paper itself.
Jay Hauben: As a minor footnote, Ronda has some
evidence that the U.S. embassy in South Korea reads
OhmyNews. She heard this from the U.S. ambassador
to South Korea and read it in a U.S. State Department
press release.
Ronda Hauben: The press release referred to one of
my articles and something that somebody else had
written.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: So netizen journalism is
something political?
Jay Hauben: From our point of view, yes.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: I’m asking this because
some German publishers/newspapers have another kind
of amateur journalism in mind. They think that journal-
ists are too expensive because they must be paid wages.
So they tell their readers to send them photos, videos
and texts and say that they will publish them. The
journalist union is not happy about this.
Ronda Hauben: The dean of the Columbia University
School of Journalism in New York City wrote an article
in The New Yorker magazine where he complained
about what he called ‘citizen journalism’ and referred
to OhmyNews. He wrote that it was “journalism with-
out journalists.” When you carefully read his article,
what it came down to, was that the business form of
journalism which is basically corporate-dominated in
the U.S. and which aims to make a lot of money – has
very little regard for the nature and quality of the
coverage that the newspapers are allowed to do. He was
Page 5
basically defending the business form of journalism in
the name of defending the journalists. He was not
defending the journalists because he was not critiquing
in any way what the journalists who work for these big
corporations must do to keep their jobs and the crisis
situation that journalism is in in the U.S. because of it.
What was interesting is that he knew about
OhmyNews and he is the dean of the Columbia
Journalism School and yet he presented nothing about
the important stories that OhmyNews has covered.
Instead he referred to one particular day and he listed
three stories covered by three different journalists on
this day and said this was just like the kind of journal-
ism you would have in a church publication or in a
club newsletter. It showed no effort on his part to
understand or seriously consider what OhmyNews has
made possible.
I critiqued what he did in an article in Ohmy-
News International. I also sent an email message to
him asking if he had seen a prior article I had done in
response to what a professor of the journalism school
had posted on ‘The Public Eye’ at CBSNews.com. My
prior article answered the same argument the dean was
now making. The ‘Public Eye’ even gave a link to
what I had written in OhmyNews.
The dean of the Columbia Journalism School
answered my email acknowledging that he had seen
my answer and still he made the same argument that
had been made prior rather than answering my critique
of the argument.
One of the things I pointed out in my critique
was that OhmyNews had helped make it possible for
the people of South Korea in 2002 to elect a candidate
to the presidency from outside of mainstream political
community. The dean mentioned nothing about that
when he trivialized what OhmyNews has done and
what the developments are. He presented none of the
actual situations and had instead a trivial discussion
about the issues. Yet he was allowed to publish his
article in The New Yorker. OhmyNews sent my re-
sponse to his article to The New Yorker. The magazine
would not publish it. It was interesting that this is
being promoted as the evaluation and the understand-
ing of netizen journalism. It is totally inaccurate.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: I’m afraid that some
professional journalism teachers in Germany think in
narrow-minded categories and only see the profes-
sional standard of journalism and their own journalists
but do not realize what the aim of journalism is any-
more – the political participation and the control of the
government.
Ronda Hauben: What I see is that netizen journalism
is getting back to the roots of why you need journalism
and journalists.
In the U.S. there is a first amendment because
there was an understanding, when it was formulated,
that you have to oversee government and that there has
to be discussion and articles and a press that looks at
what government is doing and that discusses it and that
that discussion is necessary among the population. Now
the Internet is making this possible. But the corporate-
dominated, profit-dominated form of journalism in the
U.S. will not allow that to happen even on the Internet.
Netizen journalism fortunately makes it possible.
What is of interest to me is that the Columbia
Journalism School claims that it supports ethics in
journalism. Yet here is a challenge, a challenge to treat
this seriously and to learn about it, to support it, to
encourage it and to help it to spread it. Instead, its dean
does the opposite.
Jay Hauben: Let me add two points. One is that
OhmyNews and Telepolis pay their contributors. So this
is not free journalism. This is a respect for journalistic
effort.
The second point is one Ronda is raising in her
current research. Not only is this new journalism getting
back to the roots and the purpose of journalism but also
it is doing something new and different. Is there some-
thing more than just being the real journalist taking over
because mainstream journalism is failing? There is an
intuition that the Internet is making possible a new
journalism. Perhaps the Chinese are speaking to that
when they ask, “Are we not being citizens and is it not
journalism when we communicate with each other
about the news as we see it and our understandings as
we have them?”
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: Do you think that netizen
journalism will affect the mainstream journalism or that
the mainstream journalism will learn from it?
Ronda Hauben: It turned out to be very surprising to
me that the reporter from Voice of America Korea asked
me some very serious and interesting questions. I would
have expected maybe a left-wing journalist would ask
these questions but not a mainstream or State Depart-
ment journalist.
Why was the Voice of America reporter asking me
these questions? Perhaps some people at the State
Department realized there was serious discussion going
Page 6
on online reflected by my articles but not on Voice of
America or in the mainstream media. And if there is
discussion among people about what is going on, then
that leads to the mainstream media having to learn
something or become irrelevant.
Maybe that is already happening because even
BBC is exploring ways of opening up its discussions
and processes. Maybe netizen journalism has already
had some impact and there is change happening even
though we do not see it yet.
Jay Hauben: Maybe also the distinction between
mainstream and other media is changing.
At least in South Korea, OhmyNews is already a
mainstream media. Three years after it was created,
OhmyNews was reported to be one of the most impor-
tant media in the whole society, judged to be among
the top six most influential media in South Korea.
It is not so clear that what we call the great media
or the mainstream media is left alone to have that title.
The position might be changing. The founder of
OhmyNews, Mr. Oh Yeon-Ho says he would like
OhmyNews to be setting the news agenda for the
Korean society. It is his objective that OhmyNews be
the main, mainstream media or at least he says 50
percent of what happens in the mainstream media
should be from the progressive point of view. There
should not be only the conservative mainstream media
but there should be a progressive mainstream media as
well and then those two together – that is what would
serve the society.
Ronda Hauben: Let me add that in South Korea
other online progressive publications have developed
and online conservative publications have developed.
The media situation is much more vibrant now than it
had been, I think this is as a result of what Mr. Oh
Yeon-Ho has achieved.
Dr. Gabriele Hooffacker: When you look into the
future and imagine what journalism and netizen
journalism will be like in 10 years? What are your
expectations? What do you hope and what do you
think?
Ronda Hauben: It is an interesting challenge that is
being put to us. There is a lot of support from govern-
ments and others toward making big money off of the
Internet. But meanwhile for example, the U.S. society
is in deep trouble because of the ability of government
to do things without listening to the people or consid-
ering what the people’s desires are. In my opinion
netizen journalism holds out the hope and the promise
that there can be a means for the citizens and the
netizens to have more of a way of having what is done
by government be something that is a benefit to the
society instead of harmful. The form this will take is not
clear. But one of the things that Michael wrote in 1992-
1993 was that the net bestows the power of the reporter
on the netizens. He saw that that was already happening
then. And we see Telepolis which last year celebrated
its 10
th
anniversary and which unfortunately we did not
get to talk about now but which has pioneered a form of
online and netizen journalism that really is substantial
and which has achieved some very important things.
There is OhmyNews in South Korea and there are the
Chinese bloggers and people posting to the forums.
Even in the U.S. some important news forums and
blogs have developed.
Jay Hauben: There are also the people’s journalists in
Nepal who took up to tell the story to the world about
the struggle against the king’s dictatorial powers.
Ronda Hauben: They were able to do that because of
OhmyNews International.
I just looked at those few countries for a con-
ference presentation I gave in Potsdam. I did not look at
all the other places where things are developing. It turns
out that online there is a very vibrant environment.
Something is developing and that is a great challenge to
people interested in this, to look at it seriously and try
to see, firstly what is developing and secondly, is there
a way to give it support and to figure out if there is way
of beginning to have some conferences for people to get
together and have serious papers about what is happen-
ing and some serious discussion toward the question,
can we give each other help for example, to start
something like ‘OhmyNews’ or ‘Telepolis’ in America
or similar things elsewhere. I feel that something will
turn up. It is exciting that so much is in fact going on.
Note
*Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet,
Michael Hauben and Ronda Hauben, Wiley IEEE Computer
Society Press, Los Alamitos, 1997, ISBN: 978-0-8186-7706-9. en
Page 7
[Editor’s Note: The following paper was prepared for
the International Summit on Reconstruction of
Journalism conference held at the United Nations New
York Headquarters on May 1-3, 2014.]
Netizen Reporting and Media
Criticism Pressure for a New
Journalism
The South China Tiger,
Anti-CNN and the
Wenchuan Earthquake
by Jay Hauben
I can say free media works the same way
as less-free media. So what’s most impor-
tant? The people I’d say . If people
dare to doubt, dare to think own (sic) their
own, do not take whatever comes to them,
then we’ll have a clear mind, not easily be
fooled. kylin
I. – General Background: Media in Crisis
The dominant media in China and in the U.S. are
targets of a common serious criticism. Scholars point
out that the narratives that they contain are not the
news but rather the picture painted under the influence
of the governments and leading establishments in the
respective countries (e.g., Bennett, Lawrence, &
Livingston, 2007; Li, 2003). The Chinese media, at
least until recently, has been described as a party or
propaganda press taking as its purpose to portray and
explain the viewpoints of the leadership and party of
China and to praise socialist development and cast a
negative light on western capitalism. In the U.S., the
closeness and reliance of the mainstream political
media like the NY Times and the Washington Post on
government-provided information and influence and
corporate ownership results in a portrayal of the world
in such a way as to support and give credence to the
establishment’s framing of events and realities. It is
not just at the U.S. mainstream political media but also
at the other major international media like CNN, BBC
and Deutsche Welle that this criticism is aimed.
Similar to the Chinese media, a purpose of the U.S.
and major international media has been to show the
superiority of market capitalism and freedom over
socialism and communism.
The critics ask, whose media are these? They
point out these media fail in any obligation to oversee
or supervise their respective governments. The U.S.
media is in crisis. The level of public confidence sug-
gests a growing rejection especially after its coverage
giving credence to the false story that there were
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, justifying an
invasion and occupation. The established media in
China is also in crisis. Its traditional state and party
support purpose cannot compete with the liveliness and
breadth of Internet discussion and online investigative
journalism.
In this paper I will argue that netizen activity in
China has served as a pressure for a reexamination and
recasting of journalist practice. Netizens in China have
taken many small events and made them into national
discussions and calls for social or political change. One
study is the case of the South China Tiger. It will show
how the official announcement in 2007 of the sighting
of a rare tiger was turned into an exposure of journalis-
tic weakness and official misconduct. Another case
study is of the anti-cnn website. It will show the netizen
exposure of serious malpractice of the international
media reporting on the March 2008 Lhasa violence.
That exposure by netizens cast serious doubt about the
positive expectation some in China had for the interna-
tional media. Having the concrete evidence of the
malfeasance of international media strengthened the
anti-cnn netizens to create an online forum where media
events were analyzed from many angles in an interna-
tional participatory process that lasted for at least one
year. The study of netizen criticism of Chinese media
coverage of the May 2008 Wenchuan (Sichuan) Earth-
quake will document failures of prominent Chinese
journalists and argue the value and impact of the media
watchdog function netizens in China are increasingly
playing. Journalism, at least in China, has begun to
engage and benefit from this broadening of citizen
participation in its domain.
II. – People in China as Media Critics
At least as far back as the work of Paul Lazarsfeld
and others in the 1940s, there have been empirical
studies and theoretical analyses suggesting that media
audiences are not passive receptacles for media mes-
sages. More recently, Haiqing Yu (2009, p. 9) wrote,
“Empirical research in active audience studies has
demonstrated that people are not easily fooled and
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manipulated by media producers.” China is a good
example. “Like media audiences everywhere, Chinese
readers, listeners, and viewers are active interpreters of
content, not passive dupes. Over time, they have
learned to discern overtones, subtexts, and what is not
said along with what is.” (Polumbaum, 2001, p. 270)
Active audience theory argues that people learn
to be active decoders of official messages. Many
Chinese people have been and are critical readers of
the state and party media. As an illustration, the story
is told that when in January 1976, Zhou Enlai, a leader
respected by many Chinese people at the time died,
central leadership seeking to delay the announcement
of that news reported that Zhou’s condition was critical
but still his doctors held out hope for his recovery.
Most ordinary people interpreted these reports to mean
Premier Zhou was dead (Naduvath, 2009, p. 116).
Also, mass media and communications in China “have
never operated as the well-oiled totalitarian machine
envisioned by cold warriors.”(Polumbaum, 2001, p.
270) Artists, intellectuals, scholars, and dissidents have
always more or less provided a broader spectrum than
the dominant hegemonic culture sought by the party
and state.
But many people in China have had the expecta-
tion that the mainstream international media would be
more credible. The emergence of the Internet and the
netizens however has made it possible for ordinary
people to share their suspicions about Chinese official
media publically and to turn their critical media sense
onto the faults of the international media like BBC,
CNN, Deutsche Welle, Reuters, etc. The Internet is
making possible a concrete exposure by netizens of the
character and faults of both the main Chinese media
and the previously respected international media.
III. – Who are the Netizens?
Internet adoption in China rapidly expanded
since 1995. Such expansion continues but at a slower
pace. It was reported in January 2014 by the China
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) that
there are more than 618 million Internet users in
China. In comparison, the U.S. was reported to have
260 million users. Approximately 80% or over 500
million Chinese net users access the Internet on mobile
devices. Many users in China participate in online
forums, some of whom also contribute to the over 280
million Chinese language microblogs, known as
Weibo. CNNIC reports that a smaller set of net users
are active contributors to forum and chat room discus-
sions. Among the users who actively contribute online,
I would locate net users who are “netizens,” who prac-
tice some form of netizenship, that is, they defend the
Internet and contribute actively to it to affect social and
political change.
Netizen as a concept of scholarly interest was first
analyzed in the research of Michael Hauben at Colum-
bia University starting in 1992. Hauben had participated
in the mid and late 1980s on local hobbyist run bulletin
board systems (BBSs) and in global Usenet news-
groups. He writes that he became aware of “a new
social institution, an electronic commons developing.”
1
(Hauben & Hauben, 1997, p. ix) He undertook research
to explore how and why these communications forums
served as an electronic commons. He posted questions
on newsgroups, mailing lists and portals and found a
very high level “of mutual respect and sharing of
research and ideas fostering a sense of community and
participation.” Hauben found social and political issues
being discussed with seriousness in this online com-
munity which the conventional media and his school
courses rarely if ever covered or covered only from a
narrow angle.
Hauben documented in the book, Netizens: On the
History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet (Hauben
& Hauben, 1997) which he co-authored with Ronda
Hauben that he found in this community of net users
many for whom their self-identity was generated by
their online participation. Hauben found that there were
people online who actively use and take up to defend
public communication. They oppose censorship and
disruptive online behavior. He recognized this ident-
ification and behavior as a form of network citizenship.
He contracted “net.citizen,” the name on forums in the
1990s for such people, into “netizen” to express the new
online non-geographically based social identity and net
citizenship he attributed to these people.
As the Internet spread in the mid and late 1990s
around the world so did the online self-identity and
practice of netizenship. Two uses of the word netizen
emerged. Especially in analyzing the net in China, it is
necessary to distinguish among all net users (wang min
meaning network people in Chinese) and those users
who participate constructively concerning social and
political issues in forums and chat rooms or on their
blogs and microblogs.
2
This second category is the user
who comes online for public rather than simply for
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personal and entertainment purposes. They act as cit-
izens of the net “wang luo gong min meaning ‘network
citizens’ in Chinese” and are the netizens of this
article. The distinction must be emphasized because
the Chinese characters for network person wang min
are very often translated into English as “netizen.”
I strictly adopt the second usage. Not all net users
are netizens. My usage is similar to that of Haiqing Yu
who writes, “I use ‘netizen’ in a narrow sense to mean
‘Net plus citizen’ or ‘citizen on the net.’ Netizens are
those who use the Internet as a venue for exercising
citizenship through rational public debates on social
and political issues of common concern.” (Yu, 2004,
p. 304)
I add, however, that netizens are not only ‘citi-
zens on the net’ but also ‘citizens of the net’ signifying
those who actively contribute to the development and
defense of the net as a global communications plat-
form (Hauben & Hauben, 1997, pp. ix-x).
In the examples and discussion to follow, it is
important to recognize that the Internet is basically
global. Geographic and political boundaries on the net
are weaker than in the physical world. There are ap-
proximately 34 million Chinese speaking people living
outside of mainland China including in Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore. There are perhaps at anyone
time 380,000 Chinese students studying aboard.
3
For
example, in 2014 there are approximately 235,000 stu-
dents from China studying temporarily in the U.S.
Many Chinese speaking people outside of China take
a keen interest in social and political issues in China.
Those online often participate in forums, chat rooms
and blogs hosted on servers in China and outside.
Chinese speaking netizens outside China gain from the
richness and vibrancy of the mainland netizen com-
munity and add viewpoints, media clips and infor-
mation which further enrich the information envi-
ronment and discussions in which netizens in China
participate. Efforts at what the government and party
of China call supervision and netizens call censorship
have only a limited effect, in part because of the bord-
erless essence of the Internet. In the examples that
follow it is often likely but difficult to tell whether
netizens from outside China have participated.
Information and communication technology
(ICT), for at least the last 20 or 25 years, has been
officially promoted as one of the most important
driving forces of China’s economic development. The
Chinese government and party actively support the
spread of the Internet and its active use by people
within China. Tai Zixue (2006) reports, “The Chinese
government has displayed an unusual level of enthu-
siasm in embracing the Internet since the mid-1990s
by investing heavily in the infrastructure and in promot-
ing Internet use among its government agencies,
businesses, and citizens.” Another scholar commented,
“In China, if the government does not push, hardly
anything grows so quickly.” (Guo, 2006) When report-
ing about the Internet by media outside of China, the
predominant stress of censorship in China misses this
level of support and adoption. The long-standing
governance philosophy and practice of “benevolent”
supervision and guidance in all aspects of Chinese
society are still prevalent and results in the censorship
emphasized by that media.
4
But official emphasis on
“reform and opening” especially an economic market
oriented development is changing the nature of such
supervision and guidance. The result is the rapid spread
of the Internet and its active use (averaging for net users
in China in 2014 almost three hours per day) supported
by the highest government and party officials. Broad-
band and mobile access was already available to about
40% of the population by the beginning of 2014.
Although still disproportionately in the urban areas and
with a little over 50% of the people of China without
Internet access, the level, speed of adoption and the
active participation by net users is significant. A foreign
journalist working in Beijing commented that users in
China “are usually too busy enjoying the Internet they
have to lament the Internet they do not have.” And, as
the examples which follow show, many of them are
using it as netizen journalists with the purpose of social
and political improvement.
IV. – Case Studies
China became a particular media focus during the
dramatic events leading up to and surrounding the 2008
Summer Olympics in Beijing. This paper however will
start with an example from 2007 when netizens uncov-
ered fraud and with the eventual help of the mainstream
media achieved official recognition of the fraud and
punishment of the perpetrators and covers up.
South China Tiger (2007)
Although there have been occasional reports in
China that signs of the South China tiger have been
seen or roars heard, the species has been thought to be
Page 10
extinct in the wild. There had been no confirmed sight-
ing since 1986. However on Oct. 12, 2007 in a press
conference, the Forestry Department of Shaanxi
Province in northwest China announced a verified
sighting. A South China tiger, the Department spokes-
person claimed, was photographed by a farmer with
optical and digital cameras on Oct. 3. One photo was
released. The spokesperson also said that experts had
confirmed that the 40 digital and 31 film photographs
were authentic. The announcement was carried in local
and a few national media. On Oct 13, China Central
Television, CCTV, the predominant state television
broadcaster in China briefly reported about the official
announcement in its Joint News Broadcast: “Recently,
the rare wild South China has been found in Shaanxi
after going out of sight for more than twenty years. A
peasant in Ankong town, Ping county took a clear
photograph of a wild South China tiger near a cliff.
Experts have determined the photograph to be authen-
tic.” (EastSouthWestNorth, 2007)
But already in the afternoon of Oct 12, the one
released digital photo had been posted along with the
news release on a forum frequented by photographers
and users of the Photoshop software application. Six
hours later, a forum member raised suspicion that the
photograph seemed to have been composed using
Photoshop. The photo was reposted on other forums
discussing photo presentation technologies. Soon a
wave of doubt spread with online contributors citing
irregular effects of illumination and focus, unreal fur
color, lack of three dimensional effect, etc. Some
netizens speculated that the digital photo may have
been taken from a cardboard enlargement placed in the
bushes to be photographed. The next day a self-de-
scribed Photoshop expert argued that based on the size
of the leaves in the released photo, if authentic, the
actual size of the tiger would be near that of a rat.
Comments were reposted and other online com-
munities became involved in the dispute. Various hy-
potheses were proposed but there was near unanimous
conviction, despite the official announcement of au-
thenticity and the reports in the press accepting the
accuracy of the official announcement, the photo was
faked. National and international media picked up and
welcomed the story of the sighting but also began to
include mention of netizen skepticism. Experts an-
swered some of the posts agreeing or disagreeing about
the authenticity of the photos. The farmer reasserted
that he had risked his life to photograph the tiger and
that is photos were genuine. Shaanxi Province officials
defended the announcement. Well-known wildlife pho-
tographers joined the online debate.
The demand arose online for more expert analysis
of all the photos and an independent investigation of the
farmer’s claim. The motive of the Forestry Department
was questioned. Why did it not take more time to verify
the photos? Was it hoping for increased tourism or new
money for a wild life preserve? The online discussion
questioned even more the motives of the authorities
than that of the farmer who also received reward money
for the photos. One netizen posted on the Tianya Forum
under the name First Impression 1. The post was a
response to the CCTV broadcast welcoming the sight-
ing and declaring it authentic. The netizen used Photo-
shop to make an animation of two photos that appeared
online to show they had “identical facial features,
outlines, stripes and height.” He or she wrote, “At first
sight, this photograph could not be more fake. The
lighting, the expressions, the color, the environment
how can this pass through the examination by experts
on the South China wild tiger as well as photography
experts? Did they make the examination with eyes
shut?” (EastSouthWestNorth, 2007). On Fu Jianfeng’s
bob.html, Oct. 20, 2007), it was reported that the
Shaanxi “Animal Protection Bureau director Wang
Wanyun told the media: ‘I am willing to guarantee
the authenticity of this photograph with my head.’” The
blogger also reported that a Chinese Academy of
Science plant researcher, Fu Dezhi posted on the
Yuanmu Shanchuan Forum that the leaves in the photos
were either oak or hazelnut which are about 3 cm in
size. In all photos one of the leaves is covering the
tiger’s forehead so the tiger in the photo must be part of
a cropped photograph about 8 inches square. Fu
Jiangfeng ended his blog writing “… people don’t need
their heads, they don’t need to swear, they only need to
know the truth.”
On Nov 15, a netizen posted that he had found the
original picture that was used to fake the South China
tiger sighting. He had discovered a lunar new years
calendar for 2001 which had all the features of the
photos being debated. The Shaanxi authorities re-
sponded that they would continue the investigation.
Eight months later, they tried to end the paper tiger
saga, as it was called on the net, by announcing the
photos were fake. The farmer was arrested on charges
of fraud and 13 provincial officials were dismissed or
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disciplined for their role in the episode. But, netizen
comments which followed mostly complained about
official sluggishness.
Despite the efforts of the “pro-tiger” officials and
the experts they found to defend the authenticity of the
sighting, many netizens had kept up the exposure of
fraud. As in the Hwang Woo-suk case in South Korea
where netizens challenged the officially supported
stem cell scientist, Chinese netizens were willing to
challenge the photos as fake even when the provincial
authorities and the mainstream media initially backed
their authenticity. In the end the search for the truth
prevailed.
Netizen attention to detail in photographs was
repeated when media reports appeared especially in
North America and Europe about the violence in Tibet
in March 2008.
Anti-cnn (2008)
On March 14, 2008, Tibetan demonstrators in
Lhasa the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region in
China turned violent. A Canadian tourist and the few
foreign journalists who witnessed the situation put on-
line photos, videos and descriptions documenting the
deadly violence of the rioters against citizens and pro-
perty (Al Jezeera, 2008; cali2882, 2008; Kadfly,
2008). That was even before the official Chinese
media started to report it. The mainstream media in
China framed the story as violence against Han and
Muslim Chinese fomented by the Tibetan government
in exile. Much of the mainstream international media
like BBC, VOA, and CNN framed the violence as the
result of discriminatory Chinese rule and Chinese
police brutality. (For an exception see Jill Drew, “Eye-
witnesses Recount Terrifying Day in Tibet,” Washing-
ton Post Foreign Service, Thursday, March 27, 2008,
online at:
/content/article/2008/03/26 /AR2008032603275.html.)
Wide anger was expressed by many Chinese
aboard when they discovered that some of the media in
the U.S., Germany, and the U.K., were using photos
and videos from clashes between police and pro-
Tibetan independence protestors in Nepal and India to
support that media’s claim of violence by Chinese
police. A digital slide show appeared online (dionysos-
615, 2008) containing an annotated presentation of 11
photos from CNN, Der Spiegel, the Washington Post,
N24 German TV, BBC, Fox News, Bild, etc. The
photos were mislabeled and in other ways inappropriate
for the articles with which they appeared. The photos
included screen shots from German TV stations that
consistently labels Nepalese police as Chinese. A BBC
photo showed an ambulance using it to illustrate a
“heavy military presence.” A photo used by CNN to
show Chinese military violence was carefully cropped
to hide rioters throwing rocks at a Chinese military
vehicle. The slide show ended with a slide which read,
“These western media should be shamed for the report-
ing they’ve made purposely and whoever in the world,
intending to slander Chinese people to promote territo-
rial integrity of China will be doomed to failure.” The
slide show spread widely in cyberspace in and outside
China.
Within a few days of the appearance of the
inaccurate and misleading reporting, Rau Jin a recent
university graduate launched the anti-cnn website
(http://www.anti-cnn.com). He explained that after
netizen anger and discussion he wanted to “speak out
our thoughts and let the westerners learn about the
truth.”
5
The top page of anti-cnn featured articles,
videos and photos documenting some of the alleged
distortions in the coverage of the Tibet events. The
website also had forum sections first in Chinese then
also in English. The organizers set as the goal of anti-
cnn to overcome media bias in the West by fostering
communication between Chinese netizens and netizens
outside of China so that the people of the world and of
China could have accurate knowledge about each other.
They wrote on their website, “We are not against the
western media, but against the lies and fabricated
stories in the media.” anti-cnn was chosen as the site
name, one of the organizers said, “because CNN is the
media superpower. It can do great damage so it must be
watched and challenged when it is wrong.”
6
But the site
was not limited to countering errors in the reporting of
CNN. It invited submissions that documented bias or
countered misrepresentations of China in the global
media.
Rau received hundreds of offers of help finding
examples of media distortions. He gathered a team of
40 volunteers to monitor the submissions for fact-
ualness and to limit emotional threads. Posts that were
name calling or attacks on individuals or groups were to
be deleted. Emotional posts were not to be allowed
follow-up comments. Forum discussions were started
on “Western Media Bias,” “The Facts of Tibet” and
“Modern China.” In the first five days the site attracted
Page 12
200,000 visits many from outside of China. Over time
serious threads contained debates between Han Chi-
nese and both Westerners and Tibetan and Uyghur
Chinese trying to show each other who they were and
where they differ or where they agree.
On anti-cnn, in answer to the exposure of the
Western media practice, many visitors from outside
China posted their criticism of Chinese government
media censorship. In their responses to such criticism,
some Chinese acknowledged such censorship but
argued it was easy to circumnavigate, that all societies
have their systems of bias or censorship and that net-
izens everywhere must dare to think for themselves
and get information from many sources. One netizen
with the alias kylin wrote:
I can say free media works the same way
as less-free media. So what’s most impor-
tant? The people I’d say. If people
dare to doubt, dare to think own (sic) their
own, do not take whatever comes to them,
then we’ll have a clear mind, not easily be
fooled. I can say, if such people exist, then
should be Chinese … the least likely to be
brainwashed, when have suffered from all
those incidents, cultural revolution, plus a
whole long history with all kinds of tricks.
Some analysis of anti-cnn in the Western media
criticized it as a form of nationalism (e.g., Kuhn, 2008)
or of being somehow connected with the Chinese
government. The Chinese government and anti-cnn
organizers deny any connection with each other and no
verifiable evidence of such a connection has been
produced. There are often expressions of nationalist
emotions in Chinese cyberspace, for example calls for
boycotting Japanese and French products. After the
riot in Lhasa, the Chinese government and media
blamed the Dalai Lama and “splitists.” There was an
upsurge of nationalist defense of China including on
anti-cnn. The moderators on anti-cnn and netizens in
general however are opponents of nationalism arguing
that it is a form of emotionalism and needs to be
countered by rational discourse and the presentation of
facts and an airing of all opinions. The moderators
often answered Chinese nationalists with admonitions
to “calm down and present facts.” While nationalist
sentiment and love of country and anger appeared
often on the anti-cnn forums, the opportunity for a
dialogue across national and ethnic barriers is an
expression of the internationalism characteristic of
netizens.
Chinese citizens in general know that the main-
stream Chinese media have a long history as a con-
trolled and propaganda press. Since the 1990s, there has
been a commercialization of that media and more
openness but still much of the national media has strong
remnants from its past. On the other hand the main-
stream international media had been widely assumed in
China as a more reliable source of information about
some events such as SARS and for alternative view-
points. The widespread distribution by netizens like Rau
Jin of exposure of distortions and bias in major exam-
ples of the international mainstream media called into
question for many Chinese people their positive expec-
tation about that media. It also attracted the attention of
others who questioned whether the so called Western
mainstream media is any less a propaganda or political
media than the Chinese mainstream media. After
western media framing of the war in the country of
Georgia in August 2008 as the fault of Russia, a Rus-
sian netizen started a thread on anti-cnn suggesting a
Russian-Chinese alliance. He wrote:
Russian problems with the Western media
are identical to Chinese problems . What
[do] we need to do so that their publications
about countries like China and Russia will
be written in a fair tone rather than being
politically motivated? I would be most
happy to hear your opinion on these matters.
Over its first year, the anti-cnn website had be-
come a significant news portal. After a year, there was
a debate to determine its future. Some of the founders
left. The site continued with separate forum sections in
Chinese and English but became less focused than it
was before on exposing media bias. As a continuation
of anti-cnn, the April Media Group was founded by Rau
Jin. April Media sponsored Chinese and English lan-
guage websites both known as M4. The two sites
carried news reports and comments not usually found
elsewhere in Chinese media and exposures of the
ongoing media fabrications, for example about alleged
crimes of the government of Syria.
Wenchuan Earthquake (2008)
On May 12, 2008 at 14:28 in the afternoon local
time a massive earthquake struck in south-central
China. The epicenter of the earthquake was in rural
Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province and measured 8.0
Page 13
on the Richter Scale. The world outside of the quake
zone began to learn of the earthquake one minute later,
at 14:29, when a post on the “Tianya Mixed Talk”
forum read, “Very Urgent!!!! Where has a massive
earthquake occurred???By 14:30 a video was posted
on YouKu and by 14:35 a headline on the Baidu
bulletin board reported, “Earthquake happens in
Sichuan region.” From then on posts escalated. Tianya
is the most popular forum website and had at the time
on average over 200,000 simultaneous visitors. Like-
wise YouKu, the most popular video website at the
time, and Baidu, the most popular search engine, had
tens of thousands of users online when the Wenchuan
disaster first hit. Professional news reports began to
appear at 14:46 with a dispatch by the official online
site Xinhuanet (Nip, 2009, p. 98).
Online communication was interrupted in the
epicenter. But some witnesses and survivors were able
to send out messages using mobile phones which the
recipients put online. Also, survivors who were able to
walk or drive out of the disaster area brought with then
photographs and videos they took using their phones or
cameras. These began to appear online and were
picked up by off line media and by CCTV. With roads
destroyed and all landline telephone service down to
and in the hardest hit villages, material posted by
netizens gave the mainstream media some of the
stories and all of the graphics for its reports.
Great concern was felt and voiced throughout
China and the rest of the world for the victims of the
earthquake. There was a hunger for news. Netizens
started a discussion thread on “Tianya Mixed-Talk” for
contributions of casualty information and estimates. As
the thread was updated it was visited almost one
million times in the first nine hours after the quake
first hit.
Netizens provided information from the disaster
zone, expressed their sympathy and emotions, started
to organize grassroots relief efforts, organized missing
person lists and in many ways contributed online in the
relief and rescue effort. Some netizens also raised
serious questions. A netizen posted on the Tianya
Mixed Talk forum a few hours after the quake “Some
questions and reflections about this quake.” He ques-
tioned why there was no early warning of the coming
of such a major quake. Netizens searched for and
found evidence that there were early warnings which
the Seismology Bureau ignored. A netizen on Tianya
left one remark, “Before May 12, some strange nature
phenomena predicting earthquakes appeared in earth-
quake zone and some local persons worried about earth-
quakes coming, but local officials and forecast agencies
declared that the rumor of earthquake was baseless and
people need not worry.”(Xu, 2008) Mainstream journal-
ists joined in the pursuit of this story questioning some
of the relevant officials. Netizens also called attention
to the number of schools which collapsed and ques-
tioned whether the problem was systemic.
The earthquake was the main news event for
many days. Government officials allowed journalists
unprecedented access to the disaster zone. The Internet
and the off-line media were watched intently for news
and understanding of the disaster and the unfolding
rescue effort. Criticism began to appear online of the
behavior and reporting of some of the professional
journalists, especially those seeming to be insensitive to
the victims and survivors. One well known anchor
person from the Phoenix TV station in Hong Kong,
Chen Luyu, appeared at a destroyed village with heavy
makeup, wearing designer sunglasses and carrying a
parasol. One netizen commented:
Phoenix Chen Luyu, you dressed like that
kind of a show at the ruins . I put many
viewers to see your ugly performance the
majority of the audience spurned your be-
havior, you are a very individual phenom-
enon, 99% of people really want to help the
suffering compatriots, not to see a show.
7
(Reese & Jai, 2009, p. 227; Tianya, 2008)
Many other netizens showed similar disdain
toward Chen Luyu and other reporters who seemed
frivolous or insensitive. Reese and Dai (2009, p. 227)
reported that “[t]he same anger emerged online toward
journalists when they forced busy rescuers and seri-
ously injured or dying victims to be interviewed, when
they took up seats in rescue helicopters, when they
presented the tragedy of the earthquake with bloody and
graphic pictures and descriptions, or when they shot
flash photos of victims faces without regard for the
trauma the bright lights would inflict on those who had
spent so much time trapped under the ruins in dark-
ness.”
Netizen criticism was also aimed at CCTV’s
coverage of the disaster and rescue effort. The awk-
wardness and insensitivity of some of its coverage was
not only blamed on the reporters but also on the media
organization itself. A well read blogger and former
CCTV reporter, Shi Feike, suggested that CCTV’s con-
Page 14
trol over its reporters and infrequent live coverage of
major disasters like the earthquake accounted for the
failures of some of its earthquake rescue reporting
8
(Shi, 2008).
During the time of the earthquake and rescue
efforts, activities of the netizens became part of the
news covered by the mainstream media. But also,
netizen criticism of some well-known journalists and
of, for example, CCTV was widely circulated online.
As a result, respect for the netizens throughout China
was enhanced. One observer commented, “I am deeply
touched by the patriotism and humanism shown in the
activities of our netizens.” Another wrote, “This
catastrophic disaster aroused the civil conscience and
responsibility of Chinese, and showed the power of
Chinese netizens.”
V. – Discussion
The Three Cases
Professional or mainstream journalists in the
three cases above required the collaboration of
netizens and ordinary citizens for their coverage. It
was difficult for the former to get to rural Wenchuan
after the earthquake or to have the expertise and
critical attitude of the online photographer community.
Only after netizens around the world exposed the
media fabrications about the Lhasa riots was the
mainstream media in China able to report about them
by reporting about the anti-cnn website. But the
mainstream media have more access to economic and
official resources and TV and newspapers are still
popular in China. Media scholars looking at China see
an emerging netizen-journalist collaboration. But
besides collaboration, netizens are playing the role of
media critics.
The special significance of anti-cnn was that
netizens took up the important task of media watch-
dog, but especially a watchdog over the most powerful
media like CNN and BBC. Some scholars are calling
such media practice the “Fifth Estate” because the
watchdog is over the media itself. In an article, “The
Computer as a Democratizer,” Michael Hauben argued
for the crucial role in a society of a watchdog press
(Hauben & Hauben, 1997, pp. 315-320). In every so-
ciety, major sectors of the media echo and support the
current holders of power either internally or in the
world. Now, with the netizens, there is an emerging
media and journalism which tries to serve society by
watching and criticizing the abuses of those with
power and the media which serves them. Anti-cnn
provided for the whole world an alternative to the
media which was distorting the truth about the Lhasa
riot. The net users who launched anti-cnn took for
themselves a public and international mission, using the
net to watch critically the main international media.
They took up to address journalism via exposures and
discussion and debate. In the process they expanded the
practice of journalism.
Similarly, at the time of the Wenchuan earth-
quake, netizens created a space for the public to ex-
amine and discuss journalistic operation not only at the
individual level, but also at the organizational level
(Reese & Jai, 2009, p. 228). Holding professional
journalists to their own high standards was a service to
the profession. Discussing the practice of CCTV, the
predominant state television broadcaster in China,
added to netizen supervision of the official media and
encouraged public scrutiny and criticism of even the
official media.
Context
In 2003 in China, there were numerous large scale
netizen commotions and almost 58,000 officially
acknowledged off line social and political ‘mass inci-
dents.’ In September 2004, the Fourth Session of the
Sixteenth Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
responded. The long standing policy orientation ‘Effi-
ciency First’ was withdrawn. It had been criticized by
netizens who in the course of their uprisings traced the
specific problem to this systemic root. Netizens argued
that ‘efficiency first’ meant putting business success
before the welfare of the great majority of the people.
The Central Committee replaced ‘Efficiency First’ with
the policy orientation ‘Harmonious Society’. This con-
ceptual framework seemed to be aimed at moving the
focus in China away from only economic efficiency and
toward a societal balance. One practice advised for the
implementation of the harmonious society was to foster
“interest expression” ( Li Yi Biao Da) by accommodat-
ing more ordinary citizens’ voices in the public sphere
(Lei, 2012, p. 135).
Some of the party and state support for netizen
activity stems from this policy decision to encourage
interest expression. So also does the increasing incorp-
oration of reporting about netizen activity and netizen
concerns in the mainstream media and parallel reporting
by netizens and professional journalists of events which
arouse netizen concern. The dominant stress of censor-
Page 15
ship reported by media outside of China hides this
level of support and the rapidly expanding new use for
social and political reporting, discussion and debate in
China.
Every year since 2003, there has been dozens of
national netizen uprisings and commotions around
social and political issues, sometimes exposing fraud
or corruption or questioning government actions or
explanations, sometimes discussing foreign events like
disruption of the Olympic touch relay, sometimes
exposing failures of the press or of star journalists.
They have become a normal aspect of Chinese society.
Netizen Effect on Journalism in China
Often ahead of the mainstream media, netizen
uprisings set the news agenda. Local events are given
by netizen activity national or international attention.
In alliance with more independent journalists and
editors, online issues can spread to the main stream
national media and to the whole Chinese people.
Netizen critical framing of issues often differs from
government and mainstream media framing. When
popular opinion is formed about these issues it often
follows the netizen rather than the government or
mainstream media framing. Also, the fight around
censorship is creative and spirited not only by netizens.
When journalists have stories rejected they sometimes
put the stories online, often in their own blogs or
microblogs (called J-Blogs). More and more the stories
get out despite the imposed restrictions. Even though
there is still a significant level of official media super-
vision and control, a growing body of critical reporting
is occurring often encouraged by or encouraging
netizen excitement.
Some journalists come online for their leads and
to find contacts to interview. Some are emboldened by
netizen exposures and numbers to dig deeper and take
on more controversial topics. The result is the media
environment in China is livelier than in societies with
less netizen activity even if those societies have less
media supervision and guidance.
Setting the agenda, framing issues, arousing pub-
lic opinion and supervising the media are all aspects of
political power in modern society. That the netizens in
China are able to play these roles, often with the help
of more mainstream journalists and editors suggests a
political dynamism in Chinese society that is denied by
critics of China. Netizens in China are developing into
a force contributing to motion of Chinese society in the
direction of greater citizen participation. Those journal-
ists who ally with the netizens are helping a new
journalism to emerge, a netizen journalism in China but
also globally.
Appendix: Two Case Studies
Case 1: The Death of Sun Zhigang
9
(2003)
To help control migration of rural people to the cities, the
Chinese government had in place for more than 20 years, “Mea-
sures for Internment and Deportation of Urban Vagrants.”
10
On March 17, 2003, a college graduate from the city of
Wuhan working away from home in the city of Guangzhou was
stopped for an identity check. He was detained under these meas-
ures because he did not have the temporary residence card he was
asked to show. In the police station he contacted two friends who
came quickly to vouch for him and his employed status. The police
would not release him. Three days later his friends tried to contact
him and were notified that he died from a heart attack. After
learning of Mr. Sun’s death, his relatives and friends contacted the
local police for an explanation but received no definite answer as
to what happened.
With financial help from Mr. Sun’s former classmates, his
family was able to have an autopsy performed which indicated that
Mr. Sun was brutally beaten before his death. One of the class-
mates who was studying media in Beijing posted an appeal for help
concerning Mr. Sun’s death on a cyber forum for discussion among
media professionals from all over China. A journalist working for
the South Metropolitan Daily took the post as a lead and decided
to initiate interviews of the family and authorities involved.
11
About
one month after the death, a detailed report about it appeared in the
South Metropolitan Daily with the headline, “University graduate
detained and cruelly beaten to death for not showing temporary
residence card.”
12
On the same day, the journalist also made the
report available online on the Southern Net news site.
13
Following the reports, the news was picked up by editors of
other online news portals. The net was quickly flooded with anger
at the death and appeals for justice. Major national forums
14
fea-
tured extensive discussions of the detention system, the death of
Mr. Sun and its implications. Other netizens commented about the
obvious injustice and denial of his constitutional rights. Portal sites
made the case a Hot Topic where links to related stories were
gathered. Chinese language forums outside of China were also used
for discussions and analysis of the case.
A memorial page was launched by a software engineer. It
eventually received over 200,000 visits, many visitors leaving
comments, messages of sadness and some money donations to the
family. Some comments gave examples of other cases of police
brutality. Others went further, demanding an end to the official
policy that treated migrants as lower class citizens.
The intense online reaction influenced further reporting first
by big non-governmental media and then by the mainstream
national media, feeding more online ferment. A special committee
was formed by the Guangzhou government to investigate Sun’s
death. The subsequent blunt denial by the police of responsibility
enraged many netizens. Their reaction was critical comments now
focusing on the weakness of the investigation procedures.
Page 16
Contributions of articles, responses, comments and calls for
action appeared online from activists, lawyers and academics, all
of whom had no other option of where to publish their critical
analysis. Online news articles typically received tens of thousands
of responses. Live chat discussions formulated demands for a
thorough investigation, punishment for those involved, change or
abolition of vagrancy measures, and an immediate end to deporta-
tions. The combination of online outrage and mainstream media
coverage made the case a topic of household conversation
everywhere in China. People’s Daily began to publish selected
netizen comments in its online news site. Pressure from online
communities, social groups and the central government gave the
local officials no choice but to initiate a more serious invest-
igation. The investigators acknowledged that netizen pressure
added to their determination, resulting in thirteen arrests reported.
An open trial from June 5 to 9 ended with 12 convictions of
guards at the detention center and some of the detainees. There
was one death sentence. Twenty-three governmental officials and
police officers were disciplined for their roles in the death and
lack of action after it.
Even after the arrest, online petitions were circulated and
online protest letters were addressed to the National People’s
Congress calling for abolition of the current custody and repatri-
ation system. Such letters virtually never appear in Chinese off
line media. On May 15, a netizen posted an article, “On the
Violation of ‘Legislation Law’ by the Holding System: The Case
of Sun Zhigang” on a site maintained by the government which
was followed by an online examination of the existing anti-
vagrancy laws. On June 18, after over 20 years of enforcement,
the State Council decide to abolished the 1982 Measures under
which Mr. Sun had been detained. New measures were initiated
which did not allow for detention but required a system of help for
homeless people be available on a voluntary basis.
The collaboration of netizen and traditional media set the
news agenda and helped public opinion to form so that the death
of Sun Zhigang, an ordinary person, was given extensive national
coverage. This led to the relatively quick end of a long standing
oppressive and discriminatory law. One scholar described this as
“one of the first cases of popular opinion overriding and resetting
official agendas and the first demonstration of the sociopolitical
power of Chinese netizenship.”
15
Case 2: BMW Incident (2003)
On Oct 16, 2003, two farmers, Liu Zhongxia and her
husband, rode their tractor loaded with onions through a narrow
street in Harbin, capital city of Heilongjiang Province in Northeast
China. The tractor accidentally scrapped the rearview mirror of a
car parked on the side of the street. The car was a BMW owned
by Su Xiuwen’s businessman husband. Ms. Su caused a commo-
tion haranguing the two farmers because of the damage to her hus-
band’s expensive car. Then she got back into the car and drove it
into the crowd which had gathered because of the commotion. Ms.
Liu was killed and 12 bystanders were injured.
Ms. Su was tried in a Harbin court on Dec. 20. None of the
bystanders testified. They had each received money from Ms. Su’s
husband. After two hours, the court ruled Ms. Su had not been
properly handling her car. The death of Ms. Liu was judged acci-
dental. Ms. Su was given a two year sentence which was sus-
pended. There was brief local media coverage of the trial and it
seemed it would pass as a fatal traffic accident, one of many every
day in every country.
But two days after the trial, a post about the case appeared
on the Strong Nation Forum, “Attention: The BMW killed a farm-
er. The person posting made three main points: 1. Ms. Su was
related to a high ranking official. 2. Ms. Su had killed Ms. Liu
deliberately. 3. The trial did not follow legal procedures. The post
unleashed a wide spread questioning and discussion of the case
throughout Chinese language cyberspace. Soon there were over
70,000 comments and opinions relating to the case on one portal
alone. Many netizens saw in the incident a posing of the questions
of rich versus poor in China, and justice versus corruption.
Within two weeks the BMW incident became the online
hottest topic in the China. Journalists from outside the province
who followed the online commotion went to Harbin to investigate
and report for their newspapers. After January 8, China’s main-
stream national media began intensive coverage. After all this
attention, local authorities and legal organs began a reinvestigation.
The online uproar over the case put it on the national news
agenda and offered an alternative framing to that of the court and
the local media. Almost half of the early posts looked for “behind
the scenes” reasons for Ms. Su’s light sentence. Less than ten per-
cent accepted the court’s decision. Other netizens sought to under-
stand the underlying causes. Some suggested remedies like greater
government accountability to public opinion.
There was a growing call for the authorities to open a new
investigation and hold a new trial. When it was reported in the
press that province officials promised “a satisfactory solution to the
‘BMW case’ will be offered to the public,” a post on the Strong
Nation Forum titled “Why should we trust you?” precipitated a
cynical thread casting doubt on the credibility of the officials.
16
More and more the question raised was what kind of China do we
want? A netizen with the alias stellyshi commented that history
shows that “… justice originates with the truth. But now in the
world, or in China, the truth means nothing. In modern China, with
power and money, you can say anything as you like. Even you can
kill one person as you want. So, what is this? Is this fare (sic)? Is
this so-called socialist country? I don’t think so. Never!!! … .”
17
The hundreds of thousands of online posts took many forms
including analysis, argumentation, poems, novels, dramas, letters,
animations, and jokes. Most posts were sympathetic to Ms. Liu and
hostile to Ms. Su. For many netizens, Ms. Su and Ms. Liu, the
BMW and the onion cart became symbols of the growing gap and
the character differences between the rich and the poor in China.
While much coverage in the mainstream media called for govern-
ment transparency and social improvement, a major direction taken
in netizen posts was to raise the question of the direction in which
China should be going. The mainstream media called for step-by-
step social improvement, the online discussion raised deeper
systemic questions.
The off-line media and the government in response to the
massive netizen activity took more action then they would have
otherwise. A new investigation was promised and a retrial of Ms.
Su. But by mid January the government forbad the mainstream
media from any further coverage. It also required the deletion of
some and finally all old posts and any new netizen contributions on
the major forums and portals. At the new trial there was no greater
penalty for Ms. Su and the monitoring and deleting of BMW re-
lated posts caused online attention to shift to other incidents and
Page 17
issues including net censorship.
In this incident all the netizen activity did not lead to a
different legal outcome. But it was another example that ferment
around a not very uncommon event can lead to examination of
contradictions buried in society. It is arguable that this netizen
uprising had an effect on Chinese society regardless of the legal
outcome or the deletion of hundreds of thousands of netizen
comments. And in September 2004, the Fourth Session of the Six-
teenth CCP Central Committee rejected the long standing policy
orientation “efficiency first” which had been criticized by some
netizens who in the course of their uprisings traced the specific
problem to this systemic root.
18
Notes
1. “Preface: What is a netizen,” an earlier version is online at:
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120/ch106.txt
2. Forum software hosted on Internet accessible servers allows for
sequential and threaded online text discussions which can be
monitored and moderated. Similarly hosted chat room software
allows for simultaneous multiple participant real time text
conversations. In China, most forums allow alias registration and
are often archived. Chat room sessions are ephemeral and are not
easily monitored.
3. Chinese students are studying in some 103 countries and most
densely populated in schools in the United States, Britain,
Australia, Canada, Germany, France and Japan.
4. For a discussion of Internet control in China, see Kluver 2006.
5. Quoted in China Daily, April 2, 2008,
https://www.chinadaily
.com.cn/china/2008-04/02/content_6587120_2.htm
6. Interview with anti-cnn webmaster Qi Hanting, April 19, 2008,
translated from Chinese. See Hauben, 2008.
7. Machine translated from posts in Chinese at Tianya (2008) chat
forum about the performance of Chen.
8. Chinese original cached at Baidu Content is no longer avail-
able.
9. This case is well covered in the scholarly literature. See for
example, Ibid., Tai (2006), pp. 259-268 and other references in the
following notes.
10. Ibid., p. 260.
11. Shaoguag Wang, “Changing Models of China’s Policy
Agenda Setting,” Modern China, 2008, 34 p. 79.
12. “A university graduate was taken into custody without a
temporary residence permit and was beaten to death,” in Southern
Metropolis Daily, April 4, 2003, online at: http://news.sina.com
.cn/s/2003-04-25/09501015845.shtml (In Chinese). See also,
Haiqing Yu, “From Active Audience to Media Citizenship: The
Case of Post-Mao China,” Social Semiotics, 16 (2), June 2006, pp.
303-326.
13. http://news.21cn.com/social/shixiang/2003-04-25/1021755.ht
ml (No longer available.)
14. Like Strong Nation Forum (qiangguo luntan), Development
Forum (fazhan luntan) and China Youth Forum (zhongqing
luntan)
15. Haiqing Yu, “Talking, Linking, Clicking: The Politics of
AIDS and SARS in Urban China,” positions: east asia cultures
critique, 15 (1) Spring 2007,
https://www.researchgate.net/public
ation/265748880_Talking_linking_clicking_The_politics_of
_AIDS_and_SARS_in_urban_China
16. Christina Yuqiong Zhuo and Patricia Moy, “Frame Building
and Frame Setting: The Interplay Between Online Public Opinion
and Media Coverage,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Communication Association, Dresden, June 16, 2006.
17. Comment #11 at: http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/redirect.php?tid
=39672&goto=lastpost&highlight=n (No longer available.)
18. Ibid., Shaoguang Wang, note 11, p. 80.
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[Editor’s Note: The following article documents how
some of the unifying foundation was set for the broad
nonviolent demonstrations of the people of Egypt
which took place January 25 to February 11, 2011.]
Netizens in Egypt and the
Republic of Tahrir Square*
by Ronda Hauben
On Wednesday February 8, 2011 the Egyptian
Ambassador to the United Nations, Maged A.
Abdelaziz, spoke to journalists at a stakeout outside
the Security Council.
1
There had been an ongoing set
of questions to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and his
spokesman and to the Security Council President by
journalists covering the United Nations in an effort to
understand what role the UN is able to play in the
struggle going on in Egypt. In response to a question
about the ongoing assault at the time on journalists by
police in Egypt, the Ambassador said that someone
from the foreigner side was instigating the uprising.
This refrain accusing outsiders of instigating the
Egyptian uprising had also been expressed by Egyptian
government officials a few days earlier. What is signif-
icant about this claim is that it denies the internal
process by which the Egyptian people had organized
themselves over a multi year series of struggles. These
struggles included labor struggles, anti-repression dem-
onstrations and online discussions to help to determine
a set of political and economic demands uniting the
different sectors of Egyptian society.
The claim of outside instigators ignores the role
played by active online discussion and other forms of
communication by a diversity of political actors, of
citizens empowered by their access to the Internet, who
had been striving for a more just and dynamic Egypt.
In the early 1990s, a university student in New
York, Michael Hauben, took up to do research to
explore the political power of the developing networks.
Through his research he discovered that a new form of
citizenship was being born online.
2
In response to a set of questions Hauben sent out
to people with Net access in the early 1990s, he re-
ceived descriptions of how people were exploring how
to use the Net to solve the many social and political
problems of our times. He called these users who were
active citizens exploring how the Net could help to
make a better world netizens (Net + Citizen = Netizen).
For Hauben, not all users were netizens. Instead he
reserved the use of this term to describe those users who
empowered by the Net, were exploring how to contrib-
ute to a better world.
Many of the characteristics that Hauben dis-
covered among netizens in the early 1990s are also the
characteristics of netizens who have been part of the
struggle to change Egypt.
Describing some of how the process of mobil-
ization developed, Charles Hirschkind, in his article,
“From the Blogosphere to the Street: The Role of Social
Media in the Egyptian Uprising” writes, “The seeds of
this spectacular mobilization had been sown from
across the political spectrum.”
3
Hirschkind describes
how a political alliance grew up between the secular
leftist organizations and groups with Islamic ties
(particularly the Muslim Brotherhood), working to-
gether to defend victims of state torture.
Another example of an organization working
across the political spectrum in Egypt was the Kifaya
movement, a coalition of those with diverse political
leanings united in their demand that Egyptian President
Mubarak step down and that his son Gamal not succeed
Page 19
him.
With the emergence of this movement in 2004-
2005, bloggers became a significant part of the protest
activities, reporting on the protests and discussing
them online. One blogger, Wael Abbas is mentioned
for distributing a video clip of a man being physically
abused by the police in Cairo. This video and other
forms of online reporting helped to build a movement
in Egypt against police abuse.
Another contribution to the protests was from the
many labor struggles in previous years. Strikes helped
to spread the sense of the importance of struggle in
Egypt. Bloggers, Facebook groups, and others online
took part in the discussion of grievances and in spread-
ing the information about mobilizations.
April 6, 2008 was an important example of the
power of the alliance of online netizens and workers
working together to challenge the abusive practices of
the Mubarak government.
Hirschkind describes how online discussion and
communication helped to transform diverse political
ideas into a common set of political objectives. “They
have pioneered,” he writes, “forms of political critique
and interaction that can mediate and encompass the
heterogeneity of religious and social commitments that
constitute Egypt’s contemporary political terrain.”
It was this evolving communication among
Egyptian netizens, not foreign instigation, that helped
to provide the platform for a movement which was
able to embrace a broad spectrum of Egyptian citizens.
Describing the movement that developed, Nubar
Hovsepian, in his article, “The Arab Pro-Democracy
Movement: Struggles to Redefine Citizenship” writes:
4
Organizationally it is more like a network
than our outmoded top down structures .
This is a revolution in the making sparked
by youth who are determined to alter the
dominant paradigm of politics and power
that precludes the central idea which under-
grids democracy citizenship under a social
contract.
Hovsepian argues that a new relationship be-
tween the Egyptian government and the citizens is at
the heart of the movement:
Simply put, Arab youth are leading a pro-
found revolt whose central objective is the
transformation of former ‘subjects’ into
‘citizens’ with agency and voice to make
demands of their rulers. The rulers are ex-
pected to be servants of their citizens
nothing less is acceptable.
Mohammed Bamyeh in his article, “The Egyptian
Revolution: First Impressions from the Field”
5
de-
scribes the 18 days of the Egyptian uprising as the dawn
of a new civic order. He points to many of the grass-
roots forms that developed during the days of the
uprising, one of which was a mass “civic character as a
conscious ethical contrast to the state’s barbarism.” He
describes the transformation of people’s sense of
themselves and of their capability as an integral part of
the process of the movement:
Like in the Tunisian Revolution, in Egypt
the rebellion erupted as a sort of a collective
world earthquake where the central de-
mands were very basic, and clustered
around the respect for the citizen, dignity,
and the natural right to participate in the
making of the system that ruled over the
person.
This goal, Bamyeh explains, was expressed as well by
even,
Muslim Brotherhood participants (who)
chanted at some point with everyone else
for a ‘civic’ (madaniyya) state explicitly
distinguished from two other possible alter-
natives: religious (diniyya) or military
(askariyya) state.
Describing the significance of these develop-
ments, Hovsepian regards the Egyptian events as the
Arab equivalent of the French Revolution. In a paper I
presented in Paris at Sorbonne III in summer 2010,
titled “Watchdogging to Challenge the Abuse of Power:
Netizenship in the 21
st
Century,” I proposed that the
important achievement of the French Revolution was
the conceptual transformation of the former subjects
into the citizens to be regarded as the sovereign of the
State.
6
“It was the citizens who were to possess the
power of the nation . It is among the citizens that the
discussion and decisions to determine the progress of
the nation belongs.” This goal or vision has been
considered only as an ideal for over 200 years, as
citizens have lacked the capability to exert their super-
vision over the government or corporate officials who
have grabbed the power of the state.
The Egyptian revolution had its groundwork set
by the Egyptian netizens and it is this foundation that
provides a strength to meet the many trials to be faced
in the days and years after 2011.
Page 20
Hence it is not foreign instigators who are
responsible for seeding the soil of the mighty move-
ment that removed Mubarak from power. Instead it
was a resurgence of the ideals and demands of citizens
which fueled the French Revolution, but which are
now strengthened by the actions and deeds of the
netizens.
Notes
1. Stakeout at Security Council, Maged A. Abdelaziz to the press
on February 8, 2011. https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/ass
et/U110/U110208g/
2. Michael Hauben, “The Net and the Netizens, in On the History
and Impact of Usenet and the Internet,” IEEE Computer Society
Press,
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/netbook/
3. Charles Hirschkind, “From the Blogosphere to the Street: The
Role of Social Media in the Egyptian Uprising,” Jadaliyya,
February 9, 2011.
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/599
/from-the-blogosphere-to-the-street_the-role-of-social-media-in-
the-egyptian-uprising
4. Nubar Hovsepian, The Arab Pro-Democracy Movement:
Struggles to Redefine Citizenship,” Jadaliyya, February 9, 2011.
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/588/the-arab-pro-
democracy-movement_struggles-toredefine-citizenship
5. Mohammed Bamyeh, “The Egyptian Revolution: First Impres-
sions from the Field [Updated],” Jadaliyya, February 11, 2011.
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/561/the-egyptian-
revolution_first-impressions-from-thefieldupdated
6. Ronda Hauben, “Watchdogging to Challenge the Abuse of
Power: Netizenship in the 21
st
Century,” Paper presented on July
13, 2010 at Sorbonne III, Paris, France
/Paris-7-13-10.doc
*This article was first published on April 16, 2011 on the netizen-
blog online at:
izens_egypt_tahrir_square/
Editor’s Note: The following paper was prepared for the
annual meeting of the Chinese Community of Political
Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) which was
held in Beijing on July 14-15, 2012.]
The Role of Netizen
Journalism in the Media War
at the United Nations*
by Ronda Hauben
Preface
The history of journalism includes many different
forms of publication and many different methods of
organization of those publications. Journalism scholars
like Chris Atton and Tony Harcup of the U.K. point to
a wide continuum of how the news is produced and who
are the journalists who produce it. These scholars argue
that it is too narrow to restrict the definition and consid-
eration of journalism to commercially or government
produced media. Instead these scholars propose that the
many forms of alternative journalism should be consid-
ered as part of the spectrum of journalism and those
who produce for these publications are to be considered
in any study of journalists.
Traditionally alternative journalism provides for
a broader set of issues to be raised than is common in
commercially produced mainstream media. Often, too,
alternative publications allow for a broader set of
sources to be utilized. Such a media often reflects not
only a criticism of the limitations of the mainstream
commercial media, but also a demonstration that
another form and practice of journalism is viable.
With the creation and the spread of the Internet,
the emergence of a new form of citizenship, know as
netizenship, has developed. Also a critical and vibrant
form of online journalism has begun to develop. I call
this journalism, netizen journalism. A more detailed
exploration of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of
this paper as the paper is for a panel on questions
related to the United Nations. As such, the paper will
focus on the impact of netizen journalism on the United
Nations and on issues related to the United Nations. But
an awareness of the emerging phenomenon of netizen
journalism can help to provide a context for issues
investigated in this paper.
Page 21
Introduction
In this paper I take three conflicts which are or
have been on the agenda of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. The paper will explore the role of netizen
journalism in relation to the efforts to resolve these
conflicts in a peaceful manner. The three examples the
paper will consider in relation to the UN are 1) the
Cheonan conflict in South Korea (2010), 2) the war
against Libya (2011), and 3) the crisis in Syria (2011-
2012).
I. Medvedev and the Challenge of Media
Manipulation to International Relations
In a recent speech, Dmitry Medvedev, Prime
Minister of the Russian Federation, spoke about what
he called “the new security dimensions” in interna-
tional relations.
1
“Today,” he said, “we are witness to
persistent attempts to make mass manipulation of
public opinion a tool in international relations.” He
offered as an example what he calls the media cam-
paign against Syria.
“Syria’s case is illustrative in this respect,”
Medvedev said. “A very active media campaign un-
folded with respect to Syria.” He explained, “What is
clear is that this media campaign had little to do with
ending the violence as rapidly as possible and facilitat-
ing the national dialogue that we all want to see there.”
He attributed this media campaign to the nature
of what is considered the politics of certain countries.
Describing this politics, he explained, “This sees a
country or group of countries instill their own aims and
objectives in the consciousness of others with other
points of view rejected.”
2
What I propose is important about his talk for our
panel on “The UN is a Dilemma” is that Medvedev
argues that media manipulation by certain political
actors presents a serious problem for the field of
international relations. He argues that such a media
campaign against Syria interferes with the goal of
international relations “to concentrate on professional
and serious discussion rather than propaganda efforts,”
so as to be able to work out a common approach to
settling this conflict.”
While he does not see journalism as able to help
solve this problem, I want to propose that there is the
development of an alternative form of journalism that
is taking on the problem. This is the journalism I call
netizen journalism. Netizen journalism seeks to chal-
lenge the misrepresentations and distortions of main-
stream western journalism that Medvedev presents as a
serious challenge to international relations. Netizen
journalism encourages not only the exposure of the
distortions in the mainstream media, but research and
writing to provide the background and information
needed to determine how to settle a conflict. By chal-
lenging the media campaign fomenting a conflict,
netizen journalism becomes a participant in the media
war at the UN.
II. The Cheonan Incident, the UN, and Netizen
Journalism
I first turn to the details of what happened with the
Cheonan conflict which was brought to the UN in 2010,
to examine how netizen journalism affected the media
war in that situation and helped to make a significant
contribution to the peaceful resolution of the conflict
that was embraced at the Security Council.
The Cheonan incident concerns a South Korean
naval ship which broke up and sank on March 26, 2010.
At the time it was involved in naval exercises with the
U.S. military in an area in the West Sea / Yellow Sea
between North Korea and China. This is a situation that
had been the subject of much discussion on the Internet.
Initially the South Korean government and the
U.S. government said there was no indication that North
Korea was involved. Then at a press conference on May
20, 2010, the South Korean government claimed that a
torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine exploded in
the water near the Cheonan, causing a pressure wave
that was responsible for the sinking. Many criticisms of
this scenario have been raised.
There was no direct evidence of any North Korean
submarine in the vicinity of the Cheonan. Nor was there
any evidence that a torpedo was actually fired causing
the pressure wave phenomenon. Hence the South
Korean government had no actual case that could be
presented in a court of law to support its claims.
In fact, if this claim of a pressure wave were true
even those involved in the investigation of the incident
acknowledge that “North Korea would be the first to
have succeeded at using this kind of a bubble jet
torpedo action in actual fighting.”
3
The dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan was
brought to the United Nations Security Council in June
2010 and a Presidential Statement was agreed to a
month later, in July.
4
Page 22
An account of some of what happened in the
Security Council during this process is described in an
article that has appeared in several different Spanish
language publications
5
The article describes the
experience of the Mexican Ambassador to the UN,
Claude Heller in his position as president of the
Security Council for the month of June 2010. (The
presidency rotates each month to a different Security
Council member.)
In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4,
2010 the Republic of Korea (ROK) more commonly
known as South Korea, asked the Council to take up
the Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, then the South
Korean Ambassador to the UN, requested that the
Security Council consider the matter of the Cheonan
and respond in an appropriate manner.
6
The letter
described an investigation into the sinking of the
Cheonan carried out by South Korean government and
military officials. The conclusion of the South Korean
investigation was to accuse North Korea of sinking the
South Korean ship.
Sin Son Ho was the UN Ambassador from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),
which is more commonly known as North Korea. He
sent a letter dated June 8, 2010 to the Security Council,
which denied the allegation that his country was to
blame.
7
His letter urged the Security Council not to be
the victim of deceptive claims, as had happened with
Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support
his government’s call to be able to examine the evi-
dence and to be involved in a new and more independ-
ent investigation on the sinking of the Cheonan.
How would the Mexican Ambassador as Presi-
dent of the Security Council during the month of June
handle this dispute? This was a serious issue facing
Heller as he began his presidency in June 2010.
Heller adopted what he referred to as a “bal-
anced” approach to treat both governments on the
Korean peninsula in a fair and objective manner. He
held bilateral meetings with each member of the
Security Council which led to support for a process of
informal presentations by both of the Koreas to the
members of the Security Council.
What Heller called “interactive informal meet-
ings” were held on June 14 with the South Koreans
and the North Koreans in separate sessions attended by
the Security Council members, who had time to ask
questions and then to discuss the presentations.
At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s
presentations ended, Heller said that it was important to
have received the detailed presentation by South Korea
and also to know and learn the arguments of North
Korea. He commented that “it was very important that
North Korea approached the Security Council.” In
response to a question about his view on the issues
presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I think we will
go on with the consultations to deal in a proper manner
on the issue.”
8
Heller also explained that, “the Security Council
issued a call to the parties to refrain from any act that
could escalate tensions in the region, and makes an
appeal to preserve peace and stability in the region.”
Though the North Korean Ambassador at the UN
rarely speaks to the media, the North Korean UN
delegation scheduled a press conference for the follow-
ing day, Tuesday, June 15. During the press conference,
the North Korean Ambassador presented North Korea’s
refutation of the allegations made by South Korea. Also
he explained North Korea’s request to be able to send
an investigation team to the site where the sinking of
the Cheonan occurred. South Korea had denied the
request. During its press conference, the North Korean
Ambassador noted that there was widespread condem-
nation of the investigation in South Korea and around
the world.
9
The press conference held on June 15 was a lively
event. Many of the journalists who attended were
impressed and requested that there be future press
conferences with the North Korean Ambassador.
During June, Heller held meetings with the UN
ambassadors from each of the two Koreas and then with
Security Council members about the Cheonan issue. On
the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he was asked
by a reporter what was happening about the Cheonan
dispute. He responded that the issue of contention was
over the evaluation of the South Korean government’s
investigation.
Heller described how he introduced what he refers
to as “an innovation” into the Security Council process.
As the month of June ended, the issue was not yet
resolved, but the “innovation” set a basis to build on the
progress that was achieved during the month of his
presidency.
The “innovation” Heller referred to, was a sum-
mary he made of the positions of each of the two
Koreas on the issue, taking care to present each objec-
tively. Heller explained that this summary was not an
official document, so it did not have to be approved by
Page 23
the other members of the Council. This summary
provided the basis for further negotiations. He believed
that it had a positive impact on the process of consider-
ation in the Council, making possible the agreement
that was later to be expressed in the Presidential
statement on the Cheonan that was issued by the
Security Council on July 9.
Heller’s goal, he explained, was to “at all times
be as objective as possible” so as to avoid increasing
the conflict on the Korean peninsula. Such a goal is the
Security Council’s obligation under the UN Charter.
In the July 19, 2010 Security Council’s Presiden-
tial Statement (PRST) on the Cheonan, what stands out
is that the statement follows the pattern of presenting
the views of each of the two Koreas and urging that the
dispute be settled in a peaceful manner.
In the PRST, the members of the Security Coun-
cil did not blame North Korea. Instead they refer to the
South Korean investigation and its conclusion, ex-
pressing their “deep concern” about the “findings” of
the investigation.
The PRST explains that “The Security Council
takes note of the responses from other relevant parties,
including the DPRK, which has stated that it had
nothing to do with the incident.”
10
With the exception of North Korea, it is not
indicated who “the other relevant parties” are. It does
suggest, however, that it is likely there are some
Security Council members, not just Russia and China,
who did not agree with the conclusions of the South
Korean investigation.
Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Korean
newspaper Hankyoreh noted that the statement “allows
for a double interpretation and does not blame or place
consequences on North Korea.”
11
Such a possibility of
a “double interpretation” allows different interpret-
ations.
The Security Council action on the Cheonan took
place in a situation where there had been a wide
ranging international critique, especially in the online
media, about the problems of the South Korean inves-
tigation, and of the South Korean government’s failure
to make public any substantial documentation of its
investigation, along with its practice of harassing
critics of the South Korean government claims.
12
One such critique included a three part report by
the South Korean NGO People’s Solidarity for Partici-
patory Democracy (PSPD).
13
This report raised a
number of questions and problems with the South
Korean government’s case. The PSPD document was
posted widely on the Internet and also sent to the
President of the United Nations Security Council for
distribution to those Security Council members inter-
ested and to the South Korean Mission to the UN.
There were many blog comments about the
Cheonan issue in Korean.
14
There were also some
bloggers writing in English who became active in
critiquing the South Korean investigation and the role
of the U.S. in the conflict.
One such blogger, Scott Creighton who uses the
pen name Willy Loman, wrote a post titled “The
Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to”
15
On his
blog “American Everyman,” he explained how there
was a discrepancy between the diagram displayed by
the South Korean government in a press conference it
held, and the part of the torpedo on display in the glass
case below the diagram.
He showed that the diagram did not match the part
of the torpedo on display. The South Korean govern-
ment had claimed that the diagram displayed above the
glass case was from a North Korean brochure offering
the torpedo identified as the CHT-02D.
There were many comments on his post, including
some from netizens in South Korea. Also the main-
stream conservative media in South Korea carried
accounts of his critique.
Three weeks later, at a news conference, a South
Korean government official acknowledged that the
diagram presented by the South Korean government
was not of the same torpedo as the part displayed in the
glass case. Instead the diagram was of the PT97W
torpedo, not the CHT-02D torpedo as claimed.
Describing the significance of having documented
one of the fallacies in the South Korean government’s
case, Creighton writes:
16
(I)n the end, thanks to valuable input from
dozens of concerned people all across the
world . Over 100,000 viewers read that
article and it was republished on dozens of
sites all across the world (even translated).
A South Korean MSM outlet even posted
our diagram depicting the glaring discrep-
ancies between the evidence and the draw-
ing of the CHT-O2D torpedo, which a high-
ranking military official could only refute
by stating he had 40 years military expe-
rience and to his knowledge, I had none. But
what I had, what we had, was literally thou-
Page 24
sands of people all across the world, scien-
tists, military members, and just concerned
investigative bloggers who were committed
to the truth and who took the time to con-
tribute to what we were doing here.
‘Forty years military experience’ took a
beating from ‘we the people WorldWide’
and that is the way it is supposed to be.
This is just one of a number of serious questions
and challenges that were raised about the South
Korean government’s scenario of the sinking of the
Cheonan.
Other influential events which helped to chal-
lenge the South Korean government’s claims were a
press conference in Japan held on July 9 by two
academic scientists. The two scientists presented
results of experiments they did which challenged the
results of experiments the South Korean government
used to support its case.
17
These scientists also wrote to
the Security Council with their findings.
Also a significant challenge to the South Korean
government report was the finding of a Russian team
of four sent to South Korea to look at the data from the
investigation and to do an independent evaluation of it.
The Russian team did not accept the South Korean
government’s claim that a pressure wave from a
torpedo caused the Cheonan to sink.
18
Such efforts along with online posts and discus-
sions by many netizens provided a catalyst for the
actions of the UN Security Council concerning the
Cheonan incident.
The mainstream U.S. media for the most part,
chose to ignore the many critiques which have ap-
peared. These critiques of the South Korean govern-
ment’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have
appeared mainly on the Internet, not only in Korean,
but also in English, in Japanese, and in other lan-
guages. They present a wide ranging challenge of the
veracity and integrity of the South Korean investiga-
tion and its conclusions.
An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28
noted the fact, however, that the media in the U.S. had
ignored the critique of the South Korean government
investigation that is being discussed online and spread
around the world.
19
On August 31, an op-ed by Donald
Gregg, a former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea,
appeared in the New York Times, titled “Testing North
Korean Waters.” The article noted that “not everyone
agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea.
Pyongyang has consistently denied responsibility, and
both China and Russia opposed a U.N. Security Council
resolution laying blame on North Korea.”
20
Netizens who live in different countries and speak
different languages took up to critique the claims of the
South Korean government about the cause of the
sinking of the Cheonan. Such netizen activity had an
important effect on the international community. It also
appears to have acted as a catalyst affecting the actions
of the UN Security Council in its treatment of the
Cheonan dispute.
In his op-ed in the New York Times, Gregg argued
that, “The disputed interpretations of the sinking of the
Cheonan remain central to any effort to reverse course
and to get on track toward dealing effectively with
North Korea on critical issues such as the denucle-
arization of the Korean Peninsula.”
North Korea referred to the widespread interna-
tional sentiment in its June 8 letter to the Security
Council. The UN Ambassador from North Korea wrote:
It would be very useful to remind ourselves
of the ever-increasing international doubts
and criticisms, going beyond the internal
boundary of south Korea, over the ‘investi-
gation result’ from the very moment of its
release … .
The situation that the North Korean Ambassador
referred to is the result of actions on the part of South
Korean netizens and civil society who challenged the
process and results of the South Korean government’s
investigation. Also, there was support for the South
Korean netizens by bloggers, scientists and journalists
around the world, writing mainly online but in a multi-
tude of languages and from many perspectives. Several
of the non-governmental organizations and scientists in
South Korea sent the results of their investigations and
research to members of the Security Council to provide
them with the background and facts needed to make an
informed decision.
21
The result of such efforts is something that is
unusual in the process of recent Security Council
activity. The Security Council process in the Cheonan
issue provided for an impartial analysis of the problem
and an effort to hear from those with an interest in the
issue.
The effort in the Security Council was described
by the Mexican Ambassador, as upholding the prin-
ciples of impartiality and respectful treatment of all
members toward resolving a conflict between nations in
Page 25
a peaceful manner. It represents an important example
of the Security Council acting in conformity with its
obligations as set out in the UN charter. In the July 9
Presidential Statement, the Security Council urged that
the parties to the dispute over the sinking of the Cheo-
nan find a means to peacefully settle the dispute. The
statement says:
The Security Council calls for full adher-
ence to the Korean Armistice Agreement
and encourages the settlement of outstand-
ing issues on the Korean peninsula by
peaceful means to resume direct dialogue
and negotiation through appropriate chan-
nels as early as possible, with a view to
avoiding conflicts and averting escalation.
Ambassador Gregg is only one of many around
the world who have expressed their concern with the
course of action of the U.S. and South Korea as con-
trary to the direction of the UN Security Council
Presidential Statement. Gregg explained his fear that
the truth of the Cheonan sinking “may elude us, as it
did after the infamous Tonkin Bay incident of 1964,
that was used to drag us [the U.S.] into the abyss of the
Vietnam War.”
22
Despite this dilemma, the Security
Council action on the Cheonan dispute, if it is recog-
nized and supported, has set the basis instead for a
peaceful resolution of the conflict.
23
While the netizen
community in South Korea and internationally were
able to provide an effective challenge to the misrep-
resentations by the South Korean government on the
Cheonan incident, the struggle over the misrepresenta-
tions of the conflict in Libya was less successful.
III. False Claims that Led to the War Against
Libya
A short article at the Current Events Inquiry
website lists several provocative claims which helped
to provide a false pretext for the NATO bombing of
Libya.
24
Among them were reports by Al Jazeera and
the BBC that the Libyan government had carried out
air strikes against Benghazi and Tripoli on February
22, 2011. Russia Today reports that the Russian
military who had monitored the unrest in Libya from
the beginning, “says nothing of the sort was going on
on the ground.”
25
According to the report by the Russian military,
the attacks had never occurred.
Another such claim widely circulated by major
western media very early in the Libya conflict was that
the Libyan government “is massacring unarmed demon-
strators.” The NGO, the International Crisis Group
(ICG) in its June 6, 2011 report says that such claims
were inaccurate. The report explains that this version of
the events in Libya “would appear to ignore evidence
that the protest movement exhibited a violent aspect
from early on.” This includes evidence that early in the
protests, “demonstrations were infiltrated by violent
elements.”
Similarly the ICG report found no evidence for
claims that the Libyan government “engaged in any-
thing remotely warranting use of the term ‘genocide’.”
A similar criticism was made of the claim that “foreign
mercenaries” were employed by the Libyan govern-
ment. A report by Amnesty International which is de-
scribed in an article in The Independent newspaper in
the U.K. on June 24, 2011 says that, “The Amnesty
Report found no evidence for this.”
Netizen Journalism on the Conflict in Libya Pres-
ents a Different View
From the early days of the false media claims
targeting Libya for an outside intervention to remove its
government, a growing set of articles and comments
were written and published online exposing the lack of
evidence for these claims and demonstrating that they
were distortions with a political purpose. These articles
exposing the distortions were read and distributed by a
growing set of online reporters. These examples demon-
strate that a different form of journalism is emerging.
While such a form of journalism may not yet appear to
present an adequate challenge to the gross misrepresen-
tations and inaccuracies spread by much of the main-
stream western and Arab satellite media about the
Libyan conflict, the nature of this newly developing
form of journalism is important to explore and to
understand.
This new journalism has at least two important
aspects. One is serious research into the background,
context and political significance of conflicts like that
in Libya or Syria. Another is the application of this
research to the writing of articles or to comments in
response to both mainstream and alternative media
articles.
As an example of this netizen journalism related
to the conflict in Libya, I want to refer to a small
collection of articles titled “Libya, the UN, and Netizen
Journalism.”
26
This collection contains articles focusing
on a critique of actions at the UN that provided the
Page 26
authority for the NATO war against Libya.
One article in that collection, “UN Security
Council March 17 Meeting to Authorize Bombing of
Libya All Smoke and Mirrors” is about the Security
Council meeting which passed Resolution 1973 by a
vote of 10 in favor and 5 abstentions. The article in-
cludes some sample comments from online discussions
about what was happening in Libya at the time. While
the UNSC members at the March 17 meeting speak
about their support for the resolution to “protect
Libyan civilians,” there was no acknowledgment that
the resolution instead would in effect support the
ongoing armed insurrection against the government of
Libya.
While Security Council delegates and the main-
stream media described what was happening in Libya
as “peaceful protestors” attacked by a “brutal govern-
ment,” online discussion of the situation during this
same period described the opposition in Libya as
engaged in an armed insurrection. The following sam-
ple from comments from a discussion of an article on
the British Guardian website in March 2011 provides
an example of netizens questioning and critiquing the
actions of the Security Council and asking why the UN
is protecting and supporting an armed insurgency:
27
“Armed civilians or uninformed fighters have no
place being supported or protected by our air power.
They carry a gun and get targeted that is their look out,
not our job to hit the other side.” James St. George, 22
March, 2011.
“The thing is the rebels are ‘civilians’ when ever
it suits us.” llundiel, 23 March, 2011.
“Of course once you start bombing, there will
clearly be plenty of collateral damage.
This then makes a complete mockery of the
stated purpose of the intervention, to save innocent
civilians.” contractor000, 23 March, 2011.
“Yes tanks are not planes! Or in the air flying.
The civilian protection has no place extending to
armed rebels, they are not civilians.” Cock-
fingersMcGee, 23 March, 2011.
“So we are supposed to accept this scenario that
the Military aggression against Libya is to do with
protecting the protesters, the revolution, innocent
civilians, the rebels etc. This sounds very reminiscent
of attacking Iraq because of WMD.” comunismlives,
22 March, 2011.
Similar discussions were going on at other web-
sites. Here, for example, are some comments from a
discussion at the Hidden Harmonies website.
28
“Resolution 1973 is also directed at rebel force,
but we are not bombing the rebels, but usurping the
resolution to provide air cover in aid of the rebels.
Prolonging Libya’s civil war only brings more harm to
the civilians, and facilitating division of Libya’s sover-
eignty, are contravening/violating the resolution.”
Charles Liu, March 22, 2011.
“We can argue technicalities, but everyone knows
the current U.S.-led bombings are toward weakening
Qadhafi and to bolster the rebel opposition. Obama and
the Coalition publicly say so.”
“Its like seeing a thief caught on video sneaking
around in a store and after seeing no one around,
pockets the candy. He also says he is stealing.”
“Now we are suppose to ‘prove’ it? That’s quite
retarded.” DeWang, March 22, 2011
“‘under threat of attack’ clause includes threat of
attack by the rebels, yet we are not bombing them for
their incursion outside Benghazi. This violates the
preamble’s stated limit of military authorization to not
divide Libya’s sovereignty. Not withstanding any sort
of red herring and semantics wiggling, the selective air
strike in aid of the rebels violates UN resolution 1973,
while 1970 gave no legitimacy to the armed rebellion in
Libya, which the legitimate government of Libya has
the sovereign right to sanction against.” Charles Liu,
March 22, 2011.
“I just don’t understand why the bombing is
taking place at all.”
“1) It is a civil war. Why should the west take
sides?”
“2) Wasn’t Gaddafi the U.S.’s pet since Bush II?
Why is the U.S. seeking to remove one of their pup-
pets? Is the U.S./west looking for another Iraq?”
“I wouldn’t be one bit surprised if this war was
instigated by Wall Street looking to make a killing on
oil and commodities.” colin, March 22, 2011.
“It’s a historical pattern of these UN Resolutions,
including way back when the Korean War started, that
‘all necessary force’ is the general catch phrase for
‘unrestrained warfare’ limited only by what weapons
are available.”
“Now, even the high cost of the cruise missiles, $1
million a pop, is not enough to deter the launching of
100s of these.”
“Well, I guess we are going to see the cost, sooner
Page 27
or later.” r v, March 23, 2011.
These two examples of selected comments from
online discussions at the time demonstrate that
netizens raised serious concerns and critiques of the
Security Council action passing UN Resolution 1973,
while the mainstream media mainly reported what
western governments were saying.
Similar questions and critiques were raised
throughout the conflict in articles by independent
journalists who were in Libya during much of the
period of the defense of Libya from the NATO bomb-
ing and the NATO support for the armed insurrection
in Libya. Such journalists included Mahdi Darius
Nazemroaya of Global Research, Thierry Meyssan,
from Voltairenet, Lizzy Phalen who reported for
various outlets including PressTV, and Franklin Lamb
whose articles were carried on various websites.
Also a group that called itself Concerned Afri-
cans published an open letter which they also submit-
ted to the UN Secretary General, the UN Security
Council and the UN General Assembly. The letter
which was signed by over 300 concerned Africans,
described what it called the contribution to “the
subversion of international law.” The letter maintained
that in passing UNSCR 1973, “the Security Council
used the still unresolved issue in international law of
‘the right to protect’ the so called R2P, to justify the
Chapter VII military intervention in Libya.”
29
Other
articles focused on the violations in Security Council
procedures represented by allowing Libyan officials
who had defected to appear at the Security Council
representing Libya.
30
Similarly, Professor Mahmood Mamdani, at
Columbia University who has studied the region and
its history, points to the “political and legal infrastruc-
ture for intervention in otherwise independent coun-
tries,” namely the Security Council and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court working ‘selectively,’ that has
been created by Western powers.
31
Among the many websites at the time publishing
articles critiquing the UN’s actions in Libya were The
Center for Research on Globalization, Voltaire Net-
work, Libya 360, Mathaba, April Media, and Ameri-
can Everyman.
32
During this period, several of the independent
journalists or the journalists writing articles chal-
lenging the Security Council actions providing for the
bombing of Libya appeared on satellite news programs
like that of RT News and PressTV. Also there were
interviews and videos posted online.
While these articles, discussions, critiques and
analyses did not succeed in stopping the NATO attack
on Libya, they created an example of more accurate
reporting and analysis about the attack on Libya. A few
months later when an Al Jazeera journalist explained
why he resigned from Al Jazeera, he pointed to the
pressure from Al Jazeera to misrepresent what was
happening in his reporting. He explained that the
support of Qatar for the militarization of the Libyan
conflict was a turning point in the distortion of the news
at his station.
33
Also as the following comment by a netizen
indicates, someone who supported the attack on Libya
and who has learned lessons from what happened, is
more likely to question the media claims about Syria:
(I)t is also important to me that I feel I was
deceived about the Libyan situation. Being
like Libya would itself be reason to oppose
intervention in Syria.
And others suggest that the experience of NATO’s
actions in Libya has been having an impact on what
some at the UN and some of the nations of the UN will
do with respect to Syria.
As one netizen wrote after hearing of the Houla
massacre:
34
What has changed in the last week follow-
ing the murder of more than 100 people in
Houla, including dozens of children, is that
a new urgency and disgust has been injected
into an escalating crisis that has brought the
country to the verge of civil war. The role of
the Syrian opposition should also be clearly
investigated as well. Rather than just blam-
ing Assad in a media witch-hunt. As many
of those killed were supposed to be people
who refused to collaborate with the opposi-
tion.
It is obvious that the Russians and Chinese
have learnt from Libya too. Where the
number of people killed by unbridled
NATO bombing has been carefully sup-
pressed, and the use of the UN to cover «
regime change », has only bought chaos in
its wake. So the oil there has changed hands,
but most of the north of Africa is now trans-
formed into a violent marasme. Both of
those major powers now know from experi-
ence that NATO with UN agreement
Page 28
means the destruction of peace, the loss of
their assets in the region, and the continua-
tion of war into other areas (Iran, Yemen,
Pakistan, etc. or closer to their own spheres
of influence. China sea the ‘Stans,’ the
southern (Muslim) aligned ex-Russian
states, etc. or into South America). They do
not see any end. So they must draw a line
somewhere.
Is the object of the west once again to
cause a major mid-eastern war? shaun 2
June 2012, 10:00 p.m.
IV. The Syrian Crisis and the UN: Critique of the
Reporting on Syria
Similar to the mainstream media war against
Libya, there is a set of false narratives in the main-
stream western and Arab satellite media related to
what has been happening in Syria. While such media
essentially frames its news about Syria to demonize
the Syrian government and its President Bashar Assad,
its news stories support the armed opposition, and its
journalists rely on opposition sources for the news that
is to be reported.
In this situation, netizen journalism presents a
critique of the mainstream media support for what is
an armed insurrection against Syria. The forms this
netizen journalism takes include articles, interviews,
commentary, historical background, analysis and
discussion. Critical articles about the mainstream
media reports and misrepresentations are also com-
mon.
The Houla Massacre
The original mainstream media account of what
has come to be known as the Houla massacre was that
an opposition demonstration was suppressed by Syrian
government shelling.
Criticism of this claim soon emerged pointing to
the fact that the majority of those murdered were killed
at close range, not by shelling. In response the main-
stream western media produced a new element, a so
called pro government militia that they claimed had
gone into the homes of those killed and carried out the
massacre. Why an alleged pro government militia, the
so called ‘Shabiha’ would go into the homes of pro
government supporters and massacre them, was not
explained.
When Alex Thomson, a British Channel 4 re-
porter, went to the village that the opposition in Houla
had said had produced the so called Shabiha accused of
the attack in Houla, he found no evidence of any such
militia. He writes, “Beyond a few languid soldiers and
the odd policeman no sign of militias. No trace of heavy
weapons. No tank tracks on the roads…. Well these
Alawites insist there are not, nor have ever been,
Shabiha in these villages.”
35
Neither do the mainstream
western media wonder why the Syrian government
would carry out a massacre of civilians at the very time
that the United Nations General Assembly and the
United Nations Security Council are planning to discuss
Syria.
In his book Liar’s Poker which analyzes the
disinformation used to justify the NATO bombing of
Serbia, the Belgian journalist Michel Collon observes
that “Information is already a battlefield which is part
of war.”
36
Seeking Facts About the Houla Massacre
Shortly after the news spread about the Houla
massacre, netizen media sites included articles which
revealed that the area where the massacre was carried
out was under the control of the Free Syrian Army, not
of the Syrian government. A Russian news team had
gained access to the site the day following the massacre
and did interviews to determine what had happened.
Their report was originally published in Russia but soon
was translated into English.
Their account noted that Houla is an admini-
strative area, made up of three villages. It is not the
name of a town. Some of this area had been under
control of armed insurgents for a number of weeks. The
Syrian army maintained certain checkpoints. The
Russian journalistsaccount explains that on the eve-
ning of May 24, the Free Syrian Army launched an
operation to take control of the checkpoints, bringing
600-800 armed insurgents from different areas.
At the same time that there was the fight over the
checkpoints, several armed insurgents went into certain
homes and massacred the members of several families.
Among the families targeted was a family related to a
recently elected People’s Assembly representative. This
family and another family that were killed were said to
be families that supported the Syrian government.
“Other victims included the family of two journalists
for Top News and New Orient Express, press agencies
associated with Voltaire Network,” reports the news
Page 29
and analysis site Voltairenet.
37
Soon after the news of the massacre appeared,
there were articles challenging the claims that it was
the work of the Syrian government. In his article
“Death Squads Ravage Syrian Town – West Calls for
‘Action,’ Tony Cartalucci of the Land Destroyer
Report blog, writes “‘Cui Bono?’ To whose benefit
does it serve to massacre very publicly entire families
in close quarters and broadcast the images of their
handiwork worldwide?”
38
He argues that this is in no
way in the Syrian government’s interest.
In another article he points to a U.K. government
official blaming the deaths on “artillery fire” by the
government. Claiming to be responding to such
reports, several governments including the U.K.
government expelled Syrian diplomats. Even though
these claims were soon demonstrated to be false,
Carlucci points out that there was no retraction from
the U.K. government or reversal of the expulsion of
Syrian diplomats. Cartalucci writes:
39
U.K. Foreign Office Minister, Alistair
Burt, peddling what is now a confirmed
fabrication, told for days to the public as
the West maneuvered to leverage it against
the Syrian government. The UN has now
confirmed that artillery fired by govern-
ment troops were not responsible for the
massacre, and instead carried out by
unidentified militants. Despite this, the
U.K. has failed to retract earlier accusa-
tions and has instead expelled Syrian diplo-
mats in an increasingly dangerous, irratio-
nal, aggressive posture.
Others online recognized that a photo BBC
posted which was allegedly of the corpses from the
Houla Massacre, was actually a photo that had been
taken in 2003 of deaths in Iraq. Describing how the
misrepresentation was detected, Sy Walker explains on
his blog:
40
The information on which it’s based comes
from a pro-Syrian tweeter called Hey Joud,
whom I’ve found to be well informed and
savvy.
A friend of this tweeter discovered the
misrepresentation and tweeted about it:
“@BBCWorld propaganda: http://image
shack.us/photo/my-image showing a pic
of bodies from Iraq claiming it’s the
?#HoulaMassacre? ?#Syria?
BBC changed the photo, Walker explains, adding:
This is not the first time I’ve reported on
image fakery with regard to Syria. The
western media’s sustained attack on that
beleaguered nation has now been underway
for more than a year. A comprehensive
account of all its deceptions and misreport-
ing over that period would fill many vol-
umes.
In a blog post titled “Houla Hoax,” Mathias
Broeckers also comments on the BBC presenting the
2003 Iraq photo as a photo of Houla. Broeckers
writes:
41
It is the forbidden geopolitical agenda, the
big Picture that isn’t talked about, as op-
posed to the horrors by which the wars are
legitimized.
Other online journalists comment on the bias of
the United Nations Human Rights Council and its
inability to do an objective investigation of the facts of
the Houla Massacre. Reporting about an interaction
between an anti-war activist from the “No War Net-
work,” Marinella Corregia, and Rupert Colville,
spokesman for the Human Rights Council, an article on
the Uprooted Palestinians blog is titled “UN report on
Houla massacre? But they only talk to Syrian opposi-
tion – by phone.” Colville explains to Corregia that the
Human Rights Council will do its investigation by
speaking with the local network of opposition members
they have contact with in Syria by phone, with opposi-
tion members they have met in Turkey and with opposi-
tion members they have met in Geneva.
42
Martin
Janssen, a Dutch Middle East expert and journalist who
reports from Damascus and whose articles appear
online is also concerned that there are other important
sources of information that have information about
what happened, but that the Human Relations Council
investigators will not speak with them because the
investigators are only interested in hearing from opposi-
tion sources.
43
Janssen said that he was in contact with a Catholic
organization in the area of Houla, a monastery in Qara
in the Homs-Hana region, and the two Russian journal-
ists, Marat Musin and Olga Kulygina, who were able to
visit Houla the day after the massacre, on May 25 with
a TV crew. Jenssen reported that Musin and Kulygina
tried to offer their findings to the UN Special Commis-
sion on Human Rights doing the investigation, but that
the Commission was not interested in hearing from
Page 30
them. Colville indicated that the sources the investiga-
tors had were adequate because all their other sources
had already informed them that the ‘shabibha’ were
responsible for the massacre. The Commission was not
interested in hearing from anyone with different views
or with information different from that given to them
by the opposition.
The online discussion in response to Janssen’s
article was a serious discussion critiquing the main-
stream media and putting forward the criteria of what
a media should do. The discussion is an important one
as it sets out both the failings of the current main-
stream media and the needed objectives for a more
competent media.
Netizen Journalism Coverage of Houla Massacre
Along with the account of what happened in the
al Houla region, were articles proposing a broader
perspective. This included historical background
describing where the U.S. and NATO utilized death
squads in prior conflicts. One article “Syria Under
Attack by Globalist Death Squads,” by Bramdon
Turbeville presents background on how certain U.S.
officials including Robert S. Ford, the former U.S.
Ambassador to Syria, and John Negroponte who was
U.S. Ambassador to Honduras in 1981-1985 and later
in Iraq, supported death squads first in Nicaragua
(known as the “Salvador Option”) and later in Iraq.
44
Turbeville’s article and articles by others like the
article titled, “The Salvadorian Option for Syria: US-
NATO Sponsored Death Squads Integrate ‘Opposition
Forces” by Michel Chossudovsky, put the death squads
functioning in Syria in this historical context.
Along with the articles I am describing that are
available in English, there are also a wide range of
similar articles online in French, German, and other
languages. There are also online discussions and
comments about the Syria conflict. A collection of
articles, “The Houla Massacre: The Disinformation
Campaign,” available at Global Research website, lists
a number of the articles published on the media war
over the Syrian conflict.
45
There are various forms of
online discussions. One such discussion on an online
forum was initiated with the post, “Houla Massacre,
Syria: What If?” The discussion considered whether
the Syrian government claims that it was not responsi-
ble for the massacre was or wasn’t a lie. Online
sources referred to in discussions like this could be
either mainstream media or alternative media sources.
Through discussion, referring to various articles and
details, netizens in this online forum concluded that
armed insurgents were to blame, not the Syrian govern-
ment.
46
The Media and Syrian Sovereignty
Since it is rare at the current time that the main-
stream western media deviates from a hostility toward
the Syrian government and a sympathy with the armed
insurgents, it seems significant that in Germany one of
the mainstream national newspapers, the Frankfurter
Allgmeine Zeitung has printed a significant story
documenting the role of the Free Syrian Army in the
Houla massacre. The journalist, Rainer Hermann,
speaks Arabic. He has been reporting from the Middle
East for over 22 years and he did his thesis on modern
Syrian social history. His article “Abermals Massaker
in Syrien” appeared in the Frankfurter Allgmeine
Zeitung on June 7.
47
His article had been welcomed by many netizens
and was reprinted at various online news sites. Several
online sites featured the article and offered an English
translation of it. The story collaborated the report of the
Russian journalists that the Free Syrian Army insur-
gents were behind the Houla massacre.
Similarly there was an anonymous criticism of
Rainer’s article on the Houla massacre from opposition
forces, and Rainer wrote a second article “The Extermi-
nation” responding to the criticism.
48
His article appears
to be in response to sources who are troubled over the
attacks and discrimination that the armed insurgents
have been introducing into the Syrian struggle, but it is
perhaps also an indication that netizen journalism is
having some effect in the current media war over Syria.
Similarly, there was a report by the British media
criticism site, Media Lens on the low key recognition
by a BBC journalist that it is not adequate to blame the
Houla massacre on Syria’s President Assad, as several
of the media was doing, without more knowledge of
what actually happened, and with an approach which
includes more shades of gray rather than just treating it
as a stark black or white issue.
Netizen Journalism and the UN
After the Houla massacre, the Syrian conflict,
some say, appeared to be at a turning point. Russia’s
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had an article arguing
that there are lessons that have been learnt from what
Page 31
happened with Libya and that the UN has to take into
account these lessons. In his op-ed, “Oh the Rights
Side of History,” Lavrov writes:
49
When deciding to support UN Security
Council Resolution 1970 and making no
objection to Resolution 1973 on Libya, we
believed that these decisions would help
limit the excessive use of force and pave
the way for a political settlement. Unfortu-
nately, the actions undertaken by NATO
countries under these resolutions led to
their grave violation and support for one of
the parties to the civil war, with the goal of
ousting the existing regime – damaging in
the process the authority of the Security
Council … .
It is clear that after what had happened in
Libya it was impossible to go along with
the UN Security Council taking decisions
that would not be adequately explicit and
would allow those responsible for their
implementation to act at their own discre-
tion. Any mandate given on behalf of the
entire international community should be
as clear and precise as possible in order to
avoid ambiguity. It is therefore important
to understand what is really happening in
Syria and how to help that country to pass
though this painful stage of its history.
Along with such comments from diplomats,
netizens covered and discussed what the UN was doing
about the Syrian conflict. A summary by Moon of
Alabama of the General Assembly meeting discussing
the Houla Massacre described how the UN Secretary
General, the Secretary General of the League of Arab
States and other officials, along with many of the
representatives of the nations at the UN, blamed the
massacre on the Syrian government, even though there
were few facts available as to what had happened and
who was behind the events.
50
Though rarely mentioned
in the mainstream media, there were comments by the
ambassadors of several member states including the
Syrian Ambassador and the Ambassador of the Rus-
sian Federation, those of Venezuela, of Nicaragua, and
a few others calling for an investigation, into the
details of the massacre, before making any rush to
judgment.
51
Conclusion: Channels of Communication
for International Relations
In the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, the misrep-
resentations by the mainstream western media and Arab
satellite media have seemed difficult to counter effec-
tively. In the Cheonan situation, the misrepresentations
were effectively countered both internally and on an
international level. In his presentation to journalists at
the press conference marking the start of China’s
presidency of the UN Security Council in March 2011,
China’s Ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, recog-
nized the impact of the international media on the work
of the Security Council. He went so far as to refer to the
international media as the “16
th
member of the Security
Council.”
52
The Cheonan conflict is one where the
international critique of the South Korean Cheonan
report was an encouragement to at least some members
of the Security Council, to act diplomatically to calm
the conflict. Similarly, the North Korean Ambassador
held a rare press conference and indicated that he found
encouragement in the international support for the
critique. Along with the many online articles by
netizens critiquing the role of the South Korean govern-
ment in the Cheonan conflict, progressive media in
South Korea covered the activities of those challenging
the Cheonan report and also reported on the Russian
investigation of the problem. There were also articles in
the Chinese media and the Russian media that critiqued
the South Korean efforts to blame the breakup of the
ship on North Korea.
The actions of the Security Council in the Libya
and the Syria conflicts show the serious nature of the
problem Medvedev referred to in his talk in March.
Looking at the problem it is important to analyze
the nature of the media manipulation and the means of
responding to such distorted information.
In his book The Nerves of Government Karl W.
Deutsch writes that:
Men have long and often concerned them-
selves with the power of governments,
much as some observers try to assess the
muscle power of a horse or an athlete. Oth-
ers have described the laws and institutions
of states, much as anatomists describe the
skeleton or organs of a body. This book
concerns itself less with the bones or mus-
cles of the body politic than with its nerves
its channels of communication and deci-
sion.
53
Page 32
Deutsch goes on to explain that “it might be
profitable to look upon government somewhat less as
a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem
of steering and communication.” He maintains that, “It
is communication, that is, the ability to transmit
messages and to react to them, that makes organ-
izations … .” He proposes that this is true for the cells
in the human body as it is for the “organizations of
thinking human beings in social groups.”
54
The significance of this perspective is that
distorted messages are the basis for distorted social
organization. A social organization that can make an
accurate assessment of the conditions on the ground in
a conflict, is in a position to analyze what is needed for
a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
There are a number of scholarly articles studying
the impact of the Internet on media and on communi-
cation among netizens. Some of the more interesting
articles focus on the communication channels created,
and the nature of not only the transmission of informa-
tion, but also its reception.
Deutsch makes a distinction between power and
information. He writes that “Power, we might say,
produces changes, information triggers them in a
suitable receiver.”
55
It is not the amount of what is
transmitted that is necessarily significant, but rather
the nature of what it is, what the receiver is, and the
effect of the information on the receiver. Deutsch gives
the example of the relative weakness of the Nazi
quisling government in Norway at the end of WWII,
and the relative strength of the resistance because it
had better channels of communication.
56
Joseph S. Nye in an article, “The Future of
American Power,” argues that information is indeed
important in the battle for the U.S. to try to maintain its
power.
57
He writes that, “Conventional wisdom holds
that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the
information age, the state (or the nonstate actor) with
the best story may sometime win.”
58
He advises, “It is
time for a new narrative about the future of U.S.
power.”
59
But for him whether or not the story helps to
obtain the desired goal is important, not the truth or
accuracy of the narrative.
At a program at the Japan Society in New York
where Nye spoke about his book The Future of Power,
he was asked a question about his view of U.S. actions
in the NATO war against Libya. Nye responded that
what President Barack Obama had done with respect
to the NATO war against Libya was exactly right.
60
Obama had waited until he had the needed narrative to
justify the military action against Libya. It was impor-
tant, Nye explained, that the U.S. not be seen as once
again attacking a Muslim country as had happened with
Iraq. Instead the Arab League and the UN Security
Council resolutions provided a narrative “of a legiti-
mate enforcement of humanitarian responsibility to
protect civilians.” This provided Obama with the ability
to claim that the U.S. was taking “collective responsibil-
ity,” not that the U.S. was undertaking a military
intervention.
The problem with Nye’s argument is that he is
focusing on how the world perceives the action he is
taking, not on the actual nature of the action itself.
But what happened in Libya was a military action
to support an armed insurgency against the Libyan
government. The NATO bombing of Libya was not for
the protection of civilians, but for the protection of an
armed insurrection against the government and people
of Libya.
Similarly, when the UN Security Council passed
UN Resolution 1973, many of the Ambassadors who
spoke said the resolution was to protect peaceful
protesters in Libya. A few days later the Russian Federa-
tion’s President Vladimir Putin, who was then the
Prime Minister of Russia, said that the “protection of
civilians” was but a pretext by which to intervene in the
internal affairs of a sovereign nation.
61
Nye’s contention that a convincing narrative can
gain support for actions, fails to recognize the harm in
lives lost and the devastation wrought that results from
the use of “convincing narratives” to justify actions that
are contrary to the obligations of the UN Charter and
the pursuit of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Also
such duplicity sullies the image of the United Nations
amongst peace loving people around the world.
I have briefly surveyed research in English about
Chinese netizens and have found important scholarship
developing in this field. Similarly, there is scholarship
in journalism which explores the relationship of alterna-
tive journalism and citizenship. I want to propose that
there is a need for research in the field of international
relations and communication which explores the new
forms of online media and discussion that are develop-
ing, often across geographic borders. Those who took
up the struggle against the misinformation in the
Cheonan case or against the media attacks on Libya and
Syria are pioneering this relatively new form of alterna-
tive journalism, netizen journalism. Speaking about the
Page 33
potential for such a journalism Michael Hauben, whose
pioneering research on the social impact of the Internet
recognized the emergence of the netizens, writes:
62
As people continue to connect to Usenet
and other discussion forums, the collective
population will contribute back to the
human community this new form of news.
Hauben recognized that a new form of news was
evolving which would include both the contributions
of netizens and the capabilities of the Internet. De-
scribing the frustration of many netizens with the
traditional media that they had to rely on before the
Internet, Hauben wrote, “Today, similarly, the need for
a broader and more cooperative gathering and report-
ing of the News has helped create the new online
media that is gradually supplementing traditional
forms of journalism.” What Hauben realized is there
was a symbiosis developing between the news,
netizens and the Internet. These were evolving into an
interdependent partnership which had become substan-
tial. He wrote, “the collective body of people assisted
by (Usenet) software, has grown larger than any
individual newspaper … .”
There are many examples that have developed of
netizens making their contributions to the News and
the Net.
One important example of this new media was
the anti-cnn website created in China in 2008.
63
The
website was created in response to western media
distortions of the Tibet demonstrations and riots and
the website critiqued these distortions.
Netizens in South Korea and in various online
sites around the world took on to challenge the inaccu-
racies and serious problems in the South Korean
government investigation into the sinking of the Cheo-
nan. Their work had an effect at the UN. In 2011, there
was an online critique by netizens of the UN Security
Council misrepresentation of the armed insurgency in
Libya as peaceful demonstrators needing foreign
military intervention for protection. The UN can only
benefit from such input. It is still too soon to know
whether netizens will be able to have a significant
impact on the UN in its handling of the crisis in Syria,
but those defending Syrian sovereignty have received
support and encouragement from the increasing spread
of netizen journalism.
The significance of this new form of journalism
is that there are netizens who are dedicated to doing
the research and analysis to determine the interests and
actions that are too often hidden from public view. By
revealing the actual forces at work, netizens are making
it possible to have a more accurate grasp of whose
interests are being served and what is at stake in the
events that make up the news. If such a journalism can
help to provide the UN with a more accurate under-
standing of the conflicts it is considering, it can help to
make more likely the peaceful resolution of these
conflicts.
Notes
1. “Conference Organized by the Russian Council for International
Affairs,” 23 March 2012, Moscow.
http://eng.news.krem lin.ru
/transcripts/3582
2. He refers to how Libya and Syria have been the victim of this
politics. “How are we to see the mantras repeated by particular
countries that consider themselves the main exporters of democracy
if, say in the Libyan and now the Syrian cases, countries whose
internal political lives are governed by completely different norms
are chosen as models to follow for democratic development?”
3. “Questions Linger 100 Days after the Cheonan Sinking,”
Hankyoreh, July 3 2010, online at:
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/eng
lishedition/enational/428715.html
4. Ronda Hauben, In Cheonan Dispute UN Security Council Acts
in Accord with UN Charter, Sept. 5, 2010 http://blogs.taz.de
/netizenblog/2010/09/05/in_cheonan_dispute_un_security_counc
il_discovers_un_charter/
5. The article, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de
Peninsula de Corea” by Maurizio Guerrero, the UN Correspondent
for Notimex (the Mexican News Agency), was published in la
Economia on July 5, 2010. http://enlaeconomia.com/news
/2010/07/05/69561 (No longer available.)
6. Security Council, S/2010/281, “Letter dated 4 June 2010”,
7. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010 Letter, https://www
.voltairenet.org/article166269.html (scroll down and look on the
left).
8. Media Stakeout: Informal comments to the Media by the
President of the Security Council and the Permanent Representative
of Mexico, H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the
sinking of the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.
[Webcast: Archived Video 5 minutes] http://webcast.un.org/ram
gen/ondemand/stakeout/2010/so10 0614pm3.rm (No longer avail-
able.)
9. Video of North Korean Ambassador Press Conference http://
webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/pressconference/2010
/pc100615am.rm (No longer available.)
10. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13
https://www.security
councilreport.org/un-documents/document/NKorea-SPRST-2010-
13.php
11. Lee Jae-hoon, “UN Condemns Attack on the Cheonan: Pres-
idential Statement allows for a ‘double interpretation,’ and does not
blame or place consequences upon North Korea,” Hankyoreh, July
10, 2010.
www.hani.co.kr/arti/englishedition/enational/429768.html
Page 34
12. Ronda Hauben, “Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan
Tragedy,” OhmyNews International, June 8, 2010. Ronda
Hauben, “Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Controversy,”
OhmyNews International, June 29, 2010.
13. PSPD Report Sent to Security Council, 1,
https://www.people
power21.org/Peace/584228 2, https://www.peoplepower21.org/En
glish/40150 3, https://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40157.
14. Yeran Kim, Irkwon Jeong, Hyoungkoo Khang and Bomi Kim,
“Blogging as ‘Recoding’: A Case Study of the Discursive War
Over the Sinking of the Cheonan,Media International Australia,
November 2011, No. 141, pp. 98-106.
15.
https://shadowproof.com/2010/06/15/the-sinking-of-the-cheo
nan-we-are-being-lied-to/
16. From “PCC-772 Cheonan: South Korean Government Admits
the Deception (and then Lies about It),” June 30, 2010. (No longer
available.)
17. The press conference was held on July 9, 2010 at the Foreign
Correspondents’ Club of Japan. The program was titled “Lee and
Suh: Inconsistencies in the Cheonan Report.” (See https://arxiv
.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1006/1006.0680.pdf). See also, David
Cyranoski, “Controversy over South Korea’s Sunken Ship,”
Nature, July 8, 2010, online at:
http://www.nature.com/news/2010
/100708/full/news.2010.343.html?s=news_rss
18. The Russian team proposed a different theory for how the
Cheonan sank. They had observed that the ship’s propeller had
become entangled in a fishing net and subsequently that a possible
cause of the sinking could have been that the ship had hit the
antennae of a mine which then exploded. “Russian Navy Team’s
Analysis of the Cheonan Incident,” Posted on July 27, Hankyoreh,
modified on July 29.
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition
/e_northkorea/432230.html The Russian Experts document is
titled “Data from the Russian Naval Expert Group’s Investigation
into the Cause of the South Korean Naval Vessel Cheonan’s
Sinking.” See also “Russia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that
Sinking Cheonan Ship was Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27,
2010, Hankyoreh, modified on July 28, 2010.
.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html
19. Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubts Surface on
North Korean Role in Ship Sinking”, Los Angeles Times, July 23,
2010.
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jul-23-la-
fg- korea-torpedo-20100724-story.html
20. Donald P. Gregg, “Testing North Korean Waters,” New York
Times, August 31, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/opi
nion/01iht-edgregg.html
21. Records at the UN show that the practice of sending such
correspondence to the Security Council dates back to 1946. This
is the date when the symbol S/NC/ was introduced as the symbol
for “Communications received from private individuals and non-
governmental bodies relating to matters of which the Security
Council is seized.” The Security Council has the practice of peri-
odically publishing a list of the documents it receives, the name
and organization of the sender, and the date they are received. The
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council states that
the list is to be circulated to all representatives on the Security
Council. A copy of any communication on the list is to be given
to any nation on the Security Council that requests it.
There are over 450 such lists indicated in the UN records. As each
list can contain several or a large number of documents the
Security Council has received, the number of such documents is
likely to be in the thousands.
Under Rule 39 of the Council procedures, the Security Council
may invite any person it deems competent for the purpose to supply
it with information on a given subject. Thus the two procedures in
the Security Council’s provisional rules give it the basis to find
assistance on issues it is considering from others outside the
Council and to consider the contribution as part of its deliberation
22. Tae-ho Kwon,” South Korean Government Impeded Russian
Team’s Cheonan Investigation: Donald Gregg,” Hankyoreh, Sep-
tember 4, 2010.
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/englishedition/enorth
korea/438299.html
23. See for example “PSPD’s Stance on the Presidential Statement
of the UNSC Regarding the Sinking of the ROK Naval Vessel
Cheonan,
https://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40247
libya (No longer available.)
25. “Russia Today, ‘Airstrikes in Libya did not take place’
Russian military,” March 1, 2011
http://www.rt.com/news/air
strikes-libya-russian-military/
26. “Libya, the UN, and Netizen Journalism,” The Amateur
Computerist, Winter 2012, vol. 21 No. 1
http://www.ais.org/~jrh
/acn/ACn21-1.pdf
27. Comments from discussion of article on “Comment Is Free” at
the Guardian (U.K.), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree
/2011/mar/23/libya-ceasefire-consensus-russia-china-india
28. http://blog.hiddenharmonies.org/2011/03/libya-whats-going-on
/#comments
29. “An Open Letter to People’s of Africa and the World from
Concerned Africans.”
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn21-1.pdf,
pp. 23-26.
30. “Abuse of UN Processes in Security Council Actions Against
Libya,”
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn21-1.pdf, pp. 12-21.
31. See for example “What Does Gaddafi’s Fall Mean for Africa?
http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn21-1.pdf, pp. 26-27.
32. See Introduction, “Netizen Journalism and the Story of the
Resistance to the NATO Aggression Against Libya,”
.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn21-1.pdf, pp. 1-2.
33. See for example: Ali Hashem, Interview at the Real News,
https://therealnews.com/ahashempt10319
34. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012 /jun/02/syria-
intervention-observer
35. Alex Thompson’s blog, Sunday June 3, 2012. http://blogs
.channel4.com/alex-thomsons-view/search-houla-killers/1811
36. Michel Collon, Liar’s Poker, International Action Center, New
York, 2002, p. 45. (This is an English translation. The book is
originally published in French.)
37. Marat Musin, the Houla Massacre: Opposition Terrorists
“Killed Families Loyal to the Government,” Detailed Investigation,
Global Research, June 1, 2012, ANNA NEWS (Original Russian)
and syrianews.cc, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php ?context
=va&aid=31184. See for example: Thierry Meyssan, “The Houla
Affair Highlights Western Intelligence Gap in Syria,” http://www
.voltairenet.org/The-Houla-affair-highlights. Investigators from
Vesti24: Marat Musin, Olga Kulygina (Al-Houla, Syria)
38. May 26, 2012 “Death Squad’s Ravage Syrian Town West
Calls for Action,” May 27, 2012. http://landdestroyer.blogspot
Page 35
.com/2012/05/death-squads-ravage-syrian-town-west.html
39. “West’s Houla Syria Narrative Crumbles Expels Syrian Dip-
/wests-houla-syria-narrative-crumbles.html
40. “Houla Horror Truth Is Elusive Lies Are Easier to Spot,”
https://mediawerkgroepsyrie.wordpress.com/2012/05/27/fake-
bbc-pictures-about-houla-horror-truth-is-elusive-lies-are-easier-
to-spot/
41. Mathias Broeckers, “Der Hula-Hoax,” http://www.broeckers
.com/2012/06/05/der-hula-hoax/ (in German)
42. “UN Commissioner report on Houla? But they only talk to
Syrian opposition by phone,”
http://www.rt.com/news/houla-
massacre-un-syria-635/
43. June 2, 2012, The Horrors of Houla (The blog is in Dutch De
verschrikkingen van Houla)
https://mediawerkgroepsyrie.word
press.com/2012/06/10/de-verschrikkingen-van-houla/
44. Bramdon Turbeville, “Syria under Attack by Globalist Death
Squads,” May 27, 2012, Syria360 blog, https://newsghana.com
.gh/syria-under-attack-by-globalist-death-squad-experts/. “The
Salvador Option for Syria”: U.S.-NATO Sponsored Death Squads
Integrate “Opposition Forces” by Prof. Michel Chossudovsky
2012-05-28,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context
=va&aid =31359
45. The collection of articles, “The Houla Massacre: The Dis-
information Campaign,” at Global Research, http://www.global
research.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=31399
46. Forum with discussion, Houla Massacre, Syria: What If?
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=237195
47. “Abermals Massaker in Syrien” Frankfurter Allgmeine
Zeitung, June 7, 2012, partial English translation in Prime
German Paper: Syrian Rebels Committed Houla Massacre,” Moon
of Alabama, 6-9-2012,
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2012/06
/prime-german-paper-syrian-rebels-committed-houla-
massacre.html
Another article appears on the National Review website, June 9,
2012 by John Rosenthal, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner
/302261/report-rebels-responsible-houla-massacre-john-rosenthal#
48. “New FAZ Piece On Houla Massacre: ‘The Extermination,’”
Moon of Alabama, June 15, 2012, http://wwwmoonofalabama
.org/2012/06/new-faz-piece-on-houla-massacre-the-extermin
ation.html
49. Lavrov, “On the Right Side of History,” https://www.voltaire
net.org/article174662.html
“When deciding to support UN Security Council Resolution 1970
and making no objection to Resolution 1973 on Libya, we
believed that these decisions would help limit the excessive use of
force and pave the way for a political settlement. Unfortunately,
the actions undertaken by NATO countries under these resolutions
led to their grave violation and support for one of the parties to the
civil war, with the goal of ousting the existing regime damaging
in the process the authority of the Security Council … .
It is clear that after what had happened in Libya it was impossible
to go along with the UN Security Council taking decisions that
would not be adequately explicit and would allow those respon-
sible for their implementation to act at their own discretion. Any
mandate given on behalf of the entire international community
should be as clear and precise as possible in order to avoid
ambiguity. It is therefore important to understand what is really
happening in Syria and how to help that country to pass though this
painful stage of its history.”
50. See for example the summary by Moon of Alabama, -
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2012/06/the-syria-discussion-at-
the-un-general-assembly.html See also “The UN and the Houla
Massacre: The Information battlefield”
blog/2012/06/12/un-and-houla-massacre/
51. See “The UN and the Houla Massacre: The Information Battle-
field.”
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/06/12/un-and-houla-ma
ssacre/
52. Ronda Hauben, “International Media ‘the 16
th
Member of the
Security Council,’”
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/03/15/me
dia_and_security_council/
53. Karl Deutsch, Nerves of Government, The Free Press, New
York, 1966, p. xxvii.
54. Ibid., p.77.
55. Ibid., p. 146.
56. Ibid., p. 153.
57. Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2010 Vol. 89, Issue 6, pp. 2-12.
58. Ibid., p. 2.
59. Ibid., p.10.
60. Ronda Hauben, “On Libya, Soft Power, and the Protection of
Civilians as Pretext,” Global Time, April 18, 2011.
61. Ronda Hauben, UN Security Council March 17 Meeting to
Authorize Bombing of Libya all Smoke and Mirrors.
.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/03/30/un _march_17_meeting_res1973/
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Putin and Medvedev Lead Opposing Coali-
tions in the Russian Elite,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 26,
2011,
https://jamestown.org/program/putin-and-medvedev-lead-op
posing-coalitions-in-the-russian-elite/
62. Michael Hauben and Ronda Hauben, Netizens: On the History
and Impact of Usenet and the Internet, Los Alamitos, CA, IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1997, Chapter 13, p. 233. See also the
Preface, and Chapter 1.
63. See for example, Ronda Hauben, “Netizens Defy Western
Media Fictions of China,” http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn20-2
.pdf, pp. 7-9.
*This article appears in the Amateur Computerist Vol. 22 No. 2,
pp. 17-32.
Page 36
[Editor’s Note: A version of the following article
appeared in Rhetoric and Communications E-journal,
Issue 27, March 2017. That journal can be seen online
Considerations on the
Significance of the Net
and the Netizens*
by Ronda Hauben
Topics: netizens, communication processes, communication
channels, citizen empowerment, models for democracy, nerves of
government, social impact
Abstract
The book Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet
and the Internet celebrates in 2017 the 20
th
anniversary of its
publication in English and Japanese editions in 1997. The book
documents how along with the development of the Internet came
the emergence of a new form of citizen the netizen. In his
pioneering online research in the early 1990s Michael Hauben
gathered data and did analysis demonstrating that not only the
Internet but also the netizen would have an important impact on
society. This article explores Hauben’s research recognizing that
netizens are a new social force. The article also looks at other
contributions which help to provide a conceptual framework to
understand this new social force. Media theorist Mark Poster’s
work about netizens is discussed, as is Karl Deutsch’s theoretical
understanding of the role of communication in creating a new
model for good government. But it is the candlelight revolution by
citizens and netizens in 2016-2017 in South Korea which demon-
strates in practice the importance of the netizen forging a new
governance model for participatory democracy.
Key Words: netizens, communications, empower-
ment, impact, citizen, watchdog, democracy
Introduction
With the introduction of the Internet, the question
has been raised as to what its impact will be on society.
One significant result of the impact already is the
emergence of the netizen. Michael Hauben’s work in
the 1990s recognized the significant impact not only of
the development of the Internet but also of the role of
the netizen in forging new social and political forms
and processes.
While the role of netizens in working for social
change has been documented around the world, the
role of netizens in working for social and political
change has been an especially important aspect of
South Korean experience for nearly the past two
decades. Most recently, however, widespread political
and economic corruption at the highest levels of the
South Korean society has led citizens and netizens to
take part in peaceful but massive candlelight demon-
strations advocating the need for fundamental change in
the political and economic structures of South Korean
society. The question has been raised whether there are
models for such change. In such an environment there
is a need to consider the importance of the Internet and
of the Netizen in helping to forge the new forms for
grassroots participation in the governing structures of
society. At such a time it seems appropriate to consider
the conceptual framework for the role of the netizen in
contributing to a new governing model for society
These developments in South Korea come at a
time when the book Netizens: On the History and
Impact of Usenet and the Internet celebrates the 20
th
anniversary since its publication in 1997, making a
review of the significant contribution of the book
particularly relevant to the events of our time.
Looking Back
Twenty years ago in May 1997, the print edition
of Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and
the Internet was published in English. Later that year,
in October, a Japanese translation of the book was
published. In 2017, we are celebrating the occasion of
the 20
th
Anniversary of these publications.
In honor of this occasion I want to both look back
and forward toward trying to assess the significance of
the book and of Michael Hauben’s discovery of the
emergence of the netizen. I want to begin to consider
what has happened in these 20 years toward trying to
understand the nature of this advance and the develop-
ments the advance makes possible.
By the early 1990s, Hauben recognized that the
Internet was a significant new development and that it
would have an impact on our world. He was curious
about what that impact would be and what could help it
to be a beneficial impact. He had raised a series of
questions about the online experience. He received
responses to these questions from a number of people.
Reading and analyzing the responses he explained:
There are people online who actively con-
tribute to the development of the Net. These
people understand the value of collective
work and the communal aspects of public
communications. These are the people who
Page 37
discuss and debate topics in a constructive
manner, who e-mail answers to people and
provide help to newcomers, who maintain
FAQ files and other public information
repositories, who maintain mailing lists,
and so on. These are the people who dis-
cuss the nature and role of this new com-
munications medium. These are the people
who as citizens of the Net I realized were
Netizens.
The book was compiled from a series of articles
written by Hauben and his co-author Ronda Hauben
which were posted on the Net as they were written and
which sometimes led to substantial comments and
discussion.
The most important article in the book was
Hauben’s article, “The Net and Netizens: The Impact
the Net Has on People’s Lives.” Hauben opened the
article with the prophetic words, which appeared
online first in 1993:
Welcome to the 21
st
Century. You are a
Netizen (a Net Citizen) and you exist as a
citizen of the world thanks to the global
connectivity that the Net makes possible.
You consider everyone as your compatriot.
You physically live in one country but you
are in contact with much of the world via
the global computer network. Virtually,
you live next door to every other single
Netizen in the world. Geographical separa-
tion is replaced by existence in the same
virtual space.
1
Hauben goes on to explain that what he is pre-
dicting is not yet the reality. In fact, many people
around the world were just becoming connected to the
Internet during the period in which these words were
written and posted on various different networks that
existed at the time.
But now twenty years after the publication of the
print edition of Netizens, this description is very much
the reality for our time and for many it is hard to
remember or understand the world without the Net.
Similarly, in his articles that are collected in the
Netizens book, Hauben looked at the pioneering vision
that gave birth to the Internet. He looked at the role of
computer science in the building of the earlier network
called the ARPANET, at the potential impact that the
Net and Netizen would have on politics, on journalism,
and on the revolution in ideas that the Net and Netizen
would bring about, comparing this to the advance
brought about by the printing press. The last chapter of
the book is an article Hauben wrote early on about the
need for a watchdog function over government in order
to make democracy possible.
By the time the book was published in a print
edition, it had been freely available online for three
years. This was a period when the U.S. government was
determined to change the nature of the Net from the
public and scientific infrastructure that had been built
with public and educational funding around the world
to a commercially driven entity. While there were
people online at the time promoting the privatization
and commercialization of the Internet, the concept of
netizen was embraced by others, many of whom sup-
ported the public and collaborative nature of the
Internet and who wanted this aspect to grow and
flourish.
The article “The Net and Netizens” grew out of a
research project that Hauben had done for a class at
Columbia University in Computer Ethics. Hauben was
interested in the impact of the Net and so he formulated
several questions and sent them out online. This was a
pioneering project at the time and the results he got
back helped to establish the fact that already in 1993 the
Net was having a profound impact on the lives of a
number of people.
Hauben put together the results of his research in
the article “The Net and Netizens” and posted it online.
This helped the concept of netizen to spread and to be
embraced around the world. The netizen, it is important
to clarify, was not intended to describe every net user.
Rather netizen was the conceptualization of those on the
Net who took up to support the public and collaborative
nature of the Net and to help it to grow and flourish.
Netizens at the time often had the hope that their efforts
online would be helpful toward creating a better world.
Hauben described this experience in a speech he
gave at a conference in Japan. Subsequently in 1997,
his description became the preface to the Netizens book,
Hauben explained:
In conducting research five years ago online
to determine people’s uses of the global
computer communications network, I be-
came aware that there was a new social
institution, an electronic commons, develop-
ing. It was exciting to explore this new
social institution. Others online shared this
excitement. I discovered from those who
Page 38
wrote me that the people I was writing
about were citizens of the Net or Netizens.
2
Hauben’s work which is included in the book and
the subsequent work he did recognized the advance
made possible by the Internet and the emergence of the
Netizen.
The book is not only about what is wrong with
the old politics, or media, but more importantly, the
implications for the emergence of new developments,
of a new politics, of a new form of citizenship, and of
what Hauben called the “poor man’s version of the
mass media.” He focused on what was new or emerg-
ing and recognized the promise for the future repre-
sented by what was only at the time in an early stage of
development.
For example, Hauben recognized that the collab-
orative contributions for a new media would far exceed
what the old media had achieved. “As people continue
to connect to Usenet and other discussion forums,” he
wrote, “the collective population will contribute back
to the human community this new form of news.”
3
In order to consider the impact of Hauben’s work
and of the publication of the book, both in its online
form and in the print edition, I want to look at some of
the implications of what has been written since about
netizens.
Mark Poster on the Implications of the
Concept of Netizen
One interesting example is in a book on the
impact of the Internet and globalization by Mark
Poster, a media theorist. The book’s title is Informa-
tion Please. The book was published in 2006. While
Poster does not make any explicit reference to the
book Netizens he finds the concept of the netizen that
he has seen used online to be an important one. He
offers some theoretical discussion on the use of the
“netizen” concept.
Referring to the concept of citizen, Poster is
interested in the relationship of the citizen to gov-
ernment, and in the empowering of the citizen to be
able to affect the actions of one’s government. He
considers the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen as a monument from the French Revolution of
1789. He explains that the idea of the Rights of Man
was one effort to empower people to deal with govern-
ments. But this was not adequate, though the concept
of the rights of the citizen, he recognizes, was an
important democratic milestone.
“Human rights and citizenship,” he writes, “are
tied together and reinforce each other in the battle
against the ruling classes.”
4
He proposes that “these
rights are ensured by their inscription in constitutions
that found governments and they persist in their associ-
ation with those governments as the ground of political
authority.”
5
But with the coming of what he calls the age of
globalization, Poster wonders if the concept “citizen”
can continue to signify democracy. He wonders if the
concept is up to the task.
“The conditions of globalization and networked
media,” he writes, “present a new register in which the
human is recast and along with it the citizen.”
6
“The
deepening of globalization processes strips the citizen
of power,” he writes. “As economic processes become
globalized, the nation-state loses its ability to protect its
population. The citizen thereby loses her ability to elect
leaders who effectively pursue her interests.”
7
In this situation, “the figure of the citizen is placed
in a defensive position.”
8
To succeed in the struggle
against globalization he recognizes that there is a need
to find instead of a defensive position, an offensive one.
Also he is interested in the media and its role in
this new paradigm. “We need to examine the role of the
media in globalizing practices that construct new
subjects,” Poster writes. “We need especially to exam-
ine those media that cross national boundaries and to
inquire if they form or may form the basis for a new set
of political relations.”
9
In this context, for the new media, “the important
questions, rather, are these:” he proposes, “Can the new
media promote the construction of new political forms
not tied to historical, territorial powers? What are the
characteristics of new media that promote new political
relations and new political subjects? How can these be
furthered or enhanced by political action?”
10
“In contrast to the citizen of the nation,” Poster
notices, “the name often given to the political subject
constituted on the Net is ‘netizen’.” While Poster makes
it seem that the consciousness among some online of
themselves as “netizens” just appeared online spontane-
ously, this is not accurate.
Before Hauben’s work, netizen as a concept was
rarely if ever referred to. The paper “The Net and
Netizens” introduced and developed the concept of
“netizen.” This paper was widely circulated online.
Gradually the use of the concept of netizen became
Page 39
increasingly common. Hauben’s work was a process of
doing research online, summarizing the research,
analyzing it while welcoming online comments at
various stages of the process and then putting the
research back online, and of people embracing it. This
was the process by which the foundation for the
concept of “netizen” was interactively established.
Considering this background, the observations
that Poster makes of how the concept of “netizen” is
used online represents a recognition of the significant
role for the netizen in the future development of the
body politic. “The netizen,” Poster writes, “might be
the formative figure in a new kind of political relation,
one that shares allegiance to the nation with allegiance
to the Net and to the planetary political spaces it
inaugurates.”
11
This new phenomena, Poster concludes, “will
likely change the relation of forces around the globe.
In such an eventuality, the figure of the netizen might
serve as a critical concept in the politics of democrati-
zation.”
12
The Era of the Netizen
Poster characterizes the current times as the age
of globalization. I want to offer a different view, the
view that we are in an era demarcated by the creation
of the Internet and the emergence of the netizen.
Therefore, a more accurate characterization of this
period is as the “Era of the Netizen.”
The years since the publication of the book
Netizens have been marked by many interesting
developments that have been made possible by the
growth and development of the Internet and the spread
of netizens around the world. I will refer to a few
examples to give a flavor of the kind of developments
I am referring to.
An article by Vinay Kamat in the Reader’s
Opinion section of the Times of India referred to
something I had written. Quoting the article “The Rise
of Netizen Democracy,” the Times of India article said,
“Not only is the Internet a laboratory for democracy,
but the scale of participation and contribution is
unprecedented. Online discussion makes it possible for
netizens to become active individuals and group actors
in social and public affairs. The Internet makes it
possible for netizens to speak out independently of
institutions or officials.”
13
Kamat points to the growing number of netizens
in China and India and the large proportion of the
population in South Korea who are connected to the
Internet. “Will it evolve into a fifth estate? Kamat
asks, contrasting netizens’ discussion online with the
power of the 4th estate, i.e. the mainstream media.
“Will social and political discussion in social
media grow into deliberation?” asks Kamat. “Will opin-
ions expressed be merely ‘rabble rousing’ or will they
be ‘reflective’ instead of ‘impulsive’?”
One must recognize, Kamat explains, the new
situation online and the fact that it is important to
understand the nature of this new media and not merely
look at it through the lens of the old media. What is the
nature of this new media and how does it differ from
the old? This is an important area for further research
and discussion.
Looking for a Model
When visiting South Korea in 2008, I was asked
by a colleague if there is a model for democracy that
could be helpful for South Korea a model imple-
mented in some country, perhaps in Scandinavia.
Thinking about the question I realized it was more
complex than it seemed on the surface.
I realized that one cannot just take a model from
the period before the Internet, from before the emer-
gence of the netizen. It is instead necessary that models
for a more democratic society or nation, in our times, be
models that include netizen participation in the society.
Both South Korea and China are places where the role
not only of citizens but also of netizens is important in
building more democratic structures for the society.
South Korea appears to be the most advanced in grass-
roots efforts to create examples of netizen forms for a
more participatory government decision making pro-
cess.
14
But China is also a place where there are signifi-
cant developments because of the Internet and
netizens.
15
In China there have been a large number of issues
that netizens have taken up online which have then had
an impact on the mainstream media and where the
online discussion has helped to bring about a change in
government policy.
In looking for other models to learn from, how-
ever, I also realized that there is another relevant area of
development. This is the actual process of building the
Net, a prototype which is helpful to consider when
seeking to understand the nature and particularity of the
Page 40
evolving new models for development and participa-
tion represented in the Era of the Netizen.
16
In particular, I want to point to a paper by the
research scientist who many computer and networking
pioneers credit with providing the vision to inspire the
scientific work to create the Internet. This scientist is
JCR Licklider, an experimental psychologist who was
particularly interested in the processes of the brain and
in communication research.
In a paper Licklider wrote with another psycholo-
gist, Robert Taylor, in 1968 a vision was set out to
guide the development of the Internet. The title of the
paper was “The Computer as a Communication De-
vice.”
17
The paper proposed that essential to the
processes of communication is the creation and sharing
of models. That the human mind is adept at creating
models, but that the models created in a single mind
are not helpful in themselves. Instead it is critical that
models be shared and a process of cooperative model-
ing be developed in order to be able to create some-
thing that many people will respect.
18
Nerves of Government
In his article comparing the impact of the Net
with the important impact the printing press had on
society, Hauben wrote, “The Net has opened a channel
for talking to the whole world to an even wider set of
people than did printed books.”
19
I want to focus a bit
on the significance of this characteristic, on the notion
that the Net has opened a communication channel
available to a wide set of people.
In order to have a conceptual framework to
understand the importance of this characteristic, I
recommend the book by Karl Deutsch titled, The
Nerves of Government. In the preface to this book,
Deutsch writes:
This book suggests that it might be prefera-
ble to look upon government somewhat
less as a problem of power and somewhat
more as a problem of steering; and it tries
to show that steering is decisively a matter
of communication.
20
To look at the question of government not as a
problem of power, but as one of steering, of communi-
cation, I want to propose is a fundamental paradigm
shift.
What is the difference?
Political power has to do with the ability to exert
force on something so as to affect its direction and
action. Steering and communication, however, are
related to the process of the transmission of a signal
through a channel. The communication process is one
related to whether a signal is transmitted in a manner
that distorts the signal or whether it is possible to
transmit the signal accurately. The communication
process and the steering that it makes possible through
feedback mechanisms are an underlying framework to
consider in seeking to understand what Deutsch calls
the “Nerves of Government.”
According to Deutsch, a nation can be looked at
as a self-steering communication system of a certain
kind and the messages that are used to steer it are trans-
mitted via certain channels.
Some of the important challenges of our times
relate to the exposure of the distortions of the informa-
tion being spread. For example, the misrepresentations
by the mainstream media about what happened in Libya
in 2011 or what has been happening in Syria since
2011.
21
The creation and dissemination of channels of
communication that make possible “the essential two-
way flow of information” are essential for the function-
ing of an autonomous learning organization, which is
the form Deutsch proposes for a well-functioning
system.
To look at this phenomenon in a more practical
way, I want to offer some considerations raised in a
speech given to honor a Philippine librarian, a speech
given by Zosio Lee. Lee refers to the kind of informa-
tion that is transmitted as essential to the well being of
a society. In considering the impact of netizens and the
form of information that is being transmitted, Lee asks
the question, “How do we detect if we are being manip-
ulated or deceived?”
22
The importance of this question, he explains, is
that, “We would not have survived for so long if all the
information we needed to make valid judgments were
all false or unreliable.” Also, he proposes that “infor-
mation has to be processed and discussed for it to
acquire full meaning and significance.”
23
“When infor-
mation is free, available and truthful, we are better able
to make appropriate judgments, including whether
existing governments fulfill their mandate to govern for
the benefit of the people,” Lee writes.
24
In his article “The Computer as a Democratizer,”
Hauben similarly explores the need for accurate infor-
Page 41
mation about how government is functioning. He
writes, “Without information being available to them,
the people may elect candidates as bad as or worse
than the incumbents. Therefore, there is a need to
prevent government from censoring the information
available to people.”
25
Hauben adds that, “The public needs accurate
information as to how their representatives are fulfill-
ing their role. Once these representatives have abused
their power, the principles established by [Thomas
Paine] and [James] Mill require that the public have
the ability to replace the abusers.”
26
Channels of accurate communication are critical
in order to share the information needed to determine
the nature of one’s government.
27
Conclusion
The candlelight revolution is still in process in
South Korea. It is demonstrating in practice that we are
in a period when the old forms of government are
outmoded. The paper by Licklider and Taylor proposes
that the computer is a splendid facilitator for coopera-
tive modeling. It is such a process of cooperative
modeling that offers the potential for creating not only
new technical and institutional forms, but also new
political forms. Such new political forms are more
likely to provide for the democratic processes that are
needed for the 21
st
century. Hence it is the efforts of
citizens and netizens who are involved in collaborative
modeling to create the more participatory forms and
structures as is happening during the candlelight pro-
cesses being explored in South Korea that provide for
the development of a more equitable and democratic
society.
28
References/Citations
1. Hauben, M., R. Hauben, (1997), Netizens: On the History and
Impact of Usenet and the Internet, Los Alamitos: IEEE Computer
Society Press, p. 3. Also available online in an earlier draft
version,
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120/. Retrieved on Jan. 18,
2017.
2. IBID., p. ix.
3. IBID., p. 233.
4. Poster, M., (2006). Information Please. Durham: Duke
University Press, p. 68.
5. IBID.
6. IBID., p. 70.
7. IBID., p. 71.
8. IBID.
9. IBID., p. 77.
10. IBID., p. 78.
11. IBID.
12. IBID., p. 83.
13. Kamat, V. (2011, December 16), “We are looking at the Fifth
Estate,” Reader’s Opinion, Times of India, p. 2.
india.indiatimes .com/edit-page/ampnbspWe-are-looking-at-the-
fifth-estate/articleshow/11133662.cms, Retrieved on Jan. 10, 2017.
The quote is taken from Hauben, R. “The Rise of Netizen Democ-
racy: A Case Study of Netizens’ Impact on Democracy in South
Korea,”
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120/other/misc/kore an-
democracy.txt, Retrieved on Jan. 10, 2017.
14. In South Korea there are many interesting examples of new
organizational forms or events created by netizens. For example,
Nosamo combined the model of an online fan club and off-line
gathering of supporters who worked to get Roh Moo-hyun elected
as President in South Korea in 2002. Also, OhmyNews, an online
newspaper, helped to make the election of Roh Moo-hyun possible.
Science mailing lists and discussion networks contributed to by
netizens helped to expose the fraudulent scientific work of a
leading South Korean scientist. And in 2008 there were 106 days
of candlelight demonstrations contributed to by people online and
off to protest the South Korean government’s adoption of a
weakened set of regulations about the import of poorly inspected
U.S. beef into South Korea. The debate on June 10-11, 2008 over
the form the demonstration should take involved both online and
off-line discussion and demonstrated the generative nature of
serious communication. See for example, Hauben, R. “On Grass-
roots Journalism and Participatory Democracy.”
http://www.col
umbia.edu/~rh120/other/netizens_draft.pdf, Retrieved on Jan. 10,
2017.
15. Some examples include the anti-cnn website that was set up to
counter the inaccurate press reports in the western media about the
riot in Tibet. The murder case of a Chinese waitress who killed a
Communist Party official in self defense. The case of the
Chongqing Nail House and the online discussion about the issues
involved. See for example, Hauben, R. (2010, February 14). China
in the Era of the Netizen.”
/14/china_in_the_era_of_the_netizen/.
16. IBID., Netizens.
17. “The Computer as a Communication Device,” (1968, April)
Science and Technology. http://memex.org/licklider.pdf, pp. 21-41.
Retrieved Jan. 21, 2017.
18. The Licklider and Taylor paper also points out that the sharing
of models is essential to facilitate communication. If two people
have different models and do not find a way to share them, there
will be no communication between them.
19. IBID., Netizens, p. 299
20. Deutsch, K., (1966), Nerves of Government, New York, The
Free Press, p. xxvii.
21. See for example, Hauben, R., (2012, Winter), “Libya, the UN
and Netizen Journalism,” The Amateur Computerist, Vol. 21, No.
1. http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn21-1.pdf, Retrieved Jan. 10,
2017 and Hauben, J., (2007), “On the 15
th
Anniversary of Netizens:
Netizens Expose Distortions and Fabrication.”
http://www.colum
bia.edu/~hauben/Book_Anniversary/presentation_2.doc.
22. Lee, Z. (2011), “Truthfulness and the Information Revolution,”
JPL 31, p. 105.
Page 42
23. IBID., p. 106.
24. IBID., p. 108.
25. IBID., Netizens, p. 316.
26. IBID., Netizens, p. 317.
27. M. Hauben explains: “Thomas Paine, in The Rights of Man,
describes a fundamental principle of democracy. Paine writes,
‘that the right of altering the government was a national right, and
not a right of the government’.” (Netizens, Chapter 18, p. 316)
28. Hauben, R., (2016, December 21), “Ban Ki-moon’s Idea of
Leadership or the Candlelight Model for More Democracy?,”
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2016/12/21/leadership-or-
candlelight-democracy/. Retrieved on Jan. 21, 2017.
Bibliography
Deutsch, K. (1966). Nerves of Government. New York: The Free
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Hauben, M. & Hauben, R. (1997). Netizens: On the History and
Impact of Usenet and the Internet. Los Alamitos: IEEE
Computer Society Press. Online edition:
http://www.col
umbia.edu/~rh120, Retrieved on Jan. 11, 2017.
Hauben, R. (2005). “The Rise of Netizen Democracy: A Case
Study of Netizens’ Impact on Democracy in South Korea.”
Unpublished paper. Retrieved from
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.edu/~hauben/ronda2014/Rise_of_Netizen_Democracy
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Komat, V. (2011, December 16, p. 2). Reader’s Opinion: “We’re
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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/ampn
bspWe-are-looking-at-the-fifth-estate/articleshow/111336
62.cms.
Lee, Z. E. (2011). “Truthfulness and the Information Revolution,”
Journal of Philippine Librarianship, 31. pp. 101-109.
http://journals.upd.edu.ph/index.php/jpl/article/viewFile
/2779/2597. Retrieved on Jan. 11, 2017.
Licklider, JCR, & Taylor, R. “The Computer as a Communication
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Poster, M. (2006). Information Please. Durham: Duke University
Press.
* This article is a revised version of a presentation made on May
1, 2012 at a small celebration in honor of the 15
th
Anniversary of
the publication of the print edition of the book Netizens: On the
History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet.
EDITORIAL STAFF
Ronda Hauben
William Rohler
Norman O. Thompson
Michael Hauben (1973-2001)
Jay Hauben
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