The Amateur

Computerist

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/

Winter 2025 Netizen Journalism, the UN and Korea Volume 39 No. 1

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page 1

Media War at the UN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2

U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Fails to Engage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 25

Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan Tragedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 30

Questioning Cheonan Investigation Stirs Controversy. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 36

What’s Behind SK Bringing Cheonan Issue to UNSC?. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 44

In Cheonan Dispute UN SC Acts in Accord Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 47

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 55

Introduction

The first article in this issue is “The Media War at the UN and the

DPRK. Why Netizen Journalism Matters: Notes for a Talk”. It was

presented at Stony Brook University on December 4, 2013. The talk

presents some background of what can be called “netizen journalism”. The

talk provides an example of how a conflict brought to the UN was able to

be explored and resolved.

This issue is an effort to look back at some of the previous efforts to

have journalism play a helpful role at the UN and to offer an example of

such efforts. The articles in this issue present two case studies relating to

reporting at the UN about incidents involving North Korea and South

Korea to demonstrate how such reporting could help to deal with conflicts

at the UN.

One situation is when the U.S. used a political act against the Banco

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Delta Asia, a bank in Macao, China, to remove North Korea from the

international banking system. That meant that North Korea couldn't use

credit for any of its international transactions. This presented North Korea

with a serious difficulty. The result was that North Korea held its first

nuclear test. The talk documents the results of an investigation uncovering

that the U.S. actions against North Korea and a bank involved with North

Korean financial transactions were actually directed at China. The U.S.

intended to send a message to Chinese banks that they too could be

impacted in a similar way.

The talk demonstrates how uncovering the actual motives of the U.S.

activity helped to change what was happening so that the conflict was able

to be resolved.

Another conflict that was taken up at the UN Security Council

involved whether or not to blame North Korea for the sinking of a South

Korean warship, the Cheonan. South Korea asked the Security Council to

condemn North Korea for the sinking of the ship. The Ambassador to the

UN from Mexico, Claude Heller, who was the President of the Security

Council when this issue was first taken up, documented how a neutral

body should treat such a conflict.

The Mexican Ambassador created a situation where both South Korea

and North Korea could make separate presentations of their side of the

conflict to members of the Security Council. As the end of the month of

Mexico’s presidency of the Security Council approached, Ambassador

Heller created what he called an “innovative” document. It was a summary

of the positions of each of the Koreas.

The Ambassador took care to present each side's position objectively.

This eventually resulted in a Presidential Statement documenting the

dispute and calling for a peaceful settlement to be arrived at by the two

sides.

This issue of the Amateur Computerist also includes several articles

written during the course of these disputes, documenting how the

investigation of the issues involved in the disputes was carried out.

This issue demonstrates that if there were objective and good

investigative journalism into the different disputes brought to the UN to

settle, this could be a helpful improvement in how the UN functions.

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The Media War at the UN and the DPRK

Why Netizen Journalism Matters

Notes for a Talk

by Ronda Hauben

[Author’s note: The following are slightly edited Notes prepared for a talk

presented at Stony Brook University on December 4, 2013. The talk was

part of a series of discussions in the fall of 2013 sponsored by the Center

for Korean Studies at Stony Brook focusing on North Korea. The talk was

presented with slides available at the website at the end of this article.*

Comments are welcome.]

I – Preface

I am honored to be here today and to give this talk as part of the series

of talks on North Korea.

In October 2006, I began covering the United Nations as a journalist

for the English edition of the South Korean online newspaper OhmyNews

International. When OhmyNews ended its English edition in 2010, I

became a correspondent covering the UN for an English language blog

http://blogs.taz.de/netizen blog (No longer available.) at the website of the

German newspaper Die Tageszeitung. Both OhmyNews International and

my blog at the taz.de website are online publications.

With Michael Hauben, I am a coauthor of the book Netizens: On the

History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet. The book was first

published online in January 1994. On May 1, 1997, the print edition of the

book Netizens was published in English. Later that year, in October, a

Japanese translation was published. Netizens was the first book to

recognize that along with the development of the Internet, a new form of

citizenship, called netizenship had emerged. This is a form of citizenship

that has developed based on the broader forms of political participation

made possible by the Net (i.e., the Internet).

I want to share some of the background about the origin, use, and

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impact of the netizen concept and its relation to what I call netizen

journalism before presenting two case studies of how netizen journalism

has affected the media war at the UN.

II – Introduction

While many people are now interested in the impact of the internet on

society, pioneering research was done by my coauthor Michael Hauben in

the early 1990s when the internet was first beginning to spread and to

connect people around the world.

In his research, Hauben recognized that there were people who

appreciated the communication the internet made possible and that these

people worked to spread the Net and to do what they felt needed for it to

help to create a better world. Taking the common network term, “net.citi-

zen” used online at the time, Hauben proposed that these people who

worked to contribute to the Net and the bigger world it was part of were

“netizens.”

In an article he wrote on the impact of the Net on journalism, Hauben

recognized that many people online were frustrated with the mainstream

media and that the netizens would be creating a broader and more

widespread media.

Hauben recognized in the early 1990s that “the collective body of

people assisted by (the Net)… has grown larger than any individual

newspaper….” I want to look at two news events about North Korea and

the UN in the context of this prediction. Then I will consider the implica-

tion of these case studies for the kind of journalism about North Korea that

I propose netizens and the internet are making possible.

III – Korea

In February 2003, I was glancing at the front page summaries of the

articles in an issue of the Financial Times. I saw a surprising headline for

an article that continued later in the issue. The article said that in 2002

netizens in South Korea had elected the president of the country, Roh

Moo-hyun. He had just taken office on February 25, 2003. The new

president had even promised that the Internet would be influential in the

form of government he established. Also, I learned that an online Korean

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newspaper called OhmyNews had been important in making these

developments possible. Colleagues encouraged me to get in contact with

OhmyNews and to learn more about the netizens’ activities in South Korea

and about OhmyNews.

I was able to get in contact with OhmyNews. I began to submit

articles to it. They would be printed along with a few other English

language articles others were submitting. By 2004 OhmyNews began an

English-language online edition called OhmyNews International. I began

to write for it. I soon became the first woman columnist for the English

edition.

I subsequently learned that both South Korea and China are places

where the role of netizens is important in building more democratic

structures for society. I began to pay attention to both of these netizen

developments. South Korea, for example, has been an advanced model of

grassroots efforts to create examples of netizen forms for more participa-

tory decision-making processes. I wrote several research papers document-

ing the achievements and activities of Korean netizens.

IV – Reporting on the UN

By October 2006, the second five-year term for Kofi Annan as the

Secretary-General of the United Nations was soon to end. One of the main

contenders to become the 8

Secretary-General of the UN was the Foreign

Minister of South Korea, Ban Ki-moon.

I had covered one previous United Nations event which I had found

of great interest. That event was the World Summit on the Information

Society (WSIS) which encouraged access to the internet for everyone. The

event took place in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2005. Also, I had watched

with interest some of the press reports of the speeches made by heads of

state at the 2006 opening of the General Assembly session. These events

gave me the sense that it probably would be interesting to go to the UN

and cover the activities for OhmyNews if the new Secretary-General were

Ban Ki-moon, the Korean candidate.

On October 9, 2006, Ban Ki-moon won the Security Council

nomination. This nomination was to be approved by the General Assembly

on October 13.

I thought this would be a historic event for South Korea.

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By 2006, I was writing regularly as a featured columnist for Ohmy-

News International (OMNI).

I asked the Editor of OhmyNews International if I could get a letter

for a press credential to cover the UN for OMNI. He agreed and I was able

to get my credentials in time to go to the General Assembly meeting when

the General Assembly voted to accept the Security Council’s nomination

of Ban Ki-moon.

I was surprised that some of the speeches welcoming Ban Ki-moon

as the Secretary-General elect were meaningful speeches referring to

actual problems at the UN such as the need for reform of the Security

Council. Conversely, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, made

no pretense to hide both his welcoming of Ban and his dissatisfaction with

Kofi Annan, the outgoing Secretary-General who had condemned the U.S.

invasion of Iraq. A significant focus of the comments to the new

Secretary-General from member states emphasized the importance of

communication at the UN, that it was critical for the incoming Secretary-

General to listen to all states and to hear their views.

It was a thrill to be at the UN witnessing the vote for a new Secretary-

General who was from South Korea. I wondered if the internet would be

able to have any impact on the new Secretary-General and on what

happened at the United Nations, since the internet had been able to make

it possible for netizens in South Korea to impact politics.

The very next day after Ban Ki-moon’s nomination was approved by

the General Assembly, the Security Council took up to condemn the recent

nuclear test by North Korea. This had been North Korea’s first nuclear

test. The Security Council imposed sanctions on North Korea, not giving

the North Korean Ambassador to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, a chance to re-

spond until after the sanctions had been voted on. When the North Korean

Ambassador responded, he referred among other issues, to financial

sanctions that the U.S. had imposed on North Korea. No one in the Sec-

urity Council asked him what he was referring to or how this affected the

issues the Security Council had acted on concerning North Korea.

It impressed me that just as a diplomat from South Korea was being

chosen as the new Secretary-General of the UN, at the same time sanctions

were being imposed on North Korea. The Security Council acted against

North Korea before hearing its views on the issue they were considering.

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This was in sharp contrast to the emphasis member nations had put on the

importance of hearing the views of all members when member nations

welcomed Ban Ki-moon to the United Nations in the meeting just one day

earlier in the General Assembly.

The article I wrote for OhmyNews International described this

situation. It explained:

The urgent problem facing the UN at this juncture in history is

not whether North Korea has developed and tested a nuclear

device. It is the breakdown reflected by the lack of participation

and investigation by the international community into how a

crisis will be handled once it develops, and whether the concerns

and problems of those involved in the crisis will be considered as

part of the process of seeking a solution. It is how the UN

functions when tensions reach a point where serious attention is

needed to help understand and solve a problem. (Quoted from

“The Problem Facing the UN,” OhmyNews International,

October 17, 2006).

In general when at the UN, I paid attention to Security Council

developments, particularly with regard to the meetings imposing sanctions

on North Korea and also on Iran. Also, I particularly followed the

meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly when Security

Council reform was being discussed.

V – Some Mainstream Media Created a Story

Soon after Ban Ki-moon took office as Secretary-General at the

beginning of January 2007, a story appeared in the Wall Street Journal

(WSJ) accusing North Korea of using UN funds from the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) for its nuclear program. An editorial in the

January 19 issue of the WSJ by Melanie Kirkpatrick had the headline:

“United Nations Dictators.”

No evidence was presented in the WSJ, just accusations. This situation

was reminiscent of how the WSJ and some other mainstream media had

accused the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, of misusing UN funds

in Iraq, and how this had mushroomed into what had come to be known

as the “Food for Oil” scandal.

The significance of this story for me, was to see that some of the

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mainstream media were active creating stories and accusations with no

real evidence, while only very few media appeared to be investigating the

actual underlying issues that had led the North Korean government to

carry out its first nuclear test.

VI – The Six-Party Talks and the Banco Delta Asia Story

In January 2007 there were reports in the press about a meeting that

had taken place in Berlin between Christopher Hill, the Assistant Secretary

of State for the U.S. and Kim Kye-gwan, the Deputy Foreign Minister of

North Korea.

Around this time I learned some of the background behind what had

led to North Korea carrying out its first nuclear test. An agreement was

reached on September 19, 2005, between the six parties to talk about the

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The six parties were North

Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Russia and China. Shortly after the

agreement was signed in Sept. 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department

announced that it was freezing the assets of the Banco Delta Asia (BDA)

a bank in Macao, China, which held $25 million of North Korean funds.

The result of this action was that North Korea lost access to $25

million of its bank funds, and also to the use of the international banking

system. North Korea’s response was to leave the six-party talks to protest

this action which it considered hostile and politically motivated.

North Korea was encouraged by some parties to the six-party talks to

have bilateral negotiations with the U.S. over the financial sanctions. The

U.S., however, refused to negotiate. Unable to find a way to negotiate with

the U.S. over this situation, North Korea, in July 2006, tested a missile.

The response of the UN Security Council was to condemn North Korea by

passing UN Resolution 1695 but not to investigate what the problem was

that led North Korea to carry out a missile test.

Then on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried out its first nuclear test.

Once again the Security Council failed to investigate what was behind this

action. Instead, the Security Council passed Resolution 1718 imposing

more sanctions on North Korea.

Only after this nuclear test did the U.S. demonstrate a willingness to

negotiate with the DPRK over the financial sanctions imposed on Banco

Delta Asia.

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On January 16 and 17, 2007, Christopher Hill and Kim Kye-gwan

held talks in Berlin and agreed. Though not officially announced, it was

believed that they agreed that the $25 million being held in the Macau

BDA, along with access to the international banking system would be

restored to North Korea. In exchange, North Korea would return to the six-

party talks. The Berlin meeting appeared to break the deadlock and the

six-party talks were held again starting on February 8, 2007. Another

agreement was announced five days later on February 13, 2007.

Then on March 5 and 6, Hill and Kim held bilateral talks in New York

City. Despite the agreement reached in Berlin, however, the U.S. Treasury

Department issued a finding on March 19 against the BDA under Section

311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. This move again deadlocked the six-party

talks, even as the delegates arrived for the talks in Beijing.

The deadlock continued for the next few months, with much of the

mainstream U.S. press blaming North Korea for continuing to insist that

its $25 million be returned via a banking transaction before it would agree

to any further steps in the sixparty talks. The North Korean delegate said

he understood that the agreement in Berlin with Christopher Hill had

provided for the return of the $25 million from the BDA as a money

transfer via the international banking system.

The U.S. Treasury Department officials claimed that their decision

against the BDA left it up to the bank to return the funds to North Korea.

The decision against the bank, however, meant that it had no means to

return the funds as a money transfer as the Section 311 finding against the

bank meant that it lost access to the international banking system.

During this period, there were rumors that a bank in China had been

asked by the U.S. State Department to make the transfer. The bank

allegedly considered the request. Eventually, however, the bank refused

based on its fear that it too would be frozen out of the international

banking system by the U.S. Treasury Department, as the BDA had been,

if it offered to help make the transfer of funds back to North Korea.

The McClatchy Newspaper Company, in a way that is different from

much of the rest of the mainstream U.S. media, carried articles which

helped to investigate the issues underlying this dispute between the U.S.

and North Korea. Other banks in Macau, an article in the McClatchy

Newspapers explained, had played a similar role with regard to North

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Korea, helping North Korea to sell its gold, but only the BDA had been

singled out for sanctions. The article suggested that the U.S. Treasury

Department’s actions were not based on actual criminal activity by the

bank or by North Korea, but instead were motivated by a political

objective.

One of the McClatchy newspaper articles described some documents

that the newspaper had acquired including the BDA’s complaint challeng-

ing the U.S. Treasury Department’s decision against the bank. Also, the

McClatchy newspaper article referred to a statement filed by the owner of

the BDA to protest the Treasury Department’s action.

I tried to find a way to get copies of the documents. I tried to contact

the law firm and even wrote to the McClatchy reporter, but none of these

efforts succeeded.

I did, however, find on the internet a copy of the Patriot Act and read

Section 311, the section being used against the bank. I was able to see that

the section of the law was such that the U.S. government did not have to

present any proof of its actions.

In March 2007, I did a story titled “North Korea’s $25 Million and

Banco Delta Asia,” documenting how the use of Section 311 of the Patriot

Act against the bank was a political act, rather than a criminal determina-

tion. The U.S. Treasury Department did not have to provide any evidence

and acted as the accuser and judge in the case. Even though there had been

an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea to return the $25 million

to North Korea, nothing happened.

The stalemate continued.

In May 2007, I covered the 50

Anniversary dinner celebration of the

New York City-based Korea Society. Chris Hill gave a short talk as part

of the program. He indicated that he would persevere until a means was

found to break the impasse over the $25 million so as to make it possible

for the six-party talks to continue.

Several journalists covered the event for other South Korean

publications. They were particularly interested in what Hill said, but Hill’s

talk in itself did not seem to represent a newsworthy event.

In the next few days, however, it appeared that an important story was

developing. An article by Kevin Hall titled, “Bank Owner Disputes

Money-Laundering Allegations,” published by the McClatchy Newspaper

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Company said that the blog “China Matters” had published links to some

documents refuting the Treasury Department’s charges against the bank.

“China Matters” is a blog about U.S.-China policy. The links that the

blog made available included an appeal submitted by the lawyer for Banco

Delta Asia to an administrative hearing at the Treasury Department and to

a statement by the owner of the Bank in Macao, Stanley Au.

I now had the documents in the case. The U.S. government’s findings

were general statements providing no specific evidence of wrongdoing on

the part of the bank. The bank’s statements and refutation gave significant

documentation refuting charges of illegal activity on the part of the bank.

The refutation also made the case that there was a political motive for the

U.S. government’s allegations rather than actual illegal activity on the part

of the bank.

Also, the blogger at China Matters who uses the pseudonym China

Hand or Peter Lee posted some of the Congressional testimony by David

Asher, a former U.S. government official who had helped to plan and

enforce the U.S. Treasury Department sanctions against the Banco Delta

Asia.

Asher explained that the U.S. government had targeted a small Macau

bank in order to scare the banks in China. “To kill the chicken to scare the

monkeys,” the ex-government official explained, quoting an old Chinese

proverb in his testimony in a U.S. Congressional hearing.

I wanted to verify the testimony of Asher and understand its

implications, so I searched online and found an earlier government

document from November 2006. Asher had testified in a similar vein at a

Congressional hearing titled “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and

Iran, and Its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Situations in Both

Countries,” on September 14, 2006. The document I found was the

transcript of that hearing.

The hearing was held by a special Congressional Commission about

the U.S.-China relationship which held hearings semi-annually.

What was most surprising in this document, however, was the

explanation that the Banco Delta Asia sanctions were an issue that was

only secondarily aimed at North Korea. The primary issue that was of

interest to the U.S. government officials involved in the Commission

Hearing was what was China’s foreign policy and how closely China’s

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behavior matched the foreign policy goals set out by the U.S.

In the discussion at the September 2006 hearing about the Banco

Delta Asia, David Asher described the political objectives of the action.

Speaking about China, Asher said:

They get the message from the financial angle… there’s an old

saying in Chinese, ‘You kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.’

We didn’t go out and cite a multitude of Chinese financial

institutions that have been publicly identified as working with

North Korea over the years…. We did need to designate one

small one though, and that one small one sent a message to all

the others, that they had to get in line, and it was timed to

coincide with other information that we were making public….

I think they got the message…. We need to try to align our

financial and economic interests. I do think, though the use of

some pressure, including veiled pressure is effective. (Hearing

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commis-

sion, 2006, p. 115-116.)

The Commission hearing clarified that the purpose of freezing North

Korean funds in the Banco Delta Asia was not about stopping criminal

activity by that bank or by North Korea, as there was never any evidence

presented of any such activity. Instead, it was an act with a political

objective which was to pressure China to act in conformity with U.S.

policy goals in general and in its actions toward North Korea in particular.

At last, I had the news peg for an important story. I wrote the article,

“Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the Policy Aimed at

Targeting China as well as North Korea?” submitting it to around 5:00

a.m. my time to OhmyNews International. By noon the next day, my story

appeared. That was on May 18.

Also on May 18, the Wall Street Journal carried an Op-Ed by the

former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton. The article scolded the

U.S. government for negotiating to return the $25 million to North Korea

In late May I was an invited speaker at the International Communica-

tions Association (ICA 2007) conference in San Francisco. I summed up

my experience writing for OhmyNews International, particularly

describing the BDA story and the helpful role of online media in making

it possible to present an alternative narrative as opposed to that of the

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mainstream U.S. media about the situation.

VII – Voice of America News Service

Little did I realize when I gave my talk in San Francisco, however,

that my experience with this story was not ending, but actually a new

episode was beginning.

A short time later, on June 11, I received a surprising e-mail message.

The message was from a reporter who said she worked for Voice of

America News Korea (VOA News Korean Service). VOA is an official

U.S. government news broadcasting service.

She began:

“Hello, Ms. Hauben”

She introduced herself as a reporter with the Korean Service of the

Voice of America News in Washington, D.C.

Her e-mail continued:

While I was working on a story about BDA issue, I read your report,

‘Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia.’ I thought you made some

valuable points about the BDA issue in this report, I was wondering if I

could have a conversation with you in this matter. Since I am on a

deadline, I’m trying very hard to get a hold of you. So I would really

appreciate it if you call or e-mail me back ASAP.

She gave her phone number.

I wondered if it was advisable to speak with her as VOA News has a

reputation of being a promoter of U.S. government policy, rather than a

news service seeking the facts. I asked my editors at OhmyNews

International and I also spoke with a Korean journalist I know who covers

stories at the UN for another Korean newspaper. They all encouraged me

to speak with her.

I called her as she had asked. She said she wanted to interview me by

phone. I asked her to let me know what she would want to speak with me

about. She sent me an e-mail message elaborating.

Her message explained:

The purpose of this interview is to let our listeners know what is

going on regarding the BDA issue and how the BDA issue is developing.

When I read your article, I thought you made valuable and critical

points about the BDA issue, and I thought it might be very important to let

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your idea about the BDA issue be heard by our listeners.

She listed questions she would ask me in the interview. They were:

1. How you come up with the idea of writing this article? How you

prepared it. About your sources.

2. Briefly summarize your findings or main points of the article.

3. What you are trying to accomplish by writing this article? What

needs to be done to resolve the BDA issue?

“Finally,” she wrote, “I wanted to ask you if we could do this

interview sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.… Thanks again,”

she ended the e-mail message.

She called at the arranged time.

She told me her listeners were in North Korea. I was surprised that a

reporter for a U.S. government media would offer to do a story about the

hidden political objectives of U.S. policy against North Korea which were

being camouflaged by false criminal accusations against North Korea.

We had a half-hour telephone conversation discussing my stories, the

sources I had used, and the problem represented by the American

government freezing the BDA funds. She also asked for the URLs to

follow up on the sources I had cited. These were materials I had found on

the internet, including several government documents, and copies of the

legal documents submitted by the bank owner to appeal the U.S. Treasury

Department ruling against the bank.

The VOA News reporter said she was interested in contacting former

U.S. government officials like David Asher who was responsible for

crafting the plan to freeze North Korea’s bank account assets. She wanted

to ask them to respond to my article.

Just as this contact with the VOA News journalist was happening,

there were news stories describing the ongoing efforts to find a solution

to the roadblock that the frozen North Korean funds represented.

Soon there were reports that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York

had agreed to transfer the funds from the BDA to an account held by a

Russian bank for North Korea. In the following weeks, the funds transfer

was done.

The VOA News reporter wrote me saying she had other stories to do

and was not for now going to pursue this story any longer.

Whether the contact had any impact on the resolution of the stalemate,

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I can only speculate. Regardless of her motivation, however, the VOA

News reporter had contacted me before the situation was resolved. At the

very least, an article I had done had caught the attention of someone

connected to the Voice of America News. I was given the chance to

explain what I had learned about the BDA story and to explain how I

understood the controversy surrounding it. So my story did indeed have

more of an impact than I had understood when I gave my talk at the ICA

2007 in San Francisco.

The experience I had with my BDA story and the encounter with the

Korean News Service of the VOA News demonstrates that the internet

makes it possible not only to spread an accurate narrative among the

public, but also to reach officials with an interest in the issues being

critiqued.

The reason I have taken the time to tell this story is that it represents

for me a taste of the impact that such online journalism makes possible.

VIII – The Phenomenon of Netizen

Journalism

In the research I have been doing and the experiences I have had

exploring the potential of what I call netizen journalism, several questions

have been raised:

What is this new form of news and what are its characteristics?

Is there something different from traditional journalism?

Is there some significant new aspect represented by netizen journal-

ism?

Essentially I have found that there is an important research component

of what I call netizen journalism. Netizen journalism, is a socially oriented

journalism. As such, at times there is a need to do serious research into the

background, context and political significance of conflicts. By revealing

the actual forces at work, netizen journalism provides a more accurate

grasp of whose interests are being served, and what is at stake in the

events that make up the news.

Traditionally, the press can function as a watchdog for society by

exposing the use and abuse of power. Or, the press can act to support the

abuse of political power.

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Netizens, whether journalists or citizens who turn to journalism to

challenge problems in their society, have demonstrated in a number of

instances that they are able to bring public attention to situations needing

change, and exert the needed pressure for the change so that the change

gets made.

If netizen journalism can provide a more accurate understanding of

conflicts, it can help make more likely the peaceful resolution of these

conflicts.

Also as an aside, my stories about the U.S.-BDA-North Korea-UN

conflict led to my being short-listed for one of the journalism awards

presented each year by the United Nations Correspondence Association

(UNCA) for the best journalism articles about the UN for 2007. While I

did not get the award in 2007, I did get it the following year, in 2008.

IX – The Cheonan – Some Background

The Cheonan conflict, which was brought to the UN in 2010, provides

another interesting example how netizen journalism affected the media

war and helped to make a significant contribution to a peaceful resolution

of the conflict by the Security Council.

The Cheonan incident concerns a South Korean warship which broke

in two and sank on March 26, 2010. Forty-six of the crew died. At the

time, the ship was involved in naval exercises with the U.S. military in an

area in the West Sea/Yellow Sea between North Korea and China. This is

a situation that had been the subject of much discussion on the internet.

Initially, the South Korean government and the U.S. government said

there was no indication that North Korea was involved. Then at a press

conference on May 20, 2010, the South Korean government claimed that

a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine exploded in the water near

the Cheonan, causing a pressure wave that was responsible for the sinking.

Many criticisms of this scenario have been raised.

There was no direct evidence of any North Korean submarine in the

vicinity of the Cheonan. Nor was there any evidence that a torpedo was

actually fired causing a pressure wave phenomenon. Hence the South

Korean government had no actual case that could be presented in a court

of law to support its claims.

In fact, if this claim of a pressure wave were true even those involved

Page 16

in the investigation of the incident acknowledge that North Korea would

be the first to have succeeded at using this kind of bubble jet torpedo

action in actual fighting.

X – The Cheonan Press Conference and the Local

Election

The press conference held by the South Korean government on May

20, 2010, to announce that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of

the Cheonan came, it turns out, was at the start of the local election period.

Many South Koreans were suspicious that the accusation was a ploy to

help the ruling party candidates win in the local elections. The widespread

suspicions about the government’s motives led to the ruling party losing

many of the local election contests. These election results demonstrated

the deep distrust among the South Korean population of the motives

behind the South Korean government’s accusations about North Korea’s

responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan.

XI – The Cheonan and Netizen Journalism

Netizens who live in different countries and speak different languages

took up to critique the claims of the South Korean government about the

cause of the sinking of the Cheonan. This netizen activity had an

important effect. It appears to have acted as a catalyst affecting the actions

of the UN Security Council in its treatment of the Cheonan dispute.

There were substantial analyses by non-governmental organizations

like Spark, PSPD, Peaceboat, and others posted on the internet in English

or Korean or in both languages. Some of these online posts were in the

form of letters that were also sent to the members of the UN Security

Council. At the time, I saw discussions and critiques of the Korean

government’s claims at American, Japanese and Chinese websites, in ad-

dition to conversations and postings about the Cheonan on South Korean

websites.

One such critique included a three-part analysis by the South Korean

NGO People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). This

analysis raised several questions and problems with the South Korean

government’s case. The PSPD document was posted widely on the internet

Page 17

and also sent to the President of the United Nations Security Council for

distribution to those Security Council members interested and to the South

Korean Mission to the UN.

While there were many blog comments about the Cheonan issue in

Korean, there were also some bloggers writing in English who became

active in critiquing the South Korean investigation and the role of the U.S.

in the conflict.

One blogger, Scott Creighton who uses the pen name Willy Loman,

or American Everyman, wrote a post titled “The Sinking of the Cheonan:

We Are Being Lied to.”

The South Korean government had claimed that the diagram it

displayed above the glass case containing the alleged torpedo shaft was

from a North Korean weapons sales brochure which offered the torpedo.

The torpedo was identified as the CHT-02D.

In a post he titled “A Perfect Match?,” Creighton showed how there

was a discrepancy between the diagram displayed by the South Korean

government in the press conference and the part of the torpedo it had on

display in the glass case below the diagram. He demonstrated that the

diagram did not match the part of the torpedo on display because one of

the components of the torpedo shown was in the propeller section, but in

the diagram, the component appeared in the shaft section. There were

many comments in response to this post, including some from netizens in

South Korea. Also, the mainstream conservative media in South Korea

carried accounts of this blogger’s critique. Three weeks later, at a news

conference, a South Korean government official acknowledged that the

diagram presented by the South Korean government was not of the same

torpedo as the part displayed in the glass case. Instead, the diagram

displayed was of the PT97W torpedo, not the CHT-02D torpedo as

claimed.

In a post titled “Thanks to Valuable Input” describing the significance

of having documented one of the fallacies in the South Korean govern-

ment’s case, Creighton writes:

(I)n the end, thanks to valuable input from dozens of concerned

people all across the world…. Over 100,000 viewers read that

article and it was republished on dozens of sites all across the

world (even translated). A South Korean MSM outlet even

Page 18

posted our diagram depicting the glaring discrepancies between

the evidence and the drawing of the CHT-O2D torpedo, which a

high-ranking military official could only refute by stating he had

40 years of military experience and to his knowledge, I had none.

But what I had, what we had, was literally thousands of people

all across the world, scientists, military members, and just

concerned investigative bloggers who were committed to the

truth and who took the time to contribute to what we were doing

here. ‘40 years of military experience’ took a beating from ‘we

the people WorldWide’ and that is the way it is supposed to be.

This is just one of a number of serious questions and challenges that

were raised about the South Korean government’s scenario of the sinking

of the Cheonan.

Another influential event which helped to challenge the South Korean

government’s claims was a press conference in Japan held on July 9 by

two academic scientists. The two scientists presented the results of

experiments they had done which challenged the results of experiments

the South Korean government used to support its case. These scientists

also wrote to the Security Council with their findings.

Also a significant challenge to the South Korean government report

was the finding of a Russian team of four sent to South Korea to look at

the data from the investigation and to do an independent evaluation of it.

The team of Russian navy experts visited South Korea from May 30 to

June 7. The Russian team did not accept the South Korean government’s

claim that a pressure wave from a torpedo caused the Cheonan to sink.

Getting a leaked copy of the Russian team’s report, the Hankyoreh

newspaper in South Korea reported that the Russian investigators

determined that the ship had come in contact with the ocean floor and a

propeller and shaft became entangled in a fishing net. Also, the investiga-

tors thought it likely that an old underwater mine had exploded near the

Cheonan adding to the factors that led to it sinking.

Such efforts along with online posts and discussions by many netizens

provided a catalyst for the actions of the UN Security Council concerning

the Cheonan incident.

When the UN Security Council took up the Cheonan issue in June

2010, I was surprised to learn that some of the members of the Council

Page 19

knew of the criticism of the South Korean government investigation

blaming North Korea for sinking the ship.

XII – The Cheonan and the UN Security Council

South Korea brought the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan to

the United Nations Security Council. The Mexican Ambassador to the UN,

Claude Heller, was President of the Security Council for June 2010. (The

presidency rotates each month to a different Security Council member

nation.) In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4, South Korea asked

the Council to take up the Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, then the South

Korean Ambassador to the UN, requested that the Security Council

consider the matter of the Cheonan and respond in an appropriate manner.

The letter described the investigation into the sinking of the Cheonan

carried out by the South Korean government and military officials. The

conclusion of the South Korean investigation was to accuse North Korea

of sinking the South Korean ship.

How would the Mexican Ambassador as President of the Security

Council during June handle this dispute? This was a serious issue facing

Ambassador Heller as he began his presidency.

Ambassador Heller adopted what he referred to as a “balanced”

approach to treat both governments on the Korean peninsula fairly and

objectively. He held bilateral meetings with each member of the Security

Council which led to support for a process of informal presentations by

both of the Koreas to the members of the Security Council. He arranged

for the South Korean Ambassador to make an informal presentation to the

members of the Security Council. Ambassador Heller also invited the

North Korean Ambassador to make a separate informal presentation to the

members of the Security Council. Sin Son Ho was the UN Ambassador

from North Korea.

In response to the invitation from the President of the Security

Council, the North Korean Ambassador to the UN sent a letter dated June

8 to the Security Council which denied the allegation that his country was

to blame. His letter urged the Security Council not to be the victim of

deceptive claims, as had happened with the U.S. presentation by Colin

Powell on Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support his

government’s call to be able to examine the evidence and to be involved

Page 20

in a new and more independent investigation of the sinking of the

Cheonan.

In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North Korea referred to the

widespread international sentiment questioning the conclusions of the

South Korean government’s investigation. The North Korean Ambassador

wrote:

It would be very useful to remind ourselves of the ever-increas-

ing international doubts and criticisms, going beyond the internal

boundary of South Korea, over the ‘investigation result’ from the

very moment of its release….

What Ambassador Heller called “interactive informal meetings” were

held on June 14 with the South Koreans and the North Koreans in separate

sessions attended by the Security Council members, who had time to ask

questions and then discuss the presentations.

At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s presentations ended,

Ambassador Heller said that it was important to have received the detailed

presentation by South Korea and also to know and learn the arguments of

North Korea. He commented that “it was very important that North Korea

approached the Security Council.”

In response to a question about his view on the issues presented, he

replied, “I am not a judge. I think we will go on with the consultations to

deal in a proper manner on the issue.”

Ambassador Heller also explained that “the Security Council issued

a call to the parties to refrain from any act that could escalate tensions in

the region, and makes an appeal to preserve peace and stability in the

region.”

Though the North Korean Ambassador to the UN rarely speaks to the

media, the North Korean UN delegation scheduled a press conference for

Tuesday, June 15, the day following the interactive informal meeting.

During the press conference, the North Korean Ambassador presented his

government’s refutation of the allegations made by South Korea. Also, he

explained North Korea’s request to be able to send an investigation team

to the site where the sinking of the Cheonan occurred. South Korea had

denied the request. During its press conference, the North Korean

Ambassador noted that there was widespread condemnation of the

investigation in both South Korea and around the world.

Page 21

The press conference held on June 15 was a lively event. Many of the

journalists who attended were impressed and requested that there be future

press conferences with the North Korean Ambassador.

During his presidency of the Security Council in the month of June,

Ambassador Heller held meetings with the UN ambassadors from each of

the two Koreas and then with Security Council members about the

Cheonan issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he was

asked by a reporter what was happening about the Cheonan dispute. He

responded that the issue of contention was over the evaluation of the South

Korean government’s investigation.

Ambassador Heller described how he introduced what he refers to as

“an innovation” into the Security Council process. As the month of June

ended, the issue was not yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a basis to

build on the progress that was achieved during the month of his presi-

dency.

The “innovation” Ambassador Heller referred to, was a summary he

made of the positions of each of the two Koreas on the issue, taking care

to present each objectively. Heller explained that this summary was not an

official document, so it did not have to be approved by the other members

of the Council. This summary provided the basis for further negotiations.

He believed that it had a positive impact on the process of consideration

in the Council, making possible the agreement that was later to be

expressed in the Presidential Statement on the Cheonan that was issued by

the Security Council on July 9, 2010.

Ambassador Heller’s goal, he explained, was to “at all times be as

objective as possible” so as to avoid increasing the conflict on the Korean

peninsula. Such a goal is the Security Council’s obligation under the UN

Charter.

In the Security Council’s July 9 Presidential Statement (PRST) on the

Cheonan, what stands out is that the statement follows the pattern of

presenting the views of each of the two Koreas and urging that the dispute

be settled in a peaceful manner.

In the PRST, the members of the Security Council did not blame

North Korea. Instead, they refer to the South Korean investigation and its

conclusion, expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings” of the

investigation.

Page 22

The PRST explains that “The Security Council takes note of the

responses from other relevant parties, including the DPRK, which has

stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”

Except for North Korea, it is not indicated who “the other relevant

parties” are. It does suggest, however, that it is likely there were some

Security Council members, not just Russia and China, who did not agree

with the conclusions of the South Korean investigation.

Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Korean newspaper

Hankyoreh noted that the statement “allows for a double interpretation and

does not blame or place consequences on North Korea.” Such a possibility

of a “double interpretation” allows for different interpretations.

The Security Council’s action on the Cheonan took place in a

situation where there had been a wide-ranging international critique,

especially in the online media, about the problems of the South Korean

investigation, and of the South Korean government’s failure to make

public any substantial documentation of its investigation, along with its

practice of harassing critics of the South Korean government claims. The

Security Council’s action included hearing the positions of the different

parties to the conflict.

The result of such efforts was something that is unusual in the process

of recent Security Council activity. The Security Council process in the

Cheonan issue provided for an impartial analysis of the problem and an

effort to hear from those with an interest in the issue.

The effort in the Security Council was described by the Mexican

Ambassador, as upholding the principles of impartiality and respectful

treatment of all members toward resolving a conflict between nations in

a peaceful manner. It represents an important example of the Security

Council acting in conformity with its obligations as set out in the UN

charter.

In the July 9, 2010 Presidential Statement, the Security Council urged

that the parties to the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan find a means

to peacefully settle the dispute. The statement says:

The Security Council calls for full adherence to the Korean

Armistice Agreement and encourages the settlement of outstand-

ing issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means to resume

direct dialogue and negotiation through appropriate channels as

Page 23

early as possible, to avoid conflicts and avert escalation.

The mainstream U.S. media, for the most part, chose to ignore the

many critiques which have appeared. These critiques of the South Korean

government’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have appeared mainly

on the internet, not only in Korean, but also in English, Japanese, and

other languages. They present a wide-ranging challenge to the veracity and

integrity of the South Korean investigation and its conclusions.

An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28, 2010 noted the fact,

however, that the media in the U.S. had ignored the critique of the South

Korean government investigation that was being discussed online and

spread around the world.

In this example, the netizen community in South Korea and interna-

tionally were able to provide an effective challenge to the misrepresenta-

tions by the South Korean government on the Cheonan.

In conclusion, I want to propose that the response of netizens to the

problems raised by the investigation of the Cheonan incident is but a

prelude to the potential of netizens in different countries to work together

across national borders to solve the problems of our times.

XIII – Conclusion

Describing the frustration of many netizens with the traditional media

that they had to rely on before the internet, Hauben wrote:

Today, similarly, the need for a broader and more cooperative

gathering and reporting of the News has helped create the new

online media that is gradually supplementing traditional forms of

journalism.

In an article about the power of the internet, Hauben recognized that

the Net gives the power of the reporter to the netizen. This represents a

diffusion of a power formerly held by the few, placing it in hands that are

different from its former masters.

Speaking about the potential for such a journalism Hauben predicted,

“As people continue to connect to Usenet and other discussion forums, the

collective population will contribute back to the human community this

new form of news.” He recognized that, “The Net has opened a channel

for talking to the whole world to an even wider set of people than did the

printed books.”

Page 24

In one of the press conferences at the UN when Li Baodong was the

Chinese Ambassador to the UN, he told the media, “You are the 16th

member of the Security Council.” He was in general speaking to the

traditional media. However, the case studies I have described, demonstrate

the potential for the new media, the netizen media, to assume that

membership.

Notes

1. http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp? no=323351&rel_no=1,

(site no longer available). Reprinted in the Amateur Computerist Vol 37 No. 2 at:

http://www.ais.org/~jrh /acn/ACn37-2.pdf, pages 2-4.

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/9.14.06He aringTranscript.pdf.

3. Voice of America (VOA) has been a part of several U.S. government agencies. From

its founding in 1942 to 1945, it was part of the Office of War Information, and then from

1945 to 1953 as a function of the State Department. VOA was placed under the U.S.

Information Agency in 1953. When the USIA was abolished in 1999, VOA was placed

under the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or BBG, which is an autonomous U.S.

government agency, with bipartisan membership. The Secretary of State has a seat on the

BBG. The BBG replaced the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) that oversaw the

funding and operation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a branch of VOA.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_of_America.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/429769.html

5. http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9975.doc.htm.

* The slides used for this talk are online at:

http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/stony-brook/Stony-Brook-Slides-12-04-2013.pdf.

The URL for the online version of Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the

Internet is: “Netizens: An Anthology” at:

http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120. A version of

these Notes appeared on December 17, 2013 on the Netizenblog at:

/http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2013/12/17/why-netizen-journalism-matters (No longer

Available.)

[Editors’ note: The following article appeared in OhmyNews International on June 12,

2009]

U.S. Policy Toward North

Page 25

Korea Fails to Engage

by Ronda Hauben

U.S. policy toward North Korea since Barack Obama assumed the

U.S. presidency is very different from the promises of engagement which

he made during his election campaign. This policy presents a striking

example of the disparity between pre-election promises and the action

taken thus far during the Obama presidency.

On the first day of the new administration, sanctions were authorized

against three North Korean firms under the Arms Export Control Act,

along with several nonproliferation executive orders. The three firms were

KOMID, which had been sanctioned by other administrations, Sino-Ki and

Moksong Trading Company, which were being sanctioned for the first

time.

The hostile direction of Obama’s policy, however, has been signaled

most clearly by the change made when the new administration failed to

reappoint Christopher Hill to his position as Undersecretary of State for

East Asia and the head of the U.S. negotiation team for the six-party talks

with North Korea.

Not only was Hill not reappointed, but the role of U.S. negotiator with

North Korea was downgraded and split among several different officials.

A part-time position was created for an envoy. Another person would be

the U.S. representative to the six-party talks. And still another official was

to be appointed to the position of Undersecretary of State for East Asia,

which was Hill’s former position.

Stephen Bosworth accepted the position as envoy. His official title is

Special Representative for North Korea Policy. Bosworth did so on a part-

time basis. At the same time, he maintained his full-time position as Dean

of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University along

with his new part-time job.

There has been little public discussion about why the Obama

administration made such significant changes. The Boston Globe, in an

article about Bosworth’s appointment, refers to the concerns expressed by

Leon Sigal, the director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project

at the Social Science Research Council in New York. The article quotes

Page 26

Sigal saying that there are officials in the new administration, “who don’t

think we can get anywhere, so they don’t want to do the political heavy

lifting to try.”

In contrast to the loss of Hill as a negotiator with North Korea, the

Obama administration reappointed Stuart Levey, as the Undersecretary of

Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Levey’s office in the

Treasury Department was created in 2004 under George W. Bush. This

office was used to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. One such

action was the freezing of funds that North Korea had in a bank in Macao,

China, the Banco Delta Asia (BDA).

North Korea was not only denied access to U.S. $25 million, but it

was also denied the use of the international banking system. This freezing

of North Korean funds was announced shortly after North Korea and the

five other nations who were part of the six-party talks signed the Septem-

ber 19, 2005 agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

The an-

nouncement by the Treasury Department sabotaged the implementation of

this important agreement which would have gone a long way toward the

goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. North Korea withdrew from

the six-party talks until the $25 million was returned.

It is significant here to note that Levey and his office briefly came

under public scrutiny in 2006 when the New York Times published an

article exposing how the office has access to and uses the SWIFT database

to do intelligence work targeting people and transactions that it claims are

in violation of U.S. law.

The SWIFT database contain the transactions

and identification information for the hundreds of thousands of people and

entities that do electronic banking transactions using the SWIFT system.

The action by the U.S. Treasury using a section of the Patriot Act

against the Banco Delta Asia bank, however, demonstrated that the U.S.

government has the ability to use this database information against those

it wants to target politically, rather than those who have committed any

actual illegal acts. Testimony by former U.S. government officials to the

U.S. Congress, and documents submitted to the U.S. government by the

bank owner and his lawyer, demonstrated that there was never any

evidence offered of any illegal acts. Instead the Patriot Act had been used

to allow the U.S. government to act against this bank for political

objectives. (See “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the

Page 27

policy aimed at targeting China as well as North Korea?” also in this

issue.)

The new positions, designated to negotiate with North Korea, are at

a lower administrative level than was Hill’s former position. In addition,

the Obama administration, by not reappointing Hill, has lost his valuable

expertise. Hill had effectively countered the sabotage to negotiations

caused by Levey’s office during the Bush administration.

Hill was met with opposition from some in the Bush administration

at each step along the way. Remarkably, Hill effectively countered much

of this opposition, making progress in the negotiations. In August 2008,

however, the Bush administration uni-laterally changed what it claimed

North Korea’s obligations were as part of Phase 2 of the six-party Feb

2007 agreement, and falsely declared that North Korea was in violation.

With Hill gone from the North Korean desk at the State Department,

and Levey reappointed to Hill's position at the Treasury Department, it is

significant that Obama sent an inter-agency group to visit the capitals of

Japan, South Korea and China to discuss punishments for North Korea.

Levey was featured as one of the U.S. government officials on the trip.

But is punishment appropriate? There has been no similar effort to

open negotiations with North Korea.

Instead, the U.S. administration has given its support to Levey and

others whose actions have sabotaged the success of the six-party talks.

This failure of the Obama administration is similar to previous U.S. policy

on North Korea.

Robert Carlin, part of the U.S. government negotiation team with

North Korea under the Clinton Administration, documents that there were

significant and successful negotiations on 22 issues carried out in the

period between 1993 and 2000.

These achievements, however, could not

survive the transition to the Bush Administration.

Similarly, Mike Chinoy, a former CNN journalist, in his book

Meltdown, documents both the Clinton years and much of the Bush years.

He chronicles how negotiations were torpedoed not by North Korea, but

by forces within the U.S. government itself.

In addition, the U.S. conducts frequent military maneuvers close to

North Korea which North Korea has claimed as a threat to its peace and

security.

Page 28

On April 5, 2009, North Korea test launched a communications

satellite using a rocket of advanced design. This test broke no international

law or treaty to which North Korea is a party.

Still the launch was

condemned by the UN Security Council in a Presidential Statement. Also

new sanctions were imposed on North Korea, stating as authority, a

previous Security Council Resolution 1718.

North Korea has been the target of hostile acts by the U.S. North

Korea has tested rockets and has done tests of two nuclear devices, which

it claims it needs as a deterrent. The U.S. has military agreements with

Japan and South Korea, including them under the protection of the U.S.

nuclear umbrella. There is only an armistice ending the fighting of the

Korean War. The U.S. as the head of the UN command has not been

willing to negotiate a treaty ending the Korean War.

The failure of the UN Security Council to explore North Korea’s

problems in trying to check U.S. hostility demonstrates its failure to carry

out its obligations under the UN charter. The failure of the Security

Council to protect Iraq from U.S. invasion is a warning that the Security

Council should reform its processes so that it doesn’t just become a

vehicle for the political targeting of a nation as happened with Iraq.

In his comments to journalists in response to the sanctions put on

North Korea in April 2009, the Deputy Ambassador to the UN from North

Korea, Pak Tok Hun said, “The recent activity of the security council

concerning the peaceful use of outer space by my country shows that

unless the security council is totally reformed and democratized we expect

nothing from it.”

The challenge to the nations of the UN is to provide a more neutral

and considered investigation of the problem it is trying to solve rather than

just carrying out the punishment a P5 nation may endeavor to inflict on

another nation.

Notes

1. Karin Lee and Julia Choi, “North Korea: Unilateral and Multilateral Economic

Sanctions and U.S. Department of Treasury Actions, 1955-April 2009,” National

Committee on North Korea, (Paper last updated April 28, 2009), p. 26.

http://nautilus org

/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/09035LeeChoi.pdf.

2. James F. Smith, “In role as envoy, Tufts dean carries hardearned lessons,” The Boston

Page 29

Globe, May 26, 2009.

3. Ronda Hauben, “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia: Another Abuse

under the U.S. Patriot Act,” OhmyNews International, March 3, 2007.

4. Ronda Hauben, “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia: Is the policy aimed at

targeting China as well as North Korea?,” OhmyNews International, Ma y 1 8 , 2 0 0 7.

(Also in this issue.)

5. Erick Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block

Terror,” New York Times, June 23, 2006.

https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html.

6. Ronda Hauben, “U.S. Media and the Breakdown in the Six-Party Talks,” OhmyNews

International, September 28, 2008.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no383769&rel_no-1. (No

longer available.) On line at:

https://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn18-1.pdf, pp. 10-12.

7. Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons Learned and Forgotten,” Korea

Yearbook 2007, Edited by Rudiger Frank et al., Brill, 2007, pp. 235-251.

8. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown, St. Martin’s Press, 2008.

9. Ronda Hauben, “Controversy at UN Over North Korea’s Launch: Reconvening six-

party talks or penalizing Pyongyang?,” OhmyNews International, April 10, 2009.

http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no-385061&rel_no-1. (No

longer available.)

10. Ronda Hauben, “Security Council’s Ad Hoc Actions Increase Tension on Korean

Peninsula: [Analysis] North Korea responds by withdrawing from six-party talks as

promised,” OhmyNews International, April 17, 2009. http://english.ohmynews.com

/articleview/article_view.asp?no-385093&rel_no-1. (No longer available.)

11. Seumas Milne, “After Iraq It’s Not Just North Korea that Wants a Bomb,” Guardian

Comment Is Free, May 29, 2009.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009

/may/27/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-us.

12. Pak Tok Hun, Informal Comments to the Media at the UN Media Stakeout, April 24,

2009. http://webcast.un.org/ramgen /ondemand/stakeout/2009/so090424pm2.rm. (No

longer available.)

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews International on June

8, 2010.]

Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan

Tragedy

Online Media Challenge Claims That North Korea Is

Responsible for Sinking the Cheonan

Page 30

by Ronda Hauben

The South Korean government headed by Lee Myung-bak is trying

to dispel criticism that its accusation that North Korea is responsible for

the sinking on March 26, 2010 of the Cheonan warship is politically

motivated and a cover-up or possible false flag operation.

On May 20, the South Korean government presented as incontestable

fact its conclusion that the warship Cheonan split in two and sank because

of hostile action by North Korea. Online discussion seriously challenged

that presentation. Perhaps not coincidentally, May 20, the day of the

presentation coincided with the date when campaigning for the June 2

provincial and local elections was to officially begin.

The military communication logs show that the first message from the

Cheonan of trouble said “aground on rocks.” The ship was in shallow

waters. Similarly, numerous early statements by both South Korean and

U.S. officials assured the public that North Korea was not involved with

the incident.

The rescue operation saved 58 of the crew members. Forty-six of the

104 members of the ship’s crew died as a result of the ship’s breaking in

two and sinking. Relatives of the sailors who died complained that the

rescue effort was inadequate and too late. Public criticism of the Lee

government grew regarding how it was handling the ship disaster. A so

called international group was charged with the task of assessing blame for

the disaster. That Joint Investigation Group (JIG) was under the Korean

military.

The Investigation

When the five page investigation statement

was presented on May

20, however, North Korea was accused of being the cause of the disaster.

The accusation was based on a part of a torpedo allegedly dredged up from

the sea which bore a supposed pen marked number on a rusted surface.

The sinking of the Cheonan occurred during a period when the U.S.

military and the South Korean military were conducting joint military

exercises named Key Resolve/Foal Eagle. The joint South Korean-U.S.

naval action involved several Aegis class warships which have the most

advanced computer and radar systems to track and guide weapons to find

Page 31

and destroy enemy targets. The Cheonan was a patrol combat corvette

(PCC) specializing in anti-submarine warfare.

The investigation statement claims that somehow an undetected North

Korean submarine pierced a highly protected arena of U.S.-South Korean

military maneuvers and released a torpedo in shallow waters, and then

escaped totally undetected.

An article in the Korean newspaper Hankyoreh

points out the

unlikely scenario that “a North Korean submarine [would be able] to

infiltrate the maritime cordon at a time when security reached its tightest

level and without detection by the Cheonan.”

No evidence was presented as to the actual firing of the torpedo or the

actual presence of a North Korean submarine in the vicinity of the

Cheonan. There is no actual observation of a North Korean submarine in

the area of the Cheonan, despite the fact that there was sophisticated

surveillance equipment used for the military exercises. Also, the shallow-

ness of the sea where the Cheonan sunk, about 40 to 50 m. and the rocky

bottom would make submarine travel near there almost impossible

The statement of the investigation is unsigned. The parties who

allegedly conducted the investigation are unnamed. Instead of facts to

document a basis for the accusations which might lead to war, a number

of allegations are followed by the statement that “There is no other

plausible explanation.”

Blogs and Other Online Media

The accusations made by the conservative media in South Korea

about North Korea have taken on a James Bond quality given the

mismatch between the reality of North Korean capability and the claims

being made of how it has been able to perform amazing deeds. Blogs and

other online media in both the U.S. and South Korea have presented facts

and discussion challenging the claims in the investigation statement, and

proposing other alternative explanations of the cause of the sinking of the

Cheonan. These online discussions and questions have begun not only to

supplement newspaper accounts but also to become the subject of

newspaper articles in South Korea.

Questions discussed on blogs included whether there was a North

Korean or German made torpedo involved in the sinking of the Cheonan,

Page 32

or whether there was any involvement of a torpedo at all.

An online

letter

,,4

addressed to Hillary Clinton by one of the members of the

investigation, questions whether the marks on the ship came from being

run aground or a collision with some other vessel or both.

The Whole Story as a False Account?

The nature of the pen mark on the torpedo part offered by South

Korea as its main evidence that the torpedo was fired by North Korea was

challenged

as not being a reliable piece of evidence of North Korean

involvement because there was rust under the pen mark. Also, the blades

of the offered evidence show a degree of corrosion that would usually

require far more time than the two months in the water as claimed.

Another blog

challenges the whole story of the South Korean

government as a false account like the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Some of

the Korean netizens and political activists who challenged the South Ko-

rean government about the cause of the Cheonan sinking have been

referred to the prosecutor for charges.

The South Korean government has been cited

by both Frank La Rue,

UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of

Opinion and Expression and Amnesty International for interfering with the

rights of South Korean citizens and netizens.

They Need Teeth

Given the growing set of questions about the South Korean govern-

ment account of the sinking of the Cheonan, the government has invited

some chosen bloggers and twitter users to a session “to dispel any doubts

among the young that North Korea was behind the deadly attack,”

A Yonhap News Agency press release explains that it will select 20

twitter users, 10 defense bloggers and 30 college reporters “to take a trip

to Pyeongtaek naval port south of Seoul where the salvaged parts of

Cheonan are being kept.” The article explains that “The event is aimed at

removing skepticism among young Internet users who have raised doubts

in online communities about the results of a multinational investigation

that concluded North Korea downed the ship in a torpedo attack.”

Like in the case of 9/11, careful fact checking and examination of the

Page 33

evidence by netizens has shown the South Korean government’s case for

the involvement of North Korea in the sinking of the Cheonan to be

unsustainable. Netizens are more and more able to act as watchdogs. But

they need teeth.

Notes

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigrep ort.pdf.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/4218 56.html.

3. See the comments at the end of the Scott Creighton’s blog entry, “The Sinking of the

Cheonan: We are being lied to” May 24, 2010, http://willyloman.wordpress

.com/2010/05/24/the-sinking-of-the-Cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. (No Longer Avil-

able.) Some selected comments are in the Appendix just below. Some of Scott Creighton's

article is quoted at:

https://thecommunists.org /2010/04/01/news/hands-off-korea-the-

sinking-of-the-Cheonan/.

4. https://archive.cpgb-ml.org/index.php?secName=proletarian&subName=display&art

=619.

5. http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/pcc-772-cheonan-photographic-evidence-

that-no-1-written-on -top-of-rust/. (No Longer Available.)

http://gowans.wordpress.com/2010/05/20/the-sinking-of-the-ch eonan-another-gulf-of-

tonkin-incident/.

7. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid= 2921120. (No Longer Available.)

8. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/docs/ROK-Press statement17052010.pdf.

(No Longer Available.)

9. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/05/31/3/0301000000AEN20100531003

100315F.HTML (No Longer Available.)

Appendix

Some comments from Scott Creighton’s blog entry, “The Sinking of the Cheonan: We

are being lied to,” May 24, 2010. http://willyloman.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/the-sink

ing-of-the-Cheonan-we-are-being-lied-to/. (No Longer Available.)

Comments:

6. Tim, on May 24, 2010 at 1:55 p.m. said: ‘The markings in Hangul, which reads “1?(or

No. 1 in English),” found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the

marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo.’ Now, just hang on a minute ?

a previously obtained NK torpedo? A previously obtained NK torpedo?? How many do

they have? Is it not beyond the realms of possibility that this ‘evidence’ did not originate

from NK at all. We really ought to demand the same level of ballistic forensics that apply

to crime scenes where ordinary firearms have been discharged. After all many more lives

could be at stake here.

Page 34

-------------------------------------------

57. Mika, on May 27, 2010 at 5:34 a.m. said: You may want to have a look at this:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LE26 Dg01.html. (No Longer Available.) I’ve not

tried verifying any of the claims made there yet, but the comments about the Korean

handwritten writings are damning if true, and if there was indeed still a large scale

exercise going on, that makes it completely unthinkable a NK sub would have penetrated

that deep, sank the Cheonan and got away again. OTOH, it does provide a rather credible

alternative scenario: a friendly fire incident blamed on the North Koreans. Kursk anyone?

----------------------------

145. willyloman, on May 28, 2010 at 3:38 p.m. said: the following comment was left by

a reader and it did not go through so I am posting it here so that others may read it. Mr.

Serandos: WordPress sometimes has problems with comments… it should work fine but

if posting again presents a problem, just me know. thank you

scott creighton, willyloman

Tom Serandos left the following comment: I tried to leave the following message on Mr.

Creighton’s site but I don’t think it went through.

PCC-772 report: I agree with the contents of the report.

Examine the photographs of the PCC-772 props. The deformation on each fluke is

evidence of grounding while making turns. If there was an explosion it occurred after the

ship ran aground or only the lower flukes would have been damaged when it settled to the

bottom. The damage to the shaft alleys would have locked up the props.

If there was an explosion perhaps it was an unexploded bomb from the Korean war or a

mine the S. Koreans have not retrieved (reportedly there are over 100 of those still out

there). It could have been in the vessels path when it grounded.

Also, the degree of corrosion on the torpedo parts indicates they have been in the sea for

a very long time (months). It was long enough for the active alloy in the props to set up

a galvanic cell with the other parts. I am a degreed metallurgist with 25 years of

experience and seven years of service in the U.S. Nuclear Navy.

Tom Serandos

--------------------------------------------

166. Han Kim, on May 29, 2010 at 7:30 a.m. said: I’m Korean and many Korean ppl

know the govt is making things up.

As you might know, the only reason the govt manipulated the truth is to get more votes

on the upcoming election from the old generations. :) Keep up the good work! We really

appreciate the voices from outside Korea

----------------------

203. ??, on May 29, 2010 at 2:22 p.m. said:

Dear Scott,

have you seen this article, “Did an American Mine Sink South Korean Ship?” by one

Yoichi Shimatsu: http://newamericamedia. org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-

south-korean-ship.php. (No Longer Available.)

He makes many good points, what I’d like to highlight is what he says about the type of

torpedo submitted as evidence on May 20:

Page 35

“Since torpedoes travel between 40-50 knots per hour (which is faster than collision tests

for cars), a drive shaft would crumble upon impacting the hull and its bearing and struts

would be shattered or bent by the high-powered blast … .”

My point is that even more bewildering than the various torpedo schema we’ve seen is

the very implausible situation that such a relatively intact remnant of the alleged weapon

exists as foisted onto us.

North Korea is also now vigorously bringing forth their defense, which is comprehen-

sively exposing the various contradictions in the “JIG” case. See my link of “Military

Commentator on Truth behind ‘Story of Attack by North’ (Part 1).” http://tinyurl

.com/29eh9zj The KCNA site won’t link directly, so I’m linking to the article on my own

blog.

People are going to cry about giving North Korea a hearing but they are certainly innocent

until proven guilty and their exclusion from the investigation process indicates weakness

and fear of exposure in the South Korean position, which has been relying so far on a kind

of international kangaroo court or media lynching. I’d very much like to see what

evidence they presented at their own press briefing recently to contrast with the “JIG”

press event of May 20. Again people will virulently impugn and dismiss them, but you

can be sure both Russia and China were paying close attention to all the details of their

nearer neighbor’s case.

It’s also important for your morale to know that South Korean citizens groups and

progressive media are banding together as we speak to get to the bottom of this particular

Big Lie. Also Mr. Shin is saying he’ll use the suppressive court proceedings initiated

against him to expose the whole phony deal.

Don’t lose sight of the big picture, you’ve taken some “below-the-belt” hits? hang in there

man!

-------------------------------

211. hankyul moon, on May 30, 2010 at 11:16 a.m. said:

The kr.gov will keep trying to paint with dirty mentions in order to wrap this page.

In addition of that, the kr.gov will keep change their story and evidence, which is a

traditional judgment of suspicion. Many people focused on the torpedo; however, a single

evidence is not correlated to the explosion. The torpedo that kr.gov presented is not

proven evidence of explosion scientifically. For example, there are no proofs of thermal

effects, mechanical damages by explosion, corrosion effects by salty water, and corrosion

effects by heat and salty water. Only one evidence is letter “1?”, written by bright blue

permanent marker. Nevertheless, North kr.gov denied using “1?” on machinery.

[Editor’s note: The following article first appeared in OhmyNews International in June

2010.]

Questioning Cheonan Investigation

Page 36

Stirs Controversy

by Ronda Hauben

South Korean government officials have denounced an NGO for

writing to the Security Council. The NGO is one of the most prominent

civil society organizations in South Korea, People’s Solidarity for

Participatory Democracy (PSPD). Such action disregards the long tradition

and established procedure at the United Nations for an NGO or private

individual to send communication to the Security Council on matters it is

considering.

PSPD is a watchdog NGO that was founded in 1994. Since then it has

monitored the actions of the South Korean government, supporting the

efforts of South Korean citizens to participate in political affairs.

In a letter asking for support, PSPD writes:

PSPD believes that diplomacy and security policy should be

under the citizenry’s watch and democratic control. National

Security and diplomatic policy should not be monopolized by

military and diplomatic authorities.

On June 11, 2010, the Center for Peace and Disarmament of PSPD

sent a letter to UN Security Council President Claude Heller, the Mexican

Ambassador to the UN. Mexico holds the rotating presidency of the

Security Council for the month of June. With its letter, PSPD included its

report, “The PSPD’s Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking.”

The letter and report were also sent to the other fourteen member

states of the United Nations Security Council, to the United Nations

Secretary General and to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea

(South Korea).

The PSPD report raised a number of questions and problems with the

findings presented by the South Korean government of its investigation of

the Cheonan sinking.

Background

The South Korean government, unable to win support domestically

for its allegations that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the

Cheonan, turned to the UN Security Council for action against North

Page 37

Korea.

On June 4 the South Korean Ambassador at the UN submitted a

letter to the UN Security Council requesting it to take up the matter of the

sinking of the Cheonan.

On June 8, North Korea submitted a letter to the Security Council

denying any involvement in the sinking of the Cheonan.

The Security Council scheduled an informal meeting for South Korea

to present its case against North Korea on Monday, June 14. Initially there

was no plan for the Security Council to meet with the North Korean

delegation on the Cheonan issue. On Sunday evening, however, news

reports from South Korea announced that on June 14, the Security Council

would also hold an informal meeting with North Korea.

According to some of the South Korean news media who cover the

UN, the big story in South Korea on Monday, June 14, was not that South

Korea was making its presentation to the Security Council. Instead the

media described denunciations by South Korean government officials

against PSPD for sending its report to the UN. The reporters claimed the

South Korean government believed that the PSPD report influenced the

North Korean UN delegation to request a presentation at the UN Security

Council on the subject of the Cheonan. There was no proof presented for

such allegations. This did not, however, stop South Korean government

officials from making accusations against PSPD, nor the South Korean

conservative media from supporting the denunciations with articles

accusing the NGO of unpatriotic behavior.

In Seoul, on June 14, the spokesman for Lee Myung bak, the

President of South Korea, publicly denounced PSPD.

Also on June 14, during the Question and Answer time at the National

Assembly, the South Korean Prime Minister, Un-Chan Chung, denouncing

PSPD for sending its letter and report to the UN Security Council, said,

“Such actions are against national interest. It (PSPD’s action) dishonored

and shamed our country.”

Back at UN headquarters in New York on Monday, June 14, two

separate informal meetings of the Security Council were held in the North

Lawn Building. A large number of reporters waited in the cafe outside the

area where the Security Council was meeting because the meetings were

closed to the press.

After the two separate informal Security Council meetings, the

Page 38

Mexican Ambassador spoke briefly to the press. He said, “the Security

Council issued a call to the parties to refrain from any act that could

escalate tensions in the region, and makes an appeal to preserve peace and

stability in the region.” He also indicated that the Security Council would

continue its consultations after the meetings it had with the delegations of

both nations. Heller said that it was very important to have received the

very detailed presentation by South Korea and also to know and learn

from the arguments of North Korea. He commented that it was “very

important that North Korea has approached the Security Council.” In

response to a question about his view on the issues presented, he re-

sponded, “I am not a judge. I think we will go on with the consultations to

deal in a proper manner on the issue.”

The North Korean UN delegation scheduled a press conference for the

following day, Tuesday, June 15. During the press conference, the North

Korean Ambassador presented North Korea’s refutation of the allegations

made by South Korea. Also he explained North Korea’s request to be able

to send an investigation team to go to the site where the sinking of the

Cheonan occurred. South Korea had denied the request. During the press

conference, a reporter with a South Korean newspaper asked the North

Korean Ambassador if he had received a copy of the PSPD document from

PSPD. The Ambassador responded that not to his knowledge.

In a press release, the Asian Human Rights Commission writes that

following the denunciation of PSPD by South Korean government

officials, “the country’s Prosecutor’s office reportedly leaked to news-

papers that there was a possibility that the staff of the PSPD might be

prosecuted under the National Security Act, if a case were to be filed …

.”

“In response,” the press release explains, “conservative groups filed

a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office.” On June 15, the Vice Minister

of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Chun Yeong-U said that, “A legal

examination is currently going on.”

Following the accusatory remarks by South Korean government

officials against PSPD, “people belonging to conservative groups

attempted to raid the offices of PSPD.” There are reports that members of

PSPD were assaulted verbally and physically, and threatening phone calls

were made to the PSPD offices.

Page 39

In one incident, a van containing flammable material was driven up

to the building where PSPD offices are located. The police did not arrest

the perpetrators of these deeds. The Prosecutor, instead, opened an

investigation of PSPD.

On June 17, according to the Asian Human Rights Commission, the

case against PSPD was allocated to the Public Security Bureau 1, which

announced its intention to summon PSPD officials.

The Asian Human Rights Commission also reported that the Prosecu-

tor’s office “approached one of the experts who worked on the

government-led report in order for this expert to submit a complaint

concerning alleged criminal defamation by the NGO.”

South Korean government officials, supported by some of the South

Korean media, allege that it is an unusual practice for an NGO to send a

letter or report to the UN Security Council. Recently, a reporter asked a

government official, “Are there any cases that a NGO sends a contrast

position paper against a government on the security issue.” Chun, Yung-

woo, the 2

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade responded, “I

have never heard that there are such NGOs, and document sent by a NGO

cannot be a UNSC document.”

NGO Communication to Security Council

Such an interchange demonstrates a serious lack of knowledge of UN

and particularly Security Council procedures. There is a long established

practice at the UN of NGO’s or private individuals sending letters and

documents to the Security Council on questions before the Security

Council. Most if not all of the matters before the Security Council have to

do with security issues.

Records at the UN show that the practice of sending such correspon-

dence to the Security Council dates back to 1946. This is the date when the

symbol S/NC/ was introduced as the symbol for “Communications

received from private individuals and non-governmental bodies relating

to matters of which the Security Council is seized.”

The Security Council

has the practice of periodically publishing a list of the documents it

receives, the name and organization of the sender, and the date they are

received. The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council

states that the list is to be circulated to all representatives on the Security

Page 40

Council. A copy of any communication on the list is to be given to any

nation on the Security Council that requests it.

There are over 450 such lists indicated in the UN records. As each list

can contain several or a large number of documents the Security Council

has received, the number of such documents is likely to be in the

thousands.

Under Rule 39 of the Council procedures, the Security Council may

invite any person it deems competent for the purpose to supply it with

information on a given subject. Thus the two procedures in the Security

Council’s provisional rules give it the basis to find assistance on issues it

is considering from others outside the Council and to consider the

contribution as part of its deliberation.

Appeals to End Witch Hunt Against PSPD

Initiating a criminal investigation against a South Korean NGO or

citizen for what is a long existing practice and tradition with respect to the

UN Security Council, is a South Korean government action that is being

compared to the kind of “witch-hunts” that occurred during the period of

the 1950s in the U.S. which has come to be known as McCarthyism.

In contrast to the attack on PSPD by the South Korean government

and the conservative media, many NGOs and citizens in South Korea have

expressed their support for PSPD.

A group of 200 professors and other intellectuals in South Korea has

issued a statement calling for the end of the “witch hunt” against PSPD.

The statement explains that “PSPD had performed its innate duty and right

as a civic group.” The group calls for conservative groups to end their

irrational backward attacks on PSPD.

Also, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, an

organization of 46 groups in Asia which includes PSPD, sent a petition to

Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protec-

tion of the Right of Opinion and Expression.

It asked the UN to “advise

the South Korean government to end the prosecutorial investigation of

PSPD.”

La Rue had visited South Korea on May 6-17, 2010. He issued a press

statement on May 17 documenting other examples of the abuse by the

South Korean government of the human rights of its citizens. He referred

Page 41

to the obligation of South Korea to adhere to the provisions of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protecting the right

to freedom of expression.

While La Rue’s comments were made prior to the current South

Korean government attack on PSPD, Amnesty International has issued a

statement regarding the current situation.

It writes:

Amnesty International is deeply concerned about the Seoul

Central Prosecutor’s Office’s decision on Wednesday to investi-

gate the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)

for sending a letter to the UN Security Council questioning the

results of the international investigation into the sinking of the

South Korean navy vessel the Cheonan. The civic group is

accused of ‘benefitting’ North Korea, in violation of the National

Security Law, interfering with state’s acts and defamation.

The statement concludes, “Amnesty International is also concerned

that the National Security Law continues to be used to arbitrarily target

individuals or groups peacefully exercising their basic rights to freedom

of expression and association. Simply put, this law is used as a tool to

silence dissent.”

On Friday, June 18, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon was

asked for his view of the current action by the prosecutor in South Korea

against an NGO for sending a letter to the Security Council. He responded,

“I will have to check. I’m not aware of that.... I don’t have a comment at

this time, but I may have to check and will get back to you later.”

He did

not get back to the journalist as of the publication date of this article.

Open Letter to Ban Ki-moon

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) appealed to Ban Ki-

moon. On June 24, it sent an Open Letter to Sec-Gen Ban Ki-moon about

the situation. In the letter it asks him:

… to take all necessary steps to ensure that the reprisals, directly

or indirectly attributable to the Republic of Korea, are immedi-

ately halted against civil society groups that have communicated

with the UN. The AHRC appreciates the work of the Secretary-

General concerning reprisals and urges his offices to include this

case as part of efforts to protect civil society members from

Page 42

facing attacks based on their participation in the UN’s work.

The AHRC has also asked the High Commissioner for Human Rights

to intervene to “ensure that these reprisals are halted” and that the recom-

mendations of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression be

implemented in full and without delay. It also calls upon South Korea as

a member of the Human Rights Council to act to “uphold the highest

standards.”

PSPD as Political Watchdog

PSPD reports that the organization has increased its membership by

15% with 1600 new members joining since the attack by the South Korean

government. Also, numerous individuals and organizations in Korea and

outside have sent letters and made statements in support of PSPD.

As a member of the international society, PSPD explains, “PSPD will

continuously make every effort to advance the universal goals of

democracy and peace through its activities as a political watchdog.”

Notes

1. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation on PSPD,” 6/21/2010.

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195.

2. PSPD, “The PSPD’s Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking,” June 1, 2010.

https://www.peoplepower21.org/english /40247.

3. “What’s Behind South Korea Bringing the Cheonan Issue to the UN Security Council,”

6/7/2010. http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/06/07/whats_behind_south_korea_bring

ing_the_Cheo nan_issue_to_the_un_security_council/. (No Longer Available.)

4. “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN with

regard to the armed attack by North Korea on 26 May, 2010 against the Republic of

Korea’s navy ship the Cheonan, S/2010/281.”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/

cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%202010

%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20 and%20-%20Report.pdf.

5. “Letter dated 8 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the

Security Council,” S/2010/294. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2

010/294&Lang=E. (No Longer Available.)

6. See description in: Gwak Byeong-chan, “Which Country Do You Belong To?,”

Hankyoreh, June 16, 2010.

https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_edito

rials/425906.html.

7. “Informal comments to the Media by the President of the Security Council and the

Page 43

Permanent Representative of Mexico, H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident

(the sinking of the ship from the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.” June 14, 2010.

[Webcast: Archived Video – 5 minutes.] http://webcast.

un.org/ramgen/ondemand/stakeout/2010/so100614pm3.rm. (No Longer Available.)

8. “Press Conference: H.E. Mr. Sin Son Ho, Permanent Representative of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations, on the current situation in the Korean

Peninsula.” June 15, 2010. [Webcast: Archived Video – 58 minutes.]

http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/pressconference/2010/pc100615am.rm. (No

Longer Available.)

9. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon by the Asian

Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-general-ban-ki-moon.

10. See “United Nations Series Symbols: 1946-1996,” Dag Hammarskjold Library,

United Nations, New York, 1998, p. 234.

11. “Scholars Call for End to PSPD Witch Hunt,” Hankyoreh, June 22, 2010.

https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition /e_national/426832.html.

12. Forum-Asia Submits the Urgent Appeal on Threats of Prosecution against PSPD to

UN Rapporteur 6/21/2010.

https://www .peoplepower21.org/english/40190.

13. Frank La Rue, Rapporteur, “UN, Full Text of ROK Press Statement,” May 17, 2010.

http://www.peoplepower21.org/?module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=

40191&sid=4db9d3a9ce23eab695e13dec947e1842&module_srl=37681. (No Longer

Available.)

14. “Amnesty International expresses its concern about the investigation on the PSPD,”

6/18/2010.

http://gaia-lovedream .blogspot.com/2010/06/amnesty-international-expresses-

its.html.

15. “2010-06-18, New York: Secretary-General’s remarks to the media.”

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2010-06-18/secretary-generals-

remarks-media. (No Longer Available.)

16. “An Open Letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon by the Asian

Human Rights Commission,” 6/25/2010.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/08/open-letter-secretary-general-ban-ki-moon.

17. “Stop Oppression and Prosecutor’s Investigation of PSPD.”

http://www.peoplepower21.org/English/40195.

[Editor’s Note: This article appeared on the netizenblog on June 7, 2010 and can be seen

at: http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2010/06/07/whats_behind_south_korea_bringing

_the_Cheonan_issue_to_the_un_security_council/. (No longer available.) Available at

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn30-1.pdf, pp. 3-4.]

What’s Behind South Korea Bringing

Page 44

the Cheonan Issue to the UN Security

Council?

by Ronda Hauben

An article on the Cheonan warship sinking, “The whole story of the

South Korean government as a false account?” was published in Telepolis

on June 1, 2010. It documents several of the misleading claims being

made by the South Korean government to put the blame on North Korea.

The June 2 election in South Korea for local and regional government

showed that many South Koreas citizens and netizens rejected the Lee

Myung-bak government claims and rendered his Grand National Party

candidates a surprising and serious defeat.

This, however, has not deterred the Lee government from its goal.

The election results were announced demonstrating the criticism of the

government’s hostile policy toward North Korean represented by the so

called “investigation” blaming North Korea for the sinking of the

Cheonan. Yet, the South Korean government initiated action to take its

spurious claims to the United Nations Security Council. A helpful

perspective is offered by Peter Lee in his Asia Times Online article, “The

Cheonan sinking… and Korea rising.”

“What is indisputable,” Peter Lee writes, “is the determination of the

Lee Myung-bak administration to exploit the geopolitical opportunity

presented by the sinking.” He explains how the South Korean president

not only tried to use the incident, “as a 9/11 opportunity” to get support for

his government in the local and regional elections, which clearly failed,

but also to “strengthen the South Korean alliance with the U.S.” to offer

a counterweight to China.

Even more serious, however, is the observation made by some in

South Korea, that the Lee administration is endangering their lives by its

hostile acts toward North Korea. Similarly the strategy of trying to use the

UN Security Council to give a seal of approval for the so called “investiga-

tion” which drew significant criticisms from politicians and the public at

home is but a sign of the significant role the U.S. government is playing

in this dangerous South Korean gambit.

The South Korean NGO People’s Solidarity for Participatory

Page 45

Democracy (PSPD) recently published an English translation of a critique

of the South Korean government’s “international” investigation of the -

sinking. The PSPD report provides helpful documentation of a number of

the inconsistencies and fallacies of the whole process of the claimed

“investigation.”

According to the PSPD critique, it was only after significant criticism

of the fact that the South Korean military was conducting the “investiga-

tion” of the Cheonan sinking, that it was announced that four other nations

had been invited to be part of the “investigation.” Little is known,

however, about what role these other nations played in the investigation.

PSPD reports that the head of the U.S. group appeared at the press

conference announcing the results of the investigation, to express U.S.

government support. He said that there had been close cooperation

between South Korea and the U.S. in the investigation. This did not,

however, answer the question about the role the foreign nations in the

investigation and whether they had any ability to contribute an independ-

ent perspective.

North Korea asked to be allowed to send a team of investigators to

examine the supposed evidence. South Korea refused the request.

One of the civilian members of the investigation said that he was not

provided with any briefing materials or basic information. Also he said

that the investigation only considered the theory of the government about

the torpedo as the cause of the sinking, and that the investigation was

conducted to support that theory.

The government has brought lawsuits or charges against several

citizens and netizens and a national assembly representative who

expressed disagreement with the claims of the government.

The PSPD report raises a number of other important issues about the

nature of the South Korean government investigation.

By bringing the Cheonan issue to the UN Security Council, the South

Korean government is presenting the UN with a serious challenge. The

PSPD report has urged the South Korean government to refrain from

international actions until the National Assembly has been assisted in

conducting a fact-finding process. The effort of the South Korean

government to ignore the questions of its citizens and politicians and take

the matter to the UN Security Council is the effort to use the UN Security

Page 46

Council to deny democratic processes to its own citizens. PSPD has

documented how what the South Korean government is doing by bringing

the issue to the Security Council is increasing the threat to peace and

security on the Korean peninsula. This is the opposite of what the Security

Council is to be involved with under the UN Charter.

How the Security Council handles this issue will be an important

demonstration of its ability to fulfill its obligations under the UN charter

to the other member nations of the UN and to the people of those nations.

For PSPD Report See:

http://www.peoplepower21.org/?module

=fil e & a c t = p rocFil e Downl o ad&fil e _srl = 4 0158&si d = 7 ab45

eab894bb107361ef5447c30048b&module_srl=37681&usg=AFQj

CNFTU9vP98 NdyzvCupVWG0HqgMhLlw.

[Editor’s Note: The following article appeared on Sept 5, 2009, on the netizens blog at

taz.de, a website of die Tageszeitung.]

In the Cheonan Dispute, the UN Security

Council Acts in Accord with UN Charter

by Ronda Hauben

The challenge of Security Council reform has been on the agenda of

the United Nations for decades with little obvious effect on the workings

of the Security Council itself.

But what happens when an action of the Security Council is an

improvement over past Security Council practices and presents an

important model for conflict resolution in line with the obligations of the

Charter? Will there be recognition of the peaceful direction that the action

points in or will it be ignored and members of the Security Council revert

back to the practice of the past?

The situation I am referring to is the consideration by the Security

Council of the sinking of the South Korean naval warship, the Cheonan.

The dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan was brought to the Security

Council in June and a Presidential Statement was agreed to in July.

An account of some of what happened in the Security Council during

Page 47

an important part of this process is described in an article in Spanish that

has appeared in several different Spanish language publications. The

article, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de Peninsula de Corea”

by Maurizio Guerrero, the UN Correspondent for Notimex (the Mexican

News Agency), was published on July 5.

The article describes the

experience of the Mexican Ambassador to the UN, Claude Heller in his

position as president of the Security Council for June.

In a letter to the Security Council dated June 4, the Republic of Korea

(ROK), more commonly known as South Korea, asked the Council to take

up the Cheonan dispute. Park Im-kook, the South Korean Ambassador to

the UN, requested that the Security Council consider the matter of the

Cheonan and respond appropriately.

The letter described an investigation

into the sinking of the Cheonan carried out by the South Korean govern-

ment and military officials. The conclusion was to accuse North Korea of

sinking the South Korean ship.

Sin Son Ho is the UN Ambassador from the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK), which is more commonly known as North

Korea. He sent a letter dated June 8 to the Security Council, which denied

the allegation that his country was to blame.

His letter urged the Security

Council not to be the victim of deceptive claims, as had happened with

Iraq in 2003. It asked the Security Council to support its call to be able to

examine the evidence and to be involved in a new and more independent

investigation on the sinking of the Cheonan.

How would the Mexican Ambassador as President of the Security

Council during June handle this dispute? (The presidency rotates each

month to a different Security Council member.) This was a serious issue

facing Heller as he began his presidency in June 2010.

Heller adopted what he refers to as a “balanced” approach to treat

both governments on the Korean peninsula fairly and objectively. He held

bilateral meetings with each member of the Security Council which led to

support for a process of informal presentations by both of the Koreas to

the members of the Security Council.

What Heller calls “interactive informal meetings” were held on June

14 with the South Koreans and the North Koreans in separate sessions

attended by the Security Council members, along with a time to ask

questions and then to discuss the presentations.

Page 48

At a media stakeout on June 14, after the day’s presentations ended,

Heller said that it was important to have received the detailed presentation

by South Korea and also to know and learn the arguments of North Korea.

He commented that “it was very important that North Korea approached

the Security Council.” In response to a question about his view on the

issues presented, he replied, “I am not a judge. I think we will go on with

the consultations to deal properly on the issue.”

During June, Heller held meetings with the UN Ambassadors from

each of the two Koreas and then with Security Council members about the

Cheonan issue. On the last day of his presidency, on June 30, he was

asked by the media what was happening about the Cheonan dispute. He

responded that the issue of contention was over the evaluation of the South

Korean government’s investigation.

Heller describes how he introduced what he refers to as “an innova-

tion” into the Security Council process. As June ended, the issue was not

yet resolved, but the “innovation” set a basis to build on the progress that

was achieved during the month of his presidency.

The “innovation” Heller refers to, is a summary of the positions of

each of the two Koreas on the issue, taking care to present each objec-

tively. Heller explains that this summary was not an official document, so

it did not have to be approved by the other members of the Council. This

summary provided the basis for further negotiations. He believed that it

had a positive impact on the process of consideration in the Council,

making possible the agreement that was later to be expressed in the

Presidential statement on the Cheonan that was issued by the Security

Council on July 9.

Heller’s goal, he explains, was to “at all times be as objective as

possible” to avoid increasing the conflict on the Korean peninsula. Such

a goal is the Security Council’s obligation under the UN charter.

In the Security Council’s Presidential Statement on the Cheonan,

what stands out is that the statement follows the pattern that Heller

described of presenting the views of each of the Koreas and urging that the

dispute be settled peacefuly.

In the statement, the members of the Security Council do not blame

North Korea. Instead, they refer to the South Korean investigation and its

conclusion, expressing their “deep concern” about the “findings” of the

Page 49

investigation.

Analyzing the Presidential Statement, the Korean newspaper

Hankyoreh noted that the statement “allows for a double interpretation and

does not blame or place consequences on North Korea.”

Such a pos-

sibility of a “double interpretation” allows different interpretations.

Some of the articles that have appeared in the English language media

about the Cheonan, however, appear to be oblivious to the effort to

accommodate the different viewpoints in the Presidential Statement. For

example, an editorial in the New York Times about the Presidential

Statement complained that the statement contained “weasel wording about

blame.”

An AP article reported that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan

Rice, and the South Korean Ambassador, Park Im-kook said the Presiden-

tial Statement “made clear who to blame” for the attack on the Cheonan.

Instead of directly pointing out this is contrary to the wording of the

statement, however, the AP article notes that in private some diplomats

and analysts expressed concern that the statement didn’t blame Pyong-

yang.

Another article in the New York Times, however, referred to a

statement of Li Baodong, China’s Ambassador to the UN, that the

Presidential statement moved matters in “the right direction” because it

urged “the parties concerned” to avoid escalating tensions.

Russia had sent a team of experts to South Korea to do its own

evaluation on the South Korean findings. Though the Russian evaluation

has not been released publicly, a leaked copy was the subject of articles in

Hankyoreh. These describe how the Russian team of experts disagreed

with the South Korean government’s conclusions about the sinking of the

Cheonan. The Russian experts observed the ship’s propeller had become

entangled in a fishing net and subsequently a possible cause of the sinking

could have been that the ship had hit the antennae of a mine which then

exploded.

The Presidential Statement explains that “The Security Council takes

note of the responses from other relevant parties, including the DPRK,

which has stated that it had nothing to do with the incident.”

With the exception of the DPRK, it is not indicated who “the other

relevant parties” are. It does suggest, however, that it is likely some

Page 50

Security Council members, not just Russia and China, who did not agree

with the conclusions of the South Korean investigation.

The Security Council's action on the Cheonan took place in a situation

where there has been a wide-ranging international critique, especially in

the online media, about the problems of the South Korean investigation,

and of the ROK government’s failure to make public any substantial

documentation of its investigation, along with its practice of harassing

critics of the ROK claims.

The U.S. media, however, for the most part, has chosen to ignore the

many critiques which have appeared. These critiques of the South Korean

government’s investigation of the Cheonan sinking have appeared not

only in Korean, but also in English, Japanese, and other languages. They

present a wide-ranging challenge to the veracity and integrity of the South

Korean investigation and its conclusions.

An article in the Los Angeles Times on July 28 noted the fact that the

media in the U.S. has ignored the critique of the South Korean government

investigation that is being discussed and spread around the world.

recently, on August 31, an Op-Ed by Donald Gregg, a former U.S.

Ambassador to South Korea, appeared in the New York Times, titled

“Testing North Korean Waters.” The article noted that “not everyone

agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea. Pyongyang has

consistently denied responsibility, and both China and Russia opposed a

U.N. Security Council resolution laying blame on North Korea.”

In a subsequent interview with the Washington Correspondent for

Hankyoreh, Gregg adds that the Russian team’s conclusions could only be

tentative because they were not given access to all the materials they

needed for their investigation. The Russian team recommended that the

Chinese not make an effort to review the South Korean investigation.

They would likely not have access to all the materials needed to be able

to do an adequate review.

In his Op-Ed in the New York Times, Gregg maintains that “The

disputed interpretations of the sinking of the Cheonan remain central to

any effort to reverse course and to get on track toward dealing effectively

with North Korea on critical issues such as the denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula. "Therefore, he urges the South Korean government to

make public the study it has done.

Page 51

Gregg’s public statements are just one example of the disagreement

around the world, along with the Chinese and Russian governments, with

the South Korean government’s conclusions about the sinking of the

Cheonan and about the process of the investigation itself.

North Korea referred to this widespread international sentiment in its

June 8 letter to the Security Council. The UN Ambassador from North

Korea wrote:

It would be very useful to remind ourselves of the ever-increas-

ing international doubts and criticisms, going beyond the internal

boundary of South Korea, over the ‘investigation result’ from the

very moment of its release….

The situation that the North Korean Ambassador is referring to is one

marked by actions on the part of the South Korean netizens and civil

society who challenged the process and results of the South Korean

government’s investigation. There is support for the South Korean critics

by bloggers, scientists and journalists around the world, writing in a

multitude of languages and from many perspectives. A number of the

non-governmental organizations and scientists in South Korea sent the

results of their investigations and research to members of the Security

Council to provide them with the background and facts needed to make an

informed decision.

The result of such efforts is something that is unusual in the process

of recent Security Council activity. Most often decisions are made

according to the degree of power and self-interest in the issue being

considered, rather than according to an impartial analysis of the problem

and an effort to hear from all those with an interest in the issue. However,

an impartial analysis is what is required by the obligations of the UN

Charter.

In its June 8 letter to the Security Council, North Korea referred to the

earlier experience of the Security Council, to the February 5, 2003,

Security Council meeting when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made

his presentation of his “evidence” that weapons of mass destruction

existed in Iraq. The U.S. then used these claims as the pretext for its

invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

The June 8 letter from North Korea urges:

It is imperative for the Security Council not to step into the same

Page 52

situation in which it was once misused as a tool of high-handed-

ness and hegemony of the United States by giving legitimacy to

its armed invasion of Iraq, based on a single word of lies of

Powell, United States Secretary of State, in February 2003.

The Security Council is duty-bound to adhere strictly to the principles

of respect for the sovereignty and impartiality of United Nations Member

States, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

The process of how the Security Council took up and determined its

response to the dispute on the Cheonan is an important example of a

different process than that which occurred in the Iraq situation. The effort

in the Security Council described by the Mexican Ambassador, to uphold

the principles of impartiality and respectful treatment of all members

involved in a problem, is the kind of process outlined in the UN Charter.

The process instituted by the Mexican presidency of the Security

Council in June with respect to the Cheonan dispute has the potential of

providing a significant precedent in the process of Security Council

reform. It represents an important example of the Security Council acting

in conformity with its obligations as set out in the UN charter.

In the July 9 Presidential Statement, the Security Council urges that

the parties to the dispute over the sinking of the Cheonan find a means to

peacefully settle the dispute. The statement says:

The Security Council calls for full adherence to the Korean

Armistice Agreement and encourages the settlement of outstand-

ing issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means to resume

direct dialogue and negotiation through appropriate channels as

early as possible, with a view to avoiding conflicts and averting

escalation.

Ambassador Gregg is only one of many around the world who have

expressed their concern with the course of action of the U.S. and South

Korea which is contrary to the direction of the UN Security Council

Presidential Statement. Gregg explained his fear that the truth of the

Cheonan sinking “may elude us, as it did after the infamous Tonkin Bay

incident of 1964, that was used to drag U.S. (the U.S.) into the abyss of the

Vietnam War.”

The Security Council's Action on the Cheonan dispute, if it is

recognized and supported, has set the basis instead for a peaceful

Page 53

resolution of the conflict.

Notes

1. Ronda Hauben, “UN Security Council Reform in Focus,” OhmyNews International,

September 15, 2008.

2. Maurizio Guerrero, “Heller mediacion de Mexico en conflict de Peninsula de Corea,”

Notimex, July 5, 2010 (published in en la Economia) “With the Cheonan Dispute: UN

Security Council Discovers the UN Charter.” http://enlaeconomia.com/news/2010 /07/05

/69561. (No longer available.)

3. Security Council, S/2010/281 “Letter dated 4 June 2010,”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E

4FF96FF9%7D/DPRK%20S%202010%20281%20SKorea%20Letter%20and%20Che

onan%20Report.pdf.

4. Security Council, S/2010/294, “June 8, 2010” “Letter,”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E

4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%202010%20294.pdf.

5. Ambassador Claude Heller on June 14 stakeout, “Media Stakeout: Informal comments

to the Media by the President of the Security Council and the Permanent Representative

of Mexico, H.E. Mr. Claude Heller on the Cheonan incident (the sinking of the ship from

the Republic of Korea) and on Kyrgyzstan.”

6. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13.

7. Lee Jae-hoon, “Presidential Statement allows for a ‘double interpretation and does not

blame or place consequences upon North Korea,” Hankyoreh, July 10, 2010.

www.hani.co.kr/arti/en glish_edition/e_national/429768.html.

8. “Security Council Blinks,” Editorial, New York Times, July 10, 2010.

9. Edith Lederer, “UN Condemns South Korea ship sinking,” AP, July 10, 2010.

10. Neil MacFaquahar, “Condemnation of Ship’s Sinking is a ‘Victory’ North Korea

Says,” New York Times, July 9, 2010, a version of the online article appeared in print

edition on July 10, 2010, p.6.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/world/asia/10br

iefs-KOREA.html.

11. “Russian Navy Team’s Analysis of the Cheonan Incident,”Posted on July 27,

Hankyoreh, modified on July 29.

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_north

korea/432230.html. The Russian Experts document is titled “Data from the Russian Naval

Expert Group’s Investigation into the Cause of the South Korean Naval Vessel Cheonan’s

Sinking.” See also “Russia’s Cheonan Investigation Suspects that Sinking Cheonan Ship

was Caused by a Mine,” posted on July 27, 2010, Hankyoreh, modified on July 28, 2010.

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english _edition/e_northkorea/432232.html.

12. UN Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13 Presidential Statement of July 9, 2010.

13. Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubts Surface on North Korean Role in

Ship Sinking,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2010.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-

xpm-2010-jul-23-la-fg-korea-torpedo-20100724-story.html.

Page 54

14 Donald P. Gregg, “Testing North Korean Waters,” New York Times, August 31, 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/opi nion/01iht-edgregg.html.

15. Security Council, S/2010/294, “Letter, DPRK June 8 2010.”

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%202010 %20294.pdf.

16. See for example Ronda Hauben, “Netizens Question Cause of Cheonan Tragedy,”

OhmyNews International, June 8, 2010, and Ronda Hauben, “Questioning Cheonan

Investigation Stirs Controversy,” OhmyNews International, June 29, 2010. (Both are in

this issue.)

17. Security Council, S/2010/294, June 8, 2010.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKorea%20S%20201 0%20294.pdf. See also: Colin Powell to the

UN Feb 5 2003.

https://youtu.be/1Z3f_p_7OeE.

18. Tae-ho Kwon, “South Korean Government Impeded Russian Team’s Cheonan

Investigation: Donald Gregg,” Hankyoreh, September 4, 2010.

http://english.hani.co

.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/438299.html.

19. See for example “PSPD’s Stance on the Presidential Statement of the UNSC

Regarding the Sinking of the ROK Naval Vessel Cheonan.”

https://www.peoplepower21.org/english/40247.

[Editor’s Note: The following article is a posting at the Nautilus Institue for Security and

Sustainability on June 5, 2007. It can be seen online at:

https://nautilus.org/napsnet

/napsnet-policy-forum /behind-the-blacklisting-of-banco-delta-asia/. The article originally

appeared on OhmyNews International reporting on the U.S. government activity to target

North Korea without just cause.]

Policy Forum 07-044:

Behind the Blacklisting

of Banco Delta Asia

The NAPSNet Policy Forum provides expert analysis of contemporary

peace and security issues in Northeast Asia. As always, we invite your

Page 55

responses to this report and hope you will take the opportunity to

participate in discussion of the analysis.

Recommended Citation

“Policy Forum 07-044: Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia,”

NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 05, 2007,

https://nautilus.org/napsnet

/napsnet-policy-for um/behind-the-blacklisting-of-banco-delta-asia/.

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia

Policy Forum Online 07-044A: June 5

, 2007

Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia

By Ronda Hauben

CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. Article by Ronda Hauben

III. Citations

IV. Nautilus invites your responses

I. Introduction

Ronda Hauben, researcher, writer and freelance journalist, who has

spent the past 14 years studying, writing and participating in online media,

writes, “The purpose of the action against the BDA appears not only to

have been to target North Korea and its access to the international banking

system, but also to send a message to China.”

This article was originally published by OhMyNews International:

http://english.ohmynews .com/index.asp (No longer Available.) The views

expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily

reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers

should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on

contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Article by Ronda Hauben

“Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia”

By Ronda Hauben

Page 56

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, speaking at the

Korea Society’s 50

Anniversary dinner in New York City on May 15,

said that he was determined not to “allow $26 million or $25 million get

between us and a deal that will finally do something about nuclear

weapons on the Korean peninsula.” He promised that Kathy Stevens at the

Korea desk at the State Department was working on the problem and that

“we are going to keep after this problem till we solve it.” His statement

didn’t give further details about how this problem was to be solved, a

problem that had interrupted the progress that seemed at last possible in

the Feb. 13 six-party agreement.

Just two days later, on May 17, the U.S. Wachovia Bank announced

that it is exploring a request from the State Department to transfer the

funds from the BDA (Banco Delta Asia) to North Korea. Wachovia Bank

reported that it would require the necessary approvals from bank

regulators to do the transfer.

Until this latest announcement, banks have been unwilling to do the

transfer because of the legal action that the U.S. government took against

the BDA, by ruling that it was involved in criminal activity under Section

311 of the U.S. Patriot Act. Banks which deal with a bank that has been

found guilty of such illegal acts risk losing their access to the international

financial system. North Korea has said that the denuclearization and other

aspects of the six-party agreement that it has been part of can only go

forward when the BDA situation is resolved. “To make the money transfer

possible freely just like before has been our demand… from the begin-

ning,” a spokesperson from North Korea said.

In his daily press briefing on May 17, Scott McCormack at the U.S.

State Department said, “We all want to see the BDA issue resolved,

obviously resolved within the laws and regulations of the United States as

well as the international financial system, and we’d like to move on and

get back to the business of the six-party talks, which is really focused on

the issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether this latest development with Wachovia Bank will provide the

needed breakthrough, it is too soon to tell. But there are other develop-

ments which may provide the needed pressures on the U.S. government to

decriminalize the $25 million it has frozen of North Korean funds and

restore North Korea’s access to the international banking system. Their

Page 57

access was severely impeded by the action that the U.S. Treasury

Department took against the BDA.

The developments I am referring to are the release in the public

domain of several documents related to the U. S. Treasury Department’s

actions against BDA. One of the documents is a sworn statement by the

owner of the BDA, Mr. Stanley Au, in support of his petition to revoke the

rule imposing the special measures taken by the U.S. Treasury Department

against his bank. Another document is the petition in support of his case.

Also the Treasury Department finding against the bank has been put

online. These documents have been made available on the blog “China

Matters.”

In his statement, Au explains the history of his bank’s relations with

North Korea and how there was only one experience, which occurred in

June 1994, when there was a problem with counterfeit U.S. dollars. At the

time, the bank reported this incident to the U.S. government. Agents from

the U.S. government came to the bank and questioned Au. He answered

their questions and asked if the agents recommended that the bank “desist

from doing business with North Korean entities.” The agents said “they

would like us to continue to deal with them as it was better that we

conducted this business than another financial entity that may not be so

cooperative with the United States government.”

Au explains that there was no further experience with counterfeit

money showing up in the transactions of the bank. All “large value

deposits of U.S. dollar bills from North Korean sources” were sent to the

Hong Kong branch of the Republic National Bank of New York (which

became HSBC) to be certified that they were authentic via advanced

technology possessed by that bank. Smaller quantities of bills were

examined in accord with common banking practices by the bank itself.

Au also explains that he had not been approached by U.S. government

agents alerting him to any problem or illegal activity. The first he learned

that his bank was being charged as a bank engaged in “illicit activities”

came when he saw a report in the Asian Wall Street Journal in September

2005 that his bank was a candidate for a U.S. money laundering blacklist.

He tells how:

this news came as a bolt out of the blue – the Bank had never

been informed by the United States that its practices were a cause

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of any money laundering concern, and the counterfeiting event

that the media reported as the basis for the designation had

occurred more than ten years earlier and had been promptly

reported to the authorities by Banco Delta Asia.

Stanley Au’s statement is in sharp contrast with the account in the

U.S. government’s Federal Register of the finding against the bank by the

U.S. Treasury Department.

The Federal Register finding states that the bank had provided

financial services for more than 20 years to multiple North Korean-related

individuals and entities that were engaged in illicit activities. It provides

no specific details of what such illicit activities were. It claims that the

entities paid a fee to Banco Delta Asia for their access to the bank. The

finding claims that the bank facilitated wire transfers and helped a front

company.

In his statement, Stanley Au maintained that the BDA did not charge

a fee for its services nor did it conduct illicit services for North Korea or

any other customer. The bank was only one of the banks in Macau that did

business with North Korea. The business his bank had with North Korea

began in the mid 1970s and was to assist North Korea with its foreign

trade transactions. Also Au described North Korea as a gold producing

country and that in the late 1990s the bank had acted as a “gold bullion

trader on behalf of the North Koreans.” Also the BDA bought or sold

foreign currency notes for North Korea, including U.S. dollars, because

North Korea had a limited banking system and so it couldn’t do such

transactions itself (see Statement, pp. 3-4).

The petition submitted to the U.S. Dept of the Treasury to challenge

the finding against BDA proposes that BDA was targeted not because of

any “voluminous” evidence of money laundering but “because it was an

easy target in the sense that it was not so large that its failure would bring

down the financial system.”

In the substantial and prolific analysis of the BDA problem that has

been developed on the blog “China Matters,” there is the assessment that

North Korea has legitimate financial activity and that the BDA was

legitimately serving as one of the banks for that activity. Even with the

U.N.’s sanctions, it was not appropriate to target for blacklisting the

legitimate financial activities of North Korea. The sanctions that the U.N.-

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imposed against North Korea were to be aimed at its activity that was

related to nuclear weapon development, not to normal financial transac-

tions.

The author of China Matters blog writes:

The alternative view… is that legitimate North Korean financial

activity does exist, BDA had a right to solicit North Korean

accounts and handle North Korean transactions, and Stanley Au

should be allowed to run his bank as long as he conforms to the

laws of his jurisdiction – and (the bank) not be used as a political

football in Washington’s dealings with Pyongyang.

To put it more succinctly, the blog China Matters quotes David

Ascher, who had been the coordinator for the Bush Administration

working group on North Korea and a senior adviser in East Asian affairs

in the State Department, in testimony to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on April 18,

2007, explaining why Banco Delta was chosen to be blacklisted from the

international banking system:

Banco Delta was a symbolic target. We were trying to kill the

chicken to scare the monkeys. And the monkeys were big

Chinese banks doing business in North Korea… and we’re not

talking about tens of millions, we’re talking hundreds of mil-

lions.

The purpose of the action against the BDA appears not only to have

been to target North Korea and its access to the international banking

system, but also to send a message to China.

Therefore it would appear that the action against BDA is a carefully

crafted political action and that it will be necessary that there be public

understanding, discussion and debate about what is behind this action in

order to find a way to have the policy that gave rise to the BDA action

changed.

Instead of the U.S. mainstream press carrying out the needed

investigation about why BDA has been targeted and what is behind this

action, there have been continual condemnations of North Korea.

Fortunately there are journalists like those who work with the McClatchy

News Service who have made an effort to probe what is happening

behind-the-scenes in the BDA affair and blogs like China Matters which

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have taken the time and care to begin uncovering what the BDA affair is

really all about. This is but one of the stories of what is really going on

behind the scenes within the U.S. government that has been hidden from

the public. This is one of the stories yet to be unraveled by bloggers, and

citizen journalists.

III. Citations

(1) See earlier article “North Korea’s $25 Million and Banco Delta Asia,”

http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/ACn37-2.pdf, on pages 4-6.

(2) “North Korea says work to transfer bank funds under way,” AFP, May 15, 2007,

https://www.spacewar.com/reports/North_Korea_Says_Work_To_Transfer_Bank

_Funds_Under_Way_999 .html.

(3) Scott McCormack, Daily Press Briefing, Washington DC, May 17, 2007,

https://2001-

2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/may/851 32.htm.

(4) “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations.”

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html.

(5) Statement of Mr. Stanley Au in Support of Petition to Revoke Rule Imposing Special

Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, p. 7.

See also Kevin G. Hall, “Bank owner disputes money-laundering allegations,” McClatchy

Newspapers, May 16, 2007.

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world

/article24463246.html.

(6) Departnent of the Treasury, 31 CFR Part 103/ RIN 1506-AA83, Federal Register/ Vol

72, No. 52/ Monday, March 19, 2007/ Rules and Regulations.

https://www.fincen.gov

/sites/defa ult/files/special_measure/bda_final_rule.pdf.

(7) Petition of Mr. Stanley Au and Delta Asia Group (Holdings) Ltd. to Rescind Final

Rule, p. 12.

https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/publications

/Jones_Day_Petition_Rescind_BDA_Rule.pdf.

(8) “Stanley Au Makes His Case for Banco Delta Asia,” Tuesday, May 15, 2007,

http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/05/stanley-au-makes-his-case-for-banco.html.

(9) “David Asher’s Dead End,” Saturday, April 28, 2007, at http://chinamatters

.blogspot.com/2007/04/david-ashers-dead-end.html. See also “China’s Proliferation to

North Korea and Iran, and its role in addressing the nuclear and missile situations in both

nations,” Hearing, Sept 14, 2006, Nov. 2006, at

https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/hear

ing-chinas-proliferation-north-korea-and-iran-and-its-role-addressing-nuclear-and, pages

115-116 in the hearing, pages 119-120 in the file.

(10) Ronda Hauben, “Bill Moyers and the Emergence of U.S. Citizen Journalism: Power

of government creates need for investigative news,” at

https://nettime.org/Lists-

Archives/nettime-l-0705 /msg00006.html.

IV. Nautilus invites your responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to

Page 61

this essay. Please send responses to: napsnet-reply@nautilus.org.

Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they

include the author’s name, affiliation, and explicit consent.

Produced by The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Develop-

ment Northeast Asia Peace and Security Project (napsnet-reply@nau

tilus.org).

View this online at: https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum

/behind-the-blacklisting-of-banco-delta-asia/.

Nautilus Institute, 608 San Miguel Ave., Berkeley, CA, 94707-1535

| Phone: (510) 423-0372

| Email: [email protected].

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