

JUSTIN SVEC

Department of Economics
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027

417 West 118th Street, Apt 41
New York, NY 10027
504-481-7223
jcs2104@columbia.edu
www.columbia.edu/~jcs2104

Placement Co-Chair: David Weinstein, (212) 854-6880; email, dew35@columbia.edu

Placement Co-Chair: Ricardo Reis, (212) 851-4007; email, rr2572@columbia.edu

Placement Assistant: Jody Johnson, (212) 854-6881; email, jj2289@columbia.edu

Education:

2003-Present Ph.D. Candidate, Economics, Columbia University
2006 M. Phil Economics, Columbia University
2005 M.A. Economics, Columbia University
2003 B. A. Economics, Stanford University, with Honors

Honors:

2006-07 Finalist for Presidential Teaching Award, Columbia University
2006-07 Wueller Teaching Award, Columbia University
2006-07 Lewis A. Sanders Endowed Fellowship, Columbia University
2005-06 Wueller Teaching Award, Columbia University
2004-05 Wueller Teaching Award, Columbia University

Teaching and Research Fields:

Macroeconomics
Public Finance
International Economics

Dissertation:

Title: Optimal Fiscal Policy and Model Uncertainty
Sponsor: Professor Woodford
Expected date of completion: May 2009

Job Market Paper: "Optimal Fiscal Policy with Robust Control"

Abstract: This paper compares the fiscal policies implemented by two types of government when confronted by consumer uncertainty. Consumers, lacking confidence in their understanding of the stochastic environment, distort their subjective probability model. The government does not face this uncertainty. Through its choice of a labor tax and a supply of one-period bonds, the government manipulates the competitive equilibrium allocation and the

consumers' probability distortion. I consider two types of altruistic government. The 'benevolent' government maximizes the consumers' expected utility under the true probability model, whereas the 'political' government maximizes the consumers' expected utility under the distorted probability model. I find that, relative to rational expectations, the benevolent government relies more heavily on labor taxes to finance fluctuations in spending, while the political government depends more on public debt to absorb the fiscal shock. These policies are designed to influence the consumers' savings decisions and probability distortion.

Teaching Experience:

Lecturer:

Summer 2007, Intermediate Macroeconomics

Summer 2006, Intermediate Macroeconomics

Teaching Assistant:

Fall 2008, Advanced Macroeconomics

Spring 2007, Economics of Uncertainty

Fall 2006, Political Economy

Spring 2006, Graduate Microeconomics Analysis II

Fall 2005, Political Economy

Spring 2004, Intermediate Macroeconomics

Fall 2004, Intermediate Macroeconomics

Research Experience:

June-August 2004 Research Assistant for Prof. John Donaldson

Working Papers:

“Model Uncertainty and Optimal Capital Taxation”

References:

Professor Michael Woodford, Department of Economics, Columbia University
(212) 854-1094, mw2230@columbia.edu

Professor Marc Giannoni, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
(212) 854-6118, mg2190@columbia.edu

Professor Bruce Preston, Department of Economics, Columbia University
(212) 854-4092, bp2121@columbia.edu