Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz—Decentralization Research

Map:  Districts of Uganda

 Created with MapWindow GIS, with files courtesy Ugandan Bureau of Statistics

Research Overview:

The 1980s and 1990s saw burgeoning attention within the development community on the necessity of good governance in the fight against poverty in the global South. Many academics and policy-makers embraced decentralization programs as important components in general reforms to improve governance, as they were seen to eliminate the pathologies of over-centralization, increase accountability, and reduce the distance between government and citizens. I am interested in two broad aspects of decentralization in Africa. First, the effects that decentralization programs have had in inter- and intra-ethnic relations in particularly homogeneous societies (i.e., ethnofederalism in Ethiopia), and, second, the factors that impact policy-makers’ decisions regarding when, where, and how to implement decentralization strategies.

General comments welcome [e-mail: jkk2003@columbia.edu]

Associated Research Projects

“Decentralization as Patronage: District Proliferation and Movement Support in Uganda”

Abstract: The local government and decentralization program launched by President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda has been roundly lauded for its apparent achievements in improving grassroots democracy, rebuilding state infrastructure, and fostering economic development in the war-torn and poverty-afflicted country in Africa’s Great Lakes region. While decentralization has involved the transfer of some responsibilities over policy design and resource extraction and allocation to local-level governments in Uganda, it has also been accompanied by a substantial proliferation in the number of districts—the largest sub-national unit in Uganda’s five-tiered system of local governance—in the country. In 2005, Parliament approved the creation of 22 new districts, bringing the total number of such governments in the relatively small country to 78. Just 33 districts had existed when Museveni seized power in 1986. What explains this proliferation of district-level governments in Uganda during the Museveni era? And, more specifically, why were some regions named as beneficiaries of new districts in the most recent reorganization, while others were not? This paper lays out and tests (using data drawn from the 2002 Uganda Population and housing Census and sub-county-level electoral results) three possible explanations for the specifics of the latest round of district reorganization in Uganda: 1) motivations on the part of the central government to improve living standards and access to government services in particularly deprived areas; 2) capabilities of local populations to overcome collective-action problems and lobby effectively for the benefits that being included in a new district brings; and 3) the desire on the part of the ruling administration to deliver increased amounts of patronage and pork spending to favored constituencies.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Chicago, April 2006)

Undergoing revision. Draft paper and replication dataset forthcoming.

“Ethiopia’s Experiment: The Pathologies of Ethno-Federalism in the Horn of Africa” (November 2004)

Abstract: After ousting the Marxist Derg régime from Āddīs Ābēba in 1991, the new leaders of Ethiopia launched a risky—and largely novel—experiment in the hopes of consolidating their authority and mitigating conflict in a country deeply divided by ethnicity, language, and religion. The 1995 constitution established an ethno-federal arrangement that recognized the sovereignty of constituent nations, nationalities, and peoples. This new arrangement, which divided the country into administrative units—called kililoch and astedaderoch—and assigned representation in the federal parliament on the basis of ethnicity, was perhaps most notable for its stipulation that constituent groups had the constitutional right of self-determination up the point of secession. Almost ten years later, no group has launched a constitutionally recognized secessionist project, and, although there have been violence in kililoch such as Gambela and Sumale, the new federation appears to be holding together. However, observers should be cautious before judging Ethiopia’s federal experiment to be a success. The federal arrangement suffers from a number of pathologies, including the institutionalized politicization and reification of ethnic attachments, as is evidenced by the near-total domination of Ethiopian politics by regional and ethnic parties; a lack of protections for marginal and minority populations; and the institutionalization of a three-veto-player system, which might hamper integrationists’ attempts to construct pan-Ethiopian identities and common markets.

Paper available upon request. Comments welcome [e-mail: jkk2003@columbia.edu]

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