Leszek Jesień

The 1996 IGC: European Citizenship Reconsidered

Motto:
Netizen - A habitual visitor, resident, inhabitant, citizen, denizen of the Internet.
No one person, government or group is in charge of the Internet. Cooperation between people, groups and committees, along with user actions have determined how the Internet is ‘governed’.
Brown Computer Solutions
Netizens are Net Citizens who utilize the Net from their home, workplace, school, library, etc. These people are among those who populate the Net, and make it a resource of human beings. These netizens participate to help make the Net both an intellectual and a social resource.
Michael Hauben, „Further Thoughts about Netizens”; hauben@columbia.edu

Contents:

Introduction	

Definitions	

The challenge of democratic practice	

The challenge of rights	

The ‘suspension clause’	

Conclusions	

Introduction
First there was civil citizenship, then political and finally social citizenship. The three stages of evolution of citizenship described by T. H. Marshall were drawn from development of people’s rights and duties in England since the XVIII century. This classical work however applies easily only for the nation states. The civil citizenship, the principles of equality before the law, personal liberty, freedom of speech and faith as well as the right to own private property are not nowadays questioned in the area of European civilisation. The last, hopefully, assault on them was undertaken by the communist regimes of Soviet origins.
It may seem that the political citizenship is equally safe in the modern Western political systems. The fight for universal right to elect and be elected is won as far as a single nation state is concerned. „By the political element I mean the right to participate and exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body - wrote T. H. Marshall - The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government.” Today the political citizenship is not conditioned with anything else that maturity understood as certain age of person. Yet, when we look at a more complicated political system as is the European Union, the picture does not appear equally clear. The Maastricht treaty grants the European citizens the right to vote in municipal and European Parliament elections. Yet here the problem may be when we try to have a closer look at the duties involved with citizenship. Can a foreigner be a good citizen of any country? The quality of citizenship is at stake. As well as the legitimacy of political systems and of decisions taken by elected representatives. Can a German or a British living for a few months in his or her summer house in Spain be a decent elector in the municipal elections of his/her vacation neighbourhood? In many cases certainly yes. And in many cases not. This may not be an important problem if we were not speaking about the core of the issue of European citizenship. The issue of responsible participation in the political life.
Perhaps the most debatable element of modern citizenship is that of social rights. First, it is not universally recognised in modern democracies that the social rights make necessary part of contemporary citizenship. As noted by Lord Dahrendorf, in the USA the notion of equal opportunities dominated the fight for equal civil and political rights. And the opportunity was to contain rather the civil rights, the political rights and ‘open frontier’, than the social rights. Secondly, the omnipresence of social rights in post second world war Europe may be attributed to the criticism of the before war social relations which were accused as one of the reasons for the success of totalitarian regimes. Also the post war political consensus among political parties concerning the objectives of social policy eased the development of the welfare state. The British historians noted that the success of the Beveridge report was due to a hunger for sharing the fruits of the coming peace. „The report had been published shortly after the victory of El Alamein, and to believe in Beveridge was to have faith in a successful outcome to the war; more than that, it meant believing in a democratic distribution of the spoils of victory, since Beveridge had recommended the establishment of a comprehensive system of social insurance and the foundation of a national health service.” Finally, nowadays the social protection (and - necessarily - the role of the state in it) comes under question as Europe faces the competition of the outside world. It is increasingly hard to continue to argue that the costs of the labour in Europe have to be so high because of the people’s preference for ‘European style of life’. Therefore constitutional or legal aspects of citizenship acquire both political and economic dimensions.
Lastly, the fundamental question of European citizenship lies in the attempt to respond to the needs of the citizens of the member states. Yet, by acquiring more and more rights and privileges the public does not necessarily have to respond by greater support for the European construction. We will come back to this problem later on.
We can only agree with Silvio Fagiolo the first chairman of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference under the Italian Presidency. He understands the task of bringing the Union closer to the citizens as possible through the channel of enhancing the European citizenship. „The Conference will be successful if it allows the Union to operate effectively and democratically, within the limits of the principle of subsidiarity, not only in the traditional sectors but also in the fields of foreign policy, of defence, and of the twofold priorities of security and freedom. The defining point of this process will be the transition from the concept of the market to that of the citizenship, by which I mean a greater direct involvement of the citizens in the running of the Union.”
Life itself brought up a commentary to these words. On the eve of launching the 1996 IGC, portrayed for a long time as a major overview of the Union structures and policies, as a major step towards enlargement, only 15 per cent of European citizens were aware of the event. The best informed came out the Danes (37 per cent), while the Belgians appeared the least knowing (9 per cent) about the Conference formally introduced on a special summit of European leaders. Later on the proportion of the Europeans knowing about the IGC naturally raised to (only?) 28 per cent, yet with somewhat ironic side-effect: about 37 per cent of those informed thought the main issue debated there was single currency, the issue deliberately avoided following the Reflection Group advise.
Definitions
What does it mean to be European citizen? The answer given by the Treaty on European Union is simple: it means to be the citizen of any member state and therefore the citizen of the Union. It means to have the right to participate in municipal and European Parliament elections in the place of living. It means to have the right to the other country consular protection outside the territory of the Union and the right to petition the European Parliament and to apply to the Ombudsman.
The concept of European citizenship was often described as ‘ambitious’. It is hoped to lead to an „introduction of a subject of the Community into the social, economic, cultural, and even political life of the member state of which he is not the subject but on which territory he resides”.
On the other hand the IGC negotiators are facing the challenge of ‘promoting the European values’, as it was formulated by the Reflection Group. The Westendorp report stresses the necessity of strengthening the security of citizens at home and the need to tackle what seems to be important to the people, namely employment, environment, transparency of the Union activities and decision making and finally proper application of the subsidiarity principle. All this in order to „regain the commitment of [the Union’s] citizens”. The list of demands to citizenship is certainly right but not sufficient, although I would not argue for its simple extension. It rightly comes from the analysis of the citizens’ needs. However by fulfilling all possible needs (understood as rights) of the people we do not create citizenship. It may be a necessary condition, but it certainly is not a sufficient one. This is amply demonstrated by modern ‘secessionist’ movements in the countries like Canada (Quebec), Spain (Basque), France (Corse), etc. all of which happen to develop within modern liberal democracies, apparently fulfilling their obligations towards the citizens in the most advanced ‘fullest’ possible way. Rightly so, nobody even tries to compare the level of dissatisfaction of, say, les Quebecois with the anger of the Kurds.
The simple definition of citizenship says that it „denote the full and responsible membership of an individual in a state”. Other formulation explains that citizenship shows „the condition of being citizen and the responsibilities and rights this status entails”, where citizens are understood as „full and equal members of a democratic political community”. 
The word ‘democratic’ resides on principle of legitimacy. Therefore, although some autocratic regimes may be partially legitimised, it is widely assumed that legitimacy and citizenship are the twin Atlas brothers of democracy: democracy’s bedrock. „The axial principle of the polity is legitimacy, and in a democratic polity it is the principle that power can be held and governance exercised only with the consent of the governed. The implicit condition is the idea of equality, that all men are to have an equal voice in this consensus. But the idea of citizenship which embodies this conception has in the past 100 years been expanded to include equality not only in the public sphere, but in all other dimensions of social life as well - equality before the law, equality of civil rights, equality of opportunity, even equality of results - so that a person is able to participate fully, as a citizen, in the society. Much of this may be formal, but it is always the source to which aggrieved groups have recourse when seeking justice in the society.”
Although citizenship is a fundamental condition of legitimacy, it is not sufficient. A regime may only be legitimate if its citizens perceive the rulers as ‘theirs’ but also if the system shows other necessary qualities. As the first quality, Mattei Dogan mentioned lack of coercion: „theoretically, the lower the degree of legitimacy, the higher should be the amount of coercion”. The indicators of the lack of coercion are all civil freedoms: of expression, of association, of demonstration, of religious institutions, but also low level of military intervention in the political arena, fair elections, dependent judiciary, free competition among political parties and absence of government terror. He notes as well that „a high level of corruption is one of the best symptoms of delegitimation”. This should not be misunderstood with political and other scandals which only are publicly visible where freedom of speech is fully practised. Also people’s trust in the regime’s institution is necessary. When men and women distrust the institutions of their state, this clearly is the signal of ongoing delegitimization of the regime as a whole. However, widely observed distrust of modern political institutions is regarded as not yet undermining democracy itself. The people, while expressing their lack of confidence in the institutions still consider democracy as the only way of government for their country.
We need to see the problems of European citizenship in wider context. Certainly what can be said, and in fact was often said, the Europeans are dissatisfied with the European politics (Maastricht referenda, Norwegian rejection of membership, diminishing support for the Union among new member states expressed recently in the elections to the European Parliament - those are the examples). Following Dogan’s categorisation we can say that the Europeans distrust Brussels. As far as the level of corruption is concerned, it would be safe to say that it is not perhaps different that the level of it in the member states. Somewhat much more interesting results we may have if we apply the coercion criteria towards the European Union. Certainly we can observe a very low, if none at all, level of military intervention in the political arena. Certainly, and fortunately, there is absence of government terror. But what about the rest of the coercion criterion? Can we answer as positively as we would on the national level that the European level ensures the freedom of speech, of demonstrations, of association, of political competition? We certainly can answer positively, in the sense that nothing forbids those freedoms from practice. But in practice all of them do not exist fully. The European press, widely read one and circulating all over Europe is either American (International Herald Tribune, Wall Street Journal Europe), or national (Financial Times, Economist). Where are those demonstrations against/for common issues taking place in all major European cities? European-wide political parties? Those freedoms are not practised not because an oppressive regime stops the citizens from practising them. The European citizens do not want(?), need(?), feel like(?) to practising them. The Maastricht treaty do not ‘grant’ them those freedoms expressis verbis, but they exist potentially as nothing in law stops the citizens from having political activity on the European scale.
When a hybrid like the European Union is considered, any decent theory of legitimisation of political regime through citizens’ participation breaks down. The existing theories of citizenship show their historical bias and fundamental limitation only to the nation states.
Two interesting exceptions we can observe here. There are indeed some European non-governmental organisations like European Movement or European Students’ Association (AEGEE) etc., as there are the churches which cut across the borders, all of them. The first, however are - although valuable in themselves - the elitist affairs. The second case belongs to the European historical heritage.
The theories of citizenship stress the role of intellectuals. In the past they were the guardians of common heritage, they were the promoters of the idea of nation state and universal participation in its life, thus the citizenship. Nowadays, they - academics, politicians, journalists, etc. - have the chance to react to the excesses of the nationalist feelings which may be destructive for increasingly complex societies. Far from becoming the melting pot, the USA and other liberal democracies undergo the process of diversification with growing discrepancies of income (after weakening of the welfare state), polarisation of politics (after the collapse of communism) and regionalisation as a reaction to globalisation. The intellectual elite is the one well equipped for a bold approach to the issue of citizenship. They should hope that there still exists a fabric linking those various elements of the society, sometimes facing against each other as the vested interest groups, sometimes simply drifting apart as is the case of ethnically oriented regions or provinces of some states or the case of excluded welfare dependants versus the rich self isolating in the suburbs. The fabric of citizenship.
Is has been often observed that effectiveness of the Union is something the citizens do care about, that once the Intergovernmental Conference will be able to make the Union to take the decisions timely and efficiently, they will be „closer to the Union”. Yet it is a ‘normal’ political practice in the member states to rather claim the successes on domestic political parties account, whereas the blame for mistakes and sacrifices is often projected on the Union. The citizen is then well off thanks to the national politicians, not to the Commissioners. Both subjectively and ‘objectively’: “The sacrifice of some authority and policy independence to European institutions has enabled national governments to better perform the economic and social tasks required of democratic welfare state and has thereby actually bolstered, rather than undermined, the sovereignty and legitimacy of European nation-states.”
The challenge of democratic practice
The Reflection Group noted that the IGC „must make the Union more relevant to its citizens”. This has been based on a conviction that in fact the Union is not really close to the hearts of the citizens. Well, it would be hard to argue that this is not the case. Yet, it seems to be worthwhile to reconsider whether the core of the problem was formulated in a way which would help the IGC to formulate eventual response.
Usually it is taken for granted in debates on citizenship and democratisation of the Union that the idea of European integration is undergoing a crisis of popularity or support. Indeed, as noted above, it would be difficult to argue otherwise. But perhaps the situation is less clear and may not easily allow for the application of this simple dichotomy popular vs. unpopular, legitimate vs. delegitimized, etc. It has been often argued that significant part of the negative voting in all referenda after Maastricht was due to the domestic political situations. The most vivid example of this may be the 1992 European referendum in France which was both called because of domestic reasons (Mitterrand wanted to win the opposition over the European issues) and also almost failed because Mitterrand’s calculations proved false in face of declining popularity of the Socialist Party. This is why the French referendum was sometimes called ‘anti-Mitterrand’ plebiscite rather than truly a voting over essential European issues. Of course, one may argue that if there was a strong pro-European feeling in favour of the Maastricht then the ‘anti-Mitterrand’ factor would have counted much less, if ever. Yes, the European idea was not at that time particularly popular in the sense of emotionally striking the hearts of the Europeans, and still is not. However the issue here is not only popularity of integration.
Perhaps the issue here is also and foremost the shape and health of the modern version of representative democracy based on a well functioning free market economy, the liberal democracy. In the member states of the Union, and elsewhere in the ‘democratic world’ the citizens are dissatisfied with their political institutions, their politicians, the way ‘things are going’ in their countries. The examples of Ross Perot in the USA, recent Belgian manifestations, ‘revolution’ in Italy, Jörg Haider in Austria, are abundant and do not arise from the problems of European integration. This simply adds its own layer of complication to this certainly not-very-simple structure and not-very-democratic practice.
And it was rightly observed by Philippe Schmitter that the challenge to the qualifiers the modern democracy was usually described with: representative, liberal; as well as to the very fundamentals of it: that it is in fact democracy, that the best it is practised within the public sphere of the nation states, will come from the political debate and experience of the established liberal democracies. Even more, their „ability to adjust their well-entrenched rules and practices will determine the prospects of democracy worldwide”. Interestingly for the debate over European citizenship, Schmitter argues that the future is rather for the post-liberal kind of democracy than the ‘more liberal’ (more liberalism with less democracy - radical privatisation with less of citizens participation resulting in a ‘de-democratisation’) or the pre-liberal one (a kind of new ‘civic republicanism’ with more of direct rule of the people). The post-liberal version is not yet clearly formulated, but „proposals have emerged for citizens’ juries, for interactive polls, for extending voting rights to future generation, for videodemocracy or teledemocracy, for better ways to enlighten citizens in the formation of their preferences, for reciprocal representation between countries, for vouchers whereby individuals could support a system of ‘secondary citizenship’ for interest associations and social movements, and the like.”
What strikes a ‘European’ observer is the dissimilarity of above described efforts to improve functioning of democracy, or simply to find modern ways for proper expression of political will of the citizens, and the way the IGC puts the issue on the negotiating table. None of the mentioned propositions are on the list of wishes for the European citizens during the IGC. And it would be surprising if they were. The reasons for this discrepancy may be found in the critique of new republicanism which claims among others for decentralisation of power (as compared to European subsidiarity and regions), referenda and recall initiatives (as compared to propositions for general European-wide elections of the President of the Union), obligatory voting (compared to election procedures for the European Parliament), civic education (versus European educational programmes like Tempus, Leonardo, Language, etc., and multiple public awareness campaigns as those for example for promoting the euro), quotas for minorities (vs. the biggest problem of weighting of votes in the Council and number of country seats in the EP). Schmitter argues that this approach „makes demands of individual citizens - especially upon their time and attention - that are unrealistic given the pace of contemporary life and availability of so many more appealing ways of spending one’s (always scarce) leisure”. Indeed, it seems at least unrealistic to count on more citizens’ participation and closeness on the basis of - worthwhile in itself - greater transparency of the European institutions, and - necessary anyway - simpler Treaty, or subsidiarity.
Just because ‘the others’ (the national democratic states) have the same kind of problem does not assuage our, ‘European’, worries. Yet, in this case ‘the others’ are also ‘us’. The political and citizenship problems of the modern well established democracies within the nation states are also those of the European Union, but the level of complication is much higher, and in this case simple comparison of solutions would not probably lead us very far.
The challenge of rights
Apart of the troubles with citizenship which arise from modern practice of democracy, there are those which stem from debates on its content. Let us assume, following T. H. Marshall, that no content of citizenship is agreed: „There is no universal principle that determines what (…) rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, and enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed.”
Yet, in this situation, there is a natural tendency to enlarge the rights endlessly in hope to achieve greater loyalty of citizens: what worked on consecutive stages of the development of the notion of citizenship, it should work now. There are two areas of citizenship which are particularly vulnerable to debatable enlargement of its scope: the human rights and social rights. Significantly both are very much present on the agenda of the IGC. It may mean that in the situation of lack of relevant solutions for the issue of citizenship, the negotiators face the pressure for putting more and more of the rights in hope of winning the sympathy of reluctant citizens of the members states. Also, in the situation of apparent - and necessary as noted by T. H. Marshall - lack of consensus around the content of it, the member states seem to press with their own versions of citizenship. What works on nation state level, why should it not work on the European one? Especially when it coincides with the way governance is practised in national capitals. What we have then is a competition of versions of citizenships wrapped with competing models of democracies.
The issue of social rights is highly debatable because it reflects some deep divisions as to how modern governance should look like in today’s world, especially at the European level. The differences around Social Chapter are still there due to the sharp differences among ruling elites of member states. Whereas present British opposition will perhaps lessen with probable new Labour government, social rights enhancement will not be an easy journey as the governments struggle with fulfilling the Maastricht criteria for EMU. This was interestingly demonstrated by French approach to ‘social Europe’, which was raised as an important issue on the occasion of launching of the IGC, but then the French diplomacy carefully avoided putting it onto the IGC agenda. The issue of employment under discussion during the IGC provokes wide differences of opinion. Some of the countries are simply against new treaty provisions, others - for example Austrian new employment proposal - would like to have words ‘full employment’ among the Community objectives (Art. 2) and the Irish presidency proposes to keep wording of ‘high level of employment’ but among the Union objectives (Art. B).
As observed by Dahrendorf, in their development over last decades the social rights were transformed into ‘entitlements’. Those in turn are considered sometimes as the first necessary element in building of citizenship. “The notion of inclusiveness, which is at the heart of the social policy, is the precondition to realising citizenship.” Yet, if we leave aside the practical problems of managing economy by governments, the entitlements do not represent a strong unifying factor giving the people a sense of belonging and a reason for common endeavour.
The human rights pose quite a different problem. They are protected on the national level, and the opinion of the European Court of Justice about the possibility of the EU adherence to the European Convention of Human Rights was pessimistic. But, surprisingly, human rights may provide us with an answer to the fundamental question whether, it is at all possible to have Union’s citizenship as such. Putting it differently, whether we can have the European citizens per se. Having in mind the Treaty definition of European citizenship it appears impossible. The Maastricht treaty grants European citizenship only to the citizens of the member states, thus a European citizen is one who already holds a national citizenship, not the other way round. But what would happen if one loses its national citizenship? This was analysed by law professor Stephen Hall with unanticipated results: in fact it is possible - according to him - for denationalised person to hold only the Union’s citizenship and therefore to be the European citizen.
“Nothing in the TEU affects a Member State’s power to withdraw its nationality from a person in circumstances which do not violate the general principle of law protected by the Court of Justice. Such a withdrawal is, nevertheless, one which falls within the ‘framework of Community law’ since the enactment of Article 8 EC.
Consequently where a national measure deprives an individual of his Member State nationality in violation of the fundamental human rights protected by the Court of Justice as general principle of Community law, the national authorities will probably be under an obligation not to apply that measure. The result would be that the individual would then retain both his Member State nationality and his Union citizenship. (...)
Even if the validity of the denationalisation measure remained unaffected at the level of domestic law, a citizen of the Union would retain that Community status in his (former) own Member State. Such a Community status could not be withdrawn in violation of the fundamental rights protected by the Court of Justice as general principles of law.”
Having this possibility in mind we turn to the critical analysis of the German Constitutional Court opinion on the Maastricht treaty by Prof. Weiler. The Karlsruhe court based its reluctant fiat for the ratification of the treaty on the no-demos thesis, arguing that there is no European demos in the sense of ethno-cultural feeling of belonging. Prof. Weiler argues, however, that this understanding of demos - valid as it is for traditional process of creation of modern nation states - denies any possibility for another set of linkages among members of polity. It disregards also the examples of ‘conscious’ elitist creation of some of the states, as Italy and Germany. He stresses than the need for breaking the link between nationality and citizenship and prefers the following understanding of European citizenship:
„the Union belongs to, is composed of, citizens who by definition do not share the same nationality. The substance of membership (an thus of the demos) is in a commitment to the shared values (…), to the duties and rights of a civic society (…). What is special in this concept is that it invites individuals to see themselves as belonging simultaneously to two demoi (…).
The treaties on this reading would have to be seen not only as an agreement among states (…) but as a ‘social contract’ among the nationals of those states (…) that they will (…) regard themselves as associating as citizens in this civic society.”
The way out of popular disenchantment with European integration would be then rather in enhancing the symbolic side of European life, in conscious leadership and open challenging of hard problems facing Europe, then in meticulous fine-tuning of the myriad of rights and entitlements.
The ‘suspension clause’
Certainly much can be done to improve the functioning of the European citizenship. A careful enhancement of the citizens’ rights is very much proper. Yet, as the phenomenon of citizenship is about the two-way linkage between individual and state, this should be reinforced with the duties as well.
In modern world there are only few duties the citizen is due to his/her state. One is military service as an expression of the duty to defend the political entity one is participating in. While we are long way away from building an European army, there may be an opportunity to serve - possibly just a part of the military service - in one of the multi-national forces emerging in Europe (Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euromarifor, etc.). This cannot be done as a treaty provision concerning every member state (there are the neutral countries and others reluctant to give up - even partially - their hand over this important feature of the nation state). The idea of flexible integration now discussed at the IGC - which seems suitable for security and military cooperation - may be tried in this field.
The other duty is paying taxes. This is highly doubtful whether in any envisageable future any general tax will be introduced from the European level. The fundamental democratic principle of Magna Carta: ‘no taxation without representation’ puts us into a vicious circle of the lack of a European demos which makes impossible any taxation by - thus ‘undemocratic’ - European institutions. However a kind of ‘target tax’ may be discussed. It is perhaps not a comfortable position for an observer from the associated country to propose special tax for the sake of enlargement, especially given mixed effects of German Solidarbeitrag and mixed feeling of the Germans about it. It should be noted however, that raising the issue of the EU enlargement into a all-European common cause might have an important impact on the deliberations the Europeans give to the fundamental paradox of European integration: „Man and woman of Europe today, more than ever, feel the need for a common project. And yet, for a growing number of Europeans, the rationale for Community integration is not self-evident.” An European Solidarbeitrag might be an option to consider from the political point of view.
The European Union cannot be an easy offer. As much as it is attractive for obvious political and economic reasons, it cannot be for everybody. It has to have the limits defined in terms of civilisation, geography and political values if it is to be more than a closed common market, than ‘Fortress Europe’. It seems that nolens volens we are observing a kind of formulation of what Europe is. Following the period of initial hesitation after 1989, the Eastern enlargement of the Union is about to happen. European integration also experienced a series of rejections: Greenland, Switzerland, Norway and Malta are all different. Those examples of non-participation in political integration are also signs of growing consciousness of what the European Union is and what is not. As much as it is hard to define ‘Europe’ in positive political terms, these experiences contribute to self-definition of those Europeans who decided to participate in the venture anyway.
Having those circumstances in mind, the EU should respond to the need of definition of Europe. Much has been said in this context about the role of strengthening of human rights in the Treaty, about eventual adherence of the Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. This comes out difficult due to the lack of the EU legal personality, and perhaps unnecessary as all member states are in fact well established democracies. In any case, human rights are applicable not only to the citizens of a democratic regime, but also to the non-citizens. Therefore, even if introduced into the Treaty, the human rights would not necessarily enhance European citizenship.
It seems however that even stronger response of the EU in this area could be introduction of a ‘suspension clause’ providing the EU with the possibility of suspending membership of or even enforcing the sanctions against a member state violating human rights and rules of democracy. The idea came to the forefront of discussions in the context of embracing the ‘new democracies’ of Central and Eastern Europe. But its implications may be far more reaching provided that the principles on which the Union is build will be upheld. Whatever were political considerations of accepting Russia into the Council of Europe at the time of war in Chechnya, the message for the Europeans was that ‘we’ are not about the human rights. As it is hard to imagine that the Europeans are not about the human values, the gap between the politicians and the peoples probably has grown even larger in this particular moment.
The recent Austro-Italian proposal concerning fundamental rights and citizenship goes into this direction and forsees introduction of new article O (2) which would allow to suspend certain membership rights for a country ‘seriously and persistently’ violating’ rules of democracy and human rights. The European Council (determining the facts) and then the Council (implementing the measures) would decide on qualified majority with the vote of the country concerned not taken into account. Yet, under the reading of the Presidency proposal, the provision looks somewhat weaker and the act of establishing whether the breach of fundamental rights has taken place is for the European Council finding it unanimously. It is hard to imagine that a country violating the rule of law, democracy and human rights would not object to the very opinion that this actually happens.
The human rights are to defend them and not to surrender, or to accept their violation. The logic is to accept in full. In this context of belonging, participation and citizenship similar can be said about the EU argument with the USA about trading with Cuba, Iran and Libya (American Helms-Burton and D’Amato laws punishing also European companies dealing with those countries). Once the argument has reached moral grounds (and the American sanctions are presented in moral terms) the EU cannot espouse its political, economic, practical or even legal reasons, unless it is ready to accept unavoidable loss of ‘proximity’ of its citizens to the case of integration based on European values.
Only when highly valued, the political entity can count on true belonging of its members. Only then citizenship can be built.
Conclusions
The path chosen by the IGC is necessary. It is indispensable to enhance citizens’ rights along modern trends. Therefore it should strike a proper balance between far reaching propositions of the Scandinavian countries and a more cautious approach of the others. Particular attention should be given to the costs of the social rights and the ability to advance them. In the longer term they may be more destructive if not delivered, than if not included in the treaty at all.
Yet, the true focus of creating of European citizenship should shift into the political and symbolic sphere. It is not perhaps the job of the IGC negotiators to deal with symbolic features of the European construction, but here they are ultimately confronted with the political reality of the treaty’s text they try to put up.
There is a number of issues around which the Europeans can rally. The first may be future enlargement, if this is presented not only in form of financial burden and bureaucratic hurdle. The Eastern enlargement of the Union should be shaped as a common cause of all the Europeans. The Union needs the catchy phrases for rallying the Europeans behind the task. The strong leadership is needed for this as much as common conviction of the political and intellectual elites that this is truly a historical task and opportunity to get the Central heart of Europe and the Eastern outskirts of it back together with its more developed Western part.
The key difference in the approach to re-democratisation of former communist countries can be seen when the Union activities in the region are compared with the American ones. The Union has set up a vast project called PHARE highly beneficial for the associated countries. The USA is also operating with the government money (USAID and USIA), but their most visible activity are the little and even tiny projects done at the local level by volunteers, and efficiently and flexibly run by private foundations (often partially supported by the federal funds). The effect is that the Union has spent a lot of very much needed money with very little credit for it. And the issue of citizens participation was lost altogether on this track. It is missing now on both sides: among the European citizens and their Central and Eastern European compatriots which can only see, if ever, the Brussels involvement, but not the European citizenry around.
Almost in front of us, and almost unnoticed the new kind of citizenship is evolving. The Netizenry - those who use the Internet. Without much of attention, without governments and power, without financial incentives and social entitlements. But using the Internet is today a sign of belonging to the elite, to those who exchange ideas, who participate in something important, in a common cause. There is no question of governance there, nor the question of representation, but there is a full, ultimate and direct participation. Of course, the notion of netizenship would not come out, perhaps would not even emerge yet, if there was no intrusion: the attempt to control, or censor the Internet. Those who use it, oppose the encroachments of the ‘outside’ power fiercely. The battle gives them an additional sense of commonality. There are the Internet newspapers, the clubs, interest and hobby groupings, there is growing Net business and serious scientific exchange of ideas. Yahoo - one of the first Internet services provider - is already listed at the stock exchange.
At the time the European Union struggles to shape the European citizenship with much effort and little success, the other citizenship - Netizenship - emerges. The IGC negotiators and European political leaders should perhaps look at this phenomenon with sympathy and attention.