The Amateur

Computerist

Spring 2024 The U.S., the UN and Korea Volume 37 No. 2

Table of Contents

Articles from 2006 to 2017

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Problem Facing the U.N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2

North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia . . Page 4

Net Gives Power of the Reporter to the Netizen . . Page 6

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia . . . . . Page 8

United Nations Command As Camouflage . . . . . Page 11

Overseas Koreans Remember 6.15 . . . . . . . . . . Page 17

U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Fails to Engage Page 19

Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan Tragedy. . Page 22

Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Controversy Page 24

Security Council Acts in Accord with UN Charter. Page 28

U.S. Misrepresents its Role in Korean War . . . . . Page 32

Send Communication to the UNSC . . . . . . . . . . Page 34

Introduction

This issue of the Amateur Computerist is a

collection of articles written between 2006 and 2017,

highlighting activities at the United Nations about the

Korean Question and the U.S. role in the ongoing di-

vision. The tension from the division remains un-

solved.

Beginning over 1000 years ago, the Korean

people formed themselves into one nation occupying

the whole Korean Peninsula with a continuous society,

language and political system. In 1943, a Korean in

exile wrote that “When the ancestors of northern

Europe were wandering in the forests, clad in skins and

practicing rites, Koreans had a government of their

own and attained a high degree of civilization.” That

was before the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed in

1945 at the end of WWII to a temporary division to

facilitate the withdrawal of Japanese troops.

In March of 1946, a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commis-

sion was set up to assist in forming a provisional Ko-

rean government. By the summer of 1947, it was clear

that the Commission was failing. The U.S. brought the

“problem of Korean independence” to the UN.

In 1947 and 1948, the United States led the

United Nations to play a major role in dividing the

Korean Peninsula and people into the Republic of

Korea (ROK – known as South Korea) and the Demo-

cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK – known as

North Korea).The UN General Assembly sent to Korea

UNTCOK (United Nations Temporary Commission on

Korea) with the mandate to “facilitate and expedite the

attainment of the national independence of Korea and

withdrawal of occupying forces.” But instead,

UNTOCK arranged an election in the south of Korea

in May 1948. In that election all Koreans in the north

and many Koreans in the south were excluded. The

U.S. military government and right wing paramilitary

groups controlled the entire election process. Most

major political parties and politicians in southern

Korea opposed the elections. There were strikes, dem-

onstrations and protests against creating a separate

South Korea. In the run-up to the voting, the repression

of this opposition resulted in over 10,000 arrests and

hundreds of deaths.

The significant aspect of the UN supported

election was that it led to an official government

structure for only the southern part of Korea, which

months later the UN called the only legitimate govern-

ment in Korea, thus solidifying the division of Korea.

One view of the military conflict two years later that

became known as the Korean War was that it was a

civil war to restore Korea as one country. (The details

of this history can be seen at:

http://www.columbia.edu

/~hauben/UN-Role-in-Korea.doc.)

Over the last 75 years, this division has caused

many extremely dangerous situations that the UN has

been called on to deal with. The articles gathered in

this issue document a little the roles played by the U.S.

and the UN but also by netizens and the civil society

around the question of the division of Korea that was

created in 1948.

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Page 1

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in

Ohmynews International on October 17, 2006]

The Problem Facing the U.N.

Can Ban Ki-moon Help Solve the

Problem With the Security Council?

by Ronda Hauben

The official selection on Oct. 13, 2006 of Ban

Ki-moon of South Korea as the new secretary general

of the United Nations could not come at a more pro-

pitious time. Why, one may ask? Hailing from the

Republic of Korea (South Korea), Ban will have

before him the daunting task of bringing the best

possible contributions from the international commu-

nity to bear on many of the difficult problems that

erupt in the world. Along with his appointment to the

post at the U.N. this past week, and the congratulations

from diplomats from many regions of the world at a

ceremony held at the General Assembly, was the event

that took place the following day: the imposition of

article 41, chapter 7 sanctions on North Korea by the

Security Council as punishment for the test of a

nuclear device several days earlier.

Though Ban does not take office for his new

position until Jan. 1, 2007, a crisis has already devel-

oped that will require the best efforts and resources he

can muster. In congratulating him on his selection,

several of the diplomats noted the great achievements

of South Korea in having transformed itself from “the

status of least developed country, to an industrialized

highly developed nation” and “as the 11th largest

economy in the world” (in the words of Gambian

Ambassador to the U.N. Crispin Grey-Johnson).

Speaking about Ban, Grey-Johnson, who is chairman

of the African regional group at the U.N., “the devel-

opments in his own region of the world call for wis-

dom and cautious diplomacy” in order to be able to

“mediate this very complex security situation that is

now unfolding in the Korean Peninsula.”

In his acceptance speech to the General Assem-

bly upon his appointment as the eighth secretary

general of the U.N., Ban acknowledged that he was

following “in a line of remarkable leaders.” That “each

of the men in his own way, came on board at the U.N.

at a critical juncture in the organization’s history.”

That “each wondered what the coming years would

require as they took over the leadership role of the

preeminent international organization.”

The secretary general elect expressed his respect

for the role played by the current secretary general,

Kofi Annan, and promised to build on his legacy.

Explaining the need to hear the views and concerns of

all the member nations of the U.N., Ban pledged to

consult widely in his preparations for assuming his

new position. “I will listen attentively to your con-

cerns, expectations and admonitions,” he promised the

192 member states.

Congratulating Ban, South African Ambassador

to the U.N. Dumisani Kumalo proposed that in order

for the secretary general elect to be able to act in the

interest of the entire membership, he will need to

“listen to the views of each and every member state.”

How the future secretary general can help to

solve the problems that come before the U.N. is not

only a critical question for the international commu-

nity, but also a critical task in the face of the increased

tension being experienced on the Korean Peninsula.

While several of the speeches at the General

Assembly ceremony spoke to the need for wide rang-

ing consultations and discussions in order to diffuse

tensions and determine how to solve difficult prob-

lems, recent actions at the Security Council the day

after the appointment of Ban demonstrate that a very

different process is practiced by that body.

Only after an agreement was achieved among the

five permanent members of the Security Council and

supported by the 10 temporary members, and voted on,

did the Council agree to hear the party to the problem

that was before them. And only after hearing the views

of all the permanent members of the Security Council

– the U.S., France, Britain, China and Russia – and

some of the temporary members about why they voted

for the sanctions on North Korea did the council allow

the representative from the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (North Korea), Pak Gil Yon, to

have a few minutes to speak. His talk was followed by

a brief statement from the South Korean ambassador to

the U.N., who spoke in support of the sanctions.

In the brief opportunity he had to speak, Pak

indicated that his country felt it was the victim of

hostile acts by the U.S. and that it had a sovereign right

to defend itself from such hostile acts. Also, he indi-

cated that the process of the Security Council in

mandating sanctions on his country was more like the

activity of gangsters than an activity representing a

legitimate means of investigating a dispute and deter-

mining how to diffuse a tense situation.

Thus, the speeches supporting discussion and

Page 2

investigation in the General Assembly on Friday, Oct.

13, and the closed decision-making process that cul-

minated the following day in the issuing of sanctions

against North Korea, are in stark contrast to each other.

The statements by several of the five permanent

members of the Security Council, the members who

have the power to veto Security Council decisions,

emphasized that their resolution imposing sanctions

against North Korea reflected the condemnation of the

“international community” and that all the nations of

the U.N. now had a legal obligation to carry out the

provisions of the sanctions.

While the Security Council does indeed have the

power to impose such sanctions on a country in the

name of the U.N., the process by which the sanctions

were decided, is a sorry demonstration of power pol-

itics that involves very few of the 192 member coun-

tries that make up the U.N.

The chairman of the Latin American and Carib-

bean regional group, in his comments to the future sec-

retary general, explained that there are important

challenges for the U.N. in the role it plays in “today’s

world.”

“International public opinion demands that the

Security Council and other bodies of the organization

should perform a much better job. There is a trend at

this time for great and infinite opportunities as well as

unprecedented risks,” explained Ecuadorian Ambassa-

dor to the U.N. Diego Cordovez.

“The United Nations, it is said, should be a base,

a forum, a mode that would enable the international

community to take advantage of those transcendental

opportunities and foresee and neutralize potential

risks,” Cordovez added. “For those reasons, it is im-

portant to insist on the need to reform thoroughly and

deeply the organization and undoubtedly, that would

be the main task and responsibility of our new secre-

tary general.” (He was referring to the failure of the

member countries to reform the Security Council.)

“It is inconceivable,” he said, “that we are dis-

cussing the reform of the Security Council for decades,

preparing infinite numbers of formulas, doing report

after report on that item, and yet it remains – immuta-

ble and impossible to the critics for its lack of repre-

sentation and its parsimonious conduct to confront

[the] world’s crises.”

The act of bringing sanctions against a member

state by the Security Council, with no investigation

into the grievances that motivated North Korea’s

actions, stands as an egregious example of the failure

of the obligation of the U.N. to hear from each member

state and to provide a place where problems can be

heard and discussed to find a solution.

North Korea says its problems are with the U.S.

and that it has developed nuclear devices because of its

need to defend itself from the U.S. That is a serious

statement requiring investigation to see who has

caused the problem and who merits the imposition of

sanctions.

Another aspect of the current process that ended

in sanctions is that the five permanent members of the

Security Council are powerful countries that possess

nuclear weapons. These very countries have failed to

meet their obligations under the Nuclear Non-prolifer-

ation Treaty to carry out disarmament.

Some scholars and diplomats explain that they

are not surprised that North Korea believes it needs to

develop a nuclear capacity in order to protect itself

from danger. Given the actions of the U.S. government

in branding North Korea as part of the “axis of evil”

and attacking another, Iraq, which it had similarly

branded, is but one of the reasons some scholars

believe the U.S. government provided North Korea

with a legitimate justification to develop nuclear wea-

pons.

In its brief talk at the Security Council meeting,

North Korea expressed one of its disappointments:

It was gangster-like for the Security Coun-

cil to adopt such a coercive resolution

against the Democratic People’s Republic

of Korea while neglecting the nuclear

threat posed by the United States against

his country … . The council was incapable

of offering a single word of concern when

the United States threatened to launch

nuclear pre-emptive attacks, reinforced its

armed forces and conducted large-scale

military exercises near the Korean Penin-

sula.

It must be remembered that the five permanent

members of the Security Council possess thousands of

nuclear weapons.

Although commentators and scholars who feel

there is justification for North Korea’s actions want to

discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they

explain that punishing North Korea, while ignoring

those countries who are in the club of nations possess-

ing nuclear weapons, can only breed cynicism and

hostility to non-proliferation and enforcement efforts.

That North Korea can claim that it felt compelled

to develop a nuclear device, is a signal that the current

Page 3

regime of power politics is not working in a way that

provides alternatives for a small nation that feels

threatened by the nations that are nuclear powers.

North Korea’s situation is a demonstration that there is

need for serious discussion by the 192 member states

of the U.N. to understand the problems that North

Korea claims compel it to develop nuclear weapons as

a means of securing its borders and protecting its

sovereignty.

There is indeed an international community, and

there is indeed a serious challenge facing it. The five

big nuclear powers who wield veto power on the

Security Council can bring to bear punishment upon a

small nation that endeavors to develop nuclear capabil-

ity. This, however, will only compound the problem as

it will only increase the hostility and resentment that

the small nation feels from such unequal treatment at

the hands of those who themselves possess nuclear

weapons and who use the power this capability be-

stows on them in such a self-serving manner.

The two Koreas have brought to the world stage

the need for a truly international organization, one that

will consider all its members’ concerns and needs, and

find ways to support serious consideration of the

problems such nations have but are unable to solve

themselves.

The urgent problem facing the U.N. at this junc-

ture in its history is not whether North Korea has

developed and tested a nuclear device. It is the break-

down reflected by the lack of participation and investi-

gation by the international community into how a

crisis will be handled once it develops, and whether the

concerns and problems of those who are involved in

the crisis will be considered as part of the process of

seeking a solution. It is how the U.N. functions when

tensions reach a point where serious attention is need-

ed to help to understand and solve a problem.

Unfortunately for the world, and for North

Korea, there was no such process in the decision to im-

pose sanctions on North Korea. The decision to impose

sanctions on North Korea was not made by the interna-

tional community. It was the decision of a small set of

nuclear countries. Who was responsible for the crisis

was not explored before determining blame, and thus

the proclaimed solution is likely only to worsen the

problem rather than solve it. Yet the actual problem

exists and the fact that people of the world recognize

it is highlighted by a recent poll taken in South Korea,

which showed that 43 percent of the population blames

the U.S. government for North Korea’s test of a nucle-

ar device, while only 37.2 percent blame the North

Koreans.

The actions in the Security Council to punish

North Korea occurred without the needed exploration

of what had motivated North Korea to turn to nuclear

weapons as a means of self-defense. Can the U.N. be

changed in the needed ways so that it will be able to

handle such problems? This is the urgent issue facing

the U.N. as the future secretary general takes over the

post in January. This is one of the challenges facing

Ban Ki-moon, member nations and people who are

part of the U.N. organization as it embarks on a new

chapter in the history of this needed global organiza-

tion.

Notes:

1. See “Pyongyang’s Nuke Test Sparks Fission Over Response.”

http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/140740/1. (No Longer

Available.)

2. See “What About North Korea’s sovereignty?” http://www.jso

nline.com/story/index.aspx?id=518268. (No Longer Available.)

3. See “U.S. Most Responsible for Nuclear Test: Poll.”

http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200610/kt20061015172

30011990.htm. (No Longer Available.)

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews

International on March 21, 2007.]

North Korea’s $25 Million and

Banco Delta Asia

by Ronda Hauben

A little known provision in the U.S. Patriot Act

(2001) has been used by the Bush administration

against North Korea to freeze $25 million dollars of its

funds and to deny it access to the international banking

system and to hard currency. Actions under this pro-

vision of the Patriot Act effectively stymied progress

in disarmament talks between the U.S., North Korea,

South Korea, China, Russia and Japan for over 18

months. North Korea says that only when the seized

$25 million and access to the international banking

system are restored is it willing to continue negotia-

tions under the Six-Party agreement concerning secur-

ity and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The little known provision of the Patriot Act is

Section 311. It is also known as the “International

Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-

Page 4

Terrorism Act of 2001.”

The original purpose was allegedly related to the

prevention, detection and prosecution of money laun-

dering connected to the financing of terrorism. The law

has rarely been used for its original purpose. Instead it

has been used by the Bush administration as a means

of unchecked political power against financial institu-

tions like the Banco Delta Asia. This case has an

impact on those nations or institutions who used the

bank, like North Korea.

Two other sections of the Patriot Act currently

under scrutiny, the use of the Patriot Act to illegally

obtain personal information on U.S. citizens, and the

use of a provision in the Patriot Act to replace U.S.

Attorneys, have been identified as being used by the

Bush administration for expanding and abusing ex-

ecutive power. Section 311 provides another means for

sidestepping international and national legal practices

and substituting an ad hoc set of processes that leave

the victims with no means of due process or defense.

Section 311 has been called by its supporters, “a

diplomatic sledgehammer that gets results” and by its

critics, a provision that denies the accused “due pro-

cess and presumes guilt.”

Critics say that this provision of the Patriot Act

applies U.S. law to the financial institutions of other

countries. In a proceeding under Section 311 of the

Patriot Act (2001) the U.S. Treasury Department acts

as accuser and judge, in international jurisdictions.

Also, often the evidence used by the Treasury Depart-

ment is classified and thus not available for examina-

tion by the accused so that it can’t be refuted.

This provision gives the U.S. Treasury the ability

to use an Executive Branch administrative procedure

rather than a legal proceeding as a way to accuse a

financial institution that is part of another nation’s

regulatory system of wrong doing, and then to find it

guilty. Under this provision of the Patriot Act, the

accused is denied knowledge of the evidence against it

and is denied the right to speak in its own defense.

Section 311 of the Patriot Act (2001) was used against

the BDA, a small bank in Macao, to freeze substantial

financial assets of North Korea and also to deny North

Korea access to the international banking system.

The

case against the BDA was instituted in September

2005 just after the U.S. had signed the Six-Party agree-

ment.

The accused under Section 311 is presumed to be

guilty and the burden falls on it to prove its innocence

without being able to know the evidence or charges.

Invoking Section 311 against the BDA effec-

tively sabotaged the implementation of the Six-Party

agreement of September 2005

for 18 months as BDA

did not have a process to challenge the Treasury

Department action, nor did those whose accounts at the

bank had been frozen, like North Korea. It was only

after North Korea conducted a missile test in July 2006

and the test of a nuclear device in October 2006, that

the Bush administration was willing to agree to negoti-

ations over the Treasury action.

Negotiations in Berlin between the U.S. govern-

ment and North Korea in January 2007 and then in

Beijing in February 2007 with the U.S., South Korea,

China, Russia and Japan, resulted in the Six-Party

agreement announced on Feb. 13, 2007.

The difference that most analysts point to in

comparing the Feb. 13 2007 Six-Party agreement with

the Six-Party agreement of September 2005 is that the

more recent agreement includes a series of processes

and a time table. The critical difference that has been

overlooked, however, is that a requirement of the Feb.

13 agreement was that the U.S. restore the funds that

were frozen by the actions of the U.S. Treasury De-

partment. Also North Korea’s access to the interna-

tional financial system was to be restored.

These requirements caused “intense friction” in

Washington between officials in the State Department

and “officials in the Treasury Department and in the

Office of Vice President Dick Cheney who were said

to favor maintaining maximum pressure” on North

Korea.

There were reports of urgent telephone calls

between officials in the State Department and the

Treasury. Assistant Secretary of State John

Negroponte finally got a decision from the Treasury

Department by Friday, March 16. The Treasury

Department had ruled against the BDA. U.S. banks

would not be allowed to do business with it. The U.S.

government announcement said that it would be up to

the Macao authorities to decide if they would unfreeze

and restore some or all of North Korea’s funds.

By the weekend of March 17, a behind the scenes

drama continued to unfold. China announced that it

regretted the U.S. action. The owner of the Macao

bank said he would go to court to attempt to challenge

the decision. Getting off the plane in Beijing on

Saturday to attend the next stage of Six-Party Talks,

Kim Kye-gwan, North Korea’s lead negotiator for the

Six-Party Talks, told reporters that all of the $25

million had to be returned if North Korea was to go to

the next step of the Six-Party Talks.

Page 5

Hill announced that he would explain the settle-

ment to the Chinese and North Korean negotiators.

China announced that a settlement had been reached

but that the details of it couldn’t yet be revealed.

Subsequently, there was an announcement that all of

the $25 million in funds would be returned to North

Korea and deposited in China in an account held by the

North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank at the Bank of

China in Beijing. U.S. Treasury Secretary Daniel

Glaser, in a press conference held with Hill, confirmed

the U.S. government decision. It was unknown he said,

when the funds would actually be put in the North

Korean bank account.

Subsequently, diplomats who were in Beijing to

continue the Six-Party Talks told reporters that North

Korean diplomats said the funds had to be in the bank

account for them to continue with negotiations.

Though there have been many newspaper articles

reporting the standoff in the Six-Party Talks caused by

the dispute over the use of Section 311 against North

Korea, few of the articles provide an understanding of

the underlying issues involved. A commentator on

BBC, for example, demonstrating a serious lack of

understanding of the use of Section 311 and the abuse

of power it represents said this is an example of the

high price that North Korea will extract for its cooper-

ation in the talks.

It is not without cause then, that in describing the

process of the Six-Party Talks Hill, compared the pro-

cess to a video game. He warned: “This process, not

unlike a video game gets more and more difficult as

you get to different levels.”

Notes:

http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/Section301.html.

2. “Treasury Casts a Wide Net Under Patriot Act.”

https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2007/mar/18/treasury-

casts-wide-net-under-patriot-act-20070318/.

3. “The U.S. government has never publicly detailed evidence

behind its charges. Nor has it sought to initiate legal action,

relying instead on Section 311 of the Patriot Act, which critics say

extends U.S. laws to cover other countries.” “Bush Administration

Plan May Unfreeze North Korean Funds.”

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/latest-news/article24461644.html.

4. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks

Beijing, September 19, 2005.

https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.

5. “Administration Reconsiders Some North Korea Restrictions.”

http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnists/

warren_p_strobel/16554751.htm. (Not currently available.)

6. “U.S., North Korea Move to Open Ties.”

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=

348974&rel_no=1. (No Longer Available.)

[Editor’s note: In August 2007, Ronda Hauben made a presenta-

tion at the World Fellowship in New Hampshire, U.S. She spoke

about covering the U.N. as a featured writer for OhmyNews

International. In the following section from her presentation, she

shows there can be a power in netizen reporting.]

The Net Gives the Power of

the Reporter to the Netizen

by Ronda Hauben

BDA Story

This spring as a featured writer for OhmyNews

International I covered the 50

anniversary dinner in

New York City of the Korea Society. One of the

speakers at the dinner was U.S. Assistant Secretary of

State Christopher Hill. He explained the problem of

$25 million of North Korean money being frozen as

part of a U.S. Treasury Department proceeding against

a bank in Macao, China, the Banco Delta Asia (BDA).

This is a problem that was at the time holding up the

implementation of the Six-Party agreement to denuc-

learize the Korean Peninsula. Hill committed himself

to work on this problem until it was solved.

There were several Korean journalists covering

the event for their publications. They were particularly

interested in what Hill said, but Hill’s talk in itself did

not seem to represent a newsworthy event.

In the next few days, however, an important story

was developing.

In the process of trying to unravel the unfolding

developments, I found a story online about the activity

the bank had engaged in for North Korea. It docu-

mented that this was legitimate banking activity, not

illegal activity. The news organization which pub-

lished the story was the McClatchy Newspapers. I also

found links on the blog, “China Matters,” to some

documents refuting the Treasury Department’s charges

against the bank.

I now had the documents in the case. The U.S.

government’s findings were general statements provid-

ing no specific evidence of wrong doing on the part of

the bank. The bank’s statements and refutation gave

significant documentation refuting charges of illegal

activity on the part of the bank. The refutation also

made the case that there were political motives for the

U. S. governments’ allegations rather than actual il-

Page 6

legal activity on the part of the bank. The U.S. gov-

ernment had targeted a small Macao bank to scare the

many banks in China. “To kill the chicken to scare the

monkeys,” as the government document explained,

quoting an old Chinese proverb.

At last I had the news peg for an important story.

I wrote an article, submitting it online around 5 a.m.

my time on May 18 to OhmyNews International

(OMNI), using the software OMNI provides for sub-

mitting articles. Also on May 18, the Wall Street

Journal carried an Op Ed by the former U.S. Ambassa-

dor to the U.N., John Bolton. His article scolded the

U.S. government for negotiating to return the $25

million to North Korea. By noon that day, my story

appeared on OMNI. So an Internet search that day gave

people who searched two substantially different

analyses to consider. (See Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia, the next article in this issue.)

This short description was part of a talk that I

gave in San Francisco in May 2007 at the International

Communications Association (ICA) annual confer-

ence.

During the conference, I summed up my experi-

ence working on this issue with the conclusion:

There is not yet an OhmyNews (OMN) in

the U.S. So my story about the connection

of the U.S. government’s policy toward

China and the U.S. government actions

against the Macao bank is not yet likely to

be able to impact how the mainstream

news media in the U.S. frames the story

with North Korea and the Six-Party Talks.

But the need for a U.S. model of OMN

becomes all the more urgent when one

participates in OMNI and thus has the

experience of exploring the potential of

what it will make possible.

Next Episode

Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San

Francisco, however, that this story was not ending, but

a new aspect was developing.

When I returned home from the ICA conference,

I did a follow-up story to my two earlier stories about

the BDA issue.

A short time later, on June 11, I found a surpris-

ing email in my mailbox. The email was from a

reporter who said she worked for the Korean Service

of the Voice of America News (VOA News).

She wrote:

Hello Ms. Hauben

She introduced herself as being a reporter with the

Voice of America News in Washington D.C.

Her email said:

While I was working on a story about BDA issue, I

read your report, ‘Behind the Blacklisting of Banco

Delta Asia.’ I thought you made some valuable points

about the BDA issue in this report, I was wondering if

I could have a conversation with you in this matter.

Since I am on deadline, I’m trying very hard to get a

hold of you. So I would really appreciate it if you call

or email me back ASAP … .

She gave her phone number.

The Voice of American News is now part of the

U.S. State Department.

I called her as she had asked and she said she

wanted to interview me by phone. I asked her to let me

know what she would want to speak with me about.

She sent me an email elaborating:

The questions I am planning to ask you during the

interview are going to be about both the content of

your article and how you did it. Although I’d like to

ask you, first of all, how you came up with the idea of

writing this article, the focus of this interview is not

just on how you prepared the article.

The purpose of this interview is to let our listen-

ers know what is going on regarding the BDA issue

and how the BDA issue is developing. When I read

your article, I thought you made valuable and critical

points about the BDA issue, and I thought it might be

very important to let your idea about the BDA issue be

heard by our listeners.

She listed questions she would ask me in the

interview.

1. How you came up with the idea of writing this

article? How you prepared it? About your sources

2. Briefly summarize your findings or main points of

the article?

3. What you are trying to accomplish by writing this

article? What needs to be done to resolve the BDA

issue?

She wrote ending the email:

Finally, I wanted to ask you if we could do this inter-

view sometime between 9am and 9:30am.... Thanks

again.

She did indeed call and we had a substantial

phone conversation discussing my stories, the Internet

sources I had used, and what I saw as the problem with

the American government’s freezing the Banco Delta

Asia funds.

Page 7

Afterwards she asked specifically for the urls to

follow up on the Internet sources I had cited. These

were basically material I had found including a blog,

several government documents, and copies of the legal

documents submitted by the Bank owner to appeal the

Treasury Department ruling against the Bank, all on

the Internet.

This was all happening at a time when there were

new efforts to find a solution to the roadblock that

freezing the BDA funds belonging to North Korea

represented to the continuation of the Six-Party Talks.

The Voice of America News reporter said she

would consider contacting the former U.S. government

officials who were responsible for crafting the plan to

freeze North Korea’s assets at Banco Delta Asia.

Just at this time, the U.S. goverment announced

a new possible arrangement for returning the funds to

North Korea via the international banking system. In

the following week it proved successful.

The Voice of American News reporter wrote me

saying she had other stories to do and was not for now

going to pursue this story any longer.

I can only speculate that perhaps her contacting

me and interviewing me was part of an effort by some

people within the U.S. government to put preassure on

others within the government who were creating the

roadblocks.

Regardless of her motivation, the Voice of

America News reporter had contacted me before the

situation was resolved. Whether the contact had any

impact on the resolution I can only speculate. At the

very least, the articles I had done had caught the

attention of someone at the Voice of America News

which is part of the U.S. State Dept. I was given the

chance to explain how I framed the story of the BDA

and what I saw the controversy surrounding it to be.

So my story did indeed have more of an impact

than I thought possible when I gave my talk at the ICA

in San Francisco. OMNI and the Internet in general

gave these stories about the BDA a power they would

not otherwise have had.

[Editor’s note: The following article appeared in Ohmynews

International on May 19, 2007]

Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia

Is the Policy Aimed at Targeting

China as Well as North Korea?

by Ronda Hauben

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher

Hill, speaking at the Korea Society’s 50

Anniversary

dinner in New York City on May 15, said that he was

determined not to “allow $26 million or $25 million

get between us and a deal that will finally do some-

thing about nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.”

He promised that Kathleen Stephens at the Korea desk

at the State Department was working on the problem

and that “we are going to keep after this problem till

we solve it.” His statement didn’t give further details

about how this problem was to be solved, a problem

that had interrupted the progress that seemed at last

possible in the Feb. 13 Six-Party agreement.

Just two days later, on May 17, the U.S.

Wachovia Bank announced that it is exploring a

request from the State Department to transfer the funds

from the BDA (Banco Delta Asia) to North Korea.

Wachovia Bank reported that it would require the

necessary approvals from bank regulators to do the

transfer.

Until this latest announcement, banks have been

unwilling to do the transfer because of the legal action

that the U.S. government took against the BDA, by

ruling that it was involved in criminal activity under

Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. Banks which deal

with a bank that has been found guilty of such illegal

acts risk losing their access to the international finan-

cial system. North Korea has said that the denuc-

learization and other aspects of the Six-Party agree-

ment that it has been part of can only go forward when

the BDA situation is resolved. “To make the money

transfer possible freely just like before has been our

demand … from the beginning,” a spokesperson from

North Korea said.

In his daily press briefing on May 17, Scott

McCormack at the U.S. State Department said, “We all

want to see the BDA issue resolved, obviously re-

solved within the laws and regulations of the United

States as well as the international financial system, and

we’d like to move on and get back to the business of

Page 8

the Six-Party Talks, which is really focused on the

issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether this latest development with Wachovia

Bank will provide the needed breakthrough, it is too

soon to tell. But there are other developments which

may provide the needed pressures on the U.S. govern-

ment to decriminalize the $25 million it has frozen of

North Korean funds and restore North Korea’s access

to the international banking system. Their access was

severely impeded by the action that the U.S. Treasury

Department took against the BDA.

The developments I am referring to are the

release in the public domain of several documents

related to the U. S. Treasury Department’s actions

against BDA. One of the documents is a sworn state-

ment by the owner of the BDA, Mr. Stanley Au, in

support of his petition to revoke the rule imposing the

special measures taken by the U.S. Treasury Depart-

ment against his bank. Another document is the peti-

tion in support of his case. Also the Treasury Depart-

ment finding against the bank has been put online.

These documents have been made available on the

blog “China Matters.”

In his statement, Au explains the history of his

bank’s relations with North Korea and how there was

only one experience, which occurred in June 1994,

when there was a problem with counterfeit U.S.

dollars. At the time, the bank reported this incident to

the U.S. government. Agents from the U.S. govern-

ment came to the bank and questioned Au. He an-

swered their questions and asked if the agents recom-

mended that the bank “desist from doing business with

North Korean entities.” The agents said “they would

like us to continue to deal with them as it was better

that we conducted this business than another financial

entity that may not be so cooperative with the United

States government.”

Au explains that there was no further experience

with counterfeit money showing up in the transactions

of the bank. All “large value deposits of U.S. dollar

bills from North Korean sources” were sent to the

Hong Kong branch of the Republic National Bank of

New York (which became HSBC) to be certified that

they were authentic via advanced technology pos-

sessed by that bank. Smaller quantities of bills were

examined in accord with common banking practices by

the bank itself.

Au also explains that he had not been approached

by U.S. government agents alerting him to any prob-

lem or illegal activity. The first he learned that his

bank was being charged as a bank engaged in “illicit

activities” came when he saw a report in the Asian

Wall Street Journal in September 2005 that his bank

was a candidate for a U.S. money laundering blacklist.

He tells how “this news came as a bolt out of the blue

– the Bank had never been informed by the United

States that its practices were a cause of any money

laundering concern, and the counterfeiting event that

the media reported as the basis for the designation had

occurred more than ten years earlier and had been

promptly reported to the authorities by Banco Delta

Asia.”

Stanley Au’s statement is in sharp contrast with

the account in the U.S. government’s Federal Register

of the finding against the bank by the U.S. Treasury

Department.

The Federal Register finding states that the bank

had provided financial services for more than 20 years

to multiple North Korean-related individuals and

entities that were engaged in illicit activities. It pro-

vides no specific details of what such illicit activities

were. It claims that the entities paid a fee to Banco

Delta Asia for their access to the bank. The finding

claims that the bank facilitated wire transfers and

helped a front company.

In his statement, Stanley Au maintained that the

BDA did not charge a fee for its services nor did it

conduct illicit services for North Korea or any other

customer. The bank was only one of the banks in

Macao that did business with North Korea. The busi-

ness his bank had with North Korea began in the mid

1970s and was to assist North Korea with its foreign

trade transactions. Also Au described North Korea as

a gold producing country and that in the late 1990s the

bank had acted as a “gold bullion trader on behalf of

the North Koreans”. Also the BDA bought or sold

foreign currency notes for North Korea, including U.S.

dollars, because North Korea had a limited banking

system and so it couldn’t do such transactions itself

(see Statement, pp. 3-4).

The petition submitted to the U.S. Dept of the

Treasury to challenge the finding against BDA pro-

poses that BDA was targeted not because of any

“voluminous” evidence of money laundering but

“because it was an easy target in the sense that it was

not so large that its failure would bring down the

financial system.”

In the substantial and prolific analysis of the

BDA problem that has been developed on the blog

“China Matters”, there is the assessment that North

Page 9

Korea has legitimate financial activity and that the

BDA was legitimately serving as one of the banks for

that activity. Even with the U.N.’s sanctions, it was not

appropriate to target for blacklisting the legitimate

financial activities of North Korea. The sanctions that

the U.N.-imposed against North Korea were to be

aimed at its activity that was related to nuclear weapon

development, not to normal financial transactions.

The author of China Matters blog writes

The alternative view … is that legitimate

North Korean financial activity does exist,

BDA had a right to solicit North Korean

accounts and handle North Korean transac-

tions, and Stanley Au should be allowed to

run his bank as long as he conforms to the

laws of his jurisdiction – and (the bank) not

be used as a political football in Washing-

ton’s dealings with Pyongyang.

To put it more succinctly, the blog China Matters

quotes David Ascher, who had been the coordinator

for the Bush Administration working group on North

Korea and a senior adviser in East Asian affairs in the

State Department, in testimony to the U.S. House

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-pro-

liferation, and Trade on April 18, 2007, explaining

why Banco Delta was chosen to be blacklisted from

the international banking system:

Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We

were trying to kill the chicken to scare the

monkeys. And the monkeys were big Chi-

nese banks doing business in North Korea

… and we’re not talking about tens of

millions, we’re talking hundreds of mil-

lions.

The purpose of the action against the BDA

appears not only to have been to target North Korea

and its access to the international banking system, but

also to send a message to China.

Therefore it would appear that the action against

BDA is a carefully crafted political action and that it

will be necessary that there be public understanding,

discussion and debate about what is behind this action

in order to find a way to have the policy that gave rise

to the BDA action changed.

Instead of the U.S. mainstream press carrying out

the needed investigation about why BDA has been

targeted and what is behind this action, there have been

continual condemnations of North Korea. Fortunately

there are journalists like those who work with the

McClatchy News Service who have made an effort to

probe what is happening behind-the-scenes in the BDA

affair and blogs like China Matters which have taken

the time and care to begin uncovering what the BDA

affair is really all about. This is but one of the stories

of what is really going on behind the scenes within the

U.S. government that has been hidden from the public.

This is one of the stories yet to be unraveled by

bloggers, and citizen journalists.

Notes:

1. See the Article “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Asia” in this issue.

2. “North Korea says work to transfer bank funds under way,”

AFP, May 15, 2007.

https://www.spacewar.com/reports/North_Korea_Says_Work_

To_Transfer_Bank_Funds_Under_Way_999.html.

(3) Scott McCormack, Daily Press Briefing, Washington DC, May

17, 2007.

https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0705/S00399/state-dept-

daily-press-briefing-may-17-2007.htm.

4. “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations.”

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world

/article24463246.html.

5. About the Statement of Mr. Stanley Au in Support of Petition

to Revoke Rule Imposing Special Measures Against Banco Delta

Asia. See:

https://www.macaobusiness.com/lifting-of-us-sanct

ions-on-delta-asia-bank-the-result-of-15-years-of-unrelenting-

effort-chairman/.

See also Kevin G. Hall, “Bank owner disputes money-laundering

allegations,” McClatchy Newspapers, May 16, 2007.

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world

/article24463246.html

6. Department of the Treasury, 31 CFR Part 103 / RIN 1506-

AA83, Federal Register / Vol 72, No. 52 / Monday, March 19,

2007 / Rules and Regulations.

https://www.govinfo.gov /content

/pkg/FR-2007-03-19/pdf/07-1303.pdf..

7. Petition of Mr. Stanley Au and Delta Asia Group (Holdings)

Ltd. to Rescind Final Rule, p. 12.

https://www.ncnk.org/resources

/publications/Jones_Day_Petition_Rescind_BDA_Rule.pdf.

8. “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia,” Tuesday,

May 15, 2007.

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-

au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html.

9. “David Asher’s Dead End,” Saturday, April 28, 2007.

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-

end.html.

See also “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its

role in addressing the nuclear and missile situations in both

nations,” Hearing, Sept 14, 2006, Nov. 2006, p. 115-116.

https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hearing-chinas-proliferation-north-

korea-and-iran-and-its-role-addressing-nuclear-and.

10. Ronda Hauben, “Bill Moyers and the Emergence of U.S.

Citizen Journalism: Power of government creates need for

investigative news.” http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/%

3Cbr%3Ehttp://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view

.asp?no=360069&rel_no=1. (No longer available.)

Page 10

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on the netizen-

blog on August 31, 2013.*]

United Nations Command

As Camouflage: On the Role

of the UN in the Unending

Korean War

by Ronda Hauben

I. – Some Background

The story of the Korean War is a story not often

told. Yet sixty years after the agreement to end the

military hostilities on July 27, 1953, there is not yet a

peace treaty to end the war. This article on the 2013

occasion of the 60

Anniversary of the Armistice

Agreement is intended as a contribution to the body of

research and study needed to find the underlying cause

of the bottleneck impeding the negotiation of a peace

treaty so a breakthrough can be made.

Korea, which had been one nation for over 1000

years, had been forcibly divided at the end of WWII.

By the UN legitimating an election in the South of

Korea in May 1948 which was boycotted by many

Koreans and from which all North Koreans and many

South Koreans were excluded, a formal structural

division was created which continues until today.

The

significant aspect of the UN supported election was

that it led to an official government structure for only

the southern part of Korea, thus solidifying the divi-

sion of Korea. The government structure created in the

South by the election was a repressive government

structure. One view of the military conflict that be-

came known as the Korean War was that it was a civil

war that was trying to restore Korea as one country.

The U.S. Government response to the fighting

which broke out in June 1950 in Korea was to perpetu-

ate support for the repressive government that the U.S.

and UN had put in place as the Republic of Korea

(more commonly known as South Korea). This is the

context in which the United Nations Security Council

resolutions of June and July 1950 authorizing UN

participation in the Korean War took place.

The question that led me to begin this study was:

What Was the Role of the UN in the Korean War and

What Should be the Role of the UN in Bringing an

End to the War?

It is important to take into account that before

any action was taken on the part of the UN on June 27,

1950 authorizing intervention in the Korean War, the

U.S. had decided and began to send military support to

the South Korean side of the conflict. The independent

journalist, I.F. Stone in his book, “The Hidden History

of the Korean War,” describes this U.S. action as forc-

ing the UN Security Council to support the U.S. Gov-

ernment action in Korea.

Stone writes:

When Truman ‘ordered the United States

air and sea forces to give the Korean Gov-

ernment troops cover and support’ he was

in effect imposing military sanctions before

they had been authorized by the Security

Council. The Council had to vote sanctions

or put itself in the position of opposing the

action taken by the United States. For gov-

ernments dependent on American bounty

and themselves fearful of Soviet expansion,

that was too much to expect, though again

Yugoslavia had the courage to vote ‘No,’

an act of principle for which it got no credit

from the Soviet bloc while antagonizing

the United States to which it owed its

Council seat.

By acting before the Security Council could act,

the U.S. was in violation of Article 2(7) of the UN

Charter which requires a Security Council action under

Chapter VII before there is any armed intervention into

the internal affairs of another nation unless the arms

are used in self-defense. (See Article 51 of the UN

Charter. The U.S. armed intervention in Korea was

clearly not an act of self defense for the U.S.) Also the

actions of the UN have come to be referred to as the

actions of the “United Nations Command”(UNC), but

this designation is not to be found in the June and July

1950 Security Council resolutions authorizing partici-

pation in the Korean War.

What is the significance of

the U.S. using the UN in these ways?

The current U.S. military command in South

Korea claims to wear three hats: Command of U.S.

troops in South Korea, Combined Forces Command

(U.S. and South Korean troops), and “United Nations

Command” with responsibilities with respect to the

Armistice. The United Nations, however, has no role

in the oversight or decision making processes of the

“United Nations Command.” The U.S. Government is

in control of the “United Nations Command.” The use

by the U.S. of the designation “United Nations Com-

mand,” however, creates and perpetuates the miscon-

ception that the UN is in control of the actions and

Page 11

decisions taken by the U.S. under the “United Nations

Command.”

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(more commonly referred to as North Korea) has

called for disbanding the “United Nations Com-

mand”(UN Command). At a press conference held at

the United Nations on June 21, 2013, the North Korean

Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Sin Son Ho

argued that the actions of the U.S. Government using

the designation “United Nations Command” are not

under any form of control by the United Nations.

Since the UN has no role in the decision making

process of what the U.S. does under the title of the

“United Nations Command,” North Korea contends

the U.S. should cease its claim that it is acting as the

“United Nations Command.”

II. – UN Authorized “Unified Command”

Looking at the Security Council resolutions

related to Korea that were passed in June and July

1950, it is clear that the content of these resolutions

supports North Korea’s argument. During this period

the UN Security Council passed four resolutions. They

are:

S.C. 82 (V)-S/1501 on June 25, 1950

S.C. 83 (V)-S/1511 on June 27, 1950

S.C. 84 (V)-S/1588 on July 7, 1950

S.C. 85 (V)-S/1657 July 31, 1950

None of these resolutions refers to a “United

Nations Command” or gives the United States permis-

sion to call itself the United Nations Command.

The last two of these resolutions refer to a

“Unified Command.” S.C. Resolution 84 of July 7,

1950 is the first Security Council resolution to refer to

the creation of a “Unified Command.” The language of

the resolution says that the Security Council, “Recom-

mends that all members providing forces and other

assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council

resolution make such forces and other assistance

available to a Unified Command under the United

States of America.”

The resolution states that the Security Council

requests the United States to designate the commander

of such forces, and it authorizes the “Unified Com-

mand” at its discretion to use the United Nations flag

“concurrently with the flags of the various nations

participating.”

S.C. Resolution 84 also made the request that

“the United States … provide the Security Council

with reports as appropriate on the course of action

taken under the Unified Command.”

In subsequent action by the Security Council

during this period, the members of the Security Coun-

cil, were careful to refer to the U.S. command of the

Korean War forces related to the United Nations as the

“Unified Command.”

Therefore, when reviewing the action by the U.S.

to designate itself as the “United Nations Command,”

the question is raised as to how, why and by whom the

designation “United Nations Command” was substi-

tuted for the Security Council designation of a “Uni-

fied Command.”

S.C. Resolution 84 was passed on July 7 using

the designation “Unified Command.” The following

day, on July 8, the U.S. President Harry Truman

appointed General Douglas MacArthur to head this

Command. A Memo referring to this appointment,

states that with this appointment, General MacArthur

was designated as the Commander of the “Unified

Command.”

In the period immediately following the passing

of UN Security Council Resolution 84, U.S. Ambassa-

dor Warren Austin refers to the U.S. government com-

mand as the “Unified Command.”

For example, “A Letter to the UN Secretary-

General from Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the

UN,” on July 12, says:

(…) I have the honor to inform you that the

President of the United States, in response

to the Security Council resolution of 7 July

1950, has on 8 July designated General

Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding

General of the military forces which the

Members of the United Nations place

under the Unified Command of the United

States pursuant to the United Nations effort

to assist the Republic of Korea.

Similarly the “Unified Command” was the

designation used in a letter dated 24 July 1950 trans-

mitting the first Report from General MacArthur to the

Security Council. The Report is titled, “First Report to

the Security Council by the United States Government

on the course of action taken under the Unified Com-

mand (USG).”

III. – U.S. Substitutes “United Nations

Command” as Camouflage

It appears that it was in a U.S. Government

communiqué dated July 25 that the designation “UN

Page 12

Command” was first officially used in a U.S. Govern-

ment communication to the UN. This document was

titled, “Communique Number 135 of the Far East

Command S/1629 25 July 1950.” It states:

The United Nations Command with Head-

quarters in Tokyo was officially estab-

lished today with General Douglas MacAr-

thur as Commander-in-Chief. The an-

nouncement was made in General Order

No. 1, General Headquarters, United Na-

tions Command. The order reads:

1. In response to the resolution of the Secu-

rity Council of the United Nations of July

7, 1950, the President of the United States

has designated the undersigned Com-

mander-in-Chief of the Military Forces this

date the United Nations Command. Pursu-

ant thereto, there is established this date the

United Nations Command, with General

Headquarters in Tokyo, Japan.

According to this communiqué dated July 25,

1950, it is the President of the United States not the

United Nations that was responsible for creating the

designation “United Nations Command,” as a replace-

ment for the UN authorized “Unified Command.” The

communiqué alleges that this was done to fulfill the

obligations of S.C. Resolution 84 of July 7. It is

evident, however, from reading the resolution of July

7 that there is no reference in that resolution to a

“United Nations Command.”

Why did the U.S. government substitute the

designation “United Nations Command” for the

Security Council designation “Unified Command”

after initially referring to the designation of “Unified

Command,” language which was actually provided for

in the Security Council resolution of July 7?

There are accounts that are helpful in understand-

ing what was going on behind the scenes at the time

that can give clues to solve this puzzle. One such

account is provided by an article by James W Houck

titled, “The Command and Control of United Nation

Forces In the Era of Peace Enforcement.”

At the time

he wrote this article in the early 1990s, Houck was

Force Judge Advocate for the Commander of the U.S.

Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain.

Houck writes that UN Secretary-General Trygve

Lie and some of the countries on the Security Council,

namely the U.K., France and Norway were in favor of

creating a structure to provide for a United Nations

role in the Korean operations.

Houck describes how, “During the negotiations

preceding authorization of the unified command,

Secretary-General Trygve Lie had proposed a ‘commit-

tee as coordination of assistance for Korea’ consisting

of troop contributing states and the Republic of Ko-

rea.”

While the explicit purpose of the committee,

Secretary-General Lie explained, was, “to stimulate

and coordinate offers of assistance, its deeper purpose

was to keep the United Nations ‘in the picture’,” as Lie

himself writes in his recollections of his seven-year

term as UN Secretary-General. He explains that his

purpose was, “to promote continuing United Nations

participation in and supervision of the military security

action in Korea of a more intimate and undistracted

character than the Security Council could be expected

to provide.”

The U.S., however, was opposed to the idea of

such a supervisory committee and had the power to

turn it down. This effectively left the U.S. in control of

the decisions regarding what was to be done in the UN

authorized operations of the Korean War.

“From the start of the Korean conflict,” Houck

explains, “the United States exercised both political

control and strategic direction over the operation.”

Though the Security Council authorized the U.S.

intervention in the Korean War, the Security Council

failed to fulfill its obligation under the UN Charter to

act as the political authority for military actions taken

under the authority of the UN Security Council.

Implicit in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter is that it is the

Security Council that can exercise force not that it can

cede its authority to others.

Instead of the United Nations fulfilling its charter

obligations, however, as Houck documents, “The

United Nations, did not interfere at all in the purely

military aspects of the operation and even in political

matters it confined itself to making recommendations.”

Corroborating Houck’s account, a military his-

torian, James Schnabel in his account of the first year

of the Korean War, describes why the U.S. government

was opposed to the Committee favored by Trygve Lie

and several Security Council members. Schnabel

explains that the response of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

was to oppose such a project. They were hostile to the

potential of such a committee to try to control military

operations.

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Schnabel writes,

“wanted a command arrangement in which the United

States, as executive agent for the United Nations,

Page 13

would direct the Korean operation, with no positive

contact between the field commander and the United

Nations.”

Though the U.S. Government had turned down

the political oversight committee proposed by the

Secretary-General, there was, according to Schnabel,

a recognition that the unilateral political and military

control the U.S. Government exercised over the

“Unified Command” was problematic. The Chiefs of

Staff directed MacArthur “to avoid any appearance of

unilateral American action in Korea.”

As Schnabel writes,”For worldwide political

reasons,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed that, “it is

important to emphasize repeatedly the fact our opera-

tions are in support of the United Nations Security

Council.”

According to Schnabel, “this led General MacAr-

thur to identify himself whenever practicable as

Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command

(CINCUNC), and whenever justified, would empha-

size in his communiqués the activities of forces of

other member nations.”

Noting that the State Department proposed to the

Secretary of Defense that reports be sent to the Secu-

rity Council each week, Schnabel writes, “These

would keep world attention on the fact that the United

States was fighting in Korea for the United Nations,

not itself.” But these reports were not required and

were not a mechanism for UN supervision over the

U.S. activities or decision making processes.

Decisions on the operations of MacArthur’s

command were made by the U.S. Government, writes

Schnabel. The United Nations at no time in the Korean

War sought to interfere in the control of operations

which were the responsibility of the United States. As

MacArthur later testified to a Senate investigating

committee, “… my connections with the United

Nations was largely nominal … everything I did came

from our own Chiefs of Staff … . The controls over me

were exactly the same as though the forces under me

were all Americans. All of my communications were

to the American high command here.”

IV. – “United Nations Command” as

Achilles Heel

UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, however,

points out that the insistence on unilateral control of

the conduct of the War waged in Korea by the U.S.

had its Achilles heel. Lie wrote, “As the Korean War

developed, Washington complained, and had reason to

complain, that the United States was carrying too

much of a burden; but its unwillingness, in those early

days, when the pattern of the police action was being

set, to accord the United Nations a larger measure of

direction and thereby participation no doubt contrib-

uted to the tendency of the Members to let Washington

assume most of the responsibility for the fighting.”

So an interesting anomaly emerges. The UN

resolution authorizing military action in Korea spoke

about a “Unified Command” and the original resolu-

tion the UN Secretary-General proposed included a

mechanism for the UN to supervise the military action.

This control was rejected by the U.S. government, and

it appears, the UN never pressed to exert its supervi-

sion over the conduct of the Korean War. This control

was thus ceded to the U.S. government.

While the U.S. government had total control over

the Korean campaign it was waging, it appears that it

also needed a means to camouflage the unilateral

nature of this operation. The designation “United

Nations Command,” which the U.S. government as-

signed to its operation, replaced the designation of the

“Unified Command” described in Security Council

Resolution 84. This change of name provided the

camouflage to hide the unilateral nature of the U.S.

command and control and of its conduct of the war

against North Korea.

The U.S. Government needed the appearance that

its unilateral actions were on behalf of and under the

United Nations. This was provided by changing the

designation of the Command from the “Unified Com-

mand” to the “United Nations Command.” The change

of name helped to create the needed misleading

appearance. Similarly, the reports that the U.S. Gov-

ernment voluntarily submitted to the UN Security

Council were titled, “Reports of the United Nations

Command.” This made it appear that the U.S. was

conducting the war on behalf of the UN and under its

supervision.

This misleading designation continues to exist

today over 60 years after it was created, thereby

continuing to give the world the false impression that

the campaign waged by the U.S. in Korea was and

continues to be a United Nations operation and that

even today the UN has a presence on the Korean

Peninsula.

While the UN did not participate in the decision

making process of the military campaign carried out in

its name, it played a role then and continues to play a

Page 14

role by allowing the U.S. Government to appropriate

the United Nations name as a camouflage cover for the

actions of the U.S. Government. What is the UN

responsibility in such a matter for what was done, and

for what continues to be done in its name? That is the

essence of the question raised by North Korea’s call

that the “United Nations Command” be dissolved.

V. – Conclusion

The research represented in this paper presents a

curious, but significant irony. The UN authorized

Member States to intervene in the Korean War, to form

the “Unified Command,” to use the UN flag along with

the flags of the member states participating in the

“Unified Command,” and it authorized the U.S. to

appoint a Commander in Chief for the “Unified

Command.”

According to the obligation required under the

UN Charter, and to the original efforts of Trygve Lie,

with support from three Security Council members,

namely, the U.K., France, and Norway, there was an

effort to set up a political entity that would oversee the

Korean War operation for the Security Council.

The U.S., however, rejected the proposal and

succeeded in controlling the political and the strategic

direction for the Korean War. After rejecting the UN

proposal for UN supervision over U.S. actions and

decisions, the U.S. put itself forward as the “United

Nations Command.” Thus assuming the cloak of the

United Nations, by referring to itself as the United

Nations. This mechanism served as a means to misrep-

resent the U.S. Government’s unilateral actions and

decision making processes in the Korean War.

Recently several UN Secretary-Generals, includ-

ing Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Gali,

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon have acknowledged that the U.S. was in

charge of the Command structure of the Korean War

activity taken under the authority of the “Unified

Command,” and that the United Nations had no role in

overseeing the actions undertaken in the name of the

UN. The statement is made that the UN “never had any

role in the command of any armed forces deployed in

the Korean peninsula.”

The difficulty raised by such a claim, however,

is that it evades the salient fact that the Security

Council authorized the U.S. to assume this role in

violation of the obligations implicit in the UN Charter

that the UN exercise supervision over the political, and

strategic decision making processes of an action

approved under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Therefore, there is some truth to the statements of

Boutros Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan, and Ban Ki-moon

that the UN had no role in the command of the military

activity carried out under its name in Korea. Specifi-

cally as the Spokesperson for Ban Ki-moon stated

recently,”The UN did not at any time have any role in

the command of the forces that operated in Korea in

1950-1953.”

But what this leaves out is that the UN authorized

the U.S. to designate the Commander of the “Unified

Command.” Then, however, under pressure from the

U.S., the UN failed to exercise its obligation to super-

vise the actions of the “Unified Command.”

Subsequently, the UN continues to evade fulfill-

ing its obligations by continuing to allow the U.S. to

claim that it is the “United Nations Command” in

Korea and in failing to provide its political supervision

over what the U.S. has done and continues to do in

Korea in the name of the UN.

The DPRK proposal is that the U.S. cease to call

itself the “United Nations Command.” It is important

to include a recognition of how the U.S. Government

activity represents a continuing violation of the UN

Charter.

Recently, in response to a question, the Spokes-

person for Ban Ki-moon said that the issues of the

Korean Armistice are issues that do not concern the

United Nations as the United Nations is not a party to

the Armistice.

Why then has the United Nations

allowed the U.S. to continue to use the designation,

“United Nations Command” to misrepresent itself as

acting under the control of the UN in the Armistice?

Unless the UN takes responsibility for allowing

the U.S. to claim the authority of the United Nations in

its continuing actions as part of the Armistice, the UN

is continuing to allow actions in violation of the UN

Charter. If there is a “United Nations Command” that

is part of the Korean Armistice Agreement, such a

command must be under the political and strategic

direction of the UN Security Council. Otherwise, the

authority of the UN Charter is being treated as a

charade to justify U.S. Government unilateral activity

under the camouflage of the UN name. It is as if the

UN is but a set of words to hide the illegal acts of one

of the Great Powers.

VI. – Epilogue

There is another significant aspect of the conduct

of the U.S. government with respect to its initiating

Page 15

and intervening into the Korean War. This has to do

with the role played by the U.S. Government in by-

passing not only the requirements of the UN Charter,

but also the requirement of the U.S. Constitution.

The UN Charter specifies that all military action

taken to intervene in another country requires a resolu-

tion of the Security Council under Chapter 7. Yet the

U.S. government made the decision and began to act

on that decision to intervene in the Korean conflict

before there was any such action by the UN Security

Council. This represented a violation by the U.S.

Government of the UN Charter.

Similarly, the U.S. Executive Branch violated the

provision of the U.S. Constitution requiring that no

decision to go to war can be made without a Congres-

sional Declaration of War. There was no such declara-

tion with respect to the U.S. Government waging war

on the Korean peninsula.

There is a provision in the UN Charter, Article

43(3) which states that member states participating in

military actions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter are

obliged to have such actions “subject to the signatory

states in accordance with their respective constitutional

processes,”

In his article “The Korean War: On What Legal

Basis Did Truman Act?” Louis Fisher who is a special-

ist in Constitutional Law, points to the constitutional

violation represented by Truman’s sending U.S. troops

to the Korean War.

Truman used as an illegitimate excuse that the

act had been authorized by the UN Security Council.

Fisher’s article describes the extensive debate in the

U.S. Congress before joining the UN to consider if it

was appropriate for the U.S. government to claim that

a Security Council resolution justified bypassing U.S.

Constitutional obligations.

In his appearance before the House Committee

on Foreign Relations then Under Secretary of State

Dean Acheson explained that “only after the President

receives the approval of Congress is he ‘bound to

furnish that contingent of troops to the Security Coun-

cil’.”

Not only did Truman commit troops and aid to

South Korea before the Security Council called it a

military action, but more importantly, no action of the

Security Council authorizes the U.S. government to

violate the U.S. Constitution. For the U.S. government

to wage war, the U.S. Constitution requires that the

U.S. Congress make the decision that authorizes that

war.

Though other artifices were employed to evade

U.S. Constitutional obligation, such as calling the

Korean War a “police action,” U.S. Courts rejected

such subterfuges.

Responding to these subterfuges, Vito Marcan-

tonio, the American Congressman from N.Y. for the

American Labor Party said, “When we agreed to the

United Nations Charter we never agreed to supplant

our Constitution with the United Nations Charter. The

power to declare and make war is vested in the repre-

sentations of the people, in the Congress of the United

States.

Commenting on this same situation, Justice Felix

Frankfurter argued, “Illegality cannot attain legitimacy

through practice. Presidential acts of war, including

Truman’s initiative in Korea can never be accepted as

constitutional or as a legal substitute for Congressional

approval.”

Notes:

1. See, for example: Jay Hauben, “Is the UN Role in Korea 1947-

1953 the Model Being Repeated Today?”

http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/UN-Role-in-Korea.doc.

2. I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New York,

1952, p. 75. By August 1, 1950, the Soviet Union had returned to

the Security Council ending its 6-month boycott and so there were

no further UN resolutions authorized by the Security Council

supporting UN participation in the Korean War.

3. See for example: Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Misrepresents its Role

in Korean War and in Armistice Agreement as UN Command,”

taz blogs, June 26, 2013. http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/06/

26/us-misrepresents-its-role-as-un-command. (No longer Avail-

able.)

4. Press conference June 21, 2013, Ambassador Sin Son Ho at the

UN. http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/watch/ambas

sador-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-representative-of-the-democratic-

p e o p l e s -r ep u b l i c -o f - ko re a -t o - t h e -u n - p r e ss - c o n f e r -

ence/2498682301001. (No Longer Available.) A text version of

the statement presented is online at: http://www.4thmedia.org

/2013/06/26/ (No Longer Available.) illegitimacy-and-injustice-

of-the-un-command-in-south-korea-dprk-calls-for-its-immediate-

dissolution/ (No Longer Available.)

5. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War

Policy and Direction: The First Year, available at:

ht t p s: / / www. hi s t o r y. a r my. mi l / h t m l / b o o k s / 0 2 0 / 2 0 -

1/CMH_Pub_20-1.pdf. See p. 102, f/n 6 “Memo, JCS for Secy.

Defense, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Designation of a United Nations Unified

Comdr by the United States.”

6. James W. Houck, “The Command and Control of United

Nations Forces in the Era of ‘Peace Enforcement’,” Duke Journal

of Comparative and International Law, vol. 4, No 1, 1993.

7. See Houck, p. 13 f/n 51.

8. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, New York, p. 334.

9. Houck, p. 12. “None of the resolutions (referring to the June

and July S.C. resolutions -ed),” writes Houck, provided for

Page 16

Security Council control over the ensuing operation despite the

fact that it would be conducted under Security Council authoriza-

tion.”

10. See Articles 42, 44, 46 and 48 of the UN Charter. These art-

icles authorize the Security Council to use force. There is no

article in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which authorizes the

Security Council to cede political decision making to a member

state to carry out a Chapter 7 action.

11. Schnabel, p. 103, Rad, WAR 85743, DA to CINCFE, Jul. 12,

50.

12. Schnabel, p. 104, f/n 10. See MacArthur Hearings, p. 10.

13. Lie, p. 334.

14. Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the

Secretary-General, June 21, 2013. http://www.un.org/News/brief

ings/docs/2013/db130621.doc.htm. (No Longer Available.)

15. E-mail received from Eduardo del Buey on June 25, 2013.

16. See I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New

York, 1952, p. 75.

17. Louis Fisher, “The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did

Truman Act?,” American Journal of International Law, Jan. 1995.

(89 Am J. Int’l L. 21), p. 30.

18. Fisher, p. 34.

19. Fisher, p. 35.

20. Fisher, p. 38.

https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-role-of-the-un-in-the-

unending-korean-war-united-nations-command-as-camou-

flage/5350876

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in OhmyNews

International on June 17, 2009]

Overseas Koreans Remember

6.15 Joint Declaration

by Ronda Hauben

Though the Sunshine Policy that has officially

guided the struggle for Korean Reunification since

June 15, 2000 (6.15)

may be under siege by the cur-

rent government of South Korea, the U.S. government,

and the United Nations Security Council, it was very

much alive at the Overseas Koreans Conference for

Peace and Reunification of Korea held in Washington,

D.C. The conference, marking the 9

anniversary of

the historic agreement between the Heads of State of

North and South Korea, was held on June 12-14, 2009.

It was with a sigh of relief that I left New York

on Friday morning June 12 to travel to Washington,

D.C. where the June 15 Joint Korea Declaration Over-

seas Committee for Peace and Reunification of Korea

was hosting this three-day event.

At noon, in New York City on Friday, June 12,

the United Nations Security Council passed SC Reso-

lution 1874 imposing harsh sanctions against North

Korea. The voice of reason has been drowned out in a

sea of “waiting for Obama” sentiment, giving the

Obama administration license to continue and even

outdo the anti-democratic policies of the Bush admin-

istration.

For example, Obama’s administration has in-

creased the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan and en-

couraged extensive military actions displacing the

civilian population in Pakistan. But when it comes to

North Korea, U.S. government policy has been espe-

cially harsh. This has been documented in an earlier

article in OhmyNews International: “U.S. Policy

Toward North Korea Fails to Engage.” Page 19 in this

issue.

The presentations and discussion at the 6.15

anniversary conference helped to put what is hap-

pening at the UN into the bigger framework of U.S.,

Korean relations and North Korea-South Korea rela-

tions.

This broad focus is one where several genera-

tions of Koreans have grown up since the rivalry be-

tween U.S. and Soviet Union following World War II,

imposed arbitrary separation on the Korean Peninsula.

“The separation itself is violent,” explained Park

Soh-eyn, the first speaker at the Saturday morning

panel, who came to the conference from Germany. She

observed that the June 15 Declaration had a significant

symbolic effect. It provided a common approach

toward reunification for both North Korea and South

Korea. After 60 years of separation, just to be able to

look at the North Korean and South Korean flags in the

same space was touching, she recalled.

Part of the impact in South Korea of the 6.15

Joint Declaration was to legalize discussions of reuni-

fication which had been previously forbidden and

Conference participants

Page 17

criminalized by the South Korea National Security

Law. The 6.15 Declaration had also broadened the

reunification movement so that people from different

sectors of society participated, including diverse re-

ligious organizations, and diverse non-religious organ-

izations including conservative and progressive po-

litical groups. Park Soh-eyn pointed out that there have

been many exchanges between the Koreas since the

6.15 Joint Declaration.

Park Soh-eyn offered the analogy that if we

consider the separation like a disease with its harmful

effects, the reunification process provides a medica-

tion, with curing qualities.

On Friday evening of the first day of the

conference there had been a short set of talks at the

dinner held at a Korean restaurant in Tysons Corner,

Virginia. U.S. Congressman Eni Faleomavaega of

American Samoa, who is the Chairman of the Foreign

Affairs Committee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global

Environment, gave a short presentation about his

support for the Sunshine Policy

and his respect for the

work done by former South Korean President Kim Dae

Jung.

I was invited to present a greeting at the dinner.

I described how as a featured writer for OhmyNews

International, I have reported on UN events, particu-

larly focusing on the frustrations among delegates and

others with the actions of the UN Security Council. I

noted the widespread feeling that there is a need for an

English language publication to counter media myths

as about North Korea.

Another talk at the Saturday Conference was

presented by Kim Chang-soo, who had been on the

South Korean National Security Council in the Roh

Moo-hyun administration. Kim Chang-soo reviewed

some of the recent events in the relations between the

two Koreas. President Lee Myung-bak has not recog-

nized the June 15, 2000 or October 4, 2007 agreements

with North Korea negotiated by the previous two

governments. The Lee regime, in abandoning the

Sunshine policy, turned to criticizing North Korea as

well as conducting military exercises with the U.S. that

are viewed as hostile activities by North Korea.

The media has focused on internal problems in

North Korea, failing to take into account broader

issues and context. North Korea has indicated it is

willing to talk about the nuclear issues with the U.S. on

a one to one basis, which would include talking about

U.S. protection of South Korea under the U.S. nuclear

umbrella. Kim Chang-soo proposed that North Korea

is trying to get diplomatic recognition from the U.S. as

well as to address its economic issues. But the current

world media focuses on problems with North Korea,

rather than why the U.S. is not doing anything to

encourage negotiations.

Kim Chang-soo suggested that the upcoming

summit between Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama

was important and has the potential to have serious

military implications. He cautioned against Obama

failing to realize that Lee Myung-bak is considered as

a repressive dictator and that there is a long tradition of

the U.S. government supporting dictatorial regimes in

South Korea. Such support for Lee Myung-bak by the

U.S. government would remind the people of South

Korea of this past history, including the resentment

that spread across South Korea in 2002 when two

middle school girls were killed by a U.S. military tank.

Kim Chang-soo advised Obama to keep this all in

mind when he meets the President of South Korea.

Kim Chang-soo offered some observations about

the current tense situation created between the U.S.

and North Korea by U.S. support for the harsh Security

Council Resolution that has recently passed at the UN.

He referred to several analogous periods when the U.S.

made progress in normalizing relations. One such

example was when China and the U.S. began to

normalize relations in the early 1970s. Similarly

despite the hostility of the Bush administration years,

negotiations with North Korea began in earnest toward

the latter part of Bush’s tenure in office.

The current sanctions, against North Korea, are

problematic. They even go beyond the mandate of the

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that in itself has

the potential to provoke military encounters. The

Security Council’s sanctions present a contradiction

with the Armistice Agreement between North Korea

and the UN Command, which forbids one side from

blockading the other side. The provision to forcibly

inspect North Korean ships contradicts the terms of the

Armistice, as do the provisions cutting off financial

interactions with North Korea.

Kim Chang-soo observed that Obama’s policy is

similar to Bush’s earlier policy. We need to ask for a

fresh policy approach from the Obama administration,

he suggested. He advised that there is a need for a very

special high level envoy to go to North Korea to

change the direction. Also he proposed that an ex-

change of cultural events and people to people interac-

tions could be helpful.

For the upcoming meeting between the U.S. and

Page 18

South Korean presidents, Kim Chang-soo proposed

that relations with North Korea need to address not

only denuclearization, but also diplomatic recognition,

inter Korea exchanges, and forging peace in Northeast

Asia. Kim Chang-soo advised that Lee Myung-bak

recognize the significance of the June 15 Declaration

and continue to implement that spirit and to promote

this spirit when he meets with Obama, rather than a

tough military approach to North Korea.

In thinking about the impact of the events at the

conference, it seems that U.S. and North Korean

relations are at a particularly low point with the danger

of a military confrontation. At such a time, it is partic-

ularly important to consider the achievements of the

Sunshine Policy and the 6.15 Joint Declaration as a

means to support peace and reunification, rather than

war, on the Korean Peninsula.

The continuing tragedy of the two Koreas is a

serious problem for the world, not just for the Korean

people. Also the U.S. government’s refusal to nego-

tiate a peace treaty to end the Korean war means that

there is a particularly dangerous situation on the

Korean Peninsula. The Armistice is but a temporary

truce, not a means of more permanently preventing a

return to military action.

A number of conversations at the conference,

however, emphasized that people in Korea have faced

many hardships over the years so that this difficult

time is not unusual for them.

One speaker on Friday evening summing up this

sentiment admitted, “I feel sometimes hopeless.” But

along with this sentiment, he explained his belief that

there is a basis for hope. He reminded those at the

conference, “But our people have been through so

many hardships … . We shouldn’t be passive. As our

voices get bigger, we’ll get more power. We shouldn’t

appeal to Lee Myung-bak. We should appeal to the

people.”

Notes:

1. From June 13 to June 15, 2000, an inter-Korean summit

between South Korean president Kim Dae-jung and the Demo-

cratic People’s Republic of Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong-il

took place in Pyongyang. It was the first inter-Korean summit

since the Korean War 1950-1953. On the last day of the summit,

the June 15

(6.15) North–South Joint Declaration was adopted

between leaders of North Korea and South Korea. See

https://en

.wi kipedia.org/wiki/2000_inter-Korean_summit and

https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/publi

cations/South-North_Joint_Dec_2000.pdf .

2. Most of the talks presented at the conference and dinner were

in Korean. This account of the conference is based on translations

from Korean into English provided by several colleagues.

3. During the South Korean presidency of Kim Dae-jung, a

national security policy was adopted known as the Sunshine

Policy. The national security policy had three basic principles: (1)

No military provocation from the North will be accepted; (2) The

South will not attempt to annex or occupy the North in any way;

(3) The South will actively seek peace and mutual partnership

with the North. For example, see

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki

/Sunshine_Policy.

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in OhmyNews

International on June 12, 2009]

U.S. Policy Toward North

Korea Fails to Engage

by Ronda Hauben

U.S. policy toward North Korea since Barack

Obama assumed the U.S. presidency is very different

from the promises of engagement which he made

during his election campaign. This policy presents a

striking example of the disparity between pre election

promises and the action taken thus far during the

Obama presidency.

On the first day of the new administration, sanc-

tions were authorized against three North Korean firms

under the Arms Export Control Act, along with several

nonproliferation executive orders. The three firms

were KOMID, which had been sanctioned by other

administrations, Sino-Ki and Moksong Trading Com-

pany, which were being sanctioned for the first time.

The hostile direction of Obama’s policy, how-

ever, has been signaled most clearly by the change

made when the new administration failed to reappoint

Christopher Hill to his position as Undersecretary of

State for East Asia and the head of the U.S. negotiation

team for the six-party talks with North Korea.

Not only was Hill not reappointed, but the role of

U.S. negotiator with North Korea was downgraded and

split among several different officials. A part time

position was created for an envoy. Another person

would be the U.S. representative to the six-party talks.

And still another official was to be appointed to the

position of Undersecretary of State for East Asia,

which was Hill’s former position.

Stephen Bosworth accepted the position as

envoy. His official title is Special Representative for

North Korea Policy. Bosworth did so on a part time

Page 19

basis. At the same time, he maintained his full time

position as Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy at Tufts University along with his new part

time job.

There has been little public discussion about why

the Obama administration made such significant

changes. The Boston Globe, in an article about

Bosworth’s appointment, refers to the concerns ex-

pressed by Leon Sigal, the director of the Northeast

Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Sci-

ence Research Council in New York. The article

quotes Sigal saying that there are officials in the new

administration, “who don’t think we can get anywhere,

so they don’t want to do the political heavy lifting to

try.”

In contrast to the loss of Hill as a negotiator with

North Korea, the Obama administration reappointed

Stuart Levey, as the Undersecretary of Treasury for

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Levey’s office in

the Treasury Department, was created in 2004 under

George W. Bush. This office was used to impose econ-

omic sanctions on North Korea. One such action was

the freezing of funds that North Korea had in a bank in

Macao, China, the Banco Delta Asia (BDA).

North Korea was not only denied access to U.S.

$25 million, but it was also denied the use of the

international banking system. This freezing of North

Korean funds was announced shortly after North

Korea and the five other nations who were part of the

six-party talks signed the September 19, 2005 agree-

ment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

The an-

nouncement by the Treasury Department sabotaged the

implementation of this important agreement which

would have gone a long way toward the goal of de-

nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. North Korea with-

drew from the six-party talks until the $25 million was

returned.

It is significant here to note that Levey and his

office briefly came under public scrutiny in 2006 when

the New York Times published an article exposing how

the office has access to and uses the SWIFT Data Base

to do intelligence work targeting people and transac-

tions that it claims are in violation of U.S. law.

The

SWIFT Data Base contains the transactions and ident-

ification information for the hundreds of thousands of

people and entities that do electronic banking transac-

tions using the SWIFT system.

The action by the U.S. Treasury using a section

of the Patriot Act against the Banco Delta Asia Bank,

however, demonstrated that the U.S. government has

the ability to use this data base information against

those it wants to target politically, rather than those

who have committed any actual illegal acts. Testimony

by former U.S. government officials to the U.S.

Congress, and documents submitted to the U.S. gov-

ernment by the bank owner and his lawyer, demon-

strated that there was never any evidence offered of

any illegal acts. Instead the Patriot Act had been used

to allow the U.S. government to act against this bank

for political objectives. (See “Behind the Blacklisting

of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed at targeting

China as well as North Korea?” See page 8 in this

issue.)

The new positions, designated to negotiate with

North Korea, are at a lower administrative level than

was Hill’s former position. In addition, the Obama

administration, by not reappointing Hill, has lost his

valuable expertise. Hill had effectively countered the

sabotage to negotiations caused by Levey’s office

during the Bush administration.

Hill was met with opposition from some in the

Bush administration at each step along the way.

Remarkably, Hill effectively countered much of this

opposition, making progress in the negotiations. In

August 2008, however, the Bush administration uni-

laterally changed what it claimed North Korea’s

obligations were as part of Phase 2 of the six-party Feb

2007 agreement, and falsely declared that North Korea

was in violation.

With Hill gone from the North Korean desk at

the State Department, and Levey reappointed to his

position at the Treasury Department, it is significant

that Obama sent an inter-agency group to visit the

capitals of Japan, South Korea and China to discuss

punishments for North Korea. Levey was featured as

one of the U.S. government officials on the trip.

But is punishment appropriate? There has been

no similar effort to open negotiations with North

Korea.

Instead, the U.S. administration has given its sup-

port to Levey and others whose actions have sabotaged

the success of the six-party talks. This failure of the

Obama administration is similar to previous U.S. pol-

icy on North Korea.

Robert Carlin, part of the U.S. government nego-

tiation team with North Korea under the Clinton

Administration, documents that there were significant

and successful negotiations on 22 issues carried out in

the period between 1993 and 2000.

These achieve-

ments, however, could not survive into the transition to

Page 20

the Bush Administration.

Similarly, Mike Chinoy, a former CNN journal-

ist, in his book Meltdown, documents both the Clinton

years and much of the Bush years. He chronicles how

negotiations were torpedoed not by North Korea, but

by forces within the U.S. government itself.

In addition, the U.S. conducts frequent military

maneuvers close to North Korea which North Korea

has claimed as a threat to its peace and security.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea test launched a

communications satellite using a rocket of advanced

design. This test broke no international law or treaty to

which North Korea is a party.

Still the launch was

condemned by the UN Security Council in a Presiden-

tial Statement. Also new sanctions were imposed on

North Korea, stating as authority, a previous Security

Council Resolution 1718.

North Korea has been the target of hostile acts by

the U.S. North Korea has tested rockets and has done

tests of two nuclear devices, which it claims it needs as

a deterrent. The U.S. has military agreements with

Japan and South Korea, including them under the

protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. There is only

an armistice ending the fighting of the Korean War.

The U.S. as the head of the UN command has not been

willing to negotiate a treaty ending the Korean War.

The failure of the UN Security Council to ex-

plore North Korea’s problems in trying to check U.S.

hostility demonstrates its failure to carry out its obliga-

tions under the UN charter. The failure of the Security

Council to protect Iraq from U.S. invasion is a warning

that the Security Council should reform its processes

so that it doesn’t just become a vehicle for the political

targeting of a nation as happened with Iraq.

In his comments to journalists in response to the

sanctions put on North Korea in April 2009, the

Deputy Ambassador to the UN from North Korea, Pak

Tok Hun said, “The recent activity of the security

council concerning the peaceful use of outer space by

my country shows that unless the security council is

totally reformed and democratized we expect nothing

from it.”

The challenge to the nations of the UN is to pro-

vide a more neutral and considered investigation of the

problem it is trying to solve rather than just carrying

out the punishment a P-5 nation may endeavor to in-

flict on another nation.

Notes:

1. Karin Lee and Julia Choi, “North Korea: Unilateral and Mult-

ilateral Economic Sanctions and U.S. Department of Treasury

Actions, 1955-April 2009,” National Committee on North Korea,

(Paper last updated April 28, 2009), p. 26.

http://nautilus org

/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/09035LeeChoi.pdf.

2. James F. Smith, “In role as envoy, Tufts dean carries hard-

earned lessons,” The Boston Globe, May 26, 2009.

3. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Asia: Another Abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act,” OhmyNews

International, March 3, 2007.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-

351525&rel_no-1. (No longer available.)

4. Ronda Hauben, “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia:

Is the policy aimed at targeting China as well as North Korea?,”

OhmyNews International, Ma y 1 8 , 2 0 0 7 .

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-

362192&rel_no-1 (No longer available.)

5. Erick Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S.

in Secret to Block Terror,” New York Times, June 23, 2006.

https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html.

6. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the Six-

Party Talks,” OhmyNews International, September 28, 2008.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-

383769&rel_no-1. (No longer available.)

7. Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons Learned

and Forgotten,” Korea Yearbook 2007, Edited by Rudiger Frank

et al., Brill, 2007, p. 235-251.

8. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown, St. Martin’s Press, 2008.

9. Ronda Hauben, “Controversy at UN Over North Korea’s

Launch: Reconvening six-party talks or penalizing Pyongyang?”,

OhmyNews International, April 10, 2009.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-

385061&rel_no-1. (No longer available.)

10. Ronda Hauben, “Security Council’s Ad Hoc Actions Increase

Tension on Korean Peninsula: [Analysis] North Korea responds

by withdrawing from six-party talks as promised,” OhmyNews

International, April 17, 2009.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-

385093&rel_no-1. (No longer available.)

11. Seumas Milne, “After Iraq It’s Not Just North Korea that

Wants a Bomb,” Guardian Comment Is Free, May 29, 2009.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/may/27/north-

korea-nuclear-weapons-us.

12. Pak Tok Hun, Informal Comments to the Media at the UN

Media Stakeout, April 24, 2009. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen

/ondemand/stakeout/2009/so090424pm2.rm. (No longer avail-

able.)

Page 21

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews

International on June 8, 2010.]

Netizens Question Cause of

Cheonan Tragedy

Online media challenge claims that

North Korea is responsible for sinking

the Cheonan

by Ronda Hauben

The South Korean government headed by Lee

Myung-bak is trying to dispel criticism that its accusa-

tion that North Korea is responsible for the sinking on

March 26 of the Cheonan warship is politically moti-

vated and a cover-up or possible false flag operation.

On May 20, the South Korean government pre-

sented as incontestable fact its conclusion that the war-

ship Cheonan split in two and sank because of hostile

action by North Korea. Online discussion seriously

challenged that presentation. Perhaps not coinciden-

tally, May 20, the day of the presentation coincided

with the date when campaigning for the June 2 provin-

cial and local elections was to officially begin.

The military communication logs show that the

first message from the Cheonan of trouble said

“aground on rocks.” The ship was in shallow waters.

Similarly, numerous early statements by both South

Korean and U.S. officials assured the public that North

Korea was not involved with the incident.

The rescue operation saved 58 of the crew mem-

bers. Forty-six of the 104 members of the ship’s crew

died as a result of the ship’s breaking in two and

sinking. Relatives of the sailors who died complained

that the rescue effort was inadequate and too late.

Public criticism of the Lee government grew regarding

how it was handling the ship disaster. A so called

international group was charged with the task of

assessing blame for the disaster. That Joint Invest-

igation Group (JIG) was under the Korean military.

The Investigation

When the five page investigation statement

was

presented on May 20, however, North Korea was

accused of being the cause of the disaster. The accusa-

tion was based on a part of a torpedo allegedly dredged

up from the sea which bore a supposed pen marked

number on a rusted surface.

The sinking of the Cheonan occurred during a

period when the U.S. military and the South Korean

military were conducting joint military exercises

named Key Resolve/Foal Eagle. The joint South

Korean-U.S. naval action involved several Aegis class

warships which have the most advanced computer and

radar systems to track and guide weapons to find and

destroy enemy targets. The Cheonan was a patrol

combat corvette (PCC) specializing in anti-submarine

warfare.

The investigation statement claims that somehow

an undetected North Korean submarine pierced a

highly protected arena of U.S.-South Korean military

maneuvers and released a torpedo in shallow waters,

and then escaped totally undetected.

An article in the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh

points out the unlikely scenario that “a North Korean

submarine [would be able] to infiltrate the maritime

cordon at a time when security reached its tightest

level and without detection by the Cheonan.”

No evidence was presented as to the actual firing

of the torpedo or the actual presence of a North Korean

submarine in the vicinity of the Cheonan. There is no

actual observation of a North Korean submarine in the

area of the Cheonan, despite the fact that there was

sophisticated surveillance equipment used for the

military exercises. Also, the shallowness of the sea

where the Cheonan sunk, about 40 to 50 m. and the

rocky bottom would make submarine travel near there

almost impossible

The statement of the investigation is unsigned.

The parties who allegedly conducted the investigation

are unnamed. Instead of facts to document a basis for

the accusations which might lead to war, a number of

allegations are followed by the statement that “There

is no other plausible explanation.”

Blogs and Other Online Media

The accusations made by the conservative media

in South Korea about North Korea have taken on a

James Bond quality given the mismatch between the

reality of North Korean capability and the claims being

made of how it has been able to perform amazing

deeds. Blogs and other online media in both the U.S.

and South Korea have presented facts and discussion

challenging the claims in the investigation statement,

and proposing other alternative explanations of the

cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. These online

discussions and questions have begun not only to

supplement newspaper accounts but also to become the

subject of newspaper articles in South Korea.

Questions discussed on blogs included whether

Page 22

there was a North Korean or German made torpedo

involved in the sinking of the Cheonan, or whether

there was any involvement of a torpedo at all.

online letter

,,4

addressed to Hillary Clinton by one of

the members of the investigation, questions whether

the marks on the ship came from being run aground or

a collision with some other vessel or both.

The Whole Story as a False Account?

The nature of the pen mark on the torpedo part

offered by South Korea as its main evidence that the

torpedo was fired by North Korea was challenged

not being a reliable piece of evidence of North Korean

involvement because there was rust under the pen

mark. Also, the blades of the offered evidence show a

degree of corrosion that would usually require far more

time than the two months in the water as claimed.

Another blog

challenges the whole story of the

South Korean government as a false account like the

Gulf of Tonkin incident. Some of the Korean netizens

and political activists who challenged the South Ko-

rean government about the cause of the Cheonan

sinking have been referred to the prosecutor for

charges.

The South Korean government has been cited

both Frank La Rue, UN Special Rapporteur for the

Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Opinion and

Expression and Amnesty International for interfering

with the rights of South Korean citizens and netizens.

They Need Teeth

Given the growing set of questions about the

South Korean government account of the sinking of

the Cheonan, the government has invited

some chosen

bloggers and twitter users to a session “to dispel any

doubts among the young that North Korea was behind

the deadly attack,”

A Yonhap News Agency press release explains

that it will select 20 twitter users, 10 defense bloggers

and 30 college reporters “to take a trip to Pyeongtaek

naval port south of Seoul where the salvaged parts of

Cheonan are being kept.” The article explains that

“The event is aimed at removing skepticism among

young Internet users who have raised doubts in online

communities about the results of a multinational

investigation that concluded North Korea downed the

ship in a torpedo attack.”

Like in the case of 9/11, careful fact checking

and examination of the evidence by netizens has

shown the South Korean government’s case for the

involvement of North Korea in the sinking of the

Cheonan to be unsustainable. Netizens are more and

more able to act as watchdogs. But they need teeth.

Notes:

1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigrep

ort.pdf.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/4218

56.html.

3. See the comments at the end of the Scott Creighton’s blog

entry, “The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to” May

24, 2010, http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/the-sink-

ing-of-the-cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. (No Longer Avilable.)

Some selected comments are in the Appendix just below. Some of

Scott Creighton's article is quoted at:

https://thecommunists.org

/2010/04/01/news/hands-off-korea-the-sinking-of-the-cheonan/.

4. http://cafe419.daum.net/_c21_/bbs_search_read?grpid=11Ypb

&mrpid=&fldid=JFBW&content=P&contentval=0001q&page=

1&prev_page=&firstbbsdepth=&lastbbsdepth=&datanum=114

&regdt=&favorRegdate=&favorMode=&listSortType=&listnu

m=. (No Longer Available.)

5. http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/pcc-772-cheona

n-photographic-evidence-that-no-1-written-on -top-of-rust/. (No

Longer Available.)

http://gowans.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/the-sinking-of-the-ch

eonan-another-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/.

7. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid= 2921120.

(No Longer Available.)

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/docs/ROK-Press

statement17052010.pdf

9. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/05/31/3/030100

0000AEN20100531003100315F.HTML (No Longer Available.)

Appendix

Some comments from Scott Creighton’s blog entry, “The Sinking

of the Cheonan: We are being lied to,” May 24, 2010.

http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/the-sinking-of-the-

cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. (No Longer Available.)

6. Tim, on May 24, 2010 at 1:55 p.m. said: ‘The markings in

Hangul, which reads “1?(or No. 1 in English),” found inside the

end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a

previously obtained North Korean torpedo.’ Now, just hang on a

minute ? a previously obtained NK torpedo? A previously

obtained NK torpedo?? How many do they have? Is it not beyond

the realms of possibility that this ‘evidence’ did not originate from

NK at all. We really ought to demand the same level of ballistic

forensics that apply to crime scenes where ordinary firearms have

been discharged. After all many more lives could be at stake here.

-------------------------------------------

57. Mika, on May 27, 2010 at 5:34 a.m. said: You may want to

have a look at this: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LE26

Dg01.html. (No Longer Available.) I’ve not tried verifying any of

the claims made there yet, but the comments about the Korean

handwritten writings are damning if true, and if there was indeed

Page 23

still a large scale exercise going on, that makes it completely

unthinkable a NK sub would have penetrated that deep, sank the

Cheonan and got away again. OTOH, it does provide a rather

credible alternative scenario: a friendly fire incident blamed on the

North Koreans. Kursk anyone?

----------------------------

145. willyloman, on May 28, 2010 at 3:38 p.m. said: the following

comment was left by a reader and it did not go through so I am

posting it here so that others may read it. Mr. Serandos:

WordPress sometimes has problems with comments … it should

work fine but if posting again presents a problem, just me know.

thank you

scott creighton, willyloman

Tom Serandos left the following comment: I tried to leave the

following message on Mr. Creighton’s site but I don’t think it

went through.

PCC-772 report: I agree with the contents of the report.

Examine the photographs of the PCC-772 props. The deformation

on each fluke is evidence of grounding while making turns. If

there was an explosion it occurred after the ship ran aground or

only the lower flukes would have been damaged when it settled to

the bottom. The damage to the shaft alleys would have locked up

the props.

If there was an explosion perhaps it was an unexploded bomb

from the Korean war or a mine the S. Koreans have not retrieved

(reportedly there are over 100 of those still out there). It could

have been in the vessels path when it grounded.

Also, the degree of corrosion on the torpedo parts indicates they

have been in the sea for a very long time (months). It was long

enough for the active alloy in the props to set up a galvanic cell

with the other parts. I am a degreed metallurgist with 25 years of

experience and seven years of service in the U.S. Nuclear Navy.

Tom Serandos

--------------------------------------------

166. Han Kim, on May 29, 2010 at 7:30 a.m. said: I’m Korean

and many Korean ppl know the govt is making things up.

As you might know, the only reason the govt manipulated the

truth is to get more votes on the upcoming election from the old

generations. :) Keep up the good work! We really appreciate the

voices from outside Korea

----------------------

203. ??, on May 29, 2010 at 2:22 p.m. said:

Dear Scott,

have you seen this article, “Did an American Mine Sink South

Korean Ship?” by one Yoichi Shimatsu: http://newamericamedia.

org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-south-korean-

ship.php. (No Longer Available.)

He makes many good points, what I’d like to highlight is what he

says about the type of torpedo submitted as evidence on May 20:

“Since torpedoes travel between 40-50 knots per hour (which is

faster than collision tests for cars), a drive shaft would crumble

upon impacting the hull and its bearing and struts would be

shattered or bent by the high-powered blast … .”

My point is that even more bewildering than the various torpedo

schema we’ve seen is the very implausible situation that such a

relatively intact remnant of the alleged weapon exists as foisted

onto us.

North Korea is also now vigorously bringing forth their defense,

which is comprehensively exposing the various contradictions in

the “JIG” case. See my link of “Military Commentator on Truth

behind ‘Story of Attack by North’ (Part 1).”

http://tinyurl

.com/29eh9zj The KCNA site won’t link directly, so I’m linking

to the article on my own blog.

People are going to cry about giving North Korea a hearing but

they are certainly innocent until proven guilty and their exclusion

from the investigation process indicates weakness and fear of

exposure in the South Korean position, which has been relying so

far on a kind of international kangaroo court or media lynching.

I’d very much like to see what evidence they presented at their

own press briefing recently to contrast with the “JIG” press event

of May 20. Again people will virulently impugn and dismiss them,

but you can be sure both Russia and China were paying close

attention to all the details of their nearer neighbor’s case.

It’s also important for your morale to know that South Korean

citizens groups and progressive media are banding together as we

speak to get to the bottom of this particular Big Lie. Also Mr. Shin

is saying he’ll use the suppressive court proceedings initiated

against him to expose the whole phony deal.

Don’t lose sight of the big picture, you’ve taken some “below-the-

belt” hits? hang in there man!

-------------------------------

211. hankyul moon, on May 30, 2010 at 11:16 a.m. said:

The kr.gov will keep trying to paint with dirty mentions in order

to wrap this page.

In addition of that, the kr.gove will keep change their story and

evidence, which is a traditional judgment of suspicion. Many

people focused on the torpedo; however, a single evidence is not

correlated to the explosion. The torpedo that kr.gov presented is

not proven evidence of explosion scientifically. For example,

there are no proofs of thermal effects, mechanical damages by

explosion, corrosion effects by salty water, and corrosion effects

by heat and salty water. Only one evidence is letter “1?”, written

by bright blue permanent marker. Nevertheless, North kr.gov

denied using “1?” on machinery.

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews

International in June 2010.]

Questioning Cheonan

Investigation Stirs

Controversy

by Ronda Hauben

South Korean government officials have de-

nounced an NGO for writing to the Security Council.

The NGO is one of the most prominent civil society

organizations in South Korea, People’s Solidarity for

Participatory Democracy (PSPD). Such action dis-

regards the long tradition and established procedure at

the United Nations for an NGO or private individual to

send communication to the Security Council on mat-

ters it is considering.

PSPD is a watchdog NGO that was founded in

Page 24

1994. Since then it has monitored the actions of the

South Korean government, supporting the efforts of

South Korean citizens to participate in political affairs.

In a letter asking for support, PSPD writes:

PSPD believes that diplomacy and security

policy should be under the citizenry’s

watch and democratic control. National

Security and diplomatic policy should not

be monopolized by military and diplomatic

authorities.

On June 11, 2010, the Center for Peace and

Disarmament of PSPD sent a letter to UN Security

Council President Claude Heller, the Mexican Ambas-

sador to the UN. Mexico holds the rotating presidency

of the Security Council for the month of June. With its

letter, PSPD included its report, “The PSPD’s Stance

on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking.”

The letter and report were also sent to the other

fourteen member states of the United Nations Security

Council, to the United Nations Secretary General and

to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea

(South Korea).

The PSPD report raised a number of questions

and problems with the findings presented by the South

Korean government of its investigation of the Cheonan

sinking.

Background

The South Korean government, unable to win

support domestically for its allegations that North

Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan,

turned to the UN Security Council for action against

North Korea.

On June 4 the South Korean Ambas-

sador at the UN submitted a letter to the UN Security

Council requesting it to take up the matter of the

sinking of the Cheonan.

On June 8, North Korea submitted a letter to the

Security Council denying any involvement in the

sinking of the Cheonan.

The Security Council scheduled an informal

meeting for South Korea to present its case against

North Korea on Monday, June 14. Initially there was

no plan for the Security Council to meet with the North

Korean delegation on the Cheonan issue. On Sunday

evening, however, news reports from South Korea

announced that on June 14, the Security Council would

also hold an informal meeting with North Korea.

According to some of the South Korean news

media who cover the UN, the big story in South Korea

on Monday, June 14, was not that South Korea was

making its presentation to the Security Council.

Instead the media described denunciations by South

Korean government officials against PSPD for sending

its report to the UN. The reporters claimed the South

Korean government believed that the PSPD report

influenced the North Korean UN delegation to request

a presentation at the UN Security Council on the

subject of the Cheonan. There was no proof presented

for such allegations. This did not, however, stop South

Korean government officials from making accusations

against PSPD, nor the South Korean conservative

media from supporting the denunciations with articles

accusing the NGO of unpatriotic behavior.

In Seoul, on June 14, the spokesman for the Blue

House, for the President of South Korea, Lee Myung

bak, publicly denounced PSPD.

Also on June 14, during the Question and

Answer time at the National Assembly, the South

Korean Prime Minister, Un-Chan Chung, denouncing

PSPD for sending its letter and report to the UN

Security Council, said, “ Such actions are against

national interest. It (PSPD’s action) dishonored and

shamed our country.”

Back at UN headquarters in New York on Mon-

day, June 14, two separate informal meetings of the

Security Council were held in the North Lawn

Building. A large number of reporters waited in the

cafe outside the area where the Security Council was

meeting because the meetings were closed to the press.

After the two informal Security Council meet-

ings, the Mexican Ambassador spoke briefly to the

press. He said, “the Security Council issued a call to

the parties to refrain from any act that could escalate

tensions in the region, and makes an appeal to preserve

peace and stability in the region.” He also indicated

that the Security Council would continue its consult-

ations after the meetings it had with the delegations of

both nations. Heller said that it was very important to

have received the very detailed presentation by South

Korea and also to know and learn from the arguments

of North Korea. He commented that it was “very

important that North Korea has approached the

Security Council.” In response to a question about his

view on the issues presented, he responded, “I am not

a judge. I think we will go on with the consultations to

deal in a proper manner on the issue.”

The North Korean UN delegation scheduled a

press conference for the following day, Tuesday, June

15. During the press conference, the North Korean

Ambassador presented North Korea’s refutation of the

Page 25

allegations made by South Korea. Also he explained

North Korea’s request to be able to send an investi-

gation team to go to the site where the sinking of the

Cheonan occurred. South Korea had denied the

request. During the press conference, a reporter with a

South Korean newspaper asked the North Korean

Ambassador if he had received a copy of the PSPD

document from PSPD. The Ambassador responded

that not to his knowledge.

In a press release, the Asian Human Rights

Commission writes that following the denunciation of

PSPD by South Korean government officials, “the

country’s Prosecutor’s office reportedly leaked to

newspapers that there was a possibility that the staff of

the PSPD might be prosecuted under the National

Security Act, if a case were to be filed … .”

“In response,” the press release explains, “con-

servative groups filed a complaint with the

Prosecutor’s Office.” On June 15, the Vice Minister of

Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Chun Yeong-U said

that, “A legal examination is currently going on.”

Following the accusatory remarks by South

Korean government officials against PSPD, “people

belonging to conservative groups attempted to raid the

offices of PSPD.” There are reports that members of

PSPD were assaulted verbally and physically, and

threatening phone calls were made to the PSPD

offices.

In one incident, a van containing flammable

material was driven up to the building where PSPD

offices are located. The police did not arrest the

perpetrators of these deeds. The Prosecutor, instead,

opened an investigation of PSPD.

On June 17, according to the Asian Human

Rights Commission, the case against PSPD was allo-

cated to the Public Security Bureau 1, which

announced its intention to summon PSPD officials.

The Asian Human Rights Commission also

reported that the Prosecutor’s office “approached one

of the experts who worked on the government-led

report in order for this expert to submit a complaint

concerning alleged criminal defamation by the NGO.”

South Korean government officials, supported by

some of the South Korean media, allege that it is an

unusual practice for an NGO to send a letter or report

to the UN Security Council. Recently, a reporter asked

a government official, “Are there any cases that a

NGO sends a contrast position paper against a

government on the security issue.” Chun, Yung-woo,

the 2

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade

responded, “I have never heard that there are such

NGOs, and document sent by a NGO cannot be a

UNSC document.”

NGO Communication to Security Council

Such an interchange demonstrates a serious lack

of knowledge of UN and particularly Security Council

procedures. There is a long established practice at the

UN of NGO’s or private individuals sending letters

and documents to the Security Council on questions

before the Security Council. Most if not all of the

matters before the Security Council have to do with

security issues.

Records at the UN show that the practice of

sending such correspondence to the Security Council

dates back to 1946. This is the date when the symbol

S/NC/ was introduced as the symbol for

“Communications received from private individuals

and non-governmental bodies relating to matters of

which the Security Council is seized.”

The Security

Council has the practice of periodically publishing a

list of the documents it receives, the name and

organization of the sender, and the date they are

received. The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the

Security Council states that the list is to be circulated

to all representatives on the Security Council. A copy

of any communication on the list is to be given to any

nation on the Security Council that requests it.

There are over 450 such lists indicated in the UN

records. As each list can contain several or a large

number of documents the Security Council has re-

ceived, the number of such documents is likely to be in

the thousands.

Under Rule 39 of the Council procedures, the

Security Council may invite any person it deems com-

petent for the purpose to supply it with information on

a given subject. Thus the two procedures in the

Security Council’s provisional rules give it the basis to

find assistance on issues it is considering from others

outside the Council and to consider the contribution as

part of its deliberation.

Appeals to End Witch Hunt Against PSPD

Initiating a criminal investigation against a South

Korean NGO or citizen for what is a long existing

practice and tradition with respect to the UN Security

Council, is a South Korean government action that is

being compared to the kind of “witch-hunts” that

occurred during the period of the 1950s in the U.S.

Page 26

which has come to be known as McCarthyism.

In contrast to the attack on PSPD by the South

Korean government and the conservative media, many

NGOs and citizens in South Korea have expressed

their support for PSPD.

A group of 200 professors and other intellectuals

in South Korea has issued a statement calling for the

end of the “witch hunt” against PSPD. The statement

explains that “PSPD had performed its innate duty and

right as a civic group.” The group calls for conser-

vative groups to end their irrational backward attacks

on PSPD.

Also, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and

Development, an organization of 46 groups in Asia

which includes PSPD, sent a petition to Frank La Rue,

the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and

Protection of the Right of Opinion and Expression.

asked the UN to “advise the South Korean government

to end the prosecutorial investigation of PSPD.”

La Rue had visited South Korea on May 6-17,

2010. He issued a press statement on May 17 doc-

umenting other examples of the abuse by the South

Korean government of the human rights of its citizens.

He referred to the obligation of South Korea to adhere

to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights protecting the right to freedom of

expression.

While La Rue’s comments were made prior to

the current South Korean government attack on PSPD,

Amnesty International has issued a statement regard-

ing the current situation.

It writes:

Amnesty International is deeply concerned

about the Seoul Central Prosecutor’s

Office’s decision on Wednesday to investi-

gate the People’s Solidarity for Partici-

patory Democracy (PSPD) for sending a

letter to the UN Security Council ques-

tioning the results of the international in-

vestigation into the sinking of the South

Korean navy vessel the Cheonan. The civic

group is accused of ‘benefitting’ North

Korea, in violation of the National Security

Law, interfering with state’s acts and defa-

mation.

The statement concludes, “Amnesty International

is also concerned that the National Security Law

continues to be used to arbitrarily target individuals or

groups peacefully exercising their basic rights to free-

dom of expression and association. Simply put, this

law is used as a tool to silence dissent.”

On Friday, June 18, the UN Secretary General

Ban Ki-moon was asked for his view of the current

action by the prosecutor in South Korea against an

NGO for sending a letter to the Security Council. He

responded, “I will have to check. I’m not aware of

that.... I don’t have a comment at this time, but I may

have to check and will get back to you later.”

He did

not get back to the journalist as of the publication date

of this article.

Open Letter to Ban Ki-moon

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)

appealed to Ban Ki-moon. On June 24, it sent an Open

Letter to Sec-Gen Ban Ki-moon about the situation. In

the letter it asks him:

… to take all necessary steps to ensure that

the reprisals, directly or indirectly

attributable to the Republic of Korea, are

immediately halted against civil society

groups that have communicated with the

UN. The AHRC appreciates the work of

the Secretary-General concerning reprisals

and urges his offices to include this case as

part of efforts to protect civil society

members from facing attacks based on their

participation in the UN’s work.

The AHRC has also asked the High Com-

missioner for Human Rights to intervene to “ensure

that these reprisals are halted” and that the recom-

mendations of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of

expression be implemented in full and without delay.

It also calls upon South Korea as a member of the

Human Rights Council to act to “uphold the highest

standards.”

PSPD as Political Watchdog

PSPD reports that the organization has increased

its membership by 15% with 1600 new members join-

ing since the attack by the South Korean government.

Also, numerous individuals and organizations in Korea

and outside have sent letters and made statements in

support of PSPD.

As a member of the international society, PSPD

explains, “PSPD will continuously make every effort

to advance the universal goals of democracy and peace

through its activities as a political watchdog.”

Notes

1. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation on PSPD,”

Page 27

6/21/2010. http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195.

2. PSPD, “The PSPD’s Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan

Sinking,” June 1, 2010.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89

978449&url=http://knsi.org/knsi/admin/work/works/s%2520sta

nce%2520on%2520Sunken%2520Cheonan%2520Warship.pdf

&ved=2ahUKEwiZt7nlwZCFAxVshYkEHZZIDpUQFnoECA0

QAQ&usg=AOvVaw0YmzlO3QQpO1xn7gox9YbO.

3. “What’s Behind South Korea Bringing the Cheonan Issue to the

UN Security Council,” 6/7/2010. http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog

/2010/06/07/whats_behind_south_korea_bringing_the_cheonan

_issue_to_the_un_security_council/. (No Longer Available.)

4. “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of

Korea to the UN with regard to the armed attack by North Korea

on 26 May, 2010 against the Republic of Korea’s navy ship the

Cheonan, S/2010/281.” http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/

cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9

%7D/DPRK%20S%202010%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20

and%20Cheonan%20Report.pdf.

5. “Letter dated 8 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative

of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United

Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,”

S/2010/294. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol

=S/2010/294&Lang=E. (No Longer Available.)

6. See description in: Gwak Byeong-chan, “Which Country Do

You Belong To?,” Hankyoreh, June 16, 2010.

https://english.hani

.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/425906.html.

7. “Informal comments to the Media by the President of the

Security Council and the Permanent Representative of Mexico,

H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking of

the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.” June

14, 2010. [Webcast: Archived Video – 5 minutes.] http://webcast.

un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2010/so100614pm3.rm. (No

Longer Available.)

8. “Press Conference: H.E. Mr. Sin Son Ho, Permanent

Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to

the United Nations, on the current situation in the Korean

Peninsula.” June 15, 2010. [Webcast: Archived Video – 58

minutes.]

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/pressconference/2010/

pc100615am.rm. (No Longer Available.)

9. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-

Moon by the Asian Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-

general-ban-ki-moon.

10. See “United Nations Series Symbols: 1946-1996,” Dag

Hammarskjold Library, United Nations, New York, 1998, p. 234.

11. “Scholars Call for End to PSPD Witch Hunt,” Hankyoreh,

June 22, 2010.

https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition

/e_national/426832.html.

12. Forum-Asia Submits the Urgent Appeal on Threats of

Prosecution against PSPD to UN Rapporteur 6/21/2010.

https://www.peoplepower21.org/english/40190.

13. Frank La Rue, Rapporteur, “UN, Full Text of ROK Press

Statement,” May 17, 2010. http://www.peoplepower21.org/?mod

ule=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=40191&sid=4db9d3

a9ce23eab695e13dec947e1842&module_srl=37681. (No Longer

Available.)

14. “Amnesty International expresses its concern about the

investigation on the PSPD,” 6/18/2010.

http://gaia-lovedream.blogspot.com/2010/06/amnesty-

international-expresses-its.html.

15. “2010-06-18, New York: Secretary-General’s remarks to the

media.” https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/20

10-06-18/secretary-generals-remarks-media. (No Longer

Available.)

16. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-

Moon by the Asian Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-

general-ban-ki-moon.

17. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation of PSPD.”

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195.

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on the netizen-

blog on May 9, 2010.]

In Cheonan Dispute UN

Security Council Acts in

Accord with UN Charter

by Ronda Hauben

The challenge of Security Council reform has

been on the agenda at the United Nations for decades

with little obvious effect on the workings of the

Security Council itself.

But what happens when an action of the Security

Council is an improvement over past Security Council

practices and presents an important model for conflict

resolution in line with the obligations of the Charter?

Will there be recognition of the peaceful direction that

the action points in or will it be ignored and members

of the Security Council revert back to the practice of

the past?

The situation I am referring to is the consid-

eration by the Security Council of the sinking of the

South Korean naval warship, the Cheonan. The dispute

over the sinking of the Cheonan was brought to the

Security Council in June and a Presidential Statement

was agreed to in July.

An account of some of what happened in the

Security Council during an important part of this

process is described in an article in Spanish that has

appeared in several different Spanish language

publications. The article, “Heller mediacion de Mexico

en conflict de Peninsula de Corea” by Maurizio

Guerrero, the UN Correspondent for Notimex (the

Mexican News Agency), was published on July 5.

The

article describes the experience of the Mexican

Ambassador to the UN, Claude Heller in his position

Page 28

as president of the Security Council for the month of

June.

In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4,

the Republic of Korea (ROK) more commonly known

as South Korea, asked the Council to take up the

Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, the South Korean

Ambassador to the UN requested that the Security

Council consider the matter of the Cheonan and re-

spond in an appropriate manner.

The letter described

an investigation into the sinking of the Cheonan car-

ried out by South Korean government and military

officials. The conclusion was to accuse North Korea of

sinking the South Korean ship.

Sin Son Ho is the UN Ambassador from the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),

which is more commonly known as North Korea. He

sent a letter dated June 8 to the Security Council,

which denied the allegation that his country was to

blame.

His letter urged the Security Council not to be

the victim of deceptive claims, as had happened with

Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support

its call to be able to examine the evidence and to be

involved in a new and more independent investigation

on the sinking of the Cheonan.

How would the Mexican Ambassador as

President of the Security Council during the month of

June handle this dispute? (The presidency rotates each

month to a different Security Council member.) This

was a serious issue facing Heller as he began his

presidency in June 2010.

Heller adopted what he refers to as a “balanced”

approach to treat both governments on the Korean

peninsula in a fair and objective manner. He held

bilateral meetings with each member of the Security

Council which led to support for a process of informal

presentations by both of the Koreas to the members of

the Security Council.

What Heller calls “interactive informal meet-

ings” were held on June 14 with the South Koreans

and the North Koreans in separate sessions attended by

the Security Council members, along with a time to

ask questions and then to discuss the presentations.

At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s

presentations ended, Heller said that it was important

to have received the detailed presentation by South

Korea and also to know and learn the arguments of

North Korea. He commented that “it was very import-

ant that North Korea approached the Security

Council.” In response to a question about his view on

the issues presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I

think we will go on with the consultations to deal in a

proper manner on the issue.”

During June, Heller held meetings with the UN

Ambassadors from each of the two Koreas and then

with Security Council members about the Cheonan

issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he

was asked by the media what was happening about the

Cheonan dispute. He responded that the issue of con-

tention was over the evaluation of the South Korean

government’s investigation.

Heller describes how he introduced what he

refers to as “an innovation” into the Security Council

process. As the month of June ended, the issue was not

yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a basis to build

on the progress that was achieved during the month of

his presidency.

The “innovation” Heller refers to, is a summary

of the positions of each of the two Koreas on the issue,

taking care to present each objectively. Heller explains

that this summary was not an official document, so it

did not have to be approved by the other members of

the Council. This summary provided the basis for

further negotiations. He believed that it had a positive

impact on the process of consideration in the Council,

making possible the agreement that was later to be

expressed in the Presidential statement on the Cheonan

that was issued by the Security Council on July 9.

Heller’s goal, he explains, was to “at all times be

as objective as possible” so as to avoid increasing the

conflict on the Korean peninsula. Such a goal is the

Security Council’s obligation under the UN charter.

In the Security Council’s Presidential Statement

on the Cheonan, what stands out is that the statement

follows the pattern that Heller described of presenting

the views of each of the Koreas and urging that the

dispute be settled in a peaceful manner.

In the statement, the members of the Security

Council do not blame North Korea. Instead they refer

to the South Korean investigation and its conclusion,

expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings”

of the investigation.

Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Korean

newspaper Hankyoreh noted that the statement “allows

for a double interpretation and does not blame or place

consequences on North Korea.”

Such a possibility of

a “double interpretation” allows different inter-

pretations.

Some of the articles that have appeared in the

English language media about the Cheonan, however,

appear to be oblivious to the effort to accommodate the

Page 29

different viewpoints in the Presidential Statement. For

example, an editorial in the New York Times about the

Presidential Statement complained that the statement

contained “weasel wording about blame.”

An AP article reported that the U.S. Ambassador

to the UN, Susan Rice, and the South Korean

Ambassador, Park Im-kook said the Presidential

Statement “made clear who to blame” for the attack on

the Cheonan.

Instead of directly pointing out this is

contrary to the wording of the statement, however, the

AP article notes that in private some diplomats and

analysts expressed concern that the statement didn’t

blame Pyongyang.

Another article in the New York Times, however,

referred to a statement of Li Baodong, China’s

Ambassador to the UN, that the Presidential statement

moved matters in “the right direction” because it urged

“the parties concerned” to avoid escalating tensions.

Russia had sent a team of experts to South Korea

to do its own evaluation on the South Korean findings.

Though the Russian evaluation has not been released

publicly, a leaked copy was the subject of articles in

Hankyoreh. These describe how the Russian team of

experts disagreed with the South Korean government’s

conclusions about the sinking of the Cheonan. The

Russian experts observed the ship’s propeller had

become entangled in a fishing net and subsequently a

possible cause of the sinking could have been that the

ship had hit the antennae of a mine which then

exploded.

The Presidential Statement explains that “The

Security Council takes note of the responses from

other relevant parties, including the DPRK, which has

stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”

With the exception of the DPRK, it is not in-

dicated who “the other relevant parties” are. It does

suggest, however, that it is likely some Security

Council members, not just Russia and China, did not

agree with the conclusions of the South Korean invest-

igation.

The Security Council action on the Cheonan took

place in a situation where there has been a wide

ranging international critique, especially in the online

media, about the problems of the South Korean

investigation, and of the ROK government’s failure to

make public any substantial documentation of its

investigation, along with its practice of harassing

critics of the ROK claims.

The U.S. media, however, for the most part has

chosen to ignore the many critiques which have ap-

peared. These critiques of the South Korean govern-

ment’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have

appeared not only in Korean, but also in English, in

Japanese, and in other languages. They present a wide

ranging challenge of the veracity and integrity of the

South Korean investigation and its conclusions.

An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28

noted the fact that the media in the U.S. has ignored

the critique of the South Korean government

investigation that is being discussed and spread around

the world.

More recently, on August 31, an Op Ed by

Donald Gregg, a former U.S. Ambassador to South

Korea, appeared in the New York Times, titled “Testing

North Korean Waters.” The article noted that “not

everyone agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North

Korea. Pyongyang has consistently denied respons-

ibility, and both China and Russia opposed a UN

Security Council resolution laying blame on North

Korea.”

In a subsequent interview with the Washington

correspondent for Hankyoreh, Gregg adds that the

Russian team’s conclusions could only be tentative

because they were not given access to all the materials

they needed for their investigation. The Russian team

recommended that the Chinese not make an effort to

review the South Korean investigation. They would

likely not have access to all the materials needed to be

able to do an adequate review.

In his Op Ed in the New York Times, Gregg

maintains that, “The disputed interpretations of the

sinking of the Cheonan remain central to any effort to

reverse course and to get on track toward dealing

effectively with North Korea on critical issues such as

the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” There-

fore, he urges the South Korean government to make

public the study it has done.

Gregg’s public statements are just one example

of the disagreement around the world, along with the

Chinese and Russian governments, with the South

Korean government’s conclusions about the sinking of

the Cheonan and about the process of the investigation

itself.

North Korea referred to this widespread inter-

national sentiment in its June 8 letter to the Security

Council. The UN Ambassador from North Korea

wrote:

It would be very useful to remind ourselves

of the ever-increasing international doubts

and criticisms, going beyond the internal

boundary of south Korea, over the ‘invest-

Page 30

igation result’ from the very moment of its

release … .

The situation that the North Korean Ambassador

is referring to is one marked by actions on the part of

the South Korean netizens and civil society who

challenged the process and results of the South Korean

government’s investigation. There is support for the

South Korean critics by bloggers, scientists and jour-

nalists around the world, writing in a multitude of lan-

guages and from many perspectives. A number of the

non-governmental organizations and scientists in

South Korea sent the results of their investigations and

research to members of the Security Council to provide

them with the background and facts needed to make an

informed decision.

The result of such efforts is something that is

unusual in the process of recent Security Council

activity. Most often decisions are made according to

the degree of power and self interest in the issue being

considered, rather than according to an impartial

analysis of the problem and an effort to hear from all

those with an interest in the issue. But an impartial

analysis is what is required by the obligations of the

UN Charter.

In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North

Korea referred to the earlier experience of the Security

Council, to the February 5, 2003 Security Council

meeting when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell

made his presentation of his “evidence” that weapons

of mass destruction existed in Iraq. The U.S. then used

these claims as the pretext for its invasion of Iraq in

March 2003.

The June 8 letter from North Korea urges:

It is imperative for the Security Council not

to step into the same situation in which it

was once misused as a tool of high-

handedness and hegemony of the United

States by giving legitimacy to its armed

invasion into Iraq, based on a single word

of lies of Powell, United States Secretary

of State, in February 2003.

The Security Council is duty bound to

adhere strictly to the principles of respect

for the sovereignty and impartiality of

United Nations Member States, as

enshrined in the Charter of the United

Nations.

The process of how the Security Council took up

and determined its response to the dispute on the

Cheonan is an important example of a different process

than that which occurred in the Iraq situation. The

effort in the Security Council described by the

Mexican Ambassador, to uphold the principles of

impartiality and respectful treatment of all members

involved in a problem.

The process instituted by the Mexican presidency

of the Security Council in June with respect to the

Cheonan dispute has the potential of providing for a

significant precedent in the process of Security

Council reform. It represents an important example of

the Security Council acting in conformity with its

obligations as set out in the UN charter.

In the July 9 Presidential Statement, the Security

Council urges that the parties to the dispute over the

sinking of the Cheonan find a means to peacefully

settle the dispute. The statement says:

The Security Council calls for full

adherence to the Korean Armistice

Agreement and encourages the settlement

of outstanding issues on the Korean pe-

ninsula by peaceful means to resume direct

dialogue and negotiation through appro-

priate channels as early as possible, with a

view to avoiding conflicts and averting es-

calation.

Ambassador Gregg is only one of many around

the world who have expressed their concern with the

course of action of the U.S. and South Korea which is

contrary to the direction of the UN Security Council

Presidential Statement. Gregg explained his fear that

the truth of the Cheonan sinking “may elude us, as it

did after the infamous Tonkin Bay incident of 1964,

that was used to drag us (the U.S.) into the abyss of the

Vietnam War.”

The Security Council Action on the Cheonan

dispute, if it is recognized and supported, has set the

basis instead for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Notes:

1. Ronda Hauben, “UN Security Council Reform in Focus,”

OhmyNews International, September 15, 2008.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=

383668&rel_no=1. (No Longer Available.)

2. Maurizio Guerrero, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de

Peninsula de Corea,” Notimex, July 5, 2010 (published in en la

Economia). http://enlaeconomia.com/news/2010/07/05/69561.(No

Longer Available.)

3. Security Council, S/2010/281, “Letter dated 4 June 2010.”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%2020 10%

20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20and%20Cheonan%20Report.pdf.

Page 31

4. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010 Letter.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Nkorea%20S%20

2010%20294.pdf.

5. Ambassador Claude Heller at the June 14 stakeout. “Media

Stakeout: Informal comments to the Media by the President of the

Security Council and the Permanent Representative of Mexico,

H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking of

the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.”

[Webcast: Archived Video – 5 minutes.]

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2010

/so100614pm3.rm. (No Longer Available.)

6. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13. http://www.un.org/en/

ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2010/13. (No Longer

Available.)

7. Lee Jae-hoon,“Presidential Statement allows for a ‘double

interpretation, and does not blame or place consequences upon N.

Korea,” Hankyoreh, July 10, 2010.

www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/429768.html.

8. “Security Council Blinks,” Editorial, New York Times, July 10,

2010.

9. Edith Lederer, “UN Condemns S Korea ship sinking,” AP, July

10, 2010.

10. Neil MacFaquahar, “Condemnation of Ship’s Sinking is a

‘Victory’ North Korea Says,” New York Times, July 9, 2010, a

version of online article appeared in print edition on July 10,

2010, p.6.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/world/asia/10br

iefs-KOREA.html.

11. “Russian Navy Team’s Analysis of the Cheonan Incident,”

Posted on July 27, Hankyoreh, modified on July 29.

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432230

.html. The Russian Experts document is titled “Data from the

Russian Naval Expert Group’s Investigation into the Cause of the

South Korean Naval Vessel Cheonan’s Sinking.”

See also “Russia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that Sinking

Cheonan Ship was Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27, 2010,

Hankyoreh, modified on July 28, 2010.

http://www.hani.co.kr/

arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html.

12. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13. Presidential Statement

of July 9, 2010. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?

symbol=S/PRST/2010/13. (No Longer Available.)

13. Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubts Surface on

North Korean Role in Ship Sinking,” Los Angeles Times, July 23,

2010. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/23/world/la-fg-korea-

torpedo-20100724/2. (No Longer Available.)

14. Donald P. Gregg, “Testing North Korean Waters,” New York

Times, August 31, 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/opinion/01iht-edgregg.html

15. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Nkorea%20S%202010

%20294.pdf. Letter, DPKR June 8 2010.

16. See for example: Ronda Hauben, “Netizens Question Cause

of Cheonan Tragedy,” OhmyNews International, June 8, 2010.

(See page 21 in this issue.)

Ronda Hauben, “Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs

Controversy,” OhmyNews International, June 29, 2010. (See page

24 in this issue.)

17. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%2020

10%20294.pdf.

See also “[FULL] Colin Powell’s Presentation to the UN Security

Council On Iraq’s WMD Program,” Feb 5, 2003.

https://youtu.be/DhWlPo3qxak.

18. Tae-ho Kwon, “South Korean Government Impeded Russian

Team’s Cheonan Investigation: Donald Gregg,” Hankyoreh,

September 4, 2010.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/

e_northkorea/438299.html.

19. See for example “PSPD’s Stance on the Presidential Statement

of the UNSC Regarding the Sinking of the ROK Naval Vessel

Cheonan.”

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40247.

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared on the

netizenblog on June 26, 2013. It can be sen online at: https://

libya360.wordpress.com/2013/06/26/us-misrepresents-its-role-i

n-korean-war-and-in-armistice-agreement-as-un-command/.]

U.S. Misrepresents its Role in

Korean War and in Armistice

Agreement as UN Command

by Ronda Hauben

July 27 of this year will be an important

anniversary. It will be the 60

anniversary of the

Armistice Agreement which provided the means to end

the hostilities of the Korean War.

The armistice was recognized as a temporary

means to stop the military action. It included a recom-

mendation that it be followed by a political conference

three months later to hammer out a political agreement

which would serve as a peace treaty ending the Korean

war. The political conference has never been held. And

no means has yet been created to settle the unresolved

issues of the Korean War.

At the UN on Friday, June 21, the permanent

mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, held

a press conference.

Sin Son Ho, DPRK’s Ambassador

to the United Nations, presented journalists with a

statement outlining the background of a serious pro-

blem remaining from the Korean War, a problem that

needs to be resolved if the tension on the Korean

Peninsula is not to escalate.

He documented how the United States, without

any authority from the United Nations, changed the

name of the Unified Command it was to direct, to the

name ‘UN Command’. This change falsifies the nature

of the U.S. role in the Korean War and in the

Armistice, making it appear that the U.S. is acting

Page 32

under the authority of the United Nations. The de-

cisions made by what is called the ‘UN Command’ are

made by the U.S. The U.S. is not acting as a subsidiary

or representative of the UN when it acts under the

name of the “UN Command.” Yet the false appearance

given is that the U.S. is acting under the authority of

the UN.

The DPRK Ambassador explained how this mis-

representation was accomplished by the U.S. in July

1950. On July 7, a Security Council Resolution (S.C.

84, 1950) was passed putting the U.S. as the head of

what was called in the resolution the Unified Com-

mand, but with no oversight obligations by the UN for

the actions of the U.S. On July 25, 1950, the U.S.

submitted a report to the Security Council in which it

replaced the name Unified Command with the name

‘UN Command.’

Subsequently, the U.S. uses the designation UN

Command despite the fact that this creates a false

impression that there is a role played by the UN in

Korean Armistice activities. The U.S. even uses UN

Command as its designation in the actual Armistice

Agreement.

The DPRK has at various times tried to get the

U.S. to drop its misleading use of the title UN Com-

mand. In November 1975, Resolution 3390 (XXX) B

was passed by the UN General Assembly calling for

negotiations between the relevant parties so that the

U.S. would no longer use the misleading designation

‘UN Command’ to represent the U.S. military role.

The U.S. has not fulfilled on the obligation to carry out

these negotiations. Instead the U.S. at the time argued

that changing its designation as the UN Command

would affect the oversight provisions provided for in

the Armistice Agreement.

Subsequently, the DPRK points out that in the 60

years since the Armistice Agreement was signed, any

oversight provisions it may have included no longer

exist and the actual decisions regarding the agreement

currently are made through negotiations between the

Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the U.S. military

authority.

In view of the facts, Ambassador Sin said, the

existence of the UN Command is an “anachronism.”

Instead of agreeing to dissolve it, however, he ex-

plained, the U.S. is projecting that it can serve as a

“multinational force command” which would cons-

titute the “matrix of an Asian version of NATO.”

Two former UN Secretary-Generals have spoken

out against the continuing use by the U.S. military of

the name ‘UN Command.’ Ambassador Sin noted that

both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan have gone

on record confirming that there is no UN military

activity related to the U.S. claim that it is the UN

Command.

At the June 21 noon press briefing by the Deputy

Spokesman for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,

a question was raised asking for Ban Ki-moon’s views

on the issue. The journalist asked:

As I am sure you know, just now, Sin Son

Ho, the Permanent Representative of the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

held a press conference in which he said he

called for the dismantling of the “UN

Command” uh, in South Korea, and he said

it is not really a UN body at all, and quoted

Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan to

that effect. So what I wonder is as, as, the

office of the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-

moon, as the head of the UN system, has,

does he, what is his position on the legal

status in terms of the UN of the ‘UN Com-

mand’? And separately, does he have any,

what … would be, what’s his response to a

call to, to dismantle this entity?

In apparent agreement with the DPRK, Deputy

Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, Eduardo del

Buey responded:

But the United Nations has never had any

role in the command of any armed forces

deployed in the Korean peninsula. In

particular, the United Nations did not at

any time have any role in the command of

the forces that operated in Korea under the

Unified Command between 1950 and 1953.

In response, to the part of the question relating to

Ban Ki-moon’s view on the U.S. representing itself as

the UN Command, the Deputy Spokesperson promised

a future reply. He noted that:

Well, first of all, as you know, the Secre-

tary-General is just getting off the plane

from China now, so he is going to be

reading the transcript of the statement by

the Permanent Representative of the Dem-

ocratic People’s Republic of Korea, and

we’ll have something later on to say.

To an e-mail asking for further clarification of the

Secretary-General’s view about the DPRK’s call for

the dissolution of the ‘UN Command,’ the Deputy

Spokesperson answered by referring to the Secretary-

Page 33

General’s view that with respect to an issue related to

the Armistice Agreement:

This is a matter for the parties to the

Agreement. The United Nations is not

party to the Armistice Agreement.

Does this mean Ban Ki-moon believes that the

misuse of the UN name by the U.S. is an issue to be

solved by the parties to the Armistice Agreement, and

is not a concern for the UN?

In his press briefing Ambassador Sin said that if

the U.S. did not dissolve the UN Command, the DPRK

is considering once again pursuing this issue at the UN

General Assembly, which in November 1975 had

already urged the U.S. to dissolve the UN Command

(See 3390(XXX)B 1975).

Ambassador Sin explained that “due to the

existence of the ‘UN Command,’ the security mech-

anism on the Korean peninsula has become war-orient-

ed not peace-oriented.”

“In other words,” he elaborated, “the existence of

the ‘UN Command’ is not serving the peace building

efforts on the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, it is

the root of evil or tumor laying a stepping stone for the

U.S. armed forces of aggression toward the DPRK and

the realization of the America’s Pivot to Asia

strategy.”

Ambassador Sin proposed that “If the United

States has real intention to put an end to hostile

relation with the DPRK, it should make the right

decision to dissolve the ‘UN Command’ and replace

the Armistice Agreement with a peace regime as pro-

posed by the DPRK this year when we mark the 60

year since the Armistice Agreement was signed.”

Notes:

1. Press conference June 21, 2013, Ambassador Sin Son Ho at the

UN. http://webtv.un.org/media/press-conferences/watch/ambassa

dor-sin-son-ho-the-permanent-representative-of-the-democratic-

peoples-republic-of-korea-to-the-un-press-conference

/2498682301001. (No Longer Available.) For an earlier version

of the statement, see: KCNA, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues

Memorandum” January 14, 2013.

2. Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the

Secretary-General June 21, 2013. http://www.un.org/News/brief

ings/docs/2013/db130621.doc.htm. (No Longer Available.)

3. E-mail from Eduardo del Buey on June 25, 2013.

[Editor’s Note: This article appeared on the netizenblog on Jan.

29, 2017.]

Channel for Individuals

or NGO’s to Send

Communication to the UN

Security Council

by Ronda Hauben

Since the early days of the UN Security Council,

there has been a procedure for private individuals and

non-governmental organizations to be able to send

communications to the Security Council on matters of

which it is seized.

The procedure has been referred to

by its library classification symbol which is S/NC.

I first came across this procedure when an NGO

in South Korea had been accused of being unpatriotic

to the South Korean government because that NGO

(and others as well) sent a critique to the Security

Council about something the South Korean gover-

nment was presenting to the Security Council.

It seemed particularly inappropriate for the South

Korean government to accuse an NGO of disloyalty

because of a letter sent to members of the Security

Council as there is a long tradition from 1946 to the

present for private individuals or NGO’s to write to the

Security Council. Security Council documents show

that there are lists of probably thousands of such

communications.

In doing some research at the UN into the back-

ground of this procedure of the UN I came to realize

that in the early days of the Security Council, lists of

such communications were issued by the Secretariat on

a frequent basis. The procedure is described in the

Appendix of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the

Security Council. It states:

Provisional Procedure for Dealing with

Communications from Private Individuals

and Non-Governmental Bodies

A. A list of all communications from pri-

vate individuals and non-governmental

bodies relating to matters of which the Se-

curity Council is seized shall be circulated

to all representatives on the Security Cou-

ncil.

Page 34

B. A copy of any communication on the

list shall be given by the Secretariat to any

representative on the Security Council at

his request.

The lists published by the UN Secretariat of the

communications received by the Security Council from

individuals or non-governmental entities included the

name and organization of the sender, the date of the

communication, the city or town and country of the

sender, and originally whether the communication was

a telegram, letter, petition etc. The communications

were grouped by the Security Council agenda item that

the communication referred to.

If a Security Council member saw some com-

munication on a list that was of interest, the Security

Council member could request a copy of the com-

munication from the Secretariat.

From 1946 and for several years afterwards, lists

were issued on a frequent basis. By the mid 1990’s the

lists would be issued on a quarterly basis by the UN

Secretariat. Then for some reason not yet understood,

starting from the 2000 list, lists by the Secretariat

would only be issued once a year, around April.

Along with the less frequent issuing of the lists of

communications sent to the Security Council, there

appears to be no publicly available information indi-

cating how or where an individual or non-governmen-

tal entity can send a communication to the Security

Council.

Recently when asking some Security Council

members if they were aware of this procedure, only

one indicated he remembered seeing some correspon-

dence from individuals or NGO’s sent to the Security

Council. Others appeared to have no knowledge of this

process. While this brief survey was only based on a

small sample, it demonstrated a breakdown in one of

the few publicly available channels of communication

between members of the public and members of the

Security Council.

In 2010 some NGO’s and some academics who

were scientists attempted to send communication to the

Security Council about a matter being considered by

the Security Council. They sent email to all the mem-

ber states then on the Security Council. None of these

communications, however, appeared on the annual

S/NC list published by the UN Secretariat for 2010.

More recently, during the press conference

marking the beginning of the Russian Federation’s

Presidency of the Security Council for the month of

October 2016, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin responded

to a question raised by a journalist. He said that he

would support, “the greater involvement of women” in

line with Security Council Resolution 1325 to help

address the high level of tension on the Korean Penin-

sula.

In response to his statement, Christine Ahn, the

International Coordinator for the NGO “Women Cross

DMZ” wrote to the Security Council asking that sev-

eral recommendations the group proposed be raised at

the Security Council Debate on Resolution 1325

planned for October 25, 2016.

When she tried to find where to send her letter to

have it considered as a communication to the Security

Council, however, there was no clear information pub-

licly available about where an individual or NGO

should send their communication. A press inquiry

demonstrated that such information was not easy to

locate.

Similarly, a press inquiry to some Security

Council members yielded little help with how to find

such information. It was only a month later, at the

press conference held by the Spanish Ambassador on

the occasion of assuming the Presidency of the

Security Council for the month of December 2016, that

there was an offer of help to find the answer to the

mystery.

Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi, the

Spanish Ambassador to the UN, welcomed the ques-

tion on how to send communication to the Security

Council saying that his delegation “really believed in

the participation of civil society.” He promised that if

information was sent to him documenting the problem,

“I’ll do my best … . I’ll see what I can do.”

An inquiry by his press secretary led to a

response from the Secretariat. The email from the

Office of the President of the Security Council in the

UN Department of Political Affairs in the Secretariat

stated that if an email or surface mail on a topic being

considered by the Security Council is sent to the email

address given in the UN Journal for communications

for UN member nations to send their communication

to the Security Council, or to the postal address

provided, it will usually be informally circulated by the

Security Council President via their “political coord-

inators’ network.”

If the document “falls under one of the agenda

items seized by the Security Council, it gets listed and

published as a Security Council document under S/NC

[year]/1.” Then it will appear on the list that is pub-

Page 35

lished for that year by the Secretariat.

Looking at the earliest S/NC lists, one is im-

pressed by the fact that there are communications from

individuals and groups around the world. For example

some of the earliest lists present communication re-

ceived “Concerning Franco Regime in Spain.”

Looking at the names of those who are listed as

sending communication to the UN Security Council

from 1946 to the present, one gets a sense of the UN

existing in bigger world in a way that is different from

what is conveyed when one just watches the workings

of, for example, the Security Council. It would appear

that more serious attention should be paid to making

the address for sending communication to the Security

Council publicly available.

Also more frequent publication of the lists would

make it possible for Security Council members to

make timely requests for copies of the communications

that interested them. That could help broaden the per-

spectives of Security Council members to enable them

to be better able to find peaceful ways to resolve

difficult conflicts.

Notes:

1. The term “seized” as used at the UN indicates, “that, while the

Security Council is seized of a matter, no other organ of the

United Nations may legally take it up, as under Article 12 of the

UN Charter.” See:

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/be_seized_of.

2. Ronda Hauben, “S. Korean Gov’t Urged to End Criminal

Investigation of NGO for Questions on Cheonan Sent to UN,”

taz.de/netizenblog, June 26, 2010.

3. Román Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain), President of the Security

Council for the month of December 2016 – Press Conference. See

“1 Dec 2016 – Press Conference by H.E. Mr. Román Oyarzun

Marchesi, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United

Nations and President of the Security Council for the month of

December 2016, on the Security Council Programme of work for

the month” at: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1c/k1cgrjce9a.

(watch starting at 23:20.) (No Longer Available.)

4. Communication from private individuals, NGO’s or other

entities which relate to the work of the Security Council can be

sent to the e-mail address listed in the UN Journal,

[email protected] or mailed to:

United Nations Security Council

405 East 42nd Street

New York, NY 10017

ELECTRONIC EDITION

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http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

All Amateur Computerist issues from 1988 to the present are

available at: http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/NewIndex.pdf.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ronda Hauben

William Rohler

Norman O. Thompson

Michael Hauben (1973-2001)

Jay Hauben

The Amateur Computerist invites submissions.

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of author and source of article cited.

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