

E Pluribus Unum: Political Unification and Political Realism

Chapter 8: Conclusion*

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Chapter 8: Conclusion

Medicine must be sweet, truth must be beautiful; this has been man's folly since the days of Adam. Besides, it may all be quite natural, and perhaps it is as it should be. Nature herself has many tricks of expediency and many deceptions –

– Anton Chekhov¹

This work has investigated how and why states politically unify, not modifying realism so much as returning to its origins. Drawing on classical realism, I argued that unification occurs when states face an optimally intense, indefinite, and symmetrically shared threat; a security crisis opens a window of opportunity; and elites persuade relevant audiences of union's necessity through the media, the military, and political procedures. I tested the argument by detailing five cases of attempted unification: the United States, Switzerland, Australia, Sweden-Norway, and Gran Colombia.

What remains is threefold. In the first section I summarize the cases and outline the work's principal findings. The second section contains final ruminations on the argument, last thoughts on alternative perspectives, and areas for future inquiry. And the third section is devoted to policy implications.

¹ Chekhov 1979, 59 [*At Home*].

I. Case Profiles

The first case of successful union is the United States, a hard case for my argument. Great Britain's occupation was insufficient to spur union; then unification was achieved after the invading army returned across the Atlantic. After the Revolutionary War, Great Britain still posed an intense threat to its former colonies, through its seeming hostility to them, through its presence in Canada, through its reputed use of Indians against the former colonists, and through its maritime supremacy. Spain posed similar threats in the South; its bottling up of the Mississippi River endangered states with inchoate secessionism. Key American elites felt these threats acutely and began agitating for unification. Elites seized upon Shays' Rebellion, and because they were in prime positions to control the flow of information, make credible military threats, and manipulate political procedures, the United States unified. American elites acted prudently and we know how this story ends: thirteen weak states symmetrically menaced by enduring great powers develop into the most powerful empire since Rome.

The second instance of successful union is the Swiss. Switzerland unified after the French conquered the country and demonstrated that the previous system of Swiss alliances was untenable. Attempts to push back the clock were unsuccessful and, ahead of the European curve, several cantons saw that they would be safer unified with their longtime allies than by themselves or as tiny provinces of larger states. Elites pressed the issue in print, in procedures, and by arms, forcing the other cantons to choose between the devil they knew and the devil they did not. Through an almost bloodless war, the Swiss cantons decisively banded together indefinitely to balance against shared symmetrical threats, and tightened their bonds as those threats grew.

The first example of unattained union is Sweden and Norway. The two states came together after the Napoleonic Wars to brace against future great power threats. But Norway had acquitted itself well during the war and did not share the same level of threat as Sweden. Lacking intensity and symmetry, Norway resisted unification, and the ambiguous terms of union were made a shell by subsequent Norwegian actions. Finally, when the fear of foreign interference had ebbed and the two states had clearly asymmetric foreign policy interests, Norwegian elites stepped up propaganda measures, started procedural initiatives, and militarized their border. Sweden and Norway were brought together by moderate pressures, and as the pressures faded their quasi-union faded too.

The second case of failed union is Gran Colombia. It came together to face Spain and became incoherent because the Spanish threat collapsed. Initially, Spain was a ferocious threat, symmetrically afflicting the three northernmost states of South America, and was expected to remain a danger for some time. Following Spain's collapse, no foreign power was strong enough to pose an intense threat to the members of Gran Colombia, making the duration and symmetry of the threat beside the point. Despite brandishing legendary powers of persuasion, possessing an army, and installing his candidates in critical government positions, Simón Bolívar fell from power because he did not adjust to a power distribution antithetical to union. South American states threatened each other more than foreign powers threatened them; elites who acted in line with this reality were rewarded while those who did not were pummeled. For this reason Bolívar's quixotic mission ended in disaster.

As a plausibility probe and heuristic device, we also examined Australia because it is a case where union was imposed from above. Australia's colonies were highly

dependent on Great Britain and for political expedience the mother country decided that Australia should unify. The colonies were consistently uninterested, but Great Britain had time and power on its side. Ultimately England used political procedures to effect union, but its media and military leverage helped as well. By the time Japan presented Australia with a unification-worthy threat, Australia had already unified, though ironically the Japanese threat revealed that Australia and England were asymmetrically threatened and consequently the two became much less integrated. The unification process of Australia was fundamentally different than the other examples included in this work, and the case study bolsters the belief that unions impelled from external states are conceptually distinct.

In sum, the evidence strongly supports the argument. I have come across no case where voluntary union happened without the external threat described in the argument. In the cases of the United States and Switzerland, unification unfolded as the argument suggests and the unions persist to this day. Sweden-Norway and Gran Colombia both believed they confronted unification-worthy threats, but neither did and union unwound. Sweden and Norway faced larger threats and so had the more lasting friendship, but the states of Gran Colombia were not disciplined by unifying threats and quickly split apart with little love lost. It is a promising finding that the causes of union appear not to be distinct from the causes of disunion. And the Australian case is in a class by itself; England propelled Australian union to ease administrative burdens in maintaining an empire and this top-down pressure was enough to override the lack of threat.

II. Final Reflections on the Argument

At the outset, two main objectives were put forth: 1) how and why equal states unify and 2) how and why such unions fracture. I argued that unions are extreme alliances prompted by extreme circumstances. The distribution of power structured incentives for states and set the parameters for likely responses to threats by conditioning thought and action. I asserted that states were most likely to unify when they faced an optimally intense, indefinite, symmetrically afflicting threat. Although the distribution of power gives and takes away opportunities, elites have latitude with respect to when, how, and whether states unify – elite competition determines what institutions and policies will be selected. A security crisis is necessary to open a window for a radical solution like union to be acceptable. To succeed, elites need to have competitive advantages influencing the media, the military, and political procedures; some of their advantages flow from the distribution of power, some from their own talents. Systemic feedback will penalize poorly chosen policies and institutions until a tolerable solution is adopted.

Running the argument in reverse explains why unions fail. When unifying threats slacken in intensity, shorten in duration, or grow asymmetrical, the union is likely to drift apart and fragment. Without a unifying threat, elites advocating union will have less resonant messages, find their base of support evaporating, and be at a disadvantage in competing with elites favoring schism. Again, a security crisis is necessary to display that the unified states face a threat that is either no longer optimally intense, not as durable as expected, or asymmetrically afflicting, and elites can either find or make such crises. Once the crisis has opened a window for policy change, elites compete in the media, with the military, and with political procedures to effect their preferred policy.

And while the distribution of power circumscribes elites and tends to influence which side is stronger in the long run, at any given moment the policy chosen will reflect elite competition.

My argument has suggested that constructivists look at some of the right variables but draw the wrong conclusions. Wars over ideas are a part of politics and winning propaganda battles are critical for unification to succeed. But political entrepreneurs and normative cascades are not the end of the story. Many wonderful ideas are kicked up in the stampede of politics; most of them settle back down to be trampled on. What separates the successful from the unsuccessful ideas are the background conditions. In unification, that means not only that the international distribution of power tends toward a particular configuration, but also the structure of the domestic marketplace for ideas impacts who will hear what, when, and how. In the short run, ideas can have disproportionate independent effects; in the long run, ideas must correlate with material factors to resonate.

This work also has theoretical relevance for liberal arguments on political integration. In the cases scrutinized here, formal international institutions were neither necessary nor sufficient for successful unification. The exemplar international institution, the United Nations, was not present in any of the case studies, and the feeble international institutions that loosely held together the United States and Switzerland in their pre-unified days were violated in order to effect union. While the United Nations may have a beneficial influence on states, the evidence presented here does not support a weaker claim that earlier international institutions were primary drivers of unification.

With regard to interdependence explanations of unification, I found minimal support. Unifying states did discuss the economic rewards of union, but economics was a sideshow. In all the cases analyzed, security concerns drove union, and that stands to reason. Customs unions and free trade associations capture economic benefit without the security risks that attend political unions. Elites worried about external threats, and trade concerns were subordinate to high political goals. Where external threats were lacking, economic forces were never able to bring about political union.

The relationship between democracy and unification remains obscure. In some cases, democratic procedures assisted political integration, though mostly indirectly by lending outcome reached through nominally democratic means a mantle of legitimacy. But political units are set up to preserve their autonomy; they are not constituted to fundamentally destroy themselves. Ordinary politics did not unify any of the cases under study; force and fraud were routinely employed to circumvent the usual procedures of governance. Democracy was more helpful in cases of disintegration. When Norway sought independence, its vote on the matter communicated preferences and resolve, which influences Sweden's behavior. Nonetheless, it was a disappointment not to clarify the connection between democracy and unification in greater detail.

I have sought to improve realist explanations of alliances and transitions between anarchy and hierarchy, cannibalizing classical realists to close a hole in modern realism. Realism can cover state formation and permanent alliances, and the extension does no violence to its principles. Neorealists need to reconsider that, while rare, peaceful unions between relatively equal states happen, and for realist reasons too. Autonomy is not a sacrosanct or constant value; states are willing to sacrifice their autonomy if it is the least

bad option. And, along with other studies, this work has found it profitable to augment structural realist logic by peering into the black box of domestic politics.

Also of theoretical interest is a charge by Robert Keohane. He claims that realism “is better at telling us why we are in such trouble than how to get out of it.” (Keohane in Keohane ed. 1986, 198). There are many ways to decrease conflict and violence, but arguable the best is establishing a strong third party enforcer and entering hierarchy. Political union is the path out of anarchy, and this can be voluntarily and involuntarily. Few contest the supremacy of realism in explaining involuntary unions, but this work has gone farther, arguing that only realism offers a satisfactory explanation for voluntary union. Liberal and constructivist explanations for voluntary union are not adequate, so if by “trouble” Keohane means anarchy, his allegation falls flat. Realism is better than its rivals at telling us why we are in such trouble and how to get out of it, but its answer is not a Hollywood ending. Unification for realists is rare, risky, and hard to bring about. Realism struggles to offer appealing palliatives for great power war, unlike its rivals: “think well of other groups of people,” “setup institutions,” “trade more,” and “propagate democracy.” There are no easy answers or mild tradeoffs to exit anarchy. Alas, this is consistent with the pessimistic strain of realism and the ethos of “better to be right than liked.” In this regard, Keohane’s criticism sticks.

This work has also touched on topics for future research. Later work may examine other types of unifications that were not the focus of this work, for instance, how unification between unequal states differs from unification between equal states and how externally impelled unifications differ from internally impelled unions. Later work may

also specify a clearer relationship between democracy and unification, and why some unifications terminate in warring enmity while others end in amity.

III. Implications and Policy Recommendations

There is a very important policy caveat to this work: I am not in favor of union or disunion. Unification is no panacea and many states have found neither security nor unity in union. If we wish to avert the monstrous security and humanitarian costs of fractured lands and abortive unions, we are well advised to understand the causes of unification. But that says nothing about what the optimal size of states is or should be. If done competently, this study should be relevant whenever egalitarian unions are forming or dividing themselves, which means its relevance does not depend on a single outcome. But I should not be taken as favoring either outcome in the abstract.

To be more concrete, currently the number of states in the international system is proliferating, and scholars (e.g. Chaim Kaufmann and Radha Kumar) debate whether partition of states is a sound solution to acute domestic hostilities. Although I do not have an ahistorical answer to whether small or large states are better, I approve of each on a case-by-case basis and can say that my argument posits factors germane to partition. Where equal states face an optimally intense, indefinite, symmetrically afflicting threat, they should do their best to balance against it, unifying when necessary. Where a state composed of relatively equal factions no longer faces a union-worthy threat and parties wish to exit, let them make a virtue of necessity and part as amicably as possible,

preferably with the aid of third party peacekeepers and dispute resolution mechanisms in place.

A. Bipolarity and Unipolarity

The breakup of the Soviet Union is of lingering interest to political scientists and is somewhat germane to the present study. The Soviet Union faced intense great power threats from its inception, during WWII it paid an egregious human toll, and after WWII it faced a wary, nuclear-armed United States. As the Cold War wore on, it became increasingly clear that nuclear weapons made interfering with vital interests wildly dangerous. And then, despite some alarming moments, the threat from the first world gradually declined. While not viewed as benign, the United States showed little appetite for territorial acquisitions, and the intensity of America's threat diminished. Nevertheless, the USSR was slow to relax its ties. States, like all institutions, have high startup costs, and when they are entrenched are seldom altered lightly.

Meanwhile, domestic causes eroded the Soviet Union. Soviet oppression alienated satellites that felt an asymmetry between their interests and those of their great power sponsor. As in the case of Sweden-Norway, when unifying threats decrease in intensity and symmetry, states become more susceptible to disassembly. Local elites began challenging Soviet rule and creating crises, which eventually opened the door to successful independence movements. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* gave more media advantage to pro-independence advocates and when the USSR declined to use force to quiet unrest, unofficial and official dissolution began. Obviously, there is much I telescope and much detail that my argument does not account for. Still, beyond this, the

Soviet case does not fit my scope conditions; it was an involuntary union between unequals. Here I only aspire to offer a *prima facie* claim that some elements of my argument may explain some of the Soviet Union's demise.

A similar claim may be advanced with regard to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the territories of Yugoslavia did not face a unifying foreign threat and domestic conditions were favorable for strife (see, for example, de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999). By manipulating the marketplace of ideas and the military, political elites played off their new conditions to stoke a security crisis and precipitate disunion. The result was greater independence for Yugoslavia's constituent parts, but at a price of greater insecurity and horrible bloodshed.

Relatedly, we ought to beg the question of why there is a unipolar world. If unions can only cohere when there is countervailing pressure, then the United States has no business existing. It has an entire hemisphere to itself, it is protected by two massive moats, and it is much more powerful than any other state or coalition that opposes it. Part of the answer is institutional inertia – discarding institutions that have served superbly in the past and may do so again in the foreseeable future would be insanity. A united Europe and/or a strong China are on the American foreign policy horizon, and are sufficiently threatening to sustain union for decades.

Should these threats fail to materialize and nothing comparable take their place, the United States will become increasingly less united. Indeed, one can argue that we are witnessing the beginning of this process. Following a period of post-Cold War confusion, the American electorate has grown more and more polarized. The United States is the most powerful empire since Rome, but that analogy has a dark side. “Red”

versus “blue” Americans evokes “blue” versus “green” Romans, and the divisions that split the Roman Empire. After Rome crushed its last peer competitor, Carthage, it continued on inertially for several decades, its factions growing ever-deeper until a series of security crises and cataclysmic civil wars shook Rome for generations. The Roman Empire held together for an impressive length of time, but only with a staggering amount of bloodshed and the establishment of the Eastern Empire. No threat, no union, and Gibbon’s defining work on Rome’s fall reaches the same conclusion.

B. Modern Unions

My argument does not augur well for further integration of the European Union.² My thoughts on European integration, however, pertain mostly to the relative equal states at its core: Germany, France, Italy, and Britain, and so I have little to say about peripheral participants. The closest parallels in this study suggest that Europe’s past most resembled Australian union and its future will resemble Sweden-Norway’s past. At first, the United States impelled Europe to integrate, the better to keep the Soviets out and the Germans down. But the United States was ambivalent about European power; it wanted a counterweight to potential Soviet expansion, but it did not want to forge a future peer competitor to American might. The preferred solution was an integrated Europe that was not unified, and that is what the United States got. After *détente*, the United States needed Europe as a counterweight even less. The American pacifier (Joffe 1984), though

² For some of the best works on the European Union, see Lundestad 1997; Parsons 2003; Nugent 1999; Sidjanski 2000; Rosato 2003; Trachtenberg 1999; Mattli 1999; Moravcsik 1998; Herman, Risse, and Brewer eds. 2004. See also Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2000; Fransen 2001; Farrell et al. eds. 2001; L. Goldstein 2001; Haas 1970; Henderson 2005; M. Holmes 2001; Kupchan 2004-2005; T. Lindberg ed. 2005; L. Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold eds. 1971; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; McInnes 1992; Menon and Wright eds. 2001; Newman 1996; Pollack 2003; Winn and Lord 2001.

annoying, does not threaten to alter European borders or permit states to harbor the illusion that conquest might pay. Like Britain in Australia, the United States transforms Europe's security environment and makes it much harder for the forces of internally impelled unification to happen.

There has been a frequent discussion of current problems with the European constitution. France has of late rejected it and called the document's future into question. Along with much hand wringing, union proponents have blamed rejection on a host of factors: a lack of transparency, accountability, and distributional worries. Advocates are not satisfied with monetary union. Jacques Delors, a former European Commission president, said "We're not here just to make a single market, that doesn't interest me, but to make a political union."³ If that is so, he is likely to be disappointed. Under present conditions, no constitution would unify Europe. Without a unification worthy threat, one that neither the U.S. nor Russia poses, even if all the transparency, accountability, and distributional concerns were expertly resolved, Europeans would still reject political union because it is unnecessary. There is as yet no compelling reason for Europeans to surrender further autonomy.

States, I contend, do not balance against economic or cultural threats, they balance against security threats, and the United States is rather benign as hegemons go. In short, neither the United States, nor imploded Russia, nor any other state or combination of states appears close to constituting the optimally intense, indefinite, symmetrical threat necessary for union. And even should a unifying threat appear, the United States could still thwart union by using its influence to prevent the neighborly

³ Quoted in *The Economist* 10 September 2005, 52.

nudges necessary to effect unification. So long as the United States is committed to pacifying Europe, we will continue to see European elites flailing ineffectually for unity.

A digression is necessary. European balancing raises larger questions about what states balance against. Let me be clear about what I am not saying; I am not saying that the United States should pull out of Europe. I am not saying Europe will not balance against the United States. I am saying that Europe will not politically unify to face external threats until core states face an optimally intense, indefinite, symmetrical threat and elites can persuade the requisite states to join the new union. Since the United States has no territorial ambitions in Europe, militarily balancing against the U.S. is an inappropriate response. The United States and Europe may have cultural and economic disagreements, but these disputes are better handled through cultural and economic channels. Of course these categories are not hermetically sealed from each other, and I am open to the idea that the decreasing strategic importance of taking and holding land may mean that other assets are worth going to war. Yet with the costs and risks of war between industrialized states, threatening war over trade or cultural policy seems incredible – the game is not worth the candle.

A related issue is whether unification must happen in response to a state. For example, there is talk that European integration can proceed, not because of fear of the Soviets or American hegemony, but out of the fear of another major European war. Another way of phrasing the issue is that autonomous states – especially Germany – in Europe would sooner or later become embroiled in another catastrophic war; avoiding this is the task of political integration. Unification would then be an extreme act of collective self-binding or threat tethering (see Weitsman 1997). I am skeptical of this

argument but do not dismiss it out of hand. States balance against threats and there is no logical reason that threats cannot be entities other than states, e.g. natural disasters, asteroids, or war.

I find the “war as unifying threat” thesis unlikely for a number of reasons. To begin with, I know of no historical precedent of it. And while one might be found it is unwise to bet against long odds. Non-state threats, such as those listed above, are transient evils and lack the indefinite duration necessary for unification efforts to be successful. Moreover, states, like people, are prone to viewing themselves as basically benign and competent and are therefore unlikely to have the will or ability to bind themselves. In addition, states, like people, are liable – paraphrasing Jacques Barzun (2001, xx, 142) – to the whirligig of boredom and fatigue. Throughout history attitudes toward war have inverted, swinging from horror to eagerness and back within a generation.

But a simpler answer may be that states are generally rational and are willing to take the chance of war as the price for greater freedom of action. Unifying states appreciate that war between them is less likely, but I have found no case where that motive was unaccompanied by great fear of an invading state. States regularly deplore war and could at any time politically unify to squelch the risk of fighting, which would, if carried to its logical conclusion, ultimately produce a world state. That we have never seen anything near a world state is not encouraging for the thesis under investigation.

My skepticism has greatest relevance at the conventional level of warfare; nuclear weapons may radically undermine the above logic. It is hard to assess the impact of nuclear weapons on unification since they are so seldom threatened. The invention of

nuclear weaponry has correlated with increases in the number of states in the world, and this is true even in areas where there are nuclear powers, like Europe and the former Soviet Union. So there is a case to be made that a nuclear world is not hospitable to unification efforts. How far nuclear weapons, or anticipatory effects of them, are to blame is a subject outside my ken, but preliminary empirics do not support the hypothesis that the increasing destructiveness of war leads to political unification.

For similar reasons, terrorism is an improbable threat to cause greater political unification. Terrorism is increasing in frequency but remains a rare and it certainly has not killed in the numbers that war between states does. Further, it is not clear that political union would be an appropriate counter to the threat that terrorism poses. States may boost the cooperation between their counter-terrorism efforts, but though it may be durable enough, terrorism is not an intense enough or symmetrical enough threat. For this reason, we have seen no elite talk of political union as an answer to the problem of terrorism, in spite of no shortage of crisis triggers.

Returning from the digression, Central America is also attempting to walk down the European path for an “ever closer union.” There have been attempts at political union in Central America since at least the mid-1820s (see Karnes 1961). And if my argument is correct, such attempts will continue to fail into the foreseeable future. Although the case does fit within my scope – it is an unequal collection of states – Central America cannot hope to balance against the United States and so fashioning a balancing coalition would be futile. The states of Central America may find it expedient to form a customs union, and the Central American Free-Trade Agreement indicates interest in such an undertaking. Yet political union means centralizing foreign policy and tools of coercion,

and Central American states have been too worried about Guatemalan domination to institute union. It is conceivable that the United States could energetically encourage union between Central American states, and, like Britain and Australia, the United States probably has the political leverage to make union a real possibility. However, it is hard to imagine circumstances where the U.S. would expend political capital to effect Central American union. This is not to say that further integration between Central American states is not a worthy goal, only that political union is out of reach for some time.

ASEAN is yet another instance of anticipated integration, and here too political union is improbable.⁴ Two factors make union difficult: lack of intensity and symmetry. China is the most compelling threat in Asia, and its rising power and border disputes have raised anxieties. However, China has yet to develop sufficient power projection capability to overcome local and American resistance, and China's attention appears to be absorbed by Taiwan and managing the urban/rural tensions caused by fast growth. The American pacifier again obviates the need for increased regional cooperation. Also, several ASEAN members are islands, an excellent source of asymmetry. Getting these states to see themselves as painted into the same corner would take a far more expansive threat than China can soon pose.

Lastly, there are the tenuous unions that currently attract the most attention: Iraq and Afghanistan. Clearly, these cases do not fit within the scope conditions of the work; their internal divisions are not approximately equal and their unions are imposed under the aegis of an occupying force. Nevertheless, I would like to venture modest policy recommendations with respect to these two countries. There has been much discussion

⁴ On ASEAN, see Antolik 1990; Beeson ed. 2004; Bessho 1999; Gill 1997; Henderson 1999; Leifer 1989; Mahapatra 1990; Scalapino and Wanandi 1982; Taylor ed. 1996.

on the constitution writing process, and though I do not mean to disparage constitutions, I would like to indicate potential pitfalls of a constitutional focus. First, I suspect that some of the constitutional hullabaloo comes from a misunderstanding of the American Constitution. In the United States, the Constitution is so revered that Americans are tempted to export the importance of their constitution to other places. But the conditions that produced the U.S. Constitution are amazingly different from those facing Iraqi and Afghani elites. It remains to be seen how long and how large the American commitment to these states will be, but sooner or later American soldiers will depart and its largesse will constrict. When that happens, its daughter states had better face unifying threats or state building labors are destined to unravel.

Even were conditions the same, Americans have incorrectly learned the lessons of their own constitution. They assume that smart people, gathered in a room for a few months, can scrawl an ingenious document that slices through Gordian knots. Indeed, Americans are extremely fortunate to have the constitution they do, but as detailed at length earlier, the ratification of the Constitution is hardly a Triumph of Reason. It took very specific circumstances, sage bargaining, and highly adept politicking to ratify. In short, if Americans are to build other nations, their expectations about the sordid process and high costs of unification need to be more realistic.

IV. Conclusion

I have argued that unification between equals is a matter of opportunity, fortune, and virtue. Through four case studies, the argument found strong support, trying in the

process to shed new theoretical light and tread new empirical ground. If correct, the argument is critical of all the major paradigms, highlights avenues for future research, and bears significant policy relevance. And yet, the argument may still be thought a letdown, a killjoy, an emotional disenchantment. Let us entertain another view.

No story is liable to be more honeyed than the story of a nation's beginnings. This work has argued that national origins are somewhat earthier, and are the product of foreign influence, propaganda, force, and turbulent domestic politics. While this may offend our cherished ideals, it need not. We are surrounded by oceans of relationships made possible by political unification, and silk is no less beautiful because it comes from worms. A less illusioned understanding of union retains ample romance, and it is certainly preferable to the alternative: neglecting the causes of union comes at the cost of unnecessary violence. In closing, the potential reward of this work is to subvert Santayana.⁵ Those who cannot remember the past cannot selectively repeat it.

⁵ 1954, 82.