The Amateur

Computerist

Winter 2025 Netizen Journalism, the UN and Korea Volume 39 No. 1

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Media War at the UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2

U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Fails to Engage Page 13

Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan Tragedy. . Page 15

Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Controversy Page 18

What’s Behind SK Bringing Cheonan Issue to UNSC? Page 22

In Cheonan Dispute UN SC Acts in Accord Charter . . Page 23

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia . . . . Page 27

Introduction

The first article in this issue is “The Media War

at the UN and the DPRK. Why Netizen Journalism

Matters: Notes for a Talk”. It was presented at Stony

Brook University on December 4, 2013. The talk

presents some background of what can be called

“netizen journalism”. The talk provides an example of

how a conflict brought to the UN was able to be

explored and resolved.

This issue is an effort to look back at some of

the previous efforts to have journalism play a helpful

role at the UN and to offer an example of such efforts.

The articles in this issue present two case studies

relating to reporting at the UN about incidents involv-

ing North Korea and South Korea to demonstrate how

such reporting could help to deal with conflicts at the

UN.

One situation is when the U.S. used a political

act against the Banco Delta Asia, a bank in Macao,

China, to remove North Korea from the international

banking system. That meant that North Korea couldn't

use credit for any of its international transactions. This

presented North Korea with a serious difficulty. The

result was that North Korea held its first nuclear test.

The talk documents the results of an investigation

uncovering that the U.S. actions against North Korea

and a bank involved with North Korean financial

transactions were actually directed at China. The U.S.

intended to send a message to Chinese banks that they

too could be impacted in a similar way.

The talk demonstrates how uncovering the

actual motives of the U.S. activity helped to change

what was happening so that the conflict was able to be

resolved.

Another conflict that was taken up at the UN

Security Council involved whether or not to blame

North Korea for the sinking of a South Korean war-

ship, the Cheonan. South Korea asked the Security

Council to condemn North Korea for the sinking of the

ship. The Ambassador to the UN from Mexico, Claude

Heller, who was the President of the Security Council

when this issue was first taken up, documented how a

neutral body should treat such a conflict.

The Mexican Ambassador created a situation

where both South Korea and North Korea could make

separate presentations of their side of the conflict to

members of the Security Council. As the end of the

month of Mexico's presidency of the Security Council

approached, Ambassador Heller created what he called

an “innovative” document. It was a summary of the

positions of each of the Koreas.

The Ambassador took care to present each

side’s position objectively. This eventually resulted in

a Presidential Statement documenting the dispute and

calling for a peaceful settlement to be arrived at by the

two sides.

This issue of the Amateur Computerist also

includes several articles written during the course of

these disputes, documenting how the investigation of

the issues involved in the disputes was carried out.

This issue demonstrates that if there were

objective and good investigative journalism into the

different disputes brought to the UN to settle, this

could be a helpful improvement in how the UN func-

tions.

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Page 1

The Media War at the UN

and the DPRK

Why Netizen Journalism

Matters

Notes for a Talk

by Ronda Hauben

[Author’s note: The following are slightly edited Notes

prepared for a talk presented at Stony Brook Univer-

sity on December 4, 2013. The talk was part of a series

of discussions in the fall of 2013 sponsored by the

Center for Korean Studies at Stony Brook focusing on

North Korea. The talk was presented with slides

available at the website at the end of this article.*

Comments are welcome.]

I – Preface

I am honored to be here today and to give this

talk as part of the series of talks on North Korea.

In October 2006, I began covering the United

Nations as a journalist for the English edition of the

South Korean online newspaper OhmyNews Inter-

national. When OhmyNews ended its English edition

in 2010, I became a correspondent covering the UN for

an English language blog http://blogs.taz.de/netizen

blog (No longer available.) at the website of the

German newspaper Die Tageszeitung. Both Ohmy-

News International and my blog at the taz.de website

are online publications.

With Michael Hauben, I am a coauthor of the

book Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet

and the Internet. The book was first published online

in January 1994. On May 1, 1997, the print edition of

the book Netizens was published in English. Later that

year, in October, a Japanese translation was published.

Netizens was the first book to recognize that along

with the development of the Internet, a new form of

citizenship, called netizenship had emerged. This is a

form of citizenship that has developed based on the

broader forms of political participation made possible

by the Net (i.e., the Internet).

I want to share some of the background about

the origin, use, and impact of the netizen concept and

its relation to what I call netizen journalism before

presenting two case studies of how netizen journalism

has affected the media war at the UN.

II – Introduction

While many people are now interested in the

impact of the internet on society, pioneering research

was done by my coauthor Michael Hauben in the early

1990s when the internet was first beginning to spread

and to connect people around the world.

In his research, Hauben recognized that there

were people who appreciated the communication the

internet made possible and that these people worked to

spread the Net and to do what they felt needed for it to

help to create a better world. Taking the common

network term, “net.citizen” used online at the time,

Hauben proposed that these people who worked to

contribute to the Net and the bigger world it was part

of were “netizens.”

In an article he wrote on the impact of the Net

on journalism, Hauben recognized that many people

online were frustrated with the mainstream media and

that the netizens would be creating a broader and more

widespread media.

Hauben recognized in the early 1990s that “the

collective body of people assisted by (the Net)… has

grown larger than any individual newspaper….” I want

to look at two news events about North Korea and the

UN in the context of this prediction. Then I will

consider the implication of these case studies for the

kind of journalism about North Korea that I propose

netizens and the internet are making possible.

III – Korea

In February 2003, I was glancing at the front

page summaries of the articles in an issue of the

Financial Times. I saw a surprising headline for an

article that continued later in the issue. The article said

that in 2002 netizens in South Korea had elected the

president of the country, Roh Moo-hyun. He had just

taken office on February 25, 2003. The new president

had even promised that the Internet would be influen-

tial in the form of government he established. Also, I

learned that an online Korean newspaper called Ohmy-

News had been important in making these develop-

ments possible. Colleagues encouraged me to get in

contact with OhmyNews and to learn more about the

netizens’ activities in South Korea and about Ohmy-

News.

I was able to get in contact with OhmyNews. I

began to submit articles to it. They would be printed

along with a few other English language articles others

were submitting. By 2004 OhmyNews began an Eng-

Page 2

lish-language online edition called OhmyNews Inter-

national. I began to write for it. I soon became the first

woman columnist for the English edition.

I subsequently learned that both South Korea

and China are places where the role of netizens is

important in building more democratic structures for

society. I began to pay attention to both of these net-

izen developments. South Korea, for example, has

been an advanced model of grassroots efforts to create

examples of netizen forms for more participatory

decision-making processes. I wrote several research

papers documenting the achievements and activities of

Korean netizens.

IV – Reporting on the UN

By October 2006, the second five-year term for

Kofi Annan as the Secretary-General of the United

Nations was soon to end. One of the main contenders

to become the 8

Secretary-General of the UN was the

Foreign Minister of South Korea, Ban Ki-moon.

I had covered one previous United Nations

event which I had found of great interest. That event

was the World Summit on the Information Society

(WSIS) which encouraged access to the internet for

everyone. The event took place in Tunis, Tunisia in

November 2005. Also, I had watched with interest

some of the press reports of the speeches made by

heads of state at the 2006 opening of the General

Assembly session. These events gave me the sense that

it probably would be interesting to go to the UN and

cover the activities for OhmyNews if the new Secre-

tary-General were Ban Ki-moon, the Korean candi-

date.

On October 9, 2006, Ban Ki-moon won the

Security Council nomination. This nomination was to

be approved by the General Assembly on October 13.

I thought this would be a historic event for

South Korea.

By 2006, I was writing regularly as a featured

columnist for OhmyNews International (OMNI).

I asked the Editor of OhmyNews International

if I could get a letter for a press credential to cover the

UN for OMNI. He agreed and I was able to get my

credentials in time to go to the General Assembly

meeting when the General Assembly voted to accept

the Security Council’s nomination of Ban Ki-moon.

I was surprised that some of the speeches

welcoming Ban Ki-moon as the Secretary-General

elect were meaningful speeches referring to actual

problems at the UN such as the need for reform of the

Security Council. Conversely, the U.S. Ambassador to

the UN, John Bolton, made no pretense to hide both

his welcoming of Ban and his dissatisfaction with Kofi

Annan, the outgoing Secretary-General who had con-

demned the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A significant focus

of the comments to the new Secretary-General from

member states emphasized the importance of commu-

nication at the UN, that it was critical for the incoming

Secretary-General to listen to all states and to hear

their views.

It was a thrill to be at the UN witnessing the

vote for a new Secretary-General who was from South

Korea. I wondered if the internet would be able to have

any impact on the new Secretary-General and on what

happened at the United Nations, since the internet had

been able to make it possible for netizens in South

Korea to impact politics.

The very next day after Ban Ki-moon’s nomi-

nation was approved by the General Assembly, the

Security Council took up to condemn the recent nuc-

lear test by North Korea. This had been North Korea’s

first nuclear test. The Security Council imposed sanc-

tions on North Korea, not giving the North Korean

Ambassador to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, a chance to re-

spond until after the sanctions had been voted on.

When the North Korean Ambassador responded, he

referred among other issues, to financial sanctions that

the U.S. had imposed on North Korea. No one in the

Security Council asked him what he was referring to or

how this affected the issues the Security Council had

acted on concerning North Korea.

It impressed me that just as a diplomat from

South Korea was being chosen as the new Secretary-

General of the UN, at the same time sanctions were

being imposed on North Korea. The Security Council

acted against North Korea before hearing its views on

the issue they were considering. This was in sharp

contrast to the emphasis member nations had put on

the importance of hearing the views of all members

when member nations welcomed Ban Ki-moon to the

United Nations in the meeting just one day earlier in

the General Assembly.

The article I wrote for OhmyNews Interna-

tional described this situation. It explained:

The urgent problem facing the UN at

this juncture in history is not whether

North Korea has developed and tested

a nuclear device. It is the breakdown

reflected by the lack of participation

and investigation by the international

Page 3

community into how a crisis will be

handled once it develops, and whether

the concerns and problems of those

involved in the crisis will be considered

as part of the process of seeking a solu-

tion. It is how the UN functions when

tensions reach a point where serious

attention is needed to help understand

and solve a problem. (Quoted from

“The Problem Facing the UN,”

OhmyNews International, October 17,

2006).

In general when at the UN, I paid attention to

Security Council developments, particularly with

regard to the meetings imposing sanctions on North

Korea and also on Iran. Also, I particularly followed

the meetings of the Security Council and the General

Assembly when Security Council reform was being

discussed.

V – Some Mainstream Media Created a

Story

Soon after Ban Ki-moon took office as Sec-

retary-General at the beginning of January 2007, a

story appeared in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) ac-

cusing North Korea of using UN funds from the

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for its

nuclear program. An editorial in the January 19 issue

of the WSJ by Melanie Kirkpatrick had the headline:

“United Nations Dictators.”

No evidence was presented in the WSJ, just

accusations. This situation was reminiscent of how the

WSJ and some other mainstream media had accused

the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, of misusing

UN funds in Iraq, and how this had mushroomed into

what had come to be known as the “Food for Oil”

scandal.

The significance of this story for me, was to see

that some of the mainstream media were active creat-

ing stories and accusations with no real evidence,

while only very few media appeared to be investigat-

ing the actual underlying issues that had led the North

Korean government to carry out its first nuclear test.

VI – The Six-Party Talks and the Banco

Delta Asia Story

In January 2007 there were reports in the press

about a meeting that had taken place in Berlin between

Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State for

the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan, the Deputy Foreign

Minister of North Korea.

Around this time I learned some of the back-

ground behind what had led to North Korea carrying

out its first nuclear test. An agreement was reached on

September 19, 2005, between the six parties to talk

about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The six parties were North Korea, South Korea, the

U.S., Japan, Russia and China. Shortly after the agree-

ment was signed in Sept. 2005, the U.S. Treasury De-

partment announced that it was freezing the assets of

the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) a bank in Macao, China,

which held $25 million of North Korean funds.

The result of this action was that North Korea

lost access to $25 million of its bank funds, and also to

the use of the international banking system. North

Korea’s response was to leave the six-party talks to

protest this action which it considered hostile and po-

litically motivated.

North Korea was encouraged by some parties

to the six-party talks to have bilateral negotiations with

the U.S. over the financial sanctions. The U.S., how-

ever, refused to negotiate. Unable to find a way to

negotiate with the U.S. over this situation, North Ko-

rea, in July 2006, tested a missile. The response of the

UN Security Council was to condemn North Korea by

passing UN Resolution 1695 but not to investigate

what the problem was that led North Korea to carry out

a missile test.

Then on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried

out its first nuclear test. Once again the Security Coun-

cil failed to investigate what was behind this action.

Instead, the Security Council passed Resolution 1718

imposing more sanctions on North Korea.

Only after this nuclear test did the U.S. demon-

strate a willingness to negotiate with the DPRK over

the financial sanctions imposed on Banco Delta Asia.

On January 16 and 17, 2007, Christopher Hill

and Kim Kye-gwan held talks in Berlin and agreed.

Though not officially announced, it was believed that

they agreed that the $25 million being held in the

Macau BDA, along with access to the international

banking system would be restored to North Korea. In

exchange, North Korea would return to the six-party

talks. The Berlin meeting appeared to break the dead-

lock and the six-party talks were held again starting on

February 8, 2007. Another agreement was announced

five days later on February 13, 2007.

Then on March 5 and 6, Hill and Kim held bi-

lateral talks in New York City. Despite the agreement

Page 4

reached in Berlin, however, the U.S. Treasury Depart-

ment issued a finding on March 19 against the BDA

under Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. This move

again deadlocked the six-party talks, even as the del-

egates arrived for the talks in Beijing.

The deadlock continued for the next few

months, with much of the mainstream U.S. press

blaming North Korea for continuing to insist that its

$25 million be returned via a banking transaction

before it would agree to any further steps in the six-

party talks. The North Korean delegate said he under-

stood that the agreement in Berlin with Christopher

Hill had provided for the return of the $25 million

from the BDA as a money transfer via the international

banking system.

The U.S. Treasury Department officials claim-

ed that their decision against the BDA left it up to the

bank to return the funds to North Korea. The decision

against the bank, however, meant that it had no means

to return the funds as a money transfer as the Section

311 finding against the bank meant that it lost access

to the international banking system.

During this period, there were rumors that a

bank in China had been asked by the U.S. State De-

partment to make the transfer. The bank allegedly

considered the request. Eventually, however, the bank

refused based on its fear that it too would be frozen out

of the international banking system by the U.S. Trea-

sury Department, as the BDA had been, if it offered to

help make the transfer of funds back to North Korea.

The McClatchy Newspaper Company, in a way

that is different from much of the rest of the main-

stream U.S. media, carried articles which helped to

investigate the issues underlying this dispute between

the U.S. and North Korea. Other banks in Macau, an

article in the McClatchy Newspapers explained, had

played a similar role with regard to North Korea,

helping North Korea to sell its gold, but only the BDA

had been singled out for sanctions. The article sug-

gested that the U.S. Treasury Department’s actions

were not based on actual criminal activity by the bank

or by North Korea, but instead were motivated by a

political objective.

One of the McClatchy newspaper articles de-

scribed some documents that the newspaper had

acquired including the BDA’s complaint challenging

the U.S. Treasury Department’s decision against the

bank. Also, the McClatchy newspaper article referred

to a statement filed by the owner of the BDA to protest

the Treasury Department’s action.

I tried to find a way to get copies of the docu-

ments. I tried to contact the law firm and even wrote to

the McClatchy reporter, but none of these efforts suc-

ceeded.

I did, however, find on the internet a copy of

the Patriot Act and read Section 311, the section being

used against the bank. I was able to see that the section

of the law was such that the U.S. government did not

have to present any proof of its actions.

In March 2007, I did a story titled “North

Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia,” docu-

menting how the use of Section 311 of the Patriot Act

against the bank was a political act, rather than a

criminal determination. The U.S. Treasury Department

did not have to provide any evidence and acted as the

accuser and judge in the case. Even though there had

been an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea

to return the $25 million to North Korea, nothing

happened.

The stalemate continued.

In May 2007, I covered the 50

Anniversary

dinner celebration of the New York City-based Korea

Society. Chris Hill gave a short talk as part of the

program. He indicated that he would persevere until a

means was found to break the impasse over the $25

million so as to make it possible for the six-party talks

to continue.

Several journalists covered the event for other

South Korean publications. They were particularly

interested in what Hill said, but Hill’s talk in itself did

not seem to represent a newsworthy event.

In the next few days, however, it appeared that

an important story was developing. An article by

Kevin Hall titled, “Bank Owner Disputes Money-

Laundering Allegations,” published by the McClatchy

Newspaper Company said that the blog “China Mat-

ters” had published links to some documents refuting

the Treasury Department’s charges against the bank.

“China Matters” is a blog about U.S.-China

policy. The links that the blog made available included

an appeal submitted by the lawyer for Banco Delta

Asia to an administrative hearing at the Treasury

Department and to a statement by the owner of the

Bank in Macao, Stanley Au.

I now had the documents in the case. The U.S.

government’s findings were general statements provid-

ing no specific evidence of wrongdoing on the part of

the bank. The bank’s statements and refutation gave

significant documentation refuting charges of illegal

activity on the part of the bank. The refutation also

Page 5

made the case that there was a political motive for the

U.S. government’s allegations rather than actual illegal

activity on the part of the bank.

Also, the blogger at China Matters who uses

the pseudonym China Hand or Peter Lee posted some

of the Congressional testimony by David Asher, a

former U.S. government official who had helped to

plan and enforce the U.S. Treasury Department sanc-

tions against the Banco Delta Asia.

Asher explained that the U.S. government had

targeted a small Macau bank in order to scare the

banks in China. “To kill the chicken to scare the mon-

keys,” the ex-government official explained, quoting

an old Chinese proverb in his testimony in a U.S.

Congressional hearing.

I wanted to verify the testimony of Asher and

understand its implications, so I searched online and

found an earlier government document from Novem-

ber 2006. Asher had testified in a similar vein at a

Congressional hearing titled “China’s Proliferation to

North Korea and Iran, and Its Role in Addressing the

Nuclear and Missile Situations in Both Countries,” on

September 14, 2006. The document I found was the

transcript of that hearing.

The hearing was held by a special Congressio-

nal Commission about the U.S.-China relationship

which held hearings semi-annually.

What was most surprising in this document,

however, was the explanation that the Banco Delta

Asia sanctions were an issue that was only secondarily

aimed at North Korea. The primary issue that was of

interest to the U.S. government officials involved in

the Commission Hearing was what was China’s

foreign policy and how closely China’s behavior

matched the foreign policy goals set out by the U.S.

In the discussion at the September 2006 hear-

ing about the Banco Delta Asia, David Asher de-

scribed the political objectives of the action. Speaking

about China, Asher said:

They get the message from the finan-

cial angle… there’s an old saying in

Chinese, ‘You kill the chicken to scare

the monkeys.’ We didn’t go out and

cite a multitude of Chinese financial

institutions that have been publicly

identified as working with North Korea

over the years…. We did need to desig-

nate one small one though, and that one

small one sent a message to all the

others, that they had to get in line, and

it was timed to coincide with other

information that we were making

public…. I think they got the mes-

sage…. We need to try to align our

financial and economic interests. I do

think, though the use of some pressure,

including veiled pressure is effective.

(Hearing before the U.S.-China Eco-

nomic and Security Review Commis-

sion, 2006, p. 115-116.)

The Commission hearing clarified that the

purpose of freezing North Korean funds in the Banco

Delta Asia was not about stopping criminal activity by

that bank or by North Korea, as there was never any

evidence presented of any such activity. Instead, it was

an act with a political objective which was to pressure

China to act in conformity with U.S. policy goals in

general and in its actions toward North Korea in

particular.

At last, I had the news peg for an important

story. I wrote the article, “Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia: Is the Policy Aimed at Targeting

China as well as North Korea?” submitting it to around

5:00 a.m. my time to OhmyNews International. By

noon the next day, my story appeared. That was on

May 18.

Also on May 18, the Wall Street Journal car-

ried an Op-Ed by the former U.S. Ambassador to the

UN, John Bolton. The article scolded the U.S. govern-

ment for negotiating to return the $25 million to North

Korea

In late May I was an invited speaker at the

International Communications Association (ICA 2007)

conference in San Francisco. I summed up my experi-

ence writing for OhmyNews International, particularly

describing the BDA story and the helpful role of online

media in making it possible to present an alternative

narrative as opposed to that of the mainstream U.S.

media about the situation.

VII – Voice of America News Service

Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San

Francisco, however, that my experience with this story

was not ending, but actually a new episode was begin-

ning.

A short time later, on June 11, I received a

surprising e-mail message. The message was from a

reporter who said she worked for Voice of America

News Korea (VOA News Korean Service). VOA is an

official U.S. government news broadcasting service.

Page 6

She began:

“Hello, Ms. Hauben”

She introduced herself as a reporter with the

Korean Service of the Voice of America News in

Washington, D.C.

Her e-mail continued:

While I was working on a story about BDA

issue, I read your report, ‘Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia.’ I thought you made some valuable

points about the BDA issue in this report, I was won-

dering if I could have a conversation with you in this

matter. Since I am on a deadline, I’m trying very hard

to get a hold of you. So I would really appreciate it if

you call or e-mail me back ASAP.

She gave her phone number.

I wondered if it was advisable to speak with her

as VOA News has a reputation of being a promoter of

U.S. government policy, rather than a news service

seeking the facts. I asked my editors at OhmyNews

International and I also spoke with a Korean journalist

I know who covers stories at the UN for another

Korean newspaper. They all encouraged me to speak

with her.

I called her as she had asked. She said she

wanted to interview me by phone. I asked her to let me

know what she would want to speak with me about.

She sent me an e-mail message elaborating.

Her message explained:

The purpose of this interview is to let our

listeners know what is going on regarding the BDA

issue and how the BDA issue is developing.

When I read your article, I thought you made

valuable and critical points about the BDA issue, and

I thought it might be very important to let your idea

about the BDA issue be heard by our listeners.

She listed questions she would ask me in the

interview. They were:

1. How you come up with the idea of writing

this article? How you prepared it. About your sources.

2. Briefly summarize your findings or main

points of the article.

3. What you are trying to accomplish by

writing this article? What needs to be done to resolve

the BDA issue?

“Finally,” she wrote, “I wanted to ask you if we

could do this interview sometime between 9:00 a.m.

and 9:30 a.m.… Thanks again,” she ended the e-mail

message.

She called at the arranged time.

She told me her listeners were in North Korea.

I was surprised that a reporter for a U.S. government

media would offer to do a story about the hidden pol-

itical objectives of U.S. policy against North Korea

which were being camouflaged by false criminal ac-

cusations against North Korea.

We had a half-hour telephone conversation

discussing my stories, the sources I had used, and the

problem represented by the American government

freezing the BDA funds. She also asked for the URLs

to follow up on the sources I had cited. These were

materials I had found on the internet, including several

government documents, and copies of the legal docu-

ments submitted by the bank owner to appeal the U.S.

Treasury Department ruling against the bank.

The VOA News reporter said she was inter-

ested in contacting former U.S. government officials

like David Asher who was responsible for crafting the

plan to freeze North Korea’s bank account assets. She

wanted to ask them to respond to my article.

Just as this contact with the VOA News jour-

nalist was happening, there were news stories describ-

ing the ongoing efforts to find a solution to the road-

block that the frozen North Korean funds represented.

Soon there were reports that the Federal Re-

serve Bank of New York had agreed to transfer the

funds from the BDA to an account held by a Russian

bank for North Korea. In the following weeks, the

funds transfer was done.

The VOA News reporter wrote me saying she

had other stories to do and was not for now going to

pursue this story any longer.

Whether the contact had any impact on the

resolution of the stalemate, I can only speculate.

Regardless of her motivation, however, the VOA News

reporter had contacted me before the situation was

resolved. At the very least, an article I had done had

caught the attention of someone connected to the

Voice of America News. I was given the chance to

explain what I had learned about the BDA story and to

explain how I understood the controversy surrounding

it. So my story did indeed have more of an impact than

I had understood when I gave my talk at the ICA 2007

in San Francisco.

The experience I had with my BDA story and

the encounter with the Korean News Service of the

VOA News demonstrates that the internet makes it

possible not only to spread an accurate narrative

among the public, but also to reach officials with an

interest in the issues being critiqued.

The reason I have taken the time to tell this

Page 7

story is that it represents for me a taste of the impact

that such online journalism makes possible.

VIII – The Phenomenon of Netizen

Journalism

In the research I have been doing and the

experiences I have had exploring the potential of what

I call netizen journalism, several questions have been

raised:

What is this new form of news and what are its

characteristics?

Is there something different from traditional

journalism?

Is there some significant new aspect repre-

sented by netizen journalism?

Essentially I have found that there is an impor-

tant research component of what I call netizen journal-

ism. Netizen journalism, is a socially oriented journal-

ism. As such, at times there is a need to do serious

research into the background, context and political

significance of conflicts. By revealing the actual forces

at work, netizen journalism provides a more accurate

grasp of whose interests are being served, and what is

at stake in the events that make up the news.

Traditionally, the press can function as a

watchdog for society by exposing the use and abuse of

power. Or, the press can act to support the abuse of

political power.

Netizens, whether journalists or citizens who

turn to journalism to challenge problems in their

society, have demonstrated in a number of instances

that they are able to bring public attention to situations

needing change, and exert the needed pressure for the

change so that the change gets made.

If netizen journalism can provide a more

accurate understanding of conflicts, it can help make

more likely the peaceful resolution of these conflicts.

Also as an aside, my stories about the U.S.-

BDA-North Korea-UN conflict led to my being short-

listed for one of the journalism awards presented each

year by the United Nations Correspondence Associa-

tion (UNCA) for the best journalism articles about the

UN for 2007. While I did not get the award in 2007, I

did get it the following year, in 2008.

IX – The Cheonan – Some Background

The Cheonan conflict, which was brought to

the UN in 2010, provides another interesting example

how netizen journalism affected the media war and

helped to make a significant contribution to a peaceful

resolution of the conflict by the Security Council.

The Cheonan incident concerns a South Korean

warship which broke in two and sank on March 26,

2010. Forty-six of the crew died. At the time, the ship

was involved in naval exercises with the U.S. military

in an area in the West Sea/Yellow Sea between North

Korea and China. This is a situation that had been the

subject of much discussion on the internet.

Initially, the South Korean government and the

U.S. government said there was no indication that

North Korea was involved. Then at a press conference

on May 20, 2010, the South Korean government

claimed that a torpedo fired by a North Korean subma-

rine exploded in the water near the Cheonan, causing

a pressure wave that was responsible for the sinking.

Many criticisms of this scenario have been raised.

There was no direct evidence of any North

Korean submarine in the vicinity of the Cheonan. Nor

was there any evidence that a torpedo was actually

fired causing a pressure wave phenomenon. Hence the

South Korean government had no actual case that

could be presented in a court of law to support its

claims.

In fact, if this claim of a pressure wave were

true even those involved in the investigation of the

incident acknowledge that North Korea would be the

first to have succeeded at using this kind of bubble jet

torpedo action in actual fighting.

X – The Cheonan Press Conference and

the Local Election

The press conference held by the South Korean

government on May 20, 2010, to announce that North

Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan

came, it turns out, was at the start of the local election

period. Many South Koreans were suspicious that the

accusation was a ploy to help the ruling party candi-

dates win in the local elections. The widespread sus-

picions about the government’s motives led to the

ruling party losing many of the local election contests.

These election results demonstrated the deep distrust

among the South Korean population of the motives

behind the South Korean government’s accusations

about North Korea’s responsibility for the sinking of

the Cheonan.

XI – The Cheonan and Netizen Journalism

Netizens who live in different countries and

Page 8

speak different languages took up to critique the

claims of the South Korean government about the

cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. This netizen

activity had an important effect. It appears to have

acted as a catalyst affecting the actions of the UN

Security Council in its treatment of the Cheonan

dispute.

There were substantial analyses by non-govern-

mental organizations like Spark, PSPD, Peaceboat, and

others posted on the internet in English or Korean or in

both languages. Some of these online posts were in the

form of letters that were also sent to the members of

the UN Security Council. At the time, I saw discus-

sions and critiques of the Korean government’s claims

at American, Japanese and Chinese websites, in ad-

dition to conversations and postings about the Cheo-

nan on South Korean websites.

One such critique included a three-part analysis

by the South Korean NGO People’s Solidarity for

Participatory Democracy (PSPD). This analysis raised

several questions and problems with the South Korean

government’s case. The PSPD document was posted

widely on the internet and also sent to the President of

the United Nations Security Council for distribution to

those Security Council members interested and to the

South Korean Mission to the UN.

While there were many blog comments about

the Cheonan issue in Korean, there were also some

bloggers writing in English who became active in

critiquing the South Korean investigation and the role

of the U.S. in the conflict.

One blogger, Scott Creighton who uses the pen

name Willy Loman, or American Everyman, wrote a

post titled “The Sinking of the Cheonan: We Are

Being Lied to.”

The South Korean government had claimed

that the diagram it displayed above the glass case

containing the alleged torpedo shaft was from a North

Korean weapons sales brochure which offered the

torpedo. The torpedo was identified as the CHT-02D.

In a post he titled “A Perfect Match?,” Creigh-

ton showed how there was a discrepancy between the

diagram displayed by the South Korean government in

the press conference and the part of the torpedo it had

on display in the glass case below the diagram. He

demonstrated that the diagram did not match the part

of the torpedo on display because one of the compo-

nents of the torpedo shown was in the propeller sec-

tion, but in the diagram, the component appeared in the

shaft section. There were many comments in response

to this post, including some from netizens in South

Korea. Also, the mainstream conservative media in

South Korea carried accounts of this blogger’s critique.

Three weeks later, at a news conference, a South

Korean government official acknowledged that the

diagram presented by the South Korean government

was not of the same torpedo as the part displayed in

the glass case. Instead, the diagram displayed was of

the PT97W torpedo, not the CHT-02D torpedo as

claimed.

In a post titled “Thanks to Valuable Input”

describing the significance of having documented one

of the fallacies in the South Korean government’s case,

Creighton writes:

(I)n the end, thanks to valuable input

from dozens of concerned people all

across the world…. Over 100,000

viewers read that article and it was

republished on dozens of sites all

across the world (even translated). A

South Korean MSM outlet even posted

our diagram depicting the glaring dis-

crepancies between the evidence and

the drawing of the CHT-O2D torpedo,

which a high-ranking military official

could only refute by stating he had 40

years of military experience and to his

knowledge, I had none. But what I had,

what we had, was literally thousands of

people all across the world, scientists,

military members, and just concerned

investigative bloggers who were com-

mitted to the truth and who took the

time to contribute to what we were

doing here. ‘40 years of military ex-

perience’ took a beating from ‘we the

people WorldWide’ and that is the way

it is supposed to be.

This is just one of a number of serious ques-

tions and challenges that were raised about the South

Korean government’s scenario of the sinking of the

Cheonan.

Another influential event which helped to chal-

lenge the South Korean government’s claims was a

press conference in Japan held on July 9 by two aca-

demic scientists. The two scientists presented the re-

sults of experiments they had done which challenged

the results of experiments the South Korean govern-

ment used to support its case. These scientists also

wrote to the Security Council with their findings.

Page 9

Also a significant challenge to the South

Korean government report was the finding of a Rus-

sian team of four sent to South Korea to look at the

data from the investigation and to do an independent

evaluation of it. The team of Russian navy experts

visited South Korea from May 30 to June 7. The Rus-

sian team did not accept the South Korean govern-

ment’s claim that a pressure wave from a torpedo

caused the Cheonan to sink. Getting a leaked copy of

the Russian team’s report, the Hankyoreh newspaper

in South Korea reported that the Russian investigators

determined that the ship had come in contact with the

ocean floor and a propeller and shaft became entangled

in a fishing net. Also, the investigators thought it likely

that an old underwater mine had exploded near the

Cheonan adding to the factors that led to it sinking.

Such efforts along with online posts and dis-

cussions by many netizens provided a catalyst for the

actions of the UN Security Council concerning the

Cheonan incident.

When the UN Security Council took up the

Cheonan issue in June 2010, I was surprised to learn

that some of the members of the Council knew of the

criticism of the South Korean government investiga-

tion blaming North Korea for sinking the ship.

XII – The Cheonan and the UN Security

Council

South Korea brought the dispute over the

sinking of the Cheonan to the United Nations Security

Council. The Mexican Ambassador to the UN, Claude

Heller, was President of the Security Council for June

2010. (The presidency rotates each month to a differ-

ent Security Council member nation.) In a letter to the

Security Council dated June 4, South Korea asked the

Council to take up the Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook,

then the South Korean Ambassador to the UN, re-

quested that the Security Council consider the matter

of the Cheonan and respond in an appropriate manner.

The letter described the investigation into the sinking

of the Cheonan carried out by the South Korean

government and military officials. The conclusion of

the South Korean investigation was to accuse North

Korea of sinking the South Korean ship.

How would the Mexican Ambassador as

President of the Security Council during June handle

this dispute? This was a serious issue facing Ambassa-

dor Heller as he began his presidency.

Ambassador Heller adopted what he referred to

as a “balanced” approach to treat both governments on

the Korean peninsula fairly and objectively. He held

bilateral meetings with each member of the Security

Council which led to support for a process of informal

presentations by both of the Koreas to the members of

the Security Council. He arranged for the South

Korean Ambassador to make an informal presentation

to the members of the Security Council. Ambassador

Heller also invited the North Korean Ambassador to

make a separate informal presentation to the members

of the Security Council. Sin Son Ho was the UN

Ambassador from North Korea.

In response to the invitation from the President

of the Security Council, the North Korean Ambassador

to the UN sent a letter dated June 8 to the Security

Council which denied the allegation that his country

was to blame. His letter urged the Security Council not

to be the victim of deceptive claims, as had happened

with the U.S. presentation by Colin Powell on Iraq in

2003. It asked the Security Council to support his

government’s call to be able to examine the evidence

and to be involved in a new and more independent

investigation of the sinking of the Cheonan.

In its June 8 letter to the Security Council,

North Korea referred to the widespread international

sentiment questioning the conclusions of the South

Korean government’s investigation. The North Korean

Ambassador wrote:

It would be very useful to remind our-

selves of the ever-increasing interna-

tional doubts and criticisms, going

beyond the internal boundary of South

Korea, over the ‘investigation result’

from the very moment of its release….

What Ambassador Heller called “interactive

informal meetings” were held on June 14 with the

South Koreans and the North Koreans in separate

sessions attended by the Security Council members,

who had time to ask questions and then discuss the

presentations.

At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s

presentations ended, Ambassador Heller said that it

was important to have received the detailed presenta-

tion by South Korea and also to know and learn the

arguments of North Korea. He commented that “it was

very important that North Korea approached the

Security Council.”

In response to a question about his view on the

issues presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I think

we will go on with the consultations to deal in a proper

manner on the issue.”

Page 10

Ambassador Heller also explained that “the

Security Council issued a call to the parties to refrain

from any act that could escalate tensions in the region,

and makes an appeal to preserve peace and stability in

the region.”

Though the North Korean Ambassador to the

UN rarely speaks to the media, the North Korean UN

delegation scheduled a press conference for Tuesday,

June 15, the day following the interactive informal

meeting. During the press conference, the North Kor-

ean Ambassador presented his government’s refutation

of the allegations made by South Korea. Also, he

explained North Korea’s request to be able to send an

investigation team to the site where the sinking of the

Cheonan occurred. South Korea had denied the re-

quest. During its press conference, the North Korean

Ambassador noted that there was widespread condem-

nation of the investigation in both South Korea and

around the world.

The press conference held on June 15 was a

lively event. Many of the journalists who attended

were impressed and requested that there be future press

conferences with the North Korean Ambassador.

During his presidency of the Security Council

in the month of June, Ambassador Heller held meet-

ings with the UN ambassadors from each of the two

Koreas and then with Security Council members about

the Cheonan issue. On the last day of his presidency,

on June 30, he was asked by a reporter what was hap-

pening about the Cheonan dispute. He responded that

the issue of contention was over the evaluation of the

South Korean government’s investigation.

Ambassador Heller described how he intro-

duced what he refers to as “an innovation” into the

Security Council process. As the month of June ended,

the issue was not yet resolved, but the “innovation” set

a basis to build on the progress that was achieved

during the month of his presidency.

The “innovation” Ambassador Heller referred

to, was a summary he made of the positions of each of

the two Koreas on the issue, taking care to present

each objectively. Heller explained that this summary

was not an official document, so it did not have to be

approved by the other members of the Council. This

summary provided the basis for further negotiations.

He believed that it had a positive impact on the process

of consideration in the Council, making possible the

agreement that was later to be expressed in the Presi-

dential Statement on the Cheonan that was issued by

the Security Council on July 9, 2010.

Ambassador Heller’s goal, he explained, was to

“at all times be as objective as possible” so as to avoid

increasing the conflict on the Korean peninsula. Such

a goal is the Security Council’s obligation under the

UN Charter.

In the Security Council’s July 9 Presidential

Statement (PRST) on the Cheonan, what stands out is

that the statement follows the pattern of presenting the

views of each of the two Koreas and urging that the

dispute be settled in a peaceful manner.

In the PRST, the members of the Security

Council did not blame North Korea. Instead, they refer

to the South Korean investigation and its conclusion,

expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings”

of the investigation.

The PRST explains that “The Security Council

takes note of the responses from other relevant parties,

including the DPRK, which has stated that it had

nothing to do with the incident.”

Except for North Korea, it is not indicated who

“the other relevant parties” are. It does suggest, how-

ever, that it is likely there were some Security Council

members, not just Russia and China, who did not agree

with the conclusions of the South Korean investiga-

tion.

Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Kor-

ean newspaper Hankyoreh noted that the statement

“allows for a double interpretation and does not blame

or place consequences on North Korea.” Such a pos-

sibility of a “double interpretation” allows for different

interpretations.

The Security Council’s action on the Cheonan

took place in a situation where there had been a wide-

ranging international critique, especially in the online

media, about the problems of the South Korean inves-

tigation, and of the South Korean government’s failure

to make public any substantial documentation of its

investigation, along with its practice of harassing cri-

tics of the South Korean government claims. The

Security Council’s action included hearing the posi-

tions of the different parties to the conflict.

The result of such efforts was something that is

unusual in the process of recent Security Council

activity. The Security Council process in the Cheonan

issue provided for an impartial analysis of the problem

and an effort to hear from those with an interest in the

issue.

The effort in the Security Council was de-

scribed by the Mexican Ambassador, as upholding the

principles of impartiality and respectful treatment of

Page 11

all members toward resolving a conflict between

nations in a peaceful manner. It represents an impor-

tant example of the Security Council acting in confor-

mity with its obligations as set out in the UN charter.

In the July 9, 2010 Presidential Statement, the

Security Council urged that the parties to the dispute

over the sinking of the Cheonan find a means to

peacefully settle the dispute. The statement says:

The Security Council calls for full

adherence to the Korean Armistice

Agreement and encourages the settle-

ment of outstanding issues on the Ko-

rean peninsula by peaceful means to

resume direct dialogue and negotiation

through appropriate channels as early

as possible, to avoid conflicts and avert

escalation.

The mainstream U.S. media, for the most part,

chose to ignore the many critiques which have ap-

peared. These critiques of the South Korean govern-

ment’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have

appeared mainly on the internet, not only in Korean,

but also in English, Japanese, and other languages.

They present a wide-ranging challenge to the veracity

and integrity of the South Korean investigation and its

conclusions.

An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28,

2010 noted the fact, however, that the media in the

U.S. had ignored the critique of the South Korean gov-

ernment investigation that was being discussed online

and spread around the world.

In this example, the netizen community in

South Korea and internationally were able to provide

an effective challenge to the misrepresentations by the

South Korean government on the Cheonan.

In conclusion, I want to propose that the

response of netizens to the problems raised by the

investigation of the Cheonan incident is but a prelude

to the potential of netizens in different countries to

work together across national borders to solve the

problems of our times.

XIII – Conclusion

Describing the frustration of many netizens

with the traditional media that they had to rely on

before the internet, Hauben wrote:

Today, similarly, the need for a broader

and more cooperative gathering and

reporting of the News has helped create

the new online media that is gradually

supplementing traditional forms of

journalism.

In an article about the power of the internet,

Hauben recognized that the Net gives the power of the

reporter to the netizen. This represents a diffusion of a

power formerly held by the few, placing it in hands

that are different from its former masters.

Speaking about the potential for such a journal-

ism Hauben predicted, “As people continue to connect

to Usenet and other discussion forums, the collective

population will contribute back to the human commu-

nity this new form of news.” He recognized that, “The

Net has opened a channel for talking to the whole

world to an even wider set of people than did the

printed books.”

In one of the press conferences at the UN when

Li Baodong was the Chinese Ambassador to the UN,

he told the media, “You are the 16th member of the

Security Council.” He was in general speaking to the

traditional media. However, the case studies I have

described, demonstrate the potential for the new me-

dia, the netizen media, to assume that membership.

Notes

1. http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?

no=323351&rel_no=1, (site no longer available). Reprinted in the

Amateur Computerist Vol 37 No. 2 at: http://www.ais.org/~jrh

/acn/ACn37-2.pdf, pages 2-4.

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/9.14.06He

aringTranscript.pdf.

3. Voice of America (VOA) has been a part of several U.S.

government agencies. From its founding in 1942 to 1945, it was

part of the Office of War Information, and then from 1945 to 1953

as a function of the State Department. VOA was placed under the

U.S. Information Agency in 1953. When the USIA was abolished

in 1999, VOA was placed under the Broadcasting Board of

Governors, or BBG, which is an autonomous U.S. government

agency, with bipartisan membership. The Secretary of State has

a seat on the BBG. The BBG replaced the Board for International

Broadcasting (BIB) that oversaw the funding and operation of

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a branch of VOA.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_of_America.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/429769.html

5. http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9975.doc.htm.

* The slides used for this talk are online at:

http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/stony-brook/Stony-Brook-

Slides-12-04-2013.pdf.

The URL for the online version of Netizens: On the History and

Impact of Usenet and the Internet is: “Netizens: An Anthology”

at:

http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120. A version of these Notes

appeared on December 17, 2013 on the Netizenblog at:

/http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/12/17/why-netizen-

Page 12

journalism-matters (No longer Available.)

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in OhmyNews

International on June 12, 2009]

U.S. Policy Toward North

Korea Fails to Engage

by Ronda Hauben

U.S. policy toward North Korea since Barack

Obama assumed the U.S. presidency is very different

from the promises of engagement which he made

during his election campaign. This policy presents a

striking example of the disparity between pre-election

promises and the action taken thus far during the

Obama presidency.

On the first day of the new administration,

sanctions were authorized against three North Korean

firms under the Arms Export Control Act, along with

several nonproliferation executive orders. The three

firms were KOMID, which had been sanctioned by

other administrations, Sino-Ki and Moksong Trading

Company, which were being sanctioned for the first

time.

The hostile direction of Obama’s policy,

however, has been signaled most clearly by the change

made when the new administration failed to reappoint

Christopher Hill to his position as Undersecretary of

State for East Asia and the head of the U.S. negotiation

team for the six-party talks with North Korea.

Not only was Hill not reappointed, but the role

of U.S. negotiator with North Korea was downgraded

and split among several different officials. A part-time

position was created for an envoy. Another person

would be the U.S. representative to the six-party talks.

And still another official was to be appointed to the

position of Undersecretary of State for East Asia,

which was Hill’s former position.

Stephen Bosworth accepted the position as

envoy. His official title is Special Representative for

North Korea Policy. Bosworth did so on a part-time

basis. At the same time, he maintained his full-time

position as Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy at Tufts University along with his new

part-time job.

There has been little public discussion about

why the Obama administration made such significant

changes. The Boston Globe, in an article about

Bosworth’s appointment, refers to the concerns ex-

pressed by Leon Sigal, the director of the Northeast

Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Sci-

ence Research Council in New York. The article

quotes Sigal saying that there are officials in the new

administration, “who don’t think we can get anywhere,

so they don’t want to do the political heavy lifting to

try.”

In contrast to the loss of Hill as a negotiator

with North Korea, the Obama administration reap-

pointed Stuart Levey, as the Undersecretary of Trea-

sury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Levey’s

office in the Treasury Department was created in 2004

under George W. Bush. This office was used to impose

economic sanctions on North Korea. One such action

was the freezing of funds that North Korea had in a

bank in Macao, China, the Banco Delta Asia (BDA).

North Korea was not only denied access to U.S.

$25 million, but it was also denied the use of the

international banking system. This freezing of North

Korean funds was announced shortly after North Korea

and the five other nations who were part of the six-

party talks signed the September 19, 2005 agreement

to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

The announce-

ment by the Treasury Department sabotaged the

implementation of this important agreement which

would have gone a long way toward the goal of de-

nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. North Korea with-

drew from the six-party talks until the $25 million was

returned.

It is significant here to note that Levey and his

office briefly came under public scrutiny in 2006 when

the New York Times published an article exposing how

the office has access to and uses the SWIFT database

to do intelligence work targeting people and transac-

tions that it claims are in violation of U.S. law.

The

SWIFT database contain the transactions and ident-

ification information for the hundreds of thousands of

people and entities that do electronic banking transac-

tions using the SWIFT system.

The action by the U.S. Treasury using a section

of the Patriot Act against the Banco Delta Asia bank,

however, demonstrated that the U.S. government has

the ability to use this database information against

those it wants to target politically, rather than those

who have committed any actual illegal acts. Testimony

by former U.S. government officials to the U.S.

Congress, and documents submitted to the U.S. gov-

ernment by the bank owner and his lawyer, demon-

strated that there was never any evidence offered of

Page 13

any illegal acts. Instead the Patriot Act had been used

to allow the U.S. government to act against this bank

for political objectives. (See “Behind the Blacklisting

of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed at targeting

China as well as North Korea?” also in this issue.)

The new positions, designated to negotiate with

North Korea, are at a lower administrative level than

was Hill’s former position. In addition, the Obama

administration, by not reappointing Hill, has lost his

valuable expertise. Hill had effectively countered the

sabotage to negotiations caused by Levey’s office

during the Bush administration.

Hill was met with opposition from some in the

Bush administration at each step along the way.

Remarkably, Hill effectively countered much of this

opposition, making progress in the negotiations. In

August 2008, however, the Bush administration uni-

laterally changed what it claimed North Korea’s

obligations were as part of Phase 2 of the six-party Feb

2007 agreement, and falsely declared that North Korea

was in violation.

With Hill gone from the North Korean desk at

the State Department, and Levey reappointed to Hill's

position at the Treasury Department, it is significant

that Obama sent an inter-agency group to visit the

capitals of Japan, South Korea and China to discuss

punishments for North Korea. Levey was featured as

one of the U.S. government officials on the trip.

But is punishment appropriate? There has been

no similar effort to open negotiations with North

Korea.

Instead, the U.S. administration has given its

support to Levey and others whose actions have sab-

otaged the success of the six-party talks. This failure of

the Obama administration is similar to previous U.S.

policy on North Korea.

Robert Carlin, part of the U.S. government

negotiation team with North Korea under the Clinton

Administration, documents that there were significant

and successful negotiations on 22 issues carried out in

the period between 1993 and 2000.

These achieve-

ments, however, could not survive the transition to the

Bush Administration.

Similarly, Mike Chinoy, a former CNN journal-

ist, in his book Meltdown, documents both the Clinton

years and much of the Bush years. He chronicles how

negotiations were torpedoed not by North Korea, but

by forces within the U.S. government itself.

In addition, the U.S. conducts frequent military

maneuvers close to North Korea which North Korea

has claimed as a threat to its peace and security.

On April 5, 2009, North Korea test launched a

communications satellite using a rocket of advanced

design. This test broke no international law or treaty to

which North Korea is a party.

Still the launch was

condemned by the UN Security Council in a Presiden-

tial Statement. Also new sanctions were imposed on

North Korea, stating as authority, a previous Security

Council Resolution 1718.

North Korea has been the target of hostile acts

by the U.S. North Korea has tested rockets and has

done tests of two nuclear devices, which it claims it

needs as a deterrent. The U.S. has military agreements

with Japan and South Korea, including them under the

protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. There is only

an armistice ending the fighting of the Korean War.

The U.S. as the head of the UN command has not been

willing to negotiate a treaty ending the Korean War.

The failure of the UN Security Council to

explore North Korea’s problems in trying to check

U.S. hostility demonstrates its failure to carry out its

obligations under the UN charter. The failure of the

Security Council to protect Iraq from U.S. invasion is

a warning that the Security Council should reform its

processes so that it doesn’t just become a vehicle for

the political targeting of a nation as happened with

Iraq.

In his comments to journalists in response to

the sanctions put on North Korea in April 2009, the

Deputy Ambassador to the UN from North Korea, Pak

Tok Hun said, “The recent activity of the security

council concerning the peaceful use of outer space by

my country shows that unless the security council is

totally reformed and democratized we expect nothing

from it.”

The challenge to the nations of the UN is to

provide a more neutral and considered investigation of

the problem it is trying to solve rather than just carry-

ing out the punishment a P5 nation may endeavor to

inflict on another nation.

Notes

1. Karin Lee and Julia Choi, “North Korea: Unilateral and Mult-

ilateral Economic Sanctions and U.S. Department of Treasury

Actions, 1955-April 2009,” National Committee on North Korea,

(Paper last updated April 28, 2009), p. 26.

http://nautilus org /wp-

content/uploads/2011/12/09035LeeChoi.pdf.

2. James F. Smith, “In role as envoy, Tufts dean carries hard-

earned lessons,” The Boston Globe, May 26, 2009.

3. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta

Page 14

Asia: Another Abuse under the U.S. Patriot Act,” OhmyNews

International, March 3, 2007.

4. Ronda Hauben, “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia:

Is the policy aimed at targeting China as well as North Korea?,”

OhmyNews International, Ma y 1 8 , 2 0 0 7. (Also in this issue.)

5. Erick Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S.

in Secret to Block Terror,” New York Times, June 23, 2006.

https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html.

6. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the Six-

Party Talks,” OhmyNews International, September 28, 2008.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-

383769&rel_no-1. (No longer available.) On line at:

https://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn18-1.pdf, pp. 10-12.

7. Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons Learn-

ed and Forgotten,” Korea Yearbook 2007, Edited by Rudiger

Frank et al., Brill, 2007, pp. 235-251.

8. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown, St. Martin’s Press, 2008.

9. Ronda Hauben, “Controversy at UN Over North Korea’s

Launch: Reconvening six-party talks or penalizing Pyongyang?,”

OhmyNews International, April 10, 2009.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-

385061&rel_no-1. (No longer available.)

10. Ronda Hauben, “Security Council’s Ad Hoc Actions Increase

Tension on Korean Peninsula: [Analysis] North Korea responds

by withdrawing from six-party talks as promised,” OhmyNews

International, April 17, 2009. http://english.ohmynews.com

/articleview/article_view.asp?no-385093&rel_no-1. (No longer

available.)

11. Seumas Milne, “After Iraq It’s Not Just North Korea that

Wants a Bomb,” Guardian Comment Is Free, May 29, 2009.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009 /may/27/north-

korea-nuclear-weapons-us.

12. Pak Tok Hun, Informal Comments to the Media at the UN

Media Stakeout, April 24, 2009. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen

/ondemand/stakeout/2009/so090424pm2.rm. (No longer avail-

able.)

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews

International on June 8, 2010.]

Netizens Question Cause of

Cheonan Tragedy

Online Media Challenge Claims That

North Korea Is Responsible for Sinking

the Cheonan

by Ronda Hauben

The South Korean government headed by Lee

Myung-bak is trying to dispel criticism that its accusa-

tion that North Korea is responsible for the sinking on

March 26, 2010 of the Cheonan warship is politically

motivated and a cover-up or possible false flag opera-

tion.

On May 20, the South Korean government pre-

sented as incontestable fact its conclusion that the war-

ship Cheonan split in two and sank because of hostile

action by North Korea. Online discussion seriously

challenged that presentation. Perhaps not coinciden-

tally, May 20, the day of the presentation coincided

with the date when campaigning for the June 2 provin-

cial and local elections was to officially begin.

The military communication logs show that the

first message from the Cheonan of trouble said

“aground on rocks.” The ship was in shallow waters.

Similarly, numerous early statements by both South

Korean and U.S. officials assured the public that North

Korea was not involved with the incident.

The rescue operation saved 58 of the crew

members. Forty-six of the 104 members of the ship’s

crew died as a result of the ship’s breaking in two and

sinking. Relatives of the sailors who died complained

that the rescue effort was inadequate and too late.

Public criticism of the Lee government grew regarding

how it was handling the ship disaster. A so called

international group was charged with the task of as-

sessing blame for the disaster. That Joint Investigation

Group (JIG) was under the Korean military.

The Investigation

When the five page investigation statement

was presented on May 20, however, North Korea was

accused of being the cause of the disaster. The accusa-

tion was based on a part of a torpedo allegedly dredged

up from the sea which bore a supposed pen marked

number on a rusted surface.

The sinking of the Cheonan occurred during a

period when the U.S. military and the South Korean

military were conducting joint military exercises

named Key Resolve/Foal Eagle. The joint South

Korean-U.S. naval action involved several Aegis class

warships which have the most advanced computer and

radar systems to track and guide weapons to find and

destroy enemy targets. The Cheonan was a patrol

combat corvette (PCC) specializing in anti-submarine

warfare.

The investigation statement claims that some-

how an undetected North Korean submarine pierced a

highly protected arena of U.S.-South Korean military

maneuvers and released a torpedo in shallow waters,

and then escaped totally undetected.

An article in the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh

points out the unlikely scenario that “a North Korean

submarine [would be able] to infiltrate the maritime

Page 15

cordon at a time when security reached its tightest

level and without detection by the Cheonan.”

No evidence was presented as to the actual

firing of the torpedo or the actual presence of a North

Korean submarine in the vicinity of the Cheonan.

There is no actual observation of a North Korean

submarine in the area of the Cheonan, despite the fact

that there was sophisticated surveillance equipment

used for the military exercises. Also, the shallowness

of the sea where the Cheonan sunk, about 40 to 50 m.

and the rocky bottom would make submarine travel

near there almost impossible

The statement of the investigation is unsigned.

The parties who allegedly conducted the investigation

are unnamed. Instead of facts to document a basis for

the accusations which might lead to war, a number of

allegations are followed by the statement that “There

is no other plausible explanation.”

Blogs and Other Online Media

The accusations made by the conservative

media in South Korea about North Korea have taken

on a James Bond quality given the mismatch between

the reality of North Korean capability and the claims

being made of how it has been able to perform amaz-

ing deeds. Blogs and other online media in both the

U.S. and South Korea have presented facts and discus-

sion challenging the claims in the investigation state-

ment, and proposing other alternative explanations of

the cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. These online

discussions and questions have begun not only to

supplement newspaper accounts but also to become the

subject of newspaper articles in South Korea.

Questions discussed on blogs included whether

there was a North Korean or German made torpedo

involved in the sinking of the Cheonan, or whether

there was any involvement of a torpedo at all.

online letter

,,4

addressed to Hillary Clinton by one of

the members of the investigation, questions whether

the marks on the ship came from being run aground or

a collision with some other vessel or both.

The Whole Story as a False Account?

The nature of the pen mark on the torpedo part

offered by South Korea as its main evidence that the

torpedo was fired by North Korea was challenged

not being a reliable piece of evidence of North Korean

involvement because there was rust under the pen

mark. Also, the blades of the offered evidence show a

degree of corrosion that would usually require far more

time than the two months in the water as claimed.

Another blog

challenges the whole story of the

South Korean government as a false account like the

Gulf of Tonkin incident. Some of the Korean netizens

and political activists who challenged the South Ko-

rean government about the cause of the Cheonan

sinking have been referred to the prosecutor for

charges.

The South Korean government has been cited

by both Frank La Rue, UN Special Rapporteur for the

Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Opinion and

Expression and Amnesty International for interfering

with the rights of South Korean citizens and netizens.

They Need Teeth

Given the growing set of questions about the

South Korean government account of the sinking of

the Cheonan, the government has invited

some chosen

bloggers and twitter users to a session “to dispel any

doubts among the young that North Korea was behind

the deadly attack,”

A Yonhap News Agency press release explains

that it will select 20 twitter users, 10 defense bloggers

and 30 college reporters “to take a trip to Pyeongtaek

naval port south of Seoul where the salvaged parts of

Cheonan are being kept.” The article explains that

“The event is aimed at removing skepticism among

young Internet users who have raised doubts in online

communities about the results of a multinational

investigation that concluded North Korea downed the

ship in a torpedo attack.”

Like in the case of 9/11, careful fact checking

and examination of the evidence by netizens has

shown the South Korean government’s case for the

involvement of North Korea in the sinking of the

Cheonan to be unsustainable. Netizens are more and

more able to act as watchdogs. But they need teeth.

Notes

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigrep

ort.pdf.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/4218

56.html.

3. See the comments at the end of the Scott Creighton’s blog

entry, “The Sinking of the Cheonan: We are being lied to” May

24, 2010, http://willyloman.wordpress .com/2010/05/24/the-sink-

ing-of-the-Cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. (No Longer Avilable.)

Some selected comments are in the Appendix just below. Some of

Scott Creighton's article is quoted at:

https://thecommunists.org

/2010/04/01/news/hands-off-korea-the-sinking-of-the-Cheonan/.

Page 16

4. https://archive.cpgb-ml.org/index.php?secName=proletarian

&subName=display&art=619.

5. http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/pcc-772-cheona

n-photographic-evidence-that-no-1-written-on -top-of-rust/. (No

Longer Available.)

http://gowans.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/the-sinking-of-the-ch

eonan-another-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/.

7. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid= 2921120.

(No Longer Available.)

8. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/docs/ROK-Press

statement17052010.pdf. (No Longer Available.)

9. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/05/31/3/03010

00000 AEN20100531003100315F.HTML (No Longer Available.)

Appendix

Some comments from Scott Creighton’s blog entry, “The Sinking

of the Cheonan: We are being lied to,” May 24, 2010.

http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/the-sinking-of-the-

Cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. (No Longer Available.)

Comments:

6. Tim, on May 24, 2010 at 1:55 p.m. said: ‘The markings in

Hangul, which reads “1?(or No. 1 in English),” found inside the

end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a

previously obtained North Korean torpedo.’ Now, just hang on a

minute ? a previously obtained NK torpedo? A previously

obtained NK torpedo?? How many do they have? Is it not beyond

the realms of possibility that this ‘evidence’ did not originate from

NK at all. We really ought to demand the same level of ballistic

forensics that apply to crime scenes where ordinary firearms have

been discharged. After all many more lives could be at stake here.

-------------------------------------------

57. Mika, on May 27, 2010 at 5:34 a.m. said: You may want to

have a look at this: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LE26

Dg01.html. (No Longer Available.) I’ve not tried verifying any of

the claims made there yet, but the comments about the Korean

handwritten writings are damning if true, and if there was indeed

still a large scale exercise going on, that makes it completely

unthinkable a NK sub would have penetrated that deep, sank the

Cheonan and got away again. OTOH, it does provide a rather

credible alternative scenario: a friendly fire incident blamed on the

North Koreans. Kursk anyone?

----------------------------

145. willyloman, on May 28, 2010 at 3:38 p.m. said: the following

comment was left by a reader and it did not go through so I am

posting it here so that others may read it. Mr. Serandos:

WordPress sometimes has problems with comments… it should

work fine but if posting again presents a problem, just me know.

thank you

scott creighton, willyloman

Tom Serandos left the following comment: I tried to leave the

following message on Mr. Creighton’s site but I don’t think it

went through.

PCC-772 report: I agree with the contents of the report.

Examine the photographs of the PCC-772 props. The deformation

on each fluke is evidence of grounding while making turns. If

there was an explosion it occurred after the ship ran aground or

only the lower flukes would have been damaged when it settled to

the bottom. The damage to the shaft alleys would have locked up

the props.

If there was an explosion perhaps it was an unexploded bomb

from the Korean war or a mine the S. Koreans have not retrieved

(reportedly there are over 100 of those still out there). It could

have been in the vessels path when it grounded.

Also, the degree of corrosion on the torpedo parts indicates they

have been in the sea for a very long time (months). It was long

enough for the active alloy in the props to set up a galvanic cell

with the other parts. I am a degreed metallurgist with 25 years of

experience and seven years of service in the U.S. Nuclear Navy.

Tom Serandos

--------------------------------------------

166. Han Kim, on May 29, 2010 at 7:30 a.m. said: I’m Korean

and many Korean ppl know the govt is making things up.

As you might know, the only reason the govt manipulated the

truth is to get more votes on the upcoming election from the old

generations. :) Keep up the good work! We really appreciate the

voices from outside Korea

----------------------

203. ??, on May 29, 2010 at 2:22 p.m. said:

Dear Scott,

have you seen this article, “Did an American Mine Sink South

Korean Ship?” by one Yoichi Shimatsu: http://newamericamedia.

org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-south-korean-

ship.php. (No Longer Available.)

He makes many good points, what I’d like to highlight is what he

says about the type of torpedo submitted as evidence on May 20:

“Since torpedoes travel between 40-50 knots per hour (which is

faster than collision tests for cars), a drive shaft would crumble

upon impacting the hull and its bearing and struts would be

shattered or bent by the high-powered blast … .”

My point is that even more bewildering than the various torpedo

schema we’ve seen is the very implausible situation that such a

relatively intact remnant of the alleged weapon exists as foisted

onto us.

North Korea is also now vigorously bringing forth their defense,

which is comprehensively exposing the various contradictions in

the “JIG” case. See my link of “Military Commentator on Truth

behind ‘Story of Attack by North’ (Part 1).”

http://tinyurl

.com/29eh9zj The KCNA site won’t link directly, so I’m linking

to the article on my own blog.

People are going to cry about giving North Korea a hearing but

they are certainly innocent until proven guilty and their exclusion

from the investigation process indicates weakness and fear of

exposure in the South Korean position, which has been relying so

far on a kind of international kangaroo court or media lynching.

I’d very much like to see what evidence they presented at their

own press briefing recently to contrast with the “JIG” press event

of May 20. Again people will virulently impugn and dismiss them,

but you can be sure both Russia and China were paying close

attention to all the details of their nearer neighbor’s case.

It’s also important for your morale to know that South Korean

citizens groups and progressive media are banding together as we

speak to get to the bottom of this particular Big Lie. Also Mr. Shin

is saying he’ll use the suppressive court proceedings initiated

against him to expose the whole phony deal.

Don’t lose sight of the big picture, you’ve taken some “below-the-

belt” hits? hang in there man!

-------------------------------

211. hankyul moon, on May 30, 2010 at 11:16 a.m. said:

Page 17

The kr.gov will keep trying to paint with dirty mentions in order

to wrap this page.

In addition of that, the kr.gov will keep change their story and

evidence, which is a traditional judgment of suspicion. Many

people focused on the torpedo; however, a single evidence is not

correlated to the explosion. The torpedo that kr.gov presented is

not proven evidence of explosion scientifically. For example,

there are no proofs of thermal effects, mechanical damages by

explosion, corrosion effects by salty water, and corrosion effects

by heat and salty water. Only one evidence is letter “1?”, written

by bright blue permanent marker. Nevertheless, North kr.gov

denied using “1?” on machinery.

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews

International in June 2010.]

Questioning Cheonan

Investigation Stirs

Controversy

by Ronda Hauben

South Korean government officials have de-

nounced an NGO for writing to the Security Council.

The NGO is one of the most prominent civil society

organizations in South Korea, People’s Solidarity for

Participatory Democracy (PSPD). Such action dis-

regards the long tradition and established procedure at

the United Nations for an NGO or private individual to

send communication to the Security Council on mat-

ters it is considering.

PSPD is a watchdog NGO that was founded in

1994. Since then it has monitored the actions of the

South Korean government, supporting the efforts of

South Korean citizens to participate in political affairs.

In a letter asking for support, PSPD writes:

PSPD believes that diplomacy and

security policy should be under the

citizenry’s watch and democratic con-

trol. National Security and diplomatic

policy should not be monopolized by

military and diplomatic authorities.

On June 11, 2010, the Center for Peace and

Disarmament of PSPD sent a letter to UN Security

Council President Claude Heller, the Mexican Ambas-

sador to the UN. Mexico holds the rotating presidency

of the Security Council for the month of June. With its

letter, PSPD included its report, “The PSPD’s Stance

on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking.”

The letter and report were also sent to the other

fourteen member states of the United Nations Security

Council, to the United Nations Secretary General and

to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea

(South Korea).

The PSPD report raised a number of questions

and problems with the findings presented by the South

Korean government of its investigation of the Cheonan

sinking.

Background

The South Korean government, unable to win

support domestically for its allegations that North

Korea was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan,

turned to the UN Security Council for action against

North Korea.

On June 4 the South Korean Ambas-

sador at the UN submitted a letter to the UN Security

Council requesting it to take up the matter of the

sinking of the Cheonan.

On June 8, North Korea submitted a letter to

the Security Council denying any involvement in the

sinking of the Cheonan.

The Security Council scheduled an informal

meeting for South Korea to present its case against

North Korea on Monday, June 14. Initially there was

no plan for the Security Council to meet with the North

Korean delegation on the Cheonan issue. On Sunday

evening, however, news reports from South Korea

announced that on June 14, the Security Council would

also hold an informal meeting with North Korea.

According to some of the South Korean news

media who cover the UN, the big story in South Korea

on Monday, June 14, was not that South Korea was

making its presentation to the Security Council.

Instead the media described denunciations by South

Korean government officials against PSPD for sending

its report to the UN. The reporters claimed the South

Korean government believed that the PSPD report

influenced the North Korean UN delegation to request

a presentation at the UN Security Council on the

subject of the Cheonan. There was no proof presented

for such allegations. This did not, however, stop South

Korean government officials from making accusations

against PSPD, nor the South Korean conservative

media from supporting the denunciations with articles

accusing the NGO of unpatriotic behavior.

In Seoul, on June 14, the spokesman for Lee

Myung bak, the President of South Korea, publicly

denounced PSPD.

Also on June 14, during the Question and An-

swer time at the National Assembly, the South Korean

Page 18

Prime Minister, Un-Chan Chung, denouncing PSPD

for sending its letter and report to the UN Security

Council, said, “Such actions are against national inter-

est. It (PSPD’s action) dishonored and shamed our

country.”

Back at UN headquarters in New York on

Monday, June 14, two separate informal meetings of

the Security Council were held in the North Lawn

Building. A large number of reporters waited in the

cafe outside the area where the Security Council was

meeting because the meetings were closed to the press.

After the two separate informal Security Coun-

cil meetings, the Mexican Ambassador spoke briefly to

the press. He said, “the Security Council issued a call

to the parties to refrain from any act that could escalate

tensions in the region, and makes an appeal to preserve

peace and stability in the region.” He also indicated

that the Security Council would continue its consult-

ations after the meetings it had with the delegations of

both nations. Heller said that it was very important to

have received the very detailed presentation by South

Korea and also to know and learn from the arguments

of North Korea. He commented that it was “very

important that North Korea has approached the Secu-

rity Council.” In response to a question about his view

on the issues presented, he responded, “I am not a

judge. I think we will go on with the consultations to

deal in a proper manner on the issue.”

The North Korean UN delegation scheduled a

press conference for the following day, Tuesday, June

15. During the press conference, the North Korean

Ambassador presented North Korea’s refutation of the

allegations made by South Korea. Also he explained

North Korea’s request to be able to send an investi-

gation team to go to the site where the sinking of the

Cheonan occurred. South Korea had denied the re-

quest. During the press conference, a reporter with a

South Korean newspaper asked the North Korean

Ambassador if he had received a copy of the PSPD

document from PSPD. The Ambassador responded

that not to his knowledge.

In a press release, the Asian Human Rights

Commission writes that following the denunciation of

PSPD by South Korean government officials, “the

country’s Prosecutor’s office reportedly leaked to

newspapers that there was a possibility that the staff of

the PSPD might be prosecuted under the National

Security Act, if a case were to be filed … .”

“In response,” the press release explains, “con-

servative groups filed a complaint with the Prosecu-

tor’s Office.” On June 15, the Vice Minister of Foreign

Affairs and Trade, Mr. Chun Yeong-U said that, “A

legal examination is currently going on.”

Following the accusatory remarks by South

Korean government officials against PSPD, “people

belonging to conservative groups attempted to raid the

offices of PSPD.” There are reports that members of

PSPD were assaulted verbally and physically, and

threatening phone calls were made to the PSPD

offices.

In one incident, a van containing flammable

material was driven up to the building where PSPD

offices are located. The police did not arrest the

perpetrators of these deeds. The Prosecutor, instead,

opened an investigation of PSPD.

On June 17, according to the Asian Human

Rights Commission, the case against PSPD was allo-

cated to the Public Security Bureau 1, which an-

nounced its intention to summon PSPD officials.

The Asian Human Rights Commission also

reported that the Prosecutor’s office “approached one

of the experts who worked on the government-led

report in order for this expert to submit a complaint

concerning alleged criminal defamation by the NGO.”

South Korean government officials, supported

by some of the South Korean media, allege that it is an

unusual practice for an NGO to send a letter or report

to the UN Security Council. Recently, a reporter asked

a government official, “Are there any cases that a

NGO sends a contrast position paper against a govern-

ment on the security issue.” Chun, Yung-woo, the 2

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade responded,

“I have never heard that there are such NGOs, and

document sent by a NGO cannot be a UNSC docu-

ment.”

NGO Communication to Security Council

Such an interchange demonstrates a serious

lack of knowledge of UN and particularly Security

Council procedures. There is a long established prac-

tice at the UN of NGO’s or private individuals sending

letters and documents to the Security Council on

questions before the Security Council. Most if not all

of the matters before the Security Council have to do

with security issues.

Records at the UN show that the practice of

sending such correspondence to the Security Council

dates back to 1946. This is the date when the symbol

S/NC/ was introduced as the symbol for “Communica-

tions received from private individuals and non-

Page 19

governmental bodies relating to matters of which the

Security Council is seized.”

The Security Council has

the practice of periodically publishing a list of the

documents it receives, the name and organization of

the sender, and the date they are received. The Provi-

sional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council

states that the list is to be circulated to all representa-

tives on the Security Council. A copy of any communi-

cation on the list is to be given to any nation on the

Security Council that requests it.

There are over 450 such lists indicated in the

UN records. As each list can contain several or a large

number of documents the Security Council has re-

ceived, the number of such documents is likely to be in

the thousands.

Under Rule 39 of the Council procedures, the

Security Council may invite any person it deems com-

petent for the purpose to supply it with information on

a given subject. Thus the two procedures in the Secu-

rity Council’s provisional rules give it the basis to find

assistance on issues it is considering from others

outside the Council and to consider the contribution as

part of its deliberation.

Appeals to End Witch Hunt Against PSPD

Initiating a criminal investigation against a

South Korean NGO or citizen for what is a long

existing practice and tradition with respect to the UN

Security Council, is a South Korean government action

that is being compared to the kind of “witch-hunts”

that occurred during the period of the 1950s in the U.S.

which has come to be known as McCarthyism.

In contrast to the attack on PSPD by the South

Korean government and the conservative media, many

NGOs and citizens in South Korea have expressed

their support for PSPD.

A group of 200 professors and other intellectu-

als in South Korea has issued a statement calling for

the end of the “witch hunt” against PSPD. The state-

ment explains that “PSPD had performed its innate

duty and right as a civic group.” The group calls for

conservative groups to end their irrational backward

attacks on PSPD.

Also, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and

Development, an organization of 46 groups in Asia

which includes PSPD, sent a petition to Frank La Rue,

the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and

Protection of the Right of Opinion and Expression.

asked the UN to “advise the South Korean government

to end the prosecutorial investigation of PSPD.”

La Rue had visited South Korea on May 6-17,

2010. He issued a press statement on May 17 doc-

umenting other examples of the abuse by the South

Korean government of the human rights of its citizens.

He referred to the obligation of South Korea to adhere

to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights protecting the right to freedom of

expression.

While La Rue’s comments were made prior to

the current South Korean government attack on PSPD,

Amnesty International has issued a statement regarding

the current situation.

It writes:

Amnesty International is deeply con-

cerned about the Seoul Central Prosecu-

tor’s Office’s decision on Wednesday

to investigate the People’s Solidarity

for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)

for sending a letter to the UN Security

Council questioning the results of the

international investigation into the

sinking of the South Korean navy ves-

sel the Cheonan. The civic group is

accused of ‘benefitting’ North Korea,

in violation of the National Security

Law, interfering with state’s acts and

defamation.

The statement concludes, “Amnesty Interna-

tional is also concerned that the National Security Law

continues to be used to arbitrarily target individuals or

groups peacefully exercising their basic rights to free-

dom of expression and association. Simply put, this

law is used as a tool to silence dissent.”

On Friday, June 18, the UN Secretary General

Ban Ki-moon was asked for his view of the current

action by the prosecutor in South Korea against an

NGO for sending a letter to the Security Council. He

responded, “I will have to check. I’m not aware of

that.... I don’t have a comment at this time, but I may

have to check and will get back to you later.”

He did

not get back to the journalist as of the publication date

of this article.

Open Letter to Ban Ki-moon

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)

appealed to Ban Ki-moon. On June 24, it sent an Open

Letter to Sec-Gen Ban Ki-moon about the situation. In

the letter it asks him:

… to take all necessary steps to ensure

that the reprisals, directly or indirectly

attributable to the Republic of Korea,

Page 20

are immediately halted against civil

society groups that have communicated

with the UN. The AHRC appreciates

the work of the Secretary-General

concerning reprisals and urges his

offices to include this case as part of

efforts to protect civil society members

from facing attacks based on their par-

ticipation in the UN’s work.

The AHRC has also asked the High Com-

missioner for Human Rights to intervene to “ensure

that these reprisals are halted” and that the recom-

mendations of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of

expression be implemented in full and without delay.

It also calls upon South Korea as a member of the

Human Rights Council to act to “uphold the highest

standards.”

PSPD as Political Watchdog

PSPD reports that the organization has in-

creased its membership by 15% with 1600 new mem-

bers joining since the attack by the South Korean

government. Also, numerous indtions in Korea and

outside have sent letters and made statements in

support of PSPD.

As a member of the international society, PSPD

explains, “PSPD will continuously make every effort

to advance the universal goals of democracy and peace

through its activities as a political watchdog.”

Notes

1. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation on PSPD,”

6/21/2010.

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195.

2. PSPD, “The PSPD’s Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan

Sinking,” June 1, 2010.

https://www.peoplepower21.org/english

/40247.

3. “What’s Behind South Korea Bringing the Cheonan Issue to the

UN Security Council,” 6/7/2010. http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog

/2010/06/07/whats_behind_south_korea_bringing_the_Cheo

nan_issue_to_the_un_security_council/. (No Longer Available.)

4. “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of

Korea to the UN with regard to the armed attack by North Korea

on 26 May, 2010 against the Republic of Korea’s navy ship the

Cheonan, S/2010/281.”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/

cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7

D/DPRK%20S%202010%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20

and%20-%20Report.pdf.

5. “Letter dated 8 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative

of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Na-

tions addressed to the President of the Security Council,”

S/2010/294. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol

=S/2010/294&Lang=E. (No Longer Available.)

6. See description in: Gwak Byeong-chan, “Which Country Do

You Belong To?,” Hankyoreh, June 16, 2010.

https://english

.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/425906.html.

7. “Informal comments to the Media by the President of the

Security Council and the Permanent Representative of Mexico,

H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking of

the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.” June

14, 2010. [Webcast: Archived Video – 5 minutes.] http://webcast.

un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2010/so100614pm3.rm. (No

Longer Available.)

8. “Press Conference: H.E. Mr. Sin Son Ho, Permanent Represen-

tative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United

Nations, on the current situation in the Korean Peninsula.” June

15, 2010. [Webcast: Archived Video – 58 minutes.]

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/pressconference/2010/

pc100615am.rm. (No Longer Available.)

9. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-

Moon by the Asian Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-

general-ban-ki-moon.

10. See “United Nations Series Symbols: 1946-1996,” Dag

Hammarskjold Library, United Nations, New York, 1998, p. 234.

11. “Scholars Call for End to PSPD Witch Hunt,” Hankyoreh,

June 22, 2010.

https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition

/e_national/426832.html.

12. Forum-Asia Submits the Urgent Appeal on Threats of Pro-

secution against PSPD to UN Rapporteur 6/21/2010.

https://www

.peoplepower21.org/english/40190.

13. Frank La Rue, Rapporteur, “UN, Full Text of ROK Press

Statement,” May 17, 2010. http://www.peoplepower21.org/?mo

dule=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=40191&sid=4db9d3a

9ce23eab695e13dec947e1842&module_srl=37681. (No Longer

Available.)

14. “Amnesty International expresses its concern about the

investigation on the PSPD,” 6/18/2010. http://gaia-lovedream

.blogspot.com/2010/06/amnesty-international-expresses-its.html.

15. “2010-06-18, New York: Secretary-General’s remarks to the

media.” https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/20

10-06-18/secretary-generals-remarks-media. (No Longer Avail-

able.)

16. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-

Moon by the Asian Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-

general-ban-ki-moon.

17. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation of PSPD.”

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195.

Page 21

[Editor’s Note: This article appeared on the netizenblog on June

7, 2010 and can be seen at: http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010

/06/07/whats_behind_south_korea_bringing_the_Cheonan_issu

e_to_the_un_security_council/. (No longer available.) Available

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn30-1.pdf, pp. 3-4.]

What’s Behind South Korea

Bringing the Cheonan Issue

to the UN Security Council?

by Ronda Hauben

An article on the Cheonan warship sinking,

“The whole story of the South Korean government as

a false account?” was published in Telepolis on June 1,

2010. It documents several of the misleading claims

being made by the South Korean government to put

the blame on North Korea.

The June 2 election in South Korea for local

and regional government showed that many South

Koreas citizens and netizens rejected the Lee Myung-

bak government claims and rendered his Grand Na-

tional Party candidates a surprising and serious defeat.

This, however, has not deterred the Lee gov-

ernment from its goal. The election results were

announced demonstrating the criticism of the govern-

ment’s hostile policy toward North Korean represented

by the so called “investigation” blaming North Korea

for the sinking of the Cheonan. Yet, the South Korean

government initiated action to take its spurious claims

to the United Nations Security Council. A helpful

perspective is offered by Peter Lee in his Asia Times

Online article, “The Cheonan sinking… and Korea

rising.”

“What is indisputable,” Peter Lee writes, “is

the determination of the Lee Myung-bak administra-

tion to exploit the geopolitical opportunity presented

by the sinking.” He explains how the South Korean

president not only tried to use the incident, “as a 9/11

opportunity” to get support for his government in the

local and regional elections, which clearly failed, but

also to “strengthen the South Korean alliance with the

U.S.” to offer a counterweight to China.

Even more serious, however, is the observation

made by some in South Korea, that the Lee administra-

tion is endangering their lives by its hostile acts toward

North Korea. Similarly the strategy of trying to use the

UN Security Council to give a seal of approval for the

so called “investigation” which drew significant

criticisms from politicians and the public at home is

but a sign of the significant role the U.S. government

is playing in this dangerous South Korean gambit.

The South Korean NGO People’s Solidarity for

Participatory Democracy (PSPD) recently published an

English translation of a critique of the South Korean

government’s “international” investigation of the -

sinking. The PSPD report provides helpful documenta-

tion of a number of the inconsistencies and fallacies of

the whole process of the claimed “investigation.”

According to the PSPD critique, it was only

after significant criticism of the fact that the South

Korean military was conducting the “investigation” of

the Cheonan sinking, that it was announced that four

other nations had been invited to be part of the “inves-

tigation.” Little is known, however, about what role

these other nations played in the investigation. PSPD

reports that the head of the U.S. group appeared at the

press conference announcing the results of the investi-

gation, to express U.S. government support. He said

that there had been close cooperation between South

Korea and the U.S. in the investigation. This did not,

however, answer the question about the role the

foreign nations in the investigation and whether they

had any ability to contribute an independent perspec-

tive.

North Korea asked to be allowed to send a team

of investigators to examine the supposed evidence.

South Korea refused the request.

One of the civilian members of the investiga-

tion said that he was not provided with any briefing

materials or basic information. Also he said that the

investigation only considered the theory of the govern-

ment about the torpedo as the cause of the sinking, and

that the investigation was conducted to support that

theory.

The government has brought lawsuits or char-

ges against several citizens and netizens and a national

assembly representative who expressed disagreement

with the claims of the government.

The PSPD report raises a number of other

important issues about the nature of the South Korean

government investigation.

By bringing the Cheonan issue to the UN

Security Council, the South Korean government is

presenting the UN with a serious challenge. The PSPD

report has urged the South Korean government to

refrain from international actions until the National

Assembly has been assisted in conducting a fact-

finding process. The effort of the South Korean gov-

ernment to ignore the questions of its citizens and

Page 22

politicians and take the matter to the UN Security

Council is the effort to use the UN Security Council to

deny democratic processes to its own citizens. PSPD

has documented how what the South Korean govern-

ment is doing by bringing the issue to the Security

Council is increasing the threat to peace and security

on the Korean peninsula. This is the opposite of what

the Security Council is to be involved with under the

UN Charter.

How the Security Council handles this issue

will be an important demonstration of its ability to

fulfill its obligations under the UN charter to the other

member nations of the UN and to the people of those

nations.

For PSPD Report See: http://www.peoplepow

er21.org/?module=file&act=procFileDownload&file

_srl=40158&sid=7ab45eab894bb107361ef5447c300

48b&module_srl=37681&usg=AFQjCNFTU9vP98

NdyzvCupVWG0HqgMhLlw.

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on Sept 5, 2009, on

the netizens blog at taz.de, a website of die Tageszeitung.]

In the Cheonan Dispute, the

UN Security Council Acts in

Accord with UN Charter

by Ronda Hauben

The challenge of Security Council reform has

been on the agenda of the United Nations for decades

with little obvious effect on the workings of the

Security Council itself.

But what happens when an action of the Secur-

ity Council is an improvement over past Security

Council practices and presents an important model for

conflict resolution in line with the obligations of the

Charter? Will there be recognition of the peaceful

direction that the action points in or will it be ignored

and members of the Security Council revert back to the

practice of the past?

The situation I am referring to is the consider-

ation by the Security Council of the sinking of the

South Korean naval warship, the Cheonan. The dispute

over the sinking of the Cheonan was brought to the

Security Council in June and a Presidential Statement

was agreed to in July.

An account of some of what happened in the

Security Council during an important part of this

process is described in an article in Spanish that has

appeared in several different Spanish language publi-

cations. The article, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en

conflict de Peninsula de Corea” by Maurizio Guerrero,

the UN Correspondent for Notimex (the Mexican

News Agency), was published on July 5.

The article

describes the experience of the Mexican Ambassador

to the UN, Claude Heller in his position as president of

the Security Council for June.

In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4,

the Republic of Korea (ROK), more commonly known

as South Korea, asked the Council to take up the

Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, the South Korean

Ambassador to the UN, requested that the Security

Council consider the matter of the Cheonan and

respond appropriately.

The letter described an investi-

gation into the sinking of the Cheonan carried out by

the South Korean government and military officials.

The conclusion was to accuse North Korea of sinking

the South Korean ship.

Sin Son Ho is the UN Ambassador from the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),

which is more commonly known as North Korea. He

sent a letter dated June 8 to the Security Council,

which denied the allegation that his country was to

blame.

His letter urged the Security Council not to be

the victim of deceptive claims, as had happened with

Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support

its call to be able to examine the evidence and to be

involved in a new and more independent investigation

on the sinking of the Cheonan.

How would the Mexican Ambassador as Pres-

ident of the Security Council during June handle this

dispute? (The presidency rotates each month to a

different Security Council member.) This was a serious

issue facing Heller as he began his presidency in June

2010.

Heller adopted what he refers to as a “bal-

anced” approach to treat both governments on the

Korean peninsula fairly and objectively. He held

bilateral meetings with each member of the Security

Council which led to support for a process of informal

presentations by both of the Koreas to the members of

the Security Council.

What Heller calls “interactive informal meet-

ings” were held on June 14 with the South Koreans

and the North Koreans in separate sessions attended by

the Security Council members, along with a time to

ask questions and then to discuss the presentations.

Page 23

At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s

presentations ended, Heller said that it was important

to have received the detailed presentation by South

Korea and also to know and learn the arguments of

North Korea. He commented that “it was very impor-

tant that North Korea approached the Security Coun-

cil.” In response to a question about his view on the

issues presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I think

we will go on with the consultations to deal properly

on the issue.”

During June, Heller held meetings with the UN

Ambassadors from each of the two Koreas and then

with Security Council members about the Cheonan

issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he

was asked by the media what was happening about the

Cheonan dispute. He responded that the issue of

contention was over the evaluation of the South

Korean government’s investigation.

Heller describes how he introduced what he

refers to as “an innovation” into the Security Council

process. As June ended, the issue was not yet resolved,

but the “innovation” set a basis to build on the progress

that was achieved during the month of his presidency.

The “innovation” Heller refers to, is a summary

of the positions of each of the two Koreas on the issue,

taking care to present each objectively. Heller explains

that this summary was not an official document, so it

did not have to be approved by the other members of

the Council. This summary provided the basis for

further negotiations. He believed that it had a positive

impact on the process of consideration in the Council,

making possible the agreement that was later to be

expressed in the Presidential statement on the Cheonan

that was issued by the Security Council on July 9.

Heller’s goal, he explains, was to “at all times

be as objective as possible” to avoid increasing the

conflict on the Korean peninsula. Such a goal is the

Security Council’s obligation under the UN charter.

In the Security Council’s Presidential State-

ment on the Cheonan, what stands out is that the

statement follows the pattern that Heller described of

presenting the views of each of the Koreas and urging

that the dispute be settled peacefuly.

In the statement, the members of the Security

Council do not blame North Korea. Instead, they refer

to the South Korean investigation and its conclusion,

expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings”

of the investigation.

Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Kor-

ean newspaper Hankyoreh noted that the statement

“allows for a double interpretation and does not blame

or place consequences on North Korea.”

Such a pos-

sibility of a “double interpretation” allows different

interpretations.

Some of the articles that have appeared in the

English language media about the Cheonan, however,

appear to be oblivious to the effort to accommodate the

different viewpoints in the Presidential Statement. For

example, an editorial in the New York Times about the

Presidential Statement complained that the statement

contained “weasel wording about blame.”

An AP article reported that the U.S. Ambassa-

dor to the UN, Susan Rice, and the South Korean

Ambassador, Park Im-kook said the Presidential

Statement “made clear who to blame” for the attack on

the Cheonan.

Instead of directly pointing out this is

contrary to the wording of the statement, however, the

AP article notes that in private some diplomats and

analysts expressed concern that the statement didn’t

blame Pyongyang.

Another article in the New York Times, how-

ever, referred to a statement of Li Baodong, China’s

Ambassador to the UN, that the Presidential statement

moved matters in “the right direction” because it urged

“the parties concerned” to avoid escalating tensions.

Russia had sent a team of experts to South

Korea to do its own evaluation on the South Korean

findings. Though the Russian evaluation has not been

released publicly, a leaked copy was the subject of

articles in Hankyoreh. These describe how the Russian

team of experts disagreed with the South Korean

government’s conclusions about the sinking of the

Cheonan. The Russian experts observed the ship’s

propeller had become entangled in a fishing net and

subsequently a possible cause of the sinking could

have been that the ship had hit the antennae of a mine

which then exploded.

The Presidential Statement explains that “The

Security Council takes note of the responses from

other relevant parties, including the DPRK, which has

stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”

With the exception of the DPRK, it is not

indicated who “the other relevant parties” are. It does

suggest, however, that it is likely some Security

Council members, not just Russia and China, who did

not agree with the conclusions of the South Korean

investigation.

The Security Council's action on the Cheonan

took place in a situation where there has been a wide-

ranging international critique, especially in the online

Page 24

media, about the problems of the South Korean inves-

tigation, and of the ROK government’s failure to make

public any substantial documentation of its investiga-

tion, along with its practice of harassing critics of the

ROK claims.

The U.S. media, however, for the most part,

has chosen to ignore the many critiques which have

appeared. These critiques of the South Korean govern-

ment’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have

appeared not only in Korean, but also in English,

Japanese, and other languages. They present a wide-

ranging challenge to the veracity and integrity of the

South Korean investigation and its conclusions.

An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28

noted the fact that the media in the U.S. has ignored

the critique of the South Korean government investiga-

tion that is being discussed and spread around the

world.

More recently, on August 31, an Op-Ed by

Donald Gregg, a former U.S. Ambassador to South

Korea, appeared in the New York Times, titled “Testing

North Korean Waters.” The article noted that “not

everyone agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North

Korea. Pyongyang has consistently denied responsibil-

ity, and both China and Russia opposed a U.N. Secu-

rity Council resolution laying blame on North

Korea.”

In a subsequent interview with the Washington

Correspondent for Hankyoreh, Gregg adds that the

Russian team’s conclusions could only be tentative

because they were not given access to all the materials

they needed for their investigation. The Russian team

recommended that the Chinese not make an effort to

review the South Korean investigation. They would

likely not have access to all the materials needed to be

able to do an adequate review.

In his Op-Ed in the New York Times, Gregg

maintains that “The disputed interpretations of the

sinking of the Cheonan remain central to any effort to

reverse course and to get on track toward dealing

effectively with North Korea on critical issues such as

the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. "There-

fore, he urges the South Korean government to make

public the study it has done.

Gregg’s public statements are just one example

of the disagreement around the world, along with the

Chinese and Russian governments, with the South

Korean government’s conclusions about the sinking of

the Cheonan and about the process of the investigation

itself.

North Korea referred to this widespread inter-

national sentiment in its June 8 letter to the Security

Council. The UN Ambassador from North Korea

wrote:

It would be very useful to remind our-

selves of the ever-increasing interna-

tional doubts and criticisms, going

beyond the internal boundary of South

Korea, over the ‘investigation result’

from the very moment of its release….

The situation that the North Korean Ambassa-

dor is referring to is one marked by actions on the part

of the South Korean netizens and civil society who

challenged the process and results of the South Korean

government’s investigation. There is support for the

South Korean critics by bloggers, scientists and

journalists around the world, writing in a multitude of

languages and from many perspectives. A number of

the non-governmental organizations and scientists in

South Korea sent the results of their investigations and

research to members of the Security Council to provide

them with the background and facts needed to make an

informed decision.

The result of such efforts is something that is

unusual in the process of recent Security Council

activity. Most often decisions are made according to

the degree of power and self-interest in the issue being

considered, rather than according to an impartial

analysis of the problem and an effort to hear from all

those with an interest in the issue. However, an impar-

tial analysis is what is required by the obligations of

the UN Charter.

In its June 8 letter to the Security Council,

North Korea referred to the earlier experience of the

Security Council, to the February 5, 2003, Security

Council meeting when U.S. Secretary of State Colin

Powell made his presentation of his “evidence” that

weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq. The U.S.

then used these claims as the pretext for its invasion of

Iraq in March 2003.

The June 8 letter from North Korea urges:

It is imperative for the Security Council

not to step into the same situation in

which it was once misused as a tool of

high-handedness and hegemony of the

United States by giving legitimacy to

its armed invasion of Iraq, based on a

single word of lies of Powell, United

States Secretary of State, in February

2003.

The Security Council is duty-bound to adhere

Page 25

strictly to the principles of respect for the sovereignty

and impartiality of United Nations Member States, as

enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

The process of how the Security Council took

up and determined its response to the dispute on the

Cheonan is an important example of a different pro-

cess than that which occurred in the Iraq situation. The

effort in the Security Council described by the Mexi-

can Ambassador, to uphold the principles of impartial-

ity and respectful treatment of all members involved in

a problem, is the kind of process outlined in the UN

Charter.

The process instituted by the Mexican presi-

dency of the Security Council in June with respect to

the Cheonan dispute has the potential of providing a

significant precedent in the process of Security Coun-

cil reform. It represents an important example of the

Security Council acting in conformity with its obliga-

tions as set out in the UN charter.

In the July 9 Presidential Statement, the Secu-

rity Council urges that the parties to the dispute over

the sinking of the Cheonan find a means to peacefully

settle the dispute. The statement says:

The Security Council calls for full

adherence to the Korean Armistice

Agreement and encourages the settle-

ment of outstanding issues on the Ko-

rean peninsula by peaceful means to

resume direct dialogue and negotiation

through appropriate channels as early

as possible, with a view to avoiding

conflicts and averting escalation.

Ambassador Gregg is only one of many around

the world who have expressed their concern with the

course of action of the U.S. and South Korea which is

contrary to the direction of the UN Security Council

Presidential Statement. Gregg explained his fear that

the truth of the Cheonan sinking “may elude us, as it

did after the infamous Tonkin Bay incident of 1964,

that was used to drag U.S. (the U.S.) into the abyss of

the Vietnam War.”

The Security Council's Action on the Cheonan

dispute, if it is recognized and supported, has set the

basis instead for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Notes

1. Ronda Hauben, “UN Security Council Reform in Focus,”

OhmyNews International, September 15, 2008.

2. Maurizio Guerrero, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de

Peninsula de Corea,” Notimex, July 5, 2010 (published in en la

Economia) “With the Cheonan Dispute: UN Security Council

Discovers the UN Charter.” http://enlaeconomia.com/news/2010

/07/05 /69561. (No longer available.)

3. Security Council, S/2010/281 “Letter dated 4 June 2010,”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D

27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%202010%2

0281%20SKorea%20Letter%20and%20Cheonan%20Report.pdf.

4. Security Council, S/2010/294, “June 8, 2010” “Letter,”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D

27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%202010%

20294.pdf.

5. Ambassador Claude Heller on June 14 stakeout, “Media Stak-

eout: Informal comments to the Media by the President of the

Security Council and the Permanent Representative of Mexico,

H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking of

the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.”

6. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13.

7. Lee Jae-hoon, “Presidential Statement allows for a ‘double

interpretation and does not blame or place consequences upon

North Korea,” Hankyoreh, July 10, 2010.

www.hani.co.kr/arti/en

glish_edition/e_national/429768.html.

8. “Security Council Blinks,” Editorial, New York Times, July 10,

2010.

9. Edith Lederer, “UN Condemns South Korea ship sinking,” AP,

July 10, 2010.

10. Neil MacFaquahar, “Condemnation of Ship’s Sinking is a

‘Victory’ North Korea Says,” New York Times, July 9, 2010, a

version of the online article appeared in print edition on July 10,

2010, p.6. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/world/asia/10br

iefs-KOREA.html.

11. “Russian Navy Team’s Analysis of the Cheonan

Incident,”Posted on July 27, Hankyoreh, modified on July 29.

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/432230

.html. The Russian Experts document is titled “Data from the

Russian Naval Expert Group’s Investigation into the Cause of the

South Korean Naval Vessel Cheonan’s Sinking.” See also “Rus-

sia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that Sinking Cheonan Ship

was Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27, 2010, Hankyoreh,

modified on July 28, 2010.

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english

_edition/e_northkorea/432232.html.

12. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13 Presidential Statement

of July 9, 2010.

13. Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubts Surface on

North Korean Role in Ship Sinking,” Los Angeles Times, July 23,

2010.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jul-23-la-

fg-korea-torpedo-20100724-story.html.

14 Donald P. Gregg, “Testing North Korean Waters,” New York

Times, August 31, 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/opi

nion/01iht-edgregg.html.

15. Security Council, S/2010/294, “Letter, DPRK June 8 2010.”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%202010

%20294.pdf.

16. See for example Ronda Hauben, “Netizens Question Cause of

Cheonan Tragedy,” OhmyNews International, June 8, 2010, and

Ronda Hauben, “Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Con-

troversy,” OhmyNews International, June 29, 2010. (Both are in

this issue.)

17. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010.

Page 26

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%20201

0%20294.pdf. See also: Colin Powell to the UN Feb 5 2003.

https://youtu.be/1Z3f_p_7OeE.

18. Tae-ho Kwon, “South Korean Government Impeded Russian

Team’s Cheonan Investigation: Donald Gregg,” Hankyoreh,

September 4, 2010.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition

/e_northkorea/438299.html.

19. See for example “PSPD’s Stance on the Presidential Statement

of the UNSC Regarding the Sinking of the ROK Naval Vessel

Cheonan.”

https://www.peoplepower21.org/english/40247.

[Editor’s Note: The following article is a posting at the Nautilus

Institue for Security and Sustainability on June 5, 2007. It can be

seen online at:

https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum

/behind-the-blacklisting-of-banco-delta-asia/. The article original-

ly appeared on OhmyNews International reporting on the U.S.

government activity to target North Korea without just cause.]

Policy Forum 07-044:

Behind the Blacklisting

of Banco Delta Asia

The NAPSNet Policy Forum provides expert analysis

of contemporary peace and security issues in Northeast

Asia. As always, we invite your responses to this re-

port and hope you will take the opportunity to partici-

pate in discussion of the analysis.

Recommended Citation

“Policy Forum 07-044: Behind the Blacklisting of

Banco Delta Asia,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 05,

2007, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-for

um/behind-the-blacklisting-of-banco-delta-asia/.

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia

Policy Forum Online 07-044A: June 5

, 2007

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia

By Ronda Hauben

CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. Article by Ronda Hauben

III. Citations

IV. Nautilus invites your responses

I. Introduction

Ronda Hauben, researcher, writer and freelance

journalist, who has spent the past 14 years studying,

writing and participating in online media, writes, “The

purpose of the action against the BDA appears not

only to have been to target North Korea and its access

to the international banking system, but also to send a

message to China.”

This article was originally published by

OhMyNews International: http://english.ohmynews

.com/index.asp (No longer Available.) The views

expressed in this article are those of the author and do

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nauti-

lus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on conten-

tious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Article by Ronda Hauben

“Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia”

By Ronda Hauben

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher

Hill, speaking at the Korea Society’s 50

Anniversary

dinner in New York City on May 15, said that he was

determined not to “allow $26 million or $25 million

get between us and a deal that will finally do some-

thing about nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.”

He promised that Kathy Stevens at the Korea desk at

the State Department was working on the problem and

that “we are going to keep after this problem till we

solve it.” His statement didn’t give further details

about how this problem was to be solved, a problem

that had interrupted the progress that seemed at last

possible in the Feb. 13 six-party agreement.

Just two days later, on May 17, the U.S.

Wachovia Bank announced that it is exploring a re-

quest from the State Department to transfer the funds

from the BDA (Banco Delta Asia) to North Korea.

Wachovia Bank reported that it would require the

necessary approvals from bank regulators to do the

transfer.

Until this latest announcement, banks have

been unwilling to do the transfer because of the legal

action that the U.S. government took against the BDA,

by ruling that it was involved in criminal activity under

Section 311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. Banks which deal

with a bank that has been found guilty of such illegal

acts risk losing their access to the international finan-

cial system. North Korea has said that the

denuclearization and other aspects of the six-party

Page 27

agreement that it has been part of can only go forward

when the BDA situation is resolved. “To make the

money transfer possible freely just like before has been

our demand… from the beginning,” a spokesperson

from North Korea said.

In his daily press briefing on May 17, Scott

McCormack at the U.S. State Department said, “We all

want to see the BDA issue resolved, obviously re-

solved within the laws and regulations of the United

States as well as the international financial system, and

we’d like to move on and get back to the business of

the six-party talks, which is really focused on the issue

of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether this latest development with

Wachovia Bank will provide the needed breakthrough,

it is too soon to tell. But there are other developments

which may provide the needed pressures on the U.S.

government to decriminalize the $25 million it has

frozen of North Korean funds and restore North Ko-

rea’s access to the international banking system. Their

access was severely impeded by the action that the

U.S. Treasury Department took against the BDA.

The developments I am referring to are the

release in the public domain of several documents

related to the U. S. Treasury Department’s actions

against BDA. One of the documents is a sworn state-

ment by the owner of the BDA, Mr. Stanley Au, in

support of his petition to revoke the rule imposing the

special measures taken by the U.S. Treasury Depart-

ment against his bank. Another document is the

petition in support of his case. Also the Treasury

Department finding against the bank has been put

online. These documents have been made available on

the blog “China Matters.”

In his statement, Au explains the history of his

bank’s relations with North Korea and how there was

only one experience, which occurred in June 1994,

when there was a problem with counterfeit U.S.

dollars. At the time, the bank reported this incident to

the U.S. government. Agents from the U.S. govern-

ment came to the bank and questioned Au. He an-

swered their questions and asked if the agents recom-

mended that the bank “desist from doing business with

North Korean entities.” The agents said “they would

like us to continue to deal with them as it was better

that we conducted this business than another financial

entity that may not be so cooperative with the United

States government.”

Au explains that there was no further experi-

ence with counterfeit money showing up in the trans-

actions of the bank. All “large value deposits of U.S.

dollar bills from North Korean sources” were sent to

the Hong Kong branch of the Republic National Bank

of New York (which became HSBC) to be certified

that they were authentic via advanced technology

possessed by that bank. Smaller quantities of bills were

examined in accord with common banking practices by

the bank itself.

Au also explains that he had not been ap-

proached by U.S. government agents alerting him to

any problem or illegal activity. The first he learned that

his bank was being charged as a bank engaged in

“illicit activities” came when he saw a report in the

Asian Wall Street Journal in September 2005 that his

bank was a candidate for a U.S. money laundering

blacklist.

He tells how:

this news came as a bolt out of the blue

– the Bank had never been informed by

the United States that its practices were

a cause of any money laundering con-

cern, and the counterfeiting event that

the media reported as the basis for the

designation had occurred more than ten

years earlier and had been promptly

reported to the authorities by Banco

Delta Asia.

Stanley Au’s statement is in sharp contrast with

the account in the U.S. government’s Federal Register

of the finding against the bank by the U.S. Treasury

Department.

The Federal Register finding states that the

bank had provided financial services for more than 20

years to multiple North Korean-related individuals and

entities that were engaged in illicit activities. It pro-

vides no specific details of what such illicit activities

were. It claims that the entities paid a fee to Banco

Delta Asia for their access to the bank. The finding

claims that the bank facilitated wire transfers and

helped a front company.

In his statement, Stanley Au maintained that

the BDA did not charge a fee for its services nor did it

conduct illicit services for North Korea or any other

customer. The bank was only one of the banks in

Macau that did business with North Korea. The busi-

ness his bank had with North Korea began in the mid

1970s and was to assist North Korea with its foreign

trade transactions. Also Au described North Korea as

a gold producing country and that in the late 1990s the

bank had acted as a “gold bullion trader on behalf of

Page 28

the North Koreans.” Also the BDA bought or sold

foreign currency notes for North Korea, including U.S.

dollars, because North Korea had a limited banking

system and so it couldn’t do such transactions itself

(see Statement, pp. 3-4).

The petition submitted to the U.S. Dept of the

Treasury to challenge the finding against BDA pro-

poses that BDA was targeted not because of any

“voluminous” evidence of money laundering but

“because it was an easy target in the sense that it was

not so large that its failure would bring down the

financial system.”

In the substantial and prolific analysis of the

BDA problem that has been developed on the blog

“China Matters,” there is the assessment that North

Korea has legitimate financial activity and that the

BDA was legitimately serving as one of the banks for

that activity. Even with the U.N.’s sanctions, it was not

appropriate to target for blacklisting the legitimate

financial activities of North Korea. The sanctions that

the U.N.-imposed against North Korea were to be

aimed at its activity that was related to nuclear weapon

development, not to normal financial transactions.

The author of China Matters blog writes:

The alternative view… is that legiti-

mate North Korean financial activity

does exist, BDA had a right to solicit

North Korean accounts and handle

North Korean transactions, and Stanley

Au should be allowed to run his bank

as long as he conforms to the laws of

his jurisdiction – and (the bank) not be

used as a political football in Washing-

ton’s dealings with Pyongyang.

To put it more succinctly, the blog China

Matters quotes David Ascher, who had been the

coordinator for the Bush Administration working

group on North Korea and a senior adviser in East

Asian affairs in the State Department, in testimony to

the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on April 18,

2007, explaining why Banco Delta was chosen to be

blacklisted from the international banking system:

Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We

were trying to kill the chicken to scare

the monkeys. And the monkeys were

big Chinese banks doing business in

North Korea… and we’re not talking

about tens of millions, we’re talking

hundreds of millions.

The purpose of the action against the BDA

appears not only to have been to target North Korea

and its access to the international banking system, but

also to send a message to China.

Therefore it would appear that the action

against BDA is a carefully crafted political action and

that it will be necessary that there be public under-

standing, discussion and debate about what is behind

this action in order to find a way to have the policy that

gave rise to the BDA action changed.

Instead of the U.S. mainstream press carrying

out the needed investigation about why BDA has been

targeted and what is behind this action, there have been

continual condemnations of North Korea. Fortunately

there are journalists like those who work with the

McClatchy News Service who have made an effort to

probe what is happening behind-the-scenes in the BDA

affair and blogs like China Matters which have taken

the time and care to begin uncovering what the BDA

affair is really all about. This is but one of the stories

of what is really going on behind the scenes within the

U.S. government that has been hidden from the public.

This is one of the stories yet to be unraveled by

bloggers, and citizen journalists.

III. Citations

(1) See earlier article “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Del-

ta Asia,”

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn37-2.pdf, on pages 4-6.

(2) “North Korea says work to transfer bank funds under way,”

AFP, May 15, 2007,

https://www.spacewar.com/reports/North

_Korea_Says_Work_To_Transfer_Bank_Funds_Under_Way_999

.html.

(3) Scott McCormack, Daily Press Briefing, Washington DC, May

17, 2007,

https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/may/851

32.htm.

(4) “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations.”

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-

case-for-banco.html.

(5) Statement of Mr. Stanley Au in Support of Petition to Revoke

Rule Imposing Special Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, p. 7.

See also Kevin G. Hall, “Bank owner disputes money-laundering

allegations,” McClatchy Newspapers, May 16, 2007.

https://www

.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24463246

.html.

(6) Departnent of the Treasury, 31 CFR Part 103/ RIN 1506-

AA83, Federal Register/ Vol 72, No. 52/ Monday, March 19,

2007/ Rules and Regulations.

https://www.fincen.gov/sites/defa

ult/files/special_measure/bda_final_rule.pdf.

(7) Petition of Mr. Stanley Au and Delta Asia Group (Holdings)

Ltd. to Rescind Final Rule, p. 12.

https://www.ncnk.org/sites/de

fault/files/content/resources/publications/Jones_Day_Petition_R

escind_BDA_Rule.pdf.

(8) “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia,” Tuesday,

May 15, 2007, http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-

Page 29

au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html.

(9) “David Asher’s Dead End,” Saturday, April 28, 2007, at http://

chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-end.html.

See also “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its

role in addressing the nuclear and missile situations in both na-

tions,” Hearing, Sept 14, 2006, Nov. 2006, at

https://www.uscc

.gov/hearings/hearing-chinas-proliferation-north-korea-and-iran-

and-its-role-addressing-nuclear-and, pages 115-116 in the hearing,

page, 119-120 in the file.

(10) Ronda Hauben, “Bill Moyers and the Emergence of U.S.

Citizen Journalism: Power of government creates need for invest-

igative news,” at

https://nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0705

/msg00006.html.

IV. Nautilus invites your responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network in-

vites your responses to this essay. Please send re-

sponses to: napsnet-reply@nautilus.org. Responses

will be considered for redistribution to the network

only if they include the author’s name, affiliation, and

explicit consent.

Produced by The Nautilus Institute for Security and

Sustainable Development Northeast Asia Peace and

Security Project (napsnet-reply@nautilus.org).

View this online at: https://nautilus.org/napsnet/naps

net-policy-forum/behind-the-blacklisting-of-banco-

delta-asia/.

Nautilus Institute, 608 San Miguel Ave., Berkeley,

CA, 94707-1535

| Phone: (510) 423-0372

| Email: [email protected].

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