

FOUNDATIONS OF METALOGIC

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Primary Reference

My Lecture Notes will serve as the primary reference material. Handouts on [Incompleteness](#), [Undefinability & Undecidability](#), the [ZFC Axioms](#), and [Constructability & Forcing](#), available at [my website](#), may also be useful. We will, however, review this technical material as we go.

Other References

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic (Cohnitz & Estrada-González)
Computability and Logic (Boolos, Jeffrey, & Burgess)
Fast Track to Forcing (Džamonja)
Philosophy and Model Theory (Button & Walsh)

Week 1 (Jan. 19): Logical Form

Iacona, “Two Notions of Logical Form”
Pietroski, “[Logical Form](#)”
Russell, [Our Knowledge of the External World](#) (Lecture II)

Optional: Lepore & Ludwig, “[What is Logical Form?](#)”

Week 2 (Jan 26): Logical Constants

MacFarlane, “[Logical Constants](#)”
Tarski, “A Philosophical Letter of Alfred Tarski”
Tarski, “What are Logical Notions?”

Optional: Varzi, “On Logical Relativity”

Week 3 (Feb 2): Ascendence of First-Order Logic

Eklund, “How Logic Became First-Order”

Goldfarb, “Logic in the 20s: The Nature of the Quantifier”

Shapiro, “Do Not Claim Too Much: Second-Order Logic and First-Order Logic”

Optional: Brady, *From Peirce to Skolem: A Neglected Chapter in the History of Mathematical Logic*

Optional: Ewald, “The Emergence of First-Order Logic”

Week 4 (Feb. 9): Types and Tokens

Hilbert, “On the Infinite”

Kreisel, “Hilbert’s Programme”

Wetzel, “Expressions vs. Numbers”

Optional: Bourbaki, *Theory of Sets* (Introduction & Chapter 1)

Optional: Clarke-Doane, “Platonic Semantics”

Optional: Wetzel, “What are Occurrences of Expressions?”

[Visit from [Linda Wetzel](#)]

Week 5 (Feb. 16): Strict Finitism

Alston, “Ontological Commitments”

Quine & Goodman, “[Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism](#)”

Weir, “[A Neo-Formalist Approach to Mathematical Truth](#)”

Optional: Friedman, [Philosophical Problems in Logic](#)

Optional: Rossberg & Cohnitz, “[Logical Consequence for Nominalists](#)”

Week 6 (Feb 23): Soundness & Completeness

Crossley et al., *What is Mathematical Logic* (Chapter 2)

Dummett, “The Justification of Deduction”

Kaye, “Circularity in Soundness and Completeness”

Optional: Haack, “Dummett’s Justification of Deduction”

Optional: Kreisel, “Informal Rigor and Completeness Proofs”

Week 7 (March 2): Compactness & Löwenheim–Skolem

Benacerraf, “Skolem and the Skeptic”

Crossley et al., *What is Mathematical Logic* (Chapter 3)

Skolem, “Some Remarks on Axiomatic Set Theory”

Optional: Field, “Are Our Mathematical and Logical Concepts Highly Indeterminate?”

Optional: Väänänen, “[Second-Order and Higher-Order Logic](#)”

Week 8 (March 9): The Purpose of Formalization

Azzouni, “The Derivation-Indicator View of Mathematical Practice”

Fallis, “Intentional Gaps in Mathematical Proofs”

Marfori, “Informal Proofs and Mathematical Rigor”

Optional: Macbeth, “Formal Proofs in Mathematical Practice”

Optional: Rav, “Why do we Prove Theorems?”

Week 9 (March 16): NO CLASS (Spring Break)

Week 10 (March 23): Automated Theorem Proving

[Visit from [Michael Harris](#)]

Avigad, “Computers in Mathematical Inquiry”

Bassler, O. Bradley, “The Surveyability of Mathematical Proof: A Historical Perspective”

Harris, “Do Androids Prove Theorems in Their Sleep?”

Optional: Ornes, “[How Close Are Computers to Automating Mathematical Reasoning?](#)”

Optional: Thurston, “[On Proof and Progress in Mathematics](#)”

Week 11 (March 30): First Incompleteness Theorem

Benacerraf, “God, the Devil and Gödel”

Crossley et al., *What is Mathematical Logic?* (Chapter 5)

Feferman, “Transfinite Recursive Progressions of Axiomatic Theories”

Optional: Lacey & Joseph, “What the Gödel Formula Says”

Optional: Smith, *An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems, 2nd Ed.* (Chapter 29, Sec. 30.4, & [MRDP Theorem supplement](#))

Week 12 (April 6): Undefinability of Truth

Shapiro, "Proof and Truth: Through Thick and Thin"

Smith, *An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems, 2nd Ed.* (Chapter 27)

Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth"

Optional: Woleński, "[Godel, Tarski and Truth](#)"

Week 13 (April 13): Second Incompleteness Theorem

Detfleson, *Hilbert's Program* (Chapter 3: The Gödelian Challenge)

Smith, *An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems* (Chapters 31-36 & Sec. 37.5)

Optional: Hilbert, "[Knowledge of Nature and Logic](#)"

Optional: Zach, "[Hilbert's Program](#)"

Week 14 (April 20): Inner Models & Forcing

Crossley et al., *What is Mathematical Logic?* (Chapter 6)

Kennedy, *Gödel's Theorems* (Chapters 6-7)

Ciesielski, *Set Theory for the Working Mathematician* (Chapter 9)

Optional: Honzik, "[A Quick Guide to Independence Results](#)"

Week 14 (April 27): Pluralism, Incommensurability, & Physics

[Visit from [Sean Carroll](#)]

Carroll, "Real Physics without Real Math"

Clarke-Doane, [Mathematics and Metaphilosophy](#) (Chapters 2 & 4)

Shapiro, *Varieties of Logic* (Chapter 7)

Optional: Arenhart, "The Received View on Quantum Non-Individuality: Formal and Metaphysical Analysis"

Optional: French & Krause, *Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis* (Chapter 9: The Logic of Quanta)