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# The Politics of Violence in Democratization

## Lessons from Kenya and South Africa

*Jacqueline M. Klopp and Elke Zuern*

In South Africa after Nelson Mandela's release from prison and the unbanning of opposition movements, an estimated 15,000 people died in political violence.<sup>1</sup> In Kenya, over the last decade of political liberalization, over two thousand people were killed, and at least 500,000 displaced.<sup>2</sup> Despite large-scale violence, and indeed civil war in South Africa, both countries successfully made the transition to formal, electoral democracies. In April 1994 South Africa held its first nonracial, democratic elections. In December 2002 Kenya achieved a historic transfer of power from the dominant party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), to an opposition coalition through a free and fair election. In both cases, contrary to popular expectations and dire predictions, large-scale violence declined markedly, allowing for the creation of new democracies.

Many scholars have argued that in the short term democratization, particularly in ethnically heterogeneous countries, is linked to greater human rights violations and large-scale violence (thousands of deaths over the period of political opening, typically measured in years). First, a number of studies based on large N data sets suggest a correlation between violence and democratization.<sup>3</sup> Second, international relations theorists, drawing upon work in security studies, have underlined the role of elite manipulation in explaining the rapid escalation of violence in cases of political liberalization from the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda.<sup>4</sup> This work has been complemented by case studies that tease out some of the processes through which violence emerges.<sup>5</sup> These studies have clearly pointed to the potential relationship between attempted democratization and violence, but central questions remain unresolved. Which mechanisms produce violence within moments of potential democratic openings? In what ways is this violence connected to wider renegotiations of power? How can the escalation and deescalation of violence in cases such as Kenya and South Africa be explained?

Accumulating evidence, including that from Kenya and South Africa, suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between violence and democratization with "more murder in the middle" transitional moment when oppositional actors contest authoritarian states and less when the regime is either primarily authoritarian or democratic.<sup>6</sup> This inverted U pattern has been explained largely by institutional and rational

actor arguments. Neither of these explanations on their own adequately resolves the puzzle of how violence in moments of transition may escalate and deescalate, because they fail to define the mechanisms that produce violence and link them to a bargaining process. By disaggregating different mechanisms of violence and examining how they come into play within renegotiations of power between incumbents and opponents, this puzzle can be solved. Different forms of violence can be used within bargaining to improve the position of one party over another or, in some cases, to derail negotiations altogether. Through comparison of Kenya and South Africa three mechanisms through which violence is produced within the wider bargaining process over change can be isolated: public order policing of protest by mobilized opponents to those in power, incumbent deployment of special forces, and manipulation of local conflicts by national actors in the context of party formation. The aim of this article is not to explain all forms of violence within these cases, but rather to disaggregate the central dynamics linked to transitional politics.

### **Explaining the Inverted U**

Explanations of the inverted U-shaped relationship between violence and democratization focus on institutions and/or incentives for rational action. According to the institutional argument, authoritarian states are able to repress violence while more democratic states are able to channel conflicts into peaceful institutional channels. In transitional moments, in contrast, state control is weakened. Democratic institutions are incomplete, and repression persists. Often violence takes the form of incumbents' backlash against challengers. In this view, violence deescalates because eventually "new and more open institutions take root to promote a peaceful resolution of domestic conflict."<sup>7</sup>

However, institutions themselves are a product of bargaining processes. They can not explain change but rather are an indicator of it. Once in place, they may, if effective, work to structure the bargaining environment, reinforce bargains, and reduce the chance of new escalations of violence. In Kenya and South Africa, for example, violence deescalated largely in response to bargaining rather than the introduction of new formal institutions. In both Kenya and South Africa violence declined sharply prior to the change in power that ushered in inclusive democratic governments and new channels for participation. In South Africa distinctive outbreaks of violence occurred in the aftermath of the legalization of the largest opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC), the intensification of party competition in various parts of the country, key moments in the national negotiation process, and the announcement of an election date. Specific forms of violence declined at different moments in 1992, 1993, and 1994, prior to the April elections. In Kenya violence coincided with the change to a multiparty system in 1991 and escalated before and after the first multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997.

The rational action explanation of the inverted U-shaped relationship relies on incentives. In an authoritarian state the opportunity for collective political action and chances of success are low, and the costs high, reducing the likelihood of protest and challenges to incumbents. In a democratic state the opportunity for peaceful collective action and probability of success are higher than for violent action. In both cases violence is less likely than the intermediate state, where opportunities exist for protest and challenges to incumbents but the probability of success through peaceful means is low. Proponents of this model therefore argue that incentives for violent tactics exist on the part of challengers as well as incumbents.<sup>8</sup> These incentives, however, remain largely external to the model. Missing is a way to explain how incentives to use or condone violent tactics may shift rather abruptly for the central actors negotiating a transition.

Democratic transitions theory has the potential to help solve this puzzle. If violence-producing mechanisms are linked to bargaining, violence may decline rapidly once its roots are exposed and/or an agreement is formally or tacitly reached. Bargainers' willingness to make these agreements will shift with their perceptions of the effects of violence upon their political positions. This approach to the problem of violence within democratization (or more appropriately, political liberalization) has been inadequately explored. Most work on transitions has not focused explicitly on the role of violence and in fact often treats violence as exogenous to elite negotiations over transition. Indeed, pacted transitions are explicitly defined as those allowing the creation of a new regime without significant violent confrontation.<sup>9</sup> Further, by focusing on the bargaining process between regime leaders and opponents within formal negotiating fora, transitions accounts frequently delink negotiators from the very populations they depend upon for support and a position at the table.<sup>10</sup> By looking at these constituencies, key actors within them, and their links to negotiators, mechanisms that produce violence in transitional moments can be found.

The strength of transitions theory for the problem at hand lies in its central focus on interactions among different actors, both those constituting the elite and the masses, their arguments, tactics, and allies. This work points to the need to break down the regime at least into hardliners who do not wish to compromise and softliners who see the need for reforms to legitimize the regime and the opposition at least into moderates who seek compromise and radicals more willing to use popular mobilization to push for greater change in the rules of the game.<sup>11</sup>

Violence or the threat of violence, if it can be controlled or channeled, can be a useful technique to intimidate or divide opponents, force an agreement for change, or push an adversary's hand to make greater concessions.<sup>12</sup> Two important strategies of violence tend to occur within a broader bargaining process: violence for positioning and violence for derailment. The first seeks to strengthen the hand of key actors within negotiations over the transformation of the state; the second attempts completely to fracture and destroy attempts at negotiation, either to return to the authoritarian past or to create a new state through violent revolution.

By focusing on the three violence-producing mechanisms, four central propositions on how different actors may employ and/or be affected by violence as part of the bargaining process can be offered. First, hardliners may employ violence to undermine, even to crush, opposition actors and to attempt to derail any reform or liberalization process. Softliners in the government may not approve but can still benefit from this violence during negotiations. Second, moderate opposition actors employ protests to test the regime's promises of liberalization and to mobilize both domestic and international support for further reforms. If such opposition actions are shown to be peaceful but are met with state violence they may strengthen the hand of the opposition. Third, revelations of the use of violence by hardliners against opposition actors and civilians may strengthen the position of softliners, if hardliners have not eliminated their opponents. Even in the absence of outrage over such revelations, the threat of full-scale civil war may lead more actors to endorse the reforms of softliners. Fourth, local rivalries between competing opposition actors may be employed by radicals in the opposition or hardliners in government to fuel conflicts and attempt to weaken their competitors. All actors may rhetorically frame local conflicts to strengthen their competing claims. (See Table 1.)

### **Kenya and South Africa**

Before the transition, Kenya was characterized as a plebiscitary, one-party regime, essentially an inclusive authoritarian regime, while South Africa was characterized a racial oligarchy, an extremely exclusive, restrictive, and limited democracy often considered more comparable to bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America than to the neopatrimonial regimes of sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>13</sup> While the World Bank classifies Kenya as a low income country, South Africa is middle income.<sup>14</sup> The dynamics of competition in these two countries were also starkly different. In Kenya the opposition overwhelmingly denounced violence and worked primarily through a newly competitive electoral system to gain power. In South Africa opposition actors engaged in varying levels of violence both in self-defense and in armed attacks against adversaries, leading to civil war in many parts of the country. In Kenya, while the opposition and government sparred, top leaders rarely engaged in serious formal negotiations to change the constitution. In South Africa extended formal negotiations were essential to the transition and the holding of the first nonracial democratic elections. Despite the marked differences between these cases, after the mechanisms by which violence was produced are disaggregated and examined and these processes are embedded in a wider process of bargaining over change, remarkable similarities linked more to general bargaining strategies than institutional configurations, can be found.

These two cases belong to a larger universe of countries that experienced political openings defined as the formal creation of greater, though by no means complete or

**Table 1** The Politics of Violence in Democratization

<b>Violence effects actors' relationship to:</b>		
	<b>Regime</b>	<b>Opposition</b>
<b>REGIME</b> <b>Soft-Liners</b>	Revelations of hardliners' use of violence and the threat of civil war may strengthen the bargaining position of soft-liners who seek to rein in violence by extending reforms.	
<b>REGIME</b> <b>Hard-liners</b>		<b>SPECIAL FORCES:</b> Use of informal repression to undermine, even crush, opposition, derail reforms and strengthen bargaining power. <b>LOCAL RIVALRIES:</b> Ethnicization of local conflicts to attempt to divide and weaken the opposition.
<b>OPPOSITION</b> <b>Moderates</b>	<b>PROTESTS:</b> Test the regime's promises of liberalization and mobilize domestic and international support for reforms.	
<b>OPPOSITION</b> <b>Radicals</b>	<b>PROTESTS:</b> Same as above	<b>LOCAL RIVALRIES:</b> Test and shift relative balance of power often by employing ethnic labeling within party competition.

guaranteed, freedoms for opposition actors to organize and voice their demands. Opposition actors in these countries offered a profound challenge to incumbents who maintained control of functioning state institutions until they lost power in national elections. This control gave incumbent leaders a significant advantage in both the

production and policing of violence. The role of government actors and their allies will be highlighted in the analysis of the upsurge of violence during struggles over democratization to demonstrate the means by which incumbents may choose to employ and/or quell violence and the ways their strategies may change through their interactions with opposition actors. Opposition actors, too, may choose violent tactics, and some forms of violence emerge as an unintended consequence of complex strategic interactions. However, in many cases such as these, since incumbents enjoy privileged access to the means of violence, their decision to shift tactics can be the key factor in moving towards transition or large-scale violence.

### **Public Order Policing of Protest and Unpremeditated Violence**

Demonstrations are a key bargaining tool for challengers to authoritarian rule. Whether opposition politicians help to organize popular mobilizations or rely on students and civil society actors, they benefit from these actions. Public displays of defiance may weaken the legitimacy of incumbents at home and abroad and strengthen the hand of the opposition. Indeed, the violence around policed demonstrations, predictable if not directly intentional, becomes enmeshed in the political sparring between incumbents and opposition leaders eager to gain support both nationally and internationally.

**Violence at Public Protests** For example, in Kenya in 1997 the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), an umbrella organization of church groups, human rights associations, and opposition politicians, organized a mass action campaign to force reforms and level the playing field before the next election. Denied a permit to hold a rally, on July 7 the NCEC decided to go ahead with demonstrations. The police responded with brutality, beating protesters and killing at least fourteen people. The extent of the violence, broadcast on CNN, shocked Kenyans and donors and put Moi's government on the defensive.<sup>15</sup> The sense of crisis produced by this violence pushed the softliner faction in the government to broker a deal with moderate opposition leaders, who in turn broke away from the more radical platform of the NCEC which was urging a boycott of the election and a national constitutional conference. Negotiations resulted in the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) reforms that involved a limited expansion of rights. In the sparring after the NCEC mass action campaign, Moi's government played up the specter of violent chaos as a way to delegitimize the opposition, while the opposition pointed to the police killings to delegitimize the government and reassert the right to assemble.<sup>16</sup> The opposition view prevailed in part because the perpetrators of the most egregious violence—the police—were caught on television.

In South Africa a similar process was at work. While popular protest was a key vehicle for the ANC to demonstrate its overwhelming support and for ordinary people excluded from formal participation in state governance to engage in the wider bargaining process, the apartheid government attempted to justify clearly excessive force as necessary

to maintain order. In one such protest in Sebokeng in late March 1990, the police fired upon a crowd, killing seventeen unarmed protesters and injuring over 400. The ANC responded by formally suspending prenegotiation talks with the National Party (NP), arguing that it could not continue talking to a ruling party that failed to prevent and possibly encouraged such egregious attacks.<sup>17</sup> This tool was effective for the ANC, as it demonstrated concern for the lives of its supporters and defiance toward the still brutal and very powerful apartheid government. At the same time, the ANC kept less formal negotiation channels with the NP open and employed the leverage gained by news coverage of the government's brutality to move forward and return to negotiations.

Demonstrations thus mark key and dramatic moments in the attempt by challengers to expand political opportunities.<sup>18</sup> The response of the government, in turn, sends a clear signal as to whether it intends to continue with authoritarian patterns or allow the expansion of this space. In transitional moments when bargaining over political space intensifies, often more violence is produced through public order policing of demonstrations. Since such violence is frequently attributed to the disorder of the "crowd," it is critical to explore how violence is actually produced in these contexts.<sup>19</sup>

**Public Order Policing** The legal frameworks of authoritarian states, often rooted in colonial (or, in eastern Europe, Soviet) mechanisms of control, clearly confer enormous leeway to the police to use force to maintain public order. The form of policing under such authoritarian states is, therefore, dramatically different from that in democracies.<sup>20</sup> In both Kenya and South Africa prior to the transition, public order laws made any demonstration unsanctioned by the state illegal, and police often quickly resorted to force against peaceful demonstrators to enforce these laws.<sup>21</sup> As the police were rarely punished for using force, unarmed protesters were routinely killed or wounded, often as they turned to run.<sup>22</sup> This violence was generally not premeditated, but because of the legal-administrative framework within which the police operated violence was likely. A repeated pattern of such police behavior constituted a "reign of terror" aimed at demobilizing challengers and slowing any evolving democratization process.<sup>23</sup>

As transitions often involve increasing waves of demonstrations incorporating large numbers of protesters, periods of greater public contestation would be expected to be marked by increases in public violence. In South Africa killings by the police increased significantly in 1989, during the Defiance Campaign, and with the beginnings of greater government steps toward reform. Most of the 600 police killings between 1989 and 1993 occurred in the context of public law policing.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, beginning in 1990 with demonstrations for multiparty politics, the number of people killed by the police during demonstrations in Kenya increased dramatically. While there were no recorded killings between 1983 and 1989, at least fifty-one people were killed between 1990 and 2002.<sup>25</sup>

**Promises of Reform** This form of violence does not simply end with the promise of state reform. As transitions theorists have demonstrated, incumbents frequently begin a



liberalization process with the expectation that they will be able to reduce pressures on their government without ceding significant power. In both Kenya and South Africa opposition groups found that newly promised freedoms were not necessarily enforced on the ground, as regular police and army units continued to employ repression and harassment to discourage open political contestation. Thus, a seemingly contradictory process occurred in many cases: the coincidence of a formal move towards democracy from above and more violent struggles over newly promised rights that seem to appear from below.<sup>26</sup>

In South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s more and more apartheid laws were repealed. President de Klerk announced to top police commanders in early 1990: "We will not use you any longer as instruments to attain political goals. . . . This is the responsibility of the politicians."<sup>27</sup> Despite such promises, killings by the police remained high until the end of 1993, when an agreement was reached for multiracial elections and new monitoring mechanisms had been put in place to quell violence at public gatherings.<sup>28</sup> The Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that, "in the post-1990 period, the approach of the SAP [South African Police] to crowd control and public order policing remained largely unchanged and . . . large numbers of people died as a result of unjustifiable use of deadly force."<sup>29</sup>

In 1997 in Kenya parliament amended the Public Order Act that required all public meetings to be licensed by the government. Permits were replaced with a three day advance notification to the police. This formal change resulted in a temporary lull in violence. However, as the U.S. Department of State report for 1998 noted, "this improvement was not sustained. . . . Authorities repeatedly disrupted public demonstrations about which the organizers duly informed the police in advance."<sup>30</sup> As people tried to take advantage of new freedoms to organize civic education or campaign meetings, they confronted the same police response as before. As a result, violence escalated. Indeed, a year after the reforms, in a remarkable admission, the deputy police commissioner Stephen Kimenju revealed that "powerful politicians" gave the police orders to "clobber civilians and disperse peaceful demonstrations."<sup>31</sup>

### **Incumbent Deployment of Special Forces and Informal Repression**

The violence around public order policing operates overtly and often within the legal confines of the state. A starkly different dynamic occurs when government officials through violence specialists covertly plan deadly action against civilians for political purposes. This violence, illegal even under authoritarian constitutions, can bring international censure and significantly weaken the bargaining position of its proponents; officials involved in these activities therefore set up covert structures and work to obscure their own link to these structures. Such operations are often financed by government hardliners and tend to function parallel to recognized institutions and outside their formal constraints. The violence perpetrated by such covert operations, often called "informal repression" can then be blamed at a higher level on banditry, criminals, or

mobs, reinforcing the need for a heavy hand in maintaining law and order.<sup>32</sup> In South Africa these specialists were officials within the security forces. In Kenya hardliners in KANU, including high-level cabinet ministers, hired violence specialists from the army and police. In both cases these state-sanctioned networks of special forces directly planned and orchestrated violence to strengthen the position of the incumbent party.

The actions of special forces demonstrate two important strategies of violence production within a broader bargaining process: violence for positioning and violence for derailment. In South Africa, in the context of formal negotiations over the reconfiguration of the regime, most violence perpetrated by special forces with the support of central state actors was aimed at positioning the incumbent party within ongoing negotiations. For this reason the ANC's threatened and repeated withdrawal from negotiations after significant massacres was a relatively effective counterstrategy. In Kenya, in the context of a broader bargaining process, violence by special forces was more frequently aimed at protecting the status quo by ensuring victory in the newly competitive elections and strictly controlling any formal process of change; in this way violence was employed both as a positioning and a derailling strategy.

**South Africa's "Third Force"** In South Africa, while the apartheid state embarked upon formal reforms to legalize opposition activity, the country's security apparatus remained a clear legacy of three decades of "low-intensity civil war." The so-called counterrevolutionary strategy of the 1980s sought to weaken the ANC and its allies through assassination and hit-and-run operations outside the country and explicitly worked to employ "the ethnic factor in South African society."<sup>33</sup> After the formal onset of political liberalization in 1990, this strategy served as the basis for security force operations within the country.<sup>34</sup> Military-style attacks on trains, for example, led to approximately 572 deaths between 1990 and 1993.<sup>35</sup> Massacres (defined as occurrences leading to at least ten deaths) occurred in Sebokeng, Kwashange, Daveyton, Swanieville, Bruntville, Boipatong, and Bisho.<sup>36</sup> The Boipatong massacre alone left forty-five people dead.

ANC leaders and ordinary township residents, and with time most South Africans, began to speak of a "third force" as the source of much of this violence. Though it would be false to argue that the third force existed as a single, centrally organized conspiracy against the ANC, it is quite clear that security forces played an important role in fomenting violence and received support from high-level actors within the ruling regime.<sup>37</sup> For their part, government leaders defined the steady rise of seemingly random attacks in the townships around Johannesburg, including drive-by shootings and train massacres, as "instability" that was to be expected during a period of rapid political change.

Security force actions included support of Inkatha, the Zulu cultural organization that became the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in 1990, a staunch adversary of the ANC. In 1986, for example, 200 Inkatha hit-men were trained in the Caprivi, Namibia, by the

South African Defense Force (SADF) Department of Military Intelligence; in the early 1990s these paramilitary personnel were deployed in the Johannesburg area and Natal in hit squads that attacked ANC-dominated communities. Eugene de Kock, who was eventually convicted on eighty-nine of 121 charges of murder, kidnapping, arms smuggling, fraud, and theft and sentenced to 212 years, led the infamous Vlakpaas unit that organized such massacres. The unit funneled arms, funds, and other support to Inkatha in areas such as the volatile East Rand, which later turned into war zones between ANC and IFP militants. Though these special forces were cut off from formal oversight, they received thinly veiled support from key political leaders, such as Adriaan Vlok, the minister of law and order, who was caught on tape in 1990 endorsing political assassinations.<sup>38</sup>

Subsequent investigations, ranging from those of the Goldstone Commission, the Steyn Report, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the testimony of key security force agents, including Dirk Coetzee and Eugene de Kock, have repeatedly confirmed the role of security units in the violence.<sup>39</sup> These actions had unequivocal destabilizing effects upon key bases of ANC support. Community organizations that previously had not been involved in violence also found themselves in a difficult position.<sup>40</sup> One civic leader in Bophelong commented: "Our position was that the community must show their anger but they must not kill anybody or burn anybody's property." She added that such decisions became "very hard to enforce" as violence escalated.<sup>41</sup>

With time, and significant deaths, townships were divided, and no-go areas developed, defined by political party affiliation (mostly, ANC versus IFP). By late 1991 ANC cadres had clearly responded to attacks by IFP militants by increasing their own armed capabilities and had in turn increased their attacks against the IFP. In many townships, the ANC established self-defense units that waged war against Inkatha self-protection units. In Meadowlands, Soweto, one ANC cadre later bragged that, though ANC communities were at first caught by surprise at the attacks coming from the hostels, with time they developed significant fighting capabilities themselves. "Had it not been for the security forces, we would have wiped them out."<sup>42</sup>

### **Kenya's "Ethnic Clashes"**

In Kenya large-scale violence by special forces was also part of a wider bargaining strategy of positioning and derailment, although the violence generally did not take on a dynamic autonomous from national actors, as it did in South Africa. In Kenya, beginning in 1991, violence labeled "ethnic clashes" by the government claimed the lives of thousands and displaced over a half a million. High-level actors in Moi's government, including Minister Nicholas Biwott, recruited individuals from the military and the administrative police to perpetrate these "ethnic clashes."<sup>43</sup> Much as the "Third Force" trained Inkatha hit men, these KANU government ministers hired violence specialists to form the core of militias which in turn recruited youths from localities where the "ethnic clashes" took place. As one witness told a government

commission in a story that would be repeated over and over again, “politicians had incited people to fight,” and “they transported warriors to the area and paid them for each person killed.”<sup>44</sup> In many areas where KANU support was potentially threatened by multiethnic populations constituting a swing vote, KANU hawks organized ethnically exclusive late night meetings with militia leaders, local administrators, and ordinary citizens to plot who would be targeted and when. Even under these conditions, it still took some time for the initial violence to become ethnicized. Indeed, in some cases, people worked together as a community to repulse “invaders,” but once random angry victims attacked innocent people from the Kalenjin, “Moi’s group,” these initial interethnic coalitions fell apart.<sup>45</sup>

As in South Africa, the violence began during a period of liberalization and aimed to strengthen the position of KANU as it entered a newly opened electoral arena. The torching of homes and the killing of villagers in selected areas of Kenya began a month before the promised legalization of multiparty politics in December 1991 and coincided with a series of government-orchestrated rallies that threatened opposition supporters with violence. The opposition was ethnicized as Kikuyu, no doubt because the leading and most threatening candidates, such as the current President Mwai Kibaki (elected in December 2002), were Kikuyu. This violence appeared deliberately aimed at discrediting the opposition, which was accused of perpetrating the violence. Indeed, Moi had been warning that multiparty politics in Kenya would bring tribal warfare, and the “ethnic clashes” seemed to fulfill the president’s dire predictions. Further, much as in South Africa, the violence caught the opposition off guard and destabilized key areas of support. Indeed, as the violence persisted up to the first multiparty elections in 1992, key voters became internally displaced and hence disenfranchised; some areas were effectively “emergency zones” sealed off from anyone except the government.

Kenya’s “ethnic clashes” were also part of a strategy of derailment. In 1997, when the NCEC called for mass actions to push for reforms to level the playing field before the next election, “ethnic clashes” broke out on the Coast and in the Rift Valley. This violence began with a deliberately staged, grotesque attack on a police station staffed by migrants from other parts of Kenya. These new “clashes” broke the momentum of the constitutional movement. This strategy of derailment by KANU hardliners worked to bolster the position of KANU moderates: fearing an escalation of violence, a number of opposition MPs broke from a hardline position in constitutional negotiations and agreed to a much weaker package of reforms sponsored by softliners in the KANU government.

### **Local Rivalries, Political Party Formation, and Violence**

Clearly, not all violence is merely orchestrated from above. Disputes over resources and authority occur in local communities without external prompting and at times grow violent. Further, even when external interventions occur, some local people “do not simply

have politics thrust upon them; rather they appropriate politics and use them for their own purposes."<sup>46</sup> However, when in the context of political liberalization new political parties form, they can generate more violence as local rivalries become entangled in the new competition between political parties, and national leaders attempt to channel and frame disputes to their own uses, often attempting to ethnicize them to draw in, polarize, and mobilize larger audiences.<sup>47</sup> Further, the uncertainty produced by political competition and the fears and rumor it breeds provide fertile ground for violent resolution of ongoing disputes. Poor policing or deliberate withdrawal of police protection adds to the likelihood of violence.

Even in those cases where violence seems largely local and "mass-based" in origin, such as the case of "riots," central actors often play a key role in defining the limits and the meaning of such violence.<sup>48</sup> In both Kenya and South Africa hardliners in the regime sought to depict violence as largely ethnic to undermine the leading opposition parties' multiethnic (and multiracial) appeal. In South Africa radical opposition leaders in the newly formed Inkatha Freedom Party also worked to underline ethnic identities and rivalries, hoping to capture a larger percentage of Zulu supporters. In both cases, political leaders interpreted and reinterpreted local violence to blame and delegitimize opponents and argue for law and order or transformation depending on which side of the table they were sitting.

**Using and Ethnicizing Land Disputes: Uncoordinated Violence** For example, in Narok North constituency in Kenya political competition overlay long-standing disputes between agriculturalists who were buying land, often illicitly, and pastoralist Maasai who needed large tracts of land for grazing. When new parties emerged in 1992, the incumbent ole Ntimama, a hardliner in the KANU government and a large-scale farmer himself who was responsible for encouraging land sales, chose to use this real source of tension. His main opponents, Lempaka and Tiampata, were Maasai, but they both worked actively to build alliances with local Kikuyu who were largely agriculturalists. Hence, Ntimama presented himself as the champion of the pastoralist Maasai and used this simmering land problem to his advantage. As Ntimama campaigned, he persistently defined the small-scale Kikuyu farming community in Narok as alien troublemakers responsible for the deprivation of Maasai rights and deliberately played on real land insecurity by arguing that, if the Kikuyu-led opposition party came to power, all Maasai land would be grabbed.

The new party competition deliberately overlaid with simmering land problems generated violence in the constituency. On June 10, 1992, the National Elections Monitoring Unit, a domestic elections watchdog organization, observed that "trouble started after alleged [Maasai] warriors ganged up and vowed not to let any Kikuyu register as voters." Three people were killed and ten buildings were razed to the ground.<sup>49</sup> On the day of the election another three Kikuyu were killed by a group of Maasai as they were going to

vote. It is not at all clear that Ntimama orchestrated this violence directly, as he did with the ethnic clashes in the area. However, by cleverly ethnicizing competition for land Ntimama helped raise the stakes of the election and give its outcome a particular local meaning. A KANU win meant preserving land in the hands of Maasai; a loss, more land alienation. This ethnicization, in turn, helped provoke and justify uncoordinated violence on the ground. Finally, the fear of retribution by those locals involved in violence, as well as Ntimama's new reputation as a "strong leader," helped create a cohesive local constituency around him. The ability to "deliver Maasai votes" increased Ntimama's bargaining strength to such an extent that he eventually found his way into the new Kenyan government and until recently served as a minister in the office of the president.

**Ethnicizing Local Disputes within Political Party Competition** Similar dynamics can be seen in South Africa. July 1990 marked an important turning point. On July 14, 1990, Inkatha's leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi announced that Inkatha would become a national political party open to all races: the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The IFP began an intensive campaign of recruiting IFP supporters among Zulu speakers in the migrant hostels around Johannesburg and employed clear calls for ethnic identification. On July 22, fighting between Inkatha and the ANC, which had become endemic in KwaZulu-Natal, spread to the Johannesburg area. Approximately 1,500 IFP supporters returning from a political rally attacked township residents in Sebokeng whom they presumed to be ANC supporters.<sup>50</sup> In the following days, violence spread to other townships around Johannesburg. In a climate of heightened insecurity, political uncertainty, rumor, and fear, even conflicts that did not begin with political party antagonisms, such as a gambling argument in Katlehong on the East Rand, quickly became part of the larger conflict.<sup>51</sup> The cycle of retaliatory violence led to increased killings, often defined in ethnic terms as Zulu versus Xhosa in the news media and by government hardliners and some radical opposition actors.<sup>52</sup> The month following the launch of the IFP marked the highest rate of political fatalities during the four-year transition period; 698 people died in August alone.<sup>53</sup>

Inkatha's ethnic discourse, which built upon the apartheid ideology of separate ethnic and racial identities, stood as a ready frame with which to explain barbarous acts and define retaliation. Both the ruling NP and the IFP stood to benefit from the ethnicization of this spreading violence. Hardliners in government pointed to what they referred to as "black on black" and "tribal" violence to argue for the stark dangers of majority rule and to call for special protections for the white minority. IFP leaders hoped to garner more of the "Zulu vote," as Zulu speakers make up the largest language group in South Africa with over twenty percent of the total population. This strategy was, however, only partially successful. While much popular discussion of the violence and party competition employed ethnic labels, the majority of Zulu speakers turned out to vote for the ANC rather than the IFP in the 1994 elections.<sup>54</sup>

**Violence, Bargaining and Deescalation** Kenya and South Africa illustrate that violence, as part of both positioning and derailing strategies, can be an intrinsic part of bargaining over political change. Moderate incumbents who favor reform may tolerate and even employ violence but do so largely as a means to strengthen their bargaining position. They may fail to police the police and use incidents of violence around demonstrations to attack their opponents. Moderate opposition actors, similarly, while decrying violence, may seek to publicize, at times even provoke, state actions to strengthen their domestic and international support. Hardliners, in contrast, employ violence to undermine moderates on all sides and derail any reform process. They may be significantly weakened when strategies of violence production are exposed and moderates are pressed to condemn their actions, but even then, by building constituencies in part through violence, they can gain bargaining power as potential spoilers or allies.

For violence to be useful to incumbent or opposition actors involved in bargaining, it needs to be controllable. Those who employ violence as a positioning tactic are involved directly or indirectly in its production. For this reason, when a successful bargain is struck or the violence begins to damage their position, those who have employed violence as a positioning tactic will generally take steps to rein it in. They will not necessarily be able to control the impact of their interventions or even be successful in deescalating violence that they have instigated. Indeed, these processes in some cases leave significant legacies of violence.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, this relationship between mechanisms of violence production and bargaining processes over change can better explain cases like Kenya and South Africa where violence does decline dramatically.

**De Klerk's Gamble** In South Africa violence so destabilized the country that it undermined the authority of President de Klerk. Revelations regarding the sources of significant violence also began to subvert a hardline strategy within the NP to draw out the transition in order to allow the formation of a coalition with the IFP and other right-leaning parties to challenge the ANC.<sup>56</sup> In July 1991 the *Weekly Mail* broke "Inkathagate," revealing a state-supported security police operation that funded Inkatha in its violent campaign against the ANC. By late July the NP was forced to respond. Two ministers, Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok and Defense Minister Magnus Malan were demoted to lesser cabinet posts, and de Klerk announced plans for a multi-party conference on violence as well as the appointment of a standing commission of inquiry to investigate political violence (later known as the Goldstone Commission). Despite these steps, violence continued, as key NP ministers such as the new Minister of Law and Order Hernus Kriel failed to take the more drastic action required to rein in violence specialists.<sup>57</sup> Rather than being shut down, largely autonomous units such as Vlakplaas were allowed to continue functioning, now with almost no interaction with state authorities.

When multiparty negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) reached a deadlock near the middle of 1992, the ANC responded to the stalemate with a promise to demonstrate its mass-based strength by orchestrating rolling mass action. After the ANC action began on June 16, IFP supporters attacked residents of Boipatong. The day after the massacre, the ANC suspended negotiations, and Mandela personally attacked de Klerk for not having taken a stronger stand to stop the violence. De Klerk's approval rating among black South Africans, the crucial majority to which the NP needed to appeal to if it were to have any future in a democratic South Africa, had declined precipitously in the past year.<sup>58</sup> Continued violence also threatened the NP as the incumbent party that was eager to improve its international image and encourage economic growth at home in order to maintain support.<sup>59</sup>

After yet another massacre, this one in Bisho in early September, de Klerk, who had been employing the continuing violence as a positioning strategy, recognized the pending threat of a complete breakdown of negotiations and the eruption of full-scale civil war. The ANC and the NP signed the crucial Record of Understanding on September 26, 1992, effectively marginalizing the IFP. De Klerk also strengthened the powers of the Goldstone Commission, which responded with greater evidence of continuing security force actions against the ANC. Stronger action was taken finally to rein in these forces.<sup>60</sup> While many forms of violence unfortunately continued and even increased, hit squad activity, train commuter attacks, and massacres in the region around Johannesburg all sharply declined.<sup>61</sup> Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his party, the IFP, were clearly weakened by the Record of Understanding and the growing revelations of Inkatha-state complicity. The IFP leader continued to assert his power, largely by attempting to derail any settlement negotiated without the blessing of the IFP, but the ANC and NP pressed ahead with negotiations and plans for democratic elections. One week before the vote, fearing fully institutionalized marginalization, Buthelezi backed away from the brink and committed the IFP to contest the vote; this decision opened the door for remarkably violence-free elections, despite the bloodshed preceding them. After the elections, Buthelezi joined Mandela (president) and deKlerk (second deputy president) as the minister of home affairs in the government of national unity.<sup>62</sup>

**Moi's Decision** Similarly, after a decade of high levels of violence prior to elections, Kenya experienced a peaceful transfer of power from President Moi to Mwai Kibaki and a coalition of parties, the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC). Prior to the 2002 election and after allowing a virulent anti-Kikuyu campaign by his hardliners, Moi dramatically chose Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of former President Kenyatta and a Kikuyu, as the new leader of KANU. Whether this choice was a deliberate miscalculation, based on the idea that it would keep the opposition fragmented and split the Kikuyu vote, is unclear. However, his choice eliminated violence based on anti-Kikuyu rhetoric as a positioning strategy. Militias were reined in, and, indeed, there were no "ethnic clashes"



in the 2002 election. Further, it is highly probable that President Moi received assurances from Kibaki that, if he allowed a transfer of power, he would not be prosecuted for crimes. Informal negotiations between Kikuyu business elites who funded both the new KANU under Kenyatta and NaRC under Kibaki and hardliners in Moi's government took place as early as November 2000 and may have helped create such an understanding. Indeed, in his speech acknowledging his defeat, Moi emphasized that Kibaki is "a man of integrity." Moi's impunity was reinforced when the NaRC brought into its fold former KANU hardliners who were marginalized in Moi's preelectoral shuffle in KANU, making transitional justice questions awkward.

## **Conclusions**

Analysis of key mechanisms of violence production that emerge within bargaining over democratization can help explain how large-scale violence can escalate and deescalate fairly abruptly during a process of political change. In both Kenya and South Africa violence declined dramatically because new agreements between incumbents and challengers were struck. Policing was improved in many localities, as police largely refrained from engaging peaceful protestors with violence and worked to establish more impartial policing. Incumbents reined in informal militias who they had paid and supported, effectively stopping many massacres. And national politicians generally refrained from endorsing local violence and framing it in ethnic terms.

This approach complements the rational action explanation for the inverted U-shaped relationship between violence and democratization. Once an agreement is reached, incentives to use violence decline among actors. It also explains how newly democratic institutions might emerge out of violence, producing bargaining processes that, sadly, often leave significant authoritarian and violent legacies. Further comparative research is needed to apply this approach to cases where violence escalates with dramatically different consequences. In cases such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia a key factor leading to escalation may be the sidelining and killing of moderates. In such cases, hardliners use violence early on as a derailing strategy to destroy possible agreements between opposing sides, agreements that in Kenya and South Africa allowed for the deescalation of violence. Further work in applying transitions theory to understand better the politics of violence in democratization will bring new insights, not only to relatively successful cases of democratization like Kenya and South Africa, but also catastrophic cases like Rwanda and those that seem suspended between both possibilities.

## **NOTES**

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Department Brown Bag Colloquium, Peter Kruezer and the Democratic Peace section of the European Consortium for Political Research, Robin Varghese, and our anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments in improving this manuscript.

1. The South African Institute of Race Relations estimated just under 15,000 deaths from the beginning of February 1990 through the end of April 1994. South African Survey 1997/98 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1998) p. 600, cited in Adrian Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence during South Africa's Transition," *Politikon*, 27 (November 2000), 241. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report cites approximately 14,000 deaths from mid 1990; this number excludes well over 1,000 deaths in early 1990.

2. These figures are estimates and are lower bounds. They are derived from Human Rights Watch, *Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 1; African Rights, "Violence at the Coast: The Human Consequences of Kenya's Crumbling Political Institutions," *Witness*, 2 (October-November, 1997), 2; and press reports on the 1998 violence.

3. Demet Yalcin Mousseau, "Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, 38 (September 2001), 547–67. Stephen Saideman, David Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton, "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict," *Comparative Political Studies*, 35 (February 2002), 103–29, using different variables, challenge this conclusion.

4. Some of the recent works that posit a link between political liberalization, possibly leading to democratization, and large-scale violence are Rui de Figueiredo and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261–302, Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); and Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

5. V. P. Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Peter Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence," *Comparative Politics*, 31 (April 1999), 253–71; Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998); Stuart Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001); John Darby, *The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001); Jacqueline Klopp, "'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 35 (2001), 473–517; Timothy Sisk, "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus: South Africa in Transition and the Politics of Uncertainty," *Negotiation Journal*, 9 (January 1993), 77–94; Timothy Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Harvey Glickman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa* (Atlanta: African Studies Association Press, 1995). Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), employs numerous case studies to define a wide range of forms and mechanisms of collective violence.

6. Helen Fein, "More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 17 (February 1995), 170–91; Edward Muller and Erich Weede, "Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34 (December 1990), 624–51; Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31 (June 1987), 266–97; Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992," *American Political Science Review*, 95 (March 2001), 33–48.

7. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gales, and Gleditsch, p. 34.

8. For a version of this argument, see Muller and Weede.

9. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 192; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

10. Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997), 305–22.
11. O'Donnell and Schmitter, p. 28; Kaufman, p. 96.
12. Theorists of social protest have already examined this insight. Doug McAdam, "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency," *American Sociological Review*, 48 (December 1983), 735–54; William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1975).
13. Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
14. In 1991, according to the World Bank, Kenya had a per capita GNP of \$340. By 2001 it had risen to only \$350, placing Kenya firmly within the set of lower income countries. In 1991 World Bank statistics indicate that South Africa had a GNP of \$2,450. In 2001 it was \$2,850, placing it within the middle income category.
15. Joel Barkan and Njuguna Ng'ethe, "Kenya Tries Again," *Journal of Democracy*, 9 (April 1998), 37.
16. Frank Holmquist and Michael Ford, "Kenyan Politics: Toward a Second Transition?," *Africa Today*, 45 (April-June 1998), 244.
17. "Shooting Sinks Peace Talks." *The Star*, Apr. 1, 1900.
18. Donatella Della Porta, "Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 64, defines protest policing as a "barometer" of existing political opportunities for movements and "one of the best and most 'visible' indicators of institutional attitudes to protest."
19. The idea that crowds of any kind are naturally predisposed to violence persists in prejudicing analysis, even though the statistics suggest that the vast majority of violence is perpetrated by the policing of these crowds. See Robert Holton, "The Crowd in History: Some Problems of Theory and Method," *Social History*, 3 (May 1978), 219–33; Mark Harrison, *Crowds and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
20. Though apartheid South Africa was institutionally defined as an extremely exclusive and restricted democratic system, the majority of the population experienced the state (even outside of the states of emergency) as a prototypical authoritarian regime. For this reason, both Kenya and South Africa are referred to as authoritarian states. One study noted that from 1970 to 1976 the killing rate of the police in South Africa was twice that of the police in United States, in a period when both countries permitted police to shoot at people fleeing arrest. See Don Foster and Clifford Luyt, "The Blue Man's Burden: Policing in South Africa," *South African Journal on Human Rights*, 2 (1986), 303; John Brewer, *Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Janine Rauch and David Storey, "The Policing of Public Gatherings and Demonstrations in South Africa: 1960–1994" (Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1998).
21. In South Africa these laws included the Public Safety Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Gatherings and Demonstrations Act, the Unlawful Organizations Act, and the Affected Organizations Act, among many others. In Kenya, they consisted of the Public Order Act and the Societies Act.
22. Ronald Weitzer and Cheryl Beattie, "Police Killings in South Africa: Criminal Trials 1986–1992," *Policing and Society*, 4 (1994), 99–117; Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Mission to Repress* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1998).
23. N. C. Steytler, "Policing 'Unrest': The Restoring of Authority," *Acta Juridica* (1989), 1.
24. South Africa, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, vol. 2 (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998), p. 590.
25. Amnesty International Annual Reports, 1983–2003.
26. This analysis clearly echoes a familiar story. Democratization in the U.S. South combined the formal introduction of voting rights with profound and often violent struggle for the exercise of those rights. On how rights come into being through bargaining, broadly defined, see Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Charles

- Tilly, "Where Do Rights Come From?," in Theda Skocpol, ed., *Democracy, Revolution and History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 55–72.
27. Quoted in Sisk, "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus," p. 90.
28. It must also be noted that from 1991 to 1993 the killing of police officers also increased sharply; 268 officers were killed from July 1991 to June 1993. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, vol. 2, p. 585.
29. South Africa, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, vol. 2, p. 590.
30. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices.
31. Judith Achieng, "Cleaning Up the Image of the Police," Inter-Press Service (IPS), December 22, 1998.
32. In some cases, informal repression was committed by youth gangs in Kenya and South Africa beholden to local politicians.
33. Taken from an April 1986 State Security Council strategy document, quoted in Stephen Ellis, "The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24 (June 1998), 274.
34. Also see African National Congress, "Counter-Revolution in the Making: Towards a Common Perception of Violence in the Transitional Period," presented at the African National Congress National Consultative Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14–16, 1990; Martin Murray, *Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa* (New York: Verso, 1994), ch. 5; Sisk, "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus"; Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa*.
35. South Africa, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, vol. 2, p. 611.
36. Guelke, p. 243.
37. South Africa, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, vol. 2, pp. 709–710; Guelke.
38. Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, "The Natal Conflict," in J. D. Brewer, ed., *Restructuring South Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 21.
39. For such confessions, see Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, *A Human Being Died That Night: A South African Story of Forgiveness* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003); Jacques Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997).
40. Elke Zuern, "South Africa's Civics in Transition: Agents of Change or Structures of Constraint?," *Politikon*, 28 (May 2001), 5–20.
41. Interview with Bophelong civic leaders, August 29, 1997.
42. Interview in Meadowlands, July 16, 1997.
43. Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1992); Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Tribal Clashes in Kenya* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1999); Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1997); Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1998); Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Kayas Revisited: A Post-Election Balance Sheet* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1998).
44. Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes*, p. 51.
45. Interviews with participants in Molo and Enosupukia, two badly hit areas, November 2000.
46. Jonathan Spencer, quoted in Stathis Kalyvas, "The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics*, 1 (September 2003), 479.
47. Beth Roy, *Some Trouble with Cows: Making Sense of Social Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), does an excellent job of demonstrating how Bangladeshi local and national political leaders transformed a conflict over a cow and a neighbor's lentil patch into a Hindu-Muslim conflict. With time, the villagers themselves had reconstructed their understanding of the conflict, now also in terms of religious identity.

48. For example, Paul Brass, *Theft of an Idol* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 286, notes in the case of “riots” in India: “. . . one cannot ignore the intent or will of the state government and the district administration to act upon what it knows to head off or control violence. Some chief ministers or political parties make it their business to say there will be no riots under their rule. When they say so and mean it, they can usually prevent them or limit their effects.”
49. National Elections Monitoring Unit, *The Multi-Party General Elections in Kenya* (Nairobi: NEMU, 1993), p. 128.
50. The IFP at this time was bussing large numbers of party supporters from KwaZulu-Natal into the Johannesburg area in an attempt to increase its support and drive non-IFP supporters from the hostels.
51. Rupert Taylor, “The Myth of Ethnic Division: Township Conflict on the Reef,” *Race and Class*, 33 (October-December 1991), 1–2.
52. Articles in South African leading dailies such as “Witnesses Describe West Rand Hostel Bloodbath,” *The Star*, July 16, 2000, and “Bloodbath Erupts in Vaal Townships,” *The Star*, July 23, 2000, frequently pointed to the presumed ethnicity of victims and perpetrators, highlighting the role of Zulus and stoking fear of Zulus with banners such as “The Zulus Are Coming!” Ibid. p. 3. Other reports spoke of ANC versus Zulu conflicts or went so far as to equate the stridently interracial and interethnic ANC as a Xhosa organization, thereby reframing the conflict as one between Zulus and Xhosas.
53. Cited in Guelke, p. 241.
54. The IFP share of the national vote declined with each postapartheid national election: 1994, 10.54 percent; 1999, 8.58 percent; 2004, 6.97 percent. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa.
55. Robert Fatton, “The Impairments of Democratization: Haiti in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics*, 31 (January 1999), 209–29; Jacqueline Klopp, “Kenya’s Internally Displaced: Managing Civil Conflicts in Democratic Transitions,” in Dorina Bekoe, ed., *East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 59–80; Rupert Taylor, “Justice Denied: Political Violence in KwaZulu-Natal after 1994,” *African Affairs*, 101 (October 2002), 473–508.
56. Ellis, p. 283.
57. Ibid, p. 288.
58. Taylor and Shaw, p. 23.
59. Guelke, p. 252.
60. Ellis, p. 90.
61. Taylor and Shaw, p. 24. Massacres in Natal unfortunately continued as the ANC and IFP battled for political control.
63. Thabo Mbeki (ANC) was the first deputy president. De Klerk withdrew the NP from the government of national unity in 1996, citing the need for a “strong and vigilant opposition.” NP Media Release, May 9, 1996. Buthelezi maintained his position in the national cabinet until the 2004 elections.